United States of America v. Iran: United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
For nearly 30 years, tension between the U.S. and Iranians grew to a focal point in 1979 with the
Iranian “White” Revolution and Hostage Crisis. Since the 1953 U.S. backed coup in which Iran’s
democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq, was deposed, Iranians had grown
increasingly bellicose toward the Shah Pahlavi, whom the Iranian religious right viewed as a puppet of
the United States, and his U.S. backers. The Shah, somewhat truthfully, was viewed as a corrupt
“petrocrat” who embraced westernization along with a lavish style of living for him and his family. In
1979, amid economic troubles and youth unrest, fueled by religious figures such future Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shah was ousted. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was not long over when the
Shah, suffering various health ailments, sought treatment within the U.S., prompting further student
uprisings. On November 4, 1979, angry students stormed the U.S. embassy, resulting in its destruction
and the taking of 66 U.S. citizens as hostages, with some being held for as many as 444 days- until
January of 1981. These events prompted the U.S. to bring a claim before the International Court of
Justice, alleging that the Iranian government was negligent in its protection of U.S. diplomats and
consular staff and that it had failed to restore the American hostages. The Iranian government may or
may not have been complicit in the siege of the American embassy. However, it clearly failed to prevent
an attack, ensure the safety of diplomats protected by international law, or do anything to secure the
American hostages and provide for their safe return. Given that Iran was bound by international law,
treaties, and agreements, it had an obligation to fulfill those duties and goals to which they were in
agreement with. Also, a ICJ decision to hold Iran somewhat responsible for the actions of their citizens
toward those of another diplomatically protected government would have positive implications for the
future protection of diplomats and their families around the world. Furthermore, such a decision would
be a deterrent of such complacency on the part of governments in the event of acts of violence,
terrorism, or war within their borders toward protected citizens or bodies of another sovereign state.
Is a government financially responsible for the damages done by fringe elements or more radical citizens
of their country toward the property of another government?
What role should sovereignty play in these events; does Iran have a right to do nothing, and can it be
held responsible for an inability to do something?
If the United States is allowed to ask for reparations, should the amount and type awarded be
determined by this case or under another suit?
Georgia v. Russian Federation: Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
forms of Racial Discrimination
Since the 1992 civil war in the North Caucuses there have been allegations of ethnic cleansing, racial
discrimination, and other forms of violence by both the Georgians and Abkhaz. It has been reported by
Human Rights Watch and the confirmed by the OSCE in 1994, 1996, and 1999 and by the United Nations
that both countries, along with North and South Ossetia, have been guilty of human rights violations and
racial discrimination. Between then and the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, the Russian Federation
has had a policy of extending citizenship toward ethnic Russians, Cossacks, Abkhaz, or Ossetia within the
state of Georgia’s recognized territory. This, along with ethnic cleansing, has contributed to ethnic
tension between Georgians and pro-Russian peoples within the region. Violence, discrimination, and a
more subtle war of cultures have been at play in the region for some time. The Georgian government
alleges that Russia has encouraged the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Ossetia and Abkhazia and that
the Russian Federation has violated Georgia’s sovereignty by extending citizenship toward its
inhabitants and promoting secession and/or independence within its territories. It is well documented
that the Russia government provided military and financial support for pro-Russian forces and factions
during the civil war and in 2008 then-president Vladimir Putin had correspondence with the leaders of
Georgia’s apparent secessionist territories in which he encouraged independence. With the Russian
invasion that year, it was clear that the two countries would not agree on the territories of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Russia claimed that since these territories were de facto independent, it was not at all
invading the Georgia, while Georgia claimed that Russia was using armed force to lead minoritysupported takeovers of the territories, which would eventually be annexed by Russia. Complicating
matters further, the international diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains unclear.
According to Georgia and many other countries, these territories remain a part of Georgia. But
according to Russia and some of its allies, the countries are independently recognized. First the
territorial status of the region must be determined by the ICJ. Then it will be possible to determine how
the Russian Federation violated Georgia’s sovereignty, if at all. Besides this fact, the U.N. and ICJ have a
clear role to play in the protection of displaced person, refugees, and victims of ethnic cleansing
throughout the region. Violations by Russia, the subject of this case, during the 1990s or more recent
2008 war, should be prosecuted. It will also be the duty of the court to determine if the Russian
Federation is responsible for violence committed by separatist groups in disputed territories. From that
point on, financial obligations and reparations can be determined.
How should the ICJ recognize the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia during the entire time frame
examined, given that their territorial diplomatic status is disputed?
Is Russia’s verbal and financial support of secession in disputed territories a violation of Georgia’s
sovereignty?
To what extend can the Russian government be held accountable for actions committed by non-Russian,
yet overtly pro-Russian, separatist force within Abkhazia?