A Simulation Model of
Katouzian’s Theory of Arbitrary
State and Society
Saeed P. Langarudi
Michael J. Radzicki
System Dynamics Colloquium
University at Albany, State University of New York
April 17, 2015
Introduction
• Why is Katouzian’s theory important?
• Why should we model it?
2
Homa Katouzian
 Studied Economics in the U.K.:

University of Birmingham (1967)

University of London (1968)

University of Kent at Canterbury (1984)
 Taught economics in Britain, Iran, Canada, and the US (1968-1986).
 Worked as an economic consultant with the Organization of American
States, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1968-1986).
 Faculty of Oriental Studies and the Iran Heritage Research Fellow at St.
Antony's College, University of Oxford.
 Editor of the bimonthly Iranian Studies, the Journal of the International
Society for Iranian Studies.
 Former member of the Editorial Board of Comparative Studies of South
Asia, Africa and the Middle East and Comparative Economic Studies.
3
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
External Reference Modes
Source: Bharier (1971, 59)
Source: online portal of Iran’s Central Bank (CBI 2014)
Iranian GNP (1900-1960)
Iranian GNP (1960-2010)
Abdication of Reza Shah (1941)
Revolution (1979)
1900
4
SIS/CIA
coup d'état
against Mossadegh (1953)
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
External Reference Modes
Sliced reference mode
of behavior of Iranian
GNP:
A valid theory of Iranian
socio-economic
development should be
able to replicate this
mode of behavior.
5
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
External Reference Modes
•
Economists’ solutions:
─
Separation of pre-revolution and
post-revolution eras e.g. (Pesaran
Pre-revolution
2000)
Post-revolution
─
Introducing dummy variables to their
models e.g. (Esfahani et al. 2013)
─
Verbal description of negative
influence of socio-political instability
on economy e.g. (Esfahani and
Pesaran 2009)
6
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Mashayekhi’s Model of Iranian Economic Growth (Mashayekhi 1978)
Mashayekhi’s model
20 M
generates the same
behavior as the
15 M
reference mode but it
relates the stagnation
phase to depletion of oil
reserves which has not
happened yet.
1
1
10 M
1
1
1
5M
1
1
1
1
1
0 1
2
1958
gnp :GNP:
Current
1 2
1
1
2
1966
1
1
2
2
1974
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1982
1990
1998
Time (Year)
Oil Revenue:
2
oilrev : Current
2
2
2006
2
2
2
Source: Simulation results of Mashayekhi’s model (Langarudi and Radzicki 2013)
7
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Why Katouzian’s Theory?
• Katouzian’s theory uniquely explains periods of
stagnation and growth in Iranian socio-politicaleconomic system.
• By modeling this theory:
─ we provide a formal basis to test its internal consistency.
─ we can design and perform scenario/policy analyses.
─ we can improve the theory in particular directions if it is
needed.
8
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Katouzian’s Theory of
Arbitrary State and Society
•
•
9
Internal reference mode
Model structure
Model Structure
10
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Internal Reference Mode
Reference modes of
behavior of Iranian
socio-political system
described by Katouzian:
The Katouzian model
should be able to
replicate this mode of
behavior.
Chaos:
Political Power:
11
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Katouzian Model
mps
-
+
saving rate
+
Chaos
-
-
change in
chaos
+
change in
+ respect
for law
embryonic
respect for law
-
Society
Savings
perceived
confiscation
fraction
+
+
society
investment
Respect
For Law
corruption
Average
Public
Utility
-
confiscation
fraction
+
society
capital
formation
++
+ +
+
society
resources
effect of
utility on
desired power
+
state control
efficiency
utility from
freedom
+
anger
accumulation
Public
Anger
state
controlling
power
+
+
output
+
+
desired spending
on chaos control
-
+
tax
revenue +
++
+
+
State
Capital
+
confiscation
state
resources +
+
state capital
formation
+
+
state
revenues
probability
of uprising
+
power
accumulation
power
depletion Political
Power
+
oil
+
revenue
State Capital
Under
Construction
+
tax
rate
forgetting
rate
+
+
+
+
+ desired
power
+
change in
utility
+ public
utility
+
-
+
12
utility from
corruption
freedom
-
Socity
Capital
- embryionic
chaos
-
utility
from chaos
disposable
income +
Society
Capital Under
Construction
+
desired power
from chaos
+
utility
from
income
state
investment
+
State
Reserve
+
+
reserve
coverage
-
state
+ expenditure
-
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Base Run of the
Katouzian Model
13
Base Run Simulation
Total Economic Output
9000
1
6750
$/Year
1
1
1
4500
1
1
1
1
2250
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
14
20
40
60
80
100 120
Time (Year)
140
160
180
200
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Base Run Simulation
3 Dmnl
.8 Dmnl
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
1.5 Dmnl
.4 Dmnl
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
0 Dmnl
0 Dmnl
0
20
1
Chaos : Base
Political Power : Base
15
40
1
60
1
2
2
2
80
1
2
100 120
Time (Year)
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
140
1
2
160
1
2
180
1
2
1
2
2
200
Dmnl
Dmnl
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Model Validation
16
Validation Tests (Sterman 2000, Chapter 21)
Boundary adequacy
Structure assessment
Dimensional consistency
Parameter assessment
Extreme conditions
Integration error
Behavior reproduction
Behavior anomalies
Family member
Surprise behavior
Sensitivity analysis
System improvement
17
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Validation Tests (Sterman 2000, Chapter 21)
Boundary adequacy
Structure assessment
Dimensional consistency
Parameter assessment
Extreme conditions
Integration error
Behavior reproduction
Behavior anomalies
Family member
Surprise behavior
Sensitivity analysis
System improvement
18
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Boundary Adequacy
• Semi-exogenous variable:
─ Oil Revenue
• Important missing structures:
─ Socio-economic inequalities
─ Demographic dynamics
19
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Sensitivity Analysis: Parameter Variations
Parameter
Capital Formation Delay
Capital Life
Capital Output Ratio
Cost per Chaos
Initial Anger
Initial Chaos
Initial Corruption
Initial Power
Initial Reserve
Initial Respect for Law
Initial Society Capital under Construction
Initial Society Savings
Initial Society Capital
Initial State Capital Under Construction
Initial State Capital
Initial Utility
Investment Fraction
MAX Confiscation Fraction
Perception Time
Regulation Delay
Reserve Coverage Time
Society Memory
Time to Change Chaos
Time to Change Power
Time to Change Respect for Law
Time to Change Utility
Time to Corrupt
Time to Forget
Time to Smooth Probability of Uprising
20
Min
Base
Max
Unit
3
5
20
15
2.5
50
-0.2
0.3
0.4
0.2
500
0.01
500
