Round 5—Aff vs GMU KL
1AC
PLAN
The United States should make legal and regulate nearly all prohibited cannabis sativa L. in the
United States.
1AC CARTELS
Contention one is cartels—
Drug violence is causing massive instability in Mexico
Rodriguez 11/9/14 (Carlos Rodriguez 11-9 Opinion editor at The Brownsville Herald “Don’t
fail” Posted on Nov 9, 2014
http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/opinion/editorials/article_67ab01ec-695a-11e4-a9d713a648a3f589.html,)
Observers in recent years have warned that if
Mexico can’t find some way to control the scourge of drugrelated crime and violence, it risks deteriorating into a failed state .¶ Based on recent events, that
failure might seem closer than ever.¶ People on both sides of the border are still demanding
answers after the mid-October kidnapping and murder of a young Progreso woman, her brothers and boyfriend
in the town of Control, Tamaulipas, between Matamoros and Reynosa.¶ Witness say the siblings, who had gone to Mexico to
visit their father, were kidnapped by members of a special police force created by Matamoros Mayor Leticia Salazar.¶ That crime
came on the heels of a similar action in which 43 students at a teaching college in Iguala, in Guerrero
state, were rounded up shortly after a some city buses were commandeered during a student protest. Apparently,
they were kidnapped by local police and military personnel.¶ Searches for the students, who are presumed dead, have been
futile. Searchers found a mass grave, but the bodies aren’t the students’.¶ Iguala’s former mayor and his wife, who had gone into
hiding shortly after the students’ sequester, have been arrested in connection to the disappearance.¶ This is the kind of stuff
we’ve heard mostly in despotic African dictatorships. To hear it could be happening right across
the Rio Grande, in a country that has all the natural resources to be a global economic power, is
both alarming and disappointing.¶ Granted, cartels often scare witnesses, and the news media, into
silence. So the fact that so many people are saying they saw the recent massacres, and point the finger at police units, is suspect.
However, the fact that such accusations are widely believed, and believable, speaks volumes about the
administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto, who was elected largely on a promise to put an end to the violence that has virtually
destroyed the country.¶ Peña Nieto now has to endure widespread heckling and shouts of “Assassin!” at his public appearances.
Unless things change, the president, who’s barely completing the first trimester of his term, could be in for a long four years.¶
Bringing crime under control is crucial for Mexico’s future, as it surely would increase foreign
investment and improve the economy, which would give the country’s workers options that are
better than becoming mules for the cartels.
State-by-state legalization is reducing cartel profits, but it’s not enough—ending
federal prohibition is the key final blow
McKay 12/2/14 (Tom, "11 Months After Marijuana Legalization, Here's What's Happening to
Mexican Cartels." Policy Mic. mic.com/articles/105510/11-months-after-marijuana-legalizationhere-s-what-s-happening-to-mexican-cartels, TD)
Legal weed in the United States is undercutting Mexican competition.¶ With either recreational or medical
marijuana legal in more than half of U.S. states, drug cartels south of the border are beginning to find that growing, smuggling and
distributing pot is a much less lucrative business.¶ What's happening: NPR's John Burnett reported from the ground in the
northwestern Mexican state of Sinaloa, where drug-related crime is so intense that its coverage is now restricted. One farmer told
him that business was not going so well:¶ "Two or three years ago, a kilogram [2.2 pounds] of marijuana was worth $60 to $90," says
Nabor, a 24-year-old pot grower ... "But now they're paying us $30 to $40 a kilo. It's a big difference.
If the U.S.
continues to legalize pot, they'll run us into the ground." ¶ If the price slumps to $20 a kilogram,
Nabor speculates that the Mexican weed market will collapse. The culprit, Burnett says, is much better domestic weed proudly made
in America:¶ U.S.-grown marijuana - some of it cultivated in high-tech greenhouses - is three or four times more expensive than
Mexican marijuana. [High TImes editor Dan Vinkovetsky] says prices for Mexican weed continue to slide because it's so much
weaker. He says American cannabis typically has 10% to 20% THC, the ingredient that makes a person high,
whereas the THC content of so-called Mexican brick weed is typically 5% to 8%.¶ Burnett's findings
dovetail an April Washington Post report, which found that drug cartels were instead trying to push cheap heroin after wholesale
cannabis prices in Sinaloa crashed from $100 per kilogram five years ago to less than $25. "It's not worth it anymore," longtime
marijuana farmer Rodrigo Silla told the Washington Post. "I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization." ¶ Source: Getty
Images¶ The background: As Mic's Coleen Jose previously reported, Mexican
drug cartels remain incredibly
dangerous, killing on average 12,896 people per year from 2007 to 2013, making them far deadlier than terrorist group
illegal drug trade generates more
money on an annual basis than the GDP of many individual countries, and Mexican authorities
are relatively weak and corrupt. (The recent massacre of 43 Mexican university students by drug cartels likely happened
after police handed them off to the criminals for execution.) Drug prices are very difficult to estimate, since no one is
actually keeping track of the market, but marijuana is a major revenue stream for drug cartels. This chart
Islamic State.¶ But there's a very simple explanation for all this violence: The
from Information Is Beautiful roughly estimates that a square kilometer of marijuana is worth approximately $47.6 million dollars.¶
Crushing the weed market and cutting off one of its main sources
of revenue is essential to destroying Latin American drug cartels. Cocaine is worth more money,
but Mexican cartels may ultimately earn more from weed since they don't have to first buy
cocaine in bulk from Colombian suppliers.¶ Why you should care: Legalization in the U.S. won't be a death blow for
Source: David McCandless¶
cartels, who will shift their efforts to pushing other substances or perhaps other ventures entirely (like human smuggling). Western
Mexico's Knights Templar cartel, for example, may make most of its money from illegal mining, logging and extortion.¶ An
astonishing 2012 New York Times profile of the El Chapo Guzman organization documented the cartel's amazing, corporate-style
complexity, including staff accountants and armies of independent contractors. Drug cartels are complex, dynamic organizations
that shift with the times. They're not going away anytime soon.¶ Source: Getty Images¶ But marijuana legalization will
severely undercut the value of one of their most profitable products. A 2012 study from the Mexican
Competitiveness Institute found that U.S. state legalization would wipe out around 30% of the cartels' marijuana market. Another by
the RAND Corporation in 2010 speculated that if American weed pushed out cartel-grown pot, the latter's profits from marijuana
could plummet by 85%.¶ If defeating cartels is a priority, than the federal government should ease up marijuana
by removing it from the Schedule I category of substances with no known medical purpose (a lie) and allow dispensaries in states
Congress could legalize
the sale of recreational marijuana, which would deal a far more effective blow to
cartels than piecemeal legalization on a state-by-state basis . Considering most Americans now
where marijuana has been legalized to function normally, instead of taxing them to death. Or
support marijuana legalization, that day might not be far off. But for the nearly 13,000 people a year murdered by the drug trade in
Mexico, it's still not soon enough.
legalization creates a regulated domestic industry to displace cartels
Beckley Foundation, 11 [The Beckley Foundation policy programme is dedicated to
improving national and global drug policies, through research that increases understanding of
the health, social and fiscal implications of drug policy, “Legalizing Marijuana: An Exit Strategy
from the War on Drugs,” http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/2011/04/legalizing-marijuana-anexit-strategy-from-the-war-on-drugs/]
There are a few “unknowns” when it comes to the marijuana industry—its effects on productivity and drug-related violence, for example. Experts need to examine these effects, and policymakers must open their
ears to these experts. A government-sponsored marijuana commission is not a new idea; in fact, Nixon established one in 1972 when he formed the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. When the
commission opposed Nixon by supporting decriminalization, he ignored their recommendations and instead intensified his efforts on the “War on Drugs” campaign. This tradition of adhering to popular and
personal beliefs instead of scientific facts is still common today. With the U.S. federal debt sky-high and drug-related violence in Mexico mounting, legalization is more relevant than ever and the topic is ripe for
debate. Here we explore the domestic costs and benefits that the legalization of marijuana would incur, how it might affect the marijuana industry in the Americas (particularly in Mexico), and aims to debunk the
multitude of popular falsehoods that surround marijuana. Why Current Policies Are Not Working Despite assurances from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that the current drug policy is making headway,
there are clear signs that prohibition has not succeeded in diminishing drug supply or demand. Lowering demand for illegal drugs is the most effective way to lower illegal drug production—while vendors may not
respond to the threat of legal repercussions, they certainly respond to market forces. As the largest consumer of Mexican drugs, it is the responsibility of the U.S. to address its own demand for marijuana. But
American demand and accessibility to marijuana are not decreasing. In fact, marijuana use is currently on the rise and, although usage has oscillated in the past decades, the proportion of use among 12th graders
is only a few percentage points below what it was in 1974. Eighty-one percent of American 12th graders said marijuana was “fairly easy or very easy” to acquire in 2010.2 In a 2009 survey, 16.7 million Americans
While the U.S. may be unable to control its own
demand for marijuana, it could stop its contribution to drug cartel revenues by allowing a
domestic marijuana industry to thrive , shifting profits from cartels to U.S. growers. While figures on
over 12 years of age had used marijuana in the past month—that’s 6.6 percent of the total population.3
marijuana smuggling into the U.S. fail to provide conclusive evidence of how much of the drug is entering the country, marijuana seizures have been steady throughout the Americas in the past decade. However,
this says nothing certain about actual production numbers.4 Domestically, the task of restricting U.S. production is becoming more difficult. Indoor crops that use efficient hydroponic systems are becoming more
popular in the U.S. but pose a challenge to law enforcement agencies for a number of reasons. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), indoor systems: “[have] the benefit of having
lower chances of detection, high yields with several harvests per year with high potency cannabis and elevated selling prices. The equipment, knowledge and seeds for indoor growing have become very accessible…
[and] The costs of building an indoor growing site can be quickly recovered.”5 Cultivating high-quality marijuana is becoming easier, less risky, and more profitable even for the casual grower. The rise of indoor
crops will pose a new obstacle to drug enforcement agencies in stopping marijuana production in the U.S. The UNODC outlines other negative “unintended consequences” that have resulted from the illegality of
when a good is forbidden, a black market inevitably rises. Black markets inherently
lack safety regulations and often finance other criminal activities. A second consequence is that treatment programs are often
underfunded when the bulk of any drug policy budget is spent on law enforcement. Two other consequences have been termed “geographical” and “substance” displacement. Both terms
involve the idea of the “balloon effect”: when an activity is suppressed in one area, it simply
reappears in another area. Geographical displacement can be illustrated by events in Colombia,
the Caribbean, and Mexico: as the U.S. cracked down on Colombian drug trafficking, smuggling
routes were shifted to Mexico and the Caribbean. Drug trafficking was not eliminated, but
drugs. The first is obvious;
simply moved from one site to another. Substance displacement is an even more disturbing repercussion: as availability of one drug is mitigated through
enforcement, consumers and suppliers flock to alternate drugs that are more accessible.6 While marijuana is not a harmless substance, most would agree that it is the least harmful of illicit drugs. Some drug users
may be pushed toward more dangerous substances, or “hard” drugs, because marijuana is too difficult to or dangerous to obtain. Conversely,
marijuana could pull users away from hard drugs.
raising the accessibility of
These ramifications of the current drug control system need to be taken into
account in the debate over legalization. A critical shortcoming of U.S. drug policy is that it treats drug addiction as a crime instead of a health matter. Almost 60 percent of the overall economic cost of drug abuse is
due to expenditures spent on “drug crime”—the sale, manufacture, and possession of drugs.7 There seems to be a wide consensus that at the very least, drug policy must shift its focus to treatment. Tarnishing
someone’s record for drug use makes no sense; it encourages criminal activity by obstructing job opportunities and it does nothing to address the factors that cause drug use. Additionally, treatment is not readily
accessible to those seeking help despite its efficacy in preventing future drug use. In 2009, 20.9 million Americans (8.3 percent of the total population over age 12) who needed treatment for drug or alcohol abuse
did not receive it in a specialty facility—a hospital, a rehab facility, or a mental health facility.8 This is an unacceptably high number. The U.S. overinvests in its prohibition strategy while severely underfunding
treatment options. Marijuana legalization’s potential role in improving treatment options for all drugs will be discussed later in this article; for now, suffice it to say that the status quo is not producing the desired
results and requires modification. Legalization and The Mexican Drug War The issue of legalization has been brought to the forefront in recent years because of numerous calls by Latin American leaders to discuss
the matter as a viable policy option. Presidents Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and Felipe Calderón of Mexico, while not personally advocating legalization, have publicly called for serious discussion of the
concept. Former Mexican President Vicente Fox, who previously took a hard line against drugs, has altered his public stance and now supports legalization of all drugs, especially marijuana. He argues that
prohibition does not work, that drug production ends up funding criminals, and that it is the responsibility of citizens to decide whether to use drugs or not.9 Former Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso of
Brazil, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, and César Gaviria of Colombia all supported in a report by The Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy that the U.S. decriminalize marijuana use (Colombia and
Mexico have already done so).10 The U.S. has ignored these requests to place drug legalization or decriminalization on the policy agenda. Drug trafficking is not a national problem; it transcends country borders
and needs to be approached from a hemispheric perspective. Therefore, the United States needs to work with its southern neighbors to formulate a comprehensive drug policy. However, it is also telling that every
Latin American leader who has formally supported legalization or decriminalization has done so only after leaving office, indicating that such policies are not politically “safe” stances. The difference between
decriminalization permits drug use while legalization
permits both drug use and production. Those that favor decriminalization maintain that it would enable law enforcement agencies to shift resources from
prosecuting drug users to prosecuting drug suppliers. Decriminalization would also free up resources for effective drug treatment programs. Those that favor legalization go
one step further than decriminalization: in Vicente Fox’s words, “[W]e have to take all the production chain out of the hands of criminals and into
the hands of producers—so there are farmers that produce marijuana and manufacturers that process it and distributors that distribute it, and shops that sell it.”11 Legalization would
include the benefits of decriminalization , while also depriving gangs and cartels of a
lucrative product; if both the supply and demand sides are legitimate, a black market would
become obsolete. Legalizing marijuana in the United States, the largest buyer of Mexican
drugs, could potentially weaken drug cartels by limiting their sources of revenue. The UNODC has acknowledged
that this is a plausible way of reducing gang and cartel profits.12 Mexican and American Marijuana Markets Eliminating the marijuana market share of
Mexican cartels would hit them especially hard because it serves as a steady, reliable source of
income and carries relatively little risk for them to produce. The percentage of total cartel drug revenues from marijuana is greatly debated—
Mexican and American official figures range from 50-65 percent, but a study by the RAND Corporation suggests closer to 15-26 percent.13 Even the most conservative of
these estimates—roughly a fifth of revenue—would strike a blow to cartel profits if
eliminated. Marijuana is particularly valuable to cartels because they control the entire
production line; they both grow and distribute it themselves, making it more reliable and
less risky . Conversely, cocaine is imported to Mexico mostly from South America, heightening
the risk of smuggling it. More troubling is that cartels are now even growing marijuana on U.S. public lands, mostly throughout national parks and forests, in order to avoid the task of
smuggling drugs across the U.S.-Mexican border.14 If Mexico were to reach the point of legalizing marijuana, the U.S.
could continue to buy the drug legally from south of the border, like many other
consumer goods . But even if Mexico did not implement its own legalization, recent data
indicates that a domestic U.S. industry could fill the role of the supplier and eliminate the need
for Mexican marijuana. The drug is increasingly grown domestically15 and U.S. growers are already posing a threat to Mexican market share. Exact numbers are impossible to assess,
decriminalization and legalization is in their degree of leniency towards drugs;
but figures of American domestic marijuana production range from 30-60 percent of the total consumed in the U.S.16 Additionally, a report by the RAND Corporation found that legalizing marijuana in California
alone (and a subsequent rise in state-wide marijuana production) could lower Mexican cartel marijuana revenues by 65-85 percent. This could occur if Californian marijuana were smuggled to the rest of the U.S.
where the drug would still be illegal. The marijuana’s projected high quality and low price would make it an extremely competitive product.17 It seems reasonable to assume that if the drug were legalized in all fifty
states, the domestic market could easily overwhelm the Mexican market share. In terms of tangible effects on Mexican drug violence, the RAND Corporation and UNODC agree that removing U.S. demand for
illegal marijuana would increase violence in the short run because Mexican cartels would be fighting for dominance in a shrinking market.18 But in the long run, once U.S. demand is met by domestic supply,
The U.S. population is by far the largest drug market for
Mexico, making our action necessary for any transnational legalization to be effective. While
cocaine, methamphetamines, and heroin are still funding cartels, drug violence will not be
completely eliminated; but any move to starve their resources is a step forward in
weakening them and, ultimately, saving lives.
cartels would be financially debilitated and, most likely, some of the violence quelled.
Only the plan sufficiently limits cartel power
Carpenter, 11 [Undermining Mexico’s Dangerous Drug Cartels by Ted Galen Carpenter, Ted
Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books and more than
500 articles and policy studies on international issues. His latest book, The Fire Next Door:
Mexico’s Drug Violence and the Danger to America, is forthcoming in 2012]
unless the production and sale of drugs is also legalized, the black-market premium
will still exist and law-abiding businesses will still stay away from the trade. In other words, drug
Yet
commerce will remain in the hands of criminal elements that do not shrink from engaging
in bribery, intimidation, and murder. Wall Street Journal columnist Mary Anastasia O’Grady aptly makes that distinction with respect to the drug-law reform that
Mexico enacted in 2009: Mexican consumers will now have less fear of penalties and, increasingly in the case of marijuana, that’s true in the United States as well. But trafficking will
remain illegal, and to get their product past law enforcement the criminals will still have an
enormous incentive to bribe or to kill. Decriminalization will not take the money out of the
business, and therefore will not reduce corruption, cartel intimidation aimed at democraticgovernment authority or the terror heaped on local populations by drug lords.58 Because of its proximity to the huge
U.S. market, Mexico will continue to be a cockpit for that drug-related violence. By its domestic commitment to prohibition, the United States is
creating the risk that the drug cartels may become powerful enough to destabilize its southern
neighbor. Their impact on Mexico’s government and society has already reached worrisome levels. Worst of all, the
carnage associated with the black-market trade in drugs does not respect national boundaries. The frightening violence now convulsing Mexico could become a feature of life in American communities, as the
cartels begin to flex their muscles north of the border. When the United States and other countries ponder whether to persist in a strategy of drug prohibition, they need to consider all of the potential societal
costs, both domestic and international. On the domestic front, American’s prisons are bulging with people who have run afoul of the drug laws. Approximately one-third of inmates in state prisons and nearly 60
percent of those in federal prisons are incarcerated for drug trafficking offenses. Most of those inmates are small-time dealers. Prohibition has created or exacerbated a variety of social pathologies, especially in
minority communities where drug use rates are higher than the national average and rates of arrests and imprisonment are dramatically higher. Those are all serious societal costs of prohibition. Conclusion
The most feasible and effective strategy to counter the mounting turmoil in Mexico is to
drastically reduce the potential revenue flows to the trafficking organizations. In other words, the
United States could substantially defund the cartels through the full legalization (including
manufacture and sale) of currently illegal drugs. If Washington abandoned the prohibition model, it is very
likely that other countries in the international community would do the same. The United States
exercises disproportionate influence on the issue of drug policy, as it does on so many other
international issues. If prohibition were rescinded, the profit margins for the drug trade would
be similar to the margins for other legal commodities, and legitimate businesses would become
the principal players. That is precisely what happened when the United States ended its quixotic
crusade against alcohol in 1933. To help reverse the burgeoning tragedy of drug-related violence in Mexico, Washington must seriously consider adopting a similar course today with
respect to currently illegal drugs. Even taking the first step away from prohibition by legalizing marijuana , indisputably the
mildest and least harmful of the illegal drugs, could cause problems for the Mexican cartels. Experts provide a wide range
of estimates about how important the marijuana trade is to those organizations. The high-end estimate, from a
former DEA official, is that marijuana accounts for approximately 55 percent of total revenues. Other experts dispute that figure.
Edgardo Buscaglia, who was a research scholar at the conservative Hoover Institution until 2008, provides the low-end estimate, contending that the drug amounts to “less than 10 percent” of total revenues.
the marijuana business is financially
important to the cartels. The Mexican marijuana trade is already under pressure from
competitors in the United States. One study concluded that the annual harvest in California alone equaled or exceeded the entire national production in Mexico, and that output for the
Officials in both the U.S. and Mexican governments contend that it’s more like 20 to 30 percent.59 Whatever the actual percentage,
United States was more than twice that of Mexico.60 As sentiment for hard-line prohibition policies fades in the United States, and the likelihood of prosecution diminishes, one could expect domestic growers,
Legalizing pot would strike a blow against Mexican
traffickers. It would be difficult for them to compete with American producers in the American
market, given the difference in transportation distances and other factors. There would be little
incentive for consumers to buy their product from unsavory Mexican criminal syndicates when
legitimate domestic firms could offer the drug at a competitive price—and advertise how they are honest enterprises. Indeed, for many
both large and small, to become bolder about starting or expanding their businesses.
Americans, they could just grow their own supply—a cost advantage that the cartels could not hope to match. It is increasingly apparent, in any case, that both the U.S. and Mexican governments need to make
drastic changes in their efforts to combat Mexico’s drug cartels. George Grayson aptly summarizes the fatal flaw in the existing strategy. “It is extremely difficult—probably impossible—to eradicate the cartels.
They or their offshoots will fight to hold on to an enterprise that yields Croesus-like fortunes from illegal substances craved by millions of consumers.”61 Felipe Calderón’s military-led offensive is not just a futile,
The most
effective way is to greatly reduce the “Croesus-like” fortunes available to the cartels. And the
only realistic way to do that is to bite the bullet and end the policy of drug prohibition,
preferably in whole, but at least in part, starting with the legalization of marijuana. A failure to move away
from prohibition in the United States creates the risk that the already nasty corruption and violence
next door in Mexico may get even worse. The danger grows that our southern neighbor could
become, if not a full-blown failed state, at least a de-facto narco-state in which the leading drug
cartels exercise parallel or dual political sovereignty with the government of Mexico. We may eventually encounter a situation—if we haven’t already—
where the cartels are the real power in significant portions of the country. And we must worry that the disorder inside Mexico will
spill over the border into the United States to a much greater extent than it has to this point. The fire of drug-related
violence is flaring to an alarming extent in Mexico. U.S. leaders need to take constructive action now, before that fire consumes our neighbor’s home
and threatens our own. That means recognizing reality and ending the second failed prohibition crusade.
utopian crusade. That would be bad enough, but the reality is much worse. It is a futile, utopian crusade that has produced an array of ugly, bloody side effects. A different approach is needed.
Specifically undermines Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels—that’s key to overall stability
Chad Murray 11, M.A. student in the Latin American and Hemispheric Studies Program @
George Washington, supervised and sponsored by the OAS and Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission, “Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential
Effects of U.S. Legalization”, 4/26/11,
https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana071111.pdf
While Los Zetas and La Familia have recently dominated the media coverage of the drug war in Mexico, they might not be
objectively termed the strongest cartels in the country. They are the most active in attacking government forces and setting up narco
bloqueos in major cities.59 However, they do not have the financial strength, military prowess, territorial reach, or tactical discipline
of Mexico‟s largest DTO, the Sinaloa cartel. 60 This DTO and the Tijuana cartel are major traffickers of
marijuana, and their territories are the major marijuana production areas in Mexico. They have
near exclusive control of the so called “Golden Triangle” region of Mexico where the mountainous areas
of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua states meet. This makes sense, because according to sources in the Drug Enforcement Agency
these two DTOs likely make a majority their revenue from marijuana.¶ The amount of marijuana
trafficked by the Sinaloa cartel is evident by the scale of recent drug busts. In October of 2010 Mexican
police and military forces seized more than 134 metric tons of marijuana in one Sinaloa facility. This was equal to almost $200
million according to Mexican authorities.63 The very next month 30 tons of marijuana was retrieved by law enforcement on both
sides of the border after a Tijuana drug smuggling tunnel was discovered.64 The DTO behind this operation has not been
determined, but based on the location it is likely to be either the Sinaloa cartel or Arello Felix Organization. These seizures represent
only a proportion of the amount marijuana trafficked into the United States from Mexico through the San Diego-Tijuana corridor in
2 months. There are other drug transport corridors that likely receive more marijuana traffic. ¶ Although the Sinaloa cartel
does not often target civilians, it is the most violent DTO in terms of overall casualties. It has
targeted hundreds of police officers and its leader, “El Chapo” Guzmán, is widely thought to
have caused a recent upsurge in violence after breaking a truce with the other major criminal groups in the
country.66 The feud between the Sinaloa and Juarez organizations is the reason that Juarez is the most violent city in Mexico, and
according to some accounts, the entire world. 67 The Sinaloa cartel’s huge financial resources make it a
major threat to the government , because they are able to corrupt large numbers of local, state, and
officials. This was revealed in several high profile cases in recent years.68The Sinaloa cartel is
constantly trying to expand its territory into that traditionally held by other cartels, particularly in
Juarez, and this is a major cause of much of the violence.¶ The Sinaloa cartel has the greatest capacity
to wage „all-out war‟ because they have far more money than the other DTOs. Guzmán is also more
focused on winning the favor and tacit protection of the populace, and thus is more involved in the drugs trade than
kidnapping, and prefers to bribe rather than confront authorities.69 However, in many ways this makes the Sinaloa cartel
more dangerous to the Government in Mexico. Its use of bribes can make local state and even federal law
enforcement unreliable. Furthermore, the Sinaloa organization’s outreach to the civilian population makes it even harder
federal government
for the government to gain information about Guzmán. In addition, the massive strength of the Sinaloa cartel makes an eventual
peace all the more allusive. In the event that the government would try to reduce the violence through talks with cartels, the Sinaloa
organization would be unlikely to take them seriously. The government has little to offer big organizations like Sinaloa, which
already enjoy near uncontested control over the areas in which they operate.¶ The Tijuana cartel is also a powerful, though often
underrated organization. This group was infamous in 2008 and 2009, when it destabilized much of Tijuana with its attacks on the
police and rival cartels. 71As with the Sinaloa cartel, the Tijuana cartel is a very important organization with
networks mainly in the Tijuana and the San Diego area. This DTO is famous for both its violence
and the brutality. Most notoriously, Teodoro García Simental’s war for control of Tijuana led to hundreds being tortured and
killed until his arrest in 2010. ¶ The main areas where the Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels tend to cultivate marijuana include
Sonora, Michoacán, and Sinaloa states. They focus on trafficking in marijuana because it is easy to grow,
profitable for wholesale, and cheap to pay laborers. In 2010 farmers received only 15 to 20 dollars for a pound of
marijuana. 73 This price is just barely above the amount farmers could get for corn and other produce. Therefore, if the price
farmers were to be paid for marijuana were to fall much further, it is not unlikely that many
would turn to more legitimate crops.¶ These cartels represent a huge part of the Mexican
organized criminal structure. Dealing a major blow to these groups could give the Mexican
government a leg up. The Sinaloa cartel currently has the ability, due to its huge monetary reserves, to project its influence
and carry out violence acts across vast swathes of Mexico. The Tijuana cartel holds large parts of its namesakxe city through violence
and coercion. The following chapter will explore what effect, if any, the legalization of marijuana would have on the revenue,
operational capacities, overall strength, and ability to wage violence for these two cartels.
