Round 2—Aff vs Wake MS
1AC
PLAN
The United States should make legal and regulate nearly all marihuana in the
United States.
1AC 1
Contention 1 is the FDA—
Status quo state-by-state legalization undermines the FDA’s credibility –federal
action is key
Eddy, 10 [CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Medical Marijuana: Review and Analysis of Federal and State Policies Mark Eddy Specialist in
Social Policy April 2, 2010]
The current efforts to gain legal status of marijuana through ballot initiatives seriously
threaten the F ood and D rug A dministration statutorily authorized process of proving safety
and efficacy. (Brief of the Drug Free America Foundation et al., 2004112) Although the individual states regulate the practice of medicine,
the federal government has taken primary responsibility for the regulation of medical
products , especially those containing controlled substances. Pharmaceutical drugs must be approved for use in
the United States by the Food and Drug Administration ( FDA ), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act gives HHS and FDA the responsibility for determining that drugs are safe and effective, a requirement that
all medicines must meet before they can enter interstate commerce and be made available for general medical use.113 Clinical evaluation is required
regardless of whether the drug is synthetically produced or originates from a natural botanical or animal source. Opponents of medical marijuana say
that the FDA’s drug approval process should not be circumvented. To permit states to decide which
medical products can be made available for therapeutic use, they say, would undercut this regulatory system. State medical marijuana initiatives are
seen as inconsistent with the federal government’s responsibility to protect the public from unsafe, ineffective drugs. The Bush Administration argued
in its brief in the Raich case that “excepting drug activity for personal use or free distribution from the sweep of [federal drug laws] would discourage
the consumption of lawful controlled substances and would undermine Congress’s intent to regulate the drug market comprehensively to protect public
health and safety.”114 Three prominent drug abuse experts argued the following in their Amici brief: This
action by the state of
California did not create a “novel social and economic experiment,” but rather chaos in the
scientific and medical communities. Furthermore, under Court of Appeals ruling, such informal State
systems could be replicated, and even expanded, in a manner that puts at risk the critical
protections so carefully crafted under the national food and drug legislation of the 20th
century.115 The FDA itself has stated that FDA is the sole Federal agency that approves drug products as safe and effective for particular
indications, and efforts that seek to bypass the FDA drug approval process would not serve the
interests of public health. FDA has not approved marijuana for any indication. Only the disciplined, systematic,
scientific conduct of clinical trials can establish whether there is any medicinal value to
marijuana, smoked or otherwise.116 The Drug Free America Raich brief elaborates further (pp. 12-13): The ballot initiative-led
laws create an atmosphere of medicine by popular vote, rather than the rigorous
scientific and medical process that all medicines must undergo. Before the
development of modern pharmaceutical science, the field of medicine was fraught with potions
and herbal remedies. Many of those were absolutely useless, or conversely were harmful to
unsuspecting subjects. Thus evolved our current Food and Drug Administration and drug scheduling
processes, which Congress has authorized in order to create a uniform and reliable system of drug approval and regulation. This system is
being intentionally undermined by the legalization proponents through use of medical marijuana
initiatives. The organizers of the medical marijuana state initiatives deny that it was their intent to undermine the federal drug approval process.
Rather, in their view, it became necessary for them to bypass the FDA and go to the states because of the federal government’s resistance to marijuana
research requests and rescheduling petitions. As for the charge that politics should not play a role in the drug approval and controlled substance
scheduling processes, medical marijuana supporters point out that marijuana’s original listing as a Schedule I substance in 1970 was itself a political act
on the part of Congress. Scientists
on both sides of the issue say more research needs to be done, yet some
researchers charge that the federal government has all but shut down marijuana clinical
trials for reasons based on politics and ideology rather than science.151 In any case, as the IOM Report pointed out, “although a drug is normally
approved for medical use only on proof of its ‘safety and efficacy,’ patients with life-threatening conditions are sometimes (under protocols for
‘compassionate use’) allowed access to unapproved drugs whose benefits and risks are uncertain.”152 This was the case with the FDA’s IND
Compassionate Access Program under which a limited number of patients are provided government-grown medical marijuana to treat their serious
medical conditions. Some observers believe the pharmaceutical industry and some politicians oppose medical marijuana to protect pharmaceutical
industry profits. Because the whole marijuana plant cannot be patented, research efforts must be focused on the development of synthetic cannabinoids
such as Marinol. But even if additional cannabinoid drugs are developed and marketed, some believe that doctors and patients should still not be
criminalized for recommending and using the natural substance. The New England Journal of Medicine has editorialized that [A] federal policy that
prohibits physicians from alleviating suffering by prescribing marijuana for seriously ill patients is misguided, heavy-handed, and inhumane.
Marijuana may have long-term adverse effects and its use may presage serious addictions, but neither long-term side effects nor addiction is a relevant
issue in such patients. It is also hypocritical to forbid physicians to prescribe marijuana while permitting them to use morphine and meperidine to
relieve extreme dyspnea and pain. With both of these drugs the difference between the dose that relieves symptoms and the dose that hastens death is
very narrow; by contrast, there is no risk of death from smoking marijuana. To demand evidence of therapeutic efficacy is equally hypocritical. The
noxious sensations that patients experience are extremely difficult to quantify in controlled experiments. What really counts for a therapy with this kind
of safety margin is whether a seriously ill patient feels relief as a result of the intervention, not whether a controlled trial “proves” its efficacy.153 Some
until the federal government relents and becomes more hospitable to
marijuana research proposals and more willing to consider moving marijuana to a less restrictive schedule, the medical
marijuana issue will continue to be fought at state and local levels of governance. As one
observers suggest that
patient advocate has stated, “As the months tick away, it will become more and more obvious that we need to continue changing state laws until the
federal government has no choice but to change its inhumane medicinal marijuana laws.”154
Challenges to FDA credibility are increasing now – reasserting a strong role is key
to the pharamcuetical industry
LaMattina, 14 [John LaMattina Contributor I cover news on drugs and R&D in the pharma
industry Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.“How Did A 30 Year Big
Pharma Veteran Become An FDA Apologist?”,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2014/04/01/how-did-a-30-year-big-pharmaveteran-become-an-fda-apologist/ ]
a strong, independent FDA is crucial to the success of any
company doing drug R&D. The primary role of the FDA is to protect Americans from unsafe
drugs and poorly effective agents. Patients and physicians need to be assured that the medicine
being prescribed has undergone vigorous and thorough testing. FDA credibility makes moot
the accusations of pharma critics like Goldacre that: Drugs are tested by the people who
manufacture them, in poorly designed trials
in such
a way that they exaggerate the benefits of treatment.”
unless we have a strong and
well respected FDA, such challenges are accepted as fact.
Some
critics charge that the industry hides adverse events of their experimental medicines
when a company files a New Drug Application for FDA
approval, every shred of data ever accumulated by the company is included Thus, the
credibility of the biopharmaceutical industry is directly connected with the
credibility of the FDA Should the public believe that the FDA is inadequately
doing its job then they will be concerned that the medicines they are being prescribed are not
what they are made out to be. In effect, pharma’s reputation is directly tied to the
strength of the FDA. Given that I believe that pharma’s biggest challenge is improving its
poor reputation, you can see why I believe that the FDA’s role is important for so many reasons.
So, how did a big pharma guy become an FDA apologist? Basically, it stems from the fact that
Ben
“
, on hopelessly small numbers of weird, unrepresented patients, and analyzed using techniques that are flawed by design,
Anyone who has worked with the FDA knows that the FDA reviews all clinical trials and would never allow a key
clinical trial to proceed if it was poorly designed or was to include weird, unrepresented patients, or analyzed with flawed techniques. Such comments are absurd. Yet,
The same can be said about the side effects of new drugs.
. Few realize, however, that a
company is legally bound to report every adverse drug event within 15 days of its occurrence. Furthermore,
.
.
,
Its reverse causal -- it implicates overall industry innovation
Baghda, 7 [Ramsey, Regulation Policy Market Access, September, Vol. 2, No. 9, Avandia and
the Commercial Impact of FDA’s Credibility Gap,
www.consumersunion.org/pdf/RPMreport0907.pdf]
Still, Mott says, the agency’s longevity as the gold standard acts as an anchor in a turbulent environment. “The FDA has a reservoir of credibility built over decades.
Notwithstanding the recent bashing in the media and political arenas, I think that reservoir still exists.” Mott’s right: Not even FDA’s strongest critics have come out and said the
agency isn’t the gold standard anymore. But when asked whether FDA’s credibility is a real commercial issue for drug and biotech companies, Mott doesn’t hesitate. “Absolutely.
reductions in either the actual effectiveness or capabilities of the agency—or the perceived effectiveness or capabilities and credibility
of the agency— increases the already tremendous risks, costs and timelines in the
drug development process and hurts the industry and ultimately patients.” “FDA’s credibility
crisis “does affect our decisions on drug development targets and the risk we’re
prepared to take on in drug development. Clearly, the safety bar has gone up in the
agency over the last few years as we’ve gone through this cycle of safety questions
Any
and credibility assaults on the FDA. That affects how we think about what we’re
going to develop and how we design and run experiments.” Wall Street and internal R&D
programs aren’t the only places feeling the negative impact from FDA’s credibility
gap. The venture capital community is looking at deals through a slightly different
lens as well.
Failure to maintain medical innovation makes epidemics inevitable.
Sachs, Columbia sustainable development professor, 8-17-14
(Jeffrey, “Important lessons from Ebola outbreak”,
http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=important-lessons-fromebola-outbreak&id=92924)
Ebola is the latest of many recent epidemics, also including AIDS, SARS, H1N1 flu, H7N9 flu, and others.
AIDS is the deadliest of these killers, claiming nearly 36 million lives since 1981. Of course, even larger and more sudden
epidemics are possible , such as the 1918 influenza during World War I, which claimed 50-100
million lives (far more than the war itself). And, though the 2003 SARS outbreak was contained, causing fewer than 1,000 deaths, the
disease was on the verge of deeply disrupting several East Asian economies including China’s. There are four crucial facts to
understand about Ebola and the other epidemics. First, most emerging infectious diseases are zoonoses, meaning
that they start in animal populations, sometimes with a genetic mutation that enables the jump to
humans. Ebola may have been transmitted from bats; HIV/AIDS emerged from chimpanzees; SARS most likely came from civets traded in animal
markets in southern China; and influenza strains such as H1N1 and H7N9 arose from genetic re-combinations of viruses among wild and farm animals.
New zoonotic diseases are inevitable as humanity pushes into new ecosystems (such as formerly
remote forest regions); the food industry creates more conditions for genetic recombination; and climate
change scrambles natural habitats and species interactions. Second, once a new infectious disease
appears, its spread through airlines, ships, megacities, and trade in animal products is likely to be extremely rapid .
These epidemic diseases are new markers of globalization, revealing through their
chain of death how
vulnerable the world has become from the pervasive movement of people and goods. Third, the poor are the first to
suffer and the worst affected. The rural poor live closest to the infected animals that first transmit
the disease. They often hunt and eat bushmeat, leaving them vulnerable to infection. Poor, often illiterate, individuals are
generally unaware of how infectious diseases -- especially unfamiliar diseases -- are transmitted, making them much more
likely to become infected and to infect others. Moreover, given poor nutrition and lack of access to basic health
services, their weakened immune systems are easily overcome by infections that better
nourished and treated individuals can survive. And “de-medicalized” conditions -- with few if any professional health workers to ensure an
appropriate public-health response to an epidemic (such as isolation of infected individuals, tracing of contacts, surveillance, and so forth) -- make
initial outbreaks more severe. Finally, the
required medical responses, including diagnostic tools and effective medications and vaccines,
inevitably lag behind the emerging diseases. In any event, such tools must be continually replenished. This
requires cutting-edge biotechnology, immunology, and ultimately bioengineering to create largescale industrial responses (such as millions of doses of vaccines or medicines in the case of large epidemics). The AIDS crisis, for
example, called forth tens of billions of dollars for research and development -- and similarly substantial commitments by the pharmaceutical industry - to produce lifesaving antiretroviral drugs at global scale. Yet each
breakthrough inevitably leads to the pathogen’s
mutation , rendering previous treatments less effective. There is no ultimate victory, only a constant arms
race between humanity and disease-causing agents.
Extinction
Clapper 13 – Director of National Intelligence (James R., “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”, 3/12/13; <www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf>)//Beddow
Scientists continue to discover previously unknown pathogens in humans that made the “jump”
from animals—zoonotic diseases. Examples are: a prion disease in cattle that jumped in the 1980s to cause variant
Creutzeldt-Jacob disease; a bat henipavirus that in 1999 became known as the human Nipah Virus; a bat corona virus that jumped to
humans in 2002 to cause Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS); and another SARS-like corona virus recently identified in
individuals who have been in Saudi Arabia, which might also have bat origins. Human
and livestock population
growth and encroachment into jungles increase human exposure to crossovers. No one can
predict which pathogen will be the next to spread to humans, or when or where
such a development will occur, but humans will continue to be vulnerable to
pandemics, most of which will probably originate in animals. An easily
transmissible, novel respiratory pathogen that kills or incapacitates more than
one percent of its victims is among the most disruptive events possible. Such an
outbreak would result in a global pandemic that causes suffering and death in
every corner of the world, probably in fewer than six months. This is not a
hypothetical threat. History is replete with examples of pathogens sweeping populations that
lack immunity, causing political and economic upheaval, and influencing the
outcomes of wars—for example, the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic affected military operations
during World War I and caused global economic disruptions. The World Health Organization has described
one influenza pandemic as “the epidemiological equivalent of a flash flood.” However, slow-spreading pathogens, such as HIV/AIDS,
have been just as deadly, if not more so. Such a pathogen with pandemic potential may have already
jumped to humans somewhere; HIV/AIDS entered the human population more than 50 years before it was recognized
and identified. In addition, targeted therapeutics and vaccines might be inadequate to keep up with
the size and speed of the threat, and drug-resistant forms of diseases, such as tuberculosis,
gonorrhea, and Staphylococcus aureus, have already emerged.
the plan solves— it ensures FDA regulation
Kalam, 02 [Harvard Law School, The Food and Drug Administration and Drug Legalization: A
Brief Model of Regulation Murad Kalam March 22, 2002 Professor Peter Barton Hutt Food and
Drug Law (Winter Term),
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8852123/Kalam.html?sequence=2]
Drug legalization [2] entails the free-market availability of all currently illegal drugs; in such a regime,
“the entire illicit drug trade would become legal: manufacture, transportation, sale, purchase,
possession, use.” [3] All currently illegal drugs would become as available to consumers as any other
prescription or non-prescription drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration ( FDA ).[4] The FDA
seems the natural regulator of newly-legalized drugs (NLD’s) because the FDA already
regulates “almost every object placed into or around the human body.” [5] While many advocates of legalizing
drugs suggest that the FDA should regulate NLD’s, very little has been written about how the FDA would regulate once illicit drugs like legal drugs.[6]
For instance, California Superior Court Justice James Gray, a proponent of drug legalization, envisions a drug legalization regime in which a person
goes to his local supermarket for groceries. He puts into his cart some frozen lemonade, chocolate chip cookies, aspirin grapes—and a six-pack of
cocaine. A friend has recommended the “Big Kick” brand of cocaine and the store is having a special sale: six hits for the price of four. In this scenario,
all of the products in this man’s cart are sold in a “legalized” or “free” market. Under such a program, the
FDA would ensure the
cleanliness and purity of all these products, and see to it that they were labeled accurately for their contents and strength.
This is how the FDA regulates the sale of aspirin, a fully “legalized” drug in this country. [7]
1AC 2
Contention 2 is the war on drugs—
Aff enables regulatory experimentation that causes a shift away from punitive
drug enforcement models
Berman, 14 [April 2014, Douglas A. Berman, Professor Douglas A. Berman attended Princeton
University and Harvard Law School. In law school, he was an editor and developments office
chair of the Harvard Law Review and also served as a teaching assistant for a Harvard
University philosophy course. After graduation from law school in 1993, Professor Berman
served as a law clerk for Judge Jon O. Newman and then for Judge Guido Calabresi, both on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. After clerking, Professor Berman is the
co-author of a casebook, Sentencing Law and Policy: Cases, Statutes and Guidelines, which is
published by Aspen Publishers and is now in its second edition. He has testified before the U.S.
House of Representatives and before numerous sentencing commissions. “Reflecting on the
Latest Drug War Fronts”, Federal Sentencing Reporter, Vol. 26, No. 4, “Is the Drug War Ending
or Retrenching?”, pp. 213-216]
Why State Marijuana Legalization Could Dramatically Transform Drug War Battles and
Forces As reflected in the primary materials reprinted in this Issue, alongside the current debate over modest modifications to
federal drug sentencing schemes, federal officials have been forced to confront and respond to
much more dramatic drug law reforms taking place in the states. In 2012, voters in Colorado and
Washington legalized recreational use and sales of marijuana. These reforms came on the heels of these states and more than a
dozen others enacting laws permitting persons to legally obtain mari- juana for medicinal purposes under various regulatory
schemes. These state-level marijuana law reforms, particularly in the two states in which voter approval of recreational marijuana
use required state officials to create and monitor regulatory regimes for marijuana distribution and use, forced the Department of
Justice to review and articulate whether and how federal officials would continue to enforce existing federal prohibitions on all
marijuana use and distribution in states that had legalized such activity. Reprinted in this Issue are two documents that reflect the
results of the Justice Department’s latest efforts to provide guidance to states that have legalized marijuana use and to actors with
those states involved with marijuana-related businesses: (1) an August 2013 memorandum signed by Deputy Attorney General
James Cole providing guidance, through the articulation of eight national priorities, for on-going federal marijuana enforcement,
and (2) a February 2014 memorandum from the U.S. Department of the Treasury setting out expectations for any financial
institutions involved in providing services to marijuana-related businesses. Much might be said concerning the substance and style
of these federal policy memos, and it will likely be years before it is clear what concrete impact these statements of federal policies
and practices will have on the day-to-day activities of persons working in and around state marijuana industries. But, regardless of
exactly how federal policies and practices impact state marijuana regulations and businesses, the new reality that public
officials and private actors in a number of states are now working within and around a new
legalized marijuana regime could have an extraordinary, transformative potential
with respect to the broader drug war . Unlike sentencing reform, the creation of new state
regulatory regimes necessarily and dramatically alters the basic drug war landscape
and the basic work of those on the battlefield. As suggested above, even significant drug
sentencing reforms do not change the essential terms on which the drug war is fought, nor are
they likely to reorient the perspectives and commitments of the traditional combatants in this
war. In sharp contrast, new laws legalizing and regulating recreational use of marijuana
demand that governmental moneys and energies —which were previously devoted to
drug supply reduction strategies, interdictions, and incarceration— are now directed toward
new programming and invest- ments intended to ensure safe and limited access to
certain drugs along with revised strategies for reducing drug abuse and related
harms . Voters in Colorado and Washington have now essentially demanded their governments
experiment with new models of legal regulation for marijuana focused primarily on
safeguarding the health and security of those citizens who want to use drugs responsibly and those
who wish to avoid drug use. With government priorities reoriented in this way, some additional space has
been cleared for legitimate and responsible businesses and other private-sector actors to invest
in and contribute to creating a legal, regulatory, and social environment in which some responsible drug use is encouraged, and drug abuse is discouraged and treated as a public health
problem rather than as a criminal justice concern. With legal recreational marijuana regulations and realities just
starting to emerge in Colorado and Washington, and in light of the varied experiences in states with varied medical marijuana
regulatory structures, it is far too early to predict just how and how quickly state-level marijuana reforms can and will transform
national policies and perspectives on the drug war more generally. But it
is clear that these reforms have already
ensured that a new set of policy makers and institutional players are thinking
about regulation of drug distribution and use in radical new ways. And once it
becomes easier to understand and experience a serious, reasonable alternative to a criminal
justice response to at least some drugs, the prospect of a full withdrawal from the drug
war, rather than just a limited retrenchment in that war, becomes much more
realistic.
Explicit CSA removal key
Wild, 13 [Joshua, JD, Suffolk University, EPIC FAILURE: THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH
ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN THE FAILURE OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON DRUGS
AND HOW IT IS GOING TO FIX IT, Suffolk University Suffolk Transnational Law Review
Summer, 2013, 36 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 423, p. lexis]
The global war on drugs has been deemed a failure, an apt categorization considering the billions in exorbitant expenditures
the ardent prohibitionist
style of the United States may be the leading cause for the current global drug epidemic. n2 The
disheartening current state of the international drug problem has lead to the global erosion of support
for the U.S.-style war on drugs; furthermore, the emergence of new empirical data has [*424]
generated a series of advocates for reform who seek fiscally responsible policies grounded in science,
health, security, and human rights. n3 Part and parcel of this argument is the encouragement of
governments to experiment with the legal regulation of marijuana because of its vast
global consumption and low level of associated criminality. n4 Evidence suggesting there are more pragmatic and less
punitive approaches to the drug issue, coalescing with various global commissions advocating the assimilation of this data into policies, represents a
shift in the global drug consensus. n5 This shift in global consensus places the [*425] United States. in the
necessary sociopolitical context that may be needed to actually manage the drug epidemic. n6 This Note argues that the
United States has severely aggravated the global drug control problem by forcefully imposing a
prohibitionist ideology onto other countries around the world. n7 To remedy this error, the United States
should take accountability and stand at the forefront of drug policy reformation by
implementing demand side policies within its own nation, something that is within its own capacity. n8 Part II of this Note
I. Introduction
applied to its supply-side campaign with little statistics to effectuate its cause. n1 In fact, evidence persistently suggests that
will set forth all of the pertinent facts that are necessary for understanding the current global drug epidemic, how the epidemic arrived at this state, and what the United States
can do to manage it. n9 In Part III, this Note traces the history of international drug control and attempts to correlate the demise of control over the issue with U.S.-led supplyside policies. n10 Part IV provides an analysis of how the United States exacerbated the problem and suggests an avenue the United States can take to place the issue in a
the United States should take accountability for its mistakes and reform its
policies from a regime of prohibition to one of regulation. n12 II. Facts The ineffectiveness of the war against drugs, both
manageable position. n11 Part V concludes that
domestically and internationally, is not a relatively new or veiled problem. n13 [*426] Despite the continual emergence of empirical evidence, little has been done to assimilate
this information into drug control policies since the war was first waged by international policymakers and President Richard Nixon over forty years ago. n14 Recently, case
studies and evidence have accumulated to a level that can no longer be ignored, and the debate concerning more efficient alternatives and revisions to current drug control
policies has intensified. n15 International commissions such as the Global Commission on Drug Control Policy are chastising global drug control regimes for their lack of
leadership on drug policy and are advocating for multilateral debate on this issue. n16 Essential to the progression of this issue is the United States, who within the past forty
years has spent over $ 2.5 trillion dollars fighting the war, with little empirical data to support meaningful results. n17 In fact, research has consistently indicated that [*427] the
United States supply-side policies are instead a leading cause of the current international epidemic. n18 A. The First Step to Solving a Problem is Recognizing That There is One Current State of International Drug Control With the implementation of the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs ("UNSCND") nearly fifty years ago, it was clear
that the ultimate objective was to improve the "health and welfare of mankind." n19 Unfortunately, this objective has been lost amidst current policies driven by ideological
perspective and political convenience, with a focus on quantifiable figures such as drug arrests and harsh punishments, rather than qualitative figures that represent economic
and social development. n20 Since the initiation of the global drug prohibition system, numerous forms of empirical and scientific evidence have surfaced that reveal the nature
and patterns of drug production, distribution, consumption, and dependence. n21 Most significantly, some studies have even correlated the progression of these patterns with
the effectiveness of current policies. n22 The [*428] 2011 World Drug Report estimated that in 2009, between 149 and 272 million people globally, or 3.3% to 6.1% of the world's
middle aged population, used illicit substances at least once in that year. n23 Globally, the average prevalence of HIV and Hepatitis C among injecting drug users is 17.9% and
50%, respectively. n24 These statistics reflect the health consequences of the drug use epidemic and illustrate the importance of solving this ominous predicament. n25
Ironically, despite increasing evidence that the current drug control policies are not working, and case studies suggesting that less repressive, alternative drug control policies are
working, most policymaking bodies have tended to avoid this reality and the possibility of exploring alternatives. n26 Governments continue to expend resources and billions of
U.S. dollars on incarceration and futile supply reduction strategies which in turn displace the possibility of spending these resources on demand reduction. n27
Advocates of reform endorse the sensible policy [*429] option that governments experiment with
different models of legal regulation of drugs in an attempt to undermine the criminal market and enhance national security. n28 For this
movement to effectively control the epidemic at hand, there must be a broad consensus around the
world that the current drug control policies are morally noxious. n29 Unfortunately, the stigma and
fear associated with more toxic drugs, such as heroin, has precluded this consensus and
perpetuated the current ineffective policies. n30 B. Exacerbating the Problem - The U.S. Role in the Global War on Drugs When President
Nixon waged the U.S. Government's "War on Drugs" nearly forty years ago, policymakers' focus was on supply-side measures and harsh law enforcement as the means to stop
the seemingly endless flow of drugs across U.S. borders. n31 The problem was, and remains today, that the United States is the world's largest consumer of illicit drugs, and
combining that with drug markets as diverse and well established as they are, the possibility of stopping the supply of these drugs is simply unrealistic and unrealizable. n32
Instead, these ineffective [*430] drug policies have resulted in nothing short of an abject disaster. n33 With approximately 20 million illicit drug users in the United States, the
estimated annual cost of illicit drug use to society is above $ 193 billion. n34 With the overall availability of illicit drugs in the U.S. increasing at alarming rates, and empirical
data to correlate current drug policies to this epidemic, advocates of reform are pointing to the urgent need for a more rational drug control policy discussion. n35 Policymakers
often underrate the U.S.-demand element of the equation, and how it relates to the problem at hand, particularly when you consider that marijuana accounts for the vast
majority of America's illicit drug consumption. n36 A 2010 study conducted by the National Survey on Drug Use and Health revealed that in the United States, 22.6 million
people had used illicit drugs in the past month, 17.4 million of which used marijuana. n37 Further, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health estimated that at least 18.5 % of
the nation's young adults, aged 18 to 25, used marijuana. n38 Put bluntly, the monumental scope of the international marijuana market is largely affected by the exorbitant U.S.
