Plan
The United States should create an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for
marihuana usage and distribution in compliance with approved state laws. The United
States should legalize nearly all marihuana.
Advantage 1
Advantage 1 is the War on Drugs
Prohibition fails – legalization creates domestic demand which shores up the black
market – devastates cartels because of the reliability, accessibility, and profitability of
marijuana – even if we don’t eliminate all cartel profits, view the risk as linear
Beckley Foundation, 11 scientific programme initiates, designs and conducts research into the effects of
psychoactive substances on the brain, the foundation supports research into both science and policy of drugs., The
Beckley Foundation policy programme is dedicated to improving national and global drug policies, through
research that increases understanding of the health, social and fiscal implications of drug policy, “Legalizing
Marijuana: An Exit Strategy from the War on Drugs,” http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/2011/04/legalizingmarijuana-an-exit-strategy-from-the-war-on-drugs/, Vitz
There are a few “unknowns” when it comes to the marijuana industry—its effects on
productivity and drug-related violence, for example. Experts need to examine these effects, and policymakers must open
their ears to these experts. A government-sponsored marijuana commission is not a new idea; in fact, Nixon established one in 1972 when he
formed the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. When the commission opposed Nixon by supporting decriminalization, he
ignored their recommendations and instead intensified his efforts on the “War on Drugs” campaign. This tradition of adhering to popular and
personal beliefs instead of scientific facts is still common today. With
the U.S. federal debt sky-high and drugrelated violence in Mexico mounting, legalization is more relevant than ever and the topic is ripe for
debate. Here we explore the domestic costs and benefits that the legalization of marijuana would incur, how it might affect the marijuana
industry in the Americas (particularly in Mexico), and aims to debunk the multitude of popular falsehoods that surround marijuana. Why
Current Policies Are Not Working Despite
assurances from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that the current
drug policy is making headway, there are clear signs that prohibition has not succeeded in
diminishing drug supply or demand. Lowering demand for illegal drugs is the most effective way to lower illegal drug
production—while vendors may not respond to the threat of legal repercussions, they certainly
respond to market forces. As the largest consumer of Mexican drugs, it is the responsibility of
the U.S. to address its own demand for marijuana. But American demand and accessibility to
marijuana are not decreasing. In fact, marijuana use is currently on the rise and, although usage has
oscillated in the past decades, the proportion of use among 12th graders is only a few percentage points below what it was in 1974. Eighty-one
percent of American 12th graders said marijuana was “fairly easy or very easy” to acquire in 2010.2 In a 2009 survey, 16.7 million Americans
over 12 years of age had used marijuana in the past month—that’s 6.6 percent of the total population.3 While
the U.S. may be
unable to control its own demand for marijuana, it could stop its contribution to drug cartel
revenues by allowing a domestic marijuana industry to thrive , shifting profits from cartels to
U.S. growers . While figures on marijuana smuggling into the U.S. fail to provide conclusive evidence of how much of the drug is entering
the country, marijuana seizures have been steady throughout the Americas in the past decade. However, this says nothing certain about actual
production numbers.4 Domestically, the task of restricting U.S. production is becoming more difficult. Indoor crops that use efficient
hydroponic systems are becoming more popular in the U.S. but pose a challenge to law enforcement agencies for a number of reasons.
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), indoor systems: “[have] the benefit of having lower chances of detection,
high yields with several harvests per year with high potency cannabis and elevated selling prices. The equipment, knowledge and seeds for
indoor growing have become very accessible… [and] The costs of building an indoor growing site can be quickly recovered.”5 Cultivating highquality marijuana is becoming easier, less risky, and more profitable even for the casual grower. The rise of indoor crops will pose a new
obstacle to drug enforcement agencies in stopping marijuana production in the U.S. The
UNODC outlines other negative
“unintended consequences” that have resulted from the illegality of drugs. The first is
obvious; when a good is forbidden, a black market inevitably rises. Black markets inherently
lack safety regulations and often finance other criminal activities. A second consequence is that treatment
programs are often underfunded when the bulk of any drug policy budget is spent on law enforcement. Two other consequences have been
termed “geographical” and “substance” displacement. Both
terms involve the idea of the “balloon effect”: when
an activity is suppressed in one area, it simply reappears in another area . Geographical displacement can
be illustrated by events in Colombia, the Caribbean, and Mexico: as the U.S. cracked down on Colombian drug trafficking, smuggling routes
were shifted to Mexico and the Caribbean. Drug trafficking was not eliminated, but simply moved from one site to another. Substance
displacement is an even more disturbing repercussion: as availability of one drug is mitigated
through enforcement, consumers and suppliers flock to alternate drugs that are more accessible.6 While
marijuana is not a harmless substance, most would agree that it is the least harmful of illicit drugs. Some drug users may be pushed toward
more dangerous substances, or “hard” drugs, because marijuana is too difficult to or dangerous to obtain. Conversely,
raising the
accessibility of marijuana could pull users away from hard drugs . These ramifications of the current drug control
system need to be taken into account in the debate over legalization. A critical shortcoming of U.S. drug policy is that it treats drug addiction as
a crime instead of a health matter. Almost 60 percent of the overall economic cost of drug abuse is due to expenditures spent on “drug
crime”—the sale, manufacture, and possession of drugs.7 There seems to be a wide consensus that at the very least, drug policy must shift its
focus to treatment. Tarnishing someone’s record for drug use makes no sense; it encourages criminal activity by obstructing job opportunities
and it does nothing to address the factors that cause drug use. Additionally, treatment is not readily accessible to those seeking help despite its
efficacy in preventing future drug use. In 2009, 20.9 million Americans (8.3 percent of the total population over age 12) who needed treatment
for drug or alcohol abuse did not receive it in a specialty facility—a hospital, a rehab facility, or a mental health facility.8 This is an unacceptably
high number. The U.S. overinvests in its prohibition strategy while severely underfunding treatment options. Marijuana legalization’s potential
role in improving treatment options for all drugs will be discussed later in this article; for now, suffice it to say that the status quo is not
producing the desired results and requires modification. Legalization and The Mexican Drug War The
issue of legalization has
been brought to the forefront in recent years because of numerous calls by Latin American
leaders to discuss the matter as a viable policy option. Presidents Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and Felipe
Calderón of Mexico, while not personally advocating legalization, have publicly called for serious discussion of
the concept. Former Mexican President Vicente Fox, who previously took a hard line against drugs, has altered his public stance and now
supports legalization of all drugs, especially marijuana. He argues that prohibition does not work, that drug production ends up funding
criminals, and that it is the responsibility of citizens to decide whether to use drugs or not.9 Former Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso
of Brazil, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, and César Gaviria of Colombia all supported in a report by
The Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy that the U.S. decriminalize
marijuana use (Colombia and Mexico have already done so).10 The U.S. has ignored these requests to place drug
legalization or decriminalization on the policy agenda. Drug trafficking is not a national problem; it transcends country borders and needs to be
approached from a hemispheric perspective. Therefore, the United States needs to work with its southern neighbors to formulate a
comprehensive drug policy. However, it is also telling that every Latin American leader who has formally supported legalization or
decriminalization has done so only after leaving office, indicating that such policies are not politically “safe” stances. The
difference
between decriminalization and legalization is in their degree of leniency towards drugs; decriminalization
permits drug use while legalization permits both drug use and production. Those that favor decriminalization maintain that it
would enable law enforcement agencies to shift resources from prosecuting drug users to
prosecuting drug suppliers . Decriminalization would also free up resources for effective drug treatment programs. Those that
favor legalization go one step further than decriminalization: in Vicente Fox’s words, “[W]e have to
take all the production chain out of the hands of criminals and into the hands of producers—
so there are farmers that produce marijuana and manufacturers that process it and
distributors that distribute it, and shops that sell it.” 11 Legalization would include the benefits of
decriminalization , while also depriving gangs and cartels of a lucrative product; if both the supply and
demand sides are legitimate, a black market would become obsolete. Legalizing marijuana in the United States, the
largest buyer of Mexican drugs, could potentially weaken drug cartels by limiting their
sources of revenue. The UNODC has acknowledged that this is a plausible way of reducing gang and cartel profits.12 Mexican and
American Marijuana Markets Eliminating the marijuana market share of Mexican cartels would hit them
especially hard because it serves as a steady, reliable source of income and carries relatively
little risk for them to produce. The percentage of total cartel drug revenues from marijuana is
greatly debated—Mexican and American official figures range from 50-65 percent, but a study by
the RAND Corporation suggests closer to 15-26 percent.13 Even the most conservative of these estimates—roughly a fifth of revenue—would
strike a blow to cartel profits if eliminated.
