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“Resolved: Individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.” .............................................. 2
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 2
PART 1: A HISTORY OF CONCEPTS ............................................................................................................... 2
Research Guide ......................................................................................................................................... 9
Definitions ............................................................................................................................................... 12
Affirmative Case ...................................................................................................................................... 15
Negative .................................................................................................................................................. 20
Affirmative Blocks ................................................................................................................................... 25
Individuals Are Necessary in Evaluating Moral Obligations .................................................................... 26
A2: Consequentialism ............................................................................................................................. 27
Moral Obligations Require Doing Something Good, Not Just Not Doing Something Bad ...................... 28
Nihilism Causes Moral Oppression and Coercion ................................................................................... 29
Free Will isn’t Hindered by Moral Obligations........................................................................................ 30
Negative blocks ....................................................................................................................................... 32
“Assistance” Can Be Detrimental and Should Be Minimized .................................................................. 33
Foreign Aid Doesn’t Solve Root Issues and Can Cause Problems ........................................................... 34
Morality is Judged on Results (Consequentialism) ................................................................................. 35
Greatest Good for Greatest Number is Most Moral (Util) ...................................................................... 36
Morality Invokes Religion, Problematic .................................................................................................. 37
The Concept of Morality Itself Causes Violence, Conflicts ..................................................................... 38
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“Resolved: Individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in
need.”
Hanne Jensen
Whitman College
Introduction
What we as individuals owe our fellow man has long been in question. The very nature of most societies demands
a certain give and take, especially when it comes to rights. Living in a world with such discrepancies in standards of
living creates gaps which are impossible to ignore. But in a culture that values autonomy and self reliance, subjects
such as welfare, charity, and social services often produce wide variations of responses. In the past ten years a
variety of natural disasters have resulted in organizations imploring Americans to donate time and money.
Between Hurricane Katrina, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, earthquakes in Japan and Haiti, and other tragedies
around the world, people around the world are bombarded (albeit for a short period of time) with requests for
their assistance, especially in America. Of course they are met with mixed reactions: many feel that it is our duty
to help those who are in desperate need, whereas some feel it necessary to ask questions before offering
assistance. The role large agencies play is often one of contention, as well as what need is to be remedied. The
appropriate response felt by most people may differ between sending money to aid Haitians and handing a
homeless person a sandwich.
Obviously, many of these complications will ensue with such a universally relevant topic. It is important that you
keep each word in mind as you prepare your cases. What constitutes need, and who decides when a person is in
need? What actions are individuals limited to: are they permitted to contribute groups in order to assist those in
need? What does it mean to be morally obligated to do something, and does having a moral obligation require
action? Does the term “people” necessitate a universal approach to assistance? The way each term is interpreted
changes the way the resolution will function, both on the affirmative and the negative.
The issue this topic addresses is one of the most fundamental humanity has ever known, yet one that demands the
viewer take a certain stand. It calls for an addressing of values that will inevitably produce some sort of clash,
conflicting ideologies. At its most basic, the affirmative will call into question our civic and humanitarian duties,
whereas the negative will ask the questions of the effects this will have on people’s autonomy, well being, and
assistance from other sources.
Apart from the resources included in this brief designed to assist additional inquiries this topic will no doubt raise,
there are sample affirmative and negative cases with extensions to be utilized as examples or starting points for
continuing research. But before beginning such an exploration of the topic, the following essay is available in
order to answer some of the questions already raised, as well as to appropriately complicate matters. This
examination is divided into three main parts: first, a more involved history of the concepts involved and the views
of the philosophers who examined them; second, a brief discussion some affirmative strategies and how they
might be employed; and third, a look at the negative strategies and their potential usage.
PART 1: A HISTORY OF CONCEPTS
Niccolò Machiavelli (c. 1469-1527) was an Italian philosopher, writer, and one of the first political theorists to
advocate political realism. He argued that a true ruler must be harsh, even tyrannical, in order to maintain power:
it is better to be feared than loved. Machiavelli was one of the first people to write about what would later
become political science, and his works called into question what a ruler owes his people. His writings in The
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Prince gave foundation to many developments in philosophy and political science, not the least of which led to
discussions and insight developed by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (c. 1588-1679).
Hobbes initially was an advocate of the absolute sovereign, much like the rulers Machiavelli wrote of. However,
Hobbes claimed that every individual power that a sovereign has is given to him by his people. This is sometimes
considered to be the birth of a social contract: the people allow their rights to be slightly limited in order to gain
security and prosperity as a group. Hobbes also theorized that all men are born as natural equals, that there are
no special rights given to the wealthy or privileged by the grace of their birth, only but the nature of these social
contracts. He also advocated that each man has rights independent of the group and that those should be taken
into account when ruling as well. If considering that each man has rights and was born equal to all others, then it
would be difficult to justify not providing assistance to people who are in need of assistance.
After Hobbes came John Locke (1632-1704), an English philosopher commonly regarded as the Father of
Liberalism. Locke’s philosophy is important to this topic in three main areas: first, his work on the social contract
theory; second, his idea of the self and where the knowledge of ethical and intellectual decision making comes
from; and third, his theories on natural rights. Perhaps most relevant to the social contract discussion (as well as
American history) is Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. Like Hobbes, Locke postulated that the state was
formed to protect the people’s rights and should only be formed willingly and with consent by the governed.
However, he argued that in the state of nature, man isn’t cruel or primitive, but rational and reasonable. It is only
that we have the ability to become less so that a government is needed. Locke’s interpretation of political theory
relies much more on the notion that mankind has all of the ability to govern itself, but allows government to exist
for the sake of the good of all. It is most likely Locke’s theory which inspired James Madison to say “if men were
angels, no government would be necessary.”1 If the sole purpose of government rests in its ability to protect and
assist the citizens who created it, then it would seem that individual action is less important than government
action, and it would perhaps be more beneficial to those in need to be assisted by the larger body comprised of
more power.
Also important from Locke’s philosophy, though, is his concept of the self. Locke argued that all people are born
tabula rasa, a blank slate. In other words, they are not born with any innate feelings or ideas, everything is learned
from existing in the world and sensory development. Locke defines the self as “that conscious thinking thing,
(whatever substance, made up of whether spiritual, or material, simple, or compounded, it matters not) which is
sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as
that consciousness extends.”2 Locke is one of the first philosophers to address the capability and will of the self as
opposed to the sole will of the monarch or merely the group. If individuals are capable of consciousness, then they
are capable of understanding that around them and forming opinions based on those surrounding events. By
extension, opinions allow preferable ways of acting and being acted upon. Thus individuals also have the ability to
form their own will and their own courses of actions. It could then be argued that if they have the ability to correct
a wrong that their government is not correcting, that they should in fact correct it. In this way, an affirmative
advocacy is aligned with the basic premises of the Declaration of Independence.
Locke’s theories on natural rights indicated that all people are born with certain rights which should not be taken
away from them by force. His insights on this area of philosophy influenced many others and instigated an indepth inquisition as to what constitutes human nature and what humans are entitled to. Perhaps most influential
in this school of thought is Scottish thinker David Hume (1711-1776). Hume sought to seek a scientific explanation
of human nature. Most relevant could be his discussion of moral responsibility. Hume argued that “Actions are,
by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and
1
Madison, James. "Federalist 51." Independent Journal(1788): n. pag. Web. 7 Jul 2011.
<http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm> .
2
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Roger Woolhouse. New York: Penguin Books (1997),
p. 307.
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disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if
evil.”3 In other words, if a good deed is done without the cause of it being embedded in the individual doer, then
no good that results from the action is warranted. Similarly, if a person does not contain the inherent
characteristics which cause evil in the world and the evil is merely done in an action of happenstance, then the evil
repercussions are not attributable to that individual. This idea gets at one of the more complicated parts of the
resolution: what it means to have a moral obligation. It is possible for the affirmative to interpret the resolution as
saying that individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need whenever they are in need, however need
is defined. This is unlikely though, as it would create very difficult limits for any realistic implementation. The
negative would be much more likely to say that any individual action is not going to fulfill the moral obligation
aspect of the resolution because it is necessary that persons obtain good characteristics in order to perform any
meaningful good deed.
This idea is extremely important and relates back to the idea of eternal return. The premise of the idea is that the
world continues to recur infinitely in more or less the same form, meaning that individual action is meaningless if it
does not continue to recur as well. Thus, if a person only does something evil once and it does not become
embedded in their actions or the actions of others to continue on this pattern, it will not have any significant affect
on the fabric of human existence, rendering it obsolete. The same goes for any positive action. This philosophy
has been met with resistance, largely because it renders most human lives obsolete as well. In order to ascribe to
this framework, it would be necessary to view ethics with a larger scope. Taking this into account, it is possible to
argue that individual action bears no consequence, making any affirmative advocacy moot.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a German philosopher, is perhaps the most important writer on moral imperatives.
His four formulations on morality are considered to be largely comprehensive as well as enduring. The first
formulation is the Formula of Universal Law: “Always act according to that maxim whose universality as a law you
can at the same time will" and is the "only condition under which a will can never come into conflict with itself.”4 In
other words, if a person decides to live by a certain philosophy or lifestyle, it is imperative that they imagine what
would happen if all people lived by the same philosophy or lifestyle. If the results of this exercise are not irrational,
if such a world could exist and function appropriately, then that philosophy/lifestyle is permissible in the real
world. If not, it is not.
This is an interesting way to set up the problem with the individual aspect of the resolution. What one individual is
able to give in order to assist people in need may not be what all individuals can give.
There are countless other philosophers whose ideas are not only relevant but also useful to understanding the full
implications of this topic. Of course further research and exploration is encouraged.
PART 2: AFFIRMATIVE STRATEGIES
At first glance, it may seem hard to argue against helping those who need help. However, it could end up being a
lot more intensive and complicated than originally thought. Setting out to prove a moral obligation of anything is
difficult, especially because the term “morals” is so difficult to define. All that aside, there are still many different
successful approaches to be taken on the affirmative.
First, examine the concept of the individual. It seems as though the resolution is specifically breaking down the
possibility of large organizations to help the needy (including Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, and various
state governments). However, understanding the full aspects of individual action is necessary to expanding
possible limits of the resolution. The action of the individual could be to volunteer at a hospital, to give money to
the homeless personally, or even to donate five dollars to natural disaster relief overseas. Each of these actions is
3
4
Hume, D. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 161
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Lewis White Beck. Berlin, 1902–38, p. 437.
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helping to assist those in need, whether it is through a group or strictly personally. The point of the resolution is to
require that that decision be made by the individual, as it is the individuals’ obligation, not the organizations’.
Second, look to the word assist. Assist does not necessarily require alleviation of need or complete solvency of
problems: it means to assist. A person who gives a hungry man a sandwich has not solved world hunger, nor have
they even solved the hungry man’s hunger permanently. But they have provided assistance to a person in need.
