Outline
 Comparison 1: Posted-Bid versus Oral-Bid auctions: Plott and
Smith (1978)
 Smith (1964)
 Williams (1973)
 Comparison 2: Posted-offer versus Double-Auction Pricing
Mechanisms: Ketcham, Arlington, and Williams (1984)
 Comparison 3: Nonbinding Price Controls
 A Double Auction Market: Smith and Williams (1981)
 A Posted-Offer Market: Coursey and Smith (1983)
Laboratory Market Trading
Institutions
S/No
1
Name
8
Posted offer
auction
Posted bid
auction
Discriminative
auction
Competitive
auction
Clearinghouse
auction
Cournot quantity
choice
Walrasian
auction
Dutch auction
9
English auction
2
3
4
5
6
7
No. of Sellers /
No. of Buyers
-/-
Who Makes
Price Proposals
Sellers
Decisions
Sequential or Simultaneous
Offers posted simultaneously
How Contracts
Are Confirmed
Buyers shop in sequence
-/-
Buyers
Bids posted simultaneously
Sellers shop in sequence
1/-
Buyers
Bids posted simultaneously
1/-
Buyers
Bids posted simultaneously
-/-
Auctioneer
Price adjusted sequentially
1/-
Seller clock
Price lowered sequentially
1/-
Buyers
Price raised sequentially
Highest N bidders
pay own bid prices
Highest N bidders
pay N+1st price
Intersection of
bid and offer arrays
Intersection of
total quantity and demand
Confirmation when
excess demand is zero
Buyer confirmation
stops clock
Sale to highest bidder
-/-
Buyers and sellers Bids and offers simultaneously
-/-
Endogenous price Seller quantities simultaneously
10
Bid auction
-/-
Buyers
Prices raised sequentially
Sellers
11
Offer auction
-/-
Sellers
Prices lowered sequentially
Buyers
12
Double auction
-/-
Both types
Both types
13
Decentralized
Negotiation
List/discount
-/ -
Both types
Bids raised and offers lowered
sequentially
Sequential but decentralized
-/-
Sellers
Simultaneous (list), sequential
(discounts)
Buyers
14
Both types
Smith (1964): Oral Auction
Seller
Seller-Buyer
Buyer
Oral-Bid Auction (Buyer)
Market Organization
The market for this commodity is organized as follows: we open the market for a trading
period ( a trading “day”). The period last for 5 minutes. Any buyer is free at any time
during the period, to raise his hand and make a verbal bid to buy one unit of the
commodity at a specified price. Any seller is free to accept or not accept the bid of any
buyer but sellers cannot make counter offers. If a bid is accepted a binding contract has
been closed for a single unit between the buyer and seller will record the contract price to
be included in their earnings. Any ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by a
random choice of buyer or seller. Except for the bids and their acceptance you are not to
speak to any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but you
are free to keep trying, and as a buyer or a seller you are free to make as much profit as
you can.
Are there any questions?
Smith (1964)
Williams (1973): Posted Auction
Posted-Bid Auction
Market Organization
The market for this commodity is organized as follows: we open the market for each
trading day. Each buyer decides on a purchase price which he will write on one of the
cards provided. The buyers will be given two minutes to submit their prices. The cards
will be collected and the prices written on the blackboard. Sellers will then be free to
make offers to sell whatever quantities they desire and to specify the buyer to whom they
wish to sell. Offers will be made as follow: a seller will be chosen using random
numbers, and will state the quantity he wishes to sell and the buyer to whom he wishes to
sell. The buyer will then accept any part of the seller’s offer by stating the quantity he
wishes to buy. However, when a buyer posts a price, he must be prepared to buy at least
one unit. If the first buyer will not purchase all units the seller wants to sell, the seller is
free to choose a second buyer, and so on.
