Title: Should Juvenile Offenders Be Tried as Adults? - rehabilitation at issue
Source: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_2668_129/ai_69698409/?tag=content;col1
Synopsis: This paper recognizes the special needs and immature status of young people
and emphasize rehabilitation over punishment. It argues that the years between 12 to 17,
this age range is an inherently transitional time, a period of potential malleability, and a
formative period during which a number of developmental trajectories become firmly
established and increasingly difficult to alter. Transferring juveniles to criminal court has
three sets of implications that need to be considered in discussions about whether they
should be tried as adults: it alters the legal process by which a minor is tried; it changes
the legal standards applied in juvenile courts; it changes the possible outcomes of the
adjudication of trying a juvenile.
Should Juvenile Offenders Be Tried as Adults? - Rehabilitation at Issue
"... Transferring juveniles into a criminal justice system that precludes a rehabilitative
response may not be very sensible public policy."
For the past 100 years, American society has most often chosen the first approach. It has
redefined juvenile offenses by treating most of them as delinquent acts to be adjudicated
within a separate juvenile justice system that is theoretically designed to recognize the
special needs and immature status of young people and emphasize rehabilitation over
punishment. Two guiding beliefs about young people have prevailed: first, that juveniles
have different competencies than adults (and therefore need to be adjudicated in a
different type of venue); and second, that they have different potential for change than
adults (and therefore merit a second chance and an attempt at rehabilitation). States have
recognized that conduct alone--that is, the alleged criminal act--should not by itself
determine whether to invoke the heavy hand of the adult criminal justice system.
In recent years, though, there has been a dramatic shift in the way juvenile crime is
viewed by policymakers and the general public, one that has led to widespread changes in
policies and practices concerning the treatment of juvenile offenders. Rather than
choosing to define offenses committed by youth as delinquent, society increasingly is
opting to redefine them as adults and transfer them to the adult court and criminal justice
system.
Most reasonable people agree that a small number of young offenders should be
transferred to the adult system because they pose a genuine threat to the safety of other
juveniles, the severity of their offense merits a relatively more severe punishment, or
their history of repeated offending bodes poorly for their ultimate rehabilitation.
However, this does not describe the tens of thousands of young people who currently are
being prosecuted in the adult system, a large proportion of whom have been charged with
nonviolent crimes. When the wholesale transfer to criminal court of various categories of
juvenile offenders starts to become the rule rather than the exception, this represents a
fundamental challenge to the very premise that the juvenile court was founded on--that
adolescents and adults are different.
There are many lenses through which one can view debates about transfer policies. As a
developmental psychologist, I ask whether the distinctions we draw between people of
different ages under the law are sensible in light of what we know about age differences
in various aspects of intellectual, emotional, or social functioning. More specifically, on
the basis of what we know about development, should a boundary be drawn between
juveniles and adults in criminal matters and, if so, at what age should we draw it?
Developmental psychology, broadly defined, concerns the scientific study of changes in
physical, intellectual, emotional, and social development over the life cycle.
Developmental psychologists are mainly interested in the study of "normative"
development. My concern is whether the study of normative development indicates that
there are scientific reasons to warrant the differential treatment of young people and
adults within the legal system, especially with regard to the age period most under current
political scrutiny--the years between 12 and 17.
First, this age range is an inherently transitional time. There are rapid and dramatic
changes in individuals' physical, intellectual, emotional, and social capabilities. If there is
a period in the life span during which one might choose to draw a line between
incompetent and competent individuals, this is it.
Second, adolescence is a period of potential malleability. Experiences in the family, peer
group, school, and other settings still have a chance to influence the course of
development. To the extent that malleability is likely, transferring juveniles into a
criminal justice system that precludes a rehabilitative response may not be very sensible
public policy. However, to the extent that adolescents' amenability is limited, their
transfer to the adult system is less worrisome.
Finally, adolescence is a formative period during which a number of developmental
trajectories become firmly established and increasingly difficult to alter. Many adolescent
experiences have a tremendous cumulative impact. Bad decisions or poorly formulated
policies pertaining to juvenile offenders may have unforeseen and harmful consequences
that are very hard to undo.
It is only fair to ask whether or why a developmental perspective is even relevant to
contemporary discussions of trying juvenile offenders in the adult criminal system. After
all, current discussions about trying juveniles in adult court are typically not about the
characteristics of the offender, but about the seriousness and harmfulness of the offense-factors independent of the offender's age or maturity. "Adult time for adult crime"--the
mantra of the get-tough-on-juvenile-crime lobby--says nothing about the age of the
offender, except for the fact that it ought to be considered irrelevant.
