Monarchy and Succession in the 16 th Century
Was the succession of James I inevitable?
Perhaps the most widely recognised aspect of Elizabeth I’s reign was the ‘Virgin’
Queen’s failure to commit to marriage and subsequent inability to produce an heir
by the time of her death in March, 1603. The question of succession was one that
would plague Elizabeth’s reign, resulting, unsurprisingly, in extensive battles for
the crown as Elizabeth approached her final years from a host of contenders both
domestic and abroad. Although James VI of Scotland was ultimately to win the
right to the crown with what appeared on the surface as unified relief, to say that
any such result was ‘inevitable’ would be to discredit other viable claims to the
throne.1 It is the fundamental contention of this author that whilst James became
increasingly concerned about his right to succession, Elizabeth made little effort
to secure an alternative, and would stay true to her word as given in letters
succeeding the Treaty of Berwick. The succession of James, however, was
undoubtedly an event that could well have been prevented by numerous events –
or lack thereof – earlier in Elizabeth’s reign.2
The primary concept that may have restricted James’ succession, and thus the
most obvious starting point of this essay, is certainly Elizabeth’s failure to wed. It
is of course true that had the Queen married and a king been crowned, the
likelihood of James’s succession is decreased for a plethora of reasons. Foremost,
it is possible that the King was to outlive Elizabeth herself, particularly had he
been of a considerably younger age such as that of the Duke of Alençon, leaving
Loomis, C. (2010). The Death of Elizabeth I. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. p2.
First shall be discussed such instances that offered a challenge to James in
Elizabeth’s early life, with concentration then turning to the events in her latest
years. Specifically, early year developments will concentrate on the possible
succession of the French Duke of Alençon, and James own mother, Mary, Queen of
Scots. Later year discussions will focus on the large number of other contenders
that were named as possible successors when the death of Elizabeth was becoming
ever more imminent.
1
2
the question of succession in new hands. 3 Likewise, had the king passed before
the time of Elizabeth’s death, his influence on the succession question may still
have moved Elizabeth’s own desires away from the Scottish prince. Even more
obviously, marriage allows for the possibility of an heir to be born to precede the
throne with relatively little controversy.
Certainly, it is true that there appeared no Englishman suited to Elizabeth’s hand
in marriage, for her only desire – Sir Robert Dudley – was deemed unacceptable
given his heritage and those suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of
his last wife. However, prospect for marriage appeared very real over the
boarders, particularly in the case of the Duke of Alençon, François Hercule de
Valois. 4 Elizabeth, although forty-six by the time of the 1579 negotiations, was
deemed still able to bear children. Accordingly, had it not been for the widespread
backlash to Elizabeth’s approval of the marriage, both politically and in the wider
society, a successful match such as this was truly able to supply a solution to the
succession problem. Alas, opposition to the French Catholic prince proved too
powerful and the marriage was not to proceed. The question of inevitability
however returns to the forefront. Specifically, was Elizabeth ever genuine in her
proposals to the Duke, or was the Virgin Queen once again using the prospect of
marriage as a tool of foreign policy, this time directed at Philip II of Spain? Of this
one cannot be sure, for whilst Elizabeth may have appeared eager to flirt with the
French prince, it is unlikely that she would have ignored the controversy the
match caused even in its earliest stages. If that were the case, then, and Elizabeth’s
plans to marry the Duke were merely hollow foreign policy tools, the prospect of
This is of course dependent on the powers given to the new King, for had his
royal prerogatives been so limited as Philip II, husband of Mary Tudor, he would
have little or no legal authority over the question of succession.
4 Mueller, J. (2000). “To My Very Good Brother the King of Scots”: Elizabeth I’s
Correspondence with James VI and the Question of Succession. PMLA. 115 (5),
1064.
3
marriage in this instance does not retract from the ‘inevitability’ of James’s
succession.5
One must turn their attention, therefore, towards a different threat to James’s
claim to the English throne; specifically, his mother, Mary, Queen of Scots. Mary,
great-granddaughter to Henry VII and wife of wife of Francis II, had undoubtedly
the nearest legal claims to the throne through blood succession, though to the
mass disapproval of both Elizabeth and her Privy Council. Regardless of her
threefold claim to the throne through Tudor, Saxon and Lancastrian lines, England
could not by any means accept authority from a Catholic queen so obviously prone
to poor decision making. 6 However the threat of Mary was a divisive one,
worsened by the Queen’s ability to provide something Elizabeth was yet to do: a
male heir. It was, in essence, one of many difficulties of the Tudor monarchy that
the Scottish Queen was viewed as able to repair; a Catholic reformation and,
perhaps until her divorce from Francis II, a considerable bond between the
kingdoms of France, England and Scotland. Unfortunately for Mary, Merriman
suggests, her birth in to such a vast variety of reputations was to make inevitable
her eventual downfall.7 She posed, in essence, too much a threat for her presence
to hide under the radar. Regardless of whether her downfall was regardless or not,
however, it was to Elizabeth’s benefit that Mary’s mistakes – her ‘extraordinary
“Thus ended, definitively,” suggests Mueller, “all prospects of Elizabeth’s
marrying and bearing children… [for] she was in her fifty-first year.” It was
merely one year after the acceptance that marriage was no longer possible, that
Elizabeth would first come in to private and personal conversation with James.
Mueller, 2000: 1064
6Alford, S (2002). Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British
Sucession Crisis, 1558-1569. London: Cambridge University Press. 142.: “In 1565
the crisis over the Queen of Scot’s marriage to Lord Darnley had shocked the
Privy Council and questioned the ability of the regime to… successfully… control
political and military difficulties”.