Cartel influence determines the likelihood of state failure
Pedigo, 12 [David, “The Drug War and State Failure in Mexico” The Johns Hopkins University
- Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Beloit College Universidad San
Fransisco de Quito Cumbayá The Drug War and State Failure in Mexico David Pedigo Beloit
College]
State failure is an imminent threat in Mexico but it is not inevitable. Even failed cities
are not unavoidable realities.
This goal must be to reduce the power of cartels so that the Mexican state
can gain a monopoly on the use of legitimate force throughout its territory. This monopoly
cannot be fully achieved through policies that aim to stop the flow of drugs or reduce short term
violence
indeed
characterize its border region
,
the
that have begun to
It is necessary, however, for policies to have the appropriate goals in mind, as well as a clear understanding of how those goals can be realistically
accomplished, before the current situation can be reversed.
; these are merely symptoms of cartel power. While statistics such as homicide rates and levels of drug trafficking are certainly indicative of cartel activity, they are not necessarily accurate indicators of cartel power. Indeed, over the short term,
spikes of violence may even signify the desperate attempts of cartels to assert their power when it is being threatened. While it may be more difficult to measure, a more relevant indicator of cartel po wer may be the frequency with which state actors such as mayors,
police chiefs, governors, etc. are forced out of their post or bribed by cartels. Bribery is never likely to stop outright, but it is not overly ambitious to aim to create a Mexico where cartels can no longer influence high ranking public officials by violence and
intimidation. Higher arrests and conviction rates would also be indicative of the state’s regained monopoly on the use of force. To put this in perspective, while the arrest rate in the United States is in the 90th percentile and the conviction rate is over 50 percent,102
the arrest rate in Mexico is 22 percent and the conviction rate is 1.5 percent.103 Mexico should by no means be expected to match these rates of its much more developed neighbor to the north, but this comparison shows that a dramatic increase is certainly needed.
This is no small task, and Mexico cannot do it alone; it will require substantial assistance from the United States. This means more than financial assistance; the United States must own up to its role in the drug war through implementing effective policies. U.S.
nothing
would more significantly impact the drug war in Mexico than the full legalization
of
drugs
it would completely change the dynamics of the drug trade and weaken the cartels
in a way that perhaps nothing else could.
cartel power is the principle threat to the
Mexican state,
intelligence networks in the DEA and other law enforcement bodies are much better established than their Mexican counterparts, and these networks will continue to be useful in the pursuit of cartel members in the future. However,
in the United States
at least some
. As mentioned earlier,
It should also be noted that while
reducing this power will not solve all of Mexico’s ills, and crime and violence will most likely persist even after cartels are weakened. In Jamaica, for example, local gang bosses, or “dons” have continued to draw influence from
urban communities and engage in turf battles even after the shift of major drug flows to the Central American corridor. The dons in Jamaica are able to maintain their power networks because of a lack of alternative economic opportunities to crime.104 Undermining
the power of drug cartels in Mexico may help to avoid state failure, but the persistence of crime itself is an economic problem at heart. However, this is an entirely separate issue. Crippling the cartels in Mexico may also cause the drug trade to relocate once more, just
as it did after Plan Colombia. In fact, this has already begun to happen in Central America, which is now seeing increased levels of violence, with Honduras and El Salvador exhibiting the highest national homicide rates in the world (more than 60 murders a year per
every 100,000 people). 105 Unfortunately, given the history of the drug trade, this may simply be an unavoidable consequence. From the U.S. perspective, this at least means relocating the violence away from the border, but once again, this is a separate issue
The cartels of Mexico have created a
system that undermines the rule of law,
robs the Mexican state of its monopoly on the use of force, and threatens to turn Mexico into a
failed state.
doing nothing may create a failed state in Mexico
would have catastrophic results for both the United States and Mexico.
entirely.
n incredibly complex and dangerous
Destroying this power structure will be equally complex. It will take years, cost billions of dollars and thousands of lives, and may ultimately be an incomplete victory. Just as the drug trade will never be completely stopped, drug
traffickers will never completely lose power. Though it may seem to be a thankless struggle,
, which, as Mearsheimer and David
have both observed,
Mexico collapse causes terrorism
Pease 11 (Shadd A. Pease--master of arts in international security and former intelligence
analyst, June 2011, “Instability in the South: The Implications of Mexican State Failure on U.S.
National Security”, Proquest)//EM
Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Violations of Mexican State Sovereignty The possibility of foreign terrorist
organizations using Mexico as a base of operations for future attacks on the United States would
have major implication on U.S. national security. Foreign terrorist organizations, most likely linked to AlQaeda, would have greater freedom of movement in Mexico due to the lack of security in that
country. Organizations such as Al-Qaeda seem to move from country to country preying on weak and
chaotic states. The government of Mexico would be unable to sufficiently hamper the activities of terrorist organizations due to
a failed state scenario. The Mexican military and police forces would have limited leadership from the federal government which is
needed in order to confront terrorist organizations. The lack of security within the border of Mexico would provide terrorist
organizations with the needed cover to plan, train, and conduct terrorist activities. This insecurity in
Mexico is in stark contrast when compared to the United States neighbor to the north, Canada.
They’ll easily get nukes and bioweapons
Reblup, 10 (Tina, article from Bio Prep Watch which is a website on Biological Threats for
Policymakers and First Responders, “Drug trade could increase availability of bioweapons,”
January 21, 2010, http://www.bioprepwatch.com/news/drug-trade-could-increase-availabilityof-bioweapons/211687/ ) Harbeck
Drug cartels, as a result of the increase in the narcotics trade, have been increasingly able to
acquire biological and chemical weapons and radioactive material for the purpose of WMD
creation, the U.S. State Department has warned.¶ “The sums of money involved are growing in
extraordinary amounts, and that raises the possibility, because of the sums and the areas in
which these groups have begun to operate, for that opportunity to be exploited,” David Johnson,
assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, told The Jerusalem Post.¶
“Some of these
criminal syndicates have the organizational and financial wherewithal that
could potentially allow them to acquire and sell radioactive material, biological and chemical
weapons, and technologies used for weapons of mass destruction.Ӧ Johnson told listeners at the
Washington Institute of Near East Affairs that the unparalleled growth in drug profits is attributable to increasing demand and
supply in the worldwide market.¶
Nuclear war.
Ayson, 10 — Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies in
New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack:
Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010,
InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not
necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism
should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global
catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these
weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance
alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as
long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always
the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two
nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is
just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of
events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess
them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to
new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers
started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation,
the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an
act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack
on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least
because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far
too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some
possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered
that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied
any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of
science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread
over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can
be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the
nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials
refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion
would shift immediately
to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as
well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its
program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out
in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing
tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these
major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring
would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or
China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the
present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of
heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise
domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early
response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear
aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate
aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its
nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality,
it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear
force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any
preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as
discussed earlier) Washington
might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or
against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the
identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far
too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty.
disarming attack
One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and
abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen
insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly
raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or
unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another
member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both
Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the
Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some
cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups
based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither
“for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so
slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in
areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously
modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or
decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a
more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and
demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state
actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the
international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what
options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades,
the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this
simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which
possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use
taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly
on a high er state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state
supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons,
including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington
have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind,
would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere
immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers
not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to
interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
Bioweapons are an existential risk.
Matheny, 7 (Jason, Former Associate – Oxford University, MPJ – Johns Hopkins University,
“Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction”, Risk Analysis, 27(5), pg. 1335-1344,
http://jgmatheny.org/matheny_extinction_risk.htm)
Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge
needed to engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the
necessary equipment and materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are
self-replicating, a weapon can have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5
Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological
agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, &
Shuler, 2006). There is currently no independent body assessing the risks of high-energy physics experiments. Posner (2004) has
recommended withdrawing federal support for such experiments because the benefits do not seem to be worth the risks.
1AC BROWNFIELD
Contention two is Brownfield—
US asserted the Brownfield Doctrine in response to recent state legalization in
order to fake compliance with drug treaty commitments—sets a precedent for
unilateral reinterpretation of the regime—forestalls reform and wrecks treaty cred
Lines, 11/27/14 - Dr Rick Lines is Chair of the International Centre on Human Rights and
Drug Policy, and a Visiting Fellow at the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex (“Into the
breach: Drugs, control, and violating bad laws in good ways”
http://blogs.essex.ac.uk/hrc/2014/11/27/into-the-breach-drugs-control-and-violating-badlaws-in-good-ways/
An October statement on drug control from the US State Department has prompted much comment and speculation at home and
abroad. Delivered by Ambassador William Brownfield, the ‘Brownfield Doctrine’, as it has been named by some
commentators, lays out a four pillar approach the United States will follow in matters of international drug control. In short, these
pillars are: 1. Respect the integrity of the existing UN drug control conventions. 2. Accept flexible interpretation of those
conventions. 3. Tolerate different national drug policies…[and] accept the fact that some countries will have very strict drug
approaches; other countries will legalise entire categories of drugs. 4. Combat and resist criminal organisations, rather than
punishing individual drug users Internationally, the speech comes in the context of efforts, led primarily by
Latin American States, to open discussions on the drug control status quo, and look at
alternatives to the current prohibitionist paradigm. Domestically, it comes in the context of successful state-level
ballot initiatives to legally regulate cannabis in parts of the US, referenda the Obama Administration has said it will respect and not
interfere with. Both of these are welcome developments. The international drug regime is long overdue for reform. The marijuana
referenda will produce many positive criminal justice, health and social outcomes in those US states adopting them. However,
domestic marijuana law reform places the United States in an awkward and compromised position
within broader debates on the future shape of the international drug control regime. In allowing
legally regulated markets in cannabis to operate at state level, the US is in clear breach of core
obligations in both the 1961 and 1988 drug conventions. In one sense, the US position of
breach is no different than that of Uruguay, which in 2013 also enacted legislation
authorising the nationwide legal regulation of cannabis. However, unlike Uruguay, the United
States has historically used international drug control – and its self-appointed role as global policeman of the
treaties – as tools to advance its economic and military interests at home and abroad. In effect, the new
domestic reality in the US has created, to cite a recent commentary, a ‘treaty breach it does not
wish to admit within a system it wishes to protect’. Does Brownfield’s speech then represent a true
rethinking and opening up of the US’s position on drug reform, or is it merely a cosmetic exercise to protect its influential role in the
international drug control status quo? Responses to this question have been mixed. Some have heralded the statement as a major
shift in US drug policy, one that opens the door to deeper and wider international reforms. Others are less convinced, arguing the
statement represents ‘nothing of the sort’ and that its ‘attractiveness is superficial’. There are at least two reasons to approach this
‘doctrine’ with a degree of caution. The first is that the statement, in fact, offers little that is truly ground-breaking, at
least in the context of the Obama Presidency. How different, for example, is the position of ‘accepting flexible interpretation of the
conventions’ and ‘tolerating different national drug policies’ from Brownfield’s statement at the 2013 meeting of the UN Commission
on Narcotic Drugs: ‘[T]he United States does not claim a monopoly on best practices related to drug control. All countries must
consider their own unique circumstances and experiences. There are no simple answers or uniform solutions. Each government
must decide its own course for how to best uphold its obligations under international law to protect its citizens against the harms
caused by illegal drugs.’ Or his statement at the March 2014 Commission on Narcotic Drugs, ‘The international drug control system
is not perfect. Some argue the conventions cannot handle problems this big and complex. I respectfully disagree: over the decades,
these conventions have been flexible and resilient, evolving to help member states grapple with these challenges. We believe it is
more prudent to advance evidence-based reform within the framework of the conventions than to embrace unproven ideas that
undercut the system and risk greater drug abuse.’ In fairness, the significant new element of the October 2014 speech
is the explicit acceptance of drug legalisation as part of the legitimate policy debate, which
previous statements did not, and the March 2014 statement seems to specifically reject. However, given its new
legal domestic marijuana market, the United States could hardly say otherwise with any credibility,
given it is now among those countries that, to use its own words, ‘embrace unproven ideas that undercut the system’. What is
notable in all these statements is the reinforcement of the primacy of the three international drug control treaties as the foundations
for any way forward. Leaving aside the irony of
Brownfield calling upon States to ‘respect the integrity’ of treaties to which
the US itself is now in obvious and fundamental breach, his
statement does raise important questions about the
concept and limits of treaty flexibility . There are many legitimate reasons why a State may want to adopt
domestic laws and policies that break from the punitive prohibitionist norms of the drug conventions, and experiment instead with
legally regulated markets (i.e., to undercut criminal markets, to better address health problems related to drugs, etc.). This is what
Uruguay and a handful of US states have done, and it is a path others are likely to now follow. However, a State cannot
‘flex’ its way out of a core treaty obligation. There may be perfectly good and defensible reasons for a State to
consciously violate a bad or out-dated treaty provision, and drug suppression and control – the core tenets of which date back over
pretending these actions are
not breaches – and failing to explain why the decision to breach was necessary and made in good faith – does
nothing to clarify questions or encourage debates about necessary or appropriate law
reform. Rather, it further obfuscates international processes that already lack both
transparency and consistent application . For example, despite the calls for ‘flexibility’ and ‘tolerance’ in national
100 years in treaty law – is clearly an area of law long overdue for modernisation. But
policies, the US continues to penalise Bolivia for that government’s recent decision to allow the traditional uses of the coca leaf
domestically, particularly among indigenous communities. As described in a recent opinion piece, the official US position is critical
‘that Bolivia tries “to limit, redefine, and circumvent the scope and control” for coca under the 1961 Convention, even though that is
precisely what the US is doing in the case of cannabis.’ This conclusion can in fact be taken a step further: the US penalises
Bolivia for a non-breach (Bolivia has a reservation on the relevant treaty provision) while avoiding criticism of
its own clear breach by embracing ‘flexibility’. This application of flexibility could not be any less
consistent, the decision-making any less transparent, and the contribution to progressive
international legal development any less useful. As a policy approach, it looks remarkably self-serving. One is
left with the conclusion that the only ‘flexibility’ at play is a flexible approach to honest decisionmaking. The effect of the so-called ‘Brownfield Doctrine’ is to allow the US to pretend to
be in treaty compliance when it is not , a pretence some in the drug reform sector have rushed
to embrace. This
not only undermines calls for more meaningful discussion of law reform, it also
allows the US to continue in its self-appointed role as policeman of the conventions, or in this
case arbiter of the limits of flexibility. While this will likely provide welcome ‘wiggle room’ for further domestic reforms
in some countries, even if those are likely limited to cannabis, it does little to fundamentally challenge the
punitive prohibitionist framework of the international conventions, which is the driver of most
of the health and human rights harms of drug control. Indeed, the Brownfield speech actually looks the other
way on human rights abuses linked to drug control. As noted above, pillar three specifically ‘accept[s] the fact that some countries
will have very strict drug approaches; other countries will legalize entire categories of drugs’. Such a statement sends the tacit
message that if you don’t criticise us for our marijuana laws, we won’t criticise you for pursuing the death penalty, corporal
punishment, extrajudicial killings, denying HIV prevention measures for people who use drugs, failing to provide access to essential
medicines, or any of the litany of other human rights abuses linked to drug control that are increasingly becoming a focus of UN
human rights bodies. Significantly, Brownfield’s statement also does nothing to undermine the US’s own
position of power within the regime, and its ability to utilise drug control as a tool to advance its
own national interests. As the Bolivia case illustrates, even with these pillars of flexibility and tolerance to the rhetorical fore,
the US can and will use drug control as a tool to punish States with which it disagrees on
broader geo-political issues, not at all related to drugs. While observers and advocates in the field of drug policy
will likely continue to debate the content and implications of this speech in the months to come, it is worth flagging a second reason
for caution, one based not on US drug policy but on the record of the current administration. More than one observer has noted that
the Obama Presidency is skilled in its ability to defend the status quo while appearing to promote reform. From the illegal detention
of alleged ‘terrorists’ in Guantanamo and elsewhere, to domestic surveillance, to the use of drones to Wall Street reform, the
President and his officials have a well-documented history of using the promise of change as
a distraction to shield controversial US laws from meaningful reform. Given the 100-year
history of the United States using drug control as a basis for pursuing its own international
economic and military interests, it is certainly fair to wonder whether or not the ‘Brownfield
Doctrine’ is truly ‘change we can believe in’.
Keeping marijuana illegal under the CSA is what allows the US to cover up the
breach
Botticelli, 14 - Acting Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (Michael, Nominations
Hearing November 13, 2014 Questions for the Record from Senator Dianne Feinstein,
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/botticelli-responses-11-13-14)
As you know, the United States is a signatory of the U.N. Conventions on Narcotic Drugs, which limit the production, distribution, possession and use
of narcotics, including marijuana, to scientific and medical purposes. However, in a March 2014 report, the International Narcotics Control Board
concluded that the laws in Colorado and Washington legalizing recreational marijuana use were “not in conformity” with these treaties. Moreover, in
October 2014, Ambassador William Brownfield, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement Affairs, outlined what he described as the “four pillars” of U.S international drug policy. These pillars included advocating for
“flexible interpretation of the U.N. Conventions” and “tolerating different national drug policies.”3
a
a. Do you believe the United States is currently in compliance with its treaty obligations outlined in the U.N. Conventions, despite the legalization of
marijuana under the laws of various states? Why or why not?
ANSWER: While
the consequences of legalization measures in four states are a serious concern, United
States compliance with the Conventions has not changed . The United States is firmly committed to
upholding our obligations under the three U.N. drug conventions, as well as working with international partners to promote the goals of those
conventions. These conventions are the foundation of international cooperation for dealing with all aspects of the drug problem, and we support them
unwaveringly.
We believe that the policies set forth in the UN Drug Conventions limiting access to controlled substances for medical and scientific purposes are
sound, and based on valid health concerns. The United States has opposed efforts to alter the Conventions.
Under Federal law, marijuana remains a Schedule 1 drug , subject to a high level of control, with
criminal penalties for its illegal distribution and sale. Per the requirements of the Conventions, as well as our domestic laws, the U.S.
Government heavily emphasizes proactive enforcement of laws against drug production and trafficking, as well as related money laundering, violence,
and other illegal activities that impact the safety of our citizens. We lead the world in efforts against international drug cartels wherever they operate,
and have – with the strong support of the Congress over many years - provided training, technical assistance, and other aid to key partners around the
world, especially in the Western Hemisphere to help them disrupt and dismantle these organizations.
The Federal Government has enforced and is enforcing Federal drug laws within existing resources and allows prosecutors appropriate discretion to
prioritize cases. In the Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Cole dated August 29, 2013, DOJ has articulated eight Federal enforcement
priorities with respect to cannabis and is currently investigating and has prosecuted criminal enterprises involved in marijuana trafficking and violence
in all areas of the country.
As the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has observed, the Conventions are highly respectful of domestic law, and each country’s unique
circumstances affect how it implements its
Convention obligations. In particular, article 36 of the Single Convention acknowledges “constitutional limitations” as a constraint. The
Conventions, as they have evolved in practice, show the capacity to permit variations in national law and
policy. In the case of the United States, constitutional limitations are a major factor, given the
interplay of Federal and state-level laws and authorities on drug control issues.
The Conventions also explicitly authorize countries to provide alternatives to prison for drug users and low-level drug-involved offenders. Thus for
example, inherent in the Conventions is sufficient flexibility for countries like the United States to differentiate sentencing policy between significant
drug traffickers and violent criminals - deserving of stiff penalties and long prison sentences - and drug-involved nonviolent offenders, who are more
appropriately directed into alternatives to incarceration that can concurrently address substance use problems and protect public safety.
b. What do you believe will be the impact of the State Department’s policy, as set forth in Ambassador Brownfield’s remarks, on U.S. efforts to continue
as an international leader on drug control issues?
ANSWER: The Four Pillar framework is an effort to stake out a middle ground between those who believe that prosecution and jail is the only approach
and those favoring radical changes to the conventions. The pillars advocate for preservation of the integrity of the conventions while accepting
innovation at the national level and prioritizing cooperation against transnational organized crime. This is wholly consistent with the mandates of the
conventions, which are highly respectful of domestic law while providing the tools for cooperating on controls, sharing best practices, and expanding
access to essential medicines.
While our international partners are interested in the impacts of the actions taken at the state level with regard to marijuana, policies by U.S. states
have not had an impact on our ability to work bilaterally and multilaterally on a range of drug issues. Countries continue to support the key areas we
emphasize in our National Drug Control Strategy, such as strengthening international capacities to reduce drug production and trafficking, increasing
efforts on public health solutions to drug use, promoting sentencing reforms that include reduced and alternative sentences for non-violent, low-level
offenders with substance use disorders, and using science and evidence to guide drug policies. Our international partners also continue to recognize the
urgent threats posed by transnational organized crime, and the need for strengthened international responses.
We will continue to support global efforts to reduce the global drug problem and champion a balanced approach to reduce the demand for drugs and
combat trafficking.
c. If confirmed as Director of ONDCP, what specific steps will you take to ensure that the United States remains a leader on international drug control
issues?
ANSWER: The United States is a recognized leader in developing and promoting evidence-based drug abuse prevention and treatment programs and
provides millions of dollars of funding and technical assistance to countries to support their efforts to prevent and reduce drug use and substance use
disorders. We support most of the world’s research on the health aspects of drug abuse and addiction, and also lead the world in efforts against
international drug cartels wherever they operate, and have – with the strong support of the Congress over many years – provided training, technical
assistance, and other assistance to build the criminal justice capacities of key partners around the world, especially in the Western Hemisphere, to help
them disrupt and dismantle these organizations.
ONDCP, in close collaboration with the Department of State and other agencies, works multilaterally to demonstrate U.S. leadership on international
drug control issues and shares best practices and research with the international community. One opportunity to ensure that the United States remains
a leader on international drug control issues is at the annual United Nations Commission on Narcotics Drugs (CND). Under my direction, ONDCP is
working on an ambitious agenda for the next CND meeting in March 2015.
Earlier this year, as Acting Director, I co-led the U.S. delegation to the CND, to actively promote balanced and effective drug policies under the
framework of the U.N. Conventions. We conducted the following activities:
D resolutions on the need for an international response to new synthetic drugs and on the importance
of recovery;
ntion, and international
demand reduction;
-Chaired with Sweden an eight-country multilateral breakfast meeting on the importance of maintaining the current U.N. Drug Control
Conventions;
ipated in a high level dialogue with the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and INCB leadership;
and all the other CND
resolutions, to highlight U.S. positions and reject policies which advance drug legalization.
In meetings with counterparts in the international community , the United States will continue to
emphasize that marijuana remains illegal under Federal law; reaffirm its strong support
for the three U.N. drug conventions, and reinforce its commitment to reduce and prevent drug use,
including marijuana. We will continue to support global efforts to reduce the drug problem and champion public health interventions to reduce
the demand for drugs and continuing efforts to stop trafficking and reduce supply.
It also explicitly sustains the status quo, and creates a policy of concealed treaty
violations that shred the international system
Bewley-Taylor et al, 11/19/14 - David Bewley Taylor is the founding Director of the Global
Drug Policy Observatory at Swansea University, UK. Martin Jelsma is a political scientist who
has specialised in Latin America and international drugs policy. Damon Barrett is a co-founder
and Director of the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy and a Visiting Fellow
at the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex. (“Fatal Attraction: Brownfield's Flexibility
Doctrine and Global Drug Policy Reform” http://www.tni.org/article/fatal-attractionbrownfields-flexibility-doctrine-and-global-drug-policy-reform?context=595)
State-level cannabis reforms, which gathered steam this month, have exposed the inability of the United
States to abide by the terms of the legal bedrock of the global drug control system; the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This is something that should force a much-needed conversation about reform to long-standing
international agreements. But while ostensibly 'welcoming' the international drug policy reform debate,
it is a conversation the US federal government actually wishes to avoid. The
result is a new official position on the UN drugs treaties that, despite its seductively progressive tone,
serves only to sustain the status quo and may cause damage beyond drug
policy.
The 1961 Single Convention has been massively influential. Almost every state in the world is bound to prohibit cultivation, trade
and possession of cannabis and a range of other substances such as coca and opium for anything but medical and scientific purposes.
Wherever you are, your drugs laws are probably modeled on this agreement.
The United States has been a staunch defender of this legal regime. The treaties are central to its foreign policy on drugs, including
in Latin America. But at home the government has been clear that it will not trample on the will of voters with regard to cannabis,
even though this places it in breach of the 1961 Convention. So the US faces a predicament; a treaty breach it does not wish to admit
within a system it wishes to protect.