Marijuana is particularly valuable to cartels because they control the
entire production line ; they both grow and distribute it themselves, making it more reliable and less risky. Conversely,
cocaine is imported to Mexico mostly from South America, heightening the risk of smuggling it. More troubling is that cartels
are now even growing marijuana on U.S. public lands, mostly throughout national parks and forests, in order to avoid the task of smuggling
drugs across the U.S.-Mexican border.14 If
Mexico were to reach the point of legalizing marijuana, the U.S.
could continue to buy the drug legally from south of the border , like many other consumer goods. But even
if Mexico did not implement its own legalization, recent data indicates that a domestic U.S.
industry could fill the role of the supplier and eliminate the need for Mexican marijuana. The drug is
increasingly grown domestically15 and U.S. growers are already posing a threat to Mexican market share. Exact numbers are impossible to
assess, but figures of American domestic marijuana production range from 30-60 percent of the total consumed in the U.S.16 Additionally, a
report by the RAND Corporation found that legalizing marijuana in California alone (and a subsequent rise in state-wide marijuana production)
could lower Mexican cartel marijuana revenues by 65-85 percent. This could occur if Californian marijuana were smuggled to the rest of the
U.S. where the drug would still be illegal. The marijuana’s projected high quality and low price would make it an extremely competitive
product.17 It
seems reasonable to assume that if the drug were legalized in all fifty states, the domestic
market could easily overwhelm the Mexican market share. In terms of tangible effects on Mexican drug violence,
the RAND Corporation and UNODC agree that removing U.S. demand for illegal marijuana would increase violence in the short run because
Mexican cartels would be fighting for dominance in a shrinking market.18 But in the long run,
once U.S. demand is met by
U.S.
population is by far the largest drug market for Mexico, making our action necessary for any
transnational legalization to be effective. While cocaine, methamphetamines, and heroin are
still funding cartels, drug violence will not be completely eliminated; but any move to starve
domestic supply, cartels would be financially debilitated
their resources is a step forward in weakening them
and, most likely, some of the violence quelled. The
and, ultimately, saving lives.
Legalization causes a huge price decrease which creates a more competitive domestic
market
Caulkins et. Al, 12 Jonathan, Carnegie Mellon University, “Design considerations for legalizing cannabis:
lessons¶ inspired by analysis of California’s Proposition 19,” http://works.bepress.com/rosalie_pacula/22/, Vitz
The decline in wholesale prices will be dramatic ¶ The literature recognizes that legalization will lower¶
prices, but may underestimate the potential magnitude¶ of the decline. Current wholesale prices in the United¶ States are
$500–1500 per pound for commercial grade,¶ increasing with distance from Mexico, and $2000–4500¶ per pound for sinsemilla [4].
Legalizing cannabis would¶ reduce these prices because there would be a decrease in risk [11],
increased automation and economies of scale¶ [12].¶ Indeed, if cannabis could be farmed outdoors like¶ other crops, we
calculate that production costs would¶ be less than $20 per pound . This is consistent with the¶ National Organization
for the Reform of Marijuana¶ Laws’claimthat if cannabis production was unregulated,¶ ‘[T]he price of marijuana would presumably
drop as low¶ as that of other legal herbs such as tea or tobacco—on¶ the order of a few dollars
per ounce¶ e . . . orafew¶ centsper¶ joint’ [13]. At that point, production costs become negli-¶ gible compared to distribution, branding
and marketing¶ costs. The analogy would be to bottled water.¶ Even if production were confined to grow houses, a¶ small, low-tech business
could produce sinsemilla for¶ about $400–450 per pound [12]. Costs would be driven¶ by,indecreasingorder:(i)materials,(ii)rent,(iii)produc-¶
er’s overhead and profit (iv) electricity and (v) agricul-¶ tural labor (assuming federal enforcement is sufficiently¶ lax that semi-skilled
production workers would be com-¶ pensated as for typical agricultural workers). Factoring¶ in a healthy mark-up for distribution and retailing,
we¶ anticipate untaxed retail prices of about $40 per ounce¶ of unbranded, unbundled sinsemilla [12].
Compared to¶ current prices of $250–400 perounce,thisrepresentsan¶ 80–90% reduction.¶ Legal cannabis production
may not be a large indus-¶ try. It would only take about 8000 grow houses to meet¶ current US consumption on a 9-¶ D¶ tetrahydrocannabinol¶ (THC)-adjusted basis [3,12]. Given modest economies of¶ scale and mechanization of the sort that could remain¶ hidden
within the house, each grow house might require¶ no more than one full-time agricultural labourer, with¶ perhaps one other employee [master
growers, heating,¶ ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) technicians,¶ drivers, bookkeepers, entrepreneurs, etc.] per agricul-¶
turalworker.Sixteenthousandjobsisminisculeagainsta¶ national labor force of 140 million; it is even small com-¶ pared to current (illegal)
employment in production and¶ smuggling. Given the high value per unit weight ratios¶ andlimitednumberof housesrequired,productioncould¶
locate anywhere, presumably migrating to jurisdictions¶ offering the friendliest taxes and regulations and/or¶ lowest labor, housing and
electricity costs. Plausibly,¶ the greater economic opportunities could come from¶ distribution and bundling with other services and pro-¶ ducts
(e.g. cannabis cafes, cannabis-infused foods and¶ drinks [3]).¶
much¶ Legalization’s
Legalization will increase consumption , but it is unclear¶ by how
non-price effects on consumption, such as¶ from reduced stigma and
increased advertising , are hard¶ to estimate as no jurisdiction has ever fully legalized can-¶ nabis. The Netherlands comes closest to
having legalized¶ from the user’s perspective. Looking at the Netherlands¶ and a range of other analogies, MacCoun suggests that¶ non-
price effects might stimulate consumption increases¶ of 5– 50%
[14]. These non-price effects will also differ¶
depending on the pre-legalization cannabis culture (e.g.¶ does the jurisdiction already have a heavily promoted¶ medicinal market?).¶ The
uncertainty concerning price effects is even¶ greater, and stems from two distinct sources: (i) uncer-¶ tainty about how responsive
consumption is to changes¶ inpricewithintherangesthathavebeenobservedand(ii)¶ uncertainty about how to extrapolate that experience¶ to
prices well below those that have ever obtained in a¶ developed country in the modern era.¶ One limitation of current elasticity estimates is
that¶ the best evidence concerns how price affects annual or¶ 30-dayprevalenceof useamongbroadpopulations,such¶ as students or those in
the household population. These¶ populations frequently include large numbers of light¶ users or new initiates. Typical
price
elasticities of participation range between¶ -¶ 0.002 and¶ -¶ 0.7 , depending on¶ the population studied, with a narrower
range of¶ -¶ 0.3 to¶ -¶ 0.5 for youth [15] that is the same as the corresponding¶ range estimated for cigarette participation elasticities¶ [16].