500
500
500
500
-0.2
0.1
0.1
3
1
10
3
3
3
20
3
3
20
10
22
3
100
0.1
0.5
0.5
0.5
1,000
0.05
2,000
2,000
5,000
1,000
1,000
0.1
0.3
0.3
5
2
15
5
5
10
30
5
5
30
15
30
3.5
200
0.2
1
0.6
0.8
10,000
0.1
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
0.2
0.4
0.4
10
5
30
7
10
12
40
10
10
40
20
Year
Year
Year
$/Year
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
$
Dmnl
$
$
$
$
$
Dmnl
1/Year
Dmnl
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Sensitivity Analysis: 5800 Univariate Simulations
Confidence Levels:
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
50%
50%
75%
75% 90%
90% 100%
100%
50%
75%
90%
100%
50%
50%50% 75%
75%75% 90%
90%90% 100%
100%
100%
disposable
disposable
income
income
disposable income
disposable
disposable
disposable
income
income
income
70,000
70,000
70,000
70,000
70,000
70,000
90%
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Disposable Income
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
50%
50%
75%
75% 90%
90% 100%
100%
disposable
income
50%
75%
90%
100%
50%
50%50% 75%
75%
75% 90%
90%
90%100%
100%
100%
Political
Political
Power
Power
Political
Power
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
.9 .9 .9
.9 .9 .9
70,000
Political Power
100%
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
50%
50%
75%
75%90%
100%
50%
75%
90%90%100%
100%
50%50%
50%75%75%
75%90%90%
90%100%
100%
100%
Respect
Respect
For
Law
For
Law
Respect For Law
Respect
Respect
Respect
For Law
For
For
Law
Law
.9 .9 .9
.9 .9 .9
Respect for Law
52,500
52,500
52,500
52,500
52,500
52,500
.675
.675
.675
.675
.675.675
.675
.675
.675
.675.675
.675
35,000
35,000
35,000
35,000
35,000
35,000
.45.45.45
.45.45 .45
.45.45.45
.45 .45.45
.225
.225
.225
52,500
.225
.225.225
17,500
17,500
17,500
17,500
17,500
17,500
0 00
00 0 000
00
0
50 50
50
50
50 50
100100
100
100
100
100
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
TimeTime
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
150150
150
150
150150
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
50%
50%
75%
75% 90%
90% 100%
100%
50%
75%
90%
100%
50%
50%50% 75%
75%75% 90%
90%90% 100%
100%
100%
corruption
corruption
corruption
corruption
corruption
corruption
.8
.8 .8
Corruption
.8
.8
200200
200
200
200200
0 00
0 00 0 0
00 0
.225
.225
.225
.225.225
.225
50 5050
5050 50
100100100
100
100
100
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
(Year)
150150150
150150150
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
50%
50%
75%
75% 90%
90% 100%
100%
50%
75%
90%
100%
50%
50%50% 75%
75%
75% 90%
90%
90% 100%
100%
100%
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
6
6
6
Chaos
6 6
0 0 0
200200200 0 0 0 00 0
0 0 0
200200
200
.5 .5 .5
.6 .6.6
.6
.6 .6
4.54.54.5
4.54.5 4.5
.25.25.25
.25 .25.25
.4 .4.4
.4
.4 .4
3 3 3
3 3 3
0 0 0
0 0 0
17,500
1.51.51.5
1.51.5 1.5
50 50
50
50
50 50
100100
100
100
100
100
Time
(Year)
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
Time
TimeTime
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
150150
150
150
150150
200200
200
200
200200
0 0 0
0 00 00 0
0 0 0
100100100
150150 150
100
100
100
150
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year) 150 150
Time
(Year)
TimeTime
(Year)
Time(Year)
(Year)
200200 200
200 200
200
Public Utility
6
0 00
00 0 000
00
0
50 50 50
50 5050
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
Sensitivity
50%
50%
75%
75%90%
100%
50%
75%
90%90%100%
100%
50%50%
50%75%75%
75%90%90%
90%100%
100%
100%
public
public
utility
utility
public
utility
public
public
public
utility
utility
utility
.5
.5
.5
35,000
.8
.2 .2.2
.2
.2 .2
21
Sensitivity
50%
75%
-.25-.25-.25
-.25 -.25
-.25
50 5050
50 50 50
100100
100
100
100
100
Time
(Year)
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
Time
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
(Year)
150150150
150150
150
-.5 -.5 -.5
0 0
200200200 -.5 -.5
0 -.5
200200
200
0 0 0
50 50 50
50 5050
100100100
150150 150
100
100
100
150
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year) 150 150
TimeTime
(Year)
Time(Year)
(Year)
200200 200
200 200
200
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Sensitivity Analysis: 200 Multivariate Simulation
Sensitivity
50%
75%
90%
disposable income
111,300
83,490
55,660
27,830
0
22
0
50
100
Time (Year)
150
200
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Validation Tests (Sterman 2000, Chapter 21)
Boundary adequacy
Structure assessment
Dimensional consistency
Parameter assessment
Extreme conditions
Integration error
Behavior reproduction
Behavior anomalies
Family member
Surprise behavior
Sensitivity analysis
System improvement
23
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Validation Tests (Sterman 2000, Chapter 21)
Boundary adequacy
Structure assessment
Dimensional consistency
Parameter assessment
Extreme conditions
Integration error
Behavior reproduction
Behavior anomalies
Family member
Surprise behavior
Sensitivity analysis
System improvement
24
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Validation Tests (Sterman 2000, Chapter 21)
Boundary adequacy
Structure assessment
Dimensional consistency
Parameter assessment
Extreme conditions
Integration error
Behavior reproduction
Behavior anomalies
Family member
Surprise behavior
Sensitivity analysis
System improvement
25
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Altering Some Key
Assumptions
26
Base Run Assumptions
Initial values and
the variation range
of the variables for
Base run
simulation
27
Variable
Initial
Value
Potential
Variation
Minimum
Maximum
Interpretation
Unit
Political Power
0.50
0.00
1.00
Moderate
Dmnl
Chaos
0.50
0.00
+∞
Moderate
Dmnl
Public Anger
0.10
−∞
+∞
Low
Util
Public Utility
0.10
-1.00
1.00
Low
Util/Year
Corruption
0.50
0.00
1.00
Moderate
Dmnl
Respect for Law
0.05
0.00
1.00
Very Low
Dmnl
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Alternative Assumption
Initial value of “Respect
for Law” changed from
0.05 in the base case
to 0.20 in the
alternative simulation.
Variable
Initial
Value
Potential
Variation
Minimum
Maximum
Interpretation
Unit
Political Power
0.50
0.00
1.00
Moderate
Dmnl
Chaos
0.50
0.00
+∞
Moderate
Dmnl
Public Anger
0.10
−∞
+∞
Low
Util
Public Utility
0.10
-1.00
1.00
Low
Util/Year
Corruption
0.50
0.00
1.00
Moderate
Dmnl
Respect for Law
0.05
0.00
1.00
Very Low
Dmnl
0.20
28
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Simulation with Higher Initial Respect for Law
Base Case:
Higher Initial Respect for Law:
Disposable
Disposable
Disposable
Income
Income
Income
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
90,000
90,000
90,000
.8.8 .8
90,000
90,000
90,000
22
2
22
2
.8.8 .8
1 12 2 1 22 2
22,500
22,500
22,500
22
22 2 22 2
1 22 1 12
1 1 11 1 11
11022 1 121 22 1 12
22
2
22
2
2
2
22
2
22
2
22
2 22
2
22
2
45,000
45,000
45,000
22
2
11
.6.6 11.6
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
$/Year
$/Year
$/Year
$/Year
$/Year
45,000
45,000
45,000
22
11
2
11
1
22 112
1
1
1
11
22
Respect
Respect
for
for
Respect
