Preparing to Be Unprepared:
Human Resources
Susanne Jul, PhD
Pacific Disaster Center
sjul@pdc.org
Presented by:
Canadian Centre for
Emergency Preparedness
Disclaimer
• Work done, in part, at the Pacific Disaster
Center under a National Research Council
postdoctoral fellowship
• However, not directly related to PDC operations
– PDC operations focused on geographic information
analysis (primarily for mitigation efforts)
• Research supplemented with personal
experience with American Red Cross Disaster
Services
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Anne
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To Be Prepared
We need to have
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
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More people
More planning
More training
More exercises
More supplies
More money
All of the above
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But, What About When
We don’t have
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
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More people?
More planning?
More training?
More exercises?
More supplies?
More money?
All of the above?
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Claim
• Preparedness is an illusion
– It is impossible to prepare for all possible events
• Responders and response organizations need to
function in situations and under circumstances
for which they are unprepared
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Preparedness Is An Illusion
Sociological Evidence
• Disaster sociology has been a field of systematic
study since ~1950
• Literature predominantly reflects responses to
natural disasters in North America
• Three dimensions of events correlated with
response characteristics
– Scale
– Kind
– “Anticipability”
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Scale
• A measure of the extent of the effects of an event  5, 6, 9, 12
Local Emergency
Example
1997 Paris traffic
accident
Impact on
community
infrastructure
Local Disaster
Catastrophic Disaster
9/11 Terrorist attack,
1989 Loma Prieta
earthquake
1918 Flu Pandemic,
2004 US hurricane season,
2005 Hurricane Katrina
Localized effects, if any
Localized damage or loss
Extensive damage or
destruction
Impact on
response
infrastructure
Largely unaffected
Localized damage or loss
Extensive damage or
destruction, and/or
completely overwhelmed
Adequacy of
response
measures
Within local planning
Exceeds local capacity but
within greater response
capacity
Exceeds all planning and
capacity
Organizational
emergence
Only established
organizations
mobilized
Scope
Only part of single community and official
jurisdiction affected
Single community and
official jurisdiction affected
Multiple communities and
official jurisdictions affected
Duration
Hours-weeks
Weeks-months
Months-years
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2006 Mountain View
apartment complex
fire
Disaster
Established and
expanding
organizations
mobilized
Established, expanding, extending and emergent
organizations mobilized
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Organizational Emergence
• Emergence
– Spontaneous involvement and behavior of individuals and
organizations  3, 4, 5, 6
Tasks
Routine
Operational
Organizational
Structure
Non-Routine
Same as predisaster
I. Established
(e.g., city emergency
services)
III. Extending
(e.g., city council or church
community)
New
II. Expanding
(e.g., American Red Cross)
IV. Emergent
(e.g., community group
formed to collect donations)
“DRC typology”  6
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Scale
• A measure of the extent of the effects of an event  5, 6, 9, 12
Local Emergency
Example
1997 Paris traffic
accident
Impact on
community
infrastructure
Local Disaster
Catastrophic Disaster
9/11 Terrorist attack,
1989 Loma Prieta
earthquake
1918 Flu Pandemic,
2004 US hurricane season,
2005 Hurricane Katrina
Localized effects, if any
Localized damage or loss
Extensive damage or
Impact on
response
infrastructure
Largely unaffected
Localized damage or loss
Extensive damage or
destruction, and/or
completely overwhelmed
Adequacy of
response
measures
Within local planning
Exceeds local capacity but
within greater response
capacity
Exceeds all planning and
capacity
Organizational
emergence
Only established
organizations
mobilized
Scope
Only part of single community and official
jurisdiction affected
Duration
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Hours-weeks
2006 Mountain View
apartment complex
fire
Disaster
There will always
be a response
destruction
that exceeds actual preparedness
Established and
expanding
organizations
mobilized
Established, expanding, extending and emergent
organizations mobilized
Single community and
official jurisdiction affected
Multiple communities and
official jurisdictions affected
Even small responses depend on responders and
responding organizations
with limited or no
training,
Weeks-months
Months-years
knowledge or experience in disaster management
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Kind
• An indicator of the types of effects of an event  6, 11, 13
Agency  10
Consensus
Affect  6
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Conflict
Community disaster
Natural hazard event
Social conflicts
Sector disaster
Technology failure
Sabotage
Trans-system social
rupture (TSSR)  12
Pandemic
Computer virus