Smith (1964) versus Williams (1973)
Smith (1964)
Williams (1973)
Number of Unit /
Market Information
One-unit
(a single point in the demand and
supply schedules)
Multiple-units
(the entire demand and supply
schedules)
Trading Rule
Oral and could be revised during a
trading period
Posted and could not be revised
during a trading period
Key Results
Sellers are permitted to make offers
< Buyers are permitted to make bids
Sellers are permitted to make offers
> Buyers are permitted to make bids
Experimental Design
 4 sessions; each session has 4 buyers and 4 sellers
 Two buyers (sellers) received D1 (S1)
 Two buyers (sellers) received D2 (S2)
Posted-Bid
Oral-Bid
No Commission
1
2
Commission
3
4
Demand and Supply Schedules
Posted-Bid vs. Oral-Bid
General
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research foundations have
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make
good decisions you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash.
In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which some of you will be buyers and some of
you will be sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you will
find a sheet, labeled Buyer or Seller, which describes the value to you of any decisions you might make.
You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.
Specific Instructions for Buyers
During each market period you are free to purchase from any seller or sellers as many units as you might
want. For the first unit that you buy during a trading period you will receive the amount listed in row (1)
marked 1st unit redemption value; if you buy a second unit you will receive the additional amount listed in
row (5) marked 2nd unit redemption value; etc. The profits from each purchase (which are yours to keep)
are computed by taking the difference between the redemption value and purchase price of the unit bought.
Under no conditions may you buy a unit for a price which exceeds the redemption value. In addition to this
profit you will receive a 5 cent commission for each purchases. That is
[your earnings = (redemption value) – (purchase price) + 0.05 commission].
Posted-Bid vs. Oral-Bid
Suppose for example that you buy two units and that your redemption value for the first unit is $200 and
for the second unit is $180. If you pay $150 for your first unit and $160 for the second unit, your earnings
are:
$ earnings from 1st = 200 – 150 + 0.05 = 50.05
$ earnings from 2nd = 180 – 160 + 0.05 = 20.05
total $ earnings
= 50.05 + 20.05 = 70.10
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The purchase price of the first unit you buy
during the first period should be recorded on row (2) at the time of purchase. You should then record the
profits on this purchase as directed on rows (3) and (4). At the end of the period record the total of profits
and commissions on the last row (41) on the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly.
Specific Instructions for Sellers
During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer or buyers as many units as you might want. The
first unit that you sell during a trading period you obtain at a cost of the amount listed on the attached sheet
in the row (2) marked cost of 1st unit; if you sell a second unit you incur the cost listed in the row (6)
marked cost of the 2nd unit; etc. The profits from each sale (which are yours to keep) are computed by
taking the difference between the price at which you sold the unit and the cost of the unit. Under no
conditions may you sell a unit at a price below the cost of the unit. In addition to this profit you will receive
a 5 cent commission for each sale. That is
[your earnings = (sale price of unit) – (cost of unit) + (0.05 commission)].
Posted-Bid vs. Oral-Bid
Your total profits and commissions for a trading period, which are yours to keep, are computed by adding up
the profit and commissions on sales made during the trading period.
Suppose, for example, your cost of the first unit is $140 and your cost of the second unit is $160. For
illustrative purposes we will consider only a two-unit case. If you sell the first unit at $200 and the second unit at
$190, your earnings are:
$ earnings from 1st = 200 – 140 + 0.05 = 60.05
$ earnings from 2nd = 190 – 160 + 0.05 = 30.05
total $ earnings
= 60.05 + 30.05 = 90.10
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The sale price of the first unit you sell during the 1 st
period should be recorded on row (1) at the time of sale. You should then record the profits on this sale as directed
on rows (3) and (4). At the end of the period record the total of profits and commissions on the last row (41) on the
page. Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly.
Market Organization (included in instructions for Exp. 3 but not Exp. 4)
The market for this commodity is organized as follows: we open the market for each trading day. Each buyer
decides on a purchase price which he will write on one of the cards provided. The buyers will be given two
minutes to submit their prices. The cards will be collected and the prices written on the blackboard. Sellers will
then be free to make offers to sell whatever quantities they desire and to specify the buyer to whom they wish to
sell. Offers will be made as follow: a seller will be chosen using random numbers, and will state the quantity he
wishes to sell and the buyer to whom he wishes to sell. The buyer will then accept any part of the seller’s offer by
stating the quantity he wishes to buy. However, when a buyer posts a price, he must be prepared to buy at least one
unit. If the first buyer will not purchase all units the seller wants to sell, the seller is free to choose a second buyer,
and so on.