The response is the new 'four pillars' approach, set out by Ambassador William Brownfield (Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement):
Respect the integrity of the existing UN Drug Control Conventions...
Accept flexible interpretation of those conventions...
Tolerate different national drug policies...accept the fact that some countries will have very strict drug approaches;
other countries will legalize entire categories of drugs...
Combat and resist criminal organizations
Brownfield's statement received some positive responses , welcoming it as a breakthrough in drug policy
reform. However, its attractiveness is superficial and there are important reasons to be cautious.
For US foreign policy on drugs the four pillars make sense in the short term. Through these pillars, the US can appear to embrace
reform discussions while changing nothing of substance. US approaches to Latin America that have dominated US attentions can
carry on as before. The US gets to continue to have presence in places it has no business being other than to fight the drug trade - the
fourth pillar of this 'new' approach.
In addition, in defending the 'integrity of the treaties', the US can go on using those treaties as a disciplinary tool against producer
and transit nations in the region. Under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, when a country does not fulfill the requirements of
the international drugs conventions, the President determines that the country has 'failed demonstrably' to meet its obligations,
which can lead to sanctions.
Bolivia received such a determination again only a few weeks ago. While explaining the rationale for a more 'flexible interpretation'
Brownfield said, 'Things have changed since 1961'. However, the Presidential Determination on Bolivia stressed that the 'frameworks
established by the U.N. conventions are as applicable to the contemporary world as when they were negotiated and signed by the
vast majority of U.N. member states'.
The determination further expressed the US government's concern that Bolivia tries 'to limit, redefine, and circumvent the scope and
control' for coca under the 1961 Convention, even though that is precisely what the US is doing in the case of cannabis.
The US also objected to Bolivia's efforts to have traditional uses of coca removed from international control because it challenged the
'integrity of the treaties' - the very first pillar above. So which countries' reforms or interpretations will be deemed tolerable, and
which will threaten the integrity of the treaties? Crucially, who decides?
It is clear that a legally regulated market in cannabis is not permissible under the 1961
Single Convention. To deal with this the US, in the second pillar above, has signalled its acceptance
of unilateral interpretation of multilateral agreements beyond what those agreements
allow for. That is a very serious call beyond cannabis and beyond drug policies. The attempt under the
Bush administration to argue that waterboarding was not a breach of the UN Convention Against Torture and that detainees in the
war on terror were not covered by the Geneva Conventions should caution against allowing this kind of unilateral approach.
In reality, beyond the progressive sounding words, the path the Brownfield doctrine set out leads to further US
exceptionalism and the ongoing use of the treaties as it sees fit.
But that exceptionalism cuts both ways , and the US has also vital interests, including national security, in
holding states to international and bilateral treaty obligations. A recent example demonstrates the risks of failing
to take this into account. In July, the US issued a determination that Russia was in violation of
obligations of the Inter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), a bilateral agreement banning the testing of ballistic missiles of a
certain range. But if a 'flexible', a-la-carte approach is to be permissible under the drug control
regime when it suits the US, why should that not apply here?
Why not other important international agreements that matter to so many such as
environmental protocols setting specific targets, or human rights law and its vital protections?
Following the second pillar to the extent the US suggests is a very slippery slope .
The shift to regulated cannabis markets in the US should open the space for a muchneeded discussion of treaty reform . The problem at hand is not the treaty breach by the US;
the problem is the drug control treaty system itself. Preparations have started for a UN summit
on drugs in 2016, the first in almost twenty years, and where a conversation about treaty reform should begin. The
Brownfield doctrine is part of US efforts to keep it off the agenda .
For governments, in an effort to avoid political controversy, the four pillars may seem attractive. For those who support drug policy
reform they may seem progressive. But this is no win for drug policy reform or progress towards policies grounded in evidence and
human rights. To allow the US, for its own ends, to lead us into a politically calculated theatre of
adherence simply serves to sustain a regime that is no longer fit for purpose. It is also harmful for the integrity
of international law more broadly , from human rights, to security to the
environment . The price of allowing the US to avoid its breach of the 1961 Convention, in other words, is too high. And the
war on drugs has already cost too much.
The plan commits to the breach—ends the Brownfield approach and accelerates
treaty reform by explicitly endorsing a non-prohibition stance—net best for i-law
Rolles, 12/12/14 – senior drug policy analyst at Transform (Steve, comment on the article
“The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational
approach to a difficult question” by John Collins,
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrineon-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/)
Thanks for this John. I agree with a lot of your analysis but differ on a few fundamentals. I dont see how prohibition can be regarded
as an ‘antiquated provision’ of the treaties. Aside from regulating medical uses, prohibition wasand remains their core function; they
are essentially prohibitionist legal instruments. To me the
idea that doing something so fundamentally
contrary to prohibition as legalisation could ever be allowed within any ‘flexible
interpretation’ is not a sustainable argument for the US or anyone else. Its actually as absurd as saying
Decriminalisation, arguably yes.
torture is allow under a flexible interpretation of the convention against torture.
Legalisation – definitely not . On that basis I also disagree that there is any reasonable
case to make that the US are somehow not breaching the treaties. They clearly are – by any reading
of the law, and as claimed by the treaty bodies of the UNODC, and INCB. The reality of breach has to be
the starting point in the debate moving forward
Its certainly welcome that the US are talking about the problems with the treaties and showing
willingness to accept the reality of experiments with regulation models that challenge the prohibitionist
international framework. But the US can’t have their cake and eat it on this issue – you can’t breach a
core treaty framework and try and maintain its integrity at the same time. The US breach (and the
Uruguay breach) are the clearest challenge yet to the fundamentally punitive prohibitionist nature of the drug treaties – the US
needs to acknowledge this and lead the debate on treaty reform instead of hiding from it with spurious legal arguments about
flexibility. Trapped between the impossible challenges of enforcing federal law in the reform states,
or pushing a new treaty system through congress – they have apparently opted for a legal
fudge to try and keep the discussion on treaty refrom off the tabel for as long as possible – at least for the UNGASS.
They should own and justify the breach instead of denying it. For once, it’s a case they can
reasonably make – this is a US treaty breach that has occurred for very good reasons, namely
that the old prohibitionist system is dysfunctional and redundant – and new approaches are needed to protect the
health and welfare of citizens. The drug treaties are not written in stone; as you say, with all laws they contain mechanisms for their
reform and modernisation when needed. That need has clearly arrived
The challenge to the drug treaty framework that the US and other breaches represents can and should act as
a catalyst for meaningful debate and reform of an outdated and broken system. Modernisation of the international
system to make it fit for purpose is something the US should embrace, not shy away from or try
and finesse its way around with untenable and messy legal interpretations If the US are
serious about pursuing the wider health, human rights and development goals of the UN, or specifically the drug treaty goals of
preserving the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ they need to acknowledge that the a prohibitionists
treaty framework is no longer fit for purpose – if it ever was. Nothing could demonstrate this more
clearly than their own overt breach of its core prohibitionist tenets. Ironically, the current US
position does not preserve the ‘integrity’ of the treaties atall. Failure to reform them will simply render them increasingly
marginalised and redundant’. The way to preserve their integrity is to reform them so they achieve the UN’s wider goals.
we can encourage principled
breaches to improve local policy outcomes, and we can encourage an active multilateral debate and
reform process at the same time. The two do not need to be sequential and are not mutually
exclusive – quite the opposite . Countries no longer need the permission o the US to explore legalisation – that time
has passed, and as such the Brownfield doctrine is symbolically significant but largely irrelevant to geopolitical reality. My
sense is we shouldn’t buy into it as some huge concession – its actually a political excuse and delaying tactic that
we should simply exploit to accelerate a treaty reform process by highlighting how broken
and absurd the system is now shown to be.
Unlike the US, the reform movement can have our cake and eat it on this one –
2016 is key – domestic reform signals US commitment
Patrick, 14 [The Global Debate Over Illegal Drugs Heats Up, by Stewart M. Patrick, April 1,
2014, Senior Fellow and Director, Program on International Institutions and Global
Governance, http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2014/04/01/the-global-debate-over-illegal-drugsheats-up/]
a long-deferred debate over the “war on drugs” is finally heating up
the dominant paradigm informing U.S. and global policy towards narcotics has been
prohibition.
The U S will need to chart a new policy
course if it hopes to retain credibility and influence as global attitudes toward drugs
evolve The law enforcement approach has focused on attacking sources of supply interdicting
shipments and incarcerating dealers
these repressive efforts
have made little dent in the global drug trade. By artificially inflating profits, prohibition has
only incentivized criminal activity Traffickers have successfully shifted production sites and
transit routes in response to crackdowns.
Fortunately, a long-deferred debate
is gaining
Having been frozen for four decades,
. Ever since the Nixon administration,
That failed approach is now being challenged by a slew of influential reports, path-breaking national policies in the Western Hemisphere, and state-level experiments within the United States. Just how turbulent the debate has
become was clear at yesterday’s roundtable on the future of international drug policy, hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
nited
tates
continue to
.
U.S.
,
of drugs
. It has also targeted demand, imprisoning and fining addicts and casual users. And yet
.
Criminality, corruption and violence have destabilized vulnerable governments. Prison populations have swollen with addicts and
casual users. And yet drugs are cheaper and more available than ever before.
over how to handle the global drug trade
momentum.
The first cracks in the prohibitionist edifice appeared in 2011, with the publication of the Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy. The commission—co-chaired by former Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo, former
Brazilian president Fernando Enrique Cardoso, and former U.S. secretary of state George Shultz, and including other global lu minaries like Kofi Annan, Paul Volcker, and Javier Solana—pulled no punches. The report’s opening paragraph said it all: The global war
on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world. Fifty years after the initiation of the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and 40 years after President Nixon launched the US government’s war on drugs,
fundamental reforms
in national and global drug control policies
are urgently needed
The commission endorsed a public health
. It was time, the commission concluded, to “break the taboo on debate and reform.”
The report categorically rejected the “repressive” measures that had “clearly failed to effectively curtail supply or consumption.”
approach
The Western Hemisphere has been most receptive to this appeal. The
secretary-general of the O
A S Jose Miguel Insulza
released a bracing Report on the
Drug Problem
documenting the damage of the war on drugs
In Colombia, which has
received billions of dollars in U.S. counterdrug assistance
president Juan Manuel Santos has
announced “It’s time to think again about the war on drugs.” Further south, Uruguay has become
the first country in the Americas to legalize marijuana Meanwhile, in the United States,
Colorado and Washington have legalized recreational use of cannabis, and eighteen other states
and the District of Columbia have decriminalized
The United States, long the watchdog of the global prohibition
regime, is facing a new diplomatic landscape as a result of all this turbulence.
to reducing drug use and dependence, an end to incarceration of low-level drug offenders, and a shift from prohibition to regulation and harm reduction, with ample room for national experimenta tion—including decriminalization
and even legalization.
rganization of
merican
tates,
, last year
in the Americas,
and endorsing “differentiated approaches” tailored to national contexts and
concerns. In Central America, ravaged by drug-related violence, Guatemalan President Otto Peréz Molina has insisted that prohibition has failed and that the only solution is “regulation.”
since 2000,
,
the
trade.
its use. And at the federal level, both President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder have noted the futility and injustice of
continuing to imprison millions of Americans for low-level drug offenses.
Speaking at CSIS, Ambassador William Brownfield,
assistant secretary of the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), called it the most significant “national and global debate on drug policy” in history. It is one where the United States increasingly finds itself on the defensive,
alternately whipsawed by attacks on its prohibitionist national stance and criticisms of the conduct of its individual states. Last October, Brownfield found himself before the International Narcotics Control Board, where he was asked to explain why the United States
The diplomatic challenge for
the United States is to adjust its prohibitionist stance to new hemispheric and global
realities. And it does not have much time. In 2016 the United Nations General Assembly
will convene a Special Session UNGASS
the first such event in eighteen years. To move the
global debate on drug policy in a constructive direction, the United States has just two years
to go from enforcer to reformer.
could claim to be “in compliance” with the obligations of the three main international drug conventions, given legal and fast-developing cannabis markets in Washington and Colorado.
(
) on Drug Policy—
CSA is key
Wild, 13 [Joshua, JD, Suffolk University, EPIC FAILURE: THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH
ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN THE FAILURE OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON DRUGS
AND HOW IT IS GOING TO FIX IT, Suffolk University Suffolk Transnational Law Review
Summer, 2013, 36 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 423, p. lexis]
I. Introduction The global war on drugs has been deemed a failure, an apt categorization considering the billions in
exorbitant expenditures applied to its supply-side campaign with little statistics to effectuate its cause. n1 In fact, evidence
persistently suggests that the
ardent prohibitionist style of the United States may be the leading cause
for the current global drug epidemic. n2 The disheartening current state of the international drug
problem has lead to the global erosion of support for the U.S.-style war on drugs;
furthermore, the emergence of new empirical data has [*424] generated a series of advocates for
reform who seek fiscally responsible policies grounded in science, health, security, and human rights. n3
Part and parcel of this argument is the encouragement of governments to experiment
with the legal regulation of marijuana because of its vast global consumption and low level of
associated criminality. n4 Evidence suggesting there are more pragmatic and less punitive approaches to the
drug issue, coalescing with various global commissions advocating the assimilation of this data into policies, represents a shift
in the global drug consensus. n5 This shift in global consensus places the [*425] United States. in the
necessary sociopolitical context that may be needed to actually manage the drug epidemic. n6 This Note
argues that the United States has severely aggravated the global drug control problem by forcefully
imposing a prohibitionist ideology onto other countries around the world. n7 To remedy this error,
the United States should take accountability and stand at the forefront of drug policy
reformation by implementing demand side policies within its own nation, something that is
within its own capacity. n8 Part II of this Note will set forth all of the pertinent facts that are
necessary for understanding the current global drug epidemic, how the epidemic arrived at this state,
and what the United States can do to manage it. n9 In Part III, this Note traces the history of international drug control and attempts
to correlate the demise of control over the issue with U.S.-led supply-side policies. n10 Part IV provides an analysis of how the
United States exacerbated the problem and suggests an avenue the United States can take to place the issue in a manageable
position. n11 Part V concludes that the United States should take accountability for its mistakes and reform its
policies from a regime of prohibition to one of regulation. n12 II. Facts The ineffectiveness of the war against
drugs, both domestically and internationally, is not a relatively new or veiled problem. n13 [*426] Despite the continual emergence
of empirical evidence, little has been done to assimilate this information into drug control policies since the war was first waged by
international policymakers and President Richard Nixon over forty years ago. n14 Recently, case studies and evidence have
accumulated to a level that can no longer be ignored, and the debate concerning more efficient alternatives and revisions to current
drug control policies has intensified. n15 International commissions such as the Global Commission on Drug Control Policy are
chastising global drug control regimes for their lack of leadership on drug policy and are advocating for multilateral debate on this
issue. n16 Essential to the progression of this issue is the United States, who within the past forty years has spent over $ 2.5 trillion
dollars fighting the war, with little empirical data to support meaningful results. n17 In fact, research has consistently indicated that
[*427] the United States supply-side policies are instead a leading cause of the current international epidemic. n18 A. The First Step
to Solving a Problem is Recognizing That There is One - Current State of International Drug Control With the implementation of the
United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs ("UNSCND") nearly fifty years ago, it was clear that the ultimate objective was
to improve the "health and welfare of mankind." n19 Unfortunately, this objective has been lost amidst current policies driven by
ideological perspective and political convenience, with a focus on quantifiable figures such as drug arrests and harsh punishments,
rather than qualitative figures that represent economic and social development. n20 Since the initiation of the global drug
prohibition system, numerous forms of empirical and scientific evidence have surfaced that reveal the nature and patterns of drug
production, distribution, consumption, and dependence. n21 Most significantly, some studies have even correlated the progression
of these patterns with the effectiveness of current policies. n22 The [*428] 2011 World Drug Report estimated that in 2009, between
149 and 272 million people globally, or 3.3% to 6.1% of the world's middle aged population, used illicit substances at least once in
that year. n23 Globally, the average prevalence of HIV and Hepatitis C among injecting drug users is 17.9% and 50%, respectively.
n24 These statistics reflect the health consequences of the drug use epidemic and illustrate the importance of solving this ominous
predicament. n25 Ironically, despite increasing evidence that the current drug control policies are not working, and case studies
suggesting that less repressive, alternative drug control policies are working, most policymaking bodies have tended to avoid this
reality and the possibility of exploring alternatives. n26 Governments continue to expend resources and billions of U.S. dollars on
incarceration and futile supply reduction strategies which in turn displace the possibility of spending these resources on demand
reduction. n27 Advocates of reform endorse the sensible policy [*429] option that governments
experiment with different models of legal regulation of drugs in an attempt to undermine the criminal market
and enhance national security. n28 For this movement to effectively control the epidemic at hand, there
must be a broad consensus around the world that the current drug control policies are morally
noxious. n29 Unfortunately, the stigma and fear associated with more toxic drugs, such as heroin,
has precluded this consensus and perpetuated the current ineffective policies. n30 B. Exacerbating the
Problem - The U.S. Role in the Global War on Drugs When President Nixon waged the U.S. Government's "War on Drugs" nearly
forty years ago, policymakers' focus was on supply-side measures and harsh law enforcement as the means to stop the seemingly
endless flow of drugs across U.S. borders. n31 The problem was, and remains today, that the United States is the world's largest
consumer of illicit drugs, and combining that with drug markets as diverse and well established as they are, the possibility of
stopping the supply of these drugs is simply unrealistic and unrealizable. n32 Instead, these ineffective [*430] drug policies have
resulted in nothing short of an abject disaster. n33 With approximately 20 million illicit drug users in the United States, the
estimated annual cost of illicit drug use to society is above $ 193 billion. n34 With the overall availability of illicit drugs in the U.S.
increasing at alarming rates, and empirical data to correlate current drug policies to this epidemic, advocates of reform are pointing
to the urgent need for a more rational drug control policy discussion. n35 Policymakers often underrate the U.S.-demand element of
the equation, and how it relates to the problem at hand, particularly when you consider that marijuana accounts for the vast majority
of America's illicit drug consumption. n36 A 2010 study conducted by the National Survey on Drug Use and Health revealed that in
the United States, 22.6 million people had used illicit drugs in the past month, 17.4 million of which used marijuana. n37 Further,
the National Survey on Drug Use and Health estimated that at least 18.5 % of the nation's young adults, aged 18 to 25, used
marijuana. n38 Put bluntly, the monumental scope of the international marijuana market is largely affected by the exorbitant U.S.
demand for the drug and the illegality of the market. n39 [*431] The high demand for marijuana in the United States has eroded
authority in countries that produce marijuana, and international officials are increasingly calling on the
United States to do more to reduce its demand. n40 At a time when it seems that the drug epidemic in the United
States may be spiraling out of control, there is a growing movement among U.S. states to rethink and
restructure marijuana laws. n41 Marijuana is a criminally sanctioned drug under U.S.
federal law, but as of 2010, over half of the states have enacted or proposed legislation that either allows legal medical marijuana
or decriminalize possession of marijuana. n42 California was the first state in the United States to allow marijuana for medical use.
n43 The state tax board of California believes that the legalization and regulation of marijuana could raise $ 1.3 billion or more per
year, while saving millions of dollars in prison and law enforcement costs. n44 This economic approach to state regulation and
taxing of marijuana has a two-fold prospective: (1) eradicating the demand for a criminal market, and (2) generating a substantial
amount of revenue at a time when it is badly needed. n45 These benefits, combined with [*432] the minimal health risks of
marijuana in comparison to alcohol and tobacco, are leading more states to tolerant approaches to drug policy. n46 III. History The
notion that international drug control is primarily a fight against crime and criminals has been the foundation of policy decisions
since the development of national and global drug control regimes. n47 The concept of the drug control system was initially
developed based on laudable principles such as reducing harm to individuals and fostering economic and social development. n48
Over time, however, the drug control system degenerated into a "war" that threatens harm to individual users, farmers, and petty
traders while depressing economic and social development. n49 A. Tracing the Development of International Drug Control Policies
The framework of international drug control has transpired through a series of stages in the past century beginning with the
International Opium Convention of 1912 and continuing through 2012, marking the centennial of its existence. n50 The Opium
Convention in 1912 and the treaties that followed were [*433] initially regulatory mechanisms developed largely to control the
previously unregulated market of opium. n51 As the treaties evolved and expanded, they resulted in a regulated trade market for
opiates, cocaine, and cannabis, but not the criminalization of these substances or their trade markets. n52 As a result, the ardent
prohibitionists, namely the United States and China, departed from the negotiations in 1925. n53 World Wars I and II served as both
a burden and a blessing for the United States because drug control was not a top priority for most countries during this period and
the United States was unable to globalize their prohibitive anti-drug ideals. n54 Conversely, the end of the war marked the necessary
political atmosphere that the United States had yearned for, emerging as the dominant political, economic, and military power; a
leverage position that allowed the United States to shape a new drug control regime. n55 It was the initiative by the United States,
advocating for the international control of narcotic drugs, which lead to the development of the landmark international agreement,
the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. n56 1. The UN Drug Control Conventions The 1961 UN Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs codified all of the piecemeal multilateral treaties on drug control that had been developing since the
early years of the twentieth [*434] century and created a more prohibitive system, extending coverage to include the cultivation of
plants that were grown as the raw material of narcotic drugs. n57 With this extension, a universal system was in place for limiting
the cultivation, production, distribution, trade, use, and possession of narcotic substances. n58 A decade later in 1971, the
Convention on Psychotropic Substances was developed to combat the emerging pharmaceutical market that had completely restructured conventional drug use. n59 The assimilation of these two treaties into one drug control system resulted in the creation of
the International Narcotic Control Board (INCB), a regulatory board that limited the availability of the controlled substances to
medical and scientific purposes. n60 Much to the U.S.'s chagrin, none of the scheduled drugs were ever declared illegal and the term
"illicit drug" does not appear in the UN Conventions. n61 The effective implementation of the UN Conventions adversely affected the
drug market. n62 In the 1970s and 1980s, demand in the Western world for the previously available drugs facilitated the
development of a multi-billion dollar international narcotics trafficking business. n63 In response to the growing illegal drug
market, the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was developed [*435] and
implemented to deter the expansion of the illicit drug market through the availability of special punitive measures for offenders. n64
The implementation of this convention marked a significant point in the history of international drug control. n65 The emphasis
placed on criminal sanctions for offenders was representative of the prohibitive anti-drug ideology of the United States and was a
catalyst in the demise of control over the global drug problem. n66 B. Tracing the Development of the U.S.'s "War on Drugs" The
late 1960s marked an era of political unrest in the U.S., and recreational drug use became fashionable as a sign of social rebellion.
n67 By 1971, President Nixon declared a national "War on Drugs" in response to the growing heroin epidemic among U.S.
servicemen returning from Vietnam and U.S. illicit drug consumption growing out of control. n68 As part of this war, Nixon
established the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), a "super agency" consolidating all of the previously established drug control
agencies, which would handle all aspects of the drug problem. n69 Unfortunately, the DEA was no match for the [*436] epic drug
problem and the significant growth of the cocaine trade brought a new, violent dimension to the already expanding U.S. drug
market. n70 The exorbitant growth and ensuing violence of the cocaine trade in the late 1970s and early 1980s led President Ronald
Reagan to issue a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-221) in April of 1986, declaring the escalating drug trade a threat to
the U.S. and prompting Operation Blast Furnace, the first publicized deployment of U.S. troops to foreign soil to aid anti-drug
efforts. n71 In hindsight, the events that would unfold in 1986 and the years to follow reflected the general ideology behind the "War
on Drugs" and are symbolic of exactly what went wrong in U.S. drug policy development. n72 In 1986, President Reagan signed the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act, allocating $ 1.7 billion USD and new criminal sanctions to be applied to drug control measures. n73 The U.S.