forLaw
LawLaw
11
1
11
1
11
1
11
1
22
22
2
22
2
22
2
2
22
22
22
22 2
1
11
2
11
.3.3 .3
1
22
2
22
2
1
1
11
1
11
1
2
22
2
22
2
22
2
.3.3 .3
22
22
2
.2.2 .2
22
2
11
.1.1 1 1.1
00 0
11 1
00 0 20
20 2040
40 4060
60 6080
80 80
100
100100
120
120 120
140
140 140
160
160 160
180
180 180
200
200 200
00 0
Time
TimeTime
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
00
0
2
222
2
22
2
11
11 1
111
1
11
1
1
11
11
22 2
2
22
2
22
2
22
2
2
22
1
11
1
11
11
11
22
11
1
1
1
22
22 2
2
22
2
11
1
00
22
11
1
1
11
2
11
11
1
22
2
22
.1.1 .1
1
11
22
2
22
2
22
.2.2 .2
1
22
2
22
.4.4 .4
2
11
11
11
.4.4 .4
2
2
11
.2.2 .2
111
2
1
.2.2 .2
1 11 22 1 11
2 1 11 1
22 2
00 0 20
20 2040
40 4060
60
60
80
80
80
100
100
100
120
120
120
140
140140
160
160160
180
180180
200
2
2
2
11200
1 200
00 11022 1 12122 1 12122 1 12122 1 121 Time
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 111 111 1
1Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
22
2
2 2 1 2122 1 2
.4.4 .4
1
2
11 1
22 2
.4.4 .4
111
22
2
22
11
1 22
22
2
2
2
.6.6 .62 2
67,500
67,500
67,500
00
11
1 2
1122 1 222
11 1
22
67,500
67,500
67,500
22,500
22,500
22,500
Respect
Respect
Respect
for
forLaw
for
LawLaw
Political
Political
Power
Power
Political
Power
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Disposable
Disposable
Income
Income
Disposable
Income
1
11
11
11
1
1
11
1
1
11
111
1
11
1
1
1
2
1 12 2 1 2
1
1
020
20 20
40
40 40
60
60 608080 80
100
100 100
120
120 120
140
140 140
160
160 160
180
180 180
200
200 200
00 0
Time
Time(Year)
Time
(Year)
(Year)
00income
0 income
20
40
4060
80
801100
160
180
200
0Political
0Power
2020Power
20
40
406060 160
120
180
200
0Respect
0For
2020
2040
40
100
120
180
200
20 :20
40
60
120
140
160
180
0 Power
40: Base
8011180100
100
160
180
0 For
40
60 160
80111 80
100
160
180
1
1 60
11
180 1
11001100
11120
1120
11 140
1 11140
111160
1
11 180
1200200 Political
1 80
111 100
11120
1 120
11140
11401140
11160
111160
111 180
1200200 Respect
180
111 100
11120
1 120
1140
1114011140
1160
111160
111 180
1200 200
disposable
disposable
disposable
income
:Base
Base
: Base
Political
: :Base
Base
Respect
Law
Law
For
:Law
Base
: Base
:60
Base
Time
(Year)
(Year)
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
22
2(Year)
22(Year)
2 22 2 22 2 22 222 222 2
22
222 Time
222Time
222 (Year)
222
222
222
222
222
2
222 (Year)
222 (Year)
222
222
222
222
222
2
disposable
disposable
disposable
income
income
income
::HIRL
HIRL
: HIRL 22 2Time
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
: :HIRL
HIRL
: HIRL
Respect
Respect
Respect
For
ForLaw
Law
For :Law
HIRL
: HIRL
: HIRL2 2 Time
disposable
disposable
income
income
::Base
: Base11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 111 111 111 1
Political
Political
Power
Power
: Base
: Base 1 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 1
Respect
Respect
For
For
Base
: Base1 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 1
disposable
income
Base
Political
Power
: Base
Respect
ForLaw
Law:Law
: Base
22 Corruption
2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 222 222 2
2 2 22 2Chaos
22 2Chaos
22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 2
2 2 Public
22 Utility
22 2Utility
22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2
2
disposable
disposable
income
income
::HIRL
: HIRLCorruption
Political
Political
Power
Power
: HIRL
: HIRL
Respect
Respect
For
For
HIRL
: HIRL
2 Utility
Corruption
Chaos
Public
Public
disposable
income
HIRL
Political
Power
: HIRL
Respect
ForLaw
Law:Law
: HIRL
.7.7 .7
11
.525
.525.525
Dmnl
Dmnl
11
1
.525
.525
.525
.35
.35 .35
11
11
11
1
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
2
22
2
11
2
2 2
11
11
11
1
2
22
2
2
11 22 1 2
1122 1 222
22 2
1
2
11
22
11
1
222
2
11
2
2.25
2.25
2.25
1.5
1.5 1.5
1
11
1
11
29
0
11
1 11
1
corruption
corruption
corruption
::HIRL
HIRL
: HIRL22
222
2
00 0 20
120
140
160
180
200
20 2040
40 4060
60 6080
80 80100
100100
120120
140140
160160
180180
200200
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
Time
(Year)
11
22
2
2
1 22
11
1
22 112
2
11
22
1
222
1
11
1
1
1
11
1
11
1
11
1
222
11
1
22
2
22
2
11
1
11
1
1
11
1
1122 1 2
2
22
11
1
22
2
2
11
1
1
11
1
Time
TimeTime
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
Chaos
Chaos
::Base
Base
0Chaos
0 : Base11
0
111
111
1
22
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
: :HIRL
HIRL
: HIRL
22
11
2
.15
.15
.15
00 0
22
22
-.3
-.3-.15
-.3
-.15
-.15
00
1
1
11
11
22
222
2
1
020
40
1 20
1 40
1 20
11
222
22
2
11
1
12 2
2
2
22
2
22
2
22
2
11
22 2
11
1
11
22
222
1
1
11
2
22
1 12 2 1 2
22
0 0-.150
-.15
-.15
11
22
11
1
1 12 2 1 2
22 12 1
1 12 2 1 2
1
22 2
22 2
2
2
2
22 20240
21802180
2 280
2160
2 180
0102 2 0120
20
40 4060
60 60
802280
100
100
120
120
140
140 140
160
200
200 200
2 100
2 2 120
2 160
2
1
2 22
00 .750
.75
.75
1
00 0 20
20 2040
40 40
60
60 6080
80 80100
100100
120
120120
140
140140
160
160160
180
180180
200
200200
11 1
Time
TimeTime
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
corruption
corruption
corruption
Base
: Base
0 0 ::Base
22
11
1
11
11
1.5
.75
.75
.75
1.5 1.5
1
11
2
22
11
.15
.15 .15
11
1
Public
Public
Utility
Utility
Public
Utility
1
.3.3 .3
2.25
2.252.25
2
11
11
1
33 3
1
1
2
22 112
22
22
22
2
2
1
11
2
1
1
2
22
2
11
22
22
22
22
1
1
2
1
22
00.1750 2
.175
.175
2
11
1
11
11
121
11
1
1
22
.35
.3522
.175
.175
.35.175
22
1
.3.3 .3
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
1
Util/YearUtil/Year
Util/Year Util/Year
Util/YearUtil/Year
1
11
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
11
33 3
Corruption
Corruption
Corruption
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
.7
.7 .7
1
22
12
22
1
11
2
22
2
111
22
2
22
2
11
1
1
11
1
2
22
2
22
2
11
1
1
1
1 80
1200
1
1160
40
60
601 160
8080
100
100 100
120
120 1120
140
160 160
180
180 180
200
1 200
11401140
11 1
2
public
public
utility
utility
: Base
: Base
: Base1 1
-.3public
-.3 utility
Time
Time(Year)
Time
(Year)
(Year)
11
1
22
public
public
public
utility
utility:utility
HIRL
: HIRL
: HIRL
222
2
-.3
Worcester
Polytechnic
Institute
0 0 02020 20
40
6060 60
8080 80
100
120
140
160
180
200
40 40
100100
120 120
140 140
160 160
180 180
200 200
00 02020 204040 406060 608080 80
100
120
140
160
180
200
100100
120120
140140
160160
180180
200200
Time
(Year)
(Year)
TimeTime
(Year)
Time
Time
(Year)
Time(Year)
(Year)
Resource Abundance Dilemma
• Natural resource abundance is negatively correlated with
economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001).
• Natural resource curse does not exist—resource abundance
positively affects economic growth (Brunnschweiler 2008;
Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008).
• No clear-cut answer in the empirical literature as to whether
natural resource abundance is a blessing or a curse (Stijns
2005).
• lively debates over the impact of resource abundance on a
society’s political regime (Karl 1997; Ross 1999; 2001;
2008; Basedau and Lacher 2006; Brunnschweiler 2008;
Aslaksen 2010; Cesari 2011; Tsui 2011).