Posted-bid vs. Oral-bid
When the first seller has made all his contracts, another seller will be selected at random and he will make his
desired purchases. The process will be continued until there are no offers to sell. This completes the trading day.
We will reopen the market for a new trading day by having buyers submit new prices and the process will be
repeated. Except for the offers and their acceptance you are not to speak to any other subject. You are free to make
as much profit as you can.
Are there any questions?
Market Organization ( included in instructions for Exp. 4 but not Exp. 3)
The market for this commodity is organized as follows: we open the market for a trading period ( a
trading “day”). The period last for 5 minutes. Any buyer is free at any time during the period, to
raise his hand and make a verbal bid to buy one unit of the commodity at a specified price. Any
seller is free to accept or not accept the bid of any buyer but sellers cannot make counter offers. If a
bid is accepted a binding contract has been closed for a single unit between the buyer and seller will
record the contract price to be included in their earnings. Any ties in bids or acceptances will be
resolved by a random choice of buyer or seller. Except for the bids and their acceptance you are not
to speak to any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but you are free
to keep trying, and as a buyer or a seller you are free to make as much profit as you can.
Are there any questions?
Experimental Results
 Experiments 1 and 3
 The average prices are below equilibrium
 Prices appear to be converging to equilibrium from below
 The quantity exchanged also tends to be below equilibrium
 Experiments 2 and 4
 Average prices tend to be above the prices in the posted-bid institutions
 There is a tendency to rise towards and above equilibrium prices
Results: Experiments 1 and 2
Results: Experiments 3 and 4
Efficiency and Subject Payments
 Volume in the oral-bid auction is always greater than in the
posted-bid case. This suggests that no all gains from trade are
exhausted in the posted-bid institution
 These markets are perfectly efficient if and only if the maximum
amount of dollars is extracted by the participants from the
experimenter.
 Experiments 1 and 2 : $7.12
 Experiments 3 and 4: $9.12
Conditions for Efficiency
(when commissions are paid)
 All buyers (sellers) exchange all units with redemption values
(marginal costs) above (below) the competitive equilibrium price.
These are called the intra-marginal demand (supply) units.
 All buyers (sellers) exchange all units with redemption value
(marginal cost) equal to the competitive equilibrium price. These
are called the marginal demand (supply) units.
 No buyers (sellers) exchange any units with redemption value
(marginal costs) below (above) the competitive equilibrium price.
These are called the extra-marginal demand (supply) units.
Observed Efficiency:
Posted-Bid Auction
Without
Commission
With
Commission
Observed Efficiency:
Oral-Bid Auction
Without
Commission
With
Commission
Summary
 Price bias in one-sided oral auction affects income distribution
but not resource allocation
 The importance of commission (experiments 3+ 4 versus 1+2)
 Why efficiency of posted-bid auction is less than 100% ? (see
example)
Why efficiency <100% in
Posted-bid auctions
Price Adjustment: Oral-Bid Auction
Price Adjustment: Oral-Bid Auction
Price Adjustment: Experiment 3
Price Adjustment: Experiment 4
Summary
 In oral-bid auctions, price rise to levels that are to the
disadvantage of buyers.
 In posted-bid auctions, price falls to levels that are advantageous
to buyers.
 Oral-bid auctions: Unaccepted bids Overshoot behavior
 Posted-bid auctions: The high (low) bidder in period t lowers
(raises) his bid in period t+1.
Experiments 1 and 2
General
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research foundations have provided
funds for the conduct of this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make
good decisions you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash after the
experiment.
In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which some of you will be buyers and some of you will
be sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Two kinds of sheets will now be distributed—
information for buyers and information for sellers. The sheets are identified and numbered. The number is only
for data-collecting purposes. If you have received sellers’ information, you will function only as a seller in this
market. Similarly, if you have received buyers’ information, you will function only as a buyer in this market. The
information you have received is for your own private use. Do not reveal it to anyone.
This is a one commodity market in which there is no product differentiation. That is, each seller produces a
product which is similar in all respects to the products offered by the other seller. A seller is free to sell to any
buyer or buyers. Likewise, a buyer may purchase from any seller of sellers.