Keeping this is mind, it would be very difficult for a negative advocate to argue that we should not assist those in
need simply because it will not permanently fix anything: it does not have to permanently fix anything. The moral
obligation is centered more around the action of providing the assistance, of reaching out to fellow people
because they cannot provide for themselves. Thus the moral obligation can be fulfilled with small acts that do not
harm the benefactor in any way.
Third, consider the word people. This can be tricky, as people could mean either a number of individuals, a
collective group identifying as one, or the human race in general. Each way you take the term “people” to mean
can provide a different set of arguments. Attempting to help the entire human race could be weighty, and it is
difficult to argue that an individual has a moral obligation to assist the entire human race. Interpreting people as
meaning a collective group, such as victims of genocide in Darfur, would require again that an individual assist a
group, although this is much more realistic and possibly even a requirement by certain moral codes. The easiest to
argue is to think of people as synonymous with persons. It would be difficult to limit the obligation of an individual
to helping another individual in any event; rather, individuals have an obligation to help people whether that turns
into helping one individual multiple times or helping numerous individuals once a piece. It is not difficult to ask
one person to help another a few times over the course of a life.
Fourth to weigh and consider is the term “in need”. What does it mean to be in need? A child may be in need of
money in order to buy candy. A woman may be in need of protective laws in order to achieve equality. A man
may be in need of a blanket in order to keep warm. It is tricky to discern what in need means unless you know
what the “in order to” clause demands. Since it is not specified by the resolution, it is up to interpretation. A
logical way of tackling that question is to assume that the people in question need assistance in order to achieve or
maintain a certain way of life. This is broad, and could include civil rights, necessities of survival, emotional states
of being, or even simple autonomy. By keeping what need means to having a variety of uses keeps the resolution
more attainable and realistic: a person may then fulfill their moral obligation by protecting a victim of a hate crime
or by helping a lost child find their way home.
How need is defined is also a somewhat slippery issue. Whether a person’s need is determined by themselves or
by an on-looker could go either way. In order to avoid certain traps of oppressive rule or even biopolitical issues
that the negative could raise, it is often better to stick with need determined by the person allegedly in need,
rather than someone else deciding that a person’s standard of living is unacceptable. True, this creates issues
pertaining to persons incapable of knowing they may have a need (children, oppressed persons, the mentally
deficient), but it also avoids the issue of individuals thrusting their own personal morals onto others (a religious
zealot deciding that America is “in need” of a paradigm shift via the bombing of national landmarks). Upholding
the right of people to lead their own lives and make their own decisions gets to the heart of autonomy, a central
characteristic in the doctrine of Western rights.
Finally, perhaps the most complicated aspect of the resolution is the moral obligation. Defining universal morals
has always been problematic. Dictating what is right for all people to do at all times is next to impossible.
However, if you construct your arguments taking the above mentioned terms into account, it should be doable to
argue logically that people in need should be assisted by those who can help them. Staying away from any specific
moral philosophies could prove beneficial: the term is vague in reality and for once may be more useful if it is
vague in a round. Keep in mind also that having an obligation to do something does not necessarily guarantee it
will be done. Trying to enforce good deeds on all individuals is simply not realistic: arguing that all individuals
should be doing good deeds is a much more winnable argument.
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After knowing which angles to approach the resolution’s terms from, it is time to look to some overarching
strategies to be used.
It is important to keep in mind what the affirmative advocacy is attempting to promote. Possible values may
include justice, equality, individualism, morality, and quality of life.
By taking a stance in order to uphold justice, it would be beneficial to center your case on the argument that all
people are born with the same rights; therefore, socio-economic status should not influence the quality of life that
people have. This would be taking a more socialistic approach, so be sure to predict a debate over the benefits
and harms of our capitalist society. If you wish to point out that upholding the resolution would enable a
restructuring of society in a beneficial way, then this would be a way to achieve that paradigm shift.
Equality would be perhaps an easier alternative while still focusing on the same issues. The philosophy that all
people are born equal and should have the same rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of property (Locke) would help
to advance the argument that society now inhibits our natural rights: the poor do not have the same ability to
acquire property as the upper-middle class, nor do they have the education background in order to ensure their
liberty in the event that their rights are usurped. The very resolution itself would be a way to attain the value, at
least partially.
Individualism could also work, prioritizing the individual over the state. By drawing focus back towards individual
action, the individual is emphasized as a more important actor in the overall state of the world. This would mark a
shift in current world thought that one person can’t make a difference. By advocating personal responsibility,
individual action would become a priority, even a moral obligation in more aspects of life than just the resolution.
Morality is a tricky one, as to have a clear value of morality would require a thorough and complete definition.
This would hurt a case which required the term moral obligation to remain somewhat loosely defined. If, however,
the value of morality can match up with a clearly defined moral obligation in the case, it would be very strong and
obviously attainable. The only problem remaining would be proving that the value of morality is more important
than values such as justice and equality.
Quality of life is perhaps one of the stronger, more overlooked values. Depending on what action is being
advocated as assisting those in need, it could also be a very easy value for an affirmative to attain. If the assistance
would indeed mark a significant change in the lives of those in need, it would probably instantly bolster their
quality of life. Many studies show that when the quality of living conditions for the underprivileged are improved,
crime rates go down, property values skyrocket, and so forth. These may not seem to be extremely important
changes, but they do affect everyone in a society, not just those who were given the assistance. Quality of life
would be improved for all living in the society.
Choosing a value to uphold as the affirmative is important: it dictates what stance you are taking. It is advisable to
choose a value before you define your terms.
PART 3: NEGATIVE STRATEGIES
It is important to remember that a negative case does not need to be strictly contradictory to the affirmative. If
the affirmative gives an example that giving medication to people with disease is good, it is not necessary to argue
that that would be bad. The negative strategy should be one that includes resolutional analysis, points out
problems with the weaker aspects of the affirmative interpretation, and advocates examples of possible
alternatives. To begin with, examine the aspects of the resolution.
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One of the biggest potential avenues for success on the negative is the term “moral obligation.” Trying to argue
that people are morally obligated to help others may sound easily defensible on the surface but in fact is not. In
most Western societies, people are born with a somewhat selfish mentality that they are not obligated to help
others: it would be nice to assist those in need, but is not required. For proof of this, look to the debates on
universal healthcare currently being argued in Congress. Few people want to use their earnings to be given to
those who did not earn them.
Other problems arise with moral obligation, including what will happen if everyone did feel they were required to
help those in need. The problem of special obligation would prevent any real change from occurring. Special
obligation refers to the tendency of people to help those that have a direct impact on their lives. For example, if a
man were walking down the road and saw two people lying down, both with broken legs, but one was his mother,
he would most likely help his mother. That is not to say that the other person is less deserving of medical
attention. In fact in most cases, if the man walking down the road came across a woman with two broken legs and
severe bleeding as well as his mother with a broken arm, he would probably still help his mother. He is still
assisting a person in need, but is ignoring greater problems in doing so. People will almost always help themselves
and those people who have an impact on their lives before or instead of helping those they have no attachment to.
The actors of the resolution, “individuals”, also pose a potential problem. By promoting individual action there is
no guarantee that organizational or governmental action won’t decline. Due to increasing debts worldwide, most
governments are snipping at social services and other programs that would assist people in need. Budget
constraints cause organizations to do what they can but not waste money on programs other groups are servicing.
If individuals do start to assist those in need, it is probable that the governments and organizations already
assisting those demographics would cut necessary funding or scale back on services provided. If the support is not
a continuous dedicated effort, it could turn out that having individuals’ support could hurt the causes.
Determining need is another way to complicate the resolution. The negative should point out the problem of who
determines need. If a person must state that they are in need to be in need, then all people who are unable to ask
for help would not be considered in need. This could exclude individuals who are mentally or physically
handicapped, undereducated, oppressed, children, and more from receiving assistance. On the other hand, if
need is determined by those who would be assisting others, then a person’s rights are potentially in question.
There are countless times that the views of what the majority considers to be right and good have ended up
hurting the minority (i.e. slavery). It could even be argued that sometimes people could expressly refuse
assistance even if it could be beneficial for them (i.e. drug addicts or abused children). Pointing out the problem of
determining need can help a case in negation of the resolution.
The negative should be sure to press the affirmative on the question of what establishes assistance. Is assistance
an attempt to solve a problem, a partial solution, a complete solution, or a permanently complete solution? If a
billionaire were to give every hungry person a sandwich, he would be completely solving world hunger, but it
would not be permanent. If a child were to give a homeless woman a blanket, her being cold would be possibly
permanently solved, but it would just be that one woman. However the negative chooses to define assist is very
important. If it must be universal and permanent, then it is most likely never going to be achievable and therefore
no individual could rationally have that moral obligation, making the resolution negatively weighted.
There are many ways to approach the resolution from the negative, but it is important to emphasize whichever
value is chosen. The affirmative will probably be advocating something very humanitarian, seemingly good for all.
The negative should point out that without values like autonomy, social contract theory, utilitarianism, and
freedom, society as we know it would probably cease to function.
Autonomy could in fact be the most important and versatile value for the negative. It encompasses both the giver
and receiver of assistance. By valuing autonomy, the resolution is essentially being negated. It is an advocacy that
preferences individual action unaided by others in order to be able to live life by one’s own terms. By arguing that
individuals have a moral obligation to assist those in need, both the individuals’ autonomy and the autonomy of
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those in need is being infringed upon by creating a moral bridge in which both parties are subjected to a
relationship with the other. If an individual were to, by their own volition, assist someone, their autonomy would
not be compromised. It would in fact be strengthened. This is a difficult value to defend, though, as it could
create a very self-focused existence. Be prepared to argue that autonomy is necessary to construct any sort of free
society.
Upholding the social contract theory may seem at first to be an unusual choice for a value but it could also be very
effective. According to most modern political theory, government exists to serve the people it represents. If there
are people in need, no individual necessarily has an obligation to help another if the organization that they
constructed will not help. There is a social contract between the people and the government, and requiring that
the government continue to uphold its end of the deal (providing for the needs of the people) is something that
falls to the responsibility of the people. If the people do not hold the government to its obligations, then they may
as well not exist at all. Assisting those in need certainly falls under those obligations. By this logic, individual
action is a small justification of government lapse. Of course, it is possible to modify this argument to fit also as a
value criterion. In either case, the negative should prepare for affirmative arguments such as the government
does not have the money or support to assist all persons in need, or that individual action should be coupled with
government action for maximum success.