However, consumption is heavily concentrated¶ among a minority of the heaviest users [17]; their¶
response—intermsnotonlyof prevalencebutalsointen-¶ sity of use conditional on participation—dominates how¶ a price change will affect the
overall quantity of cannabis¶ consumed. For tobacco and alcohol the elasticity of the¶ total quantity consumed is 1.5–2.0 times greater than¶
the general population participation elasticity, but there¶ is almost no literature on total price elasticity of can-¶ nabis. Based upon what
evidence is available, Pacula¶ judged that the total
might be between¶ -¶ 0.4¶ and¶ -¶ 1.2
elasticity of demand for price¶ changes around the current price
[15].¶ Beyond this ‘parametric uncertainty’, there is also¶
‘structuraluncertainty’concerninghowlinearorconvex¶ the demand curve is as one moves to much lower prices.¶ That is not a question that can
be answered empirically,¶ because there simply are no data on cannabis consump-¶ tion at such low prices. We considered two classic¶
textbook forms for demand curves (linear and constant¶ elasticity) to demonstrate that the projected increase¶ in consumption will depend
dramatically on implicit¶ assumptions embedded in the choice of functional form.¶ Forexample,underonescenariothelineardemandcurve¶
suggests price-driven
100%,
consumption increases would probably be in the neighborhood of 75–
whereas the¶ corresponding range with constant elasticity demand¶ was 150–200% [3, see Fig. 4.1]. Thus, we conclude that¶
legalization will increase consumption substantially, pos-¶ sibly dramatically , but it is important to recognize that¶
back in the late 1970s consumption was substantially¶ higher than it is today, so it not certain consumption¶ would rise beyond the historical
peak
Federal action is key to large-scale domestic industry and access to basic banking
services
Chemerinsky, 14 Erwin, March 14, “Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation,” Legal Studies
Research Paper Series No. 20 14 – 2, UC Irvine, SSRN, Vitz
Perhaps the
most profound, and most well-documented, consequence of marijuana’s prohibited
status at the federal level is the unavailability of even the most rudimentary banking services
for those engaged in marijuana commerce.54 The threat – often explicit – of money laundering
prosecutions has made banks unwilling to engage in any transactions with marijuana
businesses.55 As a result, marijuana in the states is largely a cash business, with all of the problems
and negative connotations associated with businesses forced to the periphery of legality.56 The lack of
commercial banking is more than a dignitary harm for those operating in the marijuana industry; for many it is a sincere safety concern.
Marijuana businesses present an easy target for thieves who are aware that these businesses
often have no choice but to keep large quantities of cash on hand
Federal legalization is the only means to attract investors and scale-up the industry
Mitchell, 12 Dan, “What would a legal American marijuana industry look like?,”
http://fortune.com/2012/11/19/what-would-a-legal-american-marijuana-industry-look-like/, Vitz
But that
doesn’t mean that a real marijuana industry will grow out of the country’s changing
sentiments toward pot — with large-scale distribution, marketing, and retail sales — any time soon . For that to
happen, the federal government would have to do a lot more than merely back off and
recognize “state’s rights.” It would have to repeal the federal laws banning the possession,
use, and distribution of marijuana. And that might take a long while yet, given that the politics in, for example, Georgia, are a
lot different from the politics in Washington, Colorado, and California (even Oregon isn’t quite there yet — its ballot measure failed on Election
Day). There needs to be a national consensus, and the nation isn’t there yet.
And until full federal repeal of prohibition , a
multitude of insurmountable barriers will remain in place . The chief one is simple economics: the
industry simply can’t scale to a degree that would attract investors (who would be scared of
investing anyway). One of the many reasons that pot costs so much — about $300 an ounce on
average — is that growers must keep their operations relatively small and, usually, hidden.
Forget for the moment the direct impact that pot’s illegality (meaning, risk) has on prices:
the costs of production alone are
enormous just because economies of scale aren’t achievable . Even if the state police are no longer coming after
growers, the feds might be.
That staves off Mexican instability
Carpenter, 9 Ted, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Dr. Carpenter
served as Cato's director of foreign policy studies, “Cracks in the Drug War Fortress,” http://www.catounbound.org/2009/08/26/ted-galen-carpenter/cracks-drug-war-fortress, Vitz
In his last essay, Mr. Roberts stresses that the Mexican
cartels “will not simply go away” if legalization were
adopted. Again, I know of no credible analyst who has made that argument. But greatly reducing the amount of
revenue available to those criminal enterprises would undermine their power . Mexico’s cartels
now exploit a $30 billion to $60 billion-a-year industry. Eliminating the black-market profit that
results from prohibition would change that into a $3 billion to $6 billion-a-year industry. That means far fewer enforcers
they can hire and far fewer bribes they can offer to officials. While trafficking gangs might attempt to replace part
of that lost revenue with intensified activities in such areas as kidnapping and prostitution, those sources are
not nearly as lucrative . Some of the cartels would remain in business as criminal enterprises,
but they would be substantially weakened , thereby posing far less of a threat to Mexico’s
stability.
Indeed, the
United States could strike a major blow against the cartels just by legalizing
marijuana, while postponing a policy decision regarding harder drugs. The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates
that Mexican trafficking organizations derive two-thirds of their income from marijuana sales.
Other estimates are slightly lower (around 55 percent), but marijuana is clearly the primary source of revenue.
Under a legalized regime, who would bother buying that product from the Mexican cartels
when legitimate domestic producers could provide an ample supply — and probably at lower
cost, given the transportation advantages? In fact, many consumers would likely just grow their own supply.
Legalization creates a reverse gateway effect – solves other drugs
Herrington, 12 Luke, Editor-At-Large for E-IR and Assistant Reviews Editor for Special Operations Journal.