Specific Instructions for Sellers
During each market period you are free to produce and sell any of the amounts listed on your information sheet.
Assume that you produce only for immediate sale—there are no inventories. The dollar amounts listed in column
2 on your information sheet are your costs of producing that quantity. Your payoffs are computed as follows: At
the beginning of the experiment you will receive starting capital of $0.30. If you are able to make any sales, you
will receive the difference between your sales revenue and your cost. For example, if you were to sell two units at
$100 each, total revenue would be $200. Suppose your information sheet indicated that the cost of producing two
units was $190. Your total profit would then be $200 - $190 = $10 for the trading period. If you sold two units for
less than $190 you would incur a loss. Column 3 will be useful to a seller in deciding at any time during a given
trading period whether to sell a second unit. If the additional cost of producing the second unit is $10, then he will
lose money on that unit if he sells it at any price below $10.
Experiments 1 and 2
Obviously, these figures are illustrative only and should not be assumed to apply to the actual sellers in this
experiment. All of your profits will be added to your starting capital, and any losses you might incur will be
subtracted. Your total payoffs will be accumulated over several trading periods and the total amount will be paid to
you after the experiment.
Specific Instructions for Buyers
During each market period you are free to purchase any of the quantities listed on your information sheet. Assume
that you are buying this commodity for the purpose of reselling it in an entirely different market. The dollar
amounts listed beside each quantity are the total value of that quantity. That is, they are the amounts you can sell
that quantity for in the other market.
Your payoffs are computed as follows: You will receive starting capital of $0.30. If you are able to make any
purchases, you will receive the difference between the total value as shown on your information sheet and the total
amount you paid for the purchases. For example, if you were to purchase one unit for $105 and another for $95,
you would obviously have paid a total of $200 for the two units. Suppose your information sheet indicated that the
revenue from two units was $210. Your profit for the market period would then be $210 - $200 = $10. If you had
paid more than $210 for the two units, you would have incurred a loss. Column 3 will be useful to a buyer in
deciding at any time during a given period whether to buy an additional unit. Suppose a buyer has already bought
two units at a profit, and wants to know if he should buy a third unit. If the additional revenue he gets from the third
unit is $7, then he will lose money on that unit if he buys it at any price above $7. Obviously, these figures are
illustrative only and should not be assumed to apply to the actual buyers in this experiment. All of your profits will
be added to your starting capital, and any losses you might incur will be subtracted. Your total payoffs will be
accumulated over several trading periods and the total amount will be paid to you after the experiment.
Experiments 1 and 2
Market Organization (included in Exp. 1 instructions but not Exp. 2)
The market for this commodity is organized as follow: we open the market for each trading
day. Each buyer decides on a purchase price which he will write on one of the cards provided.
The buyers will be given two minutes to submit their prices. The cards will be collected and
the prices written on the blackboard. Sellers will then be free to make offers to sell whatever
quantities they desire and to specify the buyer to whom they wish to sell. Offers will be made
as follows: a seller selected at random, will state the quantity he wishes to sell and the buyer
to whom he wishes to sell. The buyer will then accept any part of the seller’s offer by stating
the quantity he wishes to buy. However, when a buyer posts a price, he must be prepared to
buy at least one unit if any seller wishes to sell to him. If the first buyer will not purchase all
units the seller wants to sell, the seller is free to make contracts with another buyer or buyers.
When the first seller has made all his contracts, another seller will be selected at random
and he will make his desired purchases. The process will be continued until there are no
offers to sell. This completes the trading day. We will reopen the market for a new trading
day by having buyers submit new prices and the process will be repeated.
Are there any questions?
Experiments 1 and 2
Market Organization (included in Exp. 2 instructions but not Exp. 1)
The market for this commodity is organized as follows: we open the market for a trading day.
Any buyer is free at any time to raise his hand and make a verbal bid to buy one unit of the
commodity at a specified price. Any seller is free to accept or not accept the bid of any buyer
but sellers cannot make counter offers. If a bid is accepted a binding contract has been closed
for a single unit between that buyer and seller.
This process continues for a period of time. You will be warned in advance before the
market closes and more bids will be called for before actually closing. This completes a
market “day”. We will then reopen the market for a new trading period. The cost and revenue
tables apply to each new trading period, and represent cost or revenue per period.