If valuing utilitarianism, the negative should include an explanation of the special obligation problem. By
maintaining that it is most important to cause the greatest good to the greatest number, the resolution is
insufficient. People will naturally tend to help only those closest to them, causing neither the greatest good nor
assisting the greatest number. Utilitarianism can also be used as a criterion in order to uphold justice or equality,
though those values would be difficult to argue as the negative otherwise. When it comes to the problem of
assisting people in need, it would be hard to not take a utilitarian type approach and be able to prove that people
are being served with equality and justice.
Freedom is another way to frame the debate. If the negative chooses the value of freedom, it will be easier to
argue that people ought not to be obligated to do almost anything, much less assist others. If using this value, it is
important to define freedom not as absence of government, but absence of outwardly imposed moral obligations.
Each person should be free to define for themselves what their morals are and thence their obligation to uphold
them. This value is possibly one of the more effective values for the negative, especially if the case being used is
not one that contradicts the sentiments behind the affirmative advocacy but merely the strong wording of it.
Promoting the value of freedom in this sense would not be saying that assisting those in need is bad, but rather
that individuals are not morally obligated to do so.
Offering alternatives to the resolution could prove to be very effective. If the negative argued that governments
and organizations should provide assistance, that people should do their best when possible to provide assistance,
that resources should be made available to those who need them, or any numbers of alternatives were available, it
could be a positive strategy to point out the potential harshness of the resolution. Problematizing the resolution,
so to speak, is an excellent starting point for the negative advocate.
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Research Guide
Here is a compilation of helpful resources for individual research on the topic. Included are philosophical
encyclopedias for broad questions as well as more specific academic journal articles. Remember that if these
articles are not enough to look at the resources these authors used for their information and follow the trail back to
find a variety of other sources as well.
Fieser, James. Professor of Philosophy at University of Tennessee at Martin, “Ethics”, May 2009.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/
In order to obtain a holistic understanding of modern ethics, it is necessary to read more deeply
about the subject. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy is peer-reviewed, making it not only large
and easily accessible, but also legitimate and credible. Their article on ethics (especially those
developed by Kant) is thorough enough to give a clear view of the subject while maintaining readability.
Understanding ethics will help to define morality and moral obligations in all debates.
Stanford University, Plato Philosophy database. http://plato.stanford.edu/
For any questions that may arise given the topic, the best place to start is the Plato database.
Compiled by educators at Stanford and other qualified contributors, Plato has articles on almost every
major and minor problem in philosophy today. It is a good starting place for values, criterion, various
definitions, and background information. It also has the best explanation of the special obligation
problem.
Klosko, George. "Duties to assist others and political obligations." Politics, Philosophy & Economics 3.2 (2004):
143-159. Web. 9 Jul 2011.
<http://ejournals.ebsco.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/Direct.asp?AccessToken=5WN4W44T1YA7XRF67R7YA
9K8-1QYTRN69U&Show=Object>.
This article explores the difference between political duty and moral obligation and how the two may at
times overlap. For questions regarding government involvement in assisting those is need, this would be a very
helpful resource.
Overland, Gerhard. "Forced Assistance." Law and Philosophy 28. (2009): 203-232. Web. 9 Jul 2011.
<http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=b11d8ff1-0403-4ac8a243-b0e7036fa78f%40sessionmgr111&vid=5&hid=107>.
A moral obligation is indeed something personal that each person must feel for themselves. However in
practice many people do not act according to their moral obligations unless prompted to do so. This article
examines the ethics of coerced assistance to persons in need and illustrates its points using many practical
examples.
Risse, Mathias. "Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification." Ethics and International Affairs 19.1
(2005): 9-18. Web. 9 Jul 2011.
<http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=107&sid=b11d8ff1-0403-4ac8a243-b0e7036fa78f%40sessionmgr111&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=phl&AN=PHL2070300>.
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Dr. Risse here discusses the difference between assistance and rectification. Assistance implies that the
benefactor would come from outside the situation in order to help the beneficiary, whereas rectification addresses
a wrong which was committed by one party on the other and is then attempted to be fixed. His thesis is that the
world order is not unjust, but rather incompletely just: it is on the right track but not yet completely successful.
The discrepancies between assistance and rectification is something to be considered for this debate.
Ottoni-Wilhelm, Mark. "Giving to Organizations That Help People in Need: Differences Across Denominations."
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 49.3 (2010): 389-412. Web. 9 Jul 2011.
http://ejournals.ebsco.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/Direct.asp?AccessToken=954I5II8XMXJDD1P4K9PPMJPZ
ZPM8X41J9&Show=Object
Although this topic does not explicitly address religion or religious obligations, this article is still quite
relevant. Using the statistical evidence of the Jewish demographic being more likely to contribute to charitable
giving practices as an example, the question is raised as to whether people would be more or less likely to give
based on demographic, whether it be religious affiliation, ethnicity, geographic location, or (most likely) socioeconomic class. If morals are to be determined largely by the individual, and if certain demographics have
different ideas as to what constitutes appropriate giving, then if the decision as to how to assist those in need is
left to the individual, they will have different outputs of assistance.
Iltis, Ana. "Understanding Moral Obligation in the Face of Moral Pluralism." Journal of Value Inquiry 37.4 (2003):
471-481. Web. 10 Jul 2011.
<http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/pqdweb?index=0&did=575822021&SrchMode=1&sid=1
&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1310274871&clientId=48453>.
Ana Iltis of St. Louis University does a magnificent job of explaining why moral obligations are completely
unfeasible. The fact that morality itself is a simulacratic issue, one which seems to have an image but has no real
basis in reality (see Jean Baudrillard), helps to show how having billions of people on the planet makes it
impossible to have a clear definition. Each person interprets morality through their own conception of it, while no
real manifestation of morality exists.
Krasnoff, Larry. "Autonomy and Plurality." Philosophical Quarterly 60.241 (2010): 673-691. Web. 10 Jul 2011.
<http://ejournals.ebsco.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/Direct.asp?AccessToken=5WN4444TRZPSQYJJW66BQS
UPZYPBTRN69U&Show=Object>.
The importance of autonomy in Western culture is prominent in almost every major decision made. The
problem of the dominant culture is that there are so many people involved with individual wills that accepting
each form of autonomy is difficult to manage. This article discusses the relationship between the value of
autonomy and the overwhelming plurality which makes up modern life.
Hooker, Brad. "Rule-Consequentialism and Obligations Toward the Needy." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79.1
(1998): 19-33. Web. 10 Jul 2011.
<http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=41&hid=107&sid=b11
d8ff1-0403-4ac8-a243-b0e7036fa78f%40sessionmgr111>.
This article examines the importance of rule consequentialism in the quest for understanding any moral
obligations there may be to people in need. Rule consequentialism, the philosophy that the consequences of
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upholding certain ethical rules should determine the choice of rules themselves, stands in contrast to many
deontological frameworks. An understanding of this lesser practiced philosophy is necessary for making informed
decisions as either the affirmative or negative as to what actually constitutes a moral obligation and when in fact
that should be enforced.
Jeske, Diana. "Families, Friends, and Special Obligations." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28.4 (1998): 527-555.
Web. 10 Jul 2011.
<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/stable/pdfplus/40232035.pdf?acceptTC=true>.
Jeske maintains that we do have a special obligation to our family and friends and discusses the difference
between being born into a certain relationship (i.e. being a daughter) as opposed to voluntarily entering into a
special relationship (friendship). Her explanation of how promises form these relationships is an interesting take
and perhaps could help in a distinction on why special obligations will always trump obligations to the generic
needy.
"Giving Statistics." Charity Navigator. Giving USA 2011, 2011. Web. 10 Jul 2011.
<http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=42>.
This site has some useful statistics on charities and charitable giving in the United States over the past
year. Using this information as a guideline as to what donations are like in the status quo, it will be easier to
discern what people are willing to give of their own volition, at least as far as organizations go. It is unlikely that
those figures will increase simply because people have a moral obligation in this economic climate.
"individualism." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011. Web.
10 Jul. 2011. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/286303/individualism>.
For more information as to what constitutes an individual, it is hard to go wrong with Encyclopaedia
Britannica. This article discusses what an individual is as well as what the moral good to individualism is and why it
would be important for individuals to act in contrast to solely groups. Certain actions carry more moral weight
when done by individuals and sometimes individuals can add certain elements to actions that are not present in
group work; understanding this would be very helpful for not only affirmative case construction but also negative
blocks.
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Definitions
Individual
Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/individual)
a particular being or thing as distinguished from a class, species, or collection: as (1) : a single human
being as contrasted with a social group or institution <a teacher who works with individuals> (2) : a single
organism as distinguished from a group
Bing Dictionary (http://www.bing.com/Dictionary/search?q=define+individual&FORM=DTPDIA)
1. specific person: a specific person, distinct from others in a group
"belief in the individual's right to self-expression"
2. any person: a human being, or a person of a specified type
"a panel consisting of four individuals"
"a very unfortunate individual"
3. separate thing: a separate entity or thing
4. [biology] separate organism: an independent organism separate from a group
"The plant part contains the embryo, which gives rise to a new individual."
Although “individuals” is clearly not the most contentious term in the resolution, it is important to decide whether
or not to emphasize that individual is separate from a group. If so, the Merriam-Webster definition is probably the
best bet, but if the desired goal is to not draw attention to potential mutual exclusivity arguments, it may be
preferable to go with Bing’s second definition.
Moral obligation
The Electric Law Library (http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/m142.htm)
A duty which one owes, and which he ought to perform, but which he is not legally bound to fulfil.These
obligations are of two kinds 1st. Those founded on a natural right; as, the obligation to be charitable,
which can never be enforced by law. 2d. Those which are supported by a good or valuable antecedent
consideration; as, where a man owes a debt barred by the act of limitations, this cannot be recovered by
law, though it subsists in morality and conscience; but if the debtor promise to pay it, the moral obligation
is a sufficient consideration for the promise, and the creditor may maintain an action of assumpsit, to
recover the money.
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Moral
Bing Dictionary (http://www.bing.com/dictionary/search?q=definition of moral
&qpvt=definition+of+moral+&FORM=Z7FD)
1. involving right and wrong: relating to issues of right and wrong and to how individual people should
behave
2. derived from personal conscience: based on what somebody's conscience suggests is right or wrong,
rather than on what rules or the law says should be done
3. according to common standard of justice: regarded in terms of what is known to be right or just, as
opposed to what is officially or outwardly declared to be right or just
"a moral victory."