He is
a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas where he previously earned
an MA in Global and International Studies, “Marijuana Legalization: Panacea in the War on Drugs or Stoners
Blowing Smoke?,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/24/marijuana-lagalization-panacea-in-the-war-on-drugs-orstoners-blowing-smoke/, Vitz
Legalization Will Hurt the Cartels A
chorus of Latin American leaders think legalization will undermine the
cartels, and they advocate it as a new strategy in the war on drugs. In March, Otto Perez Molina, the president of Guatemala, announced his
interest in
legalizing drugs in an effort to fight the cartels,
including the Zetas, who were allegedly behind a May 2011
attack that left 27 dismembered workers on a farm in northern Guatemala. Molina, however, is not the only leader to suggest that drug
legalization could help stem the rising tide of drug-related violence in Latin America. In fact, former
Mexican President Vicente Fox also supports the legalization of marijuana, [7] as do César Gaviria, Ernesto Zedillo,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Ricardo Lagos, former presidents of Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile respectively. [8] The government of
Uruguay is also agitating for legalization. There, officials announced that
marijuana legalization and regulation may be
used to help fight cocaine use and abuse . The government also says it would sell the drug
directly, tracking buyers in the process and limiting the black market’s ability to usurp this
new supply. [9] Grillo agrees. He suggests that mass-burnings of marijuana in Mexico, for instance, a hallmark in source control, do more
to illustrate exactly how hulking the narco-economic edifice of the cartel’s drug industry really is, than it does to elucidate how Mexico
constantly hammers their organizations. It
also demonstrates that U.S. demand for product will continue to
encourage the flow of marijuana and, by extension, other drugs over the border. Citing a narrowly defeated attempt by
California voters to legalize marijuana, and petitioners in Colorado promoting a referendum to do the same, Grillo highlights the fact that
campaigns for legalization view the Mexican Drug War “as a reason to change U.S. drug laws.” Moreover, these campaigners argue that
“American ganja smokers are giving billions of dollars to psychotic Mexican drug cartels, […] and
legalization is the only way to
stop the war .” [10] Grillo concedes that the cartels have morphed into diversified, 21st century firms
with entrenched profit sources well beyond the scope of the marijuana industry. Nevertheless, he concludes, legalization
as a
strategy in the war on drugs could still do more in the effort to undermine cartel profits than the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Mexican army ever have. Legalization “might not kill the Mexican
cartels,” he says, however it certainly could inflict a deep wound upon their organizations.
Armstrong accuses the U.S. of failure in its war on drugs, and asserts that the violence in Mexico is only one consequence. Despite the
tightening of post-9/11 border regulations, tons of cocaine and marijuana continue to pass into the U.S. and billions of dollars in illicit money
and weapons are passing into Mexico. Traditional policies hardly curb this two-way flow of illicit traffic, in essence, because secondary and
tertiary criminal lieutenants are prepared to fill the void when their leaders are arrested or killed. Indeed, General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., the
leader of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), testified before the U.S. Senate, stating that the “decapitation strategy” may succeed in killing
key drug figures, but “it ‘has not had an appreciable effect’ in thwarting the drug trade.” [11] The Mexican government has even started
rethinking its approach. Instead of focusing on the interdiction of drugs bound for U.S. markets, Mexican authorities are starting to focus more
on their citizens’ safety. Obama Administration officials, for their part, have chastised Latin American leaders for debating the legalization
strategy, whilst also stressing the importance of shared responsibility to the Mexican government. In spite of this, the U.S. has done little on its
end to stem the actual demand for illicit drugs. Armstrong believes U.S. policymakers must launch a serious dialogue here [in America] on
legalizing, or at least decriminalizing, the drugs. It’s not a perfect solution, but it’s better than no solution at all. […] The United States needs a
strategy to win the war or to settle it. [12] Indeed, if shared responsibility means anything, it means that the U.S. must do its part not to enable
the continuation of the drug wars. That means that in addition to the possible legalization or decriminalization of marijuana (and other drugs
for that matter), the U.S. must slow the flood of weapons and cash, the cartels’ raison d’etre. [13] Most importantly, legalization
could
undermine Latin American cartels by removing from marijuana, the so-called “ gateway
effect .” As has happened in other countries, such as Portugal, where decriminalization has been experimented with on a large scale,
isolating marijuana from the black market makes it more difficult for drug dealers to push
“ harder” narcotics on individuals using marijuana. More will be said on this subject below, but for now, suffice it to
say that this
has the potential to undermine the cartels— perhaps the foundations of the black
market itself—across the board, from the ground up . [14]
That allows the US to focus the war on drugs on more illicit crimes
Herrington, 12 Luke, Editor-At-Large for E-IR and Assistant Reviews Editor for Special Operations Journal.
He is
a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas where he previously earned
an MA in Global and International Studies, “Marijuana Legalization: Panacea in the War on Drugs or Stoners
Blowing Smoke?,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/24/marijuana-lagalization-panacea-in-the-war-on-drugs-orstoners-blowing-smoke/, Vitz
Fourth, legalization may violate treaty obligations under international law, and necessitate the formation of a new anti-narcotics regime. As
hegemon though, the
U.S. could lead the way in both the legalization or decriminalization of marijuana,
and the structuring of a reformed war on drugs based on these considerations. Finally, reflecting those that a more
conservative approach than that of Portugal, policymakers should shy away from legalizing harder drugs, like
heroin, meth, and cocaine. These are proven to be far more dangerous than marijuana, but also,
isolating marijuana from the black market will reduce demand for those drugs by eliminating
the “gateway effect.” Taken together, these considerations really could become the basis of a
new strategy in the war on Latin America’s cartels.
Drug war drives Mexican instability---they’re not a failed state yet, but they’re on the
path to getting there
Pedigo, 12 David, Senior Director of Technology at CEDIA Technology Council , “The Drug War and State Failure
in Mexico,” http://research.monm.edu/mjur/files/2012/2012-7.pdf, Vitz
Few topics are more relevant to the national security of the United States today than the crisis in
Mexico, which threatens to create a failed state on the southern border. In 2009, noted international
relations scholar John Mearsheimer listed the ongoing drug war in Mexico as the number one issue that
had been overlooked by President Obama, saying that, “There is the very real possibility that Mexico will
implode on Obama's watch and become a failed state, which would surely cause serious problems north of the Rio
Grande.”1 This claim has been echoed by Steven David, another eminent scholar in the field of international relations,
who states in his book, Cata- strophic Consequences, that, “there is no question that if violent instability engulfs
Mexico, American vital interests would be threatened .”2
While no single definition of a “failed state” currently exists, one of the most widely accepted indicators of state
failure is what Max Weber re- ferred to as the “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force” within a
state’s territory. In other words, failed states emerge when the ultimate authority to provide security and
enforce the rule of law comes from a power other than the state.3 By this qualification, Mexico certainly is
not a failed state today, but it does exhibit many characteristics of a “captured state,” wherein
the state itself is manipulated by other actors -- in this case drug cartels. There are also some regions throughout
Mexico’s territory where drug cartels have more influence over the rule of law than the state, and can
therefore be considered “ failed provinces ” or “failed cities.” In these regions, cartels freely murder mayors,
police officers, and journalists that challenge their authority, some- times within feet of police posts. Not only is the Mexican
state unable to pro- vide security for its population, but cartels have increasingly influenced government policy
through intimidating, killing, or buying off state actors. As both Mearsheimer and David suggest, state
failure in Mexico would have devastating effects for the United States. Some of the violence
and lawlessness of the drug war in Mexico have already begun to leak across the border . In
2005, the governors of Arizona and New Mexico declared their border regions with Mexico to be a “disaster area” on the grounds that they
were devastated by human smuggling, drug smuggling, kidnapping, murder, and destruction of property.4 There have also been recent
concerns over southern Arizona be- coming a “no-go zone” controlled by drug traffickers.5 These instances lend credibility to the
presupposition that “failed cities” like the ones in Mexico may begin to emerge in the United States as well if Mexico’s recent trends are not
reversed.
Mexican instability destabilize Latin America and the Caribbean region
Shirk, 11 David, PhD. Associate Professor, Political Science and International Relations Director, “The Drug War
in Mexico Confronting a Shared Threat,” Council of Foreign Relations, Vitz
Third, Mexican
stability serves as an important anchor for the region. With networks stretching
into Central America, the Carib- bean, and the Andean countries, Mexican DTOs undermine the
security and reliability of other U.S. partners in the hemisphere, corrupting high-level officials,
military operatives, and law enforcement personnel; undermining due process and human
rights ; reducing public support for counter-drug efforts; and even provoking hostility toward
the United States. Given the fragility of some Central American and Caribbean states,
expansion of DTO operations and violence into the region would have a gravely destabilizing
effect .