30
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Simulation without Oil Revenue
8000
8000
Oil Revenue Excluded
Disposable
Disposable
Income
Income
Political
Political
Power
Power
Disposable Income
Political Power
.8
Disposable
Disposable
Disposable
Income
Income
Income
8000
.8
8000
80008000
6000 6000
1
1 2
1 2
1
12
1
1
1
$/Year$/Year
6000
60006000
4000 4000
1
.6
1
1
1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
21
2
4000
2 2
2
1
1 1
2 2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1 12 2 1 1 1 2
4000
400040001 2 1 1 212 211 1 21 21 21122 1 221 2
1 2
1
2 2 2
2 1 2
2
122
2000 1 2000
1 1 1
2 2 22 2 2
2000 1 2 1
2 2 2 1 21 2 1 2
2 2 2
21 2 1 2 1 21 2 1 2
1
1
1
1
1 12 12 2 22 2 2
2
2
1 1 1
1 1 1
2 2 2
2000
20002000
1 1
1
2 2 12
1
1
1
1
.6 .6 .6
.4 1 1.4 1
2
2
2
2
Dmnl Dmnl
DmnlDmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
1
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power 1 2
2
2
1
.8 .8 2 .8 2 1 1
2 2 2
.6
.62 1 1 12
6000
$/Year
$/Year
$/Year
$/Year
.8
.4
1 1
.4 .4 .4
.2
.2
2
.2
1
2
2
21 2
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
2 2 2
1
1
1
Respect
Respect
Respect
for
forfor
Law
Law
Law
1
1
2 1 2
2
.15
1
.15
.15.15
.1
.1
2
.1.1 .1 2
.05 1 .05
22
1 1 1
1
.05
2
1
.1
1
2 2 2
1
2
2 2 2
1 1 1
2
2
Respect for Law
.2
.2.2 .2
.15 .15
2 1
1
2
Respect
Respect
for Law
for Law
.2
2
1
2 11 21 2 1 2
1 1 1
1 1
2
2
12
2
1
1
1
2
21 2
2
2
2 2 2
1 12 11
1
2 2
1
.2
2
1
Dmnl Dmnl
DmnlDmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Base Case:
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
11 1
2 2 12
2
21
1
2
2
11 1
22 2
1
1
2
1 1 12
12 2 2
2
21
1
1
11 1
1
2
2
2
21 2 2
1
11 1
22 2
1
11 1
11 1
2
2
2
1
21
11 1
1
1
1
1
2
2 2 12
2
2
1
1
22 2 1
22 2
2
2
11 1
22 2
22 2
11 1
2
1
1
2
21
1
2
2 2 12 1 12
1
1
1
2
1
11 1
1
1
2
2
21 1 1
.2 .2 .2
.05
.05.05
11 1
2
21 2 2
1 1 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
2 2 2
1 1
2 2180
2
0 0 20020402040604060 806080100
80100120
100
120
140
160
180
0 0 200 20 40
20401 60
4060 80
60 80 100
80100120
100120120
140140160
140160
160
200200200
0 0 20
0 20 20
4040 40
6060 60
8080 100
80100100
120
140
160
180
200
120140
140160
160180
180200
200 200
180180
120120
140140
160160
180180
200200
TimeTime
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
0 0 0
00 0
00 0
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
0 income
0 income
20
0 20:income
40
20
40 :40
60
80180
801100
120
180
200
0 Political
0Power
020
20:Power
2040
40:40
60601 6018080
120
200
200 Respect
0Respect
0For
0For
20
20For
20:40
40
40: 60
6016018080
140
140
180
200
1 601 160
1 1120
1 120
1140
1 1140
1160
1 1160
1 180
1 1 180
1200200 Political
1 1 80
1100
1 1100
1 1120
1 140
1 1140
1140
1160
1 1160
1180
1 1180
1200
11 80
1100
1 100
11120
11140
11 160
1160
1 1180
11180
1200
disposable
disposable
Base
Base
Base
Base
Law
Base
Law
Base
1 1100
1 1 100
1 140
1160
1100
1 120
1 160
1180
1 100
1 120
1 120
1
1 160
1 200
disposable
: Base
Political
Power
: Base
Respect
Law
: Base
Time
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
2 2 2Time
22 2(Year)
2(Year)
22 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2Time
2 2 Time
2(Year)
2 2(Year)
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 22 2 2
2 2Time
22 Time
22 (Year)
disposable
disposable
income
:income
Non-Oil
: Non-Oil
Political
Political
Power
:Power
Non-Oil
: Non-Oil
Respect
Respect
ForFor
Law
For
: Non-Oil
Law
: Non-Oil
2 2(Year)
2(Year)
2 (Year)
2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 2
disposable
income
: Non-Oil
Political
Power
: Non-Oil
Respect
Law
: Non-Oil
1 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 1
disposable
disposable
disposable
income
income
income
: Base
: Base
: Base
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
: Base
: Base
: Base 1 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 1
Respect
Respect
Respect
For
ForLaw
For
Law
Law
: Base
: Base
: Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Corruption
2 2Corruption
2 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 2
2 Chaos
22 2Chaos
22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 2
2 2 Public
2 2 Utility
2 Utility
2 2 2Utility
222 222 2 22 2 22 2 22 2
disposable
disposable
disposable
income
income
income
: Non-Oil
: Non-Oil
: Non-Oil
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
: Non-Oil
: Non-Oil
: Non-Oil2 Chaos
Respect
Respect
Respect
For
ForLaw
For
Law
Law
: Non-Oil
: Non-Oil
: Non-Oil
Public
Corruption
Public
.7 .7 .7
.525.525.525
1
Dmnl
Dmnl
1
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
.525
.525
.35.5251
1
.35 1 .35
1
1
.35
.35
.175
.175 .175
2
21 1
2
2
1
1
2 2 2
1
11
1
2
1 1
1 2
1 2
12
1
2
1
2
3 3 3
2
1
1
2 2
2
21 1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2 2
1
1
1
2
2
33 3
2.252.252.25
1
2
1
2
2
1 1
1
2
2
1
1
2.25
2.252.25
1.5
1.5 1.5
1
1 1
2
1.51.5
.751.5 21
.75 2.75
2
1
1
2
2 2 2
1
1
1 1 1
.75.750.75
2 2 2
1
1 1
2 2
2
1
1
1
1
1 1
2 2
1
1 1
1
2
2
1
1 2 2 12
1
2
1
1
2
.3 .3 .3
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
2
1
2 2
21 1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2 2
1
21 1
2
2
2
1
1 1
2
2 2
1
1
1
1
2
2 2
1
2
.35 1 1
2 2
2
2
2 2 2
1 21 1 1
2
2
2
2
Corruption
Corruption
Corruption
2
1
1 2
1 2 2 121
1
2
1
2 2
1 22
2 1 1 12 1
1
1
2 2
2
2
2 2 2
1 1 1
12 2 2
2
1
2
.3.3 .3
.15.15 .15
2
1
1
21 1 1
2
1 1
2 1
1
1
22 2 2
1 1 1
1 1 1
2 2 2
1
2 1 1 21
2
1
2
21
2 2 2
Util/Year
Util/Year
Util/YearUtil/Year
Util/Year
Util/Year
2
1 2 1
12
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
.7 .7 .7
1
2
11 12 1
2
.15
.150.15
0 2 02
2
1 1 21
2
2 2
22 2
2
1
1
-.15 -.15
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
1 1 11
1
2 11
2
1 2
2
2
2
11
1 22
1 1 12
2
12
2
22 2
11 1
22 2
1
2 2
11 1
1 1 1
22 2
1
0 01 02 2
-.15
1 1
2 2
Public
Public
Public
Utility
Utility
2Utility
1
2
1
1
21 2 2 2 2
1 2 11 2 1
1
21 1
2
1
1 2
1
2 2 2
2 2 2
11 1
0.175
-.3
.175
.175
-.15
-.15
-.15
1 1 1
22 2
1 1 1
1 1 1
11 1
11 1
0
-.3 -.3
2 2 21200
1 1
2 2 180
2 12 21 2100 1201 12 140
0 0 20 401 21 2601 2 80 100 120 140 1602 21802 200
0 1 1201 40 60
160 180
21 2
240
1 1 40
0
200 4020 6040 8060 Time
100
80 (Year)
120
100 140
120 160
140 180
160 200
180 200 0 1 01 0 1 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
20
0 2 2 120
60 60
80 Time
100
80 (Year)
100
120 120
140 140
160 160
180 180
200 200
Time
(Year)
0
200 40
20 60
40 80
60 Time
100
80 (Year)
120
100 140
120 160
140 180
160 200
180 200 public
Time
0 0 0 : Base
-.3-.3-.3utility : Base
1
1 Time
1 (Year)
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 Time
1 (Year)
1 (Year)
1
1
1
1
1
corruption
Time
(Year)
21 120
21 1140
21160
21 180
2200
1
1
1 Time (Year)
2
2
2 180
2 1120
2 11140
2140
2 11160
2180
2200
0 0 :0Base
corruption
:0Non-Oil
Chaos
Chaos
: Non-Oil
public
: Non-Oil
12 60
1 60
12 80
1 12100
1 120
1 140
1 160
1 180
1200200
116080
1 802100
1100
1 100
1 120
11 160
11 180
1200
corruption
corruption
public
public
utility
Base
Base
0 :0Base
20
20: Base
20
40140 40
60
80
80110021100
120
140
160
180
0 0utility
0:utility
20
20
20: 40
4014060260
120
140
160
180
200
31
2
2 2 Time
2 Time
2 (Year)
2Time
2 2(Year)
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
1 140
1 80
2 2180
2 200 public public
2
22 Time
2Time
2 Time
2(Year)
2 (Year)
22
22
22
22
22
2
corruption
corruption
: Non-Oil
: Non-Oil
Chaos :Chaos
: Base
Chaos
Chaos
: Non-Oil
: Non-Oil
utility :utility
Non-Oil
: Non-Oil
(Year)
0Base
0 020
201 204040
601601 608080
100
100100
120
120
120
140
140
140
160
1602160
180
180
200
200
(Year)
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Predictive Scenario
Analysis
32
Economic Sanctions
• Although most papers conclude that economic
sanctions do not work as intended, some scholars
believe that they can destabilize a targeted state
(Marinov 2005).