demand for the drug and the illegality of the market. n39 [*431] The high demand for marijuana in the United States has eroded authority in countries that produce marijuana,
international officials are increasingly calling on the United States to do more to reduce
its demand. n40 At a time when it seems that the drug epidemic in the United States may be spiraling out of control, there is a growing
movement among U.S. states to rethink and restructure marijuana laws. n41 Marijuana is a
criminally sanctioned drug under U.S. federal law, but as of 2010, over half of the states have enacted or proposed legislation that
and
either allows legal medical marijuana or decriminalize possession of marijuana. n42 California was the first state in the United States to allow marijuana for medical use. n43
The state tax board of California believes that the legalization and regulation of marijuana could raise $ 1.3 billion or more per year, while saving millions of dollars in prison and
law enforcement costs. n44 This economic approach to state regulation and taxing of marijuana has a two-fold prospective: (1) eradicating the demand for a criminal market,
and (2) generating a substantial amount of revenue at a time when it is badly needed. n45 These benefits, combined with [*432] the minimal health risks of marijuana in
comparison to alcohol and tobacco, are leading more states to tolerant approaches to drug policy. n46 III. History The notion that international drug control is primarily a fight
against crime and criminals has been the foundation of policy decisions since the development of national and global drug control regimes. n47 The concept of the drug control
system was initially developed based on laudable principles such as reducing harm to individuals and fostering economic and social development. n48 Over time, however, the
drug control system degenerated into a "war" that threatens harm to individual users, farmers, and petty traders while depressing economic and social development. n49 A.
Tracing the Development of International Drug Control Policies The framework of international drug control has transpired through a series of stages in the past century
beginning with the International Opium Convention of 1912 and continuing through 2012, marking the centennial of its existence. n50 The Opium Convention in 1912 and the
treaties that followed were [*433] initially regulatory mechanisms developed largely to control the previously unregulated market of opium. n51 As the treaties evolved and
expanded, they resulted in a regulated trade market for opiates, cocaine, and cannabis, but not the criminalization of these substances or their trade markets. n52 As a result, the
ardent prohibitionists, namely the United States and China, departed from the negotiations in 1925. n53 World Wars I and II served as both a burden and a blessing for the
United States because drug control was not a top priority for most countries during this period and the United States was unable to globalize their prohibitive anti-drug ideals.
n54 Conversely, the end of the war marked the necessary political atmosphere that the United States had yearned for, emerging as the dominant political, economic, and military
power; a leverage position that allowed the United States to shape a new drug control regime. n55 It was the initiative by the United States, advocating for the international
control of narcotic drugs, which lead to the development of the landmark international agreement, the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. n56 1. The UN
Drug Control Conventions The 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs codified all of the piecemeal multilateral treaties on drug control that had been developing since
the early years of the twentieth [*434] century and created a more prohibitive system, extending coverage to include the cultivation of plants that were grown as the raw material
of narcotic drugs. n57 With this extension, a universal system was in place for limiting the cultivation, production, distribution, trade, use, and possession of narcotic substances.
n58 A decade later in 1971, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances was developed to combat the emerging pharmaceutical market that had completely re-structured
conventional drug use. n59 The assimilation of these two treaties into one drug control system resulted in the creation of the International Narcotic Control Board (INCB), a
regulatory board that limited the availability of the controlled substances to medical and scientific purposes. n60 Much to the U.S.'s chagrin, none of the scheduled drugs were
ever declared illegal and the term "illicit drug" does not appear in the UN Conventions. n61 The effective implementation of the UN Conventions adversely affected the drug
market. n62 In the 1970s and 1980s, demand in the Western world for the previously available drugs facilitated the development of a multi-billion dollar international narcotics
trafficking business. n63 In response to the growing illegal drug market, the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was
developed [*435] and implemented to deter the expansion of the illicit drug market through the availability of special punitive measures for offenders. n64 The implementation
of this convention marked a significant point in the history of international drug control. n65 The emphasis placed on criminal sanctions for offenders was representative of the
prohibitive anti-drug ideology of the United States and was a catalyst in the demise of control over the global drug problem. n66 B. Tracing the Development of the U.S.'s "War
on Drugs" The late 1960s marked an era of political unrest in the U.S., and recreational drug use became fashionable as a sign of social rebellion. n67 By 1971, President Nixon
declared a national "War on Drugs" in response to the growing heroin epidemic among U.S. servicemen returning from Vietnam and U.S. illicit drug consumption growing out of
control. n68 As part of this war, Nixon established the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), a "super agency" consolidating all of the previously established drug control agencies,
which would handle all aspects of the drug problem. n69 Unfortunately, the DEA was no match for the [*436] epic drug problem and the significant growth of the cocaine trade
brought a new, violent dimension to the already expanding U.S. drug market. n70 The exorbitant growth and ensuing violence of the cocaine trade in the late 1970s and early
1980s led President Ronald Reagan to issue a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-221) in April of 1986, declaring the escalating drug trade a threat to the U.S. and
prompting Operation Blast Furnace, the first publicized deployment of U.S. troops to foreign soil to aid anti-drug efforts. n71 In hindsight, the events that would unfold in 1986
and the years to follow reflected the general ideology behind the "War on Drugs" and are symbolic of exactly what went wrong in U.S. drug policy development. n72 In 1986,
President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, allocating $ 1.7 billion USD and new criminal sanctions to be applied to drug control measures. n73 The U.S. Congress
enacted "drug certification," which was a highly politicized, disciplinary mechanism for countries that failed to fully cooperate with the prohibition of illicit drugs. n74 Military
drug interdiction became the symbol of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989, which made the Department of Defense the lead agency responsible for tackling drug
trafficking. n75 The political context of the preceding period, [*437] evolving around the Cold War, sparked questions about the potential use of the War on Drugs to legitimize
military operations abroad. n76 IV. Analysis A. A Starting Point for Review: Taking Accountability The War on Drugs' demise started when the bellicose analogy was created.
The correct classification of the global drug problem was and still is as a set of interlinked
health and social challenges to be managed, not a war to be won. n78 The U.S. has worked strenuously for
the past fifty years to ensure that all countries adopt its rigid, prohibitionist approach to drug
policy, essentially repressing the potential for alternative policy development and
experimentation . n79 This was an expensive mistake that the U.S. unfortunately cannot take back. n80 The current emergence from
the economic recession of 2008-2009 has set the stage for a generational, political and cultural shift, placing
the U.S. in a unique moment in its history; the necessary sociopolitical context to revoke its
prohibitionist ideals and replace them with more modern policies grounded in health,
science and humanity. n81 The U.S. can remedy its mistake by using its considerable diplomatic influence and
international presence to foster reform in other countries. n82 One way to do this is by capitalizing [*438] on this unique
moment in its existence and experimenting with models of legal regulation ,
specifically with marijuana because nearly half of U.S. citizens favor legalization of it. n83
n77
This will help redeem our image internationally and help repair foreign relations because the
monumental scope of the international marijuana market is largely created by the exorbitant
U.S. demand for the drug which partially stems from the illegality of the market. n84 B. Step 1:
Recognize the Ineffectiveness of The Global War on Drugs and Consider Alternatives An objective way to
gauge the effectiveness of a drug policy is to examine how the policy manages the most toxic drugs and the problems associated with them. n85 With that in mind, at the global
level, having one in five intravenous drug users have HIV and one in every two users having Hepatitis C is clearly an epidemic and not the result of effective drug control policies.
n86 The threat of arrest and punishment as a deterrent from people using drugs is sound in theory, but in practice this hypothesis is tenuous. n87 Countries that have enacted
harsh, punitive laws have higher levels of drug use and related problems than countries with more tolerant approaches. n88 Additionally, the countries that have experimented
one sensible first
step in placing this issue back into a manageable position is for national governments to
encourage other governments to experiment with models of legal regulation of
drugs which fit their context. n90 This will in turn, undermine the criminal market, enhance national security, and allow
other countries to learn from their application. n91 1. Easier to Say Than Do - A Suggestion for Overcoming Difficulties Associated With Legal Regulation
For this movement to be successful and effectively manage the epidemic at hand there must be a
broad consensus around the world that the current drug control policies are morally harmful. n92 This consensus however
with forms of legal regulation outside of punitive approaches have not seen rises in drug use and dependence [*439] rates. n89 Therefore,
is precluded by the stigma and fear associated with more toxic drugs such as heroin. n93 This note does not propose that heroin and other toxic drugs should be legalized but
instead suggests that society and drug policies tend to consolidate and classify all illicit drugs as equally dangerous. n94 This in turn restrains any progressive debate about
experimenting with the regulation of different drugs under different standards. n95 [*440] Regardless of these false dichotomies, which often restrain progressive debate, it is
difficult not to give credence to the idea of marijuana being socially acceptable when it has been by far the most widely produced and consumed illicit drug. n96 There is between
if the international
community could reach a consensus about the moral noxiousness of any drug control policy, the
repression of marijuana would likely be it. n98 Marijuana, arguably socially acceptable, represents a simple
mechanism to enter into the experimentation process with the legal regulation of drugs. n99
125 and 203 million users worldwide and no indication of that number declining. n97 With this many users, it is reasonable to conclude that
Without advocating for the UN to adopt new commissions or encouraging drastic moves such as the decriminalization of all illicit substances, the global decriminalization of
marijuana would be a relatively minor adjustment compared to the monumental impact. n100 If national governments were to decriminalize marijuana, the scope of this
movement would essentially eradicate the public health problem of marijuana abuse and the associated criminality because of its illegal status. n101 Public health problems can
be remedied because it will afford governments the ability to regulate the market and control the quality and price of the drug, essentially removing toxic impurities and setting a
price that will diminish an illegal market. n102 This will in turn diminish the criminal market [*441] by eradicating the need for users to commit crimes to procure marijuana
Without arguing that this is the panacea
for the global war on drugs, proponents of legalization can aptly point to the archaic drug
control policies in place and this macro approach as an effective way to tackle the problem now.
n104 C. Step 2: Real Reform - the U.S. Needs to Stand at the Forefront of Drug Policy
Reformation The U.S. wields considerable influence over the rest of the world, so it is no
surprise that its call for the development and maintenance of prohibitive, punitive drug policies
resulted in a majority of the international community following. n105 Conversely, if the U.S. leads
the call for the development and maintenance of more tolerant drug policies grounded in health,
humanity and science, a majority of the international community will also follow. n106 Cultural shifts do not
take place overnight, and the idea of complete U.S. drug policy reformation is too aggressive and
stark in contrast to succeed against modern bureaucracy and political alliances. n107 On the other hand, a
more moderate, piecemeal approach could effectively act as a catalyst for this transformation
while simultaneously serving as a case study for opponents of legal regulation . n108 [*442] If
and removing the economic incentive for other countries to get involved in the drug's market. n103
the U.S. is serious about addressing the ineffectiveness of the War on Drugs, then
the
federal government must remove marijuana from its list of
criminally banned substances. n109 The tone of the Obama administration is a significant
step in this direction. n110 President Obama has explicitly acknowledged the need to treat drugs as
more of a public health problem, as well as the validity of debate on alternatives, but he does not favor drug
legalization. n111 This progressive rhetoric is a significant step in the right direction, but until there is some real reform
confronting the issue, reducing punitive measures and supporting other countries to develop
drug policies that suit their context, there is still an abdication of policy responsibility. n112 1.
Starting Small - Potential Positive Effects of Regulation and Taxation of Marijuana in the U.S. If marijuana
was legal in the U.S., it would function similarly to the market of legal substances such as liquor,
coffee and tobacco. n113 Individual and corporate participants in the market would pay taxes, increasing revenues and saving the government from the exorbitant cost of trying
to enforce prohibition laws. n114 Consumers' human rights would be promoted through self-determination, autonomy and access to more accurate information about the
product they are consuming. n115 Additionally, case studies and research suggest that the decriminalization or legalization [*443] of marijuana reduces the drugs' consumption
legal regulation of marijuana would relieve the
current displaced burden the drug places on law enforcement, domestically and internationally.
and does not necessarily result in a more favorable attitude towards it. n116 The
In the U.S., law enforcement could refocus their efforts away from reducing the marijuana
market per se and instead towards reducing harm to individuals, communities and national
security. n118 Abroad, U.S. international relations would improve because of the reduced levels of
corruption and violence at home and afar. n119 The precarious position repressive policies place on
foreign governments when they have to destroy the livelihoods of agricultural workers would be
reduced. n120 Additionally, legalization and regulation would provide assistance to governments in
regaining some degree of control over the regions dominated by drug dealers and terrorist
groups because those groups would lose a major source of funding for their organizations. n121 2. Health
n117
Concerns? - Marijuana in Comparison to Other Similar Legal Substances The federal government, acknowledging the risks inherent in alcohol and tobacco, argues that adding a
third substance to that mix cannot be beneficial. n122 Adding anything to a class of [*444] dangerous substances is likely never going to be beneficial; however marijuana would
be incorrectly classified if it was equated with those two substances. n123 Marijuana is far less toxic and addictive than alcohol and tobacco. n124 Long term use of marijuana is
far less damaging than long term alcohol or tobacco use. n125 Alcohol use contributes to aggressive and reckless behavior, acts of violence and serious injuries while marijuana
actually reduces likelihood of aggressive behavior or violence during intoxication and is seldom associated with emergency room visits. n126 As with most things in life, there
can be no guarantee that the legalization or decriminalization of marijuana would lead the U.S. to a better socio-economical position in the future. n127 Two things however, are
certain: that the legalization of marijuana in the U.S. would dramatically reduce most of the costs associated with the current drug policies, domestically and internationally, and
[*445] if the U.S. is serious about its objective of considering the costs of drug control measures, then it is vital and rational for the legalization option is considered. n128 D.
The political atmosphere at the end of World War I and II was
leverage for the U.S., emerging as the dominant political, economic and military power. n129 This
leverage allowed it to shape a prohibitive drug control regime that until now has remained in
perpetuity. n130 Today, we stand in a unique moment inside of U.S. history. n131 The generational, political and
Why the Time is Ripe for U.S. Drug Policy Reformation
cultural shifts that accompanied the U.S. emergence from the "Great Recession" resulted in a sociopolitical climate that may be what is necessary for real reform. n132
Politically, marijuana has become a hot issue; economically, the marijuana industry is bolstering a faltering economy and socially, marijuana is poised to transform the way we
The public disdain for the widespread problems prohibition caused in the early
20th century resulted in the end of alcohol prohibition during the Great Depression. n134 If history
does actually repeat itself than the Great recession may have been much more telling than
expected. n135 V. Conclusion The U.S. and its prohibitionist ideals exacerbated the failure of both
the international and its own domestic drug policies. n136 As a result, the U.S. should accept
accountability for its mistakes by reforming its drug policies in a way that will help [*446] place the
global drug market back into a manageable position. n137 Marijuana is an actionable, evidence
based mechanism for constructive legal and policy reform that through a domino effect can
transform the global drug prohibition regime. n138 The generational, political and cultural
shifts that accompanied the U.S. emergence from the "Great Recession" have resulted in a
sociopolitical climate ready for real reform. n139 The U.S. will capitalize on this unique moment
by removing marijuana from the list of federally banned
live and view medicine. n133
substances, setting the stage for future international and domestic drug
policies that are actually effective. n140
scenario one is the OAS
Marijuana legalization causes drug reform and strengthens relations with the OAS
Hakim & Combs 14 [Peter Hakim president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American
Dialogue, and Cameron Combs Brazil Researcher at Eurasia Group , 1-26-2014, "Inter-American
Dialogue," Miami Herald,
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&amp;pubID=3496&amp;s=OAS]
Tiny Uruguay made waves a month ago by becoming the first nation anywhere to fully legalize the sale and use of recreational marijuana. Colorado and Washington, however, had already beaten them to the
punch, and a handful of other states are expected soon to follow suit. In addition, 18 states and the District of Columbia permit marijuana for medical purposes. A proposal to legalize medical marijuana could
the U nited S tates is without a national policy toward marijuana.
Although legally banned throughout the country by federal law, cannabis use is, in practice,
governed by an incoherent patchwork of state regulations, and further muddled by
staggering disparities in enforcement and punishment. To be sure, legal marijuana comes with costs and risks. Some studies
appear on Florida’s ballot in November. What this all means is that
suggest it interferes with learning and motivation. But keeping marijuana illegal also carries a high price tag. Particularly devastating are the human costs of arresting and jailing thousands upon thousands of
young Americans each year.
Legalizing cannabis, a step most Americans now favor, is the only way out of this jumble , particularly after
President Obama made clear that he would not enforce a federal ban on marijuana use in those states where it was now lawful. “We have other fish to fry,” he said. In another interview, he said marijuana is no
Legalization should also contribute to easier relations with Mexico and other
neighbors to the south on issues of public security. To be sure, legal marijuana comes with costs and risks. The American Medical Association considers
more harmful than alcohol.
cannabis a “ dangerous drug” while the American Psychiatric Association asserts that its use impedes neurological development in adolescents and can cause the “onset of psychiatric disorders.” Some studies
suggest it interferes with learning and motivation. It should be anticipated that legalization will lead to greater use, at all ages, as marijuana becomes more accessible and less expensive, and the cultural and social
keeping marijuana illegal also carries
a high price tag. Particularly devastating are the human costs of arresting and jailing thousands
upon thousands of young Americans each year. Roughly one-third of all U.S. citizens are arrested by age 23. Racial and ethnic
minorities are most vulnerable. African-American marijuana users are over three times more likely to be arrested and imprisoned than whites, even though the two groups
consume the drug at virtually the same levels. With cannabis accounting for roughly half of total drug arrests, legalization
would sharply reduce this egregious disparity . It would also save money by reducing the U.S. prison population. A half a million people were
incarcerated for drug offenses in 2011, a ten-fold jump since 1980 — at an average annual cost per prisoner of more than $20,000 in a minimum-security federal facility. Cannabis
legalization would also help to lift an unneeded burden from U.S. foreign policy in Latin
America, where Washington’s drug war has long strained diplomatic relations. Most
governments in the hemisphere have concluded that U.S. anti-drug policies are just not working and, in many
places, are actually contributing to mounting levels of crime, violence and corruption. Few Latin American countries are actively
contemplating legalization a la uruguaya but nowhere is there much enthusiasm for cooperating with the U nited S tates in its
continuing efforts to eradicate drug crops and interrupt drug flows. Most governments in the hemisphere have concluded
stigmas surrounding its consumption literally go up in smoke. Abuse and addiction — including among juveniles — will rise as well. But
that U.S. anti-drug policies are just not working and, in many places, are actually contributing to mounting levels of crime, violence and corruption. Colombia has been a notable exception. With U.S. support of
Santos, Colombia’s president and arguably
Washington’s closest ally in the region, is now a leading advocate of alternative drug strategies.
In an exhaustive report last year, prompted by President Santos, the O rganization of A merican S tates analyzed a range of alternative
policy approaches, including cannabis legalization. Few Latin American countries are actively contemplating legalization a la uruguaya. But many have
nearly $10 billion, the country has become far more secure in the past dozen years. Yet Juan Manuel
stopped arrests for use and possession of marijuana, and virtually all are keeping a close watch on developments in Uruguay. Nowhere is there much enthusiasm for cooperating with the United States in its
A decision by the U.S. government to legalize marijuana would be a bold
step toward breaking today’s bureaucratic and political inertia and opening the
way for a genuine hemisphere-wide search for alternative strategies.
Failure stalls OAS coop – marijuana is key
Shifter, 14 [April 14th President of the Inter-American Dialogue and an Adjunct Professor of
Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. “The US and
OAS: A Paradoxical Relationship”, Michael, Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica,
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3576]
continuing efforts to eradicate drug crops and interrupt drug flows.