Causes prolif, disease, war and creates a domino effect in the region --- these all
escalate
Manwaring 5 Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson
College, venezuela’s hugo chávez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf
President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state
failure is the most dangerous long-term security
challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status
is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism.
These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they
involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these
conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of
infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can
spawn further human rights violations, torture,
poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and
proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism,
and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional
syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive
activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South
America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring
about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide
wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively
lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and
society. Chávez’s
intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin
American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of
corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the
business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political,
economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying
such a
government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an
unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a
consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s
democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist
allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the
longer
dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their
associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity. 65
Instability in the Caribbean region causes bioterror attacks
Flynn and Bryan, 1 Bryan, director of the North-South Center’s Caribbean Program, and Stephen E. Flynn,
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a commander in the U.S. Coast Guard are co-directors of a
project on adapting border controls to support Caribbean trade and development, “Terrorism, Porous Borders, and
Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation,” http://www.cfr.org/border-and-portsecurity/terrorism-porous-borders-homeland-security-case-us-caribbean-cooperation/p4844, Vitz
Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. [in] The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between
drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have
similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean
countries is vital . Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100
companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas
(LNG), are
vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America,
terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries.
Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean
countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after
departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can
sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover,
terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily
through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have
suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again,
Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and
deployment of biological weapons within national borders
Extinction
Matheny 7 Jason is a research associate at Oxford University’s Future of Humanity Institute. He previously
worked at the Center for Biosecurity and holds an MBA from Duke University. “Reducing the Risk of Human
Extinction,” Risk Analysis Vol. 27, No. 5,
http://users.physics.harvard.edu/~wilson/pmpmta/Mahoney_extinction.pdf
Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to
engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and
materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a
weapon can have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are
funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of
local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).
Independently, escalating instability in Latin America causes global war
Rochlin 94 Francis Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Okanagan University College
James Francis “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America”, p. 130131)
While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an
Perceptions of declining U.S.
influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin
America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to
interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas.
were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the
Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that
in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and
spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United
States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international
arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a
predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of
U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on –
the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
Mexico drug violence causes oil shocks
Moran, 9 Michael, executive editor and policy analyst, Council on Foreign Relations, “Six Crises, 2009: A HalfDozen Ways Geopolitics Could Upset Global Recovery,” http://fbkfinanzwirtschaft.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/sixcrises-2009-a-half-dozen-ways-geopolitics-could-upset-global-recovery/, Vitz
Risk 2: Mexico
Drug Violence: At Stake: Oil prices , refugee flows , NAFTA , U.S. economic stability A
story receiving more attention in the American media than Iraq these days is the horrific drug-related violence across the
northern states of Mexico, where Felipe Calderon has deployed the national army to combat two
thriving drug cartels, which have compromised the national police beyond redemption . The tales
of carnage are horrific, to be sure: 30 people were killed in a 48 hour period last week in Cuidad Juarez alone, a city located directly across the
Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. So far, the impact on the United States and beyond has been minimal. But there also isn’t much sign that the
army is winning, either, and that raises a disturbing question: What if Calderon loses?¶ The CIA’s worst nightmare during the Cold War (outside
of an administration which forced transparency on it, of course) was the radicalization or collapse of Mexico. The template then was
communism, but narco-capitalism
doesn’t look much better.The prospect of a wholesale collapse
that sent millions upon millions of Mexican refugees fleeing across the northern border so far seems
remote. But Mexico’s army has its own problems with corruption, and a sizeable number of Mexicans regard Calderon’s razor-thin 2006
electoral victory over a leftist rival as illegitimate. With
Mexico’s economy reeling and the traditional safety
valve of illegal immigration to America dwindling, the potential for serious trouble exists.¶ Meanwhile, Mexico
ranks with Saudi Arabia and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the United States could not
do without. Should things come unglued there and Pemex production shut down even
temporarily , the shock on oil markets could be profound , again, sending its waves throughout the
global economy . Long-term, PEMEX production has been sliding anyway, thanks to oil fields well-beyond their peak and restrictions on
foreign investment.¶ Domestically in the U.S., any trouble involving Mexico invariably will cause a bipartisan demand for more security on the
southern border, inflame anti-immigrant sentiment and possibly force Obama to remember his campaign promise to “renegotiate NAFTA,” a
pledge he deftly sidestepped once in office.
Oil shocks cause energy wars that escalate
Qasem 7 Islam Yasin, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and Social Sciences at the University of
Pompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona, MA in International Affairs from Columbia, July 9, 2007, “The Coming Warfare of
Oil Shortage,” online: http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o.htm
Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, superpowers will not
hesitate to unleash their economic and military power to ensure secure access to oil resources,
triggering worldwide tension, if not armed conflict. And while superpowers like the United States
maintain superior conventional military power, in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker states are
already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons . In an anarchic world with many nuclearweapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in downward spiral, the chances of
using nuclear weapons
in pursues of national interests
are high .
Advantage 2
Advantage 2 is Cooperative Federalism
Federal prohibition on marijuana threatens cooperative federalism and spills over to
erode the broader doctrine of federalism itself
Grabarsky, 13 Todd, Law Clerk, United States Court, Northern District of California. J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, “CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA
POLICIES: ¶ A THREAT TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM,” Vitz
This Article now turns to the situation on the ground, exploring the ways in which the federal executive - through
efforts of the DEA and DOJ - has sought to enforce the federal drugs ban on medical marijuana
despite its limited legalization in California since the passage of the CUA in 1996. This Part then argues that these changes in
federal enforcement policy threaten state autonomy and federalism itself because they unfairly
subject the states to the whims of the federal government. This is especially true in an area drug enforcement - with extremely limited federal resources, and which, arguably, was
envisioned as a joint state-federal cooperative enforcement scheme. In other words, these federal
executive fluctuations are a threat to cooperative federalism .
Marijuana is the most pressing and complex federalism issue of our time --- this
affects the entire doctrine
Schwartz, prof of law @ UW, 13 David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of
Wisconsin Law School, “High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate
States” 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, Lexis, Vitz
Marijuana legalization by the states presents the most pressing and complex federalism issue of
our time. Congress has undisputed power to regulate individuals within a state, even if it creates rights or duties contrary to that state's laws. The
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the manufacture, distribution, and
even simple possession of marijuana, whether or not the offending conduct crosses state
lines, is clearly established. n1 In the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) n2, Congress exercised that regulatory power directly on the people of
the states. But since 1996, several states have legalized medical or even "recreational" marijuana.