• Amuzegar (1997b) believes U.S. economic sanctions
have had meaningful, although not decisive, impacts
on the Iranian economy.
• Fayazmanesh (2003) thinks that sanctions have both
harmed the Iranian economy and strengthen the
Iranian state.
• Torbat (2005) believes economic sanctions have hurt
the Iranian economy and had only a modest impact on
Iran’s political structure.
33
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Impacts of Economic Sanctions
• Impact channels:
─ Financial markets
─ International trade
─ Internal banking
─ Limitation on importing intermediate goods
 Hinders domestic industries.
 Increases inflation rate.
 Reduces people’s purchasing power.
• Higher inflation rate + scarcity of essential goods =
social unrest
─ Translated to the model by exogenous decrease in public
utility.
34
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Economic Sanctions
Base Disposable
Case:Income
Economic Sanctions:
Political
Power
Political
Power
.8 .8
.81 2
1
$/Year $/Year
$/Year
$/Year$/Year
1
1
1
22,500
1
22,500
22,500
15,000
15,000
1
15,000
1
1
1
11
.6 .6.6
.4 .4
11
1 1 1
1
1 11
1 1 1
1
1 21 2 1
1
1 211 2
1 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2
2
21 112
2
2
1 2
1 11 1 11 1 11
1 2 11 22
2 22
2 22
2 22
1 2 11 22
75007500
2 22 2 22 2 22
2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2
0 102 11 22
0
200
200210
210220
220230
230240
240250
250260
260270
270280
280290
290300
300
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
0 0
disposable
income
: Base
disposable
income
Base 1 11 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
disposable
income
: :Base
200 200
210210
210
220
220
220
230230
230
240240
240
250250
250
260260
260
270270
270
280280
280
290290
290
300300
300
disposable
income
: Sanction
disposable
income
Sanction 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
disposable
income
: :Sanction
TimeTime
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
disposable
disposable
income
income
income
: Base
::Base
Base1 111 111 111 111 111 111 1 11 1 1
Corruption
Corruption
Corruption
disposable
disposable
income
income
income
: Sanction
::Sanction
Sanction 2 222 222 222 222 2 22 2 22 2 2
.7.7.7
1 11
1 11
2
.7.525.71 11
.525
.525
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
1
1
.35
2
Dmnl
Dmnl
.525
.525
.35
.35
Corruption
Corruption
Corruption
2
2
11
1 211 2
22
1
2
22
1
1
1 2
1 2 1 2 2 22
1 11
.175
.35.175
.35
.175
11
1
4 34 4
3 3
11
2
2
2
1
11
1
12
1 2 11 22
2 2 2 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
22
2
.225
.225
.225
.15 .15
2
1 2
1
1
1
12 1 2
2
21
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
22
22
1
11 12 1 2
1
2
.151
2
1
21
1
1
2
1 11
.175.175
0 0200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300
1
1
1
11 240 250 260 270 280 290 300
20020021021022022022301230
250(Year)
260 270 22802 2 290 300
22 Time
22 2 240
Time
(Year)
2 22
Time
(Year)
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
corruption : Base
0 0 ::Sanction
corruption
Base 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12
corruption
corruption
:
Base
35 corruption
200 200
210
210
220220
220
230
230
230
240240
240
250250
250
260260
260
270270
270
280280
280
290290
290
300300
300
: Sanction
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
corruption
:210
Sanction
TimeTime
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
2
2
1 2 2 11
21
2 1
22
21
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
21
1 2
21
2
22 2
21 1 2
1
1
1
2
1
1 1 11 1
21
122 12
1
1 2
2
22 1 2
2
2
2
11 1
1 21 2
2
1
1
22 2
11 1
1 2
22 2
11 1
22 2
11 1
11 1
.075
.075
1122 1 2
0.075
11
0 0
1122 1 2
.15
.15.15
.075
.075
.075
Respect
Respect
Respect
For
ForLaw
For
LawLaw
: :Base
Base
: Base 11 111 111 111 111
Public
Utility
Public
Utility
Public
Utility
22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22
Respect
Respect
Respect
For
ForLaw
For
LawLaw
: :Sanction
Sanction
: Sanction
.4.4 .4
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
2
2
1
2
21
1
2
22
1
22 2
2
22
2
.225
2
22 2
2
1
2 12 12
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
2
12
1
11
1
1
2 2 2
2
1
2
2 2 212 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 11
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
2 2 2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
11 1
1
2
11 1
2
1
1 2
-.2
1
1
1
11
11
1
2
1 2
12
2
1 2
1
1
1
22
1122 1 2
2
2
2
1
22
1 1
1
1
1
11 1
1
1
1
1
2
11
2
1
21
2
2
1
1
2
1
11
11
2 22
1
11
0
-.200 1-.2
-.4
1 11
2 22
1
0
.2
0.2 .20
1 1 1 2
2 12
2
2
21
2
1 2 21 2 2 2 2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2 2 2 11
1
1
1 1 1
2 2 2
1 1 1
2 2 2
1 12 21 2
2 2 2
1 1 1
2
2
2
22 2
1 1
1 1 1 250
230 1240
260 270 280 290 300
1
1
2 22
1 11
2
1
1 11
Public
Public
Public
Utility
Utility
Utility
1
.2 .4
.4.4
.2
.2
1
2 2 2
3 23 23
2
2
1
2
22
21
2
2
1
2
1
11
2
2
1
2
.3.3 .3
.225
.225
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
: Base
: Base
: Base 1 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 1
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
: Sanction
: Sanction
: Sanction 2 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 2
4 44
11
2
21
0
1
1 1 1
2
2 2
2
.20 .2.2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 1
1
00
2 2 2
2 2 2
11
11
1
1 1230
1 230
200
210
220
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
200
210
220
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
1 1 2 300
200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 1 290
200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280280
290290
300300
2 2
2
2
2
2 2 2
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
0 00
00 0
Political
Power
: Base
Respect
For
Law
: Base
Political
Power
: Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 1
Respect
For
Law
: Base1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1
Political
Power
: 220
Base
Respect
For
Law
:220
Base
200200
200
210
210
210
220
220
230
230
230240
240
240
250
250
250
260
260
260270
270270
280
280280
290
290290300
300300
200
200200
210
210
210
220
220
230
230230
240
240240
250
250250
260
260260
270
270270
280
280 280
290 290
300 300
2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2
Political
Power
: Sanction
Respect
For
: Sanction
Political
Power
: Sanction 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 2
Respect
For
Law
: Sanction
Political
Power
: Sanction
Respect
ForLaw
Law
: Sanction
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
Time
TimeTime
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
11
21 1 2
2
1 1
2
2 2 2
1
1
1
1
.2
1 11
2
22
11
1
1
1 21 21 2
.4.2 .4.4
.2
Respect for Law
Respect
Respect
Respect
for
forfor
Law
Law
Law
.3
11 1
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
2 22
1 11
1 1 1
Respect
for Law
Respect
for Law
.3 .3
1
1 2 1 12 1 1
1 2 2 2 2
.4
15,000
15,000 1 21 2
7500
7500
75001 21 2 1 2
22
2 12
1 1 1 1
2
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 21 1212 1 1
2 22
.61 1 1
1
1
1
1
.8.6 .8.8
.6
1
1
1 1
2
1 2
1
1
1
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
1
Util/YearUtil/Year
Util/Year Util/Year
Util/YearUtil/Year
30,000
30,000
22,500
22,500
1 2 1 12
1 21
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
30,000
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
30,000
30,000
Political Power
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
Disposable Income
Disposable Income
Disposable
Disposable
Disposable
Income
Income
Income
2
2
1
1
1 2
1
1
21
1
22
11 1
22 2 2
2
22
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2 1
2
2
2
11
1
2
2
2
11 1 11 1 11 1
1 12 1 1 12 1 2
22
-.2
-.2 -.2
-.4
2
22
2260 270 22 280
0
-.4
2
2
200 210 220 230 240
250
290
300
1 1 01
240
250
0 200 210 220
200 200
210 210
220 220
230 230
240 Time
250(Year)
260 260
270 270
280 280
290 290
300 300
250260 260
Time
(Year)
Time
200200210210220220230230240 240
250(Year)
270 270280 280
290 290
300 300
1
1 Time
1 (Year)
1
1
1
1
1
public2utility
2 2 2:2Base
2
21 2
-.4
-.4public
-.4utility
Time (Year)
1
1
1 Time (Year)
2
2
utility
: Base1 2 11 2 11 22 2 112 22 2 112 2 11 2 11 2 11 22 2 112 2 1
Chaos : Base
Chaos : Sanction
public
: Sanction
public
utility
:
Base
0 0Chaos
0
200
200
200
210
210
210
220220
230
230230
240240
25022 250
260
260
270
270
270
280
280 280
29022290
300
22240
22 250
22 260
2 300
: Base 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chaos
: Sanction 2 22 2
public
utility
:220
Sanction
2
22
22
22
Chaos
: Base
Chaos
: Sanction
public
utility
: Sanction
200200
200
210210
210220220
220230
230
230
240
240
240250
250
250260
260
260
270
270270280
280280290
290290300
300300
Time
TimeTime
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Civil Resistance
• Civil Resistance: citizen activism in form of
protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, etc.