Steps to revitalization? To be sure, in Washington one frequently hears complaints about
multilateralism generally (as seen in attitudes towards the United Nations, for example), but the sharp criticisms aimed at
the OAS have intensified in the past several years. Indeed, in August 2011 the US Foreign Affairs Committee in the Republican-controlled
House of Representatives took the rather extreme measure of voting to end the United States’ nearly $50 million contribution to the OAS. The vote was
provoked by the perceived passivity of the OAS in responding forcefully to democratic setbacks in Venezuela . Still, the measure did not advance very
far, and had virtually no prospect of being adopted in the US Senate. In
general, despite widespread disappointment with
the organization’s performance, there is little appetite in Washington to “pull the plug” on
OAS funding. Such a move would clearly be self-defeating and would just feed criticisms that Washington doesn’t care about and has no interest
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Even in light of fiscal pressures in the United States, the cost is minimal, and would be far greater for the US in the
long term should it decide to withdraw from the OAS. Clearly concerned about the lack of progress in pursuing urgent reforms, last September the US
Congress approved the OAS Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013. Although in some respects the measure reflected the concerns about the OAS that
had been expressed in the 2012 letter by four US Senators, the tenor this time was less scolding and more hortatory. It urged decisive action to make
the OAS more effective. The question remains, however, whether the US is prepared to be actively engaged in the process to help fashion a series of
productive reforms. Although
Secretary of State Kerry made a statement on US-Latin American
relations at the OAS in November 2013, it seems clear that the regional body does not figure prominently in
the Obama administration’s Latin America agenda. Washington instead prefers to assign its
limited diplomatic resources to deepening bilateral ties with key allies like Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile,
and to establishing more productive relations with Brazil. Some attention is also given to strengthening sub-regional trade and security arrangements
such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The OAS is as at best a relatively minor instrument
in the US government’s overall policy toolkit and approach towards the region. The common agenda Yet, there are a few key areas that, albeit
episodically, get attention and appear to be of concern to Washington. These are precisely the same areas that offer the OAS the best hope of
establishing its relevance. Chief among these is the OAS’s human rights apparatuses: the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Court, and
the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. These bodies are not without serious challenges, but they do, on balance, perform an essential
function in strengthening the rule of law and democratic practice. They are also unique – they have the only body of jurisprudence in the hemisphere –
and will be hard to match in the emerging, competing regional bodies. To its credit, the United States opposed efforts by a number of governments –
particularly Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia – in early 2013 to seriously undermine the Special Rapporteur and the Commission. Those
governments charged a strong pro-US bias in both bodies. But a close examination of positions taken by the Commission and the Special Rapporteur
shows that the United States has in fact received its share of criticism by them on a variety of issues. These range from the treatment of prisoners in
Guantánomo Bay, to Mexican migrants, to the death penalty, and to the interception of public records from journalists of the Associated Press. More
recently, the Commission has pressed the US government regarding surveillance practices of the National Security Agency in the region. A
range
of non-governmental human rights organizations throughout the hemisphere have mobilized to
defend these OAS bodies. This is the area of the OAS in which such independent groups have the greatest interest, stake, and impact.
Their coordinated efforts succeeded in pushing back – for the time being – the attempts to reduce the independence and efficacy of such vital functions
For the
United States, it is not enough to merely be on the right side of the issue. Washington
should also exhibit greater diplomatic energy and skill in joining forces with other likeminded governments to mobilize sustained support for these critical OAS bodies. The United
States would enjoy more legitimacy in pushing for constructive change in the OAS if the US
Congress were prepared to make some decisions that would reverberate positively in
Latin America and the Caribbean. On the human rights question, the US Congress has unfortunately failed to ratify the San José Pact or
of the OAS. But the issues are far from resolved, and the efforts to weaken human rights protections will likely return at some point.
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (chiefly because of the death penalty issue). As a result, unlike its Latin American counterparts, the
United States is not party to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The failure to ratify the Convention makes the United States vulnerable to
criticism of hypocrisy when it takes a strong stand on human rights in other countries. Other areas on the OAS agenda are also of interest to the United
States government. Despite the controversies surrounding the Nicaraguan and Venezuelan cases, the organization has a track record in election
monitoring and observation that has been important in a number of countries, including Paraguay’s 2013 election. The US government generally
regards the OAS’s election observation work sympathetically, as it is consistent with Washington’s aims of strengthening democratic practice and
the OAS and the United States can also find common
ground in the realm of drug policy . Washington has long supported the efforts by the Inter-American Drug Abuse
institutions in the region. Despite some differences,
Commission (CICAD), which in recent years has helped reduce tensions between the US and Latin America on the question of conditionality. When the
drug issue became salient at the 2012 Summit of the Americas meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, President Obama said he was open to engaging in a
discussion about possible policy options. The OAS was put in charge of studying and reporting on alternative approaches to drug problems in the
hemisphere. In May 2013 it fulfilled its mandate, producing a sound, serious and comprehensive report. The study demonstrated that with
appropriating financing and a clear mandate, the OAS can perform well in addressing a critical hemispheric problem. To
be sure, the US
reacts strongly to any hint that legalization , even of marijuana, is an option that should
be taken seriously. Nevertheless, though a sensitive political question in the United States,
the fact is that a generational shift is clearly spurring a change in public opinion on the issue.
The votes to legalize recreational use of marijuana in Colorado and the state of Washington in
November 2012 illustrate the trend. If the United States adopted a more flexible approach on the drug question – and
became seriously engaged in the search for policy options on an issue that is today so costly for a
number of Latin American and Caribbean nations – its relations with OAS member states
would improve. Other policy changes in the US that would enhance its position within the OAS include the adoption of comprehensive
immigration reform and, of course, lifting the longstanding, and universally opposed, US embargo on Cuba. Reverse the inertia For
its own self-interest, the US should treat the OAS far more seriously than it now does .
Bilateral relationships and sub-regional arrangements are crucial, but given the nature of the
challenges facing the entire hemisphere – from security and drugs to democracy and the
environment – it is hard to see how much progress can be made without more effective
multilateral cooperation. The reality is that the hemisphere has fundamentally changed and the US no longer plays
the role it once did. Washington is left out of important deliberations. But it is still a key player in
hemispheric affairs, and the OAS – despite all of its serious and well-known deficiencies – is
an organization with ample experience and an impressive framework for dealing with a number
of critical challenges.
The impact is cascading regional instability
Herz 8, Associate Professor of the Institute of International Relations (IRI) at Pontifical Catholic University Rio, DOES THE
ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDgQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%
2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F57413%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocument%2Fdf9c52a2-2dc94ca6-9a4e-05fa2a399a31%2Fen%2FWP34.2.pdf&ei=AJqhVKnpIcGwogSRxICwAg&usg=AFQjCNGJesMu8M5Z75Yw5X_YWizR06uEA&sig2=mGQVmdP7_cJsbAI-o0-j-Q&bvm=bv.82001339,d.cGU
The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the
world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a
does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to
the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in
supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating
debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. In this new context
answer this question. First, I point out that
the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the
organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts . In addition, the OAS
remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes , which is an historical legacy of previous
periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy
mechanisms. Secondly, I will show that the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes
from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises. In the sphere of security,
in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the
redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the
hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater
transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s
working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries,
on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and 16 The Programme,
created in 1999, comprises three areas: education for the promotion of peace between states; education for the peaceful settlement of conflicts; and education for the promotion of democratic values and practices.
In August 2005, the Inter-American Programme on Education for Democratic Values and Practices was created. The Inter-American Committee on Education (CIE) with the support of the Department of
Education and Culture (DEC) of the OAS are responsible for the programme, which includes initiatives in three areas: research, professional development and educational resources, and information exchange. 17
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials and the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in
Conventional Weapons Acquisitions 17 institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent
Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an
Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty; follow-up to the Special
Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of
the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. In the sphere of
security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate
on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to
review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards
greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The
Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its
subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and
institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and nonproliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free
Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit
trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. The redefinition of the concept of security
involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the
perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal
traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined
security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional
mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. The emphasis on confidence- and securitybuilding measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea
that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly
entered the interAmerican security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms
control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of
1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark InterAmerican Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers
and exporters. 18 UN Resolution on the non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, April 24, 2004. 19 Argentina, Chile Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. 18 The
Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between
Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American
leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards
a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civilmilitary relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest
states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has
to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with
historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to
modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading
to an arms race. In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences
in the subject. In the 1990s the
organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and securitybuilding measures, designed
on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register
of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this
agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of
discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure
defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin
American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering
and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament
and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). The
countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative
provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence
and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this
trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in 19 particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. As
part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and
developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995.
Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a
seniorlevel academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General
Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm
regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. The second norm
OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security,
allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic
institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the
that the
defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions
playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated
with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of
human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press,
respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a
legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was
passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as
the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago,
determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be
summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the
Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative 20 democracy by giving the OAS the right to
suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries
to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the
InterAmerican Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations
when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy
(UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its
activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The
UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS
has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states,
OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where
political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational
programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and
importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic
stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where
intrastate and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this
is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes.
such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The
Extinction
Manwaring 5 (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International
Politics at Dickinson College, venezuela’s hugo chávez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric
warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)
President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state
failure is the most dangerous long-term
security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state
status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and
terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil”
networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or
some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things
people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These
means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty,
starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and
proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing,
warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill
over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls
violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout
the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these
actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to
establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude
to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a
targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and
society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected
Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular
perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime
to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other
basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or
destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can
take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will
control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states,
criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies,
one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any
given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and
people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global
security, peace, and prosperity.65
scenario two is afghanistan
Prohibition boosts Taliban profits support---harm reduction key to Afghan
stability
Doug Bandow 14, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil
liberties, "Afghanistan as Narco-State: End The International Drug War", Cato Institute, 11/3,
www.cato.org/blog/afghanistan-narco-state-end-international-drug-war
The U.S. government has failed to stop the drug trade at home. Washington also has not created a competent, effective, and honest central government
in Afghanistan. How
effective will Kabul be in limiting opium production when American troops go
home? Not much. A new report from the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reports that
opium production last year was the highest ever, 209,000 hectares, up 36 percent from
2012. Alas, the sky is the limit. SIGAR warned: “With deteriorating security in many parts of rural
Afghanistan and low levels of eradication of poppy fields, further increases in cultivation are
likely in 2014.” Last year the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that opium exports accounted for 14 percent of the country’s
GDP. Unfortunately, explained SIGAR: “the narcotics trade poisons the Afghan financial sector and
undermines the Afghan state’s legitimacy by stoking corruption, sustaining criminal networks,
and providing significant financial support for the Taliban and other insurgent groups.” The Afghan public is
understandably cynical. When I visited the country Afghans called large homes behind high walls lining Kabul streets “poppy palaces.” Drug production
exploded despite $7.6 billion spent by Washington alone to stop cultivation and distribution. Noted SIGAR, “the recent record-high level of poppy
cultivation calls into question the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of those prior efforts.” The State Department’s response to SIGAR was a
marvel of delusion. Production “is only one indicator of counternarcotics progress.” And “we are making good progress in building the capability of our
Afghan partners,” even as cultivation surges. This is the best case for years of expensive efforts? Even UNODC admitted that the Afghan State is beset
by “fragmentation, conflict, patronage, corruption and impunity.” The Pentagon stated that “the failure to reduce poppy cultivation and increase
eradication is due to the lack of Afghan government support for the effort.” Nevertheless, State said it looked “forward to the new Afghan government
assuming a leadership role in this regard.” Eradication
was difficult enough when backed by a strong allied
military presence. Wrote Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution, early programs were “manipulated by local Afghan strongmen to
eliminate drug competition and ethnic/tribal rivals.” Moreover, the eradication campaign, turned poppy farmers into
Taliban supporters. Eradication efforts also inflated Taliban revenues. As economist Jeffrey
Clemens pointed out, the counter-narcotics campaign both redirected opium production to
Taliban-controlled areas and raised poppy prices. Operating on their own, the Afghan National Army and Afghan
National Police will be hard-pressed to fulfill their most important responsibility to sustain the Kabul government against the Taliban. Drug
interdiction inevitably will be a secondary objective for security forces which already suffer from corruption. But no
strategy likely would
succeed even in the best circumstances. As noted earlier, attempting to suppress drugs could lose the
geopolitical war without winning the fight against poppies. Even with greater development few
legal opportunities would be better than poppy production. Another approach is to reduce demand for drugs in
Western societies to discourage production in Afghanistan. However, only the most draconian enforcement has much effect on drug use. The West
must set priorities in Afghanistan. Attempting
to eradicate poppy production is almost guaranteed to lose the
battle for hearts and minds. Instead, allied policymakers should consider strategies to drain
money and profit from the drug trade. Western governments should scale back the
drug war. Afghanistan could be allowed to produce opium for the legal morphine market.
Ultimately the entire market should be legalized or at least decriminalized for adults. Indeed,
frustration with years of militarized eradication efforts, some in the midst of insurgencies akin to that in Afghanistan, has caused several Latin
American governments to deemphasize enforcement. As I noted in Forbes online: “Afghanistan
is merely one front in a global
drug war. There are no good solutions. But Afghanistan and its Western-backers should recognize reality
and abandon the futile and counterproductive campaign against the opium trade.”
War on Drugs spills over to Pakistan and empowers the Taliban
Felbab-Brown, 9 [Testimony October 1, 2009 Transnational Drug Enterprises: Threats to
Global Stability and U.S. National Security By: Vanda Felbab-Brown, Senior Fellow, Foreign
Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2009/10/01-drug-enterprises-felbabbrown]
Large illicit
economies dominated by powerful traffickers also have pernicious effects on a country’s law
enforcement and judicial systems. As the illicit economy grows, the investigative capacity of the law enforcement and judicial
systems diminishes. Impunity for criminal activity increases, undermining the credibility of law enforcement, the judicial system, and the authority of
the government. Powerful traffickers frequently turn to violent means to deter and avoid prosecution, killing off or bribing prosecutors, judges, and
witnesses. Colombia in the late 1980s and Mexico today are powerful reminders of the corruption and paralysis of law enforcement as a result of
extensive criminal networks and the devastating effects of high levels of violent criminality on the judicial system. In addition, illicit
economies have large economic effects. Drug cultivation and processing, for example, on the one hand generate
employment for the poor rural populations and may even facilitate upward mobility. As mentioned before, they can also have powerful marcoeconomic
spillover effects in terms of boosting overall economic activity. But a burgeoning drug economy also contributes to inflation and can hence harm
legitimate, export-oriented, import-substituting industries. It encourages real estate speculation and undermines currency stability. It also
displaces legitimate production . Since the drug economy is more profitable than legal production, requires less security and
infrastructure, and imposes smaller sunk and transaction costs, the local population is frequently uninterested in, or
unable to, participate in other (legal) kinds of economic activity. The illicit economy can thus
lead to a form of so-called Dutch disease where a boom in an isolated sector of the economy causes or is accompanied by stagnation in other
core sectors since it gives rise to appreciation of land and labor costs. Effects of Regional Manifestations of the Drug-Conflict Nexus on U.S. Security
Even though the drug-violent-conflict nexus follows these general dynamics irrespective of the locale, how acute a threat to U.S. security interests it
presents depends on the strategic significance of the state weakened by such connections and the orientation of the belligerent group toward the United
States. Perhaps nowhere
in the world does the presence of a large-scaled illicit economy threaten U.S.
much in Afghanistan. There, the anti-American Taliban strengthens its
insurgency campaign by deriving both vast financial profits and great political capital
from sponsoring the illicit economy. The strengthened insurgency in turn threatens the vital
U.S. objectives of counterterrorism and Afghanistan’s stability plus the lives of U.S. soldiers and civilians deployed there to promote
these objectives. The large-scale opium poppy economy also undermines these goals by fueling
widespread corruption of Afghanistan government and law enforcement, especially the police forces. A failure to prevail
against the insurgency will result in the likely collapse of the national government and
Taliban domination of Afghanistan’s south, possibly coupled with civil war. A failure to stabilize Afghanistan will
in turn further destabilize Pakistan , emboldening the jihadists in Pakistan and
weakening the resolve of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services to take on
the jihadists . Pakistan may likely once again calculate that it needs to cultivate its jihadi assets to counter India’s influence in Afghanistan –
perceived or actual. But the seriousness of the threat and the strategic importance of the stakes do not
imply that aggressive counternarcotics suppression measures today will enhance U.S. objectives
and global stability. Indeed, just the opposite. Premature measures, such as extensive eradication before
legal livelihoods are in place, will simply cement the bonds between the rural population
dependent on poppy for basic livelihood and the Taliban, limit intelligence flows to Afghan and
NATO forces, and further discredit the Afghan government and tribal elites sponsoring
eradication. Nor, given the Taliban’s large sources of other income, will eradication bankrupt the Taliban. In fact, eradication so far
has failed to accomplish that while already generating the above mentioned counterproductive
outcomes. After years of such inappropriate focus on eradication of the poppy crop, the new counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan,
primary security interests as
announced by U.S. government officials in summer 2009, promises to mesh well with the counterinsurgency and state-building effort. By scaling back
eradication and emphasizing interdiction and development, it will help separate the population from the Taliban. A well-designed counternarcotics
policy is not on its own sufficient for success in Afghanistan. But it is indispensible. Counterinsurgent forces can prevail against belligerents profiting
from the drug trade when they increase their own counterinsurgency resources and improve the strategy. Moreover, “success” in suppressing poppy in
Afghanistan may well increase threats to U.S. security in other ways. Given
existing global demand, poppy cultivation will
shift elsewhere. There are many countries where poppy can be grown; but Burma, which used to be the number one producer for many years,
Central Asia, and Pakistan are likely candidates. A shift to Pakistan would be by far the most worrisome . In
that case, Pakistani jihadi groups would not only be able to increase their profits, but also, and most
dangerously, their political capital. Today, they have little to offer but ideological succor to the dissatisfied populations in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Northwest Frontier Province, and wider Pakistan. If widespread poppy cultivation
shifted to these areas, Kashmir , and possibly even parts of Punjab, the jihadist belligerents would be
much strengthened by providing real-time economic benefits to marginalized populations.
Nuclear war
Riedel, 10/19/14 [ Opinion | October 19, 2014 Tensions Rising Dangerously in South
AsiaDirector, The Intelligence Project | Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East
Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence By: Bruce
Riedel,http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/10/19-tensions-rising-dangerouslysouth-asia-riedel]
India and Pakistan have fought four wars since 1947 and had several crises that went to the
brink of war. Both tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Now tensions are escalating between
the two again. It began in May, when a heavily armed squad of Pakistani terrorists from Lashkar e
Tayyiba (Army of the Pure) attacked India’s consulate in Herat, in western Afghanistan. They planned to massacre Indian
diplomats on the eve of the inauguration of India’s new Hindu nationalist prime minister, Narendra Modi. The consulate’s
security forces killed the LeT terrorists first, preventing a crisis. Since LeT is a proxy of Pakistan's military
intelligence service known as the ISI, Indian intelligence officials assume the Herat attack was coordinated with higher-ups in
Pakistan. They assume another LeT attack is only a matter of time. They are probably right on both counts. This
summer, clashes
between Indian and Pakistani troops have escalated along the ceasefire line in
Kashmir. Called “the Line of Control,” the Kashmiri front line this year has witnessed the worst exchanges
of artillery and small arms fire in a decade, displacing hundreds of civilians on both sides. More than 20 have died in the
crossfire already this month. Modi has ordered his army commanders to strike back hard at the Line of
Control to demonstrate Indian resolve. Although Modi made a big gesture in May when he invited his Pakistani
counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, to his inauguration, since then Modi has canceled routine diplomatic talks with
Pakistan on Kashmir and signaled a tough line toward terrorism. He also appointed a very experienced
intelligence chief, Ajit Doval as his national security adviser. Doval is known as a hard-liner on terrorism—and on Pakistan. Modi’s
Bharatiya Janata Party strongly criticized his predecessor, Manmohan Singh, for what it saw as a weak response to LeT’s attack on
Mumbai in 2008. No military action was taken after 10 LeT terrorists, armed and trained by the ISI, killed and wounded hundreds
of innocents, including six American dead. In 2001, a previous BJP government mobilized the Indian military for months after a
Pakistan-based terror attack on the Indian parliament. The two countries were eyeball to eyeball in a tense standoff for almost a
year. Two years before that, the two countries fought a war in Kashmir around the town of Kargil. In the 1999 Kargil War, the
Pakistani army crossed the LOC to seize mountain heights controlling a key highway in Kashmir. BJP Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee
responded with airstrikes and ground forces. The Indian navy prepared to blockade Karachi, Pakistan’s major port and its critical
choke point for importing oil. A blockade would have rapidly cut off Pakistan from oil supplies. The Indian navy was so eager to
strike it had to be restrained by the high command. The
Pakistanis began losing the fight at Kargil. Then they
put their nuclear forces on high alert . President Bill Clinton pressured Nawaz Sharif (the prime minister then
and now) into backing down at a crucial summit at Blair House on July 4, 1999. If Clinton had not persuaded Sharif to
withdraw behind the LOC, the war would have escalated further, perhaps to a nuclear exchange.
Kargil is a good paradigm for what a future crisis might look like. A BJP government is not likely
to turn the other cheek. It cannot afford to let terror attacks go unpunished. That would
encourage more. The difference between the Kargil War and today is that both India and
Pakistan now have far more nuclear weapons and delivery systems than 15 years ago.
Pakistan is developing tactical nuclear weapons and has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in
the world. China provides Pakistan with its nuclear reactors. India has missiles that can reach all
of Pakistan and even to Beijing. The escalatory ladder is far more terrifying than it was
on the eve of the millennium. For retreating in 1999, Sharif was overthrown in a coup by the army commander,
Pervez Musharraf, who had planned the Kargil War. Now Musharraf is calling for Sharif to stand up to Modi
and not be pushed around by India. The main opposition party leader, Bilawal Bhutto, has called for a tough line
defending Kashmiri Muslim rights, promising to take “every inch” of Kashmir for Pakistan if he is elected prime minister in the
future. Sharif is under pressure from another party leader, Imran Khan, to resign. The politics on both sides in South
Asia leave little room for compromise or dialogue. America is seen in South Asia as a power in decline, a
perception fueled by the Afghan War. U.S. influence in New Delhi and Islamabad is low. A Clinton-like
intervention to halt an escalation will be a tough act to follow. But the consequences of a nuclear
exchange are almost too horrible to contemplate.