I believe that it is logically impossible to make the age of the offender irrelevant in
discussions of criminal justice policy. A fair punishment tot an adult is unfair when
applied to a child who did not understand the consequences of his or her actions. The
ways we interpret and apply laws should rightfully vary when the case at hand involves a
defendant whose understanding of the law is limited by intellectual immaturity or whose
judgment is impaired by emotional immaturity. Moreover, the implications and
consequences of administering a long and harsh punishment are very different when the
offender is young than when he or she is an adult.
Transferring juveniles to criminal court has three sets of implications that need to be
considered in discussions about whether they should be tried as adults. First, transfer to
adult court alters the legal process by which a minor is tried. Criminal court is based on
an adversarial model, while juvenile court is based, at least in theory, on a more
cooperative model. This difference in the climates of juvenile vs. adult courts is
significant because it is unclear at what age individuals have sufficient understanding of
the ramifications of the adversarial process and the different vested interests of
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Young defendants may simply not have what
it takes--by the standards established in the Constitution--to be able to defend themselves
in criminal court.
Second, the legal standards applied in adult and juvenile courts are different. For
example, competence to stand trial is presumed among adult defendants unless they
suffer from a serious mental illness or substantial mental retardation. We do not know if
the presumption of competence holds for juveniles, who, even in the absence of mental
retardation or mental illness, may lack sufficient competence to participate in the
adjudicative process. Standards for judging culpability may be different in juvenile and
adult courts as well. In the absence of mental illness or substantial deficiency, adults are
presumed to be responsible for their own behavior. We do not know the extent to which
this presumption applies to juveniles, or whether the validity of this presumption differs
as a function of the juvenile's age.
Finally, the choice of trying a young offender in adult vs. juvenile court determines the
possible outcomes of the adjudication. In adult court, the outcome of being found guilty
of a serious crime is nearly always some sort of punishment. In juvenile court, the
outcome of being found delinquent may be some sort of punishment, but juvenile courts
typically retain the option of a rehabilitative disposition, in and of itself or in combination
with some sort of punishment. This has two significant ramifications: the stakes of the
adjudication are substantially greater and, in juvenile court, offenders generally are
presumed amenable unless the prosecutor demonstrates otherwise. In adult court,
amenability is not presumed, and must instead be shown by the defendant's counsel.
In other words, decisiomnakers within the juvenile and criminal justice systems bring
different presumptions to the table. The juvenile court operates under the presumption
that offenders are immature, in three different senses of the word: Their development is
incomplete; their judgment is less than mature; and their character is still developing. The
adult court, in contrast, presumes that defendants are mature, competent, responsible, and
unlikely to change.
Which of these presumptions best characterizes individuals between the ages of 12 and
17? Is there an approximate age where the presumptions of the criminal court become
more applicable to an offender than the presumptions of the juvenile court? Although
developmental psychology does not point to any one age that politicians and practitioners
should use in formulating transfer policies or practices, it does point to age-related trends
in certain legally relevant attributes, such as the intellectual or emotional capabilities that
affect decisionmaking in court and on the street.
It is appropriate, based on developmental research, to raise serious concerns about the
transfer of individuals 12 and under to adult court, because of their limited adjudicative
competence as well as the very real possibility that most children this young will not
prove to be sufficiently blameworthy to warrant exposure to the harsh consequences of a
criminal court adjudication. For this reason, individuals 12 and under should continue to
be viewed as juveniles, regardless of the nature of their offense. This does not mean that
we should let them off the hook or fail to punish them. It merely means that they should
be punished and held responsible within a system designed to treat children, not fully
mature adults.
At the other end of the continuum, it appears appropriate to conclude that the vast
majority of individuals older than 16 are not appreciably different from adults in ways
that would prohibit their fair adjudication within the criminal justice system. My view is
that variability among individuals older than 12, but younger than 16, requires that some
sort of individualized assessment of an offender's competence to stand trial,
blameworthiness, and likely amenability to treatment be made before reaching a transfer
decision. The relevant decisionmakers (e.g., judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys)
should be permitted to exercise judgment about individual offenders' maturity and
eligibility for transfer.
It is true that a bullet wound hurts just as much when the weapon is fired by a child as
when it is fired by an adult, but this argument is a red herring, since we comfortably
acknowledge that there are numerous situations where mitigating factors should be taken
into account when trying a defendant, such as insanity, emotional duress, or self-defense.
Immaturity is another mitigating factor. People may differ in their opinions about the
extent to which, the ways in which, and the age at which an offender's maturity should be
considered in court decisions. One person might believe that a boundary should be drawn
at 18, another at 15, and yet another at 13. Nevertheless, ignoring the offender's age
entirely is like trying to ignore an elephant that has wandered into the courtroom. You
can do it, but most people will notice that something smells foul.