(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011)
• Civil resistance can facilitate the democratization
of a nation by separating oppressive regimes from
their main sources of power and weaken them
over time.
• Iranian opposition frequently encourage Iranian
citizens to engage in various forms of civil
resistance.
36
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Civil Resistance
Disposable Income
Political Power
1 21 21 1
.8 1 21 2
Disposable
Disposable
Disposable
Income
Income
Income
1 2
1 1
2 2
1 12
2 2
1 1
1
2 2
2
1
2
1 11
1 11
1 2
1 21 2
2 22
1 11 2 22
1 21 2 1 2
2 22
2
1 1
2 2
2 2 12 2 1 21 2 1 12 1
1 21 12 2
2 1 2 1
1 12
1 21 12 2
1 12 2 1
15,000
15,000
15,000
7500
7500
7500 1 1222 1 2
1 21 12 2
1
$/Year
$/Year
$/Year
$/Year
$/Year $/Year
1 21 2
22,500
22,500
22,500
15,000
15,000
15,000
1 11
2 22
2 2 2 2 212 21 1212 1 1
1 11
2
2
2
7500
7500
7500
010021 1212 1 1
.6
.8 .6.8
.8
.6
12 2
Corruption
Corruption
Corruption
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
.4.6
.6 .4.6
.4
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
2 22
1 11
.2
.4 .2.4
.4
.2
2
1
11
2
22
1 11
1
1 1
1 11
2 2 2 22
1 1
1
0
2 22
2
1 11
2
2 22
2 2
2 1 11
2 22
.4.2.4.4
.2
.2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
12 2 2
2
1 111 1
21
.20.2.20
222
1 11
0
1 21 230
12230
200
200210
210220
220
240250
250260
260270
270280
280290
290300
300
200
210
220
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
2230240
111
222
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
Time
(Year)
0 00
Political
Political
Power
Power
: :Base
: Base 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1
Political
Power
Base
200
200
200Power
210
210
210:220
220
230
230
230240
240
240250
250
250260
260
260270
270
270280
280
280290
290
290300
300
300
22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2
Political
Political
Power
: 220
Resistance
Political
Power
:Resistance
Resistance
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
2
2 2
1
2
1 1
2 22 2 2 2 22
1 11
.2 0.2.2
0200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300
2 22
1 1 1 300
1230
1 1 240
200
200 210
210 220
220 230
240
250
250
260
260 270
270 280
280 290
Time
(Year)
2 290
2 2 300
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
: Base
0 corruption
00
corruption
1 1 2 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12
corruption: :Base
:Resistance
Base
37corruption
200200
200210210
210220220
220230230
230240240
240250250
250260260
260270270
270280
280
280290
290
290300
300
300
corruption
corruption: Resistance
: Resistance 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
12 2
2.52.5
1 1
2
12 2
1
1 1
2
2 2
2 22
1
1 11
1 1 1 1 21
2
1.25
1.251 1
2 22
2 2 12
2 22
1 11
1 1
1
1.25
2.5
2.5
2.5 2
2
1 1
2
2 22
2
11
1
12
2
.15
.15.15
.1
.1
.1 1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
12
22 2
1
1 1 1 11 1
2
2 1
12
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2 1
11 1
1
1
1
11 1
1
1
1
1
1
11 1
1
11 1
2
2
2
11 1
2
2
121 1
2
2
22 2
2
22
2
2 2
2
11 1
11 21
2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2
.05
.05
.05
00 0
11 1
22 2
22 2
200
230
250
260
270
280
280
290
290
300 300
2270
2 2270
200200210
210210220
220220
230230240
240240
250250
260260
280
290
22 2 22 2 22 2300
.1.1.05
.1
.05
.05
12
11 1
22 2
1
2
2 22
2
2
2
2
2
2
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
Time
(Year)
00 0
1
1
1
1
1
Respect
Respect
For
For
Law
Law
:
Base
:
Base
1
1
1 1 1 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 1
Respect For Law : Base
200
200
200
210
210
210
220
220
220
230
230
230240
240
240
250
250
250260
260
260270
270
270280
280
280290
290
290300
300
300
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 2
Respect
Respect
For
Law
Law
: :Resistance
: Resistance
Respect
ForFor
Law
Resistance
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1
Respect
Respect
Respect
For
For
For
Law
Law
Law
: Base
: Base
: Base Public
Utility
Public
Public
Utility
Utility
Respect
Respect
Respect
For
For
For
Law
Law
Law
: Resistance
: Resistance
: Resistance 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2
22 2
.3.3 .3
12 2 2
11 1
1
22 2
2
2.5
3.75
3.75
3.75
2 2 1
1 1
2
1
5 55
3.75
3.75
3.75
2
.15 1
111
1 1
2
Respect
Respect
Respect
for
for
for
Law
Law
Law
.2.2.15
.2
.15
2 2
2 2 21 1 1
2
2 2 21 1 1
1 11
2 2
1 1
2 2 22
1
1 1
222
1 1 11
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
2 22
1 11
2 22
1 11
2 21 1
2 22
1 11
1
2 1 1
2 2
2 212 1 1
.2
1
1
2 2
Respect for Law
2
1 21
11
22 2
11 1
222 1
1 1
2 2 1
1 1
1 21 12 2
2 22
1 11
21
Respect
Respect
for for
LawLaw
.2 .2
1
11 1 11 1 11 111 111 111 111
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
: Base
: Base
: Base 1 1 1 1Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
: Resistance
: Resistance
: Resistance2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
55 5
2
11
2
12 2
11
21
2
1 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
disposable
disposable
disposable
income
income
income
: Base
: Base
: Base1 1Corruption
Corruption
Corruption
disposable
disposable
disposable
income
income
income
: Resistance
: Resistance
: Resistance 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
.8.8
.8
2
1
1 21 2 2 2 2
1
200
200 210
210 220
220 230
230 240
240 250
250 260
260 270
270280
280290
290300
300
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
Time
Time(Year)
(Year)
Time
(Year)
0 00
disposable
disposableincome
income: :Base
:Base
Base 111 111 111 111 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1
disposable
income
200200
200
210
210
210
220
220
220
230230
230
240240
240
250250
250
260260
260
270270
270
280
280
280
290
290
290300
300
300
2 22 2 22 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
disposable
disposable
income
income
: :Resistance
:Resistance
Resistance
disposable
income
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
1 112 22
2
.6.4.6.6
.4
.4
2
2
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
1 1 12
1
.8.6.8.8
.6 1 21 12 2
1
.61 21 12 2
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
30,000
30,000
30,000
22,500
22,500
22,500
1
1 2
21
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
.8 .8
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
30,000
Political
Political
Power
Power
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
30,000
30,000
Oil Revenue Excluded
Disposable
DisposableIncome
Income
2
.15
.3.3.15
.3
.15
2
22 21
1 1
2
1
2
1 1 2 2
2 2222
1
111 1
1 1
1 1
2
111 222 2
2 21
1 2 21 2
2 21
1
21 1
1 1
111
111
2 22
1 11
22 2
21250
1 1 260 270 280 290 300
11 1
01 1 1
1.25
1.25
1.25
1 11
2 2 2
0 200
0
210 220 2302 2240
1 11
Time
200200210210220220230230240240
250(Year)
250260260270270280280290290300300
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year): Resistance 2 2
1
1
1
Chaos
:
Base
Chaos
0 00
Chaos
Chaos
: Base
: Base 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chaos
Chaos
: Resistance
: Resistance2 2 2 2
200
200
200210
210
210220
220
220230
230
230240
240
240250
250
250260
260
260270
270
270280
280
280290
290
290300
300
300
Util/YearUtil/Year
Util/Year Util/Year
Util/YearUtil/Year
Base Case:
0 0
2
1
22
2
1 12 21 2
11
2
1
22 2
11 1
11 1
22 2
1 12 21 2
2
2
2
1
1
1
-.15
0 01 2
-.150-.15
Public
Public
Public
Utility
Utility
Utility
1
1
22 2
0.15
.15
.15
1
1
1 2
1
1
22 2
2 2 21
1
1
1
11 1
1
1 2 1
1
1
2 1 2
1
1
2
2 2 1 2 11
2
2
2
11 1 2
-.3
-.15
-.15
-.15
11 1
2
2
2
-.3
-.3
11 1
221 2 280 290 300
200
1 1 1 260 11270
1 12 21 2210 220 230 2402 2 250
11 1
2
200200210210220220230 230
240Time
240
250(Year)
250
26022260
270
270
280 280
290 290
300 300
2
22 2
1
12 1 2
2 1 2
11 1
2
Time
(Year)
1
1
1 Time
1 (Year)
1
1
1
1
1
public
-.3
-.3-.3utility : Base
public
utility
Resistance
public
public
utility
utility
: :Base
: Base 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 11 2 1
200
200
200210
210
210220
220
220230
230
230240
240
240250
250
250260
260
260270
270
270280
280
280290
290
290300
300
300
public
public
utilityutility
: Resistance
: Resistance 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Improved Respect for Law
• To the state, a favorable system is the one that
performs well economically while at the same
time exhibiting political stability over the longrun.