1AC 3
Contention 3 is California—
Unregulated marijuana cultivation is exacerbating California’s drought—CSA removal is key
Guilford 14—MA from Colombia Univeristy's School of International and Public
Affairs(Gwynn, "The US government is helping illegal pot producers destroy California’s water
supply." 2/13/14. qz.com/172828/the-us-federal-government-is-helping-illegal-pot-producersdestroy-californias-water-supply/, TD)
Heavy rains in California in recent days have partly alleviated the drought that parched the state in January. The dry spell is merely
exacerbating a long-developing problem in northern California, however: The huge volumes of water used to grow
marijuana, as well as the noxious fertilizers and pesticides gushing into streams, are pushing
local watersheds to their breaking point.¶ “Marijuana cultivation has the potential to
completely dewater and dry up streams in the areas where [cannabis farmers are] growing
pretty extensively,” Scott Bauer, a biologist with the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW), tells Quartz. He
describes encountering waterless streambeds littered with dead fish.¶ 1¶ Pot is not the only water-guzzling business that’s booming in
the Emerald Triangle, as Humboldt, Mendocino and Trinity counties are known. Wineries are too. The problem is that the
government treats them differently, says Gary Graham Hughes, executive director of the Environmental Protection Information
Center (EPIC), a non-profit group.¶ The Emerald Triangle: Humboldt, Mendocino and Trinity counties. Nearby Lake and Butte
counties are also popular grow sites.¶ The paradoxical status of marijuana in the US—it is legal to grow and
sell in some states, but remains illegal under federal law—makes it hard to regulate . In
theory, Californian state or local regulators should be able to set environmental standards for
cannabis cultivation, the way they might with grapes or timber. But the federal government won’t let
them . As a result, growers enjoy unregulated use of water, and the resulting easy profits
have helped attract operations that are increasingly industrial in scale—and run by growers who are
unrepentant about sucking the Emerald Triangle dry.¶ In this undated photo released by Butte County Department of Public Works,
marijuana grading violations are seen off of Crystal Ranch Road in the Feather Falls area in Butte County, Calif. With parts of
Northern California’s scenic hillsides illegally gouged by bulldozers for marijuana grows, frustrated local officials asked the state for
help to protect tributaries of the Sacramento River from runoff of sediment and the chemicals used on plants. The Butte County
supervisors hoped to charge growers with tougher penalties under federal and state clean water regulations than the grading
infractions local officials could impose if the gardens were legal under state medical marijuana laws. (AP Photo/Butte County
Department of Public Works¶ An illegal “trespass grow”—meaning, illegal cultivation usually on public land—in Butte county, which
abuts the Emerald Triangle.(AP Photo/Butte County Department of Public Works)¶ Pot is central to the local economy…¶ Pot is one
heck of a valuable crop. The farm value of cannabis grown in California for local consumption is probably between $2.5 billion and
$5 billion a year, according to Dale Gieringer, an economist at California Norml (CA Norml), a pro-legalization non-profit, assuming
a price of $2,500 per pound. The out-of-state export market could be even larger, he says.¶ 1¶ It’s especially valuable for the
otherwise downtrodden Emerald Triangle economies. In Humboldt, occasionally called the Silicon Valley of weed, some 4,000
commercial growers generate at least $400 million in annual sales. That compares with the $66 million made by Humboldt’s timber
industry in 2011 (pdf, p.3), the last year for which data was available.¶ …but the “green rush” is putting a strain on the land¶ It hasn’t
always been a cash crop. The Emerald Triangle’s cannabis growing dates back to the 1970s, when a wave of liberal activists settled
there, dropping out of society to go “back to the land.” They found the terrain unusually ideal for growing cannabis. But they grew it
alongside other garden produce, seldom in any large scale—and rarely destructively (these hippies were some of the framers of the
modern US conservation movement, after all).¶ California’s legalization of medical marijuana in 1996, as well as steadily rising
prices, encouraged their offspring, some less ecologically conscientious than their parents, to enter the business. But it’s in the last
few years that things have changed dramatically. From 2009 to 2012 the amount of land cultivated for pot in the Emerald Triangle
nearly doubled, to 221 acres, according to the CDFW. An aerial view shows once-dense forests now pocked with “grows,” as pot
farms are called. And they’re getting bigger and bigger, says Bauer, with industrial grows now raising 2,000-5,000
plants. Here’s a look at national forest land on Post Mountain, a rural area of Trinity county, in 2005:¶ 1¶ Post Mountain,
2005.("Resource Impacts from Marijuana Cultivation in Northern California," California Fish & Wildlife)¶ Here’s Post Mountain—
which locals now call “Pot Mountain“—in 2012:¶ Post Mountain, 2012.("Resource Impacts from Marijuana Cultivation in Northern
California," California Fish & Wildlife)¶ Many within the industry point to the expanding presence of outsiders: Everyone from
Kentuckians to Bulgarians is flocking to the area. Some of this trend, which locals liken to the California Gold Rush of the mid1800s, is due to a worry that the recent legalization of weed for recreational use in Washington and Colorado might drive down
prices.¶ “People come to Humboldt to grow as much as they can to get that one last hit before it goes legal,” says Tony Silvaggio, an
environmental sociologist at the Center for Study of Cannabis and Social Policy (CASP). “Every year it goes bigger and bigger.”¶ But
another reason is simply that weed is incredibly profitable to grow. Its illegal status, says Silvaggo, inflates its
price, and cannabis growers don’t have to pay taxes, rights to water and land use fees the
way “legal” industries do.¶ The water cost is a biggie. A single plant of marijuana needs about six
gallons (22.7 liters) of water per day to grow. That means industrial grows need between 12,000
and 30,000 gallons of water per day.¶ This has exacerbated the water crisis…¶ The dry summer
months happen to be the peak of the April-October pot-growing season. Conscientious growers—typically, long-term residents—
invest in tanks to gather and store water during the winter, when it rains more. Unethical growers irrigate by damming
streams and using diesel pumps to suck water to their sites. They also tend to pump runoff
fouled with dangerous fertilizers and pesticides back into the water supply.¶ Comparison of monthly
streamflow in California, Aug. 2000 vs. Aug. 2013.(United States Geological Service)¶ Marijuana growing in four sub-areas of the
Emerald Triangle’s watersheds is now consuming 20%-30% of the water in local streams, says the CDFW. That’s scuttling hopes for
the recovery of northern California’s beleaguered Chinook salmon population, which the logging industry almost wiped out in the
1950s. Since 2008, water overuse has driven the number of salmon returning to the rivers to spawn to record lows.¶ 1¶ Marijuana
cultivation uses an estimated 23.4 million gallons of water from the Outlet Creek watershed per year.(California Department of Fish
and Wildlife)¶ To get a better sense of context, consider the case of the Outlet Creek basin, one of the headwaters of the Eel River and
a habitat for Chinook and coho salmon. Outdoor cannabis cultivation in Mendocino’s Outlet Creek watershed consumes an Olympicsized pool worth of water each week, on average. And that’s just for 160-square-mile (414 square kilometers) swatch of the total Eel
River watershed, which spans nearly 4,000 square miles. That concentration of activity is happening all over the 8,800 square miles
the
US government “is directly to blame”¶ Cannabis cultivation need not be so bad for
the environment. Other local industries, like wineries and timber, have the potential to be
worse. While state and local agencies have dozens of workers in northern California focused
strictly on protecting the environment from vintners and loggers, no one’s doing that for
cannabis growers.¶ But don’t point fingers at local regulators, says CA Norml’s Gieringer. The “US government is directly to
of Emerald Triangle watersheds. Here’s an analysis Silvaggio and Mother Jones did using Google Earth in early 2013: ¶ … and
blame for [ending] established efforts to regulate outdoor growth,” he says.¶ That’s seems like a pretty extreme statement—at least
until you hear about what happened in Mendocino.¶ A sign posted in Mendocino county.(Flickr user Julia Wolf (this image has been
cropped))¶ The Feds cut short Mendocino’s experiment with cannabis regulation…¶ The story starts in 2010, when Tom Allman,
Mendocino’s sheriff, began charging medically licensed marijuana growing collectives $1,050 for cultivation permits, monthly
inspection fees of around $500, and $25 for a serial-numbered zip-tie that growers were to attach to each plant (pdf, p.5), certifying
that the produce met environmental and public safety standards. The regulation also capped the number of plants per individual at
25, and per collective at 99.¶ In an interview with PBS in 2011, Allman explained that his motivation was remove the gray area
around cultivation in order to honor what California voters had mandated when they legalized medical marijuana, and to free up his
officers to focus on crime. “We’re taking money from people who want to follow the law, … and we are using that exact money to go
after the people who are breaking the law,” said Allman. “[I]f we can remove the gray, if we can remove the inconsistencies, if we can
have people not confused about the marijuana laws, then I have succeeded.”¶ He didn’t succeed immediately. Growers were initially
suspicious that the police would rat them out to the Feds; in the first year, only 18 people signed up. But by the end of 2011, the
program had enlisted nearly 100 growers, bringing in $663,000 in fees in 2011—and important source of revenue for an office that
normally relied on federal funds.¶ Those fees helped finance Allman’s aggressive campaign against illegal “trespass grows“—meaning
those on public land—including some that were illegally damming streams and piping water for irrigation. Allman and his officers
eradicated 642,000 illegal marijuana plants in Mendocino county 2011—more than one-third of what the federal Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) typically eradicates each year in all of California. (For comparison, California is about 44 times bigger and
440 times more populous than Mendocino county.)¶ It helped consumers too, since they could purchase marijuana guaranteed not
to contain scary pesticides. And licensed growers were able to “reintegrate into the county and not feel like outlaws,” as county
supervisor John McCowen put it.¶ But though Mendocino created clear categories of legal and illegal growers, the federal
government didn’t see it that way. DEA agents raided farms of Mendocino’s most prominently law-abiding growers—a crackdown on
“significant drug traffickers,”said US attorney Melinda Haag. Then 2012, federal prosecutors subpoenaed Mendocino’s records of all
participants in the program, which the county’s lawyer said was a breach of medical privacy guarantees. This was a huge blow to the
trust forged between growers and Mendocino police. The federal government insisted that Mendocino shut down the program,
threatening to prosecute officials individually if they granted permits. In March 2012, Mendocino finally gave in.¶ “That,” explains
CANorml’s Gieringer, “put an end to the attempt to regulate outdoor cultivation in California.”¶ … and there’s a cynical theory about
why¶ The federal government isn’t allowed to participate in anything that treats marijuana as
legal. But nothing about Mendocino’s zip-tie program required federal involvement—so why did the Feds crack down?¶ Rusty
Payne, a spokesman for the DEA, said he wasn’t familiar with Mendocino’s zip-tie program. However, he says that the DEA is almost
exclusively focused on major operations. “You’ll rarely if ever see the DEA show up and bang on someone’s door if they have five
plants,” Payne tells Quartz. ¶ While Gieringer, Silvaggio and others who support legalization argue that Mendocino was a successful
effort at bringing order to the market through legalization, Payne argues that such systems would paradoxically increase the market
share of illegal growers.¶ “There are a lot of… myths that [marijuana is] safe, that’s it’s okay if it’s regulated. We think it’s dangerous,
and one reason is that it’s proven to be a significant source of revenue for the most violent organizations in the world, [such as] the
Mexican drug cartels,” he says. “Any time you have a regulated system, you’re going to have taxes and fees. We would see drug
trafficking organizations undercut the so-called legal market to the extent that cartels were even more emboldened by dropping their
prices because they’d be able to sell even more.”¶ If Payne’s theory is right, legalization would give the DEA even more illegal activity
to crack down on. But what if it turned out, instead, that an expanding legal market enticed some growers out of the black market,
thus driving down prices and pushing smaller illegal growers out of business—and at the same time, generating revenue for local
police to go after trespass growers more aggressively, the way Sheriff Allman did?¶ To test those theories you’d need an experiment,
and the run of Mendocino’s experiment was probably too short to tell either way. However, a cynical interpretation of the DEA’s
attitude is that it fears widespread adoption of programs similar to Mendocino’s would harm the interests of federal agencies, like
the DEA, that depend on the “War on Drugs” for funding.¶ Here’s the reasoning.¶ Around 60% of the $24.5 billion (pdf, p.19) the US
federal government allocated in fiscal year 2013 for drug-control programs went toward disrupting the supply of illegal drugs. Two
factors on which Congress evaluates the success of the DEA and its partner law-enforcement agencies are the number of plants
eradicated (pdf, p.64-5)—or “plant count,” as it’s known—and the number of organizations whose operations they disrupt, says
Payne. Some 53% of the outdoor plants (pdf) the DEA eradicated in 2012 were in California. That isn’t particularly surprising, given
that California grows between a quarter and two-thirds of the rest of the country’s pot, according to sources close to the industry.¶ ¶
Now, what if the whole of California adopted Mendocino’s zip-tie program, creating clear classes of law-abiding and illegal growers?
The program would take smaller illegal growers out of business or turn them legal, which would likely bring down California prices.
But because the export market would still pay a premium, the biggest trespass grows—which are mainly producing for export out of
California—would stay in business, and as Payne says, those are what the DEA focuses on. The surviving operations would be the
bigger and better-organized ones that are more dangerous, expensive, and time-consuming to raid. That would make it harder for
federal agencies to eradicate the same number of plants and disrupt the same number of operations as they had in the past. ¶ And
eventually, legalization in California’s current export markets—meaning, other states—will cause local production capacity to expand
and reduce the risk premium. Falling prices will close more and more of these Emerald Triangle trespass grows. When that happens,
it will be harder for illegal growers to stay in business by undercutting legal ones in a market where consumers and retailers have
gotten used to regulated, quality-controlled legal weed.¶ 1¶ ¶ The Office of National Drug-Control Policy (ONDCP)—the White House
office that coordinates federal anti-drug efforts, including the DEA—has a dual mandate, to reduce both the supply and demand of
drugs. It’s being undermined on the demand side, as support for legalization is rising fast—especially for medical use, now legal in 15
states and the District of Columbia—and so are rates of marijuana use by teens. The mandate to eliminate supply is therefore crucial
to being able to justify the ONDCP’s increasingly endangered budget, which shrank nearly 20% (pdf, p.232) in the latest fiscal year.
As for the DEA, the Department of Justice, which oversees it, explicitly identifies legalization as a “performance challenge” (pdf, p.
21-2).¶ ¶ What this all boils down to, according to the cynical interpretation, is that successful local-level regulation in California
would threaten to deprive federal anti-drug agencies of a large source of their income, and set an example for other states. That
could further undermine federal policy, and the agencies’ budgets.¶ The War on Drugs is now supposedly about the environment…¶
If this reasoning seems too much like a conspiracy theory, consider that the federal government has long cited the threat to public
safety posed by violent “Mexican cartels” (pdf, p.72) to justify its aggressive tactics and hefty budgets. Only last year did Tommy
Lanier, director of the ONDCP’s National Marijuana Initiative, quietly admit, “Based on our intelligence, which includes thousands
of cellphone numbers and wiretaps, we haven’t been able to connect anyone to a major cartel.”¶ 1¶ In the 2012 National Drug Control
Strategy, which is published by ONDCP, the sole rationale given for eradicating marijuana cultivation in the US was to stop “violent
transnational criminal organizations” (pdf, p.28).¶ The reference to Mendocino county refers to the campaign against trespass grows
that Sheriff Tom Allman spearheaded.("National Drug Control Strategy, 2012")¶ In the 2013 strategy, that changed (pdf, p.45) to an
emphasis on the environment:¶ ("National Drug Control Strategy, 2013.")¶ This, argue some, is of a piece with new federal
government talking points emphasizing that cannabis crackdowns are needed to protect the environment. Dominic Corva, head of
CASP, says this newfound passion for conservation is more about justifying the anti-marijuana policy in the face of growing public
acceptance of marijuana. “Before it was ‘cannabis is bad,'” says Corva. “Now it’s ‘environmental degradation caused by cannabis is
bad.'”¶ The DEA’s Payne says that his organization has long paid attention to environmental destruction by trespass growers. “The
environmental impacts—those are obviously concerns for anyone [in regard to] what these drug trafficking organizations are doing
to our public lands,” he says. But, he also says, “we’re not environmental experts—we go after drug traffickers.”¶ …but it isn’t exactly
being fought that way¶ If the end result is that the DEA reduces the cannabis industry’s environmental abuse, does it matter if the
way it goes about it is by treating the industry as something to be wiped out?¶ In all fairness to the DEA, it isn’t supposed to be
regulating water pumps. Indeed, saddling an anti-drug agency with environmental policing seems a perverse way of doing things,
especially when other federal agencies are refusing to do it. Take, for instance, the National Forest Service. Once focused on
regulating (and promoting) economic development on forested land, the agency has shifted more recently toward protecting the
environment (pdf, p.3), including watersheds. Part of its job is to research how commercial industries like logging affect the
environment in forests. However, it has steadfastly rejected EPIC’s requests that it do the same for marijuana cultivation. “The best
way to minimize impacts to affected resources is by discouraging this criminal activity through aggressive law enforcement,” says the
US Forest Service (pdf).¶ A U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency agent displays marijuana and cash confiscated during part of a fivemonth undercover drug investigation at the San Diego State University campus, in this undated handout photo from the DEA
released May 6, 2008. Police have arrested 18 San Diego State University students on drug-related charges stemming from an
undercover investigation there, a spokesman for the college said on Tuesday. Another 15 students were arrested previously during
the five-month operation. REUTERS/DEA/Handout¶ Some of the fruits of the DEA’s five-month undercover drug investigation at
San Diego State University in 2008.(Reuters/DEA)¶ Even if the DEA had the capacity to target the most
egregious environmental abusers, it wouldn’t be sufficient, says EPIC’s Hughes. “These are really
profound environmental harms that need more than just a bust to be dealt with,” he says. He argues
that public land management should be prioritized over law enforcement.¶ CASP’s Silvaggio says that the DEA’s focus continues to
be on destroying plants and arresting easy targets—low-level workers. That means it’s disrupting industrial grows basically by
creating minor staffing headaches. And, if the growers subsequently replant, they end up using even more water. ¶ On top of that,
law-enforcement officers don’t generally know a lot about managing the environment, and lack the staff who does. That means they
sometimes lean heavily on local volunteers to clean up pot-growing sites after a raid, says EPIC’s Hughes. Because that risks putting
volunteers in harm’s way—one died on the job in Sep. 2013—law enforcement operations tend to stay away from the bigger, riskier
grow sites in remote, hard-to-access areas, he adds, meaning those grows continue to do environmental damage.¶ Busting
trespass grows, the main focus of the DEA’s work, also does nothing to limit damage to the
water supply from growers on private residential land. Compared with public-land grows, those account for a
majority of cannabis cultivation in the area, says CDFW (pdf, p.25) and others close to the industry.
California water crisis wrecks the US economy and ag leadership
Roth 3/19/15—MA in Economics from the University of Florida, President of NCCT Consulting
(Bill, "Climate Change Puts California Economy at Risk of Collapse." Triple Pundit.
www.triplepundit.com/2015/03/climate-change-threatens-california-economic-collapse/, TD)
This is not an article about California. It is about you, in whatever state you live. California’s
economy is so large and
impacts so many other businesses that its potential collapse due to a water crisis
will impact the pocketbooks of most Americans.¶ California has a $2.2 trillion annual
economy. That makes California the seventh largest economy in the world. For all the greatness of Texas, the
California economy is approximately twice the size.¶ California’s companies are the world’s technology
leaders. Google, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, Cisco, Disney, Hewlett Packard, Tesla and Solar
City all have their corporate headquarters in California. Little know Atomic General located in San Diego is a world leader in
military drones. San Francisco and San Diego rank No. 1 and No. 3 among the top 10 biopharma
clusters in the U.S.¶ California is also a global breadbasket: It is the world’s fifth largest supplier
of food. The California agriculture industry is highly efficient, and the state is the largest food
producer in the U.S. , with only four percent of U.S. farms. California’s crop diversity is world class,
with the state growing over 450 different crops. Crops exclusively grown by California in the U.S.
include almonds, artichokes, dates, olives, raisins, pistachios and clover. The state also produces
more than 86 percent of all lemons and 94 percent of all processed tomatoes in the U.S. You might
want to drink to California’s agricultural success by having a glass of California wine, as the state is the world’s fourth largest wine
producer.¶ Whether you are a Democrat or Republican, the state anchors your government spending plan as California is the
largest federal tax payer among U.S. states. The state also pays more in federal taxes than it receives in federal
spending.¶ Climate change driving California’s drought¶ Research by Stanford University points to climate change as a key driver in
California’s historic drought level. It is not a question of whether California has ever before had droughts. The question of this
research was how climate change impacts the severity of weather events like droughts. The findings were that “… extreme
atmospheric high pressure in this region – which is strongly linked to unusually low precipitation in California – is much more likely
to occur today than prior to the human emission of greenhouse gases that began during the Industrial Revolution in the 1800s.Ӧ
This research can be yet another climate change deniers’ example of science getting in the way of their personal beliefs or economic
incentives, except this time the consequences of denial will impact Americans who eat tomato-based products, use a lemon or search
Google.¶ No water, no economy¶ Imagine the ramifications for your state if it were to run out of water. That is
the
immediate challenge facing California. January 2015 was the driest in California since
record-keeping began in 1895. This is not a recent weather event: NASA data shows that California’s water storage
capacity — in the form of its lakes, snow levels, water table etc. — has been in decline since 2002. There is no contingency plan
for this level of climate change for the world’s seventh largest economy. ¶ The economic ramification will range from
measurable to catastrophic . Two-thirds of the state’s water losses are tied to the agricultural
community’s pumping the aquifer dry. A point of diminishing return is being reached with increased reports of dry wells.
California’s agricultural industry is on the precipice of economic decline and may be heading toward
collapse due to a lack of water.¶ Rationing is now a topic of discussion in California. Water conservation has been as much of
California’s culture as energy conservation and renewable energy. But conservation cannot overcome this scale of drought and water shortage.
Rationing appears the last option available, and it holds the potential of dramatically curtailing economic activity. ¶ Rationing means that people and
businesses will have to reduce their economic activities due to a lack of water. One
obvious impact will be a lack of water to
serve the approximately 227 million domestic person trips annually to California that generates
over $100 billion in visitor spending. It has the potential to impact the operations of
California’s tech companies that the rest of the U.S., and the world, depend on to run their
economies. It will certainly mean less food sourced from California with higher prices at grocery
stores across America.
Extinction
Richard N. Haass 13, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/30/13, “The World
Without America,” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-ofamerican-power-by-richard-n--haass
Let me posit a radical idea: The most critical threat facing the United States now and for the foreseeable future is not a rising
China, a reckless North Korea, a nuclear Iran, modern terrorism, or climate change. Although all of these constitute potential or actual threats, the
biggest challenges facing the US are its burgeoning debt, crumbling infrastructure, second-rate primary and secondary schools, outdated immigration system,
and slow economic growth – in short, the domestic foundations of American power . Readers in other countries may be
tempted to react to this judgment with a dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in America’s difficulties. Such a response should not be surprising. The US and those representing it have been
guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between America’s practices and its principles understandably
provoke charges of hypocrisy. When America does not adhere to the principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment. But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at America’s imperfections and struggles
America’s failure to deal with its internal challenges would
come at a steep price. Indeed, the rest of the world’s stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself. Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for
about one-quarter of global output. If US growth accelerates, America’s capacity to consume other countries’ goods
and services will increase, thereby boosting growth around the world. At a time when Europe is drifting and
Asia is slowing, only the US (or, more broadly, North America) has the potential to drive global economic recovery . The
ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be careful what they wish for.
US remains a unique source of innovation. Most of the world’s citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More
recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other
societies to increase their energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions. The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a
the US has long been a leading example of what market economies
and democratic politics can accomplish. People and governments around the world are far more likely
to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding. Finally, the world faces many
serious challenges, ranging from the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, fight climate
change, and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to
regulating practices in cyberspace, improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts .
These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out . While Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” may
ensure the success of free markets, it is powerless in the world of geopolitics . Order requires the visible hand of
leadership to formulate and realize global responses to global challenges. Don’t get me wrong: None of this is
significant percentage of future world leaders. More fundamentally,
meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the world’s problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems
multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and
implement. Right now there is only one candidate for this role: the US. No other country has the
necessary combination of capability and outlook. This brings me back to the argument that the US must put its house in
order – economically , physically, socially, and politically – if it is to have the resources needed to promote order in the
world . Everyone should hope that it does: The alternative to a world led by the US is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia,
Japan, India, or any other country, but rather a world that is not led at all . Such a world would almost certainly be
characterized by chronic crisis and conflict . That would be bad not just for Americans, but for the vast majority of the planet ’s
suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding. But
inhabitants.
Ag collapse causes extinction
Lugar 4 (Richard G., U.S. Senator – Indiana and Former Chair – Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, “Plant Power”, Our Planet, 14(3),
http://www.unep.org/ourplanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html)
In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East, burgeoning nuclear threats and other crises, it is easy to lose
sight of the long-range challenges. But we do so at our peril. One of the most daunting of them is meeting the
world’s need for food and energy in this century. At stake is not only preventing starvation and saving the
environment, but also world peace and security. History tells us that states may go to war over access to
resources, and that poverty and famine have often bred fanaticism and terrorism. Working to feed the
world will minimize factors that contribute to global instability and the proliferation of w eapons of m ass
d estruction.
With the world population expected to grow from 6 billion people today to 9 billion by mid-century, the demand for affordable
food will increase well beyond current international production levels. People in rapidly developing nations will have the
means greatly to improve their standard of living and caloric intake. Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand
for feed grain at the same time that the growing world population will need vastly more basic food to eat.
Complicating a solution to this problem is a dynamic that must be better understood in the West: developing countries often use
limited arable land to expand cities to house their growing populations. As good land disappears, people destroy
timber resources and even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves. The long-term
environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire globe.