The obligation of those states' legislatures, executive officials, and courts to cooperate with
the federal marijuana prohibition is extremely unclear . Internal state governmental processes
have been thrown into confusion by apparent conflicts between their state's legalization laws and
the CSA. State governors have refused to implement duly enacted state laws for fear that their
subordinates will be prosecuted by federal authorities . n3 County bureaucrats are suing their
states for injunctions to block enforcement of state laws that they deem to conflict with federal policy .
n4 State courts are uncertain whether to revoke state law probationers or parolees for [*570]
engaging in conduct that is affirmatively legal under state law. n5 Local police officers are concerned that they may be
committing federal crimes by returning seized property to individuals who have committed no
state law offense - and wonder whether they are obligated by federal law to make arrests for
conduct expressly legalized by their state. n6 Rarely in our history have the obligations of officials of all branches
of state government to conform to federal law been more uncertain - and rarely has federal
law so sweepingly intruded into state policy choices . It is not an exaggeration to say that state
marijuana legalization presents a federalism crisis . n7¶ Current federalism doctrine offers three
possible resolutions to this crisis, all of them unsatisfactory . To see this, we can boil the marijuana
federalism problem down to a single question. Suppose a state or local police officer
encounters a person who is in possession of marijuana in conformance with the state's
legalization law. Must the officer arrest the person and seize the marijuana, or let the person
go and keep the marijuana? This question is the most fundamental and commonplace of all the
scenarios presenting conflicting duties of state officials in the marijuana federalism crisis . Any
doctrinal solution that cannot answer this basic "arrest and seizure" question in a satisfactory
manner - one that is consistent both internally and with the broader fabric of federalism
doctrines - necessarily fails to resolve the crisis.
Providing an “opt-out” clause in the CSA solves tensions and provides a cooperative
framework
Grabarsky, 13 Todd, Law Clerk, United States Court, Northern District of California. J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, “CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA
POLICIES: ¶ A THREAT TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM,” Vitz
B. A
Congressional Exemption for Medical Marijuana in Compliance with State Law
Because it appears that the federal executive could not viably preserve the federalism balance, this Article turns to Congress. This
Article
proposes that Congress act to reconcile the state-federal conflict of laws regarding medical
marijuana by creating an exemption from the CSA for medical marijuana usage and distribution in
compliance with approved state laws and regulatory schemes. At the most, Congress could
amend the CSA to expressly provide the exemption, or, at the very least, pass an act prohibiting the Executive from
enforcing the CSA's medical marijuana proscription in states that permit it. Such an exemption would allow states to
proceed with their medical marijuana programs while at the same time keeping the drug illegal
at the federal level . The result would be that medical marijuana would be presumptively
prohibited nationwide, except in states that take affirmative legislative and administrative
steps (as some have already done) to legalize it.
It is extremely important to note that this proposal does not call for a federal exemption to the CSA for medical marijuana. On one hand, in
states like California that elect to legalize medical marijuana, the
proposed exemption would allow those states'
legislation and regulation to operate unimpeded by federal disruption. This will also allow
these states to work with the federal authorities in focusing on the state-federal unity of
interests in drug enforcement; for example California state agents will still be able and encouraged to
work with their federal counterparts to curb the distribution and possession of drugs that remain
illegal on both the federal and state level. On the other hand, in states that wish to keep medical marijuana
prohibited, state authorities will continue to cooperate with the federal government to
execute the CSA and its state law counterpart.
The reason why this compromise is necessary stems from the so-called "laboratories of
experimentation" n137 notion of federalism that a one-size-fits-all fix is not a viable or
practicable solution to address an issue that affects over 300 million people with hundreds if
not thousands of diverse values, principles, and beliefs. As mentioned, this Article does not purport to opine on
the policy values of the legalization of medical marijuana. Rather, this Article argues that if the people or legislature of a
state decides on a social issue like medical marijuana, then the federal government should
give some deference to those decisions. When it comes to social issues, the state lawmaking process especially in states that pass laws through popular referenda - is arguably better at achieving the will of the people
than is the federal government. State governments are more localized , and thus more apt at
deciding how to specifically address a [*29] problem that affects its citizens. The very existence of
federalism acknowledges that one solution in one state might not be best for another state, let
alone the rest of the country.
The single instance of the plan demonstrates utility of respecting state concerns which
creates a larger consultative relationship
Ryan, 11 Erin, Associate Professor, William & Mary Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School, “ARTICLE:
NEGOTIATING FEDERALISM,” 52 B.C. L. Rev 1, Vitz
Professor Gillian Metzger
advocates administrative law as a subconstitutional surrogate for
addressing federalism concerns, n62 noting that procedural and substantive safeguards in administrative law
offer useful avenues for judicial federalism review that are unavailable for review of legislation. n63 She also observes that
agencies are often better-equipped to deal with core federalism concerns, which often arise in specific policymaking contexts in which agency
experts are better positioned to investigate state interests. n64
Professor Catherine Sharkey
adds that President Clinton's Federalism Executive Order provides an
excellent framework for making agencies accountable to federalism concerns, and argues that it should
be made enforceable . n65 She also observes that agencies engaged in programs of cooperative
federalism with state partners better heed federalism concerns than those administering programs without state
collaboration. n66 For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which works closely with states in administering the Clean Air and
Water Acts, has shown much greater deference to state interests than the Federal Drug Administration, whose regulations have preempted
state common law without much sensitivity. n67
These "Administrative Safeguards" authors skillfully highlight the institutional features that make
agencies more responsive to state interests. They show the federalism benefits that follow
intergovernmental interaction by demonstrating the respect for state concerns that federal
agents gain from consistent contact. Thus, even though the arguments for Administrative
Safeguards are implicitly framed in unilateral terms, the suggestion that the executive branch
offers the last, best hope for protecting federalism is predicated on the volume of executive
rulemaking, [*19] implementation, and enforcement that is effectively negotiated in
consultation with state partners .
Cooperative federalism solves warming – allows the government to set regulations to
stop race to the bottom standards but preserves state autonomy in implementation
Doremus and Hanemann, 8 Holly, Professor of Law, UC Berkeley and UC Davis, and Michael, Chancellor’s
Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Professor of Law, UC Berkeley and UC
Davis, “SYMPOSIUM: Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework is
Useful for Addressing Global Warming,” 50 Arizona Law Review 799, pg. lexis, ALB
B.
Why the Cooperative Federalism Framework of the Clean Air Act Is a Good Fit for Global Warming
EPA's general counsel opined in 1998 that the agency had authority to regulate GHG
emissions as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, n109 but the agency took no steps to do so.
Five years later, a different general counsel working for a different administration offered a different interpretation, asserting that the Clean Air Act did not allow
EPA to regulate greenhouse gases. n110 That conclusion rested on the view that the Clean Air Act's regulatory framework was ill-suited to the problem of global
climate change. Some important politicians agree. Congressman John Dingell has said that regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act would produce "a
glorious mess," n111 and President Bush has worried that applying the Clean Air Act (or the Endangered Species Act or National Environmental Policy Act, for that
matter) to global warming would cripple the economy. n112 Those concerns featured prominently in the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) EPA
issued in July 2008, n113 belatedly responding to Massachusetts v. EPA. In an unusual personal preface, the EPA Administrator revealed both a striking general
hostility to the Clean Air Act and a commitment to avoiding its use to deal with GHG emissions, writing: I believe the ANPR demonstrates the Clean Air Act, an
outdated law originally enacted to control regional pollutants that cause direct health effects, is ill-suited for the task of regulating global greenhouse gases... .
Pursuing this course of action would inevitably result in a very complicated, time-consuming and, likely, convoluted set of regulations. These rules would largely preempt or overlay existing programs that help control greenhouse gas emissions and would be relatively ineffective at reducing greenhouse gas concentrations given
the potentially damaging effect on jobs and the U.S. economy. n114 We agree that it would be difficult to apply the current Clean Air Act directly to GHG emissions.