Are there any questions?
Outline
 Comparison 1: Posted-Bid versus Oral-Bid auctions: Plott and
Smith (1978)
 Smith (1964)
 Williams (1973)
 Comparison 2: Posted-offer versus Double-Auction Pricing
Mechanisms: Ketcham, Arlington, and Williams (1984)
 Comparison 3: Nonbinding Price Controls
 A Double Auction Market: Smith and Williams (1981)
 A Posted-Offer Market: Coursey and Smith (1983)
Laboratory Market Trading
Institutions
S/No
1
Name
8
Posted offer
auction
Posted bid
auction
Discriminative
auction
Competitive
auction
Clearinghouse
auction
Cournot quantity
choice
Walrasian
auction
Dutch auction
9
English auction
2
3
4
5
6
7
No. of Sellers /
No. of Buyers
-/-
Who Makes
Price Proposals
Sellers
Decisions
Sequential or Simultaneous
Offers posted simultaneously
How Contracts
Are Confirmed
Buyers shop in sequence
-/-
Buyers
Bids posted simultaneously
Sellers shop in sequence
1/-
Buyers
Bids posted simultaneously
1/-
Buyers
Bids posted simultaneously
-/-
Auctioneer
Price adjusted sequentially
1/-
Seller clock
Price lowered sequentially
1/-
Buyers
Price raised sequentially
Highest N bidders
pay own bid prices
Highest N bidders
pay N+1st price
Intersection of
bid and offer arrays
Intersection of
total quantity and demand
Confirmation when
excess demand is zero
Buyer confirmation
stops clock
Sale to highest bidder
-/-
Buyers and sellers Bids and offers simultaneously
-/-
Endogenous price Seller quantities simultaneously
10
Bid auction
-/-
Buyers
Prices raised sequentially
Sellers
11
Offer auction
-/-
Sellers
Prices lowered sequentially
Buyers
12
Double auction
-/-
Both types
Both types
13
Decentralized
Negotiation
List/discount
-/ -
Both types
Bids raised and offers lowered
sequentially
Sequential but decentralized
-/-
Sellers
Simultaneous (list), sequential
(discounts)
Buyers
14
Both types
Key Results:
Prices in posted-offer auctions are consistently
higher than double-auctions.
Why?
Main Goal: Stress Test
Twenty-five trading periods to see “steady state”
behavior
Experience manipulated
Sellers in posted-offer auctions have complete
information on all price offers
Both posted-offer and double auctions were run on
PLATO (a computerized system)
Posted-Offer Auction: Seller
Posted-Offer Auction - Buyer
Demand and Supply Schedules
+ constant to shift
schedules
Demand and Supply Schedule: Design 1
Demand and Supply Schedule: Design 2
Competitive Equilibrium & Nash Equilibrium
 Competitive equilibrium prices are not Nash equilibria in
posted-offer markets
 Competitive equilibrium prices are Nash equilibria in double
auction markets
 In Design 2, there is a Nash equilibrium near the limit-price
level of 4.75. (4.73, 4.74, 4.76) (PO5i)
Nash Equilibrium
Experimental Design
 Design I
 Double Auction (DA)
 Inexperienced Subjects: Three experiments (2DA17, 2DA21, 2DA24)
 Experienced Subjects: Three experiments (2DA20x, 2DA47x, 2DA53x)
 Posted-offer (PO)
 Inexperienced Subjects: Three experiments (PO7i, PO12i, PO19i)
 Experienced Subjects: Three experiments (PO27ix, PO32ix, PO17ixs)
 Design II
 Double Auction (DA)
 Inexperienced Subjects: Three experiments (3DA16, 3DA18, 3DA19)
 Experienced Subjects: Three experiments (3DA28x, 3DA32x, 3DA36x)
 Posted-offer (PO)
 Inexperienced Subjects: Three experiments (PO4i, PO5i, PO11i, PO22i)
 Experienced Subjects: Three experiments (PO14ix, PO25ix)
DA: Design I
PO: Design I
Mean Deviation: Design I
PO: Design II
PO: Design II
Mean Deviation: Design II
Price Convergence: RMSE
r (t )  a  b  r (t  1)   t
Q (t )
r (t ) 
r
0
rN0
2
[
P
(
t
)

P
]
 q
C
q 1
Q (t )
a
 lim t  r (t ) 
1 b
 $0.055; rL0  0.07
Price Convergence: Other Measures
N
Q (t )
 (t ) 
0
 N0
 ( P (t )  P
q 1
q
C
)
Q (t )
       

3
 $0.054;  L0  0.07
E (t ) 

i 1
N

i 1
i
(t )
C
i
(t )
E   E   E 
3
E N0  98.8; E L0  96.5