Productivity revolution
To meet the expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in the U nited S tates will have to grow roughly
three times more food on the land we have. That’s a tall order. My farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example, yields on
average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of corn per hectare – typical for a farm in central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to
produce an annual average of 25 tonnes per hectare.
Can we possibly boost output that much? Well, it’s been done before. Advances in the use of fertilizer and water, improved
machinery and better tilling techniques combined to generate a threefold increase in yields since 1935 – on our farm
back then, my dad produced 2.8 to 3 tonnes per hectare. Much US agriculture has seen similar increases.
But of course there is no guarantee that we can achieve those results again. Given the urgency of expanding food production to meet
world demand, we must invest much more in scientific research and target that money toward projects that promise to have
significant national and global impact. For the United States, that will mean a major shift in the way we conduct and fund agriculturl
science. Fundamental research will generate the innovations that will be necessary to feed the world.
The U nited S tates can take a leading position in a productivity revolution. And our success at
increasing food production may play a decisive humanitarian role in the survival of billions of people
and the health of our planet .
Independently, unregulated growing causes environmental havoc and destroys
Salmon populations—only federal legalization solves
Dearen 14—Environmental reporter for the Associated Press (Jason, "Northern California
Rivers, Streams Being Polluted, Drained by Medical Marijuana Farms, Study Says." Cadrought.
6/1/14. www.cadrought.com/northern-california-rivers-streams-being-polluted-drained-bymedical-marijuana-farms-study-says/, TD)
SAN FRANCISCO – Some drought-stricken rivers and streams in Northern California’s coastal forests are
being polluted and sucked dry by water-guzzling medical marijuana farms , wildlife
officials say — an issue that has spurred at least one county to try to outlaw personal grows.¶ State fish and wildlife officials say much of
the marijuana being grown in northern counties under the state’s medical pot law is not being used for legal,
personal use, but for sale both in California and states where pot is still illegal.¶ This demand is
fueling backyard and larger-scale pot farming, especially in remote Lake, Humboldt and Mendocino counties on the densely
forested North Coast, officials said.¶ “People are coming in, denuding the hillsides, damming the creeks and
mixing in fertilizers that are not allowed in the U.S. into our watersheds,” said Denise Rushing, a Lake County
supervisor who supports an ordinance essentially banning outdoor grows in populated areas. ¶ “When rains come, it flows downstream into the lake and
our water supply,” she said.¶ Many
affected waterways also contain endangered salmon, steelhead and
other creatures protected by state and federal law.¶ Wildlife biologists noticed streams running dry
more often over the 18 years since the state passed Proposition 215, but weren’t sure why.¶ “We knew people were
diverting water for marijuana operations, but we wanted to know exactly how much,” said Scott Bauer, the department biologist who studied the pot
farms’ effects on four watersheds. “We didn’t know they could consume all the water in a stream.”¶ So Bauer turned
to Google mapping technology and satellite data to find out where the many gardens are, and how many plants each contained. ¶ This undated graphic
released by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife shows daily estimated total water use in residences, greenhouses and outdoor grows in the
Salmon Creek Watershed, in Humboldt County, Calif. AP Photo — California Department of Fish and Wildlife ¶ This undated graphic released by the
California Department of Fish and Wildlife shows daily estimated total water use in residences, greenhouses and outdoor grows in the Salmon Creek
Watershed, in Humboldt County, Calif. AP Photo — California Department of Fish and Wildlife¶ His study estimates that about 30,000 pot plants were
being grown in each river system — each plant uses about six gallons per day over marijuana’s 150-day growing season.¶ He compared that information
with government data on stream flows, and visited 32 sites with other biologists to verify the mapping data. He said most grow sites had posted notices
identifying them as medical pot farms.¶ Pot farm pollution has become such a problem in Lake County, south of Bauer’s study area, that officials voted
unanimously last year to ban outdoor grows.¶ “Counties are the ultimate arbiter of land use conflict, so while you have a right to grow marijuana for
medicinal use, you don’t have a right to impinge on someone else’s happiness and wellbeing,” Rushing said. ¶ Saying they were being demonized, pot
users challenged the law, and gathered enough signatures to place a referendum on the June 3 ballot. They argue that grow restrictions like the ones
being voted on in Lake County lump the responsible users in with criminals. ¶ “We definitely feel environmental issues are a concern. But more
restrictive … ordinances will force people to start growing in unregulated and illegal places on public land,” said Daniel McClean, a registered nurse and
medical marijuana user who opposes the outdoor-grow ban.¶ While some counties are trying to help regulate the environmental effects of pot farms,
Bauer hopes his study will lead to better collaboration with growers to help police illegal use of water and pesticides. ¶ Previous collaborative attempts
between government and growers have not ended well, said Anthony Silvaggio, a Humboldt State University sociology professor who studies the pot
economy.¶ “The county or state gets in there and starts doing code enforcement on other things,” Silvaggio said. “They’ve done this in the past”¶ He said
pot farmers believe they are being unfairly blamed for killing endangered salmon while decades of timber cutting and overfishing are the real culprits.¶
However, the environmental damage has led to a split in the marijuana growing community. ¶ One business, the Tea House Collective in Humboldt
County, offers medicinal pot to people with prescriptions that it says is farmed by “small scale, environmentally conscious producers.” ¶ “Patients who
cannot grow their own medicine can rely on our farmers to provide them with the best holistic medicine that is naturally grown, sustainable and forever
Humboldt,” the group’s website advertises.¶ Despite efforts of some pot farmers to clean things up, the
increased water use by farms
is a “full-scale environmental disaster,” said Fish and Wildlife Lt. John Nores, who leads the agency’s Marijuana
Enforcement Team.¶ “ Whether it’s grown quasi legally under the state’s medical marijuana laws,
or it’s a complete cartel outdoor drug trafficking grow site, there is extreme environmental
damage being done at all levels ,” Nores said.¶ Officials say until the federal government
recognizes California’s medical marijuana laws, growers will continue to operate
clandestinely to meet market demand for their product due to fear of prosecution. Meantime, enforcing
federal and state environmental regulations will be harder.
Extinction
Bernie Stephan 13, Protecting our salmon and our human survival, 10/24/2013,
http://www.ptreyeslight.com/article/protecting-our-salmon-and-our-human-survival
Biodiversity in our watershed is essential for many species
and is essential for ultimate human survival. We must protect our watersheds
Extinction is far more serious than anyone’s financial investment.¶ The cumulative effect
of many small land disturbances near a stream can be devastating Land-use restrictions to
protect salmon streams have successfully been implemented elsewhere in California
It’s time we valued our freshwater creeks—nature’s roads—for the value they bring in the long term.
, respecting the natural flows of water and
the life they enable.
.
and around the United States.
Marin’s failure to take permanent action is truly disturbing, considering that other counties and cities have enacted stream protection measures. The need to control development, to protect Marin’s salmon, has been well understood for decades. ¶ Marin officials
have watched coho salmon populations drop by 70 percent since the 1960’s. In 2010, the nonprofit Salmon Protection and Watershed Network sued the county for its failure to protect salmon. Marin’s Superior Court imposed a ban on new development in San
Geronimo Valley pending the adoption of an ordinance that had been promised since 1994.
¶ In June, almost two decades after the ordinance had been proposed, the Board of Supervisors had before it a draft stream protection ordinance ready for adoption. But
when it came to a vote, supervisors lacked the political courage to protect the salmon. Instead, they chose to punt, appointing a subcommittee to make recommendations for revising the Countywide Plan once again. ¶ We can have development setbacks for coho and
all the other species that don’t recognize our surveyed boundaries. Our creeks are roads for salmon, whose annual migrations are a marvel of nature. When my family lived on San Geronimo Creek, the sighting of salmon always lifted our spirits, connecting us to the
natural world. I envision Marin’s creeks as wildlife corridors where aquatic and terrestrial critter alike would have their needs met. It’s time for us humans to see the bigger picture and begin limiting our development. ¶ Private property rights should take a back seat
to the needs of nature. As a working realtor, I’m still speaking up for the fish. I value their right to continue co-existing with us more highly than our right to expand real estate development. But will our supervisors do the same? Human activity, especially land
development, has been the main cause of the collapse of the Lagunitas Creek salmon population, and sustaining the salmon requires rigorous protection along the entire length of the creek and its ¶ tributaries. ¶ As our planet undergoes a biodiversity crisis
everywhere, 16,000 species are threatened with extinction, including 12 percent of birds, 23 percent of mammals and 32 percent of amphibians. Biologists are clear that humans are responsible for the declines we are witnessing. The aggregate effect of all our
We should
to protect our
salmon, or they will all be gone and the threats to human survival are not far behind
development continues to destroy the homes and habitat of wildlife, even when we as individuals take great care not to. ¶
scientists over the protestations of property owners. Let’s heed the dire warnings; there has been enough delay already.
move quickly to enact a rigorous, enforceable ordinance
. Let’s listen to the
¶ I urge the county supervisors to exercise decisive leadership is reversing the tide that always seems to put private property rights ahead of
Salmon are the biological foundation—and keystone species—of our precious coastal
ecosystems
nature’s rights.
. Let’s hope the supervisors stem the tide of ecocide and side with the fish on this important issue.
1AC IF SPEEDY
Back to OAS
Risk of nuclear use is high—regional partnerships are key
Finlay and Berganas 14—deputy director of the Managing Across Boundaries initiative and
Vice President at Stimson and (Brian and Johan, "A Sustainable WMD NonProliferation
Strategy For East Africa." 7/31/14. Naval Postgraduate School.
www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2014/A%20SUSTAINABLE%20
WMD%20NONPROLIFERATION%20STRATEGY%20FOR%20EAST%20AFRICA.FINAL.pdf,
TD)
The continued and accelerating spread of materials associated with WMD is partly due to the¶
changing proliferation environment. First, the licit and illicit trade of WMD and related materials¶
is increasingly moving southward , meaning that, to a greater extent, emerging and developing¶
countries are part – wittingly or unwittingly – of the WMD supply chain, as dual-use innovators¶
and manufacturers, critical transshipment points and financial centers, or breeding grounds for¶ terrorist
sympathies (see map 1). In such a proliferation environment, absent participation by all¶ countries that represent links
in the global proliferation supply chain – from Southeast Asia,¶ Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America – increase the
probability that international efforts to¶ curb the terrorist threat and prevent WMD proliferation will
fail.¶ Second, the international community has largely failed to develop a long term and
sustainable¶ WMD nonproliferation strategy that is suitable for emerging and developing
countries. To date,¶ the great majority of WMD nonproliferation programming, particularly in Africa, are seen as¶ Westernimposed measures that are ill-connected to national and regional priorities. These ¶ 3¶ governments – in Southeast Asia,
Africa and the Caribbean and Latin America – seek capacity¶ building assistance and partnerships
to address more critical national needs, such as improved¶ border control, policing and judicial
capabilities, which more directly apply to broader global¶ challenges like conventional arms and drug trafficking,
growing energy needs, human¶ smuggling, piracy, environmental crime, public health issues and securing the supply chain to¶
facilitate more efficient trade relationships with countries around the world.
2AC
HEG
Decline of US leadership causes apolarity and global conflict --- perception of
decline crushes the plan’s effectiveness and causes US lashout
Zbigniew Brzezinski 12, Professor of American Foreign Policy @ Johns Hopkins and a Scholar
@ CSIS, “After America,” Jan/Feb, Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?page=full
For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not
even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors,
and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes . While a sudden, massive crisis of
the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction
leading to global political and economic disorder , a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or
endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be
ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to
play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of
rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and
many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks
to global well-being . Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced
national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could
ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are
already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the
Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military
cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's
uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be
pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a
politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining
United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old
Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic,
financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective
successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its
overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view
the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual
redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders
themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and
developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of
modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage,
however, a
more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international
interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional
coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to
America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting
regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among
China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to
resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a
number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo
reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in
proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea,
Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical
equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international
environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and
expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political
stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the
narcotics trade. A
decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and
good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be
more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security ,
and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally
troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican
politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another
consequence of American
decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global
common -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the
environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global
economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability . In almost every case, the potential
absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential
communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power
creates order where there would normally be conflict.
Heg good
Keck 14—Managing Editor of The Diplomat
(Zachary, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-wepanic/, dml)
Still, on
balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s
hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power
America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they
incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half
a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor,
Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based,
open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a
minimum level of human rights in the world.
Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its
relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition
periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign
intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the
rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly
impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international
system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states.
We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the AsiaPacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has
unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense
of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers
have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation
grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in
other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead.
All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has
asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus
its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time,
America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained
major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen
any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era
comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises
dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan
acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals.
But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there
are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is
commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through
multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics ,
organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction , among many others.
A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action
on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative
and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power
lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no
shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has
been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
Arms race empirically denied---nonprolif regime is resilient and solves
Daniel Larison 14, senior editor at the American Conservative, PhD in History from the Univ
of Chicago, citing Johan Bergenas, deputy director of the Managing Across Boundaries initiative
at the Stimson Center, May 22 2014, “Iran and the “Nuclear Domino” Myth,”
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/iran-and-the-nuclear-domino-myth/
Matthew Kroenig continues his never-ending series of articles promoting war with Iran. I’m not all that interested in his argument about Obama, but I wanted to respond to some assertions that he makes about
Kroenig writes:¶ Nuclear weapons in Iran would spark a nuclear
arms race in the Middle East. Tehran would probably export do-it-yourself atomic bomb kits to other countries around the world. And the global nonproliferation
regime would collapse as it became clear that the international community lacked the resolve to stop the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons.¶ All of these
claims are wrong . Johan Bergenas specifically addressed two of these claims in a 2010 article for Foreign Affairs. He rejected the idea that the nonproliferation regime would collapse
what would happen after Iran acquired nuclear weapons.
because of a nuclear-armed Iran. On the NPT itself, he said:¶ Its more than 180 committed parties are unlikely to allow Iran’s nuclear program to demolish an institution that is — and has been for four decades —
there’s
one problem with this “nuclear domino” scenario: the historical record does not
support it. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, many have feared rapid and widespread nuclear proliferation; 65 years later, only nine
countries have developed nuclear weapons .¶ Notably, Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons has not
prompted any of its neighbors to do likewise, nor has North Korea’s nuclear tests led to further proliferation in East Asia. If a state is
determined to build nuclear weapons, the nonproliferation regime cannot prevent this from happening, but the strength of that regime is that is gives the
vast majority of states incentives not to pursue such weapons.¶ He continues: ¶ Predictions of
catastrophic consequences resulting from a nuclear Iran are not only wrong but counterproductive. The assertion that the
the foundation of nonproliferation efforts.¶ As for the fear of a “nuclear domino effect,” Bergenas cites past experience with new nuclear-weapons states to show this idea to be another myth:¶ But
widespread proliferation is unavoidable could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The myth of a nuclear domino effect creates an excuse for other Middle Eastern countries — expecting that their neighbors will be
nuclear powers — to acquire nuclear weapons themselves.
California collapse undermines tech leadership—that’s roth—extinction
Taylor 5 (Mark, Professor of Political Science – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The
Politics of Technological Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions”, 4-1,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor)
I. Introduction Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR),
affecting almost every aspect of the sub-field.* First andforemost, a nation's technological capability has a
significant effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national
technological capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in
calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation's trade
profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production
facilities.' Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation's
technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them.- Thus, in broad theoretical terms,
technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of
states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience
a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the
United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century.' Conversely, great
powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from
influence on international scene.0 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics,
but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on
international relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological
innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding causal variable in
any given IR theory,but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For
example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics.7 At the
very least, they describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations,
or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power
domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics.' Jervis tells us that the
balance
of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war .9 Walt agrees, arguing that
technological change can alter a state's aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the
international balance of threats.10 Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by
raising or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of
international cooperation and regimes." Technology also lowers information & transactions costs and thus increases the
applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory." And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and
information, technological change can lead to Keohane's interdependence*5 or Thomas Friedman et al's globalization.*4 Meanwhile,
over at the "third debate", Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein's "cultural norms" which shape
security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation;" toWendt's "stripped down technological determinism" in which
technology inevitably drives nations to form a world state.*4 However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new
technology changes people's identities within society, and sometimes evencreates new cross-national constituencies, thereby
affecting international politics.17 Of course, Marxists tendto see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course
of history, though they describe mankind's major fault lines as running between economic classes rather than nation-states." Finally,
Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of transportation, communication,production, and war,
international systems wouldnot exist in the first place.'9
2AC AT: IRAN DA
veto-proof majority—concessions, also proves deal failure
Hoskinson, 3/26/15 (Charles, “Reported concessions could kill Iran deal in Washington,”
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/reported-concessions-could-kill-iran-deal-inwashington/article/2562116, JMP)
Negotiations with Iran over limiting its nuclear program appeared close to agreement Thursday,
but the reported outlines of a possible deal contained concessions by international negotiators
expected to make it politically unpalatable in Washington.
The Associated Press reported that the United States is considering letting Iran run several
hundred centrifuges used to enrich uranium at Fordow, a heavily fortified underground site near
the Shiite holy city of Qom that Iran kept secret from international inspectors until it disclosed
the facility in 2009. In exchange, Iran would reduce the number of centrifuges it operates
elsewhere and would use those at Fordow to enrich elements other than uranium.
The United States and its partners in the P5+1 group — Britain, France, Germany, Russia and
China — had wanted the facility shut down.
Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. and its negotiating partners at the
talks which resumed Friday in Lausanne, Switzerland, are scaling back demands that Iran come
clean on its past nuclear research, which included attempts to develop a nuclear weapon, to
overcome Tehran's refusal to do so.
Both moves could make any deal unable to achieve its main goal of preventing Iran from
developing a nuclear weapon, according to experts, who say those and other concessions,
particularly any walkback of demands that Iran come clean on past weapons work, will make
verification impossible.
"It is going to require a very intrusive verification system, and it's unclear whether that can be
accomplished," David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security,
who has been advising the Obama administration on the issue, told a House Foreign Affairs
subcommittee Tuesday.
Any concession that weakens the ability to verify that Iran's nuclear program is solely peaceful
would make an agreement dead on arrival in Congress, which is already likely to vote to
force Obama to submit the deal to lawmakers for approval.
House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, tweeted out a link to the AP report with the comment
"Not a good deal."
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is set to vote April 14 on legislation that would require
congressional approval of a deal and tie the relief from U.S. sanctions demanded by Iran to that
process. Supporters expect it to pass soon after by a majority large enough to overcome
Obama's expected veto.
“If today’s news report from Lausanne is true, we are not inching closer to Iran’s negotiating
position, but leaping toward it with both feet," said Sen. Bob Menendez of New Jersey, the
panel's ranking Democrat. "My fear is that we are no longer guided by the principle that ‘no deal
is better than a bad deal,’ but instead we are negotiating ‘any deal for a deal’s sake.'"
In the House, 367 lawmakers — 77 more than a veto-proof majority — signed a March 20 letter
to Obama saying that their willingness to lift U.S. sanctions depends on them being convinced
that an agreement prevents Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
"Members of Congress have made it clear that Iran's past bomb work must be disclosed if a deal
is to have any credibility." said House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce, R-Calif.
Deal Fails
Washington Examiner, 4/1/15 (“Will Obama really walk away from a bad Iran deal?”
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/will-obama-really-walk-away-from-a-bad-irandeal/article/2562352, JMP)
Another deadline, another failure by the Iranian regime and the Obama administration to reach
a nuclear agreement. This deadline was described Monday as "a real deadline" by State
Department spokeswoman Marie Harf — as opposed to the previous deadlines, which proved
not to be so "real" after all.
But this new delay in reaching a resolution acceptable to all parties should be especially
troubling, as the late tells in the negotiations cast doubt upon both Iran's intentions
and Obama's competence in preventing a terrorist-sponsoring regime from acquiring
nuclear weapons.
The most disturbing development this week was Iran's last-minute pullback. The
pullback itself is not the problem, but rather the issue cited as its cause. Negotiations to this
point had included a requirement that Iran begin shipping its stocks of 5-percent enriched
uranium to Russia. Without any warning, this has suddenly become a big hangup.
There are not many innocuous reasons for the Iranians to balk now at this particular provision.
It is not an impediment to a peaceful nuclear energy program, for which uranium need not be
enriched as far as 5 percent. The provision for shipments to Russia is designed to give the West
and Iran's neighbors at least a year's worth of breathing space before Iran can potentially make a
nuclear bomb, in the event that the Islamic Republic decides to "break out" and develop
weapons anyway. Iran's current stockpiles and centrifuges would leave only a couple of months'
breathing room before it could make a bomb.
Bear in mind that if Iran acquires the bomb, its use of a nuclear weapon is not the only possible
undesirable result. It would also embolden Iran's use of the conventional paramilitary forces it
has funded and deployed in the region for years, causing instability from Lebanon to Syria to the
Palestinian territories to Yemen. It will add teeth to Iran's increasingly aggressive challenges to
the leaders of Sunni Muslim world, to say nothing of its repeated threats to wipe Israel off the
map. Further, it would surely set off an arms race in the world's worst neighborhood.
Iran has come to the table now because it wants desperately to end international and U.S.
sanctions against it, which were imposed as punishment for its transparent nuclear ambitions.
But given its past and even its recent behavior, Iran's intention to pursue peace and friendship
cannot be — and in retrospect probably should not have been — taken at face value.
The question now is whether the White House speaks the truth in maintaining that "the
president won't sign a bad deal, that he'll walk away, that no deal is far better than a bad deal."
Obama has not so far shown so much sense. Americans can only hope it is not already too late
for him to start.
Cheating and nuclearization is inevitable
Rubin, 3/19/15 – columnist for the Washington Post (Jennifer, “Only Congress can derail the
Iran appeasement train” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/rightturn/wp/2015/03/19/only-congress-can-derail-the-iran-appeasement-train/
The backdrop to this is President Obama’s lack of credibility to forge a “good deal,” as he and his
advisers insist is the only deal better than no deal. He is desperate for a deal — so desperate he
would make massive concessions and repeatedly overlook and excuse cheating. As for the latter,
“When nuclear monitors said Iran had started testing a single advanced centrifuge last year,
some U.S. politicians and analysts jumped on the report as proof the Islamic Republic can’t be
trusted. To U.S. officials negotiating with Iran, it was probably just a mistake — one that shows
the pitfalls in the highly technical accord being discussed.” You understand then the problem
with relying on inspectors and “snapping back” sanctions; the administration will never admit
there has been cheating, so Iran will do so with impunity. If Iran cheats now, imagine how badly
it will behave once the president has his scrap of paper and has put his full weight behind a deal.
The only way to prevent cheating is to have a full accounting of past activities, to remove the
existing centrifuges and to have intrusive inspections. That is what the United Nations
resolutions envisioned. There was good reason for it.
So let’s be clear. The purpose of demanding a vote on the deal is not merely to strengthen our
bargaining position (i.e. Iran needs to give up enough to get Congress on board), but to nix a bad
deal, one that most observers fear is coming. If the deal is one that leaves Iran with thousands of
centrifuges, swiftly lifts sanctions and contains a 10-year sunset clause, Congress should put the
kibosh on it. That is why Congress wants a vote and why Obama does not want to give
lawmakers a say. Put simply, he wants to capitulate to Iran and enlist the United Nations in
undercutting existing sanctions. Congress wants to stop him.
Just so we are clear then, the bill (which is likely to be marked up in committee) is one means of
stopping Obama from giving away the store. There may be better ways to do that, but for now
that is what will come before the Senate. To vote against it is to enable the president’s
appeasement and to put us on a course for a deal that allows Iran to go nuclear at a time of its
choosing. And, in fact, by unanimous consent it could get a vote on the Senate floor before
Congress leaves town. What Democrat wants to stop it and give Obama room to give the store
away? We will find out soon enough.