Congress enacted "drug certification," which was a highly politicized, disciplinary mechanism for countries that failed to fully
cooperate with the prohibition of illicit drugs. n74 Military drug interdiction became the symbol of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1989, which made the Department of Defense the lead agency responsible for tackling drug trafficking. n75 The
political context of the preceding period, [*437] evolving around the Cold War, sparked questions about the potential use of the War
on Drugs to legitimize military operations abroad. n76 IV. Analysis A. A Starting Point for Review: Taking Accountability The War
on Drugs' demise started when the bellicose analogy was created. n77 The correct classification of the global drug
problem was and still is as a set of interlinked health and social challenges to be managed, not a
war to be won. n78 The U.S. has worked strenuously for the past fifty years to ensure that all
countries adopt its rigid, prohibitionist approach to drug policy, essentially repressing the
potential for alternative policy development and experimentation. n79 This was an expensive mistake
that the U.S. unfortunately cannot take back. n80 The current emergence from the economic recession of 2008-2009
has set the stage for a generational, political and cultural shift, placing the U.S. in a unique
moment in its history; the necessary sociopolitical context to revoke its prohibitionist ideals
and replace them with more modern policies grounded in health, science and humanity. n81
The U.S. can remedy its mistake by using its considerable diplomatic influence and international
presence to foster reform in other countries. n82 One way to do this is by capitalizing [*438] on this unique
moment in its existence and experimenting with models of legal regulation,
specifically with marijuana because nearly half of U.S. citizens favor legalization of it. n83
This will help redeem our image internationally and help repair foreign relations because the
monumental scope of the international marijuana market is largely created by the exorbitant
U.S. demand for the drug which partially stems from the illegality of the market. n84 B. Step 1:
Recognize the Ineffectiveness of The Global War on Drugs and Consider Alternatives An objective
way to gauge the effectiveness of a drug policy is to examine how the policy manages the most toxic drugs and the problems
associated with them. n85 With that in mind, at the global level, having one in five intravenous drug users have HIV and one in every
two users having Hepatitis C is clearly an epidemic and not the result of effective drug control policies. n86 The threat of arrest and
punishment as a deterrent from people using drugs is sound in theory, but in practice this hypothesis is tenuous. n87 Countries that
have enacted harsh, punitive laws have higher levels of drug use and related problems than countries with more tolerant approaches.
n88 Additionally, the countries that have experimented with forms of legal regulation outside of punitive approaches have not seen
rises in drug use and dependence [*439] rates. n89 Therefore, one sensible first step in placing this issue back
into a manageable position is for national governments to encourage other governments to
experiment with models of legal regulation of drugs which fit their context. n90 This will in turn,
undermine the criminal market, enhance national security, and allow other countries to learn from their
application. n91 1. Easier to Say Than Do - A Suggestion for Overcoming Difficulties Associated With Legal Regulation For this
movement to be successful and effectively manage the epidemic at hand there must be a broad
consensus around the world that the current drug control policies are morally harmful. n92 This consensus
however is precluded by the stigma and fear associated with more toxic drugs such as heroin. n93 This note does not propose that
heroin and other toxic drugs should be legalized but instead suggests that society and drug policies tend to consolidate and classify
all illicit drugs as equally dangerous. n94 This in turn restrains any progressive debate about experimenting with the regulation of
different drugs under different standards. n95 [*440] Regardless of these false dichotomies, which often restrain progressive
debate, it is difficult not to give credence to the idea of marijuana being socially acceptable when it has been by far the most widely
produced and consumed illicit drug. n96 There is between 125 and 203 million users worldwide and no indication of that number
declining. n97 With this many users, it is reasonable to conclude that if the international community could reach a
consensus about the moral noxiousness of any drug control policy, the repression of marijuana
would likely be it. n98 Marijuana, arguably socially acceptable, represents a simple mechanism to
enter into the experimentation process with the legal regulation of drugs. n99 Without advocating for the
UN to adopt new commissions or encouraging drastic moves such as the decriminalization of all illicit substances, the global
decriminalization of marijuana would be a relatively minor adjustment compared to the monumental impact. n100 If national
governments were to decriminalize marijuana, the scope of this movement would essentially eradicate the public health problem of
marijuana abuse and the associated criminality because of its illegal status. n101 Public health problems can be remedied because it
will afford governments the ability to regulate the market and control the quality and price of the drug, essentially removing toxic
impurities and setting a price that will diminish an illegal market. n102 This will in turn diminish the criminal market [*441] by
eradicating the need for users to commit crimes to procure marijuana and removing the economic incentive for other countries to
get involved in the drug's market. n103 Without arguing that this is the panacea for the global war on
drugs, proponents of legalization can aptly point to the archaic drug control policies in place and
this macro approach as an effective way to tackle the problem now. n104 C. Step 2: Real
Reform - the U.S. Needs to Stand at the Forefront of Drug Policy Reformation The
U.S. wields considerable influence over the rest of the world, so it is no surprise that its call for
the development and maintenance of prohibitive, punitive drug policies resulted in a majority of
the international community following. n105 Conversely, if the U.S. leads the call for the
development and maintenance of more tolerant drug policies grounded in health, humanity and
science, a majority of the international community will also follow. n106 Cultural shifts do not take
place overnight, and the idea of complete U.S. drug policy reformation is too aggressive and
stark in contrast to succeed against modern bureaucracy and political alliances. n107 On the other
hand, a more moderate, piecemeal approach could effectively act as a catalyst for this
transformation while simultaneously serving as a case study for opponents of legal
regulation . n108 [*442] If the U.S. is serious about addressing the ineffectiveness of the War
on Drugs, then the federal government must remove marijuana from its list of
criminally banned substances. n109 The tone of the Obama administration is a significant
step in this direction. n110 President Obama has explicitly acknowledged the need to treat drugs as
more of a public health problem, as well as the validity of debate on alternatives, but he does not favor drug
legalization. n111 This progressive rhetoric is a significant step in the right direction, but until there is some
real reform confronting the issue, reducing punitive measures and supporting other countries
to develop drug policies that suit their context, there is still an abdication of policy
responsibility. n112 1. Starting Small - Potential Positive Effects of Regulation and Taxation of
Marijuana in the U.S. If marijuana was legal in the U.S., it would function similarly to the market of
legal substances such as liquor, coffee and tobacco. n113 Individual and corporate participants in the market would pay
taxes, increasing revenues and saving the government from the exorbitant cost of trying to enforce prohibition laws. n114
Consumers' human rights would be promoted through self-determination, autonomy and access to more accurate information about
the product they are consuming. n115 Additionally, case studies and research suggest that the decriminalization or legalization
[*443] of marijuana reduces the drugs' consumption and does not necessarily result in a more favorable attitude towards it. n116 The
legal regulation of marijuana would relieve the current displaced burden the drug places on law
enforcement, domestically and internationally. n117 In the U.S., law enforcement could refocus
their efforts away from reducing the marijuana market per se and instead towards reducing
harm to individuals, communities and national security. n118 Abroad, U.S. international relations
would improve because of the reduced levels of corruption and violence at home and afar. n119
The precarious position repressive policies place on foreign governments when they have to
destroy the livelihoods of agricultural workers would be reduced. n120 Additionally, legalization and
regulation would provide assistance to governments in regaining some degree of control over the
regions dominated by drug dealers and terrorist groups because those groups would lose a
major source of funding for their organizations. n121 2. Health Concerns? - Marijuana in Comparison to Other
Similar Legal Substances The federal government, acknowledging the risks inherent in alcohol and tobacco, argues that adding a
third substance to that mix cannot be beneficial. n122 Adding anything to a class of [*444] dangerous substances is likely never
going to be beneficial; however marijuana would be incorrectly classified if it was equated with those two substances. n123
Marijuana is far less toxic and addictive than alcohol and tobacco. n124 Long term use of marijuana is far less damaging than long
term alcohol or tobacco use. n125 Alcohol use contributes to aggressive and reckless behavior, acts of violence and serious injuries
while marijuana actually reduces likelihood of aggressive behavior or violence during intoxication and is seldom associated with
emergency room visits. n126 As with most things in life, there can be no guarantee that the legalization or decriminalization of
marijuana would lead the U.S. to a better socio-economical position in the future. n127 Two things however, are certain: that the
legalization of marijuana in the U.S. would dramatically reduce most of the costs associated with the current drug policies,
domestically and internationally, and [*445] if the U.S. is serious about its objective of considering the costs of drug control
measures, then it is vital and rational for the legalization option is considered. n128 D. Why the Time is Ripe for U.S. Drug Policy
Reformation The political atmosphere at the end of World War I and II was leverage for the U.S.,
emerging as the dominant political, economic and military power. n129 This leverage allowed it to
shape a prohibitive drug control regime that until now has remained in perpetuity. n130 Today,
we stand in a unique moment inside of U.S. history. n131 The generational, political and cultural shifts that
accompanied the U.S. emergence from the "Great Recession" resulted in a sociopolitical climate that may be what is necessary for
real reform. n132 Politically, marijuana has become a hot issue; economically, the marijuana industry is bolstering a faltering
economy and socially, marijuana is poised to transform the way we live and view medicine. n133 The public disdain for the
widespread problems prohibition caused in the early 20th century resulted in the end of alcohol
prohibition during the Great Depression. n134 If history does actually repeat itself than the Great
recession may have been much more telling than expected. n135 V. Conclusion The U.S. and its
prohibitionist ideals exacerbated the failure of both the international and its own domestic drug
policies. n136 As a result, the U.S. should accept accountability for its mistakes by reforming its
drug policies in a way that will help [*446] place the global drug market back into a manageable
position. n137 Marijuana is an actionable, evidence based mechanism for constructive legal and
policy reform that through a domino effect can transform the global drug prohibition
regime. n138 The generational, political and cultural shifts that accompanied the U.S.
emergence from the "Great Recession" have resulted in a sociopolitical climate ready for real
reform. n139 The U.S. will capitalize on this unique moment by removing marijuana from
the list of federally banned substances, setting the stage for future international
and domestic drug policies that are actually effective. n14
Effective international law solves global transnational challenges
Largade, 14 [Christine, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, “A New
Multilateralism for the 21st Century: the Richard Dimbleby Lecture”, February 3, 2014,
https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2014/020314.htm]
I invite you to cast your minds back to the early months of 1914, exactly a century ago. Much of the world had enjoyed long years of
peace, and giant leaps in scientific and technological innovation had led to path-breaking advances in living standards and
communications. There were few barriers to trade, travel, or the movement of capital. The future was full of potential. Yet, 1914
was the gateway to thirty years of disaster—marked by two world wars and the Great
Depression. It was the year when everything started to go wrong. What happened? What
happened was that the birth of the modern industrial society brought about massive dislocation. The world was rife
with tension—rivalry between nations, upsetting the traditional balance of power, and inequality
between the haves and have-nots, whether in the form of colonialism or the sunken prospects of the uneducated working classes. By
1914, these imbalances had toppled over into outright conflict. In the years to follow, nationalist and
ideological thinking led to an unprecedented denigration of human dignity. Technology, instead of
uplifting the human spirit, was deployed for destruction and terror. Early attempts at international cooperation, such as the League
of Nations, fell flat. By the end of the Second World War, large parts of the world lay in ruins. I now invite you to consider a second
turning point—1944. In the summer of that year, the eminent economist, John Maynard Keynes, and a delegation of British officials,
embarked on a fateful journey across the Atlantic. The crossing was risky—the world was still at war and enemy ships still prowled
the waters. Keynes himself was in poor health. But he had an appointment with destiny—and he was not going to miss it. The
destination was the small town of Bretton Woods in the hills of New Hampshire, in the northeastern United States. His purpose was
to meet with his counterparts from other countries. Their plan was nothing less than the reconstruction of the global economic
order. The 44 nations gathering at Bretton Woods were determined to set a new course—based on mutual trust and
cooperation, on the principle that peace and prosperity flow from the font of cooperation, on the belief that the broad global interest
trumps narrow self-interest. This was the original multilateral moment—70 years ago. It gave birth to the United
Nations, the World Bank, and the IMF—the institution that I am proud to lead. The world we inherited was forged by these visionary
gentlemen—Lord Keynes and his generation. They raised the phoenix of peace and prosperity from the ashes of anguish and
antagonism. We owe them a huge debt of gratitude. Because of their work, we have seen unprecedented
economic and financial stability over the past seven decades. We have seen diseases
eradicated, conflict diminished, child mortality reduced, life expectancy increased, and
hundreds of millions lifted out of poverty. Today, however, we are coming out of the Great
Recession, the worst economic crisis—and the great test—of our generation. Thanks to their
legacy of multilateralism—international cooperation—we did not slip into another Great
Depression that would have brought misery across the world yet again. We all passed the
test—rejecting protectionism, reaffirming cooperation. Yet there will be many more tests ahead.
We are living through a time every bit as momentous as that faced by our forefathers a century
ago. Once again, the global economy is changing beyond recognition, as we move from the
industrial age to the hyperconnected digital age. Once again, we will be defined by how we respond
to these changes. As we look ahead toward mid-century, toward the world that our children and grandchildren will inherit
from us, we need to ask the question: what kind of world do we want that to be—and how can we achieve it? As Shakespeare says in
Julius Caesar: “On such a full sea are we now afloat, and we must take the current when it serves, or lose our ventures.” This evening,
I would like to talk about two broad currents that will dominate the coming decades—
increasing tensions in global interconnections and in economic sustainability. I
would then like to make a proposal that builds on the past and is fit for the future: a
strengthened framework for international cooperation. In short, a new multilateralism for the
21st century. Tensions in global interconnections I will start with the first major current—tensions in global interconnections,
between a world that is simultaneously coming closer together and drifting further apart. By “coming together”, I mean
the breakneck pattern of integration and interconnectedness that defines our time. It is really
the modern counterpart of what our ancestors went through in the fateful years leading up to
1914. Just look at the great linking of the global economy over the past few decades. For one thing, world trade has
grown exponentially. We are now in a world of integrated supply chains, where more than half of total manufactured
imports, and more than 70 percent of total service imports, are intermediate goods or services. A typical manufacturing company
today uses inputs from more than 35 different contractors across the world. Financial links between countries have
also grown sharply. In the two decades before the crisis in 2008, international bank lending—as a share of world GDP—rose by
250 percent. And we should expect this to rise further in the future, as more and more countries dive into the financial nexus of the
global economy. We are also living through a communications revolution. It has produced a starburst of interconnections, with
information traveling at lightning speed from limitless points of origin. The world has become a hum of interconnected voices and a
hive of interlinked lives. Today, 3 billion people are connected to each other on the internet. Three million emails are sent each
second. There are almost as many mobile devices as people on the planet, and the “mobile mindset” is deeply embedded in all
regions of the world. In fact, the highest rates of mobile penetration are in Africa and Asia. Back in 1953, when people tuned into the
coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, their experience was mediated essentially by one voice—the masterful Richard Dimbleby, whom
we honor today. In contrast, when Prince George arrived last summer, his birth was heralded by more than 25,000 tweets a minute!
With such a dizzying pace of change, we can sympathize with Violet Crawley, Downton Abbey’s countess, who wondered whether the
telephone was “an instrument of communication or torture!” This brave new world—this hyperconnected world—offers immense
hope and promise. Stronger trade and financial connections can bring tangible benefits to millions of people—through higher growth
and greater convergence of living standards. The dream of eliminating extreme poverty is within our reach. The communications
revolution too can be a potent force for good. It can empower people, unleash creativity, and spur change. Think about how twitter
messages helped to galvanize the participants in the Arab Spring, or how social media carrying the message of Malala in Pakistan
pricked the conscience of the entire world. It is not all bright skies, however. When linkages are deep and
even the
tiniest tensions can be amplified , echoing and reverberating across
the world —often in an instant, often with unpredictable twists and turns. The channels that
dense, they become hard to disentangle. In such an interwoven labyrinth,
bring convergence can also bring contagion. Because of this, the global economy can become
even more prone to instability. If not managed well, financial integration can make crises more
frequent and more damaging. Consider, for example, where and how the recent global financial crisis began—in the
mortgage markets of suburban America—and spread all around the world. The communications revolution too has a dark side. It
can sow discord, instill factionalism, and spread confusion. Instead of an online forum for ideas and expression, we could have a
virtual mob or a global platform to promote intolerance or hatred. Instead of a beautiful symphony, we could have an ugly
cacophony. So the key challenge for us in all this will be to magnify the good and diminish the bad.
If managing the great “coming together” were not difficult enough, it will be further complicated by the other current that I
mentioned: the tendency for the world to grow further apart, even as it draws closer together. This is a paradox. What do I mean? I
mean the diffusion of power across the world—toward more diverse geographical regions and more diverse global stakeholders.
Unlike with integration, our forefathers experienced nothing like this. It is a defining feature of our hyperconnected age. One of the
major megatrends of our time is the shift in global power from west to east, and from north to south—from a few to a handful, to a
myriad. Fifty years ago, the emerging markets and developing economies accounted for about a quarter of world GDP. Today, it is
half, and rising rapidly—very likely to two-thirds within the next decade. The diffusion of power also goes beyond country
relationships, extending to a whole host of networks and institutions that inhabit the fabric of global society. Think about the rising
nexus of non-government organizations, which can use the communications revolution to extend their reach and amplify the voice of
civil society. In just 20 years, the number of these groups associated with the United Nations rose from 700 to nearly 4000. Think
about the growing power of multinational corporations, who now control two-thirds of world trade. According to some research, 12
multinational corporations now sit among the world’s top 100 economic bodies in terms of sheer size. Think about powerful cities—
31 of them are also on that list of the top 100. And they continue to grow. By 2030, about 60 percent of the world’s population will
live in cities. Think also about the rising aspirations of citizens who feel increasingly part, yet not quite adjusted to, our
interconnected “global village”. By 2030, the global middle class could top 5 billion, up from 2 billion today. These people will
inevitably demand higher living standards, as well as greater freedom, dignity, and justice. Why should they settle for less? This will
be a more diverse world of increasing demands and more dispersed power. In such a world, it could be much harder to get things
done, to reach consensus on issues of global importance. The risk is of a world that is more integrated—
economically, financially, and technologically—but more fragmented in terms of power,
influence, and decision-making. This can lead to more indecision, impasse, and insecurity—the
temptations of extremism—and it requires new solutions. Tensions in economic sustainability We will also need
solutions for the second broad current that will dominate the next few decades—tensions in economic sustainability, between staying
strong and slowing down. Of course, the immediate priority for growth is to get beyond the financial crisis, which began six years ago
and is still with us, as the markets remind us these days. This requires a sustained and coordinated effort to deal with problems that
still linger—a legacy of high private and public debt, weak banking systems, and structural impediments to competitiveness and
growth—which have left us with unacceptably high levels of unemployment. You are used to the IMF talking about these issues, I
know. Tonight, however, I want to set these issues in the context of longer-term impediments. Three in particular—demographic
shifts, environmental degradation, and income inequality. As with global interconnections, some of these problems would look
familiar to our ancestors—rising inequality, for example. But others are new and novel—such as pressures on the environment.
Demographics Let me start with demographics. Over the next three decades, the world’s population will get much larger and much
older. In 30 years time, there will be about two billion more people on the planet, including three quarters of a billion people over
the age of 65. By 2020, for the first time ever, there will be more old people over 65 than children under 5. The geographical
distribution will also change—young populations in regions like Africa and South Asia will increase sharply, while Europe, China,
and Japan will age and shrink. In the coming decades, we expect India to surpass China, and Nigeria to surpass the United States, in
terms of population. And both China and India will start aging in the near future. This can create problems on both ends of the
demographic spectrum—for youthful countries and for graying countries. Right now, the young countries are seeing a “youth bulge”,
with almost three billion people—half the global population—under 25. This could prove a boon or a bane, a demographic dividend
or a demographic time bomb. A youthful population is certainly fertile ground for innovation, dynamism, and creativity. Yet
everything will depend on generating enough jobs to satisfy the aspirations of the rising generation. This calls for a single-minded
focus on improving education—and, in particular, on the potentially massive effects of technological change on employment.
Looking ahead, factors such as the internet revolution, the rise of smart machines, and the increasing high-tech component of
products will have dramatic implications for jobs and the way we work. Yet governments are not thinking about this in a sufficiently
strategic or proactive way. Aging countries will have different problems, of course. They will face slowing growth precisely at a time
when they need to take care of a retiring generation—people who have contributed to society and expect, as part of the social
contract, to be provided with decent social services as they move into their twilight years. This too can create tensions. Migration
from young to old countries might help to release some pressure at both ends. Yet it could also inflame tensions—the brain drain
could sap productive potential from source countries and a sudden influx of people could erode social cohesion in host countries and
fuel nationalism. Yes, migration can help, but it must be managed well. Environmental degradation So demographics is one
potential long-term obstacle. A second is environmental degradation, the newest and greatest challenge of
our era. We all know what is at stake here. More people with more prosperity will stretch our natural environment to
the limit. We can expect growing pressure points around water, food, and energy scarcity as
the century progresses. By 2030, almost half of the world’s population will live in regions of high water stress or shortage.
Hovering over all of this is the merciless march of climate change. Because of humanity’s hubris,
the natural environment, which we need to sustain us, is instead turning against
us. Make no mistake, it is the world’s most vulnerable people who will suffer most from the
convulsions of climate. For example, some estimates suggest that forty percent of the land now used to grow maize in subSaharan Africa will no longer be able to support that crop by the 2030s. This will have hugely disruptive implications for African
livelihoods and lives. A few years back, Prince Charles gave this very Dimbleby lecture. He used the occasion to make an
impassioned plea to respect the natural law of ecological sustainability. “In failing the earth,” he said, “we are failing humanity”.
The bad news is that we are getting perilously close to the tipping point. The good news is
that it is not too late to turn the tide—even with rising seas. Overcoming climate change is obviously a gigantic
project with a multitude of moving parts. I would just like to mention one component of it—making sure that people pay for the
damage they cause. Why is this aspect—getting the prices right—so important? Because it will help to reduce the harm today and
spur investment in the low-carbon technologies of tomorrow. Phasing out energy subsidies and getting energy prices right must also
be part of the solution. Think about it: we are subsidizing the very behavior that is destroying our planet, and on an enormous scale.
Both direct subsidies and the loss of tax revenue from fossil fuels ate up almost $2 trillion in 2011—this is about the same as the total
GDP of countries like Italy or Russia! The worst part is that these subsidies mostly benefit the relatively affluent, not the poor.
Reducing subsidies and properly taxing energy use can be a win-win prospect for people and for the planet. Income inequality
Demographics and degradation of the environment are two major long-term trends—disparity of income is the third. This is really
an old issue that has come to the fore once again. We are all keenly aware that income inequality has been rising in most
countries. Seven out of ten people in the world today live in countries where inequality has increased over the past three decades.
Some of the numbers are stunning—according to Oxfam, the richest 85 people in the world own the same amount of wealth as the
bottom half of the world’s population. In the US, inequality is back to where it was before the Great Depression, and the richest 1
percent captured 95 percent of all income gains since 2009, while the bottom 90 percent got poorer. In India, the net worth of the
billionaire community increased twelvefold in 15 years, enough to eliminate absolute poverty in this country twice over. With facts
like these, it is not surprising that inequality is increasingly on the global community’s radar screen. It is not
surprising that everyone from the Confederation of British Industry to Pope Francis is speaking out about it—because it can tear the
precious fabric that holds our society together. Let me be frank: in the past, economists have underestimated the importance of
inequality. They have focused on economic growth, on the size of the pie rather than its distribution. Today, we are more keenly
aware of the damage done by inequality. Put simply, a severely skewed income distribution harms the pace and sustainability of
growth over the longer term. It leads to an economy of exclusion, and a wasteland of discarded potential. It is easy to diagnose the
problem, but far more difficult to solve it. From our work at the IMF, we know that the fiscal system can help to reduce inequality
through careful design of tax and spending policies. Think about making taxation more progressive, improving access to health and
education, and putting in place effective and targeted social programs. Yet these policies are hard to design and—because they create
winners and losers—they create resistance and require courage. Nevertheless, we need to get to grips with it, and make sure that
“inclusion” is given as much weight as “growth” in the design of policies. Yes, we need inclusive growth. More inclusion and
opportunity in the economic life also means less cronyism and corruption. This must also rise to the top of the policy agenda. There
is one more dimension of inequality that I wish to discuss here—one that is close to my heart. If we talk about inclusion in economic
life, we must surely talk about gender. As we know too well, girls and women are still not allowed to fulfill their potential—not just in
the developing world, but in rich countries too. The International Labor Organization estimates that 865 million women around the
world are being held back. They face discrimination at birth, on the school bench, in the board room. They face reticence of the
marketplace—and of the mind. And yet, the economic facts of life are crystal clear. By not letting women contribute, we end up with
lower living standards for everyone. If women participated in the labor force to the same extent as men, the boost to per capita
incomes could be huge—27 percent in the Middle East and North Africa, 23 percent in South Asia, 17 percent in Latin America, 15
percent in East Asia, 14 percent in Europe and Central Asia. We simply cannot afford to throw away these gains. “Daring the
difference”, as I call it—enabling women to participate on an equal footing with men—can be a global economic game changer. We
must let women succeed: for ourselves and for all the little girls—and boys—of the future. It will be their world—let us give it to them.
A Multilateralism for a New Era I have talked tonight about the main pressure points that will dominate the global economy in the
years to come—the tension between coming together and drifting apart; and the tension between staying strong and slowing down. I
have talked about pressures that would have seemed familiar a century ago, and some that are entirely new. Now, how do we
manage these pressure points? Where are the solutions? Overcoming the first tension really boils down to a simple
question: do we cooperate as a global family or do we confront each other across the trenches
of insularity? Are we friends or are we foes? Overcoming the second tension requires us to face common threats that
are not bound by borders. Do we face adversity together, or do we build yet more borders and Maginot Lines that will be mere
illusionary protections? The response to both tensions is therefore the same: a renewed commitment to
international cooperation; to putting global interest above self-interest; to multilateralism. As
Martin Luther King once said, “We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever
affects one directly, affects all indirectly.” This is really an old lesson for a new era. At such a momentous
time as this, we need to choose the ethos of 1944 over 1914. We need to rekindle the
Bretton Woods spirit that has served us so well. That does not mean, however, that we need to
go back to the drawing board. Thanks to the inheritance of history, we have specific,
working, forms of cooperation at hand. Again, think about the United Nations, the World
Bank, the World Trade Organization—and of course the IMF. We might call these concrete—or
“hard”—forms of global governance. We also have a number of “soft” instruments, such as the
G20 at one end and networks of non-government organizations at the other. These entities have no formal mandates or legal
powers of enforcement, but they do have value. They can move quickly and they can wedge open the doors of dialogue. And, as
Winston Churchill famously said, “to jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war”! We have seen the power of
multilateralism in action, both “hard” and “soft”. For an example of soft cooperation, we need look no further than
right here in London five years ago, when the G20 countries rallied to turn back the tide of crisis, and made sure the world did not
slip into a second Great Depression. As for more concrete forms, I invite you to consider the historic role played by the IMF down
through the years—helping Europe after the war, the new nations of Africa and Asia after independence, the former eastern bloc
after the Iron Curtain fell, and Latin America and Asia after crippling crisis. During the current crisis, we made 154 new lending
commitments, disbursed $182 billion to countries in need, and provided technical assistance to 90 percent of our member nations.