Nonetheless
, we believe that many aspects of the Clean Air Act, notably including its division of
responsibilities between state and federal authorities, would serve the nation well in tackling global
warming . The combination of federal [*821] minimum standards for both stationary and mobile
sources with state obligations to meet emission targets that characterizes the Clean Air Act
could address many of the gaps that emission trading will inevitably leave. 1. Air Quality Standards The
one conspicuous misfit between the present Clean Air Act and the global warming problem is
the Act's reliance on national air quality standards. EPA's 2003 determination that it lacked the authority to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions rested in large part on its conclusion that the NAAQS were not a useful way to address global warming. The general counsel wrote: Unique and
basic aspects of the presence of key GHGs in the atmosphere make the NAAQS system fundamentally ill-suited to addressing global climate change. Many GHGs
reside in the earth's atmosphere for very long periods of time. CO<2> in particular has a residence time of roughly 50-200 years. This long lifetime along with
atmospheric dynamics means that CO<2> is well mixed throughout the atmosphere, up to approximately the lower stratosphere. The result is a vast global
atmospheric pool of CO<2> that is fairly consistent in concentration everywhere along the surface of the earth and vertically throughout this area of mixing. ... Any
CO<2> standard that might be established would in effect be a worldwide ambient air quality standard, not a national standard - the entire world would be either in
Such a situation would be inconsistent with a basic underlying premise of
the CAA [Clean Air Act] regime for implementation of a NAAQS - that actions taken by
individual states and by EPA can generally bring all areas of the U.S. into attainment of a
NAAQS... . The globally pervasive nature of CO<2> emissions and atmospheric concentrations
presents a unique problem that fundamentally differs from the kind of environmental
problem that the NAAQS system was intended to address and is capable of solving . n116 It is
true that no state could on its own assure compliance with an air quality standard for CO<2>.
In that sense, the Clean Air Act is a poor fit for any global, or even regional, problem .
Furthermore, the impacts of greenhouse gases on health and welfare are significantly
different than those of the current criteria pollutants. Instead of direct effects on human life
and ecosystems, carbon dioxide's impacts are largely indirect, mediated through changes in
air and water temperatures due to increased retention of solar energy. That so many people have looked to
compliance or out of compliance.
the Clean Air Act's acid rain program as a model for dealing with greenhouse gases is no surprise. The effects of CO<2> in the atmosphere are even less direct and
more independent of the geographic location of emission than the acid rain effects of SO<2>. Surely the sense that the Clean Air Act cannot deal with such a
delocalized pollution problem, together with the desire to solve the problem as painlessly as possible, has contributed significantly to the enthusiasm for cap-and-
We believe that Congress should identify the goals of GHG regulation outside the
strictures of the air quality provisions of the Clean Air Act. Those provisions require that EPA
set NAAQS at levels requisite to protect public health and welfare, without regard to costs.
Given the difficulty of deciding what level of global warming is acceptable, the likelihood that
we are already committed to a level of warming that will significantly affect public health and
welfare, and the potentially high costs of reaching our GHG goals, it is probably essential that
Congress take the lead in setting those goals. We also believe that an emission target makes
more sense in this case than an atmospheric level target. As EPA has noted, the level of CO<2>
in the atmosphere is essentially independent of the decisions of any individual state, and
indeed it is at least somewhat independent of the decisions of all the U.S. states together . States
trade approaches.
should not face sanctions, as they might under the NAAQS framework, for atmospheric CO<2> [*823] levels that are beyond their control. n123 Nonetheless, that
domestic emission reductions cannot assure attainment of the atmospheric goal need not be a barrier to regulation. The fight against global warming must proceed
on a number of fronts. The 1970 Clean Air Act set emission limits for automobiles based on back-of-the-envelope calculations of the level of reduction in automobile
emissions necessary, in concert with other reductions to be pursued under the NAAQS provisions, to achieve desired air quality levels. n124 In much the same way,
targets could be set for domestic emission reductions with the understanding that vigorous pursuit of an international successor to the Kyoto Protocol will also be
necessary to ensure that climate goals are realized. The Clean Air Act, then, is not quite the right tool for setting regulatory goals and determining acceptable
emission levels for greenhouse gases. But
the fact that the initial step under the NAAQS provisions does not
seem to work for CO<2> should not blind us to the fact that in many ways the state planning
and implementation framework used to achieve the NAAQS is an excellent fit for addressing
global warming. It can engage the states as full partners in addressing the problem, leverage
the work they are already doing, provide info rmation needed to tackle aspects of the
problem that are not well suited to markets, recognize local variation in challenges and
opportunities, take advantage of the special political and practical abilities of the states to deal
with behavioral emissions, and help states learn from one another's successes and failures.
Federal climate legislation should adopt emission reduction goals applicable to the states and
require that states prepare and implement "climate implementation plans" modeled on the
SIPs to achieve those goals. Global warming is a daunting problem, one that will be far more difficult to solve than the "standard" pollution
problems that gave rise to the Clean Air Act. Stabilizing the climate at an acceptable CO<2> level will take the concerted efforts of many nations, all levels of
domestic government, and a committed citizenry. Others have argued - quite correctly - that
federal GHG legislation should protect the ability [*824] of states to engage in their own
climate change efforts. We would go further. For this problem, it is not enough to allow
states to participate to the extent they choose to do so. Because global warming provides
textbook temptations for a race to the bottom, emission goals should be set at the national
level. States should be free to adopt more stringent goals should they choose to do so, just as
they are currently free to impose air quality standards tougher than the federal NAAQS on
themselves. Once the federal government sets minimum emission reduction goals, the states
should be required to play a primary role in implementing those goals. Federal legislation can
and should affirmatively confer upon states the authority and the responsibility to play that
role. Surprisingly, none of the current crop of GHG bills deals with the role of the states in any
depth. None would assign the states an important role, or even provide them with incentives
to voluntarily assume such a role. There may be other models that would work, but the Clean
Air Act's SIP program, while it surely could use some tweaking, provides a useful and readily
available starting model for an appropriate state role.
Even if we pass the tipping point, cooperative federalism is crucial to adaptation
measures to solve the impact to warming
Glicksman 11 (Robert, J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law, The George Washington University Law School,
“CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: A COLLECTIVE ACTION PERSPECTIVE ON FEDERALISM CONSIDERATIONS”, 2/1/11,
http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/7584-404glicksman)
The uncertainty
about the magnitude and distribution of the effects of climate change makes it
impossible to predict exactly what kinds of adaptive measures will be needed in different parts of the
country and when they will be needed. There seems to be a consensus among those who have focused on climate change adaptation policy
that the effort will necessarily involve federal, state, and local government participation . In an optimal
world,
policymakers at different levels would coordinate their responses so that adaptation
proceeds as efficiently and effectively as possible, the burdens resulting from climate change are minimized, and the
unavoidable burdens are distributed as equitably as possible, even though climate change is likely to affect some areas of the country, such as
coastal areas vulnerable to flooding and severe storm activity, more than others. It
is inevitable, however, that clashes of
interest will develop between jurisdictions when desired goods, such as potable water, are scarce or efforts by one state
or locality to avoid the undesirable aspects of climate change shift the burden of those changes to other jurisdictions. Collective action
analysis can help avoid or resolve such conflicts by assigning the authority to control the
development of climate change adaptation policy to the level of government best situated to
address a problem without exacerbating the adverse consequences of climate change for others. The conflicts are likely to arise both
when states and localities fail to do enough to anticipate and react to climate change and when they do “too much.” As the analysis above
indicates, collective
action analysis supports the exercise of federal power to create minimal
protections against the ravages of climate change in the face of state or local reluctance to
react to its consequences. The federal role, which would exist concurrently with the exercise of state and local power to
respond to climate change, could involve providing technical and financial assistance to state and local
governments or the creation of the kinds of cooperative federalism regulatory programs that have
become entrenched in U.S. environmental law over the last forty years. In limited contexts, collective
action analysis also supports displacement of the aggressive exercise of state and local authority to adapt to climate change in favor of exclusive
federal control. These situations are most likely to involve state and local efforts that result in interstate externalities.