The deal causes their impact
Flietz, 3/1/15 --- senior fellow with the Center for Security Policy and a former CIA analyst
(Fred, “Why Obama’s Iran deal is a path to war”, New York Post, March 1, 2015,
http://nypost.com/2015/03/01/why-obamas-iran-deal-is-a-path-to-war/)
The Obama administration and its supporters insist that, although the agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program now taking shape may not be perfect, the only alternative is war with Iran. A failure of
the nuclear talks, they also contend, would sacrifice important temporary agreements that now
restrict Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Both arguments are false. Worse, the nuclear deal that
the administration is pursuing may make war with Iran more likely . The world would be safer if the
nuclear talks with Iran were stopped now. The agreement being negotiated reportedly would last only 10 years and
would leave Iran able to build multiple nuclear bombs in about three months. Administration leaks describe a deal
that lets Iran keep on enriching uranium with as many as 6,500 centrifuges and continuing to
work on the Arak heavy-water reactor that will be a source of plutonium. Such an agreement
would destabilize the Middle East— launching a regional nuclear-arms race as Iran’s
Muslim rivals seek to match its capabilities, and perhaps prompting an Israeli airstrike on
Iranian nuclear facilities. Nor have the talks significantly reduced Iran’s nuclear program.
Despite President Obama’s claims to the contrary, Iran has enriched uranium at the same rate since the
nuclear talks began early last year and increased its stockpile of enriched uranium. It would take Iran
about three months to produce fuel for its first nuclear weapon by refining its low-enriched uranium to weapons-grade material. At
the end of 2013, it had on hand enough low-grade uranium for at least seven bombs; by the end of 2014, enough for at least eight. In
answer to criticism that a potential nuclear deal won’t be strong enough, Obama officials have claimed it will be subject to stringent
inspections by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. This argument is hard to take seriously: Iran has never fully
cooperated with the IAEA. During the talks, it has specifically refused to cooperate with IAEA
inspectors — one of its several violations of the interim agreement that set up the talks. The
alternative to a deeply flawed nuclear deal is not war, it is continued stalemate —
more of the slow development of the Iranian nuclear program that has persisted despite 13
months of nuclear talks. Stopping the talks might actually lower regional tensions by
easing the fears of Israel, Saudi Arabia and other states that a weak, short-lived
nuclear agreement is coming soon — one that will end sanctions on Tehran and all
restrictions on its future nuclear activities. Congress should not be fooled by the Obama team’s false claim that it’s
either their way on the Iranian nuclear program or war with Iran. The truth is that the flawed agreement being
negotiated will make a war more likely and kicks hard-to-solve elements of Iran’s nuclear
program down the road for a future president to deal with. Far better to halt the nuclear talks
and return to the pre-2012 Western approach that required Iran to end uranium enrichment,
disable its centrifuges, send its enriched-uranium stockpile out of the country and disassemble
the Arak reactor. Charles Krauthammer had it right last week on Fox News: The Iranian nuclear talks are “simply
catastrophic.” The real catastrophe will be if this foolish agreement sparks a regional war in the
Middle East.
Spurs allied prolif across Asia and global nuclear war --- alternative isn’t war and
North Korea proves Iran will string along the U.S.
Blumenthal & Linczer, 3/11/15 --- *director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute, AND **Asian Studies Research Assistant at American Enterprise Institute (Dan &
Eddie, “The risks of a nuclear Iran spread far beyond the Middle East,”
http://www.aei.org/publication/the-risks-of-a-nuclear-iran-spread-far-beyond-the-middleeast/, JMP)
“Inspectors knew when North Korea broke to the bomb, but that didn’t stop anything. North
Korea turned off the cameras, kicked out the inspectors. Within a few years, it got the bomb.”
In his address to Congress, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rightly compared the
ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran to Washington’s past experience with North Korea. But
the Obama Administration appears to be willfully ignoring the record with North Korea. It also
seems unfocused on the dire implications of a bad Iran deal for Asia.
What should the North Korea experience have taught us? The short answer is that the U.S.
began negotiating with Pyongyang twenty-one years ago and today North Korea has
approximately sixteen nuclear weapons and is on a pathway toward more.
A longer answer requires a review of the North Korea negotiating record. The first North Korean
nuclear “deal” was the 1994 Agreed Framework in which Pyongyang pledged to dismantle its
plutonium processing plant at Yongbyon in exchange for international assistance in building
two civilian nuclear reactors. By 2002, it was clear to Washington that North Korea had
abrogated its promises of a nuclear freeze. The U.S. confronted the Kim regime about its secret
construction of a uranium enrichment facility in October 2002. Kim Jong-il’s response was to
ratchet up the pressure. North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in
January 2003 and reactivated the Yongbyon facility.
President Bush convened the “Six Party Talks,” which included the U.S., China, Russia, South
Korea, North Korea and Japan, seemingly convinced by Henry Kissinger’s belief that with
Beijing and Washington working together, North Korea would abandon its nukes. The next deal
was offered to Kim in 2004: dismantle the nuclear program in return for economic aid and entry
into the international community. North Korea refused the deal, hoping to wait out a “hostile”
Bush facing uncertain reelection prospects. But the precedent had been set: ten years after the
first deal, North Korea was offered more inducements to comply with its original promises, even
after cheating and developing a second nuclear facility.
During the second Bush term, the U.S. was in a strong position to get what it wanted from North
Korea. Pyongyang’s prime benefactor, China, was scared. After the invasion of Iraq, Beijing
believed that President Bush and Vice President Cheney were committed to removing regimes in
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Beijing was also nervous that Japan’s hawkish
then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi would consider lifting the ban on Japan’s own nuclear
program.
America’s North Korea policy was on solid ground. Bush coerced and pressured Pyongyang even
as it kept open the opportunity for diplomacy. It went after Kim’s personal wealth, sanctioning
his assets at the Banco Delta Asia in Macau, and rolling up his international criminal networks,
upon which the regime relies for its very survival. North Korea was desperate.
By 2005, North Korea said it would dismantle its nuclear weapons program and return to the
NPT/IAEA regime. In exchange, the Six-Party members agreed to provide energy assistance and
respect North Korea’s right to a civilian nuclear program.
But Kim wanted more. In 2006, he test-launched a Taepodong-2 IRBM, and conducted a
nuclear weapons test, correctly predicting that his negotiating partners would placate him in
return.
In February 2007, the Six Parties reached a two-part agreement. In the first 60 days, North
Korea would freeze its nuclear activities; the second phase stipulated that North Korea would
disable all nuclear facilities. But there was no deadline for phase two. Washington simply gave
away its leverage, lifting the most painful Banco Delta Asia sanctions in return for more empty
promises.
Not too long afterwards, North Korea received yet another gift, when Bush removed North
Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for the Kim regime agreeing
for a third time to disable its plutonium enrichment facility in Yongbyon. While North Korea
made a big show of destroying a symbolic tower at Yongbyon, we now know that the Kim regime
had no intention of stopping either its drive toward nuclear weapons or the proliferation of its
WMD technology. In 2007, the Israeli air force bombed a nuclear reactor in Syria that was built
by North Korea. In 2009 and 2013, North Korea carried out its second and third nuclear
weapons tests. Pyongyang is now suspected of having multiple uranium and plutonium
enrichment sites; the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency has stated that it is “moderately
confident” that North Korea is capable of mounting nuclear warheads on missiles.
Twenty-one years of negotiating with North Korea and offering one-sided concessions has been
a complete failure. The lesson for rogues pursuing nukes is that there is no end to U.S. goodwill:
no redlines will be upheld, and no costs to be paid if promises are broken. North Korea talked
and talked, promised and promised, and cheated and cheated. In return it received fuel, aid, and
trade that bailed out its failing economy. It sold nuclear technology to Syria without the U.S.
exacting a price. It has killed South Korean soldier, sailors, and civilians with impunity.
Why wouldn’t Iran follow this very productive pattern of rogue statecraft? Indeed, Tehran is
starting from a better negotiating position: While the U.S. demanded the complete destruction
of North Korean nuclear infrastructure, Iran will be allowed to keep important parts of its own
program. Proponents of the Iran deal will argue that Iran is different, it is still part of the NPT.
But North Korea agreed to rejoin the NPT even though the U.S. policy was complete
abandonment of its nuclear infrastructure. Why did the U.S. demand more of North Korea than
arguably the more dangerous Iran? Iran already appears to be wearing out the U.S. The Obama
administration tacitly acknowledged Iran’s “right” to enrich in the interim nuclear deal. And the
U.S. goals have shifted from denying Iran nuclear weapons capability to extending the time it
will take for Iran to “breakout” to a nuclear weapon.
Just as it did with North Korea, the U.S. is throwing Iran a lifeline when Tehran is on its heels
thanks to tough sanctions and military pressures. As with North Korea, there is every reason
to expect Iran to lie and cheat, building more nuclear capacity while it
“negotiates” with Washington. Even the arguments for a deal are eerily similar to those
marshaled for a deal with North Korea. Here are some familiar nuggets: “it’s either talk or war”
and “talking in and of itself slows Iran’s nuclear program.” These arguments are weak. First, the
U.S. was on the brink of forcing Kim to either keep his weapons or lose power, without resorting
to war. Second, North Korea was cheating while it was talking — it simply hid what it was
building.
Much has been said and written about the implications of an Iran deal for the Middle East, but
the implications for Asia are equally troubling. First, there is South Korea. The U.S. forbids the
democratic and peaceful South from enriching uranium. After Iran is permitted the “right” to do
so, Seoul will either demand to the same, or simply do it: A majority of South Koreans already
support the development of a domestic nuclear deterrent and the Iran deal will show South
Korea once again that nuclear rules do not apply to rogue states.
Japan already possesses the capability to develop nuclear weapons in a matter of months. After
watching the U.S. fail to stop Pyongyang from acquiring nuclear weapons, and after facing a
nuclear China’s coercion for a decade, a homegrown deterrent looks more attractive. Tokyo has
already watched in horror as President Obama did nothing after Bashar al-Assad crossed the
administration’s chemical weapons “redline.” Tokyo relies upon the U.S. to protect it against
WMD. It is watching yet another country that was supposedly not permitted to get a nuclear
weapon, find a path toward just that. While the nuclear taboo remains strong in Japan, it may
not be strong enough to resist this set of pressures. If Japan develops nuclear weapons,
China will almost surely increase its arsenal. India will also respond in kind. All of
the sudden, a very promising 21st century Asia will look a lot more like pre-World War I
Europe — only with nuclear weapons.
The North Korea lesson is that the only good deal is one in which a rogue regime decides to
entirely give up its nuclear weapons, before Washington gives up anything. The United States is
under no pressure to conclude a deal with Iran, just as its hurry to conclude one with North
Korea was manufactured by U.S. negotiators. The mullahs are on the ropes, as was the Kim
family.
For Washington, getting a good deal means forcing a rogue regime to make the strategic
decision that having nuclear weapons is worse than giving them up. Only Washington can lead
in making the risks of holding onto nuclear weapons worse than the risks of abandoning them.
Bush’s short-lived coercive diplomacy on North Korea was a good model. The Kim family did
not think it could survive the comprehensive pressures visited upon its and was likely shocked
that the president let them off the hook. Before lifting sanctions and pressure, President Obama
should take another look at his many coercive options. The policy should be coercion until Iran
completes dismantles its nuclear infrastructure. It would be a tragic irony for a president who
came to office committed to reducing nuclear weapons to preside over a global nuclear
breakout.
TPA and ISIS push thump the link
Steinhauer, 3/15/15 (Jennifer, The New York Times, “More Democrats Are Going Their Own
Way, and That's Away From Obama,” Factiva, JMP)
WASHINGTON -- Congressional Republicans may be singularly focused on unraveling President Obama's executive orders and
actions, but when it comes to what is left of his viable policy agenda on Capitol Hill, Mr. Obama's biggest problems are
now often with Democrats.
The administration's most pressing goal, expansive trade legislation, is adamantly
opposed by scores of Democrats in the House and Senate even as most Republicans support it. Mr. Obama's
formal request for congressional authorization to fight the Islamic State is deeply
imperiled, in no small measure because Senate Democrats find it wanting .
The president's dismissal of the role of Congress in approving any nuclear agreement with Iran was facing a potential veto override
before Republicans scrambled the political dynamic by sending a letter directly to the Iranian leadership. But if international
negotiators reach an accord this month, Democrats' concerns are all but certain to roar back.
Efforts to change a national security program that sweeps up Americans' phone call data and
other records have also stalled over disagreements with Democrats, even though both parties seek changes
to the program.
Democrats may be unified on most of the policies that Mr. Obama called ''middle-class economics'' in his State of the Union address
-- which he has little chance of advancing with Republicans in control of Congress -- but these other potential achievements may be
imperiled.
''Over all, on economic issues, we pretty much walk in lock step,'' said Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York, the third-ranking
Senate Democrat. But for issues on which Mr. Obama lacks a consensus with congressional Democrats, ''he needs an amalgam,'' Mr.
Schumer said.
Administration officials note that Republicans, given their own infighting and other challenges, have failed to drive a wedge among
Democrats on issues such as funding to keep the government open and the president's veto of the Keystone XL oil pipeline.
Mr. Obama's ''willingness to put forward ideas that some in his party disagree with isn't a sign of weakness,'' said Josh Earnest, the
White House press secretary. ''In fact, it's a sign of strength and evidence that he'll work with anyone on either side of the aisle to
keep the country safe and expand opportunity for the middle class.''
In some ways, Mr. Obama faces a predictable challenge. He is grabbing for goals at the sunset of his presidency, relying on a
Congress controlled by a deeply hostile Republican Party and Democrats who are more concerned with protecting their own
interests.
''He's trying to create a legacy,'' said Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina. ''They're trying to survive.''
At the same time, Mr. Obama is wrestling with issues that have historically divided Democrats,
trade and national security. ''I don't think it's a function of his last two years in office,'' said Senator Angus King,
like
independent of Maine, who caucuses with Democrats. ''I think it's a function of the issues. I try to take it an issue at a time. That's
one of the advantages of where I am.''
The administration's most significant policy goal right now is to secure the T rans- P acific
P artnership, which would be the largest trade deal since the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement.
The accord would pull in a dozen nations from Peru to Vietnam, lowering tariffs and imposing new regulations on labor and
environmental standards along the Pacific Rim. Officials have lobbied members of Congress for months to get it done. But many
Democrats oppose the deal, believing that Nafta cost thousands of American jobs and continues to depress wages.
''We have been told for years that these things will benefit the economy, and I am not sure it is true,'' said Senator Bob Casey of
Pennsylvania, who is among at least a half-dozen Senate Democrats who have denounced the proposed agreement. ''I think the
administration knows where people like me are.''
In the House, large numbers of Democrats have joined Republicans to oppose separate
legislation that would give the president ''fast-track'' authority to negotiate trade treaties that Congress could
approve or reject but not amend.
''There is no earthly reason to take congressional authority out of trade bills,'' said Representative Louise M. Slaughter, Democrat of
New York, who opposes the trade proposal. Acknowledging that she was siding against Mr. Obama, she added: ''I represent the
people of the 25th District of New York. I like having a Democratic president, but I don't agree with him on this.''
While Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, the House minority leader, has said she ''wants to get to yes'' for
Mr. Obama on trade, many of her members expect her to stick with them in the end . Ms. Pelosi ''has
been a leader on this,'' said Representative Rosa DeLauro, Democrat of Connecticut. ''She has always been a supporter of
congressional authority.''
Last week, the administration's formal request for authorization of military action against the
Islamic State appeared headed for collapse, in many respects because Democrats found the
language of the agreement too open-ended.
''What I think Democrats are not willing to do,'' said Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, ''is to give this or any other
plenty of Republicans have criticized the
administration's proposal as well, saying it is actually too constrained.
Highway push thumps --- it’s a top priority
Hughes, 3/31/15 --- White House Correspondent (Brian, “Obama's infrastructure drive stuck
in neutral,” http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/obamas-infrastructure-drive-stuck-inneutral/article/2562279, JMP)
president an open-ended authorization for war.'' To be sure,
The 18.4-cents-per-gallon gas tax, which funds the majority of government transportation projects, has much less purchasing power
with the rise of fuel-efficient vehicles. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the federal gas tax would need to increase by
10-15 cents a gallon to maintain the current pace of infrastructure spending.
Increasing the gas tax is a nonstarter with Republicans, meaning lawmakers will likely have to raid other areas of the federal budget
to make up for the shortfall, barring a broader legislative solution.
Obama, especially since embarrassing defeats in the November midterms, has devoted a growing amount of
time to infrastructure, looking to pressure Republicans to give him a rare legislative
victory.
"I'd much rather have our problems than China's problems — that I'm confident about. On the other hand, the one thing I will say is
if they need to build some stuff, they can build it," Obama told members of the Business Roundtable in December. "And over time,
that wears away our advantage competitively. It's embarrassing. You know, you drive down the roads and you look at what they're
able to do."
When Congress returns from its two-week Easter recess, highway funding will certainly be
among its top priorities . However, those most heavily involved in the infrastructure debate aren't optimistic about
striking a major compromise.
"I'd like to tell you I'm hopeful," said one House Democratic staffer who works extensively on transportation issues. "But that would
be a lie."
deal doesn’t solve breakout
Brodsky, 3/17/15 --- Senior Middle East Analyst at Wikistrat and former Director of Policy at
the Jewish Policy Center in Washington, DC (Matthew RJ, “Bibi Is Right on Iran,”
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/bibi-right-iran-12433, JMP)
Another point Netanyahu raised was the size and scope of the nuclear infrastructure Iran would
be permitted to keep. The current discussions would allow for Iran to operate around 6,500
centrifuges, but according to [6] the IAEA former deputy director-general, Olli Heinonen, that
number goes well beyond what is needed for civilian applications. This issue involves a
combination of the number and quality of the centrifuges, their output, and the percentage of
enrichment allowed. Finding the right number gets to the heart of the agreement as the only
argument in favor of the deal that holds any water is that it would keep Iran at least one year
away from being able to breakout toward nuclear weaponization—at least during the period of
the agreement.
That leads to another problem, which is that American and Israeli intelligence assessments
differ over how fast Iran would be able to race toward a nuclear weapon. Netanyahu described
the discrepancy as “about a year by U.S. assessment, even shorter by Israel’s.” The difference is
key because according to U.S. officials, the deal is designed to allow Iran to become a nuclear
threshold state, just a year away from making the plunge if it decided to break off the agreement.
As Robert Satloff, Executive Director of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy pointed
out [7], it is questionable whether U.S. analysts can know with certainty if Iran’s breakout
capability is really one year. Indeed, given the aspects of the program not covered by the
agreement, it is unlikely that a year of warning time would remain after three, five, or ten years
of the deal.
PC irrelevant—only outcome of agreement
Wong, 4/1/15 (Kristina, “GOP calls for Iran sanctions get louder as nuclear talks drag on,”
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/237641-gop-calls-for-iran-sanctions-mount-as-talks-dragon, JMP)
Although the State Department announced talks would be extended one more day until
Wednesday, there were suggestions they could be extended for another day.
"What I'm hearing now is that they may not have a statement today. It may not come until
tomorrow, perhaps to avoid the unfortunate name 'April Fool's agreement,' " said Barbara
Slavin, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, during a conference call with reporters Wednesday.
Slavin said it appeared that the U.S. and international negotiators have convinced Iran to agree
to a 15-year deal, and that Iran has agreed to "various measures" to cut off four pathways to a
nuclear weapon. She said sticking points include how much Iran would initially reveal about
the deal.
Iran wants to keep details secret until the talks conclude on June 30, but the Obama
administration wants to put out an interim report to stave off sanctions legislation, she said. Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, agreed that
the basic parameters of the deal have to be made public if the White House wanted to hold
Congress back from passing legislation on Iran.
"They have to be fairly specific if the administration is going to get us to June 30th, and that's
the challenge that they face," he said Wednesday on MSNBC's "Andrea Mitchell Reports." The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is poised to vote on an Iran bill on April 14, when they
return from recess in two weeks. Last week, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution that
would establish a fund to cover the cost of imposing sanctions on Iran if it violated any deal,
which some Republicans have pointed to as a bellwether for support in the
chamber.
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) indicated over the weekend that, regardless of
what happens, Congress will move on legislation of some kind. Schiff downplayed the
importance of the March 31 deadline.
I don't think that we need to press on any particular date," he said. "The real date that makes all
the difference is at the end of June." "If we put too much pressure on ourselves to get a deal
within 12 hours or 24 hours, that works in Iran's favor."
Indeed, some Republicans have hedged in recent days over concerns that too much pressure
could cause the administration to rush into a reckless deal. However, Schiff also
acknowledged that political stakes are still high if the White House fails to reach a framework
agreement.
"A lot will depend on whether this is part of a deal that Congress views as a good deal. I think if
Congress comes to the conclusion this is not a good deal — the administration has given too
much, Iran has given too little — then you will see additional legislation that attempts to tie the
president's hands," he said. He said if critical issues are not ironed out, "then the president will have a hard
time holding Congress back from additional action.” STATES
Supreme Court interpretation proves we can be either
Stone, 45 – Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (HOOVEN & ALLISON CO. v. EVATT,
TAX COMMISSIONER OF OHIO No 38 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 324 U.S.
652; 65 S. Ct. 870; 89 L. Ed. 1252; 1945 U.S. LEXIS 2629 November 7, 8, 1944, Argued April 9,
1945, Decided, lexis)
The term "United States" may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of
a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations.
It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, [*672]
or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution. 6
Federal prohibition creates a shortage of cyber workers—CSA is key
Aliya Sternstein 14, Next Gov Senior Correspondent, FEDERAL CYBER HIRING COULD
TAKE A HIT UNDER MARIJUANA MANDATE, March 14,
http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/03/federal-cyber-hiring-could-take-hit-undermarijuana-mandate/80527/
The Obama administration’s policy to uphold a ban on federal employees smoking pot -- even where
recreational marijuana is now legal under state law -- could snuff out efforts to hire nonconventional but
trusted hackers to search for holes in government computer systems. Many of the best of these white
hats known as “ethical hackers ” tend to shy away from the establishment. "It is only recently that I started hearing that this state ban
would be a challenge to hiring ethical hackers," said Kathleen Smith, chief management officer at ClearedJobs.Net, an online forum for cleared security professionals that also
The managers are having a difficult time with balancing between what an employee can
do based on state law -- and what they are banned from doing based on federal law , especially
with regards to cleared work and their security clearance ." A July 2013 blog post on state marijuana laws that appeared on
hosts job fairs. "
ClearedJobs.Net was the second most popular story on the site last year. It read: “Those of you with (or planning to obtain) security clearances who have an interest in adding
marijuana use to your recreational pastime may think, ‘Great! If I’m ever in Colorado or Washington State, I can smoke pot without any ramifications!’ Unfortunately, you are
wrong!” Colorado on New Year's Day became the first state to allow the use of marijuana for leisure, and Washington will follow this summer. The federal government effectively
criminalized marijuana in 1937. Now the feds say they will look the other way in states that legalize dope, unless they see drugged driving, distribution to minors or certain other
Marijuana is illegal under federal law and the rules prohibiting
federal employees from using it still apply, regardless of state laws ,” a Justice Department
spokesperson told Nextgov's sister publication Government Executive. Officials already had announced that federal employees are barred
from inhaling while working in Colorado or anywhere else where cannabis is legal.