And we have 188 of them. The
beauty of the new multilateralism is that it can build on the old—but go
further. The existing instruments of cooperation have proven extremely successful over
the past decades, and they must be preserved and protected. That means that institutions like
the IMF must be brought fully up to date, and made fully representative of the changing
dynamics of the global economy. We are working on that. More broadly, the new multilateralism must be made
more inclusive—encompassing not only the emerging powers across the globe, but also the expanding networks and coalitions that
are now deeply embedded in the fabric of the global economy. The new multilateralism must have the capacity to listen and respond
to those new voices. The new multilateralism also needs to be agile, making sure that soft and hard forms of collaboration
complement rather than compete with each other. It needs to promote a long-term perspective and a global mentality, and be
decisive in the short term—to overcome the temptation toward insularity and muddling through. Fundamentally, it needs to instill a
broader sense of social responsibility on the part of all players in the modern global economy. It needs to instill the values of a global
civil market economy—a global “guild hall”, as it were. What might this mean in practice? It clearly means many things, starting with
all global stakeholders taking collective responsibility for managing the complex channels of the hyperconnected world. For a start,
that means a renewed commitment to openness, and to the mutual benefits of trade and foreign investment. It also requires
collective responsibility for managing an international monetary system that has traveled light years since the old Bretton Woods
system. The collective responsibility would translate into all monetary institutions cooperating closely—mindful of the potential
impact of their policies on others. In turn, that means we need a financial system for the 21st century. What do I mean by that? I
mean a financial system that serves the productive economy rather than its own purposes, where jurisdictions only seek their own
advantage provided that the greater global good prevails and with a regulatory structure that is global in reach. I mean financial
oversight that is effective in clamping down on excess while making sure that credit gets to where it is most needed. I also mean a
financial structure in which industry takes co-responsibility for the integrity of the system as a whole, where culture is taken as
seriously as capital, and where the ethos is to serve rather than rule the real economy. This has special resonance right here in the
City of London. As a financial center with global reach, it must be a financial center with global responsibility. And with all due
respect and admiration, that goes beyond hiring a Canadian to head the Bank of England! We also need the new 21st century
multilateralism to get to grips with big ticket items like climate change and inequality. On these issues, no
country can stand alone. Combating climate change will require the concerted resolve of all
stakeholders working together—governments, cities, corporations, civil society, and even private
citizens. Countries also need to come together to address inequality. As but one example, if countries compete for business by
lowering taxes on corporate income, this could make inequality worse. Overall, the kind of 21st century cooperation I am thinking of
will not come easy. It might get even harder as time passes, when the curtains fall on this crisis, when complacency sets in--even as
the seeds of the next crisis perhaps are being planted. Yet given the currents that will dominate the coming
decades, do we really have a choice? A new multilateralism is non-negotiable. Conclusion On that note,
let me end by going back again to the beginning—to Keynes and that famous tryst with destiny. Referring to that great multilateral
moment, he noted that “if we can so continue, this nightmare, in which most of us here present have spent too much of our lives, will
be over. The brotherhood of man will have become more than a phrase.” History proved Keynes right. Our forefathers vanquished
the demons of the past, bequeathing to us a better world—and our generation was the main beneficiary. We are where we are today
because of the foundation laid by the generation before us. Now it is our turn—to pave the way for the next generation. Are we up to
the challenge? Our future depends on the answer to that question. Thank you very much.
Extinction
Sachs 14—Jeffrey, D. is a Professor of Sustainable Development, Professor of Health Policy and
Management, and Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is also Special Adviser
to the United Nations Secretary-General on the Millennium Development Goals “Ukraine and
the Crisis of International Law,” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/jeffrey-d-sachs-sees-in-russia-s-annexation-of-crimea-the-return--with-us-complicity--of-great-powerpolitics
International law itself is at a crossroads . The US, Russia, the EU, and NATO cite it when it
is to their advantage and disregard it when they deem it a nuisance. Again, this is not to justify Russia’s
unacceptable actions; rather, it is to add them to the sequence of actions contrary to international law.
The same problems may soon spill over into Asia. Until recently, China, Japan, and
others in Asia
have staunchly defended the requirement that the Security Council approve any outside military
intervention in sovereign states. Recently, however, several countries in East Asia have become locked in
a spiral of claims and counterclaims regarding borders, shipping lanes, and territorial rights. So far, these
disputes have remained basically peaceful, but tensions are rising . We must hope that the countries of the
region continue to see the great value of international law as a bulwark of sovereignty, and act
accordingly.
There have long been skeptics of international law – those who believe that it can never prevail
over the national interests of major powers, and that maintaining a balance of power among
competitors is all that really can be done to keep the peace. From this perspective, Russia’s actions in the
Crimea are simply the actions of a great power asserting its prerogatives.
Yet such a world is profoundly and unnecessarily dangerous . We have learned time and again
is no such thing as a true “balance of power.” There are always imbalances and
destabilizing power shifts. Without some scaffolding of law, open conflict is all too likely .
This is especially true today, as countries jostle for oil and other vital resources. It is no coincidence
that most of the deadly wars of recent years have taken place in regions rich in valuable and
contested natural resources.
As we look back in this centennial year toward the outbreak of WWI, we see again and again that the only possible
route to safety is international law, upheld by the United Nations and respected on all sides. Yes, it sounds
naive, but no one has to look back to see the naiveté of the belief that great-power politics will
preserve peace and ensure humanity’s survival.
that there
The efficacy of international institutions is robustly documented
Brimmer, 14 [Esther, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs
at the United States Department of State (from April 2009 to June 2013, June 2014, “Smarter
Power Working Paper Series “Smart Power” and Multilateral Diplomacy”,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:fcgzix8nFGYJ:transatlantic.saisjhu.edu/publications/books/Smarter%2520Power/Chapter%25204%2520brimmer.pdf+&cd=1
&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us]
The world in 2014 is fundamentally different from previous periods, growing vastly more
interconnected, interdependent, networked, and complex. National economies are in many cases inextricably intertwined, with crossborder imports and exports increasing nearly tenfold over the past forty years, and more than doubling over just the past decade. At the same time, we
are all connected – and connected immediately – to news and events that in past generations would have been restricted to their local
vicinities. Consider, for example, the 2011 tsunami that devastated parts of Japan. Not only did we know in real time of the earthquake that triggered
the tsunami, we had live coverage of some of the tsunami’s most devastating impacts and then round-the-clock coverage of the Fukushima nuclear
power plant crisis. Communications technology brings such events to us without delay and in high definition. This communications revolution,
headlined by the explosion of social media, carries with it the almost unlimited potential to inform and educate. It also provides people and
communities with new ability to influence and advance their causes – both benevolent and otherwise, as the dramatic events of recent years in North
Africa and the Middle East have made clear. At
the same time, global power is more diffuse today than in centuries.
Although predictions of the nation-state’s demise have gone unrealized, non-state actors –
including NGOs, corporations, and international organizations - are more influential today than perhaps at any point in human
history. The same might be said for transnational criminal networks and other harmful actors. Concurrently, we are
witnessing the rise of new centers of influence – the so-called “emerging” nations – that are seeking and gaining positions of global leadership. These
emerging powers bring unique histories and new perspectives to the discussion of current challenges
and the future of global governance. Several of these countries are democracies and share many of the core values of the United
States; others have sharply different political systems and perspectives. All are gauging how to be more active in the global arena. It is this
new, more diffused global system that must now find means of addressing today’s pressing
global challenges – challenges that in many cases demand Smart Power ingenuity. From terrorism to nuclear
proliferation, climate change to pandemic disease, transnational crime to cyber attacks,
violations of fundamental human rights to natural disasters, today’s most urgent security
challenges pay no heed to state borders. So, just as global power is more diffuse, so too are the opposing threats and challenges,
and it is in this new reality that the United States must define and employ its Smart Power resources. That reality demands a definition that must now
far exceed the origin parameters of hard and soft. Many of these challenges would be unresponsive to traditional Hard tools (coercion, economic
sanctions, military force), while the application of Soft tools (norm advancement, cultural influence, public diplomacy) in customary channels is likely
to provide unsatisfactory impact. Ultimately, the other component necessary in today’s Smart Power alchemy is robust, focused, and sustained
international cooperation. In effect, in an increasing number of instances, Smart
Power must now feature shared
power, and in that context foreign policy choices must follow two related but distinct axes. First, those policy choices must strengthen a state’s
overall stature and influence (rather than diminish it), leaving the state undertaking the action in a position of equal or greater global standing. This is
easier said than done. The
proliferation in challenges facing all states has created a need for multiple,
simultaneous diplomatic transactions among a broadening cast of actors. Given the nature
of today’s threats facing states both large and small, those transactions have never been more
frequent and at times overlapping – a reality that requires new agility and synchronization
within foreign policy hierarchies. States that are less capable of responding to this new reality may experience diminished political
capital and international standing by acting on contemporary threats in isolation or without a full appreciation of the reigning international sentiment.
Many observers have highlighted U.S. decision-making in advance of the 2003 Iraq invasion as indicative of just this phenomenon. Alternatively, states
applying a new Smart Power approach to their foreign policy recognize the overlapping need to maintain global standing and stature while seeking
resolution of individual policy challenges. We see considerable effort on the part of emerging powers to find just that balance, and I would argue that
the United States has also made great strides in that regard since 2009. Second, Smart
Power policy choices must contribute
to the strength and resilience of the international system. As noted above, the globalization of
contemporary challenges and security threats has augmented the need for effective
cooperation among states and other international actors, and placed even greater
demands on the global network of international institutions , conferences, frameworks, and groupings in which
these challenges are more and more frequently addressed. Given this heightened need
for structures to facilitate international collaboration, states are more rarely undertaking
foreign policy courses of action that entirely lack a multilateral component, or that feature no
interaction with or demands upon the international architecture. As recent American history shows, even
states with unilateral tendencies have found themselves returning to the multilateral fold to
address aspects of a threat or challenge that simply cannot be addressed effectively alone. Upon
assuming office, President Obama took bold steps to respond to the new global realities described above, and to reinvigorate U.S. multilateral
diplomacy accordingly. Over
the last four years, it has become increasingly clear that effective
multilateral diplomacy can create the conditions for an international response to
a global challenge or threat that is greater than the sum of its national parts, and that
contributes to the effective resolution of both the instant challenge and future ones. Stemming from the
assessment noted at the outset – that evolution in global threats and devolutions of international clout had fundamentally changed the nature of
contemporary power – the U.S. expanded even upon its traditionally active role within the United Nations, affirming its centrality to U.S. foreign
policy. Indeed, although
action through the United Nations is far from the sole policy tool utilized by
the United States, few U.S. foreign policy challenges – whether primary or secondary in importance – find
themselves advanced without significant action in UN bodies by the United States. Take, for
example, the President’s controversial decision that the United States should seek election to the UN Human Rights Council. That controversy
stemmed from the fact that the Council was only the slightest improvement over its predecessor, the justifiably maligned Human Rights Commission.
The Council was launched with great fanfare, but then quickly reverted to bad habits – protecting despots and serial human rights abusers, and
reserving unique and corrosive attention for one UN member state – Israel. Seeking and winning election in 2009 was a risk for the United States, but
it was a risk rooted in the President’s determination to reinvest in UN bodies that could be improved through vigorous U.S. engagement. That risk has
paid off. Yes,
the Council continues to frustrate on issues related to Israel, and too comfortably
accommodates illegitimate voices on human rights issues. Nonetheless, the ledger is clearly
in the black over the last four years, with dramatic and positive Council action on freedoms of
expression and assembly; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) rights; and persistent focus on violators
of universal human rights worldwide, including in Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, Cote d’Ivoire, Cambodia, Belarus, Sri Lanka,
and Eritrea. We achieved this progress by recognizing and responding to the very realities discussed above. We sought and found common ground
between both our traditional allies and more uncommon partners. We spoke loudly and resolutely, but were willing to speak in chorus with
international voices. This
new approach did not necessarily mean the absence of differences, but it did
mean that over time the United States strengthened its credibility and standing on the Council
and the stature of the Council itself. That, in turn, was apparent in the U.S. re-election to the Council in 2012, an election in which
the United States received the largest number of votes on its regional slate. Take also the example of food security. In the wake of food
price crises in 2007 and 2008, the United States and G8 partner countries recognized the need
for a new kind of collaboration on food issues – collaboration designed to reshape the global
approach to ensuring long-term food security. At the 2009 L’Aquila G8 Summit, action was
taken to improve coordination, support country-owned processes and plans, and strengthen
multilateral institutions to advance existing efforts to promote food security worldwide. That
strengthening effort has included revitalizing FAO’s Committee on Food Security to become more inclusive, more transparent, and more responsive to
enduring needs. In a Smart Power context, this effort means seizing new opportunities to leverage partner nations, encourage engagement by emerging
powers such as Brazil, and bolstering U.S. credibility as the largest supporter of international food relief and agricultural development activities.
Across the international system, the United States is actively and substantively engaged. We mark a
similar effort by other developed and developing nations, as governments begin to come to terms with the new global reality. But, how do we measure
the success or shortcomings of this new Smart Power era? The relative strength and effectiveness of international bodies may be evidence of deepening
member state interest in both. Less measurable, perhaps, will be the relative influence of those nations following this new path and whether that
influence can be sustained. For the United States, the simultaneous application of resources to traditional bilateral interaction will continue. In many
ways, this bilateral capacity provides the United States with an important advantage in international fora. However, gone
are the days
when we can rely solely upon conversations in capitals to protect and promote our global
priorities, just as most countries have little choice but to apply their more limited resources to
collaborative bodies such as the UN. The United States has invested heavily in restoring our stature and influence in the
international system, while concurrently renewing and strengthening our commitment to that system itself. These investments come with
frustrations, setbacks, and false starts. However, they are returning dividends in ways both
obvious and incremental. In the UN General Assembly, that investment has meant building
new coalitions on important resolutions, including highlighting the abysmal human rights
records of Iran, North Korea, and Cuba. It also means revisiting our own voting decisions and, where possible and appropriate,
shaping or joining global consensus. These twin efforts have resulted in a dramatic shift in our voting
coincidence with other countries, diminishing our isolation in the General Assembly and strengthening
coalitions for future action. That coincidence (on voted resolutions) found its low in 2007 (18%), but
has subsequently risen above 50% (2011). This alone is not proof enough of a return on our Smart
Power investment, but is one indicator that such returns warrant the diplomatic investment.
NEW
Contention three is the economy—
State governments are strapped for cash
GAO 12/19/14 (Government Accountability Office, “STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’
FISCAL OUTLOOK 2014 Update,” 12/19/14, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667623.pdf, CJC)
The state and local government sector continues to face fiscal challenges which contribute to the
overall fiscal challenges of the nation as a whole. As shown in figure 1, GAO’s simulations
suggest that the sector could continue to face a gap between revenue and spending during the
next 50 years, and that state and local governments would need to make substantial policy
changes to avoid these fiscal imbalances in the future.1 In recent years, the state and local
government sector has seen an increase in tax receipts following declines during 2008 and into
2009. Specifically, from the second quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2014, total tax
receipts increased 9 percent in real dollars. Income and sales taxes accounted for most of the
growth, increasing 20 percent and 15 percent respectively, in real dollar terms during the same
period. Property tax receipts continued to lag and decreased 5 percent in real dollars from the
second quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2014, as real estate values remained
suppressed. However, during the last year, from the second quarter of 2013 to the second
quarter of 2014, total tax receipts declined 1 percent and income tax receipts declined 8 percent
in real dollars. In the long term, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), our model
suggests that at current rates total tax revenues for the sector would not return to the 2007
historical high until 2058, near the end of our simulation period. A primary driver of the decline
in the sector’s operating balance in the long term is the rising health-related costs of state and
local expenditures on Medicaid and the cost of health care compensation for state and local
government employees and retirees. Since most state and local governments are required to
balance their operating budgets, the declining fiscal conditions indicated by our simulations
continue to suggest that the sector would need to make substantial policy changes to avoid fiscal
imbalances that would likely grow in the future. That is, absent any intervention or policy
changes, state and local governments are facing, and will continue to face, an increasing gap
between receipts and expenditures in the coming years.
this will collapse the US economy
Leachman and Mai 14 (Michael, Director of State Fiscal Research with the State Fiscal Policy
division of the Center, Ph.D. in sociology from Loyola University Chicago, and Chris, Research
Assistant with the State Fiscal Project, Master of Public Policy from the University of Virginia’s
Frank Batten School, 5-20-14, "Most States Funding Schools Less Than Before the Recession"
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities) www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=4011
States’ new budgets are providing less per-pupil funding for kindergarten through 12th grade
than they did six years ago — often far less. The reduced levels reflect not only the lingering
effects of the 2007-09 recession but also continued austerity in many states; indeed,
despite some improvements in overall state revenues, schools in around a third of states are
entering the new school year with less state funding than they had last year. At a time when
states and the nation are trying to produce workers with the skills to master new technologies
and adapt to the complexities of a global economy, this decline in state educational investment
is cause for concern. Our review of state budget documents finds that: At least 35 states
are providing less funding per student for the 2013-14 school year than they did before the
recession hit. Fourteen of these states have cut per-student funding by more than 10
percent. (These figures, like all the comparisons in this paper, are in inflation-adjusted dollars
and focus on the primary form of state aid to local schools.) At least 15 states are providing less
funding per student to local school districts in the new school year than they provided a year
ago. This is despite the fact that most states are experiencing modest increases in tax revenues.
Where funding has increased, it has generally not increased enough to make up for cuts in past
years. For example, New Mexico is increasing school funding by $72 per pupil this year. But that
is too small to offset the state’s $946 per-pupil cut over the previous five years. Restoring school
funding should be an urgent priority. The steep state-level K-12 spending cuts of the last
several years have serious consequences for the nation. State-level K-12 cuts have large
consequences for local school districts. Some 44 percent of total education spending in the
United States comes from state funds (the share varies by state).[2] Cuts at the state level mean
that local school districts have to either scale back the educational services they provide, raise
more local tax revenue to cover the gap, or both. Local school districts typically have little ability
to replace lost state aid on their own. Given the still-weak state of many of the nation’s real
estate markets, many school districts struggle to raise more money from the property tax
without raising rates, and rate increases are often politically very difficult. Localities collected
2.1 percent less in property tax revenue in the 12-month period ending in March 2013 than in
the previous year, after adjusting for inflation.[3] The cuts deepened the recession and have
slowed the economy’s recovery. Federal employment data show that school districts began
reducing the overall number of teachers and other employees in July 2008, when the first round
of budget cuts began taking effect. As of August 2013, local school districts had cut a total of
324,000 jobs since 2008.[4] These job losses have reduced the purchasing power of workers’
families, in turn reducing overall economic consumption, and thus deepened the recession
and slowed the pace of recovery. The cuts undermine education reform and hinder school
districts’ ability to deliver high-quality education, with long-term negative consequences for the
nation’s economic competitiveness. Many states and school districts have undertaken important
school reform initiatives to prepare children better for the future, but deep funding cuts hamper
their ability to implement many of these reforms. At a time when producing workers with highlevel technical and analytical skills is increasingly important to a country’s prosperity, large cuts
in funding for basic education threaten to undermine the nation’s economic future.
Plan revives budgets and creates external economic benefits via innovation
Smith 11/6/14 (S.E., “How legalizing marijuana could save America's economy”,
http://www.dailydot.com/opinion/marijuana-legalization-economic-argument/, dml)
***we don’t agree with gendered language
Legalizing marijuana on a federal level would provide economic benefits for the United
States in the billions, precisely at a time when the federal economy needs a major boost. It’s
not just the feds, however, who would benefit; legalization would provide top-down economic improvements
in local communities, state coffers, and more. In addition to bringing in funds, it would save regional and
state governments substantial sums in currently wasted law enforcement dollars.
For a country obsessed with free market capitalism and government spending, the United States has been slow to act on repealing marijuana prohibition, thanks to the tangled associations between marijuana and
morality. In a nation where substances like tobacco and alcohol remain legal, highly regulated, and highly profitable, it’s surprising to see marijuana still tarred in stigma—especially when Clinton, Bush, and
Obama have all admitted to having a toke (whether they inhaled or not).
On Tuesday, Washington D.C. approved legalization (this pends Congressional approval), joined by Oregon and Alaska. Florida narrowly defeated another legalization measure, hampered only by the majority
needed to make a constitutional amendment. Washington and Colorado had already fully legalized the drug, and numerous other states either have medical use or decriminalization statutes on the books.
(California’s 215 is probably the most famous, as the state was and remains an early leader in marijuana policy reform.)
In a 1970 essay for the New York Times, Gore Vidal spoke to a previous era of prohibition in U.S. history, cautioning the reader to avoid repeating the lessons of the past. Vidal wrote, "No one in Washington today
recalls what happened during the years alcohol was forbidden to the people by a Congress that thought it had a divine mission to stamp out Demon Rum and so launched the greatest crime wave in the country's
history, caused thousands of deaths from bad alcohol, and created a general (and persisting) contempt for the laws of the United States."
44 years later, the editorial board of the same publication was calling for full legalization. “It has been more than 40 years since Congress passed the current ban on marijuana, inflicting great harm on society just
to prohibit a substance far less dangerous than alcohol,” the editors wrote, going on to debunk many of the social arguments against legalization and making a compelling case for ending prohibition. One factor
the editorial didn’t address in detail, however, was the economic reasoning for allowing marijuana to be sold freely in the U.S.
The most obvious economic aspect of the case for legalization lies in tax revenues. Average annual trade
in marijuana is estimated at $113 billion, which represents nearly $45 billion in taxes
slipping through our fingers, according to Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron. Without being able to
regulate and monitor the sale of marijuana, tax authorities miss out on municipal, state, and federal
taxes that could fund a broad assortment of initiatives—including, of course, assistance
programs for drug users, a measure supported in lieu of incarceration by over two thirds of Americans.
Given the large volume of marijuana trafficked in the U.S. annually, these gains could be quite
significant. While some argue that legalization will cause prices to drop, this could be offset by
a predicted increase in consumption (though some argue against this claim). This offset may not be viewed positively
by all, but one of the cornerstones of freedom, after all, is the freedom to make personal decisions about what you put in your body
and when. With legalization, those who choose to consume marijuana and byproducts like edible and tincture of cannabis would at
least be assured regulated, safe products.
Taking marijuana out of the black market and into the public light also provides clear savings for the
government on top of net tax gains. The drug war costs the U.S. government a tremendous amount annually,
and while this failing initiative covers a range of Schedule I drugs (including not just marijuana but cocaine, heroin, and meth),
spending would certainly decline without marijuana in the picture. Instead of wasting $1
trillion dollars on direct law enforcement initiatives yearly to investigate suspected growers, traffickers, and
dealers, the government could focus on more pressing initiatives.
Legalization would also cut prison spending, rather dramatically. An estimated one in four people are
in prison solely because of non-violent drug offenses, including possession, sales, and repeat offenses related
to marijuana. Notably, marijuana-related arrests make up a significant percentage of law
enforcement actions involving drugs. The vast majority of these individuals are black and Latino, reflecting racial
imbalances in the justice system—people of color are more likely to be profiled, more likely to be caught, and less likely to be able to
bring an adequate defense to court. This combination of factors leads to gross overrepresentation of members of these communities
in prisons and jails across the nation.
Cutting down on the number of men imprisoned for drug-related offenses also has indirect economic
benefits, by keeping men in their own communities, an issue that was recognized as early as 1988. Systemic poverty can
be directly linked to fractured communities, such as those that have been torn apart by the drug war. Allowing
men to remain with their families, economically participate in their communities, and
contribute to society boosts not only their own economic chances and those of their families, but
the community as a whole. Opening the prison doors would be a good start to solving the thorny
problem of entrenched poverty among communities of color in the United States—and it’s worth noting that poor
communities are themselves an economic drain, requiring more government support and a
stronger safety net because they are unable to support themselves.
On a more local economic level, legalization will create a ripple effect through tangentially related
industries. With the legalization of a crop that requires cultivation, farmers, farmworkers, fertilizer firms,
and other manufacturers of agricultural products all stand to benefit—and thanks to the widespread
adoption of indoor growing in the marijuana industry, sales of supplies specific to that method of cultivation should also soar.
Additionally, given the large power demands associated with indoor growing, it’s possible that the likely boom in
marijuana cultivation
could also stimulate the alternative energy industry—especially as consumers
pushed for organic and ethically produced marijuana.
Furthermore, more open cultivation means a reduction in illegal farming, fertilizer pollution, and
related problems, which is intrinsically better for the environment, while also saving environmental agencies
money along the way. Without the need to send evaluation and cleanup crews for grow operations,
such agencies can allocate their funds more productively .
Likewise, trucking, rail, and other transit firms stand to benefit, as the drug has to
transported after processing, even if just regionally. Parent firms, drivers, and manufacturers of
handling equipment would all be feeling the expansive new marijuana economy, and reinvesting
the proceedings into expanding operations. For labor unions, this could indirectly provide an
opportunity to reopen negotiations over pay, working hours, and benefits, which would stimulate further
localized economic growth.
Packaging, retail, and processing industries also stand to benefit from legalization, as do testing
labs and certification facilities. In a nation where the drug is legalized but regulated, samples need to be
routinely tested and certified, which requires experienced drug scientists to monitor the quality and
integrity of the drug supply. This holds double for processed marijuana products like tinctures and marijuana
food products, which would need to be evaluated by both the FDA and the FTC—the latter would be interested in truth in advertising
and labeling claims. That
translates to job growth in a variety of high-skilled sectors.
Nuclear war
Lieberthal and O’Hanlon 12 - *Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings AND Director of Research and Senior
Fellow Foreign Policy (Kenneth and Michael, “The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, The Brookings Institute,
7/10,http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon) EL
Lastly, American
economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our
weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the
case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect
their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear
weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing
around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely
become less stable. Major war will become more likely.
Innovation solves extinction
Brent Barker 2k, electrical engineer, and manager of corporate communications for the
Electric Power Research Institute and former industrial economist and staff author at SRI
International and as a commercial research analyst at USX Corporation, “Technology and the
Quest for Sustainability.” EPRI Journal, Summer, infotrac
accelerating productivity is
an imperative
to provide the
wealth for environmental sustainability
and to provide an economic
ladder for developing nations
opportunity for technology lies in its potential to help
stabilize global population
The key is economics. Global
communications
have brought an image of the comfortable life of the developed
world into the homes of the poorest people, firing their own aspirations for a better quality of
life, through economic development
If we
can make the
prosperity
--more accessible and affordable
the cultural drivers for
producing large families will be tempered,
quickly
From a social standpoint,
not an option but rather
for the future. It is necessary in order
, to support an aging population in the industrialized world,
. The second area of
at 10-12 billion sometime in the twenty-first century, possibly as early as 2075.