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Kind
• An indicator of the types of effects of an event  6, 11, 13
Agency  10
Consensus
Affect  6
Conflict
Community disaster
Natural hazard event
Social conflicts
Sector disaster
Technology failure
Sabotage
Trans-system social
rupture (TSSR)  12
Pandemic
Computer virus
Many responses depend on responders
with specialized skills that are unrelated
to conventional disaster management
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“Anticipability”
• A measure of the possibility of preparing for a particular
event  7
There will always be a response that we have
not imagined or believed could be needed
Predictability = Imaginability + Believability
Easy
Influenceability
Hard
Easy
1. Conventional
(e.g., 1986 Chernobyl)
2. Unexpected
(e.g., 1979 Three Mile Island)
Hard
3. Intractable
(e.g., 2005 Hurricane Katrina)
4. Fundamental
(e.g., 9/11 Terrorist attack)
There will always be a response
that we cannot anticipate
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Summary
1. Even small responses depend on responders and
responding organizations with limited or no training,
knowledge or experience in disaster management
2. There will always be a response that exceeds actual
preparedness
3. Many responses depend on responders with
specialized skills that are unrelated to conventional
disaster management skills
4. There will always be a response that we have not
imagined or believed could be needed
5. There will always be a response that we cannot
anticipate
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In Other Words,
• Preparedness is an illusion
– It is impossible to prepare for all possible events
• Responders and response organizations need to
function in situations and under circumstances
for which they are unprepared
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But Wait!
• Even if it were possible to prepare for all
possible events, resource limitations make it
impossible
• In fact, resource limitations make it impossible to
prepare for those events for which it is possible
to prepare
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Resource Limitations
• Planners generally not resource controllers  1, 10
– Public vs. private sector
– Staff vs. line management
• Given the reality of limited resources, resource
controllers must prioritize certain, near-certain
and immediate threats (i.e., routine events)  10
– Perceived low-probability and distant threats (i.e.,
disasters) lose out
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Scared?
• Can’t prepare for all possible events
• Even if we could, we don’t have the necessary
resources
• Yet everyone expects (and needs) us to be
prepared for any event!
What to do?
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Continue Conventional Preparedness
Work on getting
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
More people
More planning
More training
More exercises
More supplies
More money
All of the above
Prepare Not to Be Scared!
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Prepare to Be Unprepared
• Augment conventional preparedness
• Prepare responders and response organizations
to leverage available resources
– People
– Supplies
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Prepare to Be Scared!
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Preparing to Be Unprepared (PUp):
Human Resources
Problem
• Current response model is expert model
– Prepare expert responders and teams to accomplish
response
– Develop expertise before performing response tasks
Task-relevant knowledge
Task-specific
Knowledge of
disaster response
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General domain
Little
Extensive
Super-expert
Functional semi-expert
Functional inexpert
Some
Expert
Semi-expert
Functional inexpert
Little
Specialist
Semi-specialist
Inexpert
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Problem
• Current response model is expert model
– Prepare expert responders and teams to accomplish
response
– Develop expertise before performing response tasks
Task-relevant knowledge
Task-specific
Knowledge of
disaster response
© SJul 2007
General domain
Little
Extensive
Super-expert
Functional semi-expert
Functional inexpert
Some
Expert
Semi-expert
Functional inexpert
Little
Specialist
Semi-specialist
Inexpert
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Reality
• Experts are a scarce resource
– We can’t train enough of them in advance
– We can’t train the right expertise in advance
– If further learning is not supported, crash courses are
often just that
Task-relevant knowledge
Task-specific
Knowledge of
disaster response
© SJul 2007
General domain
Little
Extensive
Super-expert
Functional semi-expert
Functional inexpert
Some
Expert
Semi-expert
Functional inexpert
Little
Specialist
Semi-specialist
Inexpert
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Reality
• Experts are a scarce resource
– We can’t train enough of them in advance
– We can’t train the right expertise in advance
– If further learning is not supported, crash courses are
often just that
Task-relevant knowledge
Task-specific
Knowledge of
disaster response
© SJul 2007
General domain
Little
Extensive
Super-expert
Functional semi-expert
Functional inexpert
Some
Expert
Semi-expert
Functional inexpert
Little
Specialist
Semi-specialist
Inexpert