• Respect for law is exogenously increased for 10
years.
38
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Improved Respect for Law
Base Case:
Improved Respect for Law
Disposable
Disposable
Disposable
Income
Income
Income
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
.8.8.8
$/Year$/Year
$/Year
$/Year$/Year
$/Year
67,500
67,500
67,500
45,000
45,000
45,000
22 2
45,000
45,000
45,000
22 2
22 2
11 1 11 1
11 1
11 1
1 1212 2
222
222
222 222
212 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
22,500
22 2
22,5001 1212 21 1212 2
22,500
11 1
11 1
11 1
22 2
0 00
1 1
1 1 1
212 2 22 2
11 1 1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
200
200
200210
210
210
220
220
220
230
230
230
240
240
240
250
250
250
260
260
260
270
270
270
280
280
280290
290
290300
300
300
2
1
1
11 1
11212 2 11212 2
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
00 0
1 1 1 240
1 1 1250
11 11
1 1 1270
1 1 1280
1 1 1290
1 1 1 300
disposable
disposable
disposable
income
income
income
: Base
: 220
Base
:220
Base
200
210
200
210
220230
230 1240
240 250
250260
260 1270
270
280 290
290 300
300
200
210
230
260
280
22 222 222 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2
disposable
disposable
disposable
income
income
income
: Policy
: Policy
: Policy 2 2 2 2Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
disposable
income
::Base
disposable
income
: Base 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1
disposable
income
Base
Corruption
2Corruption
disposable
income
::Policy
2 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2
disposable
income
: Policy Corruption
disposable
income
Policy
.7.7.7
1 11
11 1
Corruption
Corruption
Corruption
1 11
11 1
222
1 1
1 1240
1 1 1 1250
1 1 1 260
1 1 1 270
1 1 1 280
111 1
1 1 1 300
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
:220
Base
:220
Base230
200
210
200
210: Base
230
240 250
250 1260
260 1270
270
280 290
290 300
300
200
210
220
230
240
280
290
22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 222 222 2
Political
Political
Political
Power
Power
Power
: Policy
: Policy
: Policy
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
22 2
11 1
22 2
22 2
22 2
22 2
11 1
22 2
11 1
22 2 22 2
11 1
11 1
1 12 21 2
1212 21
22 2
.175
0 00
.175
.175
11 1300
11 240
1 240
200
200
200210
210
210220
220
220230
230
230
240250
250
250260
260
260270
270
270280
280
280290
290
290
300
300
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
corruption
corruption
corruption
: Base
: Base 1 1 1 1 1 1
corruption
corruption
corruption
: Policy
: Policy
: Policy 2 2 2 2 2 2
00 0 : Base
200
200 210
210 220
220 230
230 240
240 250
250 260
260 270
270 280
280 290
290 300
300
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
11 1
11 1
22 2
22 2
11 1 11 1
112 12 2
11 1
11 1
11 1
22 2
11212 2
11 1
11 1
11 1
11 1
11 1
0101 10
22 2
11 1 11 1
2 230240
2230
200
200
200210
210
210220
220
2202230
240
240250
250
250260
260
260270
270
270280
280
280290
290
290300
300
300
22 2
2Time
2(Year)
22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2
Time
(Year)
2 2Time
2 2(Year)
Chaos
Chaos
: Base
: Base
00Chaos
0 : Base
11 1 11 1 11 1
11 1
11 1
1
11
11 1
1
11
11
1
11
22
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
: Policy
: Policy
: Policy
1
1
11
11 1
11 1 11 1
11 1 1
.125
.12511 1
.125
11 1
11 1
0 0 0 11 1
11 1
11 1
11 1
1280
1 280
1
1230
200
200200
210
210210
220
220220
230
230
240
240
240
250
250
250
260
260
260
270
270
270
280
290
290
290
300
300
300
1
1
11 1 11 1
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
00 0
1 1 240
1 1 11250
1 11 260
11 1270
11 1 280
11 1 290
1 1 300
Respect
Respect
Respect
For
ForFor
Law
Law
Law
: Base
:220
Base
: Base
200
210
230
200
210
220
230 1240
240 250
250 1260
260
270
280 11290
290 300
300
200
210
220
230
270
280
2 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 2
Respect
Respect
Respect
For
ForFor
Law
Law
Law
: Policy
: Policy
: Policy 2 2 2Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
11 1
22 2
11 1
22 2
222 222 2
1
11 1
11 1
11 1
22 2
22 2
11
11 1
11 1
11
11 1
22 2
22 2
0-.15
0 02 2
-.15
-.15
21
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 211
22 2
22 2
22 2
11
11 1
.15
.15
0.15
0 0
11 1
11 1
22 2
2
22 2
.3.3.3
.15
.15
.15
11 1
11 1
2
22
Respect
For
Law
::Base
Respect
For
Law
: Base 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1
Respect
For
Law
Base
Public
Utility
Utility
Utility
2Public
Respect
For
Law
::Policy
2 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2
Respect
For
Law
: PolicyPublic
Respect
For
Law
Policy
.3.3 .3
11 1
11 1
2323 32
22 2
22 2 22 2
22 2
Public
PublicUtility
Utility
Public
Utility
11 1 11 1
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
22 2
222
11 1
11 1
22 2
.2.2.2
1
00 0
11 1
1290
1 1290300
200
200
200210
210
210220
220
220230
230
230240
240
240250
250
250260
260
260270
270
270280
280
280290
300
300
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
00 0
22 2
22 2
22 2
.25
.25
.25
11 1
22 2
22 2
22 2
22 2
22 2
22 2
22
2
22 2
2
22 2 2 2 2
.125
.125
.125
1 1 2212
11 1
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
222
111
2 2 2 11 1
222
11 1
44
3 34 3
11 1
11 1
22 21 1 1
111
39
22 2 11 1
22 2
11 1
11 1
22 2
.35
.35
.35
.175
.175
.175
11 1
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1 11 1
Political
Power
::Base
Political
Power
: Base
Political
Power
Base
Chaos
22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2
2Chaos
Political
Power
::Policy
Political
Power
: Policy22 2 22Chaos
Political
Power
Policy
44 4
11 1
111
11 1
.525
.525
.525
.35
.35
.35 22 2
.375
.375
.375
.25
.25.25
22 2 11 1
22 2
11 1
22
2
22
22 2
22
11 1
.2.2.2
.5.5.5
.375
.375
.375
Chaos
Chaos
Chaos
11 1
111
2
2
111
2 22
11 1
2 22
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
.7.7.71 1 1
.525
.525
.525
2 22
22 2
22 2 11 1
22 1
21 1 1 1
2 2 1
22 2
.4.4.4
222
22,500
22,500
22,500
11 1 1 1
22 2 1
22 2
.6.6.6
.4.4.4
2 2 2 22 2
22 2
.6.6.611212 2
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
22 2
Dmnl Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl
Dmnl Dmnl
90,000
90,000
90,000
67,500
67,500
67,500
Respect
Respectfor
forLaw
Law
Respect
for
Law
.5.5 .5
12 12 21 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 12 1 1
1
1
1
22 2
1121 2 22 2 22 2 22 2
11 1 11 1
1 12 21 2 2 2 2
22 2
Respect
Respect
Respect
for
forfor
Law
Law
Law
Political
PoliticalPower
Power2 2
Political
Power
.8.8.8
Util/Year Util/Year
Util/Year
Util/Year
Util/Year Util/Year
Disposable
DisposableIncome
Income
Disposable
Income
90,000
90,000
90,000
2 22 2
11 1
22
22 2
11 1
11 1
22 2
22 2
22 2
22 2
11 1
22 21 1 22121 1 22121 1 2212 22 2
22 2
22 2
1
2
11 1
22 2
22 2
11 1
-.15
-.3
-.3
-.3 22 2
-.15
-.15
11 1
11 1
11 1
11200
11270
1 210
1 270
200
200
210210
220
220220
230
230230
240
240240
250
250
250
260
260
270
280
280280
290
290290
300
300300
11 1260
Time
Time
Time
(Year)
(Year)
(Year)
2 2 22 2 2
public
public
public
utility
utility
utility
: Base
: Base
: Base 1 1 1 1 1 1
public
public
public
utility
utility
utility
: Policy
: Policy
: Policy
-.3
-.3
-.3
Worcester
Institute
200
220
270
200 210
210Polytechnic
220 230
230 240
240 250
250 260
260
270 280