4. encouraging goodness and decency: giving guidance on how to behave decently and honorably
5. good by accepted standards: good or right, when judged by the standards of the average person or
society at large
6. able to tell right from wrong: able to distinguish right from wrong and to make decisions based on that
knowledge
7. based on personal conviction: based on an inner conviction, in the absence of physical proof
"moral certainty"
Obligation
Bing Dictionary (http://www.bing.com/Dictionary/search?q=definition+of+obligation&form=QB)
1. duty: something that must be done because of legal or moral duty
2. state of being obligated: the state of being under a moral or legal duty to do something
3. gratitude owed: something that somebody owes in return for something given, e.g. assistance or a favor
4. [law] binding legal agreement: a legal agreement by which somebody is bound to do something,
especially pay a specified amount of money
5. [law] legal contract: a legal document such as a mortgage or bond that contains the terms of an
obligation, usually including a penalty for failing to fulfill it
Included here together are the definitions of “moral obligation,” “moral,” and “obligation.” The first definition of
the combined terms is probably the most useful as it considers both terms in relation to each other as opposed to
separately. Needless to say, it also will take less time to explain in a round. If, however, the case is constructed so
to have significant debate into what constitutes a moral action or what an obligation is, it might be advisable to
define each word individually.
Assist
Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assist?show=0&t=1310331776)
transitive verb: to give usually supplementary support or aid to <assisted the boy with his lessons>
intransitive verb: to give support or aid <assisted at the stove> <another surgeon assisted on the
operation>
The Free Dictionary (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/assist)
To give help or support to, especially as a subordinate or supplement; aid: The clerk assisted the judge by
looking up related precedents. Her breathing was assisted by a respirator.
For arguments requiring that assistance be considered generic help of any size, using the verb in the intransitive
form is preferable. For arguments that assistance would be used supplementally, use the verb in the transitive
form. Technically, the use of assist in the resolution implies a transitive grammatical structure anyway.
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People
Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/people)
1. plural : human beings making up a group or assembly or linked by a common interest
2. plural : human beings, persons —often used in compounds instead of persons <salespeople> —often used
attributively <people skills>
3. plural : the members of a family or kinship
4. plural : the mass of a community as distinguished from a special class <disputes between the people and
the nobles> —often used by Communists to distinguish Communists from other people
5. plural peoples : a body of persons that are united by a common culture, tradition, or sense of kinship, that
typically have common language, institutions, and beliefs, and that often constitute a politically organized
group
6. lower animals usually of a specified kind or situation
7. the body of enfranchised citizens of a state
thinkexist.com (http://thinkexist.com/dictionary/meaning/people/)
1. (n.) One's subjects; fellow citizens; companions; followers.
2. (n.) Persons, generally; an indefinite number of men and women; folks; population, or part of
population; as, country people; -- sometimes used as an indefinite subject or verb, like on in French,
and man in German; as, people in adversity.
3. (n.) One's ancestors or family; kindred; relations; as, my people were English.
4. (n.) The mass of comunity as distinguished from a special class; the commonalty; the populace; the
vulgar; the common crowd; as, nobles and people.
5. (n.) The body of persons who compose a community, tribe, nation, or race; an aggregate of
individuals forming a whole; a community; a nation.
There are a surprising number of definitions of the term “people.” Avoid using MW’s definitions #3-6 and
thinkexist’s #1, 3-5 unless there is a clear purpose for attributing people to a specific group. The familial definitions
can be useful for justifications of special obligation but otherwise, as there is no clear mention of possessives in the
resolution, there should be a reason before the definition is employed as such.
Need
Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/need?show=0&t=1310333064)
1. a : a lack of something requisite, desirable, or useful
b : a physiological or psychological requirement for the well-being of an organism
2. a condition requiring supply or relief
3. lack of the means of subsistence : poverty
Dictionary.com (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/need)
1. a requirement, necessary duty, or obligation: There is no need for you to go there.
2. a lack of something wanted or deemed necessary: to fulfill the needs of the assignment.
3. urgent want, as of something requisite: He has no need of your charity.
Merriam-Webster’s second definition is probably the most accurate definition in the context of the resolution. If,
however, the goal is to argue that a need is something specific, be it food or biological necessities as opposed to an
emotional state of contentment, etc, it may be preferable to use one of the other more directed definitions.
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Affirmative Case
Here is an example affirmative case which may be used as it is constructed, as a starting point for possible
additions, or even just as an example.
Introduction
As the world grows more populous, tight-knit communities become rarer and rarer. It is becoming more of an
individually focused world where no one owes anything to anyone but themselves. If everyone were completely
self sufficient, this would not be a problem. But in the modern world poverty, hunger, natural disasters, and other
compromising circumstances are making the likelihood that all people are living at an acceptable standard shrink
away. A world where there can be no trust in other people, no possibility of shared experience in life with other
people, is not a hospitable world for anyone. Each person has a duty to help with what then can when they can.
Because of this fact, individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.
Value
Quality of Life
World Bank, 2004
"Glossary." The World Bank Group.
. Web. 10 Jul 2011.
<http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/glossary.html>.
People's overall well-being. Quality of life is difficult to measure (whether for an individual, group, or nation) because in
addition to material well-being (see standard of living) it includes such intangible components as the quality of
the environment, national security, personal safety, and political and economic freedoms.
By assisting people in need, their quality of life will be improved because a wrong will be righted, their needs
aided. They are not the only ones who will benefit, however: when the overall needs of the community are
addressed, everyone benefits and a higher standard of living and quality of life is achieved for all. Without quality
of life, life itself is meaningless. Because of this, it is the first thing that should be valued.
Value Criterion
Individual Responsibility
"Wordnet." Princeton Wordnet 3.1. Princeton University, 2011. Web. 10 Jul 2011.
<http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=responsibility⊂=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4
=&h=>.
(the
social force that binds you to the courses of action demanded by that force) "we must instill a sense of
right implies a responsibility; every opportunity, an obligation; every possession,
a duty"- John D.Rockefeller Jr
duty in our children"; "every
Everyone has the ability to help and if everyone does their part, then everyone will reap the benefits. Advocating
individual responsibility is the only way that the quality of life can be raised to its fullest potential.
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Contention One: Without individual investment, communities deteriorate
A. Individual apathy on matters of communal interest will create discord.
The Atlantic, Internationally acclaimed social and political commentary periodical, March 1982
http://www.theatlantic.com/ideastour/archive/windows.html
We have difficulty thinking about such matters, not simply because the ethical and legal issues are so complex but because we
have
become accustomed to thinking of the law in essentially individualistic terms. The law defines my rights,
punishes his behavior and is applied by that officer because of this harm. We assume, in thinking this way, that what is good for
the individual will be good for the community and what doesn't matter when it happens to one
person won't matter if it happens to many. Ordinarily, those are plausible assumptions. But in cases where
behavior that is tolerable to one person is intolerable to many others, the reactions of the others-fear, withdrawal, flight--may ultimately make matters worse for everyone, including the individual
who first professed his indifference.
Taking other persons’ wants and needs into consideration when deciding what our actions will be is the only way
to make a truly cohesive society that will benefit everyone. If people are wholly self-centric, nothing can be
accomplished and no progress can be made.
B. Without assistance by individuals, communities will deteriorate; famous broken
windows theory proves.
The Atlantic, Internationally acclaimed social and political commentary periodical, March 1982
http://www.theatlantic.com/ideastour/archive/windows.html
Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford psychologist, reported in 1969 on some experiments testing the brokenwindow theory. He arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with its hood up on a street in the Bronx and a
comparable automobile on a street in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of its
"abandonment." The first to arrive were a family--father, mother, and young son--who removed the radiator and battery. Within twenty-four
hours, virtually everything of value had been removed. Then random destruction began--windows were smashed, parts torn off, upholstery
ripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult "vandals" were well-dressed, apparently clean-cut whites. The car in
Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon, passersby were joining in. Within
a few hours, the car had been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the "vandals" appeared to be primarily respectable whites.
Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder and even for people who
ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably consider themselves law-abiding.
Because of the nature of community life in the Bronx--its anonymity, the frequency with which cars are abandoned and things are stolen or
broken, the past experience of "no one caring"--vandalism begins much more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where people have come to
believe that private possessions are cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costly. But vandalism
can occur anywhere once
communal barriers--the sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility--are lowered by actions
that seem to signal that "no one cares." We suggest that "untended" behavior also leads to the breakdown
of community controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each
other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change, in a few years or even a
few months, to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is
smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in.
Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start
drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by
panhandlers.
A society that is not aware of itself as a group where individuals can affect the well-beings of others is one that will
slowly deteriorate. The opposite holds true as well: when people are invested in other people in the world, bonds
are formed which are symbiotically beneficial.
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C. Individual participation in communities and societies helps to improve quality of
life.
Robert Costanza et al, various leaders in the field of Anthropology, Sociology, etc. December 2008
For example, objective measures
include indices of economic production, literacy rates, life expectancy, and
other data that can be gathered without directly surveying the individuals being assessed. Objective
indicators may be used singly or in combination to form summary indexes, such as the UN’s Human Development Index (Sen, 1985; UNDP,
1998). While these
measurements may provide a snapshot of how well some physical and social needs
are met, they are narrow, opportunity-biased, and cannot incorporate many issues that contribute to
QOL such as identity, participation, and psychological security. It is also clear that these so-called “objective”
measures are actually proxies for experience identified through ”subjective” associations of decision-makers; hence the distinction between
objective and subjective indicators is somewhat illusory. Subjective indicators of
QOL gain their impetus, in part, from
the observation that many objective indicators merely assess the opportunities that individuals have
to improve QOL rather than assessing QOL itself. Thus economic production may best be seen as a means to a potentially
(but not necessarily) improved QOL rather than an end in itself. In addition, unlike most objective measures of QOL, subjective measures
typically rely on survey or interview tools to gather respondents’ own assessments of their lived experiences in the form of self-reports of
satisfaction, happiness, well-being or some other near-synonym. Rather than presume the importance of various life domains (e.g., life
expectancy or material goods), subjective measures can also tap the perceived significance of the domain (or “need”) to the respondent. Diener
and Suh (1999) provide convincing evidence that subjective indicators are valid measures of what people perceive to be important to their
happiness and well-being.
Action by governments and organizations are not enough to create true improvement in quality of life. Individual
action, individual care must be taken, because quality of life is not limited to just the basic physical needs that
comprise standards of living. Quality of life includes a semblance of connections between people, psychological
and emotional well being. Merely reaching out is assisting those in need.
Contention Two: Obligation is limited to ability and required of all
A. Kant instructs that the practical construction of morals insists that they must be
universalizable.
Garth Kemerling, contributor to the online philosophical dictionary philosophypages.com, 2003
http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5i.htm
Constrained only by the principle of universalizability, the practical reason of any rational being
understands the categorical imperative to be: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at
the same time will that it should become a universal law." That is, each individual agent regards itself
as determining, by its decision to act in a certain way, that everyone (including itself) will always act
according to the same general rule in the future. This expression of the moral law, Kant maintained, provides a concrete,
practical method for evaluating particular human actions of several distinct varieties.
