Special Pricing Policies Learning objectives analyze cartel pricing illustrate price leadership see how price discrimination affects output and prices Learning objectives • distinguish between marginal pricing and ‘cost-plus’ pricing • discuss the various types of multiproduct pricing • explain how a company can use transfer pricing Overview I. Basic Pricing Strategies – Monopoly & Monopolistic Competition – Cournot Oligopoly II. Extracting Consumer Surplus – Price Discrimination – Block Pricing Two-Part Pricing Commodity Bundling III. Pricing for Special Cost and Demand Structures – Peak-Load Pricing – Cross Subsidies – Transfer Pricing Price Matching Brand Loyalty Randomized Pricing IV. Pricing in Markets with Intense Price Competition Cartel arrangements • A cartel is an arrangement where firms in an industry cooperate and act together as if they were a monopoly • cartel arrangements may be tacit or formal • illegal in the US: Sherman Antitrust Act, 1890 • examples: OPEC, IATA Cartel arrangements • Conditions that influence the formation of cartels – small number of large firms in the industry – geographical proximity of the firms – homogeneous products that do not allow differentiation – stage of the business cycle – difficult entry into industry – uniform cost conditions, usually defined by product homogeneity Cartel arrangements • In order to maximize profits, the cartel as a whole should behave as a ‘monopolist’ the cartel determines the output which equates MR = MC of the cartel as a whole the MC of the cartel as a whole is the horizontal summation of the members’ marginal cost curves price is set in the normal monopoly way, by determining quantity demanded where MC=MR and deriving P from the demand curve at that Q Cartel arrangements • Problem: incentive for firms to cheat on agreement, thus cartels are unstable • Additional costs facing the cartel – – – – formation costs monitoring costs enforcement costs cost of punishment by authorities weigh the benefits against these costs Cartel arrangements • Examples: price fixing by cartels – – – – GE, Westinghouse Archer Daniels Midland Company Sotheby’s, Christie’s Roche Holding AG, BASF AG Price leadership • Barometric price leadership – one firm in an industry will initiate a price change in response to economic conditions – the other firms may or may not follow this leader – leader may vary Price leadership • Dominant price leadership – one firm is the industry leader – dominant firm sets price with the realization that the smaller firms will follow and charge the same price – can force competitors out of business or buy them out under favorable terms – could result in investigation under Sherman Anti-Trust Act PRICE ELASTICITY AND PROFIT MAXIMIZING PRICE Raise price you will lose sales? Not necessarily if you know your price elasticity of demand UNIFORM PRICING: - Seller charges same price for every unit of the product. Lerner index = p-mc/p To maximize profits, firm should charge a price such that the LI = -1/price elasticity. Suppose the MC = 800. And firms price elasticity is -1.5 Then to maximize profits (MR=MC), firm should charge (p-800/p) = -1/-1.5= 2/3 p = 2400 Shortcomings of uniform pricing Only the marginal buyer has a benefit = price. All other (inframarginal) buyers, have benefits that exceed price = buyer surplus Firm can increase profits by exploiting these surpluses Price discrimination • Price discrimination: products with identical costs are sold in different markets at different prices the ratio of price to marginal cost differs for similar products Conditions for price discrimination – the markets in which the products are sold must by separated (no resale between markets) – the demand curves in the market must have different elasticities Price discrimination • First degree price discrimination – seller can identify where each consumer lies on the demand curve and charges each consumer the highest price the consumer is willing to pay – allows the seller to extract the greatest amount of profits – requires a considerable amount of information Caveats: • In practice, transactions costs and information constraints make this difficult to implement perfectly (but car dealers and some professionals come close). • Price discrimination won’t work if consumers can resell the good. Price discrimination • Second degree price discrimination – differential prices charged by blocks of services – requires metering of services consumed by buyers Price discrimination • Third degree price discrimination – customers are segregated into different markets and charged different prices in each – segmentation can be based on any characteristic such as age, location, gender, income, etc Price discrimination • Examples of price discrimination • doctors • telephone calls • theaters • hotel industry Price discrimination • Tying arrangement: a buyer of one product is obligated to also buy a related product from the same supplier – illegal in some cases – one explanation: a device to ‘meter’ demand for tied product – other explanations of tying • quality control • efficiencies in distribution • evasion of price controls Nonmarginal pricing • Cost-plus pricing: price is set by first calculating the variable cost, adding an allocation for fixed costs, and then adding a profit percentage or markup Problems with cost-plus pricing • calculation of average variable cost • allocation of fixed cost • size of the markup Other pricing practices • Price skimming – the first firm to introduce a product may have a temporary monopoly and may be able to charge high prices and obtain high profits until competition enters • Penetration pricing – selling at a low price in order to obtain market share Other pricing practices • Prestige pricing – demand for a product may be higher at a higher price because of the prestige that ownership bestows on the owner • Psychological pricing – demand for a product may be quite inelastic over a certain range but will become rather elastic at one specific higher or lower price Two-Part Pricing • When it isn’t feasible to charge different prices for different units sold, but demand information is known, two-part pricing may permit you to extract all surplus from consumers. • Two-part pricing consists of a fixed fee and a per unit charge. – Example: Athletic club memberships. How Two-Part Pricing Works Price 1. Set price at marginal cost. 2. Compute consumer surplus. 3. Charge a fixed-fee equal to consumer surplus. Fixed Fee = Profits = $16 10 8 6 Per Unit 4 Charge MC 2 D 1 2 3 4 5 Quantity Block Pricing • The practice of packaging multiple units of an identical product together and selling them as one package. • Examples – Paper. – Six-packs of soda. – Different sized of cans of green beans. Commodity Bundling • The practice of bundling two or more products together and charging one price for the bundle. • Examples – – – – Vacation packages. Computers and software. Film and developing. Cable television – MTV and Learning Channel Peak-Load Pricing • When demand during peak times is higher than the capacity of the firm, the firm should engage in peak-load pricing. • Charge a higher price (PH) during peak times (DH). • Charge a lower price (PL) during off-peak Price MC PH DH PL MRH MRL QL DL Q H Quantit y Cross-Subsidies • Prices charged for one product are subsidized by the sale of another product. • May be profitable when there are significant demand complementarities effects. • Examples – Browser and server software. – Drinks and meals at restaurants. Pricing in Markets with Intense Price Competition • Price Matching – Advertising a price and a promise to match any lower price offered by a competitor. – No firm has an incentive to lower their prices. – Each firm charges the monopoly price and shares the market. • Randomized Pricing – A strategy of constantly changing prices. – Decreases consumers’ incentive to shop around as they cannot learn from experience which firm charges the lowest price. – Reduces the ability of rival firms to undercut a firm’s prices. Cannibalization Occurs when sale of one product reduces the demand for another product with a higher incremental margin e.g. business travelers flying on restricted economy class fares wealthy families buying basic sedans instead of high end luxury cars • Fundamental reason for cannibalization is that seller cannot discriminate directly. • The discriminating variable does not perfectly separate the buyer segments. Conclusion • First degree price discrimination, block pricing, and two part pricing permit a firm to extract all consumer surplus. • Commodity bundling, second-degree and third degree price discrimination permit a firm to extract some (but not all) consumer surplus. • Simple markup rules are the easiest to implement, but leave consumers with the most surplus and may result in doublemarginalization. • Different strategies require different information.