, from television to movies to the Internet,
either
in their own country or through emigration to other countries.
--infrastructure, health care, education, and law
in the developed world
basic tools of
, recent history suggests that
relatively
and without coercion. But the task is enormous. The physical prerequisites for prosperity in the global economy are
electricity and communications. Today, there are more than 2 billion people living without electricity, or commercial energy in any form, in the very countries where some 5 billion people will be added in the next 50 years. If for no other reason than our enlightened
self-interest, we should strive for universal access to electricity, communications, and educational opportunity. We have little choice, because the fate of the developed world is inextricably bound up in the economic and demographic fate of the developing world. A
opportunity for technology is in decoupling population growth from land use and
decoupling economic growth from natural resource consumption through recycling, end-use
efficiency, and industrial ecology.
third, related
, more broadly,
Decoupling population from land use is well under way. According to Grubler, from 1700 to 1850 nearly 2 hectares of land (5 acres) were needed to support every child born
in North America, while in the more crowded and cultivated regions of Europe and Asia only 0.5 hectare (1.2 acres) and 0.2 hectare (0.5 acre) were needed, respectively. During the past century, the amount of land needed per additional child has been dropping in all
Europe and North America
crossed the "zero threshold"
meaning that no additional land is needed to support additional children and that land
requirements will continue to decrease
the pattern of returning land to nature will
continue to spread throughout the world, eventually stemming and then reversing the current
onslaught on the rain forests. Time is critical if vast tracts are to be saved
and success
will depend on how rapidly economic opportunities expand for those now trapped in
subsistence and frontier farming
areas of the world, with
experiencing the fastest decreases. Both
in the past few decades,
in the future. One can postulate that
great
from being laid bare,
largely
. In concept, the potential for returning land to nature is enormous. Futurist and scholar Jesse Ausubel of the Rockefeller University calculates that if farmers could lift average
grain yields around the world just to the level of today's average U.S. corn grower, one-half of current global cropland--an area the size of the Amazon basin--could be spared. If agriculture is a leading indicator, then the continuous drive to produce more from less
with shrinking agricultural land requirements, water distribution and use
around the world can be greatly altered
will prevail in other parts of the economy Certainly
, since nearly two-thirds of water now goes for irrigation. Overall, the technologies of the future will, in the words of Ausubel, be "cleaner, leaner, lighter, and
drier"--that is, more efficient and less wasteful of materials and water. They will be much more tightly integrated through microprocessor-based control and will therefore use human and natural resources much more efficiently and productively. Energy intensity,
land intensity, and water intensity (and, to a lesser extent, materials intensity) for both manufacturing and agriculture are already heading downward. Only in agriculture are they falling fast enough to offset the surge in population, but, optimistically, advances in
science and technology should accelerate the downward trends in other sectors, helping to decouple economic development from environmental impact in the coming century. One positive sign is the fact that recycling rates in North America are now approaching
65% for steel, lead, and copper and 30% for aluminum and paper. A second sign is that economic output is shifting away from resource-intensive products toward knowledge-based, immaterial goods and services. As a result, although the U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP) increased 200-fold (in real dollars) in the twentieth century, the physical weight of our annual output remains the same as it was in 1900. If anything, this trend will be accelerating. As Kevin Kelly, the editor of Wired magazine, noted, "The creations most in
demand from the United States [as exports] have lost 50% of their physical weight per dollar of value in only six years.... Within a generation, two at most, the number of people working in honest-to-goodness manufacturing jobs will be no more than the number of
farmers on the land--less than a few percent. Far more than we realize, the network economy is pulling us all in."
from population and economic growth
Even pollution shows clear signs of being decoupled
. Economist Paul Portney notes that, with the exception of greenhouse gases, "in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]
countries, the favorable experience [with pollution control] has been a triumph of technology That is, the ratio of pollution per unit of GDP has fallen fast enough in the developed world to offset the increase in both GDP per capita and the growing number of 'capitas'
themselves." The fourth opportunity for science and technology stems from their enormous potential to unlock resources not now available, to reduce human limitations, to create new options for policymakers and businesspeople alike, and to give us new levels of
insight into future challenges. Technically resources have little value if we cannot unlock them for practical use. With technology, we are able to bring dormant resources to life. For example, it was only with the development of an electrolytic process late in the
nineteenth century that aluminum--the most abundant metal on earth--became commercially available and useful. Chemistry unlocked hydrocarbons. And engineering allowed us to extract and put to diverse use untapped petroleum and gas fields. Over the course
of history, technology has made the inaccessible accessible, and resource depletion has been more of a catalyst for change than a longstanding problem. Technology provides us with last-ditch methods (what economists would call substitutions) that allow us to
circumvent or leapfrog over crises of our own making. Agricultural technology solved the food crisis of the first half of the nineteenth century. The English "steam crisis" of the 1860s, triggered by the rapid rise of coal-burning steam engines and locomotives, was
averted by mechanized mining and the discovery and use of petroleum. The U.S. "timber crisis" that Teddy Roosevelt publicly worried about was circumvented by the use of chemicals that enabled a billion or so railroad ties to last for decades instead of years. The
great "manure crisis" of the same era was solved by the automobile, which in a few decades replaced some 25 million horses and freed up 40 million hectares (100 million acres) of farmland, not to mention improving th e sanitation and smell of inner cities. Oil
discoveries in Texas and then in the Middle East pushed the pending oil crisis of the 1920s into the future. And the energy crisis of the 1970s stimulated the development of new sensing and drilling technology, sparked the advance of non--fossil fuel alternatives, and
deepened the penetration of electricity with its fuel flexibility into the global economy Thanks to underground imaging technology, today's known gas resources are an order of magnitude greater than the resources known 20 years ago, and new reserves continue to
be discovered. Technology has also greatly extended human limits. It has given each of us a productive capability greater than that of 150 workers in 1800, for example, and has conveniently pu t the power of hundreds of horses in our garages. In recent decades, it has
But global sustainability is not
inevitable
there is the potential for all of this to backfire before
the job can be done.
people sometimes turn in fear
on technologies,
that openly foster an ever-faster pace of change
extended our voice and our reach, allowing us to easily send our words, ideas, images, and money around the world at the speed of light.
. In spite of the tremendous promise that technology holds for a sustainable future,
There are disturbing indications that
and anger
industries, and institutions
. The current opposition to nuclear power genetically altered food, the globalization of the economy and the spread of American culture
should give us pause. Technology has always presented a two-edged sword, serving as both cause and effect, solving one problem while creating another that was unintended and often unforeseen. We solved the manure crisis, but automotive smog, congestion, and
urban sprawl took its place. We cleaned and transformed the cities with all-electric buildings rising thousands of feet into the sky. But while urban pollution was thereby dramatically reduced, a portion of the pollution was shifted to someone else's sky. Breaking
limits "Limits to growth" was a popular theme in the 1970s, and a best-selling book of that name predicted dire consequences for the human race by the end of the century. In fact, we have done much better than those predictions, largely because of a factor the book
missed--the potential of new technology to break limits. Repeatedly, human societies have approached seemingly insurmountable barriers only to find the means and tools to break through. This ability has now become a source of optimism, an article of faith, in
Today's perceived limits
are global in nature
and larger in scale and
complexity than ever before. Nearly 2 billion people in the world are without adequate
sanitation, and nearly as many are without access to clean drinking water. AIDS is spreading
rapidly
Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are
climbing steadily. Petroleum reserves
may last only another 50
years
the biodiversity of the planet could become as threatened in this coming
century as it was at the end of the last ice age, when more than 70% of the species
disappeared
All these perceived limits require innovation of a scope
and intensity surpassing humankind's current commitment. The list of real-world
problems that could thwart global sustainability
includes war, disease, famine, political
and religious turmoil, despotism, entrenched poverty, illiteracy, resource depletion, and
environmental degradation
We
should put our technology to work, striving to lift more than 5 billion people out of poverty while
preventing irreversible damage to the biosphere and irreversible loss of the earth's natural
resources.
many parts of the world.
, however, look and feel different. They
, multicultural,
in the regions of the world least able to fight it.
more than 30% greater than preindustrial levels
and are
, expected to be tapped by over a billion automobiles worldwide by 2015,
-100
. And without careful preservation efforts,
of large mammals and other vertebrates
in North America
(along with 29% in Europe and 86% in Australia).
is long and sobering. It
. Technology can help resolve some of these issues--poverty and disease, resource depletion, and environmental impact, for example--but it offers little recourse for the passions and politics
that divide the world. The likelihood is that we will not catch up and overtake the moving target of global sustainability in the coming century, but given the prospects for technology, which have never been brighter, we may come surprisingly close.
2AC
TREATY CP
Delay
Alex Wodak 3, Director of the Alcohol and Drug Service at St. Vincent’s Hospital, Australia,
“The international drug treaties: ‘paper tigers’ or dangerous behemoths?,” International Journal
of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 221/223
Where is the rationale to devote scarce resources to reforming the international treaties when
they seem to be merely 'paper tigers'? At a time of unprecedented¶ global threat from HIV/AIDS, all available
resources¶ should be devoted to controlling HIV infection includ-¶ ing among and from injecting drug users. Revising
international treaties is never an easy or quick activity, even if there is overwhelming
support for revision. Does the tiny international drug law reform fraternity have the resources
and the slaying power to see this battle through to the end? Few now defend the treaties as an
important part of the architecture of international arrangements. The treaties are likely to
become increas-ingly irrelevant. At some time in the future, the¶ international community will inevitably feel
compelled¶ to revise these treaties when the chasm between de facto¶ and de jure policies becomes indefensible.¶ Those
convinced that drug law reform is a high priority would do well to learn from the Serenity Prayer
of Alcoholics Anonymous, ensuring that they have the wisdom to know the difference between
what can and cannot be changed while maintaining the courage to¶ change what can be changed and the serenity
lo accept¶ what cannot be changed. Experience has shown that in¶ an increasing number of countries, HIV/AIDS can be¶ readily
controlled: in other countries the costs to future¶ generations of failing to control HIV/AIDS are incon-ceivable. The
international drug treaties delay the inevitability of reform but do little else . Reforming
international treaties, even when support for change is widespread, is often the making of a
costly and protracted quagmire . It is important to remember that the obstacles to drug law
reform are political, not legal.
Countries say no to the CP, but not the AFF
Godfrey, 14 [Will, Editor-in-Chief of Substance.com, former Editor-in-Chief of The Fix,
7/16/14, “Will the US Start to Use Its Power Over World Drug Laws for Good?,”
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/substancecom/will-the-us-start-to-use-_b_5588726.html]
Still, we
shouldn't expect global prohibition just to vanish. A lot of powerful interests are
examining the current momentum of the movement for change, Trace said, in order to identify "a
stopping point -- the next equilibrium." Blocs of countries with growing diplomatic influence, he
added, including China and Russia , "will not allow any liberalization of the drug treaties." In which
case, national drug-law changes are more likely to be justified by flexible re-interpretations of the
current international treaties -- based on those highly open-to-interpretation constitutional and public health-based optouts. Uruguay has taken this path, and other Latin American countries, already engaged in high-level drug policy debates based on
their desire to reduce violence, are likely to follow. As
soon as domestic US politics allow leaders to
conclude, confidently, that the War on Drugs is no longer a vote-winner , said Trace, US
power will begin transforming the international scene more rapidly.
PRODUCTION PIC
Kills the economy
Reiman & Balogh, 14 [California policy manager for the Drug Policy Alliance & Member
Board of Directors @ Emerald Growers Association, Dr. Amanda Reiman, PhD in Social Welfare
from UC-Berkeley) & Tomas Balogh, “Shop Local, Buy Local: Why Small Farming Is the Future
of American Cannabis Policy,”]
Cannabis legalization is moving from "if" to "when", which brings up a variety of questions and issues never broached in a public forum under prohibition. As regulations emerge around the production, manufacturing, packaging and distribution of canna bis in both
many of the considerations for cannabis
regulations are already a large part of our societal discourse
most obvious is the relationship
between cannabis cultivation and the ever growing tension between small farmers and
"Big Agriculture"
Canada
recently made it
illegal for
small farmers to grow cannabis
they created a complex, capitalintensive regulatory framework that only allows large-scale corporate producers to operate
legally
Creating a regulatory framework that only supports a few large corporations hurts the
U.S. economy as a whole by stifling small business
within the cannabis industry
medical and commercial environments, we are suddenly recognizing that these debates are not new, nor are they unique to the cannabis industry. In fact,
. Perhaps
. A May 24, 2014 article [3] in the New York Times titled When Cannabis Goes Corporate discusses how, in
individual patients and
medical
, the federal government
. Subsequently,
. All of this in an attempt to rein in what was referred to as a "free-for-all" of thousands of smaller producers scattered across the county. Why should Americans care about this and what does it mean for the broader issue of crop production here at
home? Economics.
and innovation
.
Competition makes industries stronger. By creating a new paradigm that avoids competition Canada has done the country, the industry, and the consumer a disservice. When competition is limited, ultimately it's the consumer that loses when they're offered less
choice, and higher prices. Second, while
laws limiting competition are
often justified by arguing that they are "increasing public safety" or "reducing chaos" they are really just the product of a lobbying effort on the
part of the big firms. They want a market advantage written into law so they can stop hiring new talent, stop innovating, and stop fighting to win customers by shutting down their competition. Economists refer to this as "rent seeking" [4] and while exact numbers
are one of the biggest drags on the US economy
Oligopolies serve to protect and benefit the rich. With the burgeoning cannabis industry
we have an opportunity to start off on a different foot and we should take full advantage of that
doing so will help
the US economy by creating future opportunities for
small
farmers
The corporatization of the cannabis industry ignores the decades of
wisdom and expertise that small farmers have accumulated and follows the
"monoculture" model of farming the practice of growing a single crop or plant species in
the same space year after year and using large amounts of unhealthy pesticides and fertilizers
This is the basis of large-scale farm corporations that have been trying to control our food
sources for decades
people are beginning to care more about how products
they consume are produced and environmental stewardship is becoming paramount
monoculture is being foregone in favor of the healthier and more
environmentally supportive system of polyculture
director of
IFAD
recently stated "Small
farmers hold a massive collective store of experience and local knowledge that can
provide the practical solutions needed to put agriculture on a more sustainable and
equitable footing
polyculture has been practiced for the majority of human
history with great success and America's small-scale farmers are the people best equipped to
carry on this tradition
are virtually impossible to estimate, most economists agree that laws like this
and one of the most important factors increasing
economic inequality.
. In
, we
the consumer and
tomorrow's
. Sustainability and Public Health.
[5]
, that is,
.
. We are currently moving forward into an era where
where
due to things
like global climate change. Due to this fact
[6] (a farming practice that imitates the diversity of natural ecosystems, thus, minimizing the need for pesticide and fertilizer
use). Elwyn Grainger Jones,
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (
), a specialized agency of the United Nations,
[7],
". Far from being an aberration or temporary fad,
.
Perm do the CP ‘nearly all’ is all, but with the possibility of an extraordinary
exception
Federal Register, 1 (DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Office of the Secretary 29 CFR Part 4 RIN
1215-AB26, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-01-18/html/01-1337.htm)
The AFL-CIO noted that this
criterion is designed to ensure that all contractors compete on an equal basis. The AFL-CIO
requires that all or ''nearly all'' of the
offerors meet the requirements of the other criteria. The AFL-CIO suggests that this standard be changed to require that
questions whether the criterion accomplishes this goal since it only
all offerors meet the requirements.
The Department's intention is that a contracting officer would not make this determination unless he or she has a high
degree of confidence that all offerors will meet the requirements. It is unlikely that any contracting officer would
feel able to determine absolutely that every offeror will qualify for the exemption. The
''or nearly all'' language therefore
would permit the extraordinary situation where one bidder might not qualify as exempt.
Returning to the automotive maintenance example described previously, an employer with a single employee and a relatively small
number of commercial customers could bid on the contract to maintain on average a few vehicles a month. With that small volume
of government work, the workforce for ``nearly all'' prospective contractors would spend less than 20 percent of their time working
on the contract. The single employee working for a company with relatively few commercial accounts, however, might spend more
than 20 percent of his or her time performing work on the contract. While this company's offer might be rejected for other reasons
(e.g., the contract might require a capacity to service more than one vehicle at a time--a capacity that the two-person shop might not
possess), the fact that one non-exempt contractor might bid on the contract should not negate the application of the exemption to
everyone else. The Department believes that retaining some amount of flexibility in this regard is appropriate, and the criterion is
retained.
''nearly all'' does not mean most or a majority . The
words ''nearly all'' are intended to recognize the possibility of exceptional circumstances
where an individual offeror might not meet all of the criteria. If this offeror receives the contract, of course,
The Department would like to emphasize that
the contract would be subject to SCA prevailing wage requirements. On the other hand, the Department realizes that there may be
circumstances where, once bids are received, the contracting officer determines that he or she was incorrect in the determination
that all or nearly all bidders would meet the exemption requirements. The regulation has therefore been revised to provide that in
such circumstances SCA will apply to the procurement.
Existence in the CSA sends mixed signals
Gettman, 14 [4/19/14, Jon, Ph.D. in public policy, teaching undergraduate criminal justice and
graduate level management courses., “Remove Marijuana from the Controlled Substances Act”
http://www.hightimes.com/read/remove-marijuana-controlled-substances-act]
Marijuana does not belong in the Controlled Substances Act. Any scheduling of
marijuana in the Controlled Substances Act is a threat to
state
laws
medical marijuana use and
medical marijuana
. Rescheduling is an
obsolete remedy, once long overdue but now its only value would be to provide a pretext to roll back or eliminate the advances brought about by state level reform. The CSA is intended to regulate pharmaceutical products, manufactured by corporations, and
provided to patients according to prescriptions issued by doctors. Marijuana is not a pharmaceutical product, it is grown not manufactured, and no doctor in the United States can write a prescription for a substance that remains unapproved by the Food and Drug
Administration. State medical marijuana laws challenge the premise that marijuana should be subject to this federal regulatory framework. State medical marijuana law are part of a process, governed by the principles of federalism, to develop alternative regulatory
approaches that better serve the needs of patients and caregivers. Rescheduling is advanced today as a means of expediting research on medical marijuana that would provide the means to successfully challenge the DEA’s opposition to recognizing the therapeutic
If
Congress is willing and able to pass a law providing protection for state programs and medical
cannabis users, then why not just remove marijuana from the CSA and
benefits of cannabis. Some also hope the provisions of any bill passed by Congress to change marijuana’s placement in the CSA would include protections for state medical marijuana programs and patients. This poses an obvious question.
provide such protections?
Also, as a related but perhaps separate matter, if Congress is willing and able to pass a law to expedite research on the medical use of cannabis, why not
establish appropriate regulations outside the framework of the Controlled Substances Act? The reader may have noticed that th is discussion has not included any explanation of the differences in the various schedules of the CSA and how placement in one schedule
or another would affect research or medical availability. This is because it doesn’t matter. A different schedule for marijuana would make research easier, but Congress could accomplish that with specific legislation. As long as marijuana is subject to the CSA, there
There was a time when the symbolic
ramifications of rescheduling would have helped to advance reform of the nation’s marijuana
laws. That time is past. Passage of state-level medical marijuana laws has accomplished that,
and much more – they have provided legitimacy, access and legal protections At the federal level
it is time for substantive changes in federal law and policy, not symbolism, nor
will be no legal medical use under federal law until there is FDA approval of corporate, patented, pharmaceutical cannabis products.
.
half-measures, nor tinkering around with the CSA to provide the appearance
of action without providing any significant relief for patients Imagine the following scenario.
.
Marijuana is rescheduled and the DEA then aggressively attempts to make all medical
marijuana access in the US subject to the regulatory restrictions established by the CSA. Access
to marijuana
is reduced and made much more complicated as tighter controls are
enacted
medical
under state programs
. Within a few years Sativex, a cannabis pharmaceutical product, will be approved for sale in the US by the Food and Drug Administration. The DEA will pr obably make it a Schedule III substance, like Marinol (the THC pill) or maybe even
something less restrictive. The DEA will then argue that while access to medical marijuana may have been necessary in years past, this new pharmaceutical product has rendered medical marijuana obsolete. Is this the Obama Administration’s plan? Maybe, but
However, Obama will only be in office until 2016. What then? Who knows? What we do
know is that the CSA is not a practical regulatory framework for medical cannabis and that it
can be used to roll back
cannabis access. Right now, everybody involved in
medical cannabis distribution can be indicted under federal law if not now under this Attorney
General then later under another one. Rescheduling marijuana once had potential to advance
marijuana law reform. It no longer does
It’s time to change
probably not.
or eliminate medical
,
. State level reform has changed the playing field in significant and profound ways.
This means
removing marijuana from the Controlled Substances Act
federal law to address the legitimate needs of patients in every state.
and federal passage of a new
piece of legislation granting every American access to marijuana in a legal regulated market.
CEAS
CEAs don’t resolve the underlying uncertainty
Kleiman, 13 – professor at UCLA (Mark, “MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: ARE THERE
ALTERNATIVES TO STATE-FEDERAL CONFLICT?” 4/15,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/4/15marijuana/20130415_marijuana_federalism_transcript.pdf)
And it’s
not fully clear to me that simply entering into a cooperative enforcement agreement is going
to solve the problem unless the states are prepared to do what their voters were promised they wouldn’t have to do. One of the
premises of these legalization issues was let’s take law enforcement resources out of the cannabis sector and start enforcing the laws
we really care about. But it seems to me, at least in the first few years, it’s going to require more law enforcement to
support a taxed and regulated market in the face of untaxed and unregulated threats to it, then it’s
taken up till now. And whether the states will actually enter into that agreement seems to me an interesting question. Whether they
have the capacity to keep it given -- it’s true that most law enforcement is federal -- I’m sorry, state and local rather than federal, but
most state and local law enforcement is very distinctly local. It’s not obvious to me that the Washington State Police, even if they
wanted to, could shut down what goes on. So if a cooperative enforcement agreement were entered into, and I
think it’s a serious idea, it’d
still be somewhat unsatisfactory because it would leave people doing what’s
legal under state law committing felonies under federal law . And there could be a
published policy that that particular federal felony is a low enforcement priority, but that’s not
a legal defense . MR. RAUCH: Is there a better approach? What’s your first choice? MR. KLEIMAN: Well, the first choice
might be to legalize the substance nationally. I don’t think the country’s ready for that, but if I had to guess, I’ve been predicting for a
couple of years now that we’d have full national cannabis legalization sometime in Hillary Clinton’s second term. (Laughter) And
that still seems to me like about the right guess. Not plausible now. An alternative, again, I think not plausible now, but the right
thing to do now, would be to have statutory authority not merely to enter into a cooperative
enforcement agreement, but to actually legalize at the federal level what’s done under state law for
a state which has presented to the federal government a plan for how it’s going to keep its cannabis in state rather than becoming a
national supplier. So this would be the cannabis equivalent of the welfare reform waiver policy. MR. RAUCH: And why is that
better than doing it through a contract between the AG and the states? MR. KLEIMAN: Because then
the grower and the seller would be legal rather than merely hoping they didn’t get busted.
MR. RAUCH: So you have a clear, safe harbor, which gives you a stronger incentive to stay in the legal market and
out of the gray market . MR. KLEIMAN: And then the bank that you want to deposit your money
in wouldn’t have to worry about whether its teller was going to get a 20- year sentence for
violating the money laundering laws.
Certainty is a game of margins
Kamin, 12 [Sam, Professor of Law and Director of the Constitutional Rights & Remedies
Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, , 89 Denv. U.L. Rev. 977, “MARIJUANA
AT THE CROSSROADS”, p. lexis]
the biggest problem we have with the status quo is the Sword of Damocles hanging over the
industry: namely that the production and sale of marijuana remain a serious felony offense
under federal law. The volume of marijuana that is grown and sold in Colorado's larger dispensaries is the sort of drug manufacture and distribution that can earn
people something tantamount to a lifetime sentence under federal law. n24 And while it is unlikely that any marijuana dispensary
owner in compliance with state law is going to federal prison any time soon, the fact remains that medical
marijuana is an industry built entirely on conduct that the federal government continues
to prohibit. So on the one hand, things are perfectly sustainable. The industry is regulated, patients can get their medicines, the state gets its tax revenue and
But
counties that object strenuously to the presence of dispensaries can exclude them. Everything is ok except that every sale in every dispensary is a violation of federal law. For
those of you who remember the movie Pulp Fiction, it's as John Travolta said to Samuel L. Jackson when describing the hash bars in Amsterdam, "Well they're legal but they
"Not 100 percent legal" is a particularly uncertain base
on which to found a multi-million dollar industry. And it is important to remember in this
aren't 100 percent legal."
context that
the vanishingly small risk of being sent to a federal penitentiary is not the only-or even
the principal-influence that continuing federal prohibition has on the nascent marijuana
industry. Given that every marijuana transaction in this industry is a federal crime, it is often hard for those in the industry to
convince banks to do business with them. It is hard to get investors to put their money into a
business that could be seized at any moment by the federal government. It is hard to get a lease
when your landlord can evict you at any time because your business is one that violates federal
law. It is hard to form any contractual relationship when any contract involving the sale of
marijuana is almost certainly void because it constitutes a violation of federal law. n25 Thus,
so much of predictability that we sought to achieve through our regulatory regime is lost
because of this strong disagreement between state and federal policy at this point. Continued [*986]
federal prohibition means that no state government has the power to create legal
certainty on its own. Furthermore, patients do not know where they stand either. We heard a heartbreaking story at the conference from a member of the
audience who said that she was trying to convince her mother to get a marijuana patient card to help her ease the pain of a broken hip. She told us that her mother was in terrible
pain but that she was more afraid of going to prison. And the panel, to a person, said please tell your grandmother that no U.S. Attorney in the country wants to put her in
would-be patients are aware of the conflict between state and federal law and are
chilled by the prospect of federal law enforcement-however remote it may be. However, patients'
concerns, like those of dispensary owners, are not limited to the fear of going to prison. Many are concerned that they will lose their kids,
or their public housing, or other government benefits if they test positive for marijuana, or if they are found out as
marijuana users. And this fear may be much more realistic. Many jobs do prohibit you from taking a controlled substance,
or from violating any state or federal law. The provision of public housing is often premised on an agreement not to use drugs, or not to have them on the
prison, and that is almost certainly right. What it highlights, however, is that
premises. A patient shown to use marijuana or to have it in the home might be less likely to be awarded custody in a divorce proceeding. So even patients who are not worried
those providing
services to the industry, whether they're doctors, lawyers, bankers or landlords, do not know where they stand either. For example,
about going to prison have concerns that their other settled expectations will be lost if they use marijuana as medicine. Furthermore,
lawyers have a professional obligation not to knowingly encourage or knowingly assist in the commission of a crime. n26 Obviously, this does not prohibit an attorney from
informing her client about the interaction between state and federal law and the existence and substance of Colorado's regulatory regime. Beyond that, though-when we move
from informing to advising and assisting-what conduct is permitted and what is prohibited? Can an attorney incorporate a business whose primary-or sole-business is criminal?