280 290
290 300
300
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
200
200 210
210 220
220 230
230 240
240 250
250 260
260 270
270 280
280 290
290 300
300
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Time
(Year)
Summary and
Conclusions
40
Summary and Conclusion
• Katouzian’s theory is translated into a quantitative simulation model.
─ Opened the theory to rigorous formal tests.
─ Explored its potential applications for scenario/policy analysis.
─ Provided a basis for future Iranian socio-political-economic modeling.
• Dynamic behavior of the model is consistent with reference modes of
behavior.
• Periodic episodes of significant arbitrary power are key to
understanding the historically less-than-optimal behavior of the
system.
• If Iran was a less arbitrary system it could experience a greater
pattern of economic, social, and political development.
• Although oil revenue has had a substantial impact on the economy it
has had little effect on the overall behavior of the Iranian sociopolitical system.
41
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Summary and Conclusion
•
Although economic sanctions can influence the economy as well as weakening
the political system, they are ineffective at reforming long-term behavior of the
socio-political system.
•
Civil resistance have an adverse impact on the system.
•
Iran should invest in improving social norms so that its citizens pay more
respect to the rule of law.
•
The model can be applied to resource abundance, economic sanctions, civil
resistance, cultural transformation, etc. but a rigorous structural assessment
and a comprehensive boundary test is required for each case.
•
Future work could be to enrich the model’s structure for particular applications:
─ interaction of various social and economic inequalities
─ demographic dynamics
─ labor markets
─ educational systems
─ financial markets
42
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Bibliography
43
Bibliography
Amuzegar, Jahangir. 1997. “Iran’s Economy and the US Sanctions.” Middle East Journal 51 (2): 185–99.
Aslaksen, Silje. 2010. “Oil and Democracy: More than a Cross-Country Correlation?” Journal of Peace Research
47 (4): 421–31. doi:10.1177/0022343310368348.
Basedau, Matthias, and Wolfram Lacher. 2006. A Paradox of Plenty? Rent Distribution and Political Stability in Oil
States. GIGA Working Paper Series 21. GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/gigwpaper/21.htm.
Bharier, Julian. 1971. Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970. Oxford University Press.
Brunnschweiler, Christa N. 2008. “Cursing the Blessings? Natural Resource Abundance, Institutions, and
Economic Growth.” World Development 36 (3): 399–419. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.03.004.
Brunnschweiler, Christa N., and Erwin H. Bulte. 2008. “The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of
Paradoxes and Red Herrings.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55 (3): 248–64.
doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2007.08.004.
CBI. 2014. “Economic Time Series Database.” Economic Time Series Database, Central Bank of Islamic Republic
of Iran. http://tsd.cbi.ir/.
Cesari, Anna. 2011. Oil and Democracy. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1872827. Rochester, NY: Social Science
Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1872827.
44
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Bibliography
Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic
of Nonviolent Conflict. Columbia University Press.
Esfahani, Hadi Salehi, Kamiar Mohaddes, and M. Hashem Pesaran. 2013. “Oil Exports and the
Iranian Economy.” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 53 (3): 221–37.
doi:10.1016/j.qref.2012.07.001.
Esfahani, Hadi Salehi, and M. Hashem Pesaran. 2009. “The Iranian Economy in the Twentieth
Century: A Global Perspective.” Iranian Studies 42 (2): 177–211.
doi:10.1080/00210860902764896.
Fayazmanesh, Sasan. 2003. “The Politics of the U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran.” Review
of Radical Political Economics 35 (3): 221–40. doi:10.1177/0486613403254535.
Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Vol. 26. University
of California Press.
Katouzian, Homa. 1981. The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and PseudoModernism, 1926-1979. Macmillan London.
———. 1997. “Arbitrary Rule: A Comparative Theory of State, Politics and Society in Iran.”
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 24 (1): 49–73. doi:10.2307/195668.
45
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Bibliography
Langarudi, Saeed P., and Michael J. Radzicki. 2013. “Resurrecting a Forgotten Model: Updating
Mashayekhi’s Model of Iranian Economic Development.” In Energy Policy Modeling in the 21st
Century, edited by Hassan Qudrat-Ullah, 197–233. Understanding Complex Systems. Springer
New York. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-8606-0_11.
Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” American
Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 564–76. doi:10.2307/3647732.
Mashayekhi, Ali N. (Ali Naghi). 1978. “Strategy of Economic Development in Iran : A Case of
Development Based on Exhaustible Resources.” Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/26760.
Pesaran, Mohammad Hashem. 2000. “Economic Trends and Macroeconomic Policies in PostRevolutionary Iran.” In The Economy of Iran: The Dilemmas of an Islamic State, edited by
Parvin Alizadeh, 63–100. London: U.K.: Tauris.
Ross, Michael L. 1999. “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse.” World Politics 51 (2):
297–322.
———. 2001. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53 (3): 325–61.
———. 2008. But Seriously: Does Oil Really Hinder Democracy?.
46
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Bibliography
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. 1995. Natural Resource Abundance and
Economic Growth. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 225459. Rochester, NY: Social Science
Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=225459.
———. 2001. “The Curse of Natural Resources.” European Economic Review, 15th
Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, 45 (4–6): 827–38.
doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8.
Sterman, John. 2000. Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a
Complex World. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Stijns, Jean-Philippe C. 2005. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth
Revisited.” Resources Policy 30 (2): 107–30. doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2005.05.001.
Torbat, Akbar E. 2005. “Impacts of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran.”
World Economy 28 (3): 407–34. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2005.00671.x.
Tsui, Kevin K. 2011. “More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude
Oil Discoveries*.” The Economic Journal 121 (551): 89–115. doi:10.1111/j.14680297.2009.02327.x.
47
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Thank You
48