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PUp Strategy
• Plan for semi- and inexpert responders and
response organizations to accomplish response
• Prepare for developing expertise while
performing response tasks
• Reserve experts to guide, teach and mentor
Task-relevant knowledge
Task-specific
Knowledge of
disaster response
© SJul 2007
General domain
Little
Extensive
Super-expert
Functional semi-expert
Functional inexpert
Some
Expert
Semi-expert
Functional inexpert
Little
Specialist
Semi-specialist
Inexpert
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PUp Techniques
•
•
•
•
•
Prepare tools and matériel for inexperts
Train coach responders
Leverage remote expertise
Plan and train to co-source quotidian tasks
Get ready to catch the wave
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Prepare Tools and Matériel
• For use by inexperts
– Affix instructions critical to usage
– Prioritize learnability in selection
• For inexperts
– Design to foster just-in-time and collateral learning
– Promote dual-purpose tools
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Train Coach Responders
• Onsite trainer
– No direct response responsibilities
– Provides tactical “what” and “how to” guidance to
semi- and inexpert responders
– Must have coaching skills and understanding of
response tasks
– Should be kept informed
about operational goals,
strategies and needs
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Train Coach Responders
• Onsite team builder
– Responsible for (or assists with) direct response
tasks
– Develops ad-hoc team of available responders to
accomplish task
– Must have team development and leadership
skills
– Can be paired with
responders with knowledge
of response task
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Leverage Remote Expertise
• Remote mentoring
– Expert or specialist responder supporting semi- or
inexpert responder, e.g., by phone
– Relationships and trust developed at individual
personal level
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Leverage Remote Expertise
• Responder support service, e.g., via hotline or
website
– Pool of expert or specialist responders as responder
support staff
– Continuous service (potentially 24/7)
– Pooled expertise
– Relationships and trust
established at the
organizational level
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Co-source Quotidian Tasks
• Quotidian
– Daily, ordinary, common-place
• Quotidian task
– Specialized, outsourceable, non-response-specific
• Dual-purpose organization  2
– Primary purpose not disaster-related, but
capabilities are response-relevant
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Co-source Quotidian Tasks
• Engage non-response organizations to perform
tasks that are part of their normal operations
– Look for candidate tasks during planning
– Train responders to look for and recognize quotidian tasks
and dual-purpose organizations
– Train responders to work with non-“command and control”
organizational structures
– Develop response-time
procedures for establishing
and maintaining co-sourcing
relationships
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Catch the Wave
• Allow external experts to take ownership of
projects to benefit future responses
– Compile “needed projects” descriptions in advance
– Implement development projects (even if not
immediately deployable)
– Solicit innovative solutions to operational needs (even
if not immediately practicable)
– Evaluate and test development
projects using operational inputs
(even if not actually deployed)
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Summary
Summary
• Three dimensions of disaster correlated with qualitative
differences in ensuing responses 
– Scale
– Kind
– Anticipability
• Preparedness is an illusion
– It is impossible to prepare for all possible events
– Even if it were possible to prepare for all possible events,
resource limitations make it impossible
• Must prepare responders and response organizations to
leverage available resources
 Jul, S. (2007). Who’s Really on First? A Domain-Level User, Task and
Context Analysis for Response Technology. Proceedings of the 4th
International ISCRAM Conference.
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Summary
• Techniques for preparing to leverage available
human resources
–
–
–
–
–
Prepare tools and matériel for inexperts
Train coach responders
Leverage remote expertise
Plan and train to co-source quotidian tasks
Get ready to catch the wave
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Prepare
not to be scared
to be scared
to be prepared
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&
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to be unprepared
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Thanks to
• The Pacific Disaster Center and the US National
Research Council for financial support
• Steve Hailey, American Red Cross, for leading
by example
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2.
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9.
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Drabek, T.E., McEntire, D.A. (2003). Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster: Lessons, Trends and
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<http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Quarantelli/>.
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