Can she write an employment contract for an employee whose every act will be criminal? Can she help a businessperson do the compliance work that will result in the issuance
of a state license to sell marijuana? The current contradictory state of the law obviously makes these incredibly difficult questions for a lawyer to answer. On the one hand, if
Colorado has chosen to regulate and tax this industry, it seems obvious that those regulated by the state government should be allowed to seek [*987] legal advice in complying
with that regulation. On the other, if every sale by every dispensary is a federal crime, it seems hard to argue that the attorney-by writing a lease, by doing compliance work, by
incorporating a business-is not knowingly facilitating criminal conduct. What is more, there is the possibility, however remote, of criminal prosecution for attorneys who have
marijuana entrepreneurs as clients. A lawyer who intends to help and in fact does help her client engage in criminal conduct can be charged as an accomplice in that conduct;
n27 an attorney who joins an agreement to engage in criminal conduct can be charged with conspiring to commit that conduct. n28 The specter of criminal prosecution is
particularly disarming because, while attorneys are regulated at the state level, it is federal prosecutors who could charge an attorney with conspiring with or aiding and abetting
her dispensary owner clients. While it might be far-fetched to imagine the same state that enacted medical marijuana provisions punishing attorneys for participating in that
industry, it is less fantastical to imagine a federal prosecutor-who has sworn to uphold federal laws including the CSA-going after not only a dispensary, but its bank, its landlord,
and its attorney as well. So the fact that marijuana is legal but not 100 percent legal makes everybody in the industry-patients, practitioners, lawyers, doctors, landlordsuncertain with regard to exactly where they stand.
can't hold, where can we go from here?
Uncertainty by its very nature breeds instability. So if the status quo
Banking act plank doesn’t solve investment
Sullum, 14 - I am a senior editor at Reason magazine and a nationally syndicated columnist
(Jacob, “Marijuana Money Is Still A Pot Of Trouble For Banks” Forbes, 9/18,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/09/18/local-banks-terrified-by-friendlyneighborhood-marijuana-merchants/)
An obvious solution is to make those businesses legal by carving out an exception to the federal
ban on marijuana, as the Respect State Marijuana Laws Act, introduced last year by Rep. Dana
Rohrabacher (R-Calif.), would do. The Marijuana Business Access to Banking Act, introduced
last year by Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D-Colo.), takes a narrower approach, shielding banks that serve
state-legal marijuana businesses from criminal prosecution, regulatory penalties, and loss of
deposit insurance.
Even if Congress approves such legislation, Hill warns, regulators might still discourage banks
from serving cannabusinesses by imposing unreasonable “due diligence” standards aimed at
detecting activities, such as selling marijuana to minors or supplying the interstate market, that
remain illegal. “If the compliance bar is so high that any customer misstep can result in federal
criminal or civil liability for the financial institution, then marijuana banking will not occur,”
Hill writes. “If Congress opens the door for marijuana banking, federal financial regulators
should ensure their efforts do not practically prevent banks from servicing the marijuana
industry.”
Federal prohibition creates a shortage of cyber workers—CSA is key
Aliya Sternstein 14, Next Gov Senior Correspondent, FEDERAL CYBER HIRING COULD
TAKE A HIT UNDER MARIJUANA MANDATE, March 14,
http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/03/federal-cyber-hiring-could-take-hit-undermarijuana-mandate/80527/
The Obama administration’s policy to uphold a ban on federal employees smoking pot -- even where
recreational marijuana is now legal under state law -- could snuff out efforts to hire nonconventional but
trusted hackers to search for holes in government computer systems. Many of the best of these white
hats known as “ethical hackers ” tend to shy away from the establishment. "It is only recently that I started hearing that this state ban
would be a challenge to hiring ethical hackers," said Kathleen Smith, chief management officer at ClearedJobs.Net, an online forum for cleared security professionals that also
The managers are having a difficult time with balancing between what an employee can
do based on state law -- and what they are banned from doing based on federal law , especially
with regards to cleared work and their security clearance ." A July 2013 blog post on state marijuana laws that appeared on
hosts job fairs. "
ClearedJobs.Net was the second most popular story on the site last year. It read: “Those of you with (or planning to obtain) security clearances who have an interest in adding
marijuana use to your recreational pastime may think, ‘Great! If I’m ever in Colorado or Washington State, I can smoke pot without any ramifications!’ Unfortunately, you are
wrong!” Colorado on New Year's Day became the first state to allow the use of marijuana for leisure, and Washington will follow this summer. The federal government effectively
criminalized marijuana in 1937. Now the feds say they will look the other way in states that legalize dope, unless they see drugged driving, distribution to minors or certain other
Marijuana is illegal under federal law and the rules prohibiting
federal employees from using it still apply, regardless of state laws ,” a Justice Department
spokesperson told Nextgov's sister publication Government Executive. Officials already had announced that federal employees are barred
from inhaling while working in Colorado or anywhere else where cannabis is legal.
Undergraduate code crackers – in high demand nationwide -- are seeing that some freedoms
granted to their neighbors will not apply to them if they join public service. "When I'm talking to college kids, I tell people: 'You are going
to have to think about how you are going to change your life to do this,'" Smith said. A December 2013 letter to Obama administration officials
from the information security trade group (ISC)2 said 61 percent of federal employees surveyed "believe
that their agency has too few information security workers to manage threats now , let alone
in the future, yet information security positions are going unfilled ." Federal employers might be able to entice nonconventional computer
infractions. Or, unless those rolling a joint work for them. “
whizzes with stimulants instead of hallucinogens, Smith said. "What I found with people who like doing cleared work and working for the government is they like to work on the
really cool stuff," said Smith, whose clients include security cleared professionals in the federal government and private sector. "The price to work on the really cool stuff might
be: Some of the recreational drug use I can't do any longer."
Cyber-vulnerability causes great power nuclear war
Fritz 9 | Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and
Disarmament [Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation
and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international
relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” July,
http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf]
This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source
knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer
network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If
access to
command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nucleararmed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear
power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a
nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and
provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical
distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking
technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed
upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using
computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the
hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are
susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers
which operate on a closed network may also be
compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks,
wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry
points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network,
could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on
removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal
how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance
on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and
their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple
entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed
submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been
made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US
Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet
system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was
unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory
response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did
not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer
network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further
enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be
engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to
launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack
from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response
communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation,
such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and
maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation
could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between
India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against
key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be
forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the
situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims
of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty
military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be
sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and
all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough
to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and
control centres directly.
Status quo state-by-state legalization undermines the FDA’s credibility –federal
action is key
Eddy, 10 [CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Medical Marijuana: Review and Analysis of Federal and State Policies Mark Eddy Specialist in
Social Policy April 2, 2010]
The current efforts to gain legal status of marijuana through ballot initiatives seriously
threaten the F ood and D rug A dministration statutorily authorized process of proving safety
and efficacy. (Brief of the Drug Free America Foundation et al., 2004112) Although the individual states regulate the practice of medicine,
the federal government has taken primary responsibility for the regulation of medical
products , especially those containing controlled substances. Pharmaceutical drugs must be approved for use in
the United States by the Food and Drug Administration ( FDA ), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act gives HHS and FDA the responsibility for determining that drugs are safe and effective, a requirement that
all medicines must meet before they can enter interstate commerce and be made available for general medical use.113 Clinical evaluation is required
regardless of whether the drug is synthetically produced or originates from a natural botanical or animal source. Opponents of medical marijuana say
that the FDA’s drug approval process should not be circumvented. To permit states to decide which
medical products can be made available for therapeutic use, they say, would undercut this regulatory system. State medical marijuana initiatives are
seen as inconsistent with the federal government’s responsibility to protect the public from unsafe, ineffective drugs. The Bush Administration argued
in its brief in the Raich case that “excepting drug activity for personal use or free distribution from the sweep of [federal drug laws] would discourage
the consumption of lawful controlled substances and would undermine Congress’s intent to regulate the drug market comprehensively to protect public
health and safety.”114 Three prominent drug abuse experts argued the following in their Amici brief: This
action by the state of
California did not create a “novel social and economic experiment,” but rather chaos in the
scientific and medical communities. Furthermore, under Court of Appeals ruling, such informal State
systems could be replicated, and even expanded, in a manner that puts at risk the critical
protections so carefully crafted under the national food and drug legislation of the 20th
century.115 The FDA itself has stated that FDA is the sole Federal agency that approves drug products as safe and effective for particular
indications, and efforts that seek to bypass the FDA drug approval process would not serve the
interests of public health. FDA has not approved marijuana for any indication. Only the disciplined, systematic,
scientific conduct of clinical trials can establish whether there is any medicinal value to
marijuana, smoked or otherwise.116 The Drug Free America Raich brief elaborates further (pp. 12-13): The ballot initiative-led
laws create an atmosphere of medicine by popular vote, rather than the rigorous
scientific and medical process that all medicines must undergo. Before the
development of modern pharmaceutical science, the field of medicine was fraught with potions
and herbal remedies. Many of those were absolutely useless, or conversely were harmful to
unsuspecting subjects. Thus evolved our current Food and Drug Administration and drug scheduling
processes, which Congress has authorized in order to create a uniform and reliable system of drug approval and regulation. This system is
being intentionally undermined by the legalization proponents through use of medical marijuana
initiatives. The organizers of the medical marijuana state initiatives deny that it was their intent to undermine the federal drug approval process.
Rather, in their view, it became necessary for them to bypass the FDA and go to the states because of the federal government’s resistance to marijuana
research requests and rescheduling petitions. As for the charge that politics should not play a role in the drug approval and controlled substance
scheduling processes, medical marijuana supporters point out that marijuana’s original listing as a Schedule I substance in 1970 was itself a political act
on the part of Congress. Scientists
on both sides of the issue say more research needs to be done, yet some
researchers charge that the federal government has all but shut down marijuana clinical
trials for reasons based on politics and ideology rather than science.151 In any case, as the IOM Report pointed out, “although a drug is normally
approved for medical use only on proof of its ‘safety and efficacy,’ patients with life-threatening conditions are sometimes (under protocols for
‘compassionate use’) allowed access to unapproved drugs whose benefits and risks are uncertain.”152 This was the case with the FDA’s IND
Compassionate Access Program under which a limited number of patients are provided government-grown medical marijuana to treat their serious
medical conditions. Some observers believe the pharmaceutical industry and some politicians oppose medical marijuana to protect pharmaceutical
industry profits. Because the whole marijuana plant cannot be patented, research efforts must be focused on the development of synthetic cannabinoids
such as Marinol. But even if additional cannabinoid drugs are developed and marketed, some believe that doctors and patients should still not be
criminalized for recommending and using the natural substance. The New England Journal of Medicine has editorialized that [A] federal policy that
prohibits physicians from alleviating suffering by prescribing marijuana for seriously ill patients is misguided, heavy-handed, and inhumane.
Marijuana may have long-term adverse effects and its use may presage serious addictions, but neither long-term side effects nor addiction is a relevant
issue in such patients. It is also hypocritical to forbid physicians to prescribe marijuana while permitting them to use morphine and meperidine to
relieve extreme dyspnea and pain. With both of these drugs the difference between the dose that relieves symptoms and the dose that hastens death is
very narrow; by contrast, there is no risk of death from smoking marijuana. To demand evidence of therapeutic efficacy is equally hypocritical. The
noxious sensations that patients experience are extremely difficult to quantify in controlled experiments. What really counts for a therapy with this kind
of safety margin is whether a seriously ill patient feels relief as a result of the intervention, not whether a controlled trial “proves” its efficacy.153 Some
until the federal government relents and becomes more hospitable to
marijuana research proposals and more willing to consider moving marijuana to a less restrictive schedule, the medical
marijuana issue will continue to be fought at state and local levels of governance. As one
observers suggest that
patient advocate has stated, “As the months tick away, it will become more and more obvious that we need to continue changing state laws until the
federal government has no choice but to change its inhumane medicinal marijuana laws.”154
wrecks pharmaceutical innovation
Baghda, 7 [Ramsey, Regulation Policy Market Access, September, Vol. 2, No. 9, Avandia and
the Commercial Impact of FDA’s Credibility Gap,
www.consumersunion.org/pdf/RPMreport0907.pdf]
Still, Mott says, the agency’s longevity as the gold standard acts as an anchor in a turbulent environment. “The FDA has a reservoir of credibility built over decades.
Notwithstanding the recent bashing in the media and political arenas, I think that reservoir still exists.” Mott’s right: Not even FDA’s strongest critics have come out and said the
agency isn’t the gold standard anymore. But when asked whether FDA’s credibility is a real commercial issue for drug and biotech companies, Mott doesn’t hesitate. “Absolutely.
reductions in either the actual effectiveness or capabilities of the agency—or the perceived effectiveness or capabilities and credibility
of the agency— increases the already tremendous risks, costs and timelines in the
Any
drug development process and hurts the industry and ultimately patients.” “FDA’s credibility
crisis “does affect our decisions on drug development targets and the risk we’re
prepared to take on in drug development. Clearly, the safety bar has gone up in the
agency over the last few years as we’ve gone through this cycle of safety questions
and credibility assaults on the FDA. That affects how we think about what we’re
going to develop and how we design and run experiments.” Wall Street and internal R&D
programs aren’t the only places feeling the negative impact from FDA’s credibility
gap. The venture capital community is looking at deals through a slightly different
lens as well.
Extinction
Clapper 13 – Director of National Intelligence (James R., “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”, 3/12/13; <www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf>)//Beddow
Scientists continue to discover previously unknown pathogens in humans that made the “jump”
from animals—zoonotic diseases. Examples are: a prion disease in cattle that jumped in the 1980s to cause variant
Creutzeldt-Jacob disease; a bat henipavirus that in 1999 became known as the human Nipah Virus; a bat corona virus that jumped to
humans in 2002 to cause Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS); and another SARS-like corona virus recently identified in
individuals who have been in Saudi Arabia, which might also have bat origins. Human and livestock population
growth and encroachment into jungles increase human exposure to crossovers. No one can
predict which pathogen will be the next to spread to humans, or when or where
such a development will occur, but humans will continue to be vulnerable to
pandemics, most of which will probably originate in animals. An easily
transmissible, novel respiratory pathogen that kills or incapacitates more than
one percent of its victims is among the most disruptive events possible. Such an
outbreak would result in a global pandemic that causes suffering and death in
every corner of the world, probably in fewer than six months. This is not a
hypothetical threat. History is replete with examples of pathogens sweeping populations that
lack immunity, causing political and economic upheaval, and influencing the
outcomes of wars—for example, the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic affected military operations
during World War I and caused global economic disruptions. The World Health Organization has described
one influenza pandemic as “the epidemiological equivalent of a flash flood.” However, slow-spreading pathogens, such as HIV/AIDS,
have been just as deadly, if not more so. Such a pathogen with pandemic potential may have already
jumped to humans somewhere; HIV/AIDS entered the human population more than 50 years before it was recognized
and identified. In addition, targeted therapeutics and vaccines might be inadequate to keep up with
the size and speed of the threat, and drug-resistant forms of diseases, such as tuberculosis,
gonorrhea, and Staphylococcus aureus, have already emerged.
IRAN
No deal --- Khamenei blocking compromises
Maloney, 1/21/15 --- Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings
(Suzanne, “Iran's Supreme Leader Is The Real Reason Nuclear Talks Are Deadlocked,”
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-iran-nuclear-talks-are-deadlocked-2015-1, JMP)
Representatives of Iran, the United States and five other world powers convened last week for talks on Iran's nuclear program, in what was at least the 18th negotiating session in as many months since the June 2013 election of Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. By
now, there is a certain familiarity to the proceedings: diplomats, journalists and activists converge upon a European capital. Negotiators linger behind closed doors, emerging only to pose for silent, sunny photo opportunities and murmur hopeful ambiguities.
Meetings beget future meetings, with all the players compliantly reprising their roles. Rumors of
piecemeal progress are Tweeted and rehashed.
The flurry of
excitement and activity around the process itself belies the unmistakable reality — the Iran
nuclear negotiations have been stalemated for months. The regular powwows
have
failed to achieve
a comprehensive agreement
the
state of play on the Iran nuclear issue is likely to get worse before it gets better
The American secretary of state and Iran’s foreign minister even take picturesque walks in the park.
and eruption of bilateral bonhomie
their first and foremost goal —
that would conclusively end the impasse over Iran nuclear program. Unfortunately,
. President
Barack Obama defended the negotiations in his annual State of the Union address, in an effort to convince the Republican-controlled Congress that legislation to restrict diplomacy or impose new sanctions on Iran would be a mistake. He threatened to veto new
sanctions, warning Congress that imposing more penalties would torpedo diplomacy and that "it doesn't make sense." Iran sanctions are always political catnip for the Hill, popular with most constituents and effectively cost-free, at least with respect to any
Congressional objectives. And the administration's Iran diplomacy has faced stiff opposition from many Republicans from the start, making the negotiations a perfectly predictable target for the ambitious new Republican majority in the Sen ate as well as the House.
Obama is mostly correct in his admonition about the dangers of new sanctions. Many in Congress are presumably unaware that the successful application of sanctions toward Tehran over the past decade came about through an unprecedented and inherently
ephemeral set of circumstances. These circumstances included: an Iranian leadership, personified by then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose rhetoric managed to outrage the world; the indignities of Iran's domestic repression, laid bare for all to witness in
the regime's repression of the 2009 post-election protests; and the surge of unconventional supplies of oil and gas that lowered prices and made it possible to knock as much as 1.5 million barrels of oil per day of Iranian exports from the market with relatively little
impact on the global price of oil or the price that consumers pay at the pump. With the (meaningful) exception of the energy markets, the conditions that facilitated far-reaching global adherence to Iran's economic isolation have dissipated. As a result, it is entirely
conceivable that the rest of the world will prefer to revert to the status quo ante — a world where only Washington truly embraces economic penalties against Tehran and where the powerfully extra-territorial impact of US sanctions generates frictions with allies and
partners instead of a unified multilateral coalition against Iranian transgressions. So the President is right to lay a marker now on sanctions, and warn Congress against actions that would undercut efforts toward a deal. He might have mentioned that the blame game
is already well under way. For months, Iran's diplomacy has been focused on ensuring that Washington is seen as the spoiler if and when the prospects for a deal truly go south. Congressional action and rhetoric will make or break that perception around the world.
sanctions aren't the real threat to the prospects for a comprehensive nuclear deal
with Iran. Rather, the primary obstacle to a deal rests
with the unwillingness of
Khamenei, to countenance any meaningful compromise on Iran’s production and
stockpiles of enriched uranium
Still, for now at least, the reality is that
where it always has —
Iran’s ultimate
authority, supreme leader Ayatollah Ali
. Some advocates of diplomacy with Tehran have sought to equate the problems of domestic political opposition to diplomacy in each country, depicting a bilateral symmetry in
hard-liner obstructionism. This is inaccurate and misleading. In the United States, opponents of compromise have used the democratic system to advance their position — to date, unsuccessfully. For now, they are really only background noise for an administration
in Iran, the opponents of compromise
occupy the one position that matters, the office of the Supreme Leader
that is so committed to a diplomatic outcome that it will readily engage in largely illusory conflations of rhetorical opposition with war-mongering. Meanwhile,
. Equating his role as the country's ultimate authority to that of
Congressional Republicans who have thus far failed to avert or roll back a single aspect of the Obama administration's diplomacy toward Tehran reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the relative balance of power in each system. And it does a profound
The P5+1 has proffered endless creative permutations of a
formula for addressing international concerns about Iran’s proximity to weapons capability.
Their hope is to find one that might meet the ‘red lines’ articulated by Khamenei and other
regime scions as essential to preserving Iran’s dignity — and its nuclear options. But to date,
there has been no sustained progress in gaining Iranian buy-in for any such
formulation, and Iran's only known proposal entails leaving the entirety of its current
capabilities for enrichment intact.
disservice to those in Iran who have articulated, at some risk, the need for a different path.
Inertia and tedium are practically the hallmarks of a process that has existed in various iterations for the past dozen years. During his own stint han dling the nuclear
portfolio from 2003 to 2005, Rouhani was seen as a competent but frustrating negotiator by his European interlocutors. And his successors only cemented the perception that Tehran was unwilling or incapable of advancing diplomatic solutions to the impasse,
especially former lead negotiator Saeed Jalili, who raised long-winded vapidity to an art form. This time around, however, expectations were infinitely higher, thanks to the explicit centrality of international reintegration to Rouhani's original campaign messaging
and the early momentum of his first months as president. After all, he won the presidency through a blunt campaign that promised to navigate the country out of isolation and reminded Iranians that they had as much right to prosperity as to nuclear achievements.
His early months in office were marked by gung-ho rhetoric, landmark appointments, and small but telling diplomatic breakthroughs, including a historic conversation with the US president in September 2013. Despite this strong start, the rosy — and mostly
The awkward genius of the November 2013
interim accord is that it has worked just well enough to command continuing adherence by the
parties, but not well enough to facilitate progress toward a more permanent solution.
unrealistic — expectations for rapid progress on the nuclear issue and the possibilities for a broader breakthrough have not been realized.
This is not the way it was
supposed to work. Many champions of diplomacy saw the interim deal as an implicit down payment on the long-term game; as Paul Pillar, a Georgetown University professor, long-time intelligence analyst, and Brookings non-resident senior fellow, wrote recently: It
is almost inconceivable that Ayatollah Khamenei would have made it possible for President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif to have gone as far as they have already gone, and to sign Iran up to the commitments they already have made in the preliminary
agreement reached in late 2013, if he did not genuinely share the objective of completing the negotiations and reaching a final agreement. I understand the argument that Rouhani’s election and the diplomatic progress that followed in its wake seemed to imply Iran's
readiness to resolve the nuclear issue; I practically pioneered it, writing on the night of his June 2013 election that "we are witnessing a shift of historic significance in Iran." But the presumption of path dependency is a pretty weak basis for asserting momentum
There are indeed many reasons why Iran would have signed an interim nuclear
agreement without a firm commitment to making subsequent concessions. And even if Tehran
was inclined to settle the dispute in mid-to-late 2013, it is perfectly reasonable that
developments since that time — the rise of ISIS and the intensification of the regional power
struggle, for starters — may have altered that calculation in the ensuing 18 months.
where clearly none exists.
What will alter this calculation in a
positive fashion? On sanctions, I agree with President Obama; there seems little prospect that the threat of new economic pressure will have a constructive impact on a political system led by paranoid, conspiratorial clerics who have the capacity to deflect the pain of
Obama's Congressional critics are not wrong to
express impatience with the repeated extensions of the negotiations in the absence of
meaningful evidence that Tehran is truly willing to compromise on the core issues at stake. The
itchy sanction trigger finger reflects
a fundamental recognition that the
current conditions have not proven ripe for an agreement What will overcome the diplomatic
stalemate is not simply more time or "space to let these negotiations work,"
but rather a shift in Iran's readiness to compromise on its nuclear fuel and stockpiles.
That shift can only be undertaken by Iranians, within the ruling system, who succeed in
persuading its inner circle that the revolution can only be preserved via compromise made in the
international isolation away from their own interests and directly onto an already suffering population. However, ultimately,
more than crass partisan political imperatives but
.
as White House chief of staff Denis McDonough implored
before the speech,
name of Iran's national interests.
It is, in fact, a tougher case to make than Obama's efforts to wangle recalcitrant Republicans. But it has happened before — a quarter-century ago, with the end of the Islamic
Republic's war with Iraq — and it may just be happening again today, as suggested by an extraordinary series of exchanges in recent weeks among Iran's most prominent politicians.
TPA thumps the link
Needham & Lillis, 1/22/15 (Vicki Needham and Mike Lillis, “Trade war erupts between
Obama, Dems,” http://thehill.com/policy/finance/230358-fast-track-splits-dem-lawmakers,
JMP)
A trade war is erupting between Democrats and the Obama administration over efforts to pass
“fast-track” legislation that would smooth the way for two major trade deals. Dozens of House Democrats are
expressing deep reservations about the White House’s trade agenda, putting themselves on
a collision course with President Obama over concerns that the deals will benefit big business at the expense of U.S. workers. The
president used Tuesday’s State of the Union address to lobby Congress to give him expanded trade powers that would allow an up-or-down vote on any
deal that reaches Capitol Hill, while giving the U.S. more power to steer the global agenda. But while Democrats say they backed most of the president’s
vision on other issues, some called his trade policies “dangerous.” Reps. Rosa DeLauro (Conn.) and Louise
Slaughter (N.Y.) have
been two of the loudest voices in the Democratic chorus against trade promotion authority (TPA) and say they are
optimistic they can block the trade agenda . “These trade deals make it much easier for corporations to send
American jobs overseas,” DeLauro said Wednesday in what has become a weekly occurrence of press conferences on the issue. DeLauro and other
critics say the fast-track authority doesn’t allow proper public or congressional scrutiny of the agreements and fails to give Congress the ability to
debate or amend the trade text.