Undergraduate code crackers – in high demand nationwide -- are seeing that some freedoms
granted to their neighbors will not apply to them if they join public service. "When I'm talking to college kids, I tell people: 'You are going
to have to think about how you are going to change your life to do this,'" Smith said. A December 2013 letter to Obama administration officials
from the information security trade group (ISC)2 said 61 percent of federal employees surveyed "believe
that their agency has too few information security workers to manage threats now , let alone
in the future, yet information security positions are going unfilled ." Federal employers might be able to entice nonconventional computer
infractions. Or, unless those rolling a joint work for them. “
whizzes with stimulants instead of hallucinogens, Smith said. "What I found with people who like doing cleared work and working for the government is they like to work on the
really cool stuff," said Smith, whose clients include security cleared professionals in the federal government and private sector. "The price to work on the really cool stuff might
be: Some of the recreational drug use I can't do any longer."
Cyber-vulnerability causes great power nuclear war
Fritz 9 | Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and
Disarmament [Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation
and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international
relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” July,
http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf]
This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source
knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer
network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If
access to
command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-
armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear
power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a
nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and
provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical
distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking
technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed
upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using
computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the
hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are
susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be
compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks,
wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry
points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network,
could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on
removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal
how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance
on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and
their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple
entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed
submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been
made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US
Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet
system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was
unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory
response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did
not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer
network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further
enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be
engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to
launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack
from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response
communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation,
such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and
maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation
could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between
India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against
key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be
forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the
situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims
of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty
military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be
sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and
all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough
to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and
control centres directly.
Nuclear Deterrence – Russia and US are rational
Weber, Senior Editor at TheWeek, 14
[Peter, 3-5-14, TheWeek, “What would a U.S.-Russia war look like?,”
http://theweek.com/article/index/257406/what-would-a-us-russia-war-look-like, accessed 713-14, J.J.]
Even with the slow mutual nuclear disarmament since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia each have
thousands of nuclear warheads at the ready. As Eugene Chow noted earlier this year, the entire
stockpile of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) — 448 active — is
essentially aimed squarely at Russia. Russia's hundreds of ICBMs are probably
returning the favor. In all, the U.S. has about 7,700 nuclear warheads, including
1,950 warheads ready to deploy via ICBM, submarine, and airplane, plus
thousands more in mothballs or waiting to be dismantled, according to the latest
tally by the Federation of American Scientists. Russia has slightly more warheads
overall — about 8,500 — but a slightly fewer 1,800 of them operational. China, in
comparison, has about 250 nuclear warheads, a bit less that France (300) and a bit
more than Britain (225). Nuclear war with Russia is still mutually assured
destruction. Hopefully, that's still deterrent enough .
Gun control
Kincaid 13—Robert B. and Helen S. Meyner Professor of Government and Public Service and
director of the Meyner Center for the Study of State and Local Government, Lafayette College
(Robert, “State-Federal Relations: Back to the Future?”, The Book of the States 2013, Council of State Governments, dml)
Similarly, debate over federal gun control propos- als following the December 2012 school
shootings in Newtown, Conn., led some state and local officials to urge nullification of new
federal gun laws.“Neither I, nor my deputies, will participate in the enforcement of laws that
violate our precious constitutional rights,” Sheriff Terry Box of Collin County, Texas, said.7 The
Utah Sheriffs’ Association announced in early 2013 that its members are “prepared to trade
(their) lives” to prevent federal officials from enforcing new gun laws. Lawmakers in many states
have introduced anti-federal government bills, including measures to authorize state
nullification of federal laws, exempt guns made in-state from federal regulation, require federal
officials to obtain a county sheriff’s approval to serve a war- rant or make an arrest, and ban
enforcement of Agenda 21, a United Nations agreement promot- ing sustainable development.
Alabama adopted the first state ban on Agenda 21 in 2012.8
---EPA
Bakst 14—Research Fellow in Agricultural Policy at the Heritage Foundation
(Daren, “Reining in the EPA Through the Power of the Purse”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/08/reining-in-theepa-through-the-power-of-the-purse, dml)
In April, the EPA and the Corps published a proposed rule that would define what waters are
covered.[14] The CWA covers “navigable waters.” This term is further defined as “the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas.”[15]
In defining “waters of the United States,” the EPA is going well beyond the existing regulations.
For example, the new rule would regulate all ditches—including man-made ditches—except in
narrow circumstances and cover tributaries that have ephemeral flow, such as depressions in
land that are dry most of the year except when there is heavy rain.
This water (and land) grab is an attack on property rights. Private property owners would need
to obtain permits from the federal government far more often than they already do now when
seeking to use and enjoy their land. There has been widespread opposition to the rule from
everyone from farmers to counties, which are concerned that the rule will impose costly new
requirements on them.
The proposed rule also undermines the principle of cooperative federalism that is supposed to
govern the CWA.[16] States play a central role in the implementation of the CWA. Through this
proposed rule, the EPA and the Corps would be usurping state and local power. States, local
governments, and private property owners are better positioned to address their unique clean
water needs than the federal government.
Counterplan kills federalism—only plan and perm solve
Topaz 1/11—Politico
(Jonathan, “The new clash over cannabis”, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/the-new-clash-over-cannabis-114158.html, dml)
The Obama administration and many congressional Republicans have
been loath to go anywhere near the
experiment with marijuana legalization in Colorado and other states. But pressure is mounting on
Washington to take a stand on pot, and perhaps soon .
In a lawsuit filed last month with the U.S. Supreme Court, attorneys general of Nebraska and Oklahoma
argue that Colorado’s marijuana initiative is spilling over into their neighboring, more conservative states. Marijuana
arrests and prosecutions are up over the past year, they say, straining law enforcement budgets as more overtime is paid to handle
the uptick in activity. And drugged driving is a growing problem, they contend.
But the neighbor states are also taking aim at a federal government that seems highly reluctant to
tackle the issue. And with several more states considering legalizing recreational marijuana, the
Justice Department and Congress may be forced to clarify what’s OK or not when it comes to marijuana,
experts say.
It’s gone from a slow burn to a hot, cauldron bubble ,” Douglas Berman, a law
“
professor at Ohio State University, said of tensions over cannabis policy.
The issue is emerging as a major test for attorney general nominee Loretta Lynch,
who will have to decide
whether to embrace the hands-off approach to marijuana in the states that the Justice Department has adopted
under Eric Holder — or take more decisive action to regulate it.
Experts and advocates floated a range of options if Congress or DOJ were to act, some more far-reaching or politically feasible than
others. Anti-legalization advocates want an about-face from the administration: Enforce the existing
federal marijuana ban and crack down on legalization regimes in Colorado and elsewhere. That’s a pipe
dream for the current White House but not inconceivable if a Republican is elected president in 2016.
Pro-legalization advocates want Congress or the Obama administration to reclassify marijuana under sentencing laws so that it
would carry lesser or no criminal penalties. Marijuana is currently considered a “Schedule I” drug, a category that includes heroin
and LSD. Even cocaine is deemed less dangerous than pot under federal law.
Other experts say Congress should pass legislation that would deem marijuana federally legal in states that enact legal cannabis
laws, thus removing ambiguity in those states. And still others want the administration to establish a standardized regulatory
framework throughout the states, as the federal government does with other “vice industries.”
There are, of course, many issues where the federal government largely cedes authority to the states.
But the transfer of legal marijuana across state borders — and the accompanying quality-of-life, crime and
budgetary concerns that come with it — provides a more vexing practical challenge than, say, different samesex marriage laws in the states.
The administration opting not to enforce marijuana prohibition — similar to its decision not to enforce the
Defense of Marriage Act before it was overturned by the Supreme Court — has resulted in a legally murky
situation where no one is completely sure what states can or can’t do.
The urgency is expected to grow as five states are preparing recreational pot initiatives for
the 2016 ballot: Arizona, California, Maine, Massachusetts and Nevada. A trio of other states — Missouri, Montana and
Florida — are considering similar ballot measures. Currently, recreational pot is legal in Colorado, Washington state,
Alaska and Oregon; an initiative approved by Washington, D.C., voters in November is currently being challenged by some
Republicans in Congress.
“I think
the next six months to a year is a time that
Congress needs to do
something relatively big ,” Berman said.
In the suit, Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning and Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt are asking that the high court strike down the commercial elements of Colorado’s marijuana legalization law
because the cannabis market infringes on their ability to enforce marijuana laws in their respective states.
In response, multiple experts say, the border states have engaged in “geographic profiling” — singling out vehicles crossing the border from Colorado for suspicion of carrying marijuana. Colorado’s pot industry
has created an enforcement nightmare for law enforcement in Cheyenne and Deuel counties in western Nebraska, officials say.
“It’s basically flooded our county,” Deuel County Sheriff Adam Hayward told The Associated Press.
The budgetary issues come as legalization has delivered a tax revenue windfall to Colorado since it took effect a year ago.
The suit calls for the Obama administration to enforce the Controlled Substances Act, which maintains a federal ban on marijuana, in Colorado. So far, Holder and President Barack Obama have mostly declined to
do so.
Colorado Attorney General John Suthers, in a statement after the lawsuit was announced, said his office would “vigorously defend against” the suit, which he said was “without merit.”
Other states that border Colorado — including Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico — have said they are aware of the case but have not signed on. A spokeswoman from the Kansas attorney general’s office told
POLITICO that Colorado’s law and the federal government’s limited CSA enforcement “have combined to cause harm in Kansas.”
Many experts consider the
suit a long shot to be taken up by the Supreme Court. Even if it were to succeed, it would
likely just strip away parts of the law’s regulatory structure — like the institution of stores and
dispensaries — while still allowing for personal use and possession. That would only lead to a
“Wild West environment” in Colorado and exacerbate the spillover effects in Oklahoma and
Nebraska, said Rob Mikos, a professor at Vanderbilt Law School.
Still, the suit has exposed rifts among states over
marijuana policy, which have been exacerbated
by the Justice Department’s decision to leave states mostly to their own devices on it.
In an August 2013 memo, the Justice Department announced it would not block recreational and medical marijuana in states that
had legalization measures. Citing the department’s “limited investigative and prosecutorial resources,” DOJ said it would largely
trust states to enforce their own narcotics laws outside of eight select enforcement areas, including sales to minors and drugged
driving.
The bordering states’ complaints have drawn notice in Congress. At a hearing last September on the conflict
between state and federal marijuana laws, the incoming Senate Judiciary chairman, Republican Chuck Grassley of Iowa, warned that
Colorado’s legal pot was moving into other states.
“Is the federal government prepared to pay for the law enforcement costs it is imposing on states like Iowa because it refuses to
enforce federal law?” he asked rhetorically. Lynch, the attorney general nominee, is expected to face questions about the issue at her
upcoming confirmation hearings.
In many regards, Oklahoma and Nebraska’s lawsuit demonstrates a last-resort tactic for states that
don’t see a willing partner in the federal government, but want to try to blunt the rising tide of
legal marijuana in the U.S.
But analysts are far from confident that a gridlocked Congress will summon the will to find
common ground on such a divisive issue. Though some Republicans and much of the GOP base oppose
legalization and would like to see the federal government step up its enforcement, others say
more federal action would run counter to the party’s support of states’ rights.
Several polls indicate that a majority of Americans back marijuana legalization. Support is particularly high
among young voters — 64 percent of people ages 18 to 34 in a recent Gallup poll said they support pot legalization.
Congress sent something of a mixed signal on marijuana in the $1.1 trillion spending bill passed last month. Anti-
legalization hardliners, led by GOP Rep. Andy Harris of Maryland, earned a potential victory by including
language that might invalidate D.C.’s Initiative 71. But the bill also included language to prohibit
federal agents from raiding medical marijuana facilities in states where pot is legal, codifying the
Obama administration’s de facto policy.
Without action from Congress or further clarification from DOJ, friction
between the states will only increase , experts say.
“[I]t is a useful reminder that the Constitution recognizes that having
states go their own ways is not necessarily
an unalloyed good,” said Brannon Denning, a law professor at Samford University. “In some cases, we want there
to be a single, national rule governing conduct in all 50 states.”
1AR
HEG
transition ensures great power war
Gartzke, 09 [Erik Gartzke is an associate professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, Power
Shuffle: Will the Coming Transition Be Peaceful?,
http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IntlSec/NewReadings2add/RealismUncertSysIsWarCH1109.7.pdf]
I am confident, however, of one thing: Whatever multipolarity might mean for international relations in
general, the important
question for matters of war, peace, and stability is how the new system evolves,
not what it is like when we get there. The more confusing the transition of power, the
more likely it will be accompanied by a major power war . Change breeds uncertainty .
Thoughtful observers can offer as many possible paths for our collective future as there are opportunities to be thoughtful. Optimists
point to the extraordinary peace and stability that have characterized relations among developed nations since the last world war.
Pessimists emphasize contrasting tendencies: Peace, if common among countries, is rare in international systems. But to a degree
not anticipated by traditional perspectives on international affairs, the nature of tomorrow hangs on the very veil that stands
between us and knowledge of the future. Not knowing allows the possibility of danger, but, more than this, ignorance itself can
produce the perils that we imagine lurk ahead of us. Fear is dangerous not just for what might be, but for what the fear might create
through our anxious actions. In the absence of sound theories or compelling evidence, we are forced to imagine many possibilities
that might come for us out of the darkness. Indeed, a
growing consensus among students of war says that great
danger comes from unknowns. Ignorance causes leaders to err, which in turn can lead to
war and lesser violent contests. There is reason, therefore, to be concerned about an inability to
manage fear and uncertainty effectively. Changes in the structure or hierarchy of international
politics are much less a problem in themselves than is the uncertainty that can shroud what that
structure might be, and how it will evolve.
US clings to heg – lashes out against China.
Mearsheimer 10 – Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago and IR theorist (John J., “The Gathering Storm:
China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010; <
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0056.pdf>)//Beddow
There is obviously no way China’s leaders can know who will be in charge of American foreign
policy in the years ahead, much less what their intentions toward China will be. But they do
know that all of America’s post-Cold War presidents, including Barack Obama, have
stated that they are committed to maintaining American primacy. 13 And that means
Washington is likely to go to considerable lengths to prevent China from becoming too powerful.
Regarding capabilities, the United States spends nearly as much money on defense as all the other countries in the world combined.
14 Moreover, because the American military is designed to fight all around the globe, it has
abundant power projection assets. Much of that capability is either located in the Asia-Pacific
region or can be moved there quickly should the need arise. China cannot help but see that the
United States has formidable military forces in its neighborhood that are designed in good part
for offensive purposes. 15 Surely, when Washington moves aircraft carriers into the Taiwan
Straits—as it did in 1996—or when it redeploys submarines to the Western Pacific, China sees
these naval assets as offensive, not defensive in nature. This is not to deny that most Americans, like most
Chinese, think that their military is a defensive instrument; but that is not the way it looks when you are at the other end of the rifle
barrel. 16 Thus, anyone in China seeking to gauge American intentions by assessing its military
capabilities is likely to think it is a revisionist state, not a status quo power. Lastly, there is the matter of
America’s recent behavior and what that might tell us about future US actions. As I said earlier, past actions are usually not a reliable
indicator of future behavior, because circumstances change and new leaders sometimes think differently about foreign policy than
their predecessors. But if Chinese leaders try to gauge how the United States is likely to act down the
road by looking at its recent foreign policy, they will almost certainly conclude that it is a war
-like and dangerous country. After all, America has been at war for 14 of the 21 years since the Cold War ended. That is two
out of every three years. And remember that the Obama administration is apparently contemplating a new war against Iran. One
might argue that this is all true, but the United States has not threat- ened to attack China. The problem with this argument is that
American leaders from both the Democratic and Republican parties have made it
clear that they believe the United States, to quote Madeleine Albright, is the
‘indispensable nation’ and therefore it has both the right and the responsibility to
police the entire globe. 17 Furthermore, most Chinese are well aware of how the United States
took advantage of a weak China by pushing forward the infamous ‘Open Door’ policy in the early
twentieth century. Chinese officials also know that the United States and China fought a bloody
war in Korea between 1950 and 1953. It is not surprising that the Economist recently reported
that, ‘A retired Chinese admiral likened the American navy to a man with a criminal record
‘‘wandering just outside the gate of a family home’’’. 18 It seems that this is a case where we should be thankful
that countries usually do not pay much attention to a potential rival’s past behavior when trying to determine its future intentions.
What all of this tells us is that the future security environment in the Asia-Pacific region will revolve
around China and the United States, and each of those great powers will have a military with
significant offensive capability and unknowable intentions. There is one other factor that matters greatly for
future Sino–American relations. There is no centralized authority that states can turn to for help if a dangerous aggressor threatens
them. There is no night watchman in the international system, which means that states have to rely mainly on them- selves to ensure
their survival. 19 Thus, the core question that any leader has to ask him or herself is this: what is the best way to maximize my
country’s security in a world where another state might have significant offensive military capability as well as offensive intentions,
and where there is no higher body I can turn to for help if that other state threatens my country? This question—more than any
other—will motivate American as well as Chinese leaders in the years ahead, as it has in the past.
Montiero agrees
Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he
teaches International Relations theory and security studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political
Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. “ Theory of Unipolar Politics” (Cambridge
University Press) April 2014 Ch 6 p. 144-178
The Literature on Unipolarity and Peace
The argument that unipolarity is peaceful was laid out most clearly by Wohlforth in his 1999
article, "The Stability of a Unipolar World."3 Wohlforth's argument is concise. In his own words,
[T]he current unipolarity is prone to peace. The raw power advantage of the United States
means that an important source of conflict in previous systems is absent: hegemonic rivalry over
leadership of the international system. No other major power is in a position to follow any policy
that depends for its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or an extended
rivalry. None is likely to take any step that might invite the focused enmity of the United States.
At the same time, unipolarity minimizes security competition among the other great
powers. As the system leader, the United States has the means and motive to maintain key
security institutions in order to ease local security conflicts and limit expensive competition
among the other major powers. For their part, the second-tier states face incentives to
bandwagon with the unipolar power as long as the expected costs of balancing remain
prohibitive.4
Not only is the unipole powerful enough to stave off any challenges and preclude major-power
rivalries but it is also able to manage conflicts among other states around the globe, creating
incentives for them to side with it.5 Its power advantage is so wide, the argument goes, that it
settles any quarrels in which it intervenes: "For as long as unipolarity obtains,... second-tier
states are less likely to engage in conflict-prone rivalries for security or prestige. Once the sole
pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will prevail."6 In sum, the clear
power advantage enjoyed by the unipole over all other states in the system allows it to
remain unchallenged while managing conflicts among others. This is the core logic
underpinning the argument that unipolarity is peaceful.7
Yet what specifically does this argument claim about each possible type of war? Like the
argument I lay out in this chapter, Wohlforth's primacist argument looks exclusively at armed
interstate conflict.8 From the typology of states laid out in Chapter 2, wc can derive six types of
war according to the ranks of the belligerent sides: wars between great powers, between a great
power and a major power, between a great power and a minor power, between two major
powers, between a major power and a minor power, and between two minor powers. Let me now
present the conventional wisdom on how unipolarity may or may not lead to each type of war.
Clearly, great-power war is not possible in a unipolar world. In Wohlforth's
formulation, "Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has
appeared: 2 - r = i."9 Furthermore, by arguing that unipolarity precludes hegemonic
rivalries, Wohlforth's primacist argument makes no room for wars between the sole great
power and major powers. The absence of these two types of conflicts is Wohlforth's main reason
why a unipolar world is peaceful. Unipolarity, he writes, "means the absence of two big problems
that bedeviled the statesmen of past epochs: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics
among major powers."10
I agree with Wohlforth's argument on this point. I do not, however, believe it tells the
whole story. Granted, the absence of great-power wars is an important step toward peace. But
great-power competition and the conflict it might engender would signal the emergence of one
or more peer-competitors to the unipole, and thus indicate that a transition to a bipolar or
multipolar structure would already be underway. In this sense, a discussion of great-power
conflict belongs in the context of arguments on unipolar durability, not unipolar peace. Indeed,
its inclusion in a discussion of unipolar peacefulness parallels the mistakes made in the debate
about the Cold War bipolar system, during which arguments about how the two superpowers
were unlikely to fight each other were often taken to mean that the system was peaceful,
ignoring the possibility of wars between each of the two superpowers and lesser states, as well as
armed conflicts among the latter.11
In addition to peace obtaining between the sole great power and the major powers, primacists
believe that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will remain engaged in
the world and regulate any salient conflicts. As Wohlforth writes, "[T]he sole pole's power
advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in
politics among the other major powers."11 I agree that were the unipole to remain engaged defending the global status quo - major-power wars would remain unlikely. I do not,
however, think that there is a compelling reason to expect a unipole always to remain engaged in
the world. And in case the unipole disengages, as Wohlforth implies but leaves unexplored,
major-power wars would indeed be possible. In other words, I agree with the primacists'
view that disengagement will produce conflict, while disagreeing with their claim that a
rational unipole should never disengage.
solves terrorism
Walt 2 (Stephen, professor of international affairs at Harvard, “American Primacy”
http://www.nwc .navy.mil/press/review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm)
Perhaps the most obvious reason why states seek primacy—and why the United States benefits from its current position—is that
international politics is a dangerous business. Being wealthier and stronger than other states does not guarantee that a state will
survive, of course, and it cannot insulate a state from all outside pressures. But the strongest state is more likely to escape
serious harm than weaker ones are, and it will be better equipped to resist the pressures that arise. Because the United States is
so powerful, and because its society is so wealthy, it has ample resources to devote to whatever problems it may face in the
future. At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, its power enabled the United States to help rebuild Europe and Japan, to
assist them in developing stable democratic orders, and to subsidize the emergence of an open international economic order. 7
The United States was also able to deploy powerful armed forces in Europe and Asia as effective deterrents to Soviet
expansion. When the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf increased in the late 1970s, the United States created its Rapid
Deployment Force in order to deter threats to the West’s oil supplies; in 1990–91 it used these capabilities to liberate Kuwait.
Also, when the United States was attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network in September 2001, it had the
wherewithal to oust the network’s Taliban hosts and to compel broad international support for its
campaign to eradicate Al-Qaeda itself. It would have been much harder to do any of these things if
the United States had been weaker. Today, U.S. primacy helps deter potential challenges to
American interests in virtually every part of the world. Few countries or nonstate groups want to invite the “focused
enmity” of the United States (to use William Wohlforth’s apt phrase), and countries and groups that have done so (such as
Libya, Iraq, Serbia, or the Taliban) have paid a considerable price. As discussed below, U.S. dominance does provoke opposition
in a number of places, but anti-American elements are forced to rely on covert or indirect strategies (such as terrorist bombings)
that do not seriously threaten America’s dominant position. Were American power to decline significantly, however,
groups opposed to U.S. interests would probably be emboldened and overt challenges would be
more likely.
IRAN
No way to guarantee verification and compliance
Brodsky, 3/17/15 --- Senior Middle East Analyst at Wikistrat and former Director of Policy at
the Jewish Policy Center in Washington, DC (Matthew RJ, “Bibi Is Right on Iran,”
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/bibi-right-iran-12433, JMP)
The Israeli leader also raised the issue of verifying Iran’s compliance with a deal. This is
especially important given that Iran’s past nuclear efforts have largely been clandestine or
undeclared. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can only report—not prevent
or punish—violations of the agreement. And that’s only if the nuclear watchdog knows
the full breadth of Iran’s nuclear program and has unfettered access to any site it chooses. Just
this month the IAEA, declared [5]—not for the first time—that Iran was being dilatory in its
cooperation with the agency. What about violations? If the central point of an agreement is
deterrence, then the penalties need to be agreed upon upfront, not debated as they occur, or
worse, debated if they even happened depending on how one reads the deal.