It would be unreasonable to argue that some people should contribute and some should not. The fact is, everyone
can assist those in need, and they don’t have to (nor should they) go beyond their means to do so. Whether it is a
billionaire donating substantial sums to a charitable organization or a child sharing a piece of her sandwich with a
homeless person, both are contributing.
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B. Moral obligation does not depend on a certain position an individual occupies in
life.
Olufemu Badru, Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, December 2009
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7e70c8c7-36fa-47fa-ac65e76d59278270%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111
In other words, from the foregoing, the point is that while obligation
results from contract-like relations or simply
contractarianism between the self and the other, duty results from the fact of occupying a position of responsibility; duty
is a certain job of value expected of a person who occupies the position.
Moral obligations do not arise from people earning or losing certain rights. The difference between duty and
obligation is that duty is something expected of a person because of who they are or what they are capable of
doing. Obligation is a relationship between a person and another, based on the nature that they are both people.
Contention Three: Special obligation is destructive to living in modern society
A. The “bad Samaritan” is morally reprehensible.
RJ Howard, MD, Surgeon University of Florida School of Medecine, August 2006
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=d03cba5c-eff1-4dd9-b7e2891a9cba96c4%40sessionmgr104&vid=2&hid=111
Feinberg would characterize one who refuses permission to recover organs as a ‘bad samaritan’.
A bad samaritan ‘is a stranger
standing in no “special relationship” to the endangered party; who omits to do something— warn of
unperceived peril, undertake rescue, seek aid, notify police, protect against further injury [provide organs
from deceased individuals]—for the endangered party; which he could have done without unreasonable cost
or risk to himself or others; as a result of which the other party suffers harm, or an increased risk of
harm and for these reasons the omitter is “bad” (morally blameworthy)’. Some countries in Europe
even have laws against the bad samaritan who fails to undertake easy rescue.
If we see that something is wrong and do not try to make it better when we have the capacity to do so, we are the
Bad Samaritan. We have a responsibility to do what we can if it does not create an “unreasonable cost or risk to
ourselves or others.” This is our responsibility as individuals, our moral obligation to improve the quality of life by
assisting people in need.
B. Persons have a right to be treated with respect regardless of their place of origin.
Olufemu Badru, Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, December 2009
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7e70c8c7-36fa-47fa-ac65e76d59278270%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111
Kant’s conception consists in the right
of a stranger not to be treated in a hostile manner by another upon his arrival on the other’s territory,
and this hospitable treatment is to continue so long as the stranger behaves peacefully, in the society
of his host.
Founding his justification on the right of common possession of the surface of the earth,
Whether a person is our neighbor or lives a million miles away, whether they are citizens or foreigners, all deserve
to be treated with equal respect. Often we will only help those people we are close to, or whose well being
directly affects us. This is the problem of special obligation, which stands in the way of improving the lives of the
needy.
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C. Special obligation is irrelevant, we have an obligation to help strangers just as much
as those we know.
RJ Howard, MD, Surgeon University of Florida School of Medecine, August 2006
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=d03cba5c-eff1-4dd9-b7e2891a9cba96c4%40sessionmgr104&vid=2&hid=111
Ross suggests that the
obligations of beneficence ‘rest on the mere fact that there are other beings in the
world whose condition we can make better’. I believe he would agree that we have an obligation to benefit
others, even persons we do not know.
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Negative
Introduction
It is not unique to the modern condition that there are people in need all around the world. Now and
throughout history, there have been times when people have had to rely on each other survive, much
less live happily and contentedly. There is no dispute about that. A clarification must be made, though.
While it is indeed formidable for one person to help another, to promote interpersonal relationships, it
is not required. No person owes another anything just by nature of being alive. To claim otherwise
would be to nullify basic concepts such as freedom, autonomy, and justice. It is with this in mind that I
argue individuals have no moral obligation to assist people in need.
Value
Freedom
"Wordnet." Princeton Wordnet 3.1. Princeton University, 2011. Web. 10 Jul 2011.
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=freedom
the condition of being free; the power to act or speak or think without externally imposed restraints
Freedom is a prerequisite to individuals having any individual power whatsoever. To determine what obligations
an individual has, they must first be considered free actors, otherwise any agency is removed from the question
and the discussion of moral obligation of individual action is moot.
Value Criterion
Autonomy
Dictionary.com online dictionary 2011
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/autonomy
independence or freedom, as of the will or one's actions: the autonomy of the individual.
In order to have truly free individuals, they must be autonomous, capable of making their own decision with their
own free will. Anything less would be a result of coercion of the exertion of one will onto another’s, an inherently
immoral act to begin with.
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Contention One: Individuals do not have a moral obligation to assist others.
A. While it is commendable to assist the distant needy, people are not morally
obligated to do so; it is supererogatory.
Olufemu Badru, Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, December 2009
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7e70c8c7-36fa-47fa-ac65e76d59278270%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111
the duty of assistance is very important to
Rawl’s internationalism. As stated in the earlier part of this work, it is the only principle that shows that the society of
peoples owes anything at all to the distant other in the sense of positive action to bring the peoples in
the burdened societies out of their problems. Laudable as this principle might have otherwise been, its central defect lies in
the supererogatory implication. The principle grants a duty that does not morally obligate society of
peoples to help the distant needy in those burdened societies. What it allows to get to those needy
peoples is just humanitarian services. Thus , the recipients of the assistance from the society of peoples
are deprived of any moral right to make a morally binding demand on the society of people if they fail
to fulfill this duty of assistance.
Although it is the last in the listing of the principles that under pin the society of peoples,
Although people in need may indeed have a right to receive aid, there is no obligation for individuals to give that
aid. Even though this seems somewhat contradictory, it is a question of moral obligation for separate individuals
and groups. People assisting those in need is laudable, it is not required.
B. The moral obligation to assist others is limited to not causing harm to ourselves.
RJ Howard, MD, Surgeon University of Florida School of Medecine, August 2006
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=d03cba5c-eff1-4dd9-b7e2891a9cba96c4%40sessionmgr104&vid=2&hid=111
In developing his thoughts about ‘the obligation to assist’, Peter Singer separates preventing evil from promoting good and contends ‘if
it is
in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of
comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it’. Slote argues that ‘one has an obligation to
prevent serious evil or harm when one can do so without seriously interfering with one’s life
plans or style and without doing any wrongs of commission’.
To further the point, there is no call for people to give in a way that will negatively affect them. Because they are
not obligated to give anything, there is no way to claim any specific “appropriate” amount. For a person to give
beyond their means or to negatively affect their ability to give in the future would be counterproductive to the
very nature of aid.
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Contention Two: Competent individuals have the right to make their own decisions.
A. Before autonomy can be usurped, incompetency to make decisions must be
determined.
TL Zutlevics, PhD in Philosophy Flinders University and PH Henning, MD Women’s and Children’s Hospital, Australia, December
2005 http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=6a64c405-eba3-4b9f-a4d3e99c550494e8%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111
If we are going to override someone’s autonomy the general view is that we should have very good reasons
before doing so. One such reason would be if the person were deemed incompetent to make a decision. It is permissible to act
in the interests of a person in a situation where they are deemed incompetent to make a decision.
An individual’s autonomy is key to their freedom, and therefore should not be mitigated by others. The liberties
we give up in order to live in a certain societies are exempt from this rule because they are sacrificed by the choice
of the individual. To impose a moral obligation on someone against their will would undermine their autonomy,
thus compromising their freedom.
B. Individuals should judge what they deem to be morally right and then act
accordingly
Larry Krasnoff, Professor of Philosophy at College of Charleston South Carolina, October 2010
http://ejournals.ebsco.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/Direct.asp?AccessToken=5WN4444TRZPSQYJJW66BQSUPZYPBTRN69U&Show=Object
Of course we ought
to do what we judge to be good, and of course we ought to do it because of its goodness. The
we ought to exercise
our autonomous judgment about what to believe, but just as certainly we ought to believe what we
judge to be true, independently of anything about ourselves. In the theoretical case, our thoughts are
necessarily directed towards objects beyond ourselves, and so the role of our will must be to
subordinate itself to our best judgments about the nature of the object.
model here is one of recognition, drawn without fundamental alteration from the case of belief. Certainly
Moral obligations must be the results of our reasoning and judgments. If that happens to coincide with the
reasoning and judgments of everyone else in the world, then of course we should do what we deem to be good.
But it is a decision that must be arrived at from within, not an externally advocated obligation.
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C. No moral obligation be universal in our culture, the only way it can be determined is
on an individual basis.
Ana Iltis, Center for Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University, 2003
http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/pqdweb?index=0&did=575822021&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=P
QD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1310274871&clientId=48453
The multiplicity of autonomous selves do not sustain a single standard of morality. MacIntyre argues that we
possess “the fragments of a conceptual scheme….We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use
many of the key expressions. But we have – very largely if not entirely – lost our comprehension, both
theoretical and practical, of morality.” The most striking feature of contemporary moral debates is “that they apparently can find no
terminus. There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture,” The ongoing debate
concerning the morality of immorality of abortion is a clear example of this lack of agreement or spectrum of views. There are significant
disputes concerning the moral and legal permissibility of abortion.
A successful account of moral integrity and moral
responsibility, therefore, cannot be universal but must be situated in a particular context. Absent a
universal understanding of morality, no single sense of moral obligation is available. There
appears to be no framework within which we may justifiably assert that all individuals are morally
obligated in particular ways beyond a limited set of side constraints we may recognize as universal . It
nevertheless is the case that we routinely wish to attribute moral obligations to individuals and to understand the moral obligations particular
persons bear. We
may understand particular individuals as having particular obligations only with an
appreciation of their moral characters and moral integrity. Moral character allows us to attribute
moral obligations, and moral integrity is the mechanism by which we can evaluate the extent to which
they satisfy the obligations.
As each person experiences reality in a very different way and holds different values in higher esteem than others
(examples include religion, politics, even this round), we each have different views of what constitutes moral
action. The concept of universal morality is an illusion, so saying that every individual has the same moral
obligation (to assist those in need) is laughable. Only individual morality can exist.
Contention Three: Mass individual giving is harmful to social reform
A. Charitable giving distracts from the real problem and PREVENTS opportunities for
lasting change.
BBC Ethics Guide, 2011
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/against_1.shtml
Indeed charitable giving
may even distract from finding the best solution - which might involve a
complex rethink of the way the world organises its economic relationships, and large-scale
government initiatives to change people's conditions. If that is so, then the effort put into charity might
be better devoted to pressuring governments to bring about needed change. And governments might be more
likely to focus on dealing with poverty if they weren't being helped by charities.