“I believe we have the votes, and I think we’re going to win motion in
denying fast-track,” DeLauro said. They also say they have been left out of the trade-shaping process and are concerned that the 12-nation
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will cause the loss of jobs and wages, something they say has also occurred after the passage of other trade deals.
Blocking fast-track authority could essentially kill any trade deals, since it would be much more difficult for the Obama administration to complete
deals without that lever. Trading partners would be much less willing to negotiate if they believe Congress could then change the agreements and ask
them to make further concessions. Democrats rallying against it believe the defeat would force the administration to re-evaluate its stance, a House
Democratic aide said. “We can’t swallow another hopeful notion about trade,” said Slaughter. “We’re going to fight this tooth and nail, and I believe
we’re going to win.” U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman said Wednesday that the agreements will put the U.S. in a strong position to drive
global trade in favor of its workers. “TPA puts Congress in the driver’s seat to define U.S. negotiating objectives and priorities for trade agreements,”
Froman said at the U.S. Conference of Mayors. In fact, he described fast-track authority as Congress’s best tool to ensure that lawmakers and the public
have ample time to give trade agreements the public scrutiny and debate they deserve. Yet the
White House acknowledged
Obama’s plea in the State of the Union received a mixed response from both parties . “There’s going to
be some work to be done on both sides to persuade Democrats and Republicans that this is a good idea,” White House spokesman Josh Earnest said
Wednesday. Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) said earlier this month that the
legislation will need at least 50
Democratic votes since there will be some GOP opposition. The White House is lobbying
about 80 potentially trade-friendly Democrats. But critics say any bill would be
lucky to get the backing of 20. House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (Calif.) said she wants to work with the White House to
win an agreement that Democrats can support but has yet to put her weight behind the president’s effort. Rep. Xavier Becerra (Calif.), chairman of the
House Democratic Caucus, said the trick will be threading that needle between business interests and workers. “Too often, what we see is that trade
deals get reached and signed but, those trading partners never live up to enforcing their end of the bargain,” he said Wednesday. “The last thing we
want to do is do anything that makes it more difficult for the [working class].” Rep. Joseph Crowley (N.Y.), the
vice chairman of
the House Democratic Caucus, has supported some trade deals but was quick to acknowledge the divisions.
“There’s a great deal of skepticism within our caucus because of a lack of enforcement,” he said.
What’s new, Crowley said, is the number of conservative Republicans who are also pushing
back — a dynamic that he said gives Democrats leverage in the debate . “More and
more of their members from the right-wing Tea Party … don’t believe that the trade agenda is
working for their constituents,” Crowley said. “That puts pressure on Republicans, if again, they want to pass a bill, they need to start
talking to Democrats as to what we would like to see in a TPA,” he said.
AUMF battle makes the link inevitable
Jaffe & Walsh, 2/6/15 (Alexandra Jaffe and Deirdre Walsh, “White House to request
permission to fight ISIS,” www.cnn.com/2015/02/05/politics/isis-war-authority-vote/, JMP)
Washington (CNN)President Barack Obama will send Congress a proposal to authorize the use
of force against ISIS shortly, both the White House and House Speaker John Boehner said
Thursday, setting up a what's sure to be a fierce political fight on Capitol Hill.
White House press secretary Josh Earnest told reporters the administration will send "specific
language" of an Authorization for the Use of Military Force to Congress "relatively soon." And
Boehner told Capitol Hill reporters he's "expecting ... [an AUMF] sent up here in the coming
days."
The President is required by law to secure congressional approval for prolonged military
operations, by passing an AUMF -- war authority -- on Capitol Hill.
"When it comes to fighting a war, Congress should not tie the President's hands," Boehner said.
"And we're going to go through a rigorous set of hearings, and continue to discuss this."
The time line for the bill remains murky. On Wednesday, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Bob Corker, said he expects to see the outlines of an AUMF "sometime between now
and the end of next week."
But the early contours of the authorization are already taking shape behind closed doors.
House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi told reporters on Thursday that she and several other
House Democrats have been discussing language with the administration.
She outlined three key components of a new AUMF: The length of time for U.S. involvement in
the Mideast conflict against ISIS, the geography and the scope of the authorization.
She also said a new measure by Congress would repeal the 2002 authorization to go into Iraq,
but would likely retain the 2001 authorization to send U.S. troops to Afghanistan.
Obama went forward with airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, however, without Congress weighing in.
The President is required by law to ask Congress for war authority within 60 days of initiation,
but the White House has argued that under the 2001 AUMF, which authorized war against the
9/11 perpetrators, he has the authority to attack ISIS because it's an offshoot of al Qaeda.
But as far back as September and again in his January State of the Union address, Obama has
urged Congress to pass the new authorization.
"We are strongest as a nation when the President and Congress work together," he said in
September.
That approval won't be easy to get.
Another military effort in Iraq isn't particularly appealing to members of the President's own
party, and many in both parties remember how politically damaging the 2001 AUMF vote
became for lawmakers after the public soured on the Iraq War.
On Thursday, Pelosi mentioned that language authorizing boots on the ground was another
issue that was still under debate.
"I think it's going to be a challenge, but we will have a solution to it," she said.
Boehner said the President is going to have to sell the measure both to Americans
and on Capitol Hill, suggesting the responsibility for success or failure lies on his shoulders.
"It's also going to be incumbent upon the President to make the case to the American people for
why we have to fight this fight," he said. "His actions are going to be an important part of trying
... to get the votes to actually pass an authorization."
He acknowledged: "This is not going to be an easy vote."
Plan is popular and a win
Weiner 1/20/15 ("Now Is The TIme For Obama to Make a Move on Marijuana." Business
Insider. www.businessinsider.com/its-time-for-obama-to-make-a-move-on-marijuana-2015-1,
TD)
The President is following the edict boxers know — always try to finish with a flourish if you want the judges to be kind. In other
to secure his legacy, Obama needs to go out with a bang.¶ This is likely why we've seen
Obama launch his executive action on immigration, normalize relations with Cuba, and announce his sweeping
community college plan in recent weeks. It's also why the President should add a section about cannabis
words,
to his speech.¶ Some issues advance because of forceful and unifying leadership from politicians, but more often progress happens
and politicians take notice. Gay marriage and relations with Cuba had evolved so far in the public debate that eventually courts and
elected leaders came around in a way that was unforeseen even a few years ago. Marijuana policy is following a similar arc. Twenty
three states and the District of Columbia have now have legalized cannabis for medical or recreational use. Most of these laws have
come from citizen referenda and many of the states in question have Republican legislatures.¶
This isn't a fringe issue
any more. In fact, a coalition of libertarians, millennials, social liberals, medical experts,
patients' rights advocates, economists, and law enforcement officials, have moved marijuana
smack in the middle of the mainstream of policy.¶ But the President doesn't have to be pro-pot to take some smart
and needed steps to clear up some of the odd disconnections that exist in a country where states have made uses of marijuana legal
while the federal government hasn't caught on. ¶ Here are three common sense executive actions that the President should announce
tonight that would set the table for a more sober pot policy:¶ 1. Make it legal for scientists to study the benefits of marijuana:¶ There
is now broad consensus in the medical community that there are legitimate and hugely helpful uses of cannabis as treatment for
many diseases and ailments. For example, the oils have been shown to reduce seizures in children with epilepsy and the plant is in
wide use to help soldiers calm the symptoms of PTSD. But in a bizarre Catch 22, the only way to study marijuana is to be in violation
of federal law that still makes it illegal to own the stuff.¶ Cannabis is considered a Class 1 narcotic by the Food and Drug
Administration. As such, it is treated as though it has high abuse potential and zero medicinal value (even Cocaine isn't Class 1).
Because of this federal regulation, marijuana can't be used in a study or even transported to a clinician's lab. In his address this
evening, the President should announce he is asking the FDA to review whether marijuana should be reclassified so we can conduct
further scientific research.¶ 2. Announce that states rights will be respected on marijuana laws: ¶ State legislators and voters have set
up regimes in their states with laws, regulations, and taxes for marijuana. However, a law abiding citizen of Connecticut or Alabama
could still find themselves at the wrong side of a federal indictment because of the schizophrenia that exists between federal and
state law enforcement. ¶ For the most part, the Justice Department has taken an unofficial hands off policy. Still, if the President
drops a line or two into his speech on Tuesday that makes it clear he respects the rights of the states here, it will calm the concerns of
many in those jurisdictions, encourage investment, and also probably get both sides of the aisle clapping at once in a Congress where
that rarely happens.¶ 3. Deregulate the banking industry for marijuana businesses. ¶ Drug-related crime is down in states that have
legalized some uses of marijuana. Just as drug reform advocates predicted, when you lift an industry out of the black market,
regulate it, and tax it, the criminals move on to other things. However, because of the federal banking regulations, lawful marijuana
businesses can't use normal banks. Because of this one crime is on the rise: business having stashes of cash that they can't deposit
anywhere stolen. ¶ This isn't an easy problem to untangle because of the thicket of anti-money laundering laws that are on the books
and the different bank charter rules in the 50 states. Still, the area is ripe for executive action that few could disagree with: order the
treasury department to review the laws to accommodate legal marijuana businesses. ¶ If we want to encourage a stable and wellregulated industry, the first step may be to loosen the rules that keep the operating cash, profits, and even the collected taxes in shoe
boxes rather than checking accounts.¶ These proposals may seem procedural and "small ball" on paper. You can also be sure
taking action on marijuana reform would lead to a few cartoons of the president wearing a
Rastafarian hat and smoking a blunt. But the best of all political positions is the one that's
actually popular even though your opponents think it;s not. ¶ The American people and
particularly those who have been opting out of elections — younger citizens and independents — support the idea of
legal and well-regulated marijuana. And while older and more conservative Americans are still
not comfortable with the idea, true libertarians would be with the President on this one.¶ A
critique many have about President Obama is that he doesn't take the lead on issues and
instead compromises to try for the best deal he can for the American people. Here's a chance
to do both.
And, if the disad is unique it is too unique --- new moderate Iran bill will steal
critical support from Kirk-Menendez bill
Hudson, 1/21/15 (John --- staff writer for Foreign Policy where he chases down stories from
Foggy Bottom to the White House, the Pentagon to Embassy Row, “Congressional Infighting
Could Boost White House in Iran Talks; Competing legislation threatens a major sanctions push
in Congress,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/21/congressional-infighting-could-boostwhite-house-in-iran-talks/, JMP)
A hawkish Iran sanctions bill that President Barack Obama threatened to veto in his State of the Union address now faces an
unexpected foe in Congress: competing legislation sponsored by Republicans. On Wednesday, Senator
Rand Paul (R-Kentucky) offered an alternative proposal to a controversial piece of legislation sponsored by Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Democratic Sen.
Robert Menendez of New Jersey that would impose new sanctions on Tehran if world powers fail to strike an agreement that would restrain the
country’s nuclear program. Paul’s proposal, which is still being hammered out with California Democrat Barbara Boxer, would mandate votes in
Congress to reinstate sanctions against Iran if it violates any aspects of a final nuclear deal. Boxer
called the proposal a
“moderate” alternative that would give lawmakers the opportunity to re-impose “waived or
suspended sanctions against Iran if the president in consultation with the intelligence
community, determines that Iran has violated any existing nuclear agreement.” She and her staff did not
offer more details, saying the two lawmakers were still putting the “finishing touches” on the legislation. Unlike the Kirk-Menendez
bill, the Obama administration remains open to the Paul-Boxer proposal because it would not derail the
sensitive negotiations playing out in Vienna. That’s a problem for Menendez and Kirk, who want to unite Congress behind their own
Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act. “I oppose the legislation I’ve seen so far,” Boxer said Wednesday at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing. “I am
working on legislation with Senator Paul to send a clear, unequivocal signal that Iran will be held accountable for its actions and any failure to fulfill its
commitments will be met by swift action by Congress.” To
build a veto-proof majority, the Kirk-Menendez bill needs
the support of at least 13 Democrats. Given the impressive bipartisan support for the sanctions legislation last year — it
garnered 60-cosponsors — many believed a Republican-controlled Congress could overcome the president’s veto. However, a
number of hawkish Democrats who previously supported such legislation — including Sens. Ben
Cardin (D-Md.) and Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) — have begun to waffle on the legislation in recent days, “The
administration has a point. I think we should listen to what they have to say,” Cardin, a co-sponsor of the Menendez-Kirk legislation, told reporters on
Tuesday. “Hopefully we can reach some agreement on when’s the best timing for its consideration.” A
prospective bill by Paul and
Boxer could peel off the Democratic votes that Kirk and Menendez need — especially
as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, a prospective 2016 presidential candidate, called the sanctions
legislation a “very serious strategic error” on Wednesday. But Menendez and Kirk have other problems
too. Sen. Bob Corker of Tennessee, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
is preparing a third bill: legislation that would require a vote on a joint resolution of disapproval
for any final nuclear deal with Iran. Corker says his bill, co-sponsored by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) is needed because Congress
must “weigh in” on final deal with Iran. Because the legislation is still being fleshed out, it’s unclear if a “no vote” would simply stand as a symbolic
protest, or go further and defund the specific administrative actions needed to implement the deal. Regardless, pro-Israel
hawks in
Congress want to keep the focus on the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act rather than Corker’s bill,
because the legislation does not enjoy the Democratic support that Kirk-Menendez does. Some
Republicans disagree with that strategy. John McCain, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, wants Corker’s bill to move
first because it is less controversial and would not allow the administration to blame Republicans if an Iran deal does not materialize by the selfimposed June 30 deadline. McCain told Bloomberg last week that it’s too soon to “worry about the additional sanctions.” The challenge for Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell will be to find a peaceable solution among a diverse GOP Senate that doesn’t fracture the Democratic support for
Iran sanctions legislation. Critics
of Kirk-Menendez received an unexpected boost from a separate hearing
held on Wednesday by the GOP-controlled Senate Armed Services Committee. The panel hosted foreign
policy luminaries Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security
advisers of President George H.W. Bush and Jimmy Carter respectively. Both men opposed new Iran sanctions
legislation. “They will break the talks,” said Scowcroft, who also served under President Gerald Ford. “I think we should see them out and not take
steps which would destroy the negotiations.” Proponents of the Kirk-Menendez legislation dispute that the bill would disrupt negotiations.
Arms race empirically denied---nonprolif regime is resilient and solves
Daniel Larison 14, senior editor at the American Conservative, PhD in History from the Univ
of Chicago, citing Johan Bergenas, deputy director of the Managing Across Boundaries initiative
at the Stimson Center, May 22 2014, “Iran and the “Nuclear Domino” Myth,”
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/iran-and-the-nuclear-domino-myth/
Matthew Kroenig continues his never-ending series of articles promoting war with Iran. I’m not all that interested in his argument about Obama, but I wanted to respond to some assertions that he makes about
Kroenig writes:¶ Nuclear weapons in Iran would spark a nuclear
arms race in the Middle East. Tehran would probably export do-it-yourself atomic bomb kits to other countries around the world. And the global nonproliferation
regime would collapse as it became clear that the international community lacked the resolve to stop the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons.¶ All of these
claims are wrong . Johan Bergenas specifically addressed two of these claims in a 2010 article for Foreign Affairs. He rejected the idea that the nonproliferation regime would collapse
what would happen after Iran acquired nuclear weapons.
because of a nuclear-armed Iran. On the NPT itself, he said:¶ Its more than 180 committed parties are unlikely to allow Iran’s nuclear program to demolish an institution that is — and has been for four decades —
there’s
one problem with this “nuclear domino” scenario: the historical record does not
support it. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, many have feared rapid and widespread nuclear proliferation; 65 years later, only nine
countries have developed nuclear weapons .¶ Notably, Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons has not
prompted any of its neighbors to do likewise, nor has North Korea’s nuclear tests led to further proliferation in East Asia. If a state is
determined to build nuclear weapons, the nonproliferation regime cannot prevent this from happening, but the strength of that regime is that is gives the
vast majority of states incentives not to pursue such weapons.¶ He continues: ¶ Predictions of
catastrophic consequences resulting from a nuclear Iran are not only wrong but counterproductive. The assertion that the
the foundation of nonproliferation efforts.¶ As for the fear of a “nuclear domino effect,” Bergenas cites past experience with new nuclear-weapons states to show this idea to be another myth:¶ But
widespread proliferation is unavoidable could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The myth of a nuclear domino effect creates an excuse for other Middle Eastern countries — expecting that their neighbors will be
nuclear powers — to acquire nuclear weapons themselves.
PC fails on foreign policy issues
JT Young 9/11, The American Spectator, "Obama, Woodrow Wilson, and Foreign Policy Failure", 2014,
spectator.org/articles/60395/obama-woodrow-wilson-and-foreign-policy-failure
Finally, foreign
policy destroyed Wilson’s presidency and now similarly threatens Obama’s .¶ Foreign policy thrust
itself on both presidents, but from different angles. Wilson, for all his faults, staked everything he had on a vision. He lost, but not for want of political capital, but
because he refused to compromise with Republicans on his vision.¶ Contrastingly, Obama
cannot even afford the foreign policy “ante”
expected of the free world’s leader. Even the most basic moves are beyond his depleted political
capital . Nor are these moves part of a larger vision. From the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, to the Arab Spring, to
the Syrian civil war, Iraq, and the Israel-Palestine conflict, there is nothing that links this administration’s
actions.¶ Obama cannot afford any of his foreign policy moves because he has expended his political
capital .¶ Legislatively, after almost six years in office he has not forged a relationship with Congress — not even with
Democrats, and certainly not with Republicans. Policy-wise and politically, Obama has no support on the
right and only a minority of it in America’s center — having lost it on health care, the economy, and
various other issues. Obama is wholly dependent on the left — and it is here where his foreign policy
responses are now eroding even this residual support. As his administration has looked adrift abroad, the left’s support has begun to drift from it.¶
Obama’s real problem is not a partisan one, as Wilson’s was, but an ideological one, arising from within his own base. Within the left on which he is
entirely dependent is a sizable contingent for whom U.S. engagement — especially militarily — is never
legitimate. So, even as Obama is forced to take reasonable stances abroad, he loses support within his
shrinking base.¶ As Obama erodes his base on the left, he also emboldens the right. As he weakens his
presidency, he prompts Congress to fill the void. He finds himself in a strikingly similar position to that of Wilson. ¶ There is an overarching foreign policy similarity between these two administrations a hundred years apart, but they come to the same point from opposite directions. Wilson lost
his presidency on a foreign policy in pursuit of a vision. He staked everything on it and refused to compromise to cut his losses in the end.¶ Obama
is
threatened with losing his presidency on a foreign policy in the absence of a vision. Having eroded his support over
almost six years, he cannot afford Wilson’s big gamble on a vision — even if he had one. He finds himself paying an increasingly costly
foreign policy price, just to stay in the game. In such straits, he finds himself where Wilson was, facing the ultimate
risk, but with no prospect of a visionary reward. He is instead merely playing for his political survival.
1AR
POLITICS
They don’t assume new doubts
NYT, 1/10/15 (Editorial Board, “Saving the Nuclear Deal With Iran,”
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/opinion/sunday/saving-the-nuclear-deal-withiran.html?_r=0, JMP)
Mr. Rouhani’s path to compromise is not easy. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s
chief negotiator, won an informal vote of confidence in Parliament on Tuesday after hard-liners
forced him to answer questions on the nuclear talks. But Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, who will have the last word on any agreement, voiced new doubts on Wednesday
about whether “the enemy” — America — could be trusted to really lift sanctions.
His skepticism is not unfounded. President Obama has the authority to temporarily ease
sanctions on Iran, and he has done that to a limited extent by allowing Iran to receive about
$700 million per month in assets frozen abroad under the terms of an interim nuclear
agreement that has been in place since November 2013.
Even so, the power to permanently lift most sanctions lies with Congress, where many members
deeply mistrust Tehran, and Republican leaders have said that new and stronger sanctions are
near the top of their to-do list in the new Congress. Such a move might be justified down the
road if negotiations collapse, or if Iran cheats on its commitments. But at this stage it could
easily undermine the talks, split the major powers and propel Iran to speed its nuclear
development.
New sanctions killed the deal
Sputnik 12/31 (“New US Sanctions Against Iran Violate Geneva Nuclear Deal: Iranian
Diplomat”, 2014, http://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20141231/1016438995.html)
The United States is violating the Geneva interim nuclear deal by imposing new sanctions
against Iranian entities and individuals, the Iranian Foreign Ministry's spokesperson said Wednesday during a press
conference. "This measure goes against US commitments under the Geneva Joint Plan of Action,"
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Marzieh Afkham stated. "While negotiations are
underway between Iran and the P5+1, such a move is a blatant violation of the principle of
goodwill and casts doubt on the US objectives in the talks." On Tuesday, nine Iranian entities and people were
subjected to a new economic ban by the US Treasury. They were accused of allegedly helping the Iranian government dodge US sanctions and
supporting human rights-related abusers. In particular, the entities slapped by sanctions were allegedly assisting Iran in acquiring US banknotes
worth millions of dollars, the US Treasury Department said in a statement. The Iranian entities and individuals were converting foreign currency
into US dollars, despite a ban being in place since the 90's forbidding financial transactions from Iranian banks. The imposition of new
targeted sanctions comes amid ongoing attempts to reach a final agreement on Tehran's nuclear
program.
Iran vote won’t happen til March
Wong, 1/29/15 (Kristina, “Iran sanctions bill passes Senate panel,”
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/231130-iran-sanctions-bill-passes-senate-panel, JMP)
Members of the Senate Banking Committee on Thursday passed a bill that would impose
sanctions on Iran if a comprehensive agreement to roll back its nuclear program is not reached
by June 30.
The bill, co-authored by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), passed in the
committee by an 18-4 vote.
All 12 Republicans on the committee voted for the bill, as did six Democrats.
The Democrats that voted for the bill included Sens. Menendez, Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), Jon
Tester (D-Mont.), Mark R. Warner (D-Va.) Heidi Heitkamp (D-N.D.), and Joe Donnelly (DInd.).
Schumer called the bill "a good step forward."
"If they don't come to a tough strong agreement...there will be further sanctions and further
actions," he said.
Democrats who voted against included Sens. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio), the committee’s ranking
member, Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.).
The bill, which is softer than one proposed last year by Kirk and Menendez, would allow the
president to waive sanctions indefinitely for 30 days at a time.
Last year’s bill garnered 17 Democratic co-sponsors, but Democratic support for the current bill
was not clear after President Obama threatened during his State of the Union address to veto the
bill. The administration argues any sanctions legislation passed before June 30 would derail the
talks by empowering hardliners in Iran who oppose a deal, and break the cohesion among
negotiators from the U.S. and its allies.
Menendez, however, kept together a coalition of 10 Democrats who support the bill,
promising the White House not to support a vote on the bill before March 24, by
when negotiators agreed to reach a framework agreement.
Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) said that promise would effectively delay a vote on the Senate floor of
the vote until then.
"All of us understand it's not going to be voted on before March 24," he said.
Brown urged lawmakers to wait until June 30 the negotiators’ deadline for an agreement.
TPA happens this month, there’s a bill
IUT, 2/4/15 (“Boustany Says TPA Bill On Track; Signals GOP Cool On Committee
Certification,” http://insidetrade.com/201502042487358/WTO-Daily-News/DailyNews/boustany-says-tpa-bill-on-track-signals-gop-cool-on-committee-certification/menu-id948.html, JMP)
Rep. Charles Boustany (R-LA) said Tuesday (Feb. 3) that the leaders of the House Ways &
Means and Senate Finance committees are on track to release a new Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA) bill with Finance Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-OR) during the last week of February,
but signaled that Republicans remain cool to one of Wyden's key demands for changes to
legislation introduced last year.
The change in question would have the congressional trade committees certify that a completed
trade agreement meets the negotiating objectives of the TPA bill and is therefore eligible for
expedited fast-track treatment.
"I wouldn't want to speak for anybody, but I think the general sentiment is we're satisfied with
the process as we had laid out previously without adding extra certification steps," Boustany said
in an interview with Inside U.S. Trade.
He noted that Republicans are generally comfortable with the process for consideration of trade
agreements laid out in last year's TPA bill, adding that the process should not become "too
unwieldy." But he emphasized that he was not intending to speak for Ways & Means Chairman
Paul Ryan (R-WI) on this point.
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-UT) delivered a similar message late last
week when he said the 2014 bill preserves congressional power over trade agreements in a
number of ways. One is by restricting the administration's ability to include unrelated measures
in the implementing bill because it stipulates that it can contain only provisions "strictly
necessary or appropriate" to implement a trade agreement, Hatch said in a Jan. 30 speech.
The second would make ineligible for fast-track treatment any provisions that substantially
renegotiate a trade agreement if the renegotiation occurred after TPA expired. That was the case
with the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement, which was signed before the last TPA's expiration in
2007, but renegotiated by the Obama administration several years later, one informed source
said. Nevertheless, Congress considered the renegotiated deal under fast-track procedures.
Boustany said work is progressing well on the substance on the TPA bill being negotiated by
Hatch, Wyden and Ryan. "I think there's very good progress being made among all three of
them, and I believe everything's on track … for the bill to be introduced when we come back
from the President's Day recess with the intent of moving it in early March," he said. "I think
we're hoping to see floor action in March."
But he acknowledged it would be a "pretty ambitious timeline" for a bill to be passed prior to a
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) ministerial meeting planned for mid-March. Nevertheless, he
pointed out that, if TPA bill starts moving through committees, that would send a "strong signal"
to U.S. negotiating partners that Congress is serious about passing the legislation.