Deal won’t solve nuclear Iran --- at best just limits it for a few years
Ambassador Ross, 3/31/15 --- long-time U.S. Mideast negotiator and author of the
forthcoming Doomed to Succeed: The US-Israeli relationship from Truman to Obama (Dennis,
“Deal or No, Iran Will Remain a Nuclear Threat; We are now asking the bare minimum: a oneyear breakout period we can verify,” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/irannuclear-threat-116558.html?hp=rc4_4#.VRwv8OGGPD8, JMP)
Even if much remains to be thrashed out, the tentative framework understanding that the P5+1
is trying to conclude with Iran would represent progress toward constraining the Iranian
nuclear program. The claim of the Obama administration that any eventual agreement will block
all pathways toward an Iranian nuclear weapon, however, is surely an overstatement. At best, a
deal will create impediments for the life of the agreement but offer little afterward. At that point,
the administration and its successors would need to make clear that should Iran seek to break
out to the production of weapons-grade enriched uranium—or the preparation of nuclear
weapons—it would trigger the use of force by us.
But in that case, we would be acting to deter the Iranians from translating their sizable nuclear
infrastructure into a nuclear weapon, not to dismantle the program.
It is noteworthy that the agreement that the administration still hopes to finalize with the
Iranians by June 30 does not reflect the objective we had hoped to achieve for much of President
Barack Obama’s first term. At that point, when I was in the administration, our aim was to
transform the character of the Iranian nuclear program so that the peaceful intent of its
capabilities would be demonstrated unmistakably to the international community. Necessarily,
that meant that Iran could not have a large nuclear infrastructure. If permitted enrichment, it
would have to be highly circumscribed and limited to small numbers for the purposes of
research or production of medical isotopes. If Iran wanted additional nuclear reactors to
generate electricity, it would receive its fuel from international fuel banks and its spent fuel
would be sent out of the country—much like is done with the Bushehr reactor today. Similarly,
there would be little or no stockpile of enriched uranium in the country that the Iranians might
surreptitiously seek to purify to weapons grade. And, the questions about the possible military
dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program—a euphemism for Iran’s efforts to create a nuclear
weapon—would have been satisfactorily answered.
At some point, the Obama administration changed its objective from one of transforming the
Iranian nuclear program to one of ensuring that Iran could not have a breakout time of less than
one year. The former was guided by our determination to press Iran to change its intent about
pursuing or at least preserving the option of having a nuclear weapon. The latter clearly reflects
a very different judgment: that we were not able to alter the Iranian intentions, so instead we
needed to focus on constraining their capabilities.
By definition, when we speak about a one-year breakout time, we are accepting that Iran will
have the means and infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons and we are trying to develop
impediments to its doing so—even as we also create indicators that alert us to any such Iranian
effort.
Clearly, during the course of negotiations, faced with Tehran's unwillingness to dismantle any of
its nuclear facilities, the administration came to the conclusion that we could not diplomatically
roll back the Iranian nuclear infrastructure in any significant way. But we could diplomatically
succeed in containing the Iranian nuclear program, putting limits on it and preventing its
growth for the next 15 years. Moreover, during that time, we could also create enough
transparency to know whether the Iranians were moving toward a bomb—and whether the
Iranian awareness of that would deter them from pursuing such a capability. Apparently, for the
president, the secretary of state and our lead negotiators, other alternatives could not promise as
good an outcome. Indeed, increased sanctions might pressure the Iranians but could not stop
the acceleration of their nuclear program if diplomacy broke down. That might leave the use of
force, with all its unintended consequences, as the only option, and that has little appeal for the
administration, particularly if we can limit the Iranians through other means.
But if the measure of the negotiations is now about breakout time, then the administration
needs to show convincingly that the verification regime will be far-reaching and capable of
detecting whatever the Iranians are doing and whenever they do it. In fact, a one-year breakout
time depends not just on the number and type of centrifuges, their output and the stockpile of
enriched uranium—all of which can be calculated—but also on the administration's ability to
discover the moment at which the Iranians begin to sneak out, creep out or break out from the
limitations placed on them.
Moreover, for those who say that one year is not enough time because even discovery of a
violation does not ensure a response, the administration will need to explain why this agreement
will not function like other arms control agreements, where questions related to noncompliance
have historically bogged down in endless discussions. How will we respond if we detect a
violation, particularly a serious one? Will the mechanism for response provide for a quick
determination? What if the Russians and others don’t agree or insist that an extended
discussion with the Iranians is required? How can we be sure that small violations don’t change
the base line and shrink the breakout time? Under what circumstances might we act
unilaterally?
Assuming an agreement is finalized by June 30, the administration may well be right that this
was the best one possible—and that it is better than the other alternatives. That, of course,
does not make it a good agreement. Even a bad agreement might be better than the
available alternatives, but if the administration wants to prove that the eventual agreement is
acceptable, it will need to show that it has produced the bare minimum of the outcome that we
once hoped for: that there will be a breakout time of at least one year; that the Iranians cannot
deny inspectors access to any site, including those on military or Revolutionary Guard facilities;
and that it has anticipated a full range of different Iranian violations and won’t wait for others to
respond to them. In reality, if we are to deter Iranian violations, they must know in advance
what the consequences are and that they will be high.
Skepticism about an agreement based on constraining Iranian capabilities, and not on
demonstrating a shift in Iranian intentions, is understandable. Rather than questioning the
motivations of the skeptics, the administration would be wise to demonstrate that it has
compelling answers to their concerns about the possible vulnerabilities of the deal. It might just
convince some of the skeptics that the agreement is acceptable.
Doesn’t solve their impacts and causes extinction—
Shavit 4-3
[Ari Shavit is an Israeli columnist for Haaretz and the author of My Promised Land: The
Triumph and Tragedy of Israel (2013). “Iran Is America’s New Iraq: With his nuclear deal,
Obama is making as big a mistake in the Mideast as George W. Bush did.” 4/3/15
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/iran-is-the-next-iraq-ari-shavit116639.html#ixzz3WGGLmnYr//jv]
¶ Iran is not an Israel-only issue. Iran should not be a Republican, or conservative or a hawkish issue. If Iran goes nuclear, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and the Gulf states will
go nuclear. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel will have to change its responsible and restrained nuclear policy. If Iran goes nuclear, the Middle East will become a
multi-player nuclear arena, that no one can manage and no one can control. Worried about ISIS? Anxious about Al
Qaeda? Shocked by the carnage in Syria? Imagine what will happen when the most unstable region in the world
becomes nuclearized. One outcome will be even more extremism. A second outcome will be
unceasing conventional wars. A third outcome will be the proliferation of nuclear capabilities in the
hands of non- state players that will use them, sooner or later, to catastrophic results. The
overall outcome will be a strategic nightmare that will first disrupt the everyday life of Tel Aviv and Riyadh, then Paris and London and finally New York and
Chicago. So the most urgent issue of day should not pit Israelis against Americans, Democrats against Republicans, liberals against conservatives. If Iran is nuclearized,
everyone’s values and way of life will be endangered. If the Middle East is nuclearized, the 21st
century will become a century of nuclear terror and nuclear horror.¶ ¶ The deal that Obama announced on Thursday
does not do enough to prevent this . Does an agreement that allows Iran to keep 6,100 spinning centrifuges really lock under 1,000 locks and bolt behind
1,000 bolts the Iranian nuclear project? Does an agreement that allows Iran to maintain research and development capabilities and an underground facility on Fordow really fully take advantage of Iran’s economic
Regarding Iran’s nuclear plans no mistakes can be made. This
is not a passing, marginal international crisis, but the most urgent challenge facing our
civilization. But the sad truth is that in the face of Iran’s nuclear threat, the United States, Israel and all of
their allies have made countless mistakes over the last decade. President George W. Bush invested all of America’s resources and energy in the failed wars in Iraq
frailty in order to ensure the dismantling of its nuclear infrastructure?¶ ¶
and Afghanistan—instead of focusing on a vigorous diplomatic-economic campaign against Tehran. Israeli Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert believed mistakenly that a James Bond-like mission
Obama did not exploit the unprecedented opportunity presented by
the democratic uprising in Iran in June 2009—when American interests and American values suddenly aligned. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
well understood the Iranian threat but turned it into an Israeli issue with an over-emphasis on the military option.¶ ¶ Only in the years 2011-2012 did
Washington begin a strategic and effective diplomatic effort against Tehran, but the moment it
began to bear fruit, it was abandoned. A decade of strategic shadowboxing between Iran and the West ended in 2013 with an almost-technological-victory for Tehran.
The 19,000 centrifuges it managed to produce and install are testament to the fact that the great
American democracy and the frontier Israeli democracy failed in their struggle against the
Shiite theocracy .
could defuse the ticking bomb of Natanz. President Barack
More ev—it’s a shield for weapons—their ev assumes full compliance which doesn’t
happen
Fleitz 4-3
[Fred Fleitz, a former CIA analyst, is senior vice president for policy and programs for the
Center for Security Policy. He worked on the Iranian nuclear issue for the CIA, the State
Department, and the House Intelligence Committee. “Not a Good Deal” 4/3/15
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/416404/not-good-deal-fred-fleitz //jv]
The details of the framework agreement as spelled out in a White House fact sheet and President
Obama’s speech raise many questions about a final deal. It is troubling that no final agreedupon text has been released and that Iranian and EU officials were vague in their
statements about the framework. Earlier today on National Review, Patrick Brennan wrote
about tweets by Abas Aslani, the head of an Iranian government news agency, that show how the
Iranian view of the agreement differs from the Obama administration’s view. Aslani tweeted, for
instance, that Iran will continue to develop advanced centrifuges during the duration of the deal
and “all economic sanctions by EU, US will be lifted immediately including financial, banking,
insurance, oil.” Here are my initial thoughts about the preliminary agreement, based on our
knowledge of it at this hour. Uranium Enrichment According to the White House fact sheet, Iran
will go from 9,000 operational centrifuges to 6,104. Of these, 5,060 will enrich uranium for ten
years. All centrifuges will be Iran’s first-generation IR-1 design. The remaining 10,000
operational and non-operational centrifuges will be put in storage and monitored by the IAEA.
These machines will be used to replace operating centrifuges. For 15 years, Iran has agreed not
to enrich over 3.67% U-235 and not to build additional enrichment facilities. Iran also has
agreed to “reduce” its current enriched-uranium stockpile of about 10,000 kilograms (enough to
fuel eight or more nuclear weapons if enriched to weapons-grade) to 300 kilograms. President
Obama said in his speech today that Iran’s enriched uranium would be “neutralized.” The U.S.
fact sheet says Iran will not use advanced centrifuge models for ten years and will develop them
according to a schedule worked out under the agreement. However, an Iranian spokesman
tweeted that Iran will continue its R&D on advanced centrifuges during the agreement and will
do “the beginning and completing process” of IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 to IR-8 centrifuges during the
ten-year span of the agreement. Iran will move most of its centrifuges out of its underground
Fordow enrichment facility and will not enrich uranium there for at least 15 years. Two-thirds of
Fordow’s centrifuges will be put in storage, and the facility will be used for peaceful purposes.
Comment This agreement will allow Iran to continue uranium enrichment, an
activity that the United States has refused to agree to in nuclear-technology cooperation
agreements with its friends and allies because it is so easy to use a peaceful enrichment program
to make weapons fuel. There is no practical reason for Iran to conduct uranium enrichment with
6,000 centrifuges. It would take about 200,000 centrifuges for Iran to enrich enough uranium
to fuel its Bushehr power reactor. 5,000 centrifuges are far too many for other peaceful purposes
such as producing medical isotopes or fuel plates for the Tehran research reactor. Moreover, it
would be far more economical for Iran to purchase reactor fuel rods, fuel plates, and medical
isotopes from other countries. The Obama administration hopes to address the risks of Iranian
uranium enrichment by having intrusive IAEA inspections and by requiring Iran to “reduce” or
“neutralize” its enriched-uranium stockpile. From the president’s statement and the White
House fact sheet, it appears that Iran is refusing to send its enriched uranium to Russia as the
U.S. had proposed. Also, the U.S. fact sheet says only that Iran’s current enriched-uranium
stockpile will be reduced; it does not say what will happen to uranium enriched during the
agreement. We also don’t know what the words “reduced” or “neutralized” mean. The Obama
administration previously claimed that the risk of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile had been
reduced because some of it had been converted to uranium powder. Experts later discounted
this claim because this process can be reversed in about two weeks. If Iran’s enriched-uranium
stockpile remains in the country and is only reduced to powder, Iran will retain the
capability to make eight or more nuclear weapons in about three months. Former IAEA
deputy director Olli Heinonen recently published a chart on Iran’s nuclear “breakout” time that
shows how Iran could make enough enriched uranium for one weapon in twelve weeks from
reactor-grade uranium using 6,000 centrifuges, and how it could do so in 16 weeks using only
1,000 centrifuges. Click here to view. The decision to let Iran keep its previously secret,
heavily fortified Fordow enrichment facility is a major American cave. President
Obama said in 2012 about this facility: “We know they don’t need to have an underground,
fortified facility like Fordow in order to have a peaceful [nuclear] program.” Bottom line The
preliminary agreement legitimizes — and even allows the advancement of — Iran’s
uranium-enrichment program. It does not appear to delay the breakout time for an
Iranian nuclear weapon. Incredibly, no enrichment equipment or facilities will be disassembled
or destroyed. Given Iran’s long history of cheating on nuclear agreements and covert nuclear
activities, allowing it to do any uranium enrichment is very dangerous. This is why Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has said that Iran’s enrichment program has only one
purpose: to make nuclear bombs. This is reason enough for the U.S. Congress to reject this
agreement and impose new sanctions until Iran complies with U.N. Security Council resolutions
requiring it to halt all uranium enrichment. Inspections and Verification President Obama said
today: “Iran will face strict limitations on its program, and Iran has also agreed to the most
robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear
program in history. So this deal is not based on trust. It’s based on unprecedented verification.”
According to Obama, “If Iran cheats, the world will know it.” The president also said, “Iran has
agreed to give the IAEA access to the entire supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program,
from uranium mills that provide the raw materials to the centrifuge production and storage
facilities that support the program.” According to the White House fact sheet, the IAEA will have
access to these facilities for 20 to 25 years. According to the fact sheet, Iran has agreed to
implement the IAEA additional protocol, which requires it to provide the IAEA with information
on declared and undeclared nuclear sites. Iran also “will be required” to give the IAEA access to
possible covert sites related to uranium enrichment. The president said “Iran’s past efforts to
weaponize its program will be addressed.” The fact sheet says “Iran will implement an agreed set
of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the possible military dimensions of its
program.” Comment Although the verification measures detailed by the president go beyond
what Iran is currently subject to, Tehran has never fully cooperated with IAEA
inspectors. Moreover, this verification plan does not permit snap inspections and unfettered
access to all Iranian nuclear facilities, including military bases where Iran is believed to have
conducted nuclear-weapons work. The agreement also is vague on requiring Iran to answer
questions about past weapons-related work. Iran agreed to a twelve-step program with IAEA in
late 2013 to address these questions but has addressed only one of them. It is hard to trust the
Obama administration and Iran on verification and compliance. Iran violated the terms of the
interim agreement that set up the nuclear talks, but the Obama administration repeatedly has
claimed it was in compliance. President Obama again made this false claim in his speech today.
Bottom line Verification of a final agreement must require Iran to answer all outstanding
questions about weapons-related work and allow unfettered access by the IAEA to all facilities
where nuclear activities are believed to have taken place. The preliminary agreement appears to
give Iran a pass on previous nuclear-weapons work and set up a verification plan that will not
detect all weapons-related activities. Arak Heavy-Water Reactor According to the White House
fact sheet, Iran will remove the core of this reactor and install a new core so this reactor will not
produce weapons-grade plutonium. This reactor will remain a heavy-water reactor and will be
operated for peaceful purposes. Iran has agreed not to reprocess the spent fuel of this reactor to
produce plutonium indefinitely, will sell its excess heavy water not needed for the redesigned
reactor, and will not build more heavy-water reactors for 15 years. Comment Heavy-water
reactors are a very serious proliferation risk because they are a source of plutonium. If this
reactor remains a heavy-water reactor, it will be a plutonium source. Iran constructed this
reactor in defiance of IAEA resolutions. Allowing Tehran to operate it undermines the credibility
of the Western states who pushed these resolutions and increases Iran’s expertise in operating
and building plutonium-producing reactors. Sanctions According to the fact sheet, U.S. and EU
sanctions will be lifted after the IAEA verifies that Iran has complied with “all of its key nuclearrelated steps.” These sanctions will “snap back” if Iran fails to comply with its commitments.
Previous U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran will mostly be lifted if Iran complies with key
nuclear-related steps, including resolving possible nuclear-weapons-related activities. As stated
above, the Iranian government appears to believe all sanctions will be lifted immediately. U.S.
sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human-rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place.
Comment Iranian cheating on nuclear agreements has usually been slow and subtle. It is
unlikely to engage in any unambiguous cheating that will force the Obama administration to
restore sanctions if they are lifted. Moreover, once sanctions are lifted — especially EU and U.N.
sanctions — it will be very difficult to reimpose them. The framework seems to set fairly easy
benchmarks that would allow most sanctions against Iran to be lifted quickly. This would be a
boon for the Iranian economy and would generate significantly more funds that Iran could use
to bolster its ever-increasing efforts to interfere with its neighbors and spread its influence in the
Middle East. An American Capitulation This framework appears certain to lead to a
deal that will significantly advance Iran’s uranium-enrichment program, though
agreement is supposed to reduce the threat from Iran’s nuclear program. By allowing Iran to
improve its expertise in uranium enrichment and plutonium production and by legitimizing its
nuclear program, a deal based on this framework will increase the risk from an Iranian
nuclear weapon. Such an agreement will probably further destabilize the Middle East and
could lead to a regional nuclear-arms race. President Obama’s claim that the only alternative to
this agreement is war with Iran is false. Continuing the status quo would be a much better
outcome than an agreement that paves the way to an Iranian nuclear bomb. The president
claimed that the United States will be blamed for the failure of diplomacy if Congress kills this
deal. I believe the opposite is the case. Our Middle East friends and allies are likely to reject this
preliminary agreement as a sell-out to the Iranian mullahs that puts their security at risk at a
time when Iranian influence is growing in the region. For the sake of American security and the
security of America’s Middle East friends and allies, Congress must do what it can to kill any
nuclear agreement with Iran based on the deeply flawed framework unveiled today.
Deal actually makes proliferation more likely by undermining the international
red line on weapons-grade fuel
Bolton, 3/26/15 --- scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and former U.S. ambassador
to the United Nations from August 2005 to December 2006 (John R., “To stop Iran’s bomb,
bomb Iran,” http://www.aei.org/publication/to-stop-irans-bomb-bomb-iran/, JMP)
For years, experts worried that the Middle East would face an uncontrollable nucleararms race if Iran ever acquired weapons capability. Given the region’s political,
religious and ethnic conflicts, the logic is straightforward.
As in other nuclear proliferation cases like India, Pakistan and North Korea, America and the
West were guilty of inattention when they should have been vigilant. But failing to act in the past
is no excuse for making the same mistakes now. All presidents enter office facing the cumulative
effects of their predecessors’ decisions. But each is responsible for what happens on his watch.
President Obama’s approach on Iran has brought a bad situation to the brink of catastrophe.
In theory, comprehensive international sanctions, rigorously enforced and universally adhered
to, might have broken the back of Iran’s nuclear program. But the sanctions imposed have not
met those criteria. Naturally, Tehran wants to be free of them, but the president’s own director
of National Intelligence testified in 2014 that they had not stopped Iran’s progressing its nuclear
program. There is now widespread acknowledgment that the rosy 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate, which judged that Iran’s weapons program was halted in 2003, was an
embarrassment, little more than wishful thinking.
Even absent palpable proof, like a nuclear test, Iran’s steady progress toward nuclear weapons
has long been evident. Now the arms race has begun: Neighboring countries are moving
forward, driven by fears that Mr. Obama’s diplomacy is fostering a nuclear Iran. Saudi Arabia,
keystone of the oil-producing monarchies, has long been expected to move first. No way would
the Sunni Saudis allow the Shiite Persians to outpace them in the quest for dominance within
Islam and Middle Eastern geopolitical hegemony. Because of reports of early Saudi funding,
analysts have long believed that Saudi Arabia has an option to obtain nuclear weapons from
Pakistan, allowing it to become a nuclear-weapons state overnight. Egypt and Turkey, both with
imperial legacies and modern aspirations, and similarly distrustful of Tehran, would be right
behind.
Ironically perhaps, Israel’s nuclear weapons have not triggered an arms race. Other states in the
region understood — even if they couldn’t admit it publicly — that Israel’s nukes were intended
as a deterrent, not as an offensive measure.
Iran is a different story. Extensive progress in uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing
reveal its ambitions. Saudi, Egyptian and Turkish interests are complex and conflicting, but
faced with Iran’s threat, all have concluded that nuclear weapons are essential.
The former Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal, said recently, “whatever comes out of
these talks, we will want the same.” He added, “if Iran has the ability to enrich uranium to
whatever level, it’s not just Saudi Arabia that’s going to ask for that.” Obviously, the Saudis,
Turkey and Egypt will not be issuing news releases trumpeting their intentions. But the evidence
is accumulating that they have quickened their pace toward developing weapons.
Saudi Arabia has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with South Korea, China, France and
Argentina, aiming to build a total of 16 reactors by 2030. The Saudis also just hosted meetings
with the leaders of Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey; nuclear matters were almost certainly on the
agenda. Pakistan could quickly supply nuclear weapons or technology to Egypt, Turkey and
others. Or, for the right price, North Korea might sell behind the backs of its Iranian friends.
The Obama administration’s increasingly frantic efforts to reach agreement with Iran have
spurred demands for ever-greater concessions from Washington. Successive administrations,
Democratic and Republican, worked hard, with varying success, to forestall or terminate efforts
to acquire nuclear weapons by states as diverse as South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil and
South Africa. Even where civilian nuclear reactors were tolerated, access to the rest of the
nuclear fuel cycle was typically avoided. Everyone involved understood why.
This gold standard is now everywhere in jeopardy because the president’s policy is
empowering Iran. Whether diplomacy and sanctions would ever have worked against the
hard-liners running Iran is unlikely. But abandoning the red line on weapons-grade fuel drawn
originally by the Europeans in 2003, and by the United Nations Security Council in several
resolutions, has alarmed the Middle East and effectively handed a permit to Iran’s nuclear
weapons establishment.
The inescapable conclusion is that Iran will not negotiate away its nuclear program. Nor will
sanctions block its building a broad and deep weapons infrastructure. The inconvenient truth is
that only military action like Israel’s 1981 attack on Saddam Hussein’s Osirak reactor in Iraq or
its 2007 destruction of a Syrian reactor, designed and built by North Korea, can accomplish
what is required. Time is terribly short, but a strike can still succeed.
Rendering inoperable the Natanz and Fordow uranium-enrichment installations and the Arak
heavy-water production facility and reactor would be priorities. So, too, would be the littlenoticed but critical uranium-conversion facility at Isfahan. An attack need not destroy all of
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but by breaking key links in the nuclear-fuel cycle, it could set back
its program by three to five years. The United States could do a thorough job of destruction, but
Israel alone can do what’s necessary. Such action should be combined with vigorous American
support for Iran’s opposition, aimed at regime change in Tehran.
Mr. Obama’s fascination with an Iranian nuclear deal always had an air of unreality. But by
ignoring the strategic implications of such diplomacy, these talks have triggered a potential wave
of nuclear programs. The president’s biggest legacy could be a thoroughly nuclear-weaponized
Middle East.