By attempting to fix the effects of injustice without addressing the cause, people are creating an endless cycle of
the very problems they are trying to prevent. Individuals do not have the capability to change the world alone;
they may affect some changes on the micro scale, but cannot solve for corrupt governments, failing economies, or
genocides. Larger action is needed to solve the root problems.
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B. An influx in charity spending results in a certain area, the government will cut
spending to areas that need it, stagnating growth.
BBC Ethics Guide, 2011
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/against_1.shtml
The argument goes something like this. If
the charity sector increases spending in an area also funded by
government then there is a risk that government will choose to spend less in that area with the result that
governments save money, and extra benefits provided by the charity spend are reduced.
When aid is given to a certain area of need by individuals, governments will stop sending as much assistance so
that they may afford to help in other areas, leaving large problems to individual assistance. Not only will benefits
that only the government can offer be cut, but also the stability of aid will be compromised. If individual aid shifts,
the area they were supporting will be left with nothing.
C. By individually assisting the needy, people will lose the desire to affect real
collective social reform and no real change will happen.
BBC Ethics Guide, 2011
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/against_1.shtml
This isn't a new argument: “ It is more
socially injurious for the millionaire to spend his surplus wealth in
charity than in luxury. For by spending it on luxury, he chiefly injures himself and his immediate circle, but by spending it in charity he
inflicts a graver injury upon society. For every act of charity, applied to heal suffering arising from defective
arrangements of society, serves to weaken the personal springs of social reform, alike by the
'miraculous' relief it brings to the individual 'case' that is relieved, and by the softening influence it
exercises on the hearts and heads of those who witness it. It substitutes the idea and the desire of
individual reform for those of social reform, and so weakens the capacity for collective self-help in
society,” (J A Hobson, Work and Wealth, 1914).
If people are satiated by donating their five dollars a month to the AIDS foundation, they will assume their moral
obligation has been “fulfilled” (and in some interpretations, it has). This will cause a complete stagnation of social
reform and the change needs to happen as advocated by the affirmative. Not only will individuals be less
passionate about assisting the needy, but governments will cease to be pressured as heavily to effect real change.
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Affirmative Blocks
Moral Obligations Don’t Discriminate Against People
Kant’s claims only justify assistance to people living in the territory of the assister, not
for all people everywhere.
Olufemu Badru, Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, December 2009
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7e70c8c7-36fa-47fa-ac65e76d59278270%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111
First, the Kantian conception of universal
hospitality only entail doing good to a stranger/foreigner when he is within the territory of the host.
Thus, Kantian universal hospitality should rather be rendered as ‘domestic hospitality towards strangers/foreigners.’ Second, following from
the first point, the Kantian conception of universal hospitality does not, and can even not, justify doing good in a
morally obligatory way to a distant needy, since this is outside its conceptual scope.
At least, two points are deducible from Kan’ts conception of universal hospitality.
Everyone has an obligation to assist people living in absolute poverty.
Squidoo.com, political and philosophical commentary website, 2011
http://www.squidoo.com/worldhunger#
In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, over 500
Million people are living in what the World Bank has defined as
"absolute poverty." When reading the title of this article, in knowing that 15 Million children die from hunger each year, how could
one possibly reject the idea that we have a moral obligation to help? In truth, many may think we do
have an obligation to the less fortunate. Yet, our actions often validate the arguments against helping
those in need. Is our wealth maintained by the exploitation of the innocent throughout the world? Is poverty a natural phenomenon? At
the very least, each citizen of the world owes this issue great consideration. Perhaps no one is innocent, we are all guilty of
failing to break poverty's endless cycle.
The moral obligation to assist people in need transcends time, location, and culture.
Thomas Pogge, German philosopher, Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at
Yale University, Jan-Mar 2000
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/stable/25115635?seq=2
Fourth, with respect
to these moral concerns, all human beings have equal status: They have exactly the
same human rights, and the moral significance of these rights and their fulfillment does not vary with
whose human rights are at stake. Fifth, human rights express moral concerns that are unrestricted, i.e.,
they ought to be respected by all human agents irrespective of their particular epoch, culture, religion,
moral tradition or philosophy. Sixth, these moral concerns are broadly sharable, i.e., capable of being understood and appreciated
by persons from different epochs and cultures as well as by adherents of a variety of different religions, moral traditions, and philosophies.
The notions of unrestrictedness and broad sharability are related in that we tend to feel more
confident about conceiving of a moral concern as unrestricted when this concern is not parochial to
some particular epoch, culture, religion, moral tradition or philosophy.
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Individuals Are Necessary in Evaluating Moral Obligations
Questions of morality are always ascribed to the individual.
Jan Narveson, ethics philosopher, 2002
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/stable/25115724?seq=2
The question for morals is always and fundamentally cast in individual terms: what is this, that, or the other
person to do? If we think that there are things which groups should do, those claims will say nothing to
anyone unless there is some way of understanding that individuals, such as members of that group of
persons affected by its behavior, have duties or rights or some other moral status in relation to it.
Individuals have a moral obligation to respect human rights, even if that means
disregarding other considerations.
Thomas Pogge, German philosopher, Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at
Yale University, Jan-Mar 2000
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/stable/25115635?seq=2
Persons have a moral duty to respect human rights, a duty that does not derive from a more general
moral duty to comply with national or international legal instruments. (In fact, the opposite may hold:
Conformity with human rights is a moral requirement on any legal order, whose capacity to create
moral obligations depends in part on such conformity.) Second, human rights express weighty moral
concerns, which normally override other normative considerations. Third, these moral concerns are focused on human
beings, as all of them and they alone have human rights and the special moral status associated therewith. Fourth, with respect to these moral
concerns, all human beings have equal status: They have exactly the same human rights, and the moral significance of these rights and their
fulfillment does not vary with whose human rights are at stake. Fifth, human rights express moral concerns that are unrestricted, i.e., they
ought to be respected by all human agents irrespective of their particular epoch, culture, religion, moral tradition or philosophy. Sixth, these
moral concerns are broadly sharable, i.e., capable of being understood and appreciated by persons from different epochs and cultures as well
as by adherents of a variety of different religions, moral traditions, and philosophies. The notions of unrestrictedness and broad sharability are
related in that we tend to feel more confident about conceiving of a moral concern as unrestricted when this concern is not parochial to some
particular epoch, culture, religion, moral tradition or philosophy.
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A2: Consequentialism
Morality is about the duty, not necessarily about what happens after.
William Haines, Professor at University of Hong Kong, March 2006
http://www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/
Consequentialism is controversial. Various nonconsequentialist views are that morality
is all about doing one’s duty,
respecting rights, obeying nature, obeying God, obeying one’s own heart, actualizing one’s own
potential, being reasonable, respecting all people, or not interfering with others—no matter the
consequences.
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Moral Obligations Require Doing Something Good, Not Just Not Doing
Something Bad
We have moral duties not only to prevent from doing harm but also to take positive
action.
Thomas Pogge, German philosopher, Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at
Yale University, Jan-Mar 2000
The first understanding
conceives human rights as moral rights that every human being has against
every other human being or perhaps, more generally, against every other human agent (where this also includes
collective agents, such as groups, firms, or governments). Given this understanding of human rights it matters greatly
whether one then postulates human rights that impose only negative duties (to avoid depriving) or whether one instead postulates human
A human right to freedom from assault might then
give every human agent merely a weighty moral duty to refrain from assaulting any human being or
also an additional weighty moral duty to help protect any human beings from assaults and their
effects.
rights that in addition impose positive duties (to protect and/or to aid).
It is better to inadvertently cause harm while trying to help than to let current harm
happen and do nothing.
Gerhard Øverland, expert in Philosophy, Anthropology, and Sociology, June 2008
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=106&sid=ab3a18c7-0387-4711-aed1ca0914161581%40sessionmgr114
Two questions call for extra attention, namely to determine the significance of being an innocent contributor to harm and the significance of
being a culpable bystander. Because although
it is uncontroversial to assume severe implications following from
being a culpable contributor, and no implications from being an innocent bystander, the significance of these
other two options are routinely challenged. I argue that by merely being an innocent contributor to harm one
acquires a duty to shoulder a fair share of the harm in question. Even though one innocently causes
harm, one has a duty to shoulder a fifty percent of the harm, or risk of harm, and not to leave a victim
to shoulder the whole load. I then go on to shed light on the significance of being a culpable bystander by evaluating situations in
which we can choose between forcing contributors and bystanders. I propose that in a choice between imposing cost on an
innocent contributor and a culpable bystander, we should impose it on the latter. If I am right in this
judgement, we have reason to believe that culpable bystanders may be subjected to substantial force
to ensure they help protect people in need.
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Nihilism Causes Moral Oppression and Coercion
Apathy toward existence is bad, allows those in power to construct morality.
Alan Pratt, Professor of Philosophy at Embry-Riddle University, May 2005
http://www.iep.utm.edu/nihilism/#H3
In The Banalization of Nihilism (1992) Karen Carr discusses the antifoundationalist response to nihilism. Although it still inflames a paralyzing
relativism and subverts critical tools, “cheerful
nihilism” carries the day, she notes, distinguished by an easy-going
acceptance of meaninglessness. Such a development, Carr concludes, is alarming. If we accept that all
perspectives are equally non-binding, then intellectual or moral arrogance will determine which
perspective has precedence. Worse still, the banalization of nihilism creates an environment where
ideas can be imposed forcibly with little resistance, raw power alone determining intellectual and
moral hierarchies. It’s a conclusion that dovetails nicely with Nietzsche’s, who pointed out that all interpretations of the
world are simply manifestations of will-to-power.
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Free Will isn’t Hindered by Moral Obligations
The very concept of free will is debatable, imposing moral obligations does not
compromise liberty.
James Fieser, Professor of Philosophy at University of Tennessee at Martin, July 2011
http://www.iep.utm.edu/hume/#SH3f
On the issue of free will and determinism—or “liberty” and “necessity” in Hume’s terminology—Hume
defends necessity. (1) He first argues that “all actions of the will have particular causes” (Treatise, 2.3.2.8), and so
there is no such thing as an uncaused willful action. (2) He then defends the notion of a will that consistently responds to
prior motivational causes: “our actions have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances” (Treatise, 2.3.1.4). These
motives produce actions that have the same causal necessity observed in cause-effect relations that
we see in external objects, such as when billiard ball A strikes and moves billiard ball B. In the same way, we regularly observe the
rock-solid connection between motive A and action B, and we rely on that predictable connection in our normal lives. Suppose that a traveler,
in recounting his observation of the odd behavior of natives in a distant country, told us that identical motives led to entirely different actions
among these natives. We would not believe the traveler’s report. In business, politics, and military affairs, our leaders expect predicable
behavior from us insofar as the same motives within us will always result in us performing the same action. A prisoner who is soon to be
executed will assume that the motivations and actions of the prison guards and the executioner are so rigidly fixed that these people will
mechanically carry out their duties and perform the execution, with no chance of a change of heart (Treatise, 2.3.1.5 ff.). (3) Lastly, Hume
explains why people commonly believe in an uncaused will (Treatise, 2.3.2.1 ff.). One explanation is that people
erroneously believe they have a feeling of liberty when performing actions. The reason is that, when we perform
actions, we feel a kind of “looseness or indifference” in how they come about, and some people wrongly see this as “an intuitive proof of
human liberty” (Treatise, 2.3.2.2). In the Treatise Hume rejects the notion of liberty completely. While he gives no definition of “liberty” in that
work, he argues that the notion is incompatible with necessity, and, at
best, “liberty” simply means chance. In the Enquiry,
All human actions are caused by specific prior motives, but liberty
and necessity are reconcilable when we define liberty as “a power of acting or not acting, according to
the determinations of the will” (Enquiry, 8). Nothing in this definition of liberty is in conflict with the notion of necessity.
however, he takes a more compatiblist approach.