E0 
Price Convergence: Results
Price Convergence: Treatment Variables
y  K    X K    PK    DK   K
0
k
rK0
 0
0
y K   K
 0
 EK
0, DA
Pk  
1, PO
0, inexp
xk  
1, exp
0,Design1
Dk  
1, Design2
Price Convergence: Treatment Variables
Outline
 Comparison 1: Posted-Bid versus Oral-Bid auctions: Plott and
Smith (1978)
 Smith (1964)
 Williams (1973)
 Comparison 2: Posted-offer versus Double-Auction Pricing
Mechanisms: Ketcham, Arlington, and Williams (1984)
 Comparison 3: Nonbinding Price Controls
 A Double Auction Market: Smith and Williams (1981)
 A Posted-Offer Market: Coursey and Smith (1983)
Assess the effects of price controls in
Double Auction (DA) market
Hypotheses?
Do non-binding ceilings favor buyers or sellers?
Will sellers use ceiling as focal point for tacit
collusion?
DA Experiment Design
Use PLATO
Experienced subjects (in prior experiments without
price controls)
Values and costs assigned to subjects specify a supply
and demand schedule so that efficiency is sensitive to
non binding price control
Subjects received announcement that price control is
in effect when appropriate
Each experiment consists of three “weeks” of trading,
with each week consisting of five or four periods
Total of 16 experiments
DA Experiment Design:
Example Values and Costs
+ constant shift at the beginning of new “week” and
rerandomized among subjects
DA Experiment Design:
Example Supply and Demand Schedules
DA Experiment Design:
Treatment Groups
DA Experiment: Summary of Results
Ceiling lower prices
Floor  higher prices
Results: An Example
With Price Control
Without Price Control
Linear model for
isolating the impact of various factors
i > 0
i < 0
Transfers of Earnings:
The impact of price controls
Ceiling transfers 46 cents per
period from sellers to buyers in
Week 2
Floor transfers $2.02 per
period from buyers to sellers
In week 2
t-values
Assess the effects of price controls in
Double Auction market
 Non-binding price ceilings (floors) did not appear to
serve as focal point
Non-binding ceilings lower the contract prices
(ceilings favor buyers)
Non-binding floors raise the contract prices (floors
favor sellers)
Assess the effects of price controls (could
be binding) in Posted-Offer (PO) market
Hypotheses?
Are the above results sensitive to market institution?
Price Controls in Posted-offer Auctions
 Use PLATO
 Experienced subjects (in experiments without price
controls)
Subjects received announcement that price control is
in effect when appropriate
Four buyers each capable of purchasing three units
from four sellers each capable of selling three units
Each experiment has 20 periods: either first 10 has
price control or the second 10
 Total of 13 experiments
Results: Example
Similar to results obtained in DA in non-binding cases
PO Experiment Design: Results
Summary
Similar to those results in DA for non-binding price
controls
The removal of either a binding or a non-binding price
ceiling produces a jump in contract prices
After the initial increase in prices, following the lifting
of a control, the market tends to converge toward the
CE price.
Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit
Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards
By Chrostopher Knittel and Victor Stango
We test whether a nonbinding price ceiling may serve as a
focal point for tacit collusion, using data from the credit
card market during the 1980’s. Our empirical model can
distinguish instances when firms match a binding ceiling
from instances when firms tacitly collude at a nonbinding
ceiling. The results suggest that tacit collusion at
nonbinding state-level ceilings was prevalent during the
early 1980s but that national integration of the market
reduced the sustainability of tacit collusion by the end of
the decade.