Absent cuts in emissions, warming causes extinction
Mazo, 10 Jeffrey Mazo – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for
Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010,
“Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122
The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above preindustrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is
1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1-7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still
be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century."
Without early and severe
reductions in emissions , the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first
century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and
stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of
widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as
melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond
the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation ." What is certain is that there is no
precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes
would mean profound social, cultural and political changes
Warming is real and anthropogenic --- we need to cut emissions in the short-term and
status quo adaptation can’t solve --- our method of determining this is correct and
cites a consensus
Harvey, citing IPCC climate reports, 13 Fiona, Guardian Environment Reporter, IPCC climate report:
human impact is 'unequivocal', September 27 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/27/ipcc-climate-report-un-secretary-general
World leaders must now respond to an "unequivocal" message from climate scientists and act with policies to cut greenhouse gas emissions,
the United Nations secretary-general urged on Friday. Introducing a major report from a high level UN panel of climate scientists, Ban Ki-moon
said, "The heat is on. We must act." The
world's leading climate scientists, who have been meeting in all-night sessions this
week in the Swedish capital, said there was no longer room for doubt that climate change was
occurring, and the dominant cause has been human actions in pouring greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.
In their starkest warning yet, following nearly seven years of new research on the climate, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said it was "unequivocal" and that even if the world begins to moderate greenhouse gas
emissions, warming is likely to cross the critical threshold of 2C by the end of this century. That would have
serious consequences, including sea level rises, heatwaves and changes to rainfall meaning dry regions
get less and already wet areas receive more. In response to the report, the US secretary of state, John Kerry, said in a statement: "This is yet
another wakeup call: those who deny the science or choose excuses over action are playing with fire." "Once again, the
science grows
clearer, the case grows more compelling, and the costs of inaction grow beyond anything that
anyone with conscience or commonsense should be willing to even contemplate," he said. He said
that livelihoods around the world would be impacted. "With those stakes, the response must be all hands on deck. It's not about one country
making a demand of another. It's the science itself, demanding action from all of us. The United States is deeply committed to leading on
climate change." In a crucial reinforcement of their message – included starkly in this report for the first time – the
IPCC warned that
the world cannot afford to keep emitting carbon dioxide as it has been doing in recent years. To
avoid dangerous levels of climate change, beyond 2C, the world can only emit a total of
between 800 and 880 gigatonnes of carbon. Of this, about 530 gigatonnes had already been emitted by 2011. That
has a clear implication for our fossil fuel consumption, meaning that humans cannot burn all
of the coal, oil and gas reserves that countries and companies possess. As the former UN commissioner
Mary Robinson told the Guardian last week, that will have "huge implications for social and economic development." It will also be difficult for
business interests to accept. The central estimate is that warming is likely to exceed 2C, the threshold beyond which scientists think global
warming will start to wreak serious changes to the planet. That threshold is likely to be reached even if we begin to cut global greenhouse gas
emissions, which so far has not happened, according to the report. Other key points from the report are: • Atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are now at levels "unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years." • Since the 1950's it's
"extremely likely" that human activities have been the dominant cause of the temperature rise. • Concentrations of CO2 and other greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere have increased to levels that are unprecedented in at least 800,000 years. The burning of fossil fuels is the main reason
behind a 40% increase in C02 concentrations since the industrial revolution. • Global temperatures are likely to rise by 0.3C to 4.8C, by the end
of the century depending on how much governments control carbon emissions. • Sea levels are expected to rise a further 26-82cm by the end
of the century. • The oceans have acidified as they have absorbed about a third of the carbon dioxide emitted. Thomas Stocker, co-chair of the
working group on physical science, said the message that greenhouse gases must be reduced was clear. "We
give very relevant guidance on the total amount of carbon that can't be emitted to stay to 1.5 or 2C. We are not on the path that would lead us
to respect that warming target [which has been agreed by world governments]." He said: "Continued
emissions of
greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate
system. Limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions." Though governments around the world have agreed to curb emissions, and at numerous international
meetings have reaffirmed their commitment to holding warming to below 2C by the end of the century, greenhouse gas concentrations are still
rising at record rates. Rajendra Pachauri, chair of the IPCC, said it was for governments to take action based on the science produced by the
panel, consisting of thousands of pages of detail, drawing on the work of more than 800 scientists and hundreds of scientific papers. The
scientists also put paid to claims that global warming has "stopped" because global temperatures in the past 15 years have not continued the
strong upward march of the preceding years, which is a key argument put forward by sceptics to cast doubt on climate science. But the IPCC
said the
longer term trends were clear: "Each of the last three decades has been successively
warmer at the Earth's surface than any preceding decade since 1850 in the northern hemisphere [the earliest
date for reliable temperature records for the whole hemisphere]." The past 15 years were not such an unusual case, said Stocker. "People
always pick 1998 but [that was] a very special year, because a strong El Niño made it unusually hot, and since then there have been some
medium-sized volcanic eruptions that have cooled the climate." But he said that further research was needed on the role of the oceans, which
are thought to have absorbed more than 90% of the warming so far. The
scientists have faced sustained attacks from
so-called sceptics, often funded by "vested interests" according to the UN, who try to pick holes in
each item of evidence for climate change. The experts have always known they must make their work watertight against
such an onslaught, and every conclusion made by the IPCC must pass scrutiny by all of the world's
governments before it can be published. Their warning on Friday was sent out to governments around the globe, who
convene and fund the IPCC. It was 1988 when scientists were first convened for this task, and in the five landmark reports since then the
research has become ever clearer. Now, scientists say they are certain that "warming in the climate
system is unequivocal and since 1950 many changes have been observed throughout the
climate system that are unprecedented over decades to millennia." That warning, from such a sober body,
hemmed in by the need to submit every statement to extraordinary levels of scrutiny, is the
starkest yet. "Heatwaves are very likely to occur more frequently and last longer. As the earth warms, we expect to see currently wet
regions receiving more rainfall, and dry regions receiving less, although there will be exceptions," Stocker said. Qin Dahe, also co-chair of the
working group, said: "As the ocean warm, and glaciers and ice sheets reduce, global mean sea level will continue to rise, but at a faster rate
than we have experienced over the past 40 years." Prof David Mackay, chief scientific adviser to the Department of Energy and Climate Change,
said: "The far-reaching consequences of this warming are becoming understood, although some uncertainties remain. The
most
significant uncertainty, however, is how much carbon humanity will choose to put into the
atmosphere in the future. It is the total sum of all our carbon emissions that will determine
the impacts. We need to take action now, to maximise our chances of being faced with
impacts that we, and our children, can deal with. Waiting a decade or two before taking climate change action will certainly
lead to greater harm than acting now."