A person can be morally responsible for something only if they have free will.
Kevin Timpe, Professor of Philosophy at University of San Diego, March 2006
http://www.iep.utm.edu/freewill/#H1
The second reason to care about free will is that it seems to be required for moral responsibility. While there are various
accounts of what exactly moral responsibility is, it is widely agreed that moral responsibility is distinct from causal responsibility. Consider a
falling branch that lands on a car, breaking its window. While the branch is causally responsible for the broken window, it is not morally
responsible for it because branches are not moral agents. Depending on one’s account of causation, it also might be possible to be morally
responsible for an event or state of affairs even if one is not causally responsible for that same event or state of affairs. For present purposes,
let us simply say that an
agent is morally responsible for an event or state of affairs only if she is the
appropriate recipient of moral praise or moral blame for that event or state of affairs (an agent can
thus be morally responsible even if no one, including herself, actually does blame or praise her for her
actions). According to the dominant view of the relationship between free will and moral responsibility, if an agent does not have
free will, then that agent is not morally responsible for her actions. For example, if Allison is coerced into doing a
morally bad act, such as stealing a car, we shouldn’t hold her morally responsible for this action since it is not an action that she did of her own
free will. Some philosophers do not believe that free will is required for moral responsibility. According to John Martin Fischer, human agents
do not have free will, but they are still morally responsible for their choices and actions. In a nutshell, Fischer thinks that the
kind of
control needed for moral responsibility is weaker than the kind of control needed for free will.
Furthermore, he thinks that the truth of causal determinism would preclude the kind of control needed for free will, but that it wouldn’t
preclude the kind of control needed for moral responsibility. See Fischer (1994). As this example shows, virtually every issue pertaining to free
will is contested by various philosophers.
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Morality is something experienced by people as emotions, it is not grounded in any
clear-cut fact.
James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin, July 2011
http://www.iep.utm.edu/hume/#H7
Take any immoral action, such as willful murder: “examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence,
which you call vice” (Treatise, 3.1.1.25). You will not find any such fact, but only your own feelings of disapproval .
In this context Hume makes his point that we cannot derive statements of obligation from statements of fact. When
surveying various moral theories, Hume writes, “I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or an ought not” (Treatise, 3.1.1.26). This
move from is to ought is
illegitimate, he argues, and is why people erroneously believe that morality is grounded in rational
judgments. Thus far Hume has only told us what moral approval is not, namely a judgment of reason. So what then does moral
approval consist of? It is an emotional response, not a rational one. The details of this part of his theory rest on a
distinction between three psychologically distinct players: the moral agent, the receiver, and the moral spectator. The moral agent is
the person who performs an action, such as stealing a car; the receiver is the person impacted by the
conduct, such as the owner of the stolen car; and the moral spectator is the person who observes and, in this
case, disapproves of the agent’s action. This agent-receiver-spectator distinction is the product of earlier moral sense theories
championed by the Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), Joseph Butler (1692-1752), and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747). Most generally, moral
sense theories maintained that humans have a faculty of moral perception, similar to our faculties of sensory perception. Just as our external
senses detect qualities in external objects, such as colors and shapes, so too does our moral faculty detect good and bad moral qualities in
people and actions. For Hume, all
actions of a moral agent are motivated by character traits, specifically either
virtuous or vicious character traits. For example, if you donate money to a charity, then your action is motivated by a virtuous
character trait. Hume argues that some virtuous character traits are instinctive or natural, such as
benevolence, and others are acquired or artificial, such as justice. As an agent, your action will have an
effect on a receiver. For example, if you as the agent give food to a starving person, then the receiver
will experience an immediately agreeable feeling from your act. Also, the receiver may see the usefulness of your
food donation, insofar as eating food will improve his health. When considering the usefulness of your food donation, then, the receiver will
receive another agreeable feeling from your act. Finally, I, as a spectator, observe these agreeable feelings that the receiver experiences. I,
then, will sympathetically experience agreeable feelings along with the receiver.
These sympathetic feelings of pleasure
constitute my moral approval of the original act of charity that you, the agent, perform. By sympathetically
experiencing this pleasure, I thereby pronounce your motivating character trait to be a virtue, as opposed to a vice. Suppose, on the other
hand, that you as an agent did something to hurt the receiver, such as steal his car. I as the spectator would then sympathetically experience
the receiver’s pain and thereby pronounce your motivating character trait to be a vice, as opposed to a virtue.
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Negative blocks
Individual Contributions and Charities Are More Trouble Than They’re Worth
Individual monetary contributions lead to disorganization and mismanaged funding.
Felix Salmon, Winner of the American Statistical Association’s 2010 Excellence in Statistical Reporting Award, March 2011
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/03/14/dont-donate-money-to-japan/
We went through this after the Haiti earthquake, and all of the arguments which applied there apply to Japan as well.
Earmarking funds
is a really good way of hobbling relief organizations and ensuring that they have to leave large piles of
money unspent in one place while facing urgent needs in other places. And as Matthew Bishop and Michael Green
said last year, we are all better at responding to human suffering caused by dramatic, telegenic emergencies than to the much greater loss of
life from ongoing hunger, disease and conflict. That
often results in a mess of uncoordinated NGOs parachuting in
to emergency areas with lots of good intentions, where a strategic official sector response would be
much more effective. Meanwhile, the smaller and less visible emergencies where NGOs can do the
most good are left unfunded.
Charities often only treat the consequences of injustices, masking the roots of the
problems.
BBC Ethics Guide, 2011
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/against_1.shtml
The idea is that charity
is wrong when it's used to patch up the effects of the fundamental injustices that
are built into the structure and values of a society. Charity, from this viewpoint, can sometimes be seen as actually
accepting the injustice itself, while trying to mitigate the consequences of the injustice.
Constant bombardment by charities makes people less inclined to give.
Trevor Jockins, English Professor at Harper College and NYT contributor, July 2011
Linking the cash register to the heart seems to be an outgrowth of the peculiar fantasy that says if we
just buy the right fair-trade coffee, the right $3 water, the right salvaged wood for our absolutely
gorgeous new flooring, we can alleviate most of the suffering in the world — along with our guilt for
ignoring the pleas for help that arrive in the mail and confront us on the street daily. For the richest of countries,
shopping our way to moral purity would be a nice trick, but I have my doubts. Maybe if this weren’t such a big
part of our thinking, people wouldn’t try to wring kindness from us at such odd times, or stand so boldly in the street hawking goodness. And
with a little less charity pollution around us, maybe giving wouldn’t have to feel so much like being
taken.
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“Assistance” Can Be Detrimental and Should Be Minimized
Assistance can take many forms, including coercion.
Gerhard Øverland, expert in Philosophy, Anthropology, and Sociology, June 2008
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=106&sid=ab3a18c7-0387-4711-aed1ca0914161581%40sessionmgr114
Assistance force is any force applied to ensure that a particular agent assists a person in need. But the
term denotes as well any force which has as a consequence that something happens to a person that will undo the need of another. Forced
assistance is the assistance that comes about as a result of assistance force. The assistance in question
does not need to be motivated for the right reasons, nor even be what we normally would call
‘‘assistance.’’ Pushing someone into a pool to save another person would qualify as assistance force. The fact that this saves Alice means
that the person who was pushed into the water renders what I call forced assistance even though he or she is merely used by Alice as a means
of getting out of the water. Moreover, assistance
force may simply be used to alert people about certain needs,
after which these people choose to assist because they now see the need for it. I have invented the first label in
order to have a neutral term which covers a variety of ways of using force to ensure help reaches a person or people in need, or at least that
the bad that is about to happen to him or her is avoided. Whether assistance force is permissible in certain circumstances, and by what means,
remains to be seen. In this respect it is on par with defensive force, which covers a variety of ways force can be used to save people from
aggressors, some permissible and some not. Structurally,
assistance force might have things in common with
coercion, where people are compelled by force or threats to do things against their will.
Assistance to foreign people, if given at all, should be minimal and have a clear cut-off
point.
Henry S. Richardson, Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University, November 2005
http://www.iep.utm.edu/rawls/
In The Law of Peoples [LP] (1999), Rawls relaxes the assumption that society is a closed system that coincides with a nation-state. Once this
assumption is dropped, the question that comes to the fore is: upon
what principles should the foreign policy of a
decent liberal regime be founded? Rawls first looks at this question from the point of view of ideal theory, which supposes that all
peoples enjoy a decent liberal-democratic regime. At this level, with reference to a rather thinly-described global original position, Rawls
develops basic principles concerning non-intervention, respect for human rights, and assistance for
countries lacking the conditions necessary for a decent or just regime to arise. These principles govern one
nation in its relations with others. He next discusses the principles that should govern decent liberal societies in
their relations with peoples who are not governed by decent liberalisms. He articulates the idea of a “decent
consultation hierarchy” to illustrate the sort of non-liberal society that is owed considerable tolerance by the people of a decent liberal society.
In a part of the book devoted to non-ideal theory, Rawls impressively defends quite restrictive positions on the right of war and on the moral
conduct of warfare. Surprisingly, questions of global distributive justice are confined to one brief section of LP. In that
section, Rawls treats quite dismissively two earlier attempts to extend his theoretical framework to questions of international justice, those of
Beitz (1979) and Pogge (1994). Drawing on the ideas of TJ, these philosophers had developed quite demanding principles of international
distributive justice. In LP, Rawls instead
favors a relatively minimal “duty of assistance,” with a definite
“target and a cut-off point.” LP at 119.
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West Coast Publishing
2011 LD—Moral Obligation
Foreign Aid Doesn’t Solve Root Issues and Can Cause Problems
Aid can’t solve, corruption inhibits growth of nations.
Squidoo.com, political and philosophical commentary website, 2011
http://www.squidoo.com/worldhunger#
In the first half of her book, 'Dead Aid', Moyo claims that aid
itself is what is keeping Africa poor. "Development aid
simply doesn't work," she says. "It was supposed to lead to sustainable economic growth and a reduction
of poverty. Name one African country where this has happened."
"First and foremost the widespread corruption. The people in power plunder the treasury and the treasury is filled with
development aid money. The corruption has contaminated the whole of society.
Foreign aid allows governments to be lazy.
Squidoo.com, political and philosophical commentary website, 2011
http://www.squidoo.com/worldhunger#
Aid leads to bureaucracy and inflation, to laziness and inertia. Aid hurts exports. Thanks to foreign aid
the people in power can afford not to care about their people. But the worst part of it is: aid undermines growth. The
economies of those countries that are the most dependent on foreign aid have shrunk by an average
of 0.2 percent per year ever since the seventies." In the first half of her book Moyo sets out a level-headed plan to phase out
aid within 5 years. The first half of the book is what has caused such a ruckus among intellectuals, however, the second half is truly the most
important part. The second half suggests certain methods to balance the budget of African governments. These recommendations include:
inciting foreign investment, taxing money sent home from abroad, issuing government bonds, and increasing exports (especially to developing
nations like China and India).
Aid can never work because governments have their own independent agendas.
Squidoo.com, political and philosophical commentary website, 2011
http://www.squidoo.com/worldhunger#
Why does the Western world keep giving aid if it isn’t working? According to Moyo, "The cynical answer is because it distracts attention from the trade barriers they have erected in order to protect
employment in the West. These trade barriers cost Africa an estimated 500 billion dollars every year.
That's ten times the amount Africa is given in development aid. And because they secretly don't
believe that Africa is ever going to pull it together. They feel sorry for the Africans. So they buy
themselves a conscience.
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West Coast Publishing
2011 LD—Moral Obligation
Morality is Judged on Results (Consequentialism)
Morality is about making the world better, not about the obligation.
William Haines, Professor at University of Hong Kong, March 2006
http://www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/
Consequentialism is the view that morality
is all about producing the right kinds of overall consequences. Here the
phrase “overall consequences” of an action means everything the action brings about, including the action itself. For example, if you think
that the whole point of morality is (a) to spread happiness and relieve suffering, or (b) to create as much
freedom as possible in the world, or (c) to promote the survival of our species, then you accept
consequentialism. Although those three views disagree about which kinds of consequences matter, they agree that consequences are
all that matters. So, they agree that consequentialism is true. The utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham is a well
known example of consequentialism. By contrast, the deontological theories of John Locke and Immanuel Kant are nonconsequentialist.
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West Coast Publishing
2011 LD—Moral Obligation
Greatest Good for Greatest Number is Most Moral (Util)
Utilitarianism good, helps challenge ideals of morality and prejudice.
Gareth McCaughan, essayist and philosophical theorist, June 2006
http://www.mccaughan.org.uk/g/essays/utility.html#six
The first point is one I've made already: utilitarianism, in so far as we can actually apply it (which means, in practice, only looking at a small
chunk of the future and only looking at a small region of the universe), actually does
a pretty good job of giving answers to
ethical questions. And, subject to those approximations, it's quite easy. Most of us are capable of guessing "what will happen
if...", and of imagining others' responses to the ensuing situations; and in many cases it's possible to compare the resulting utilities without too
much trouble. Secondly,
utilitarianism provides a valuable corrective against the sort of excessively rulebased ethics which come naturally to the Christian, and perhaps to anyone who lives in a society with a very
well-defined set of laws. The two approaches to ethics are complementary, and I think we need both. Thirdly, considering "the
greatest good of the greatest number" can be an effective way of defeating prejudices and selfishness.
This ethical symmetry is, after all, quite close to such principles as "Do to others as you would have them do to you" and "Love your neighbour
as yourself".
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West Coast Publishing
2011 LD—Moral Obligation
Morality Invokes Religion, Problematic
Christian fundamentalists push morality as an answer to all the world’s problems.
Theodore Schick, Professor of Philosophy at Muhlenberg College, June 1997
http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/pqdweb?index=0&did=12671755&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQ
D&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1310402458&clientId=48453
Although Plato demonstrated the logical independence of God and morality over 2,000 years ago in the
Euthyphro, the belief that morality requires God remains a widely held moral maxim. In particular, it serves
as the basic assumption of the Christian fundamentalist's social theory. Fundamentalists claim that all
of society's ills-everything from AIDS to out-of-wedlock pregnancies-are the result of a breakdown in
morality and that this breakdown is due to a decline in the belief of God. Although many fundamentalists trace
the beginning of this decline to the publication of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species in 1859, others trace it to the Supreme Court's 1963
decision banning prayer in the classroom.
A religious god is the only one who can determine a universal morality.
Theodore Schick, Professor of Philosophy at Muhlenberg College, June 1997
http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/pqdweb?index=0&did=12671755&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQ
D&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1310402458&clientId=48453
In an attempt to neutralize these purported sources of moral decay, fundamentalists across America are seeking to restore belief in God by
promoting the teaching of creationism and school prayer. The
belief that morality requires God is not limited to
theists, however. Many atheists subscribe to it as well. The existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, says that
"If God is dead, everything is permitted." In other words, if there is no supreme being to lay down the moral law,
each individual is free to do as he or she pleases. Without a divine lawgiver, there can be no
universal moral law. The view that God creates the moral law is often called the "Divine Command Theory of Ethics." According to
this view, what makes an action right is that God wills it to be done. That an agnostic should find this theory
suspect is obvious, for, if one doesn't believe in God or if one is unsure which God is the true God, being told that one must do as God
commands will not help one solve any moral dilemmas.
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West Coast Publishing
2011 LD—Moral Obligation
The Concept of Morality Itself Causes Violence, Conflicts
The most violent and difficult to solve conflicts continue to exist because of invoking
morals.
Michelle Maiese, a graduate student of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder and a part of the research staff at the Conflict
Research Consortium, 2010
Intractable conflicts are ones that remain unresolved for long periods of time and then become stuck
at a high level of intensity and destructiveness. They typically involve many parties and concern an intricate set of historical,
religious, cultural, political, and economic issues. These matters are central to human social existence and typically
resist any attempts at resolution. In fact, parties often refuse to negotiate or compromise with respect
to such issues. As a result, each side views the rigid position of the other as a threat to its very
existence. They may develop a mutual fear of each other and a profound desire to inflict as much
physical and psychological harm on each other as possible. This sense of threat and hostility often pervades the
everyday lives of the parties involved and overrides their ability to recognize any shared concerns they might have. Additional insights into the
underlying causes of intractable conflicts are offered by Beyond Intractability project participants. As
conflict escalates, any
tangible issues may become embedded within a larger set of values, beliefs, identities, and cultures.
Disputes about land, money, or other resources may take on increased symbolic significance. Over the course of conflict, the original issues can
even become irrelevant as new causes for conflict are generated by actions within the conflict itself. Those on opposing sides come to view
each other as enemies and may resort to highly destructive means. Eventually, the parties become unable to separate different issues and may
see no way out of the conflict other than through total victory or defeat. Why do some conflicts become intractable? Many
describe intractability in terms of the destructive relationship dynamics that govern the adversaries' interaction. For example, if one party
resorts to inhumane treatment in waging conflict, this deepens antagonism and may lead the opposing side to seek revenge. Likewise, when
extremist political leaders appeal to ethno-nationalist ideology to arouse fear, this may increase support for the use of violence and contribute
to intractability. Other factors that make some conflicts extremely difficult to resolve include the vast numbers of people involved, the large
number of complex issues to be resolved, and a previous history of violent confrontation. But what
are the underlying causes of
these destructive conflict dynamics? What is common to all intractable conflicts is that they involve
interests or values that the disputants regard as critical to their survival. These underlying causes
include parties' moral values, identities, and fundamental human needs. Because conflicts grounded in these
issues involve the basic molds for thought and action within given communities and culture, they are
usually not resolvable by negotiation or compromise. This is because the problem in question is one that cannot be
resolved in a win-win way. If one value system is followed, another is threatened. If one nation controls a piece of land, another does not. If one
group is dominant, another is subordinate. While sharing is possible in theory, contending sides usually regard compromise as a loss. This is
especially true in societies where natural fear and hatred is so ingrained that opposing groups cannot imagine living with or working
cooperatively with the other side. Instead, they are often willing to take whatever means necessary to ensure group survival and protect their
way of life.
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West Coast Publishing
2011 LD—Moral Obligation
Morals and values are constructed by man and can be twisted into whatever the
wielder wants for personal gain.
Dale Wilkerson, Professor at University of North Texas, Denton, August 2009
http://www.iep.utm.edu/nietzsch/#H4
Nietzsche’s philosophy contemplates the meaning of values and their significance to human existence. Given that
no absolute
values exist, in Nietzsche’s worldview, the evolution of values on earth must be measured by some other
means. How then shall they be understood? The existence of a value presupposes a value-positing perspective, and values are created by
human beings (and perhaps other value-positing agents) as aids for survival and growth. Because values are important for the
well being of the human animal, because belief in them is essential to our existence, we oftentimes
prefer to forget that values are our own creations and to live through them as if they were absolute.
For these reasons, social institutions enforcing adherence to inherited values are permitted to create selfserving economies of power, so long as individuals living through them are thereby made more secure
and their possibilities for life enhanced. Nevertheless, from time to time the values we inherit are deemed no longer suitable
and the continued enforcement of them no longer stands in the service of life. To maintain allegiance to such values, even
when they no longer seem practicable, turns what once served the advantage to individuals to a disadvantage, and what was
once the prudent deployment of values into a life denying abuse of power. When this happens the human being must
reactivate its creative, value-positing capacities and construct new values.
All values are constructed and meaningless, only action matters.
Alan Pratt, Professor of Philosophy at Embry-Riddle University, May 2005
http://www.iep.utm.edu/nihilism/#H3
For Nietzsche, there
is no objective order or structure in the world except what we give it. Penetrating the
façades buttressing convictions, the nihilist discovers that all values are baseless and that reason is impotent. “Every belief,
every considering something-true,” Nietzsche writes, “is necessarily false because there is simply no true world” (Will to Power [notes from
1883-1888]). For him, nihilism requires a radical repudiation of all imposed values and meaning: “Nihilism is . . . not only the belief that
everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts one’s shoulder to the plough; one destroys” (Will to Power). The caustic strength of
nihilism is absolute, Nietzsche argues, and under its withering scrutiny “the
highest values devalue themselves. The aim is
lacking, and ‘Why’ finds no answer” (Will to Power). Inevitably, nihilism will expose all cherished beliefs
and sacrosanct truths as symptoms of a defective Western mythos.
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