7 Merriman, M. H. (1988). Mary, Queen of France: Franciscus et Maria Rex et
Regina Francor. Scot. Angl. et Hiber. In: Lynch, M. Mary Stewart. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell Ltd. p47-48.
5
stupidity’ if you will8 - led her in to the hands of the English courts. Had Mary not
further pushed Elizabeth’s patience through ‘irresponsible plotting 9 ’, she may
never have found the justification to execute the Scottish Queen, nor, perhaps, the
desire to ever do so. 10 Additionally, had James taken a more aggressive role
against Elizabeth’s plans to execute the Scottish queen, the decision to do so would
have become too dangerous to carry out; but by this time James was growing in to
maturity and able to realise the benefits of his own mother’s death. It would, James
was to believe under the guidance of letters from Elizabeth, ensure the Scottish
prince’s right to the English throne. Accordingly, the 1586 Treaty of Berwick
confirmed James’ approval of the execution of Mary, and, in return, granted him
Elizabeth’s promise to “not do anything that might damage his claim11”. On the
surface, James VI’s succession began to appear inevitable.
However, it is important to look at relations with the two monarchies post-1586,
for it was met on numerous occasions with cases of tension that at times promised
to crumble the renewed treaty.12 James, despite his earlier passive response to the
plans for his mother’s execution, was deeply offended by her death, criticising
Elizabeth for disrespecting James as “as man of little account”. Rumours spread of
a Scottish invasion, prevented only by the weather and time of year, and Scottish
collaboration with England’s enemies across the border. For nearly a year,
Holmes, P. J. (1988). Mary Stewart in England. In: Lynch, M. Mary Stewart.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. p195-96. Holmes tackles the perception that Mary
was forced to ‘flee’ to England, suggesting rather it was a choice Mary took in
disregard of the counsel of her chief advisors, and despite numerous other
options.
9 Holmes, 1988: 203
10 Mary’s presence in England as a captive brought with it numerous benefits. For
example, whilst Mary remained alive in English custody, she became in effect ‘a
hostage to Catholic good behaviour’. “Mary was worth far more alive than dead”:
Holmes, 1988: 198 & 214
11 Doran, S. (2005). Loving and Affectionate Cousins? The Relationship Between
Elizabeth I and James VI of Scotland 1586-1603. In: Doran, S. and Richardson, G.
Tudor England and Its Neighbours. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan. p203-204.
12 Doran, 2005: 206-8
8
communication with Elizabeth and her councillors was put to a halt, only to be
renewed after James’ clear display of loyalty during the Spanish Armada. However,
tensions were to resume over the issue of James’ pension, and, more vitally, the
clear lack of cooperation from the Scottish council towards the requested
execution of various Catholic conspirators. 13 Mistakes were made on behalf of
Elizabeth as well, particularly in her support of the earl of Bothwell, an enemy of
James who conspired to march on the king’s court in Edinburgh, in discord with
the Treaty of Berwick. Relations between the two crowns began to fall apart, with
James turning towards a renewed friendship with France.14 By this time, then, the
succession of James looked far from inevitable.
It is at this point in Elizabeth’s life, unfortunately for James, that competition for
the English crown was to intensify. It is in the interest of this author to look
towards the tract of Persons, leader of the English Jesuits: A Conference about the
Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland.15 Specifically, it is important to look at
the latter half of the publication, for it is at this point that Persons lists as many as
fourteen possible claimants to the throne of England. Due to the restricted nature
of this essay, however, this author has decided to focus on a select few: Arabella
Stuart, Catherine Grey, the earl of Derby, Philip II of Spain, and the Infanta of
Castile. It is important to note, also, that whilst Persons claimed to be an “impartial
observer to the succession debate”, he appears considerably opposed to the
succession of James VI.16
Most significantly, Huntley, Errol and Angus, each of whom were involved in
both Catholic revolts and planning with the Spanish for a Catholic invasion.
Apart from confiscation of land, none of these characters were punished, much to
the bereavement of Elizabeth.
14 Doran, 2005: 214
15 Whilst it is now agreed that Persons was the author of this tract, it was
released under the pseudonym ‘Doleman’
16 Doran, S. (2004). Three Late-Elizabethan Tracts. In: Mayer, J. C. The Struggle
for Succession in Late Elizabethan England: Politics, Polemics and Cultural
Representations. Montpellier: Institut de Rechercerche sur la Renaissance. 93.
13
The promotion of the Infanta derives most certainly from Persons’ desire for the
promotion of Catholicism in England. Whilst all other claimants, he suggests, were
“tainted with illegitimacy or heresy, or disputed over by conflicting directions of
royal will or parliamentary statute”, the Infanta stood alone with an unspoiled
claim derived from John of Gaunt, to which “she added the additional qualification
of the impeccable orthodoxy of her faith”.17 Certainly, the Infanta’s claim was an
important one, particularly if one is to believe the suggestions of Cecil’s enemies
in the court – and indeed Stopes – that Cecil, by the end of Elizabeth’s reign the
“undisputed leader of the government”, was to be working in collaboration with
the King of Spain to ensure the accession of the Infanta for the promotion of the
Catholic cause.18 Certainly, James himself was to be bombarded with such claims,
coupled with new suggestions that the Earl of Essex was to be denying his rightful
succession. If this were the case, it was certainly a cause for concern, for the Queen
was becoming increasingly incapable of making decisions, allowing increasing
levels of influence for those courtiers closest to the ageing Queen.19 Fortunately
for James, however, an investigation in to the evidence given by Stopes to suggest
Cecil’s desire for the Infanta’s succession is by no means concrete, but adapted
only from an “unidentified correspondent of Father Parsons”. Conversely, one can
observe numerous denials of such claims from Cecil himself, and a failure to
further any plans after the death of Essex.20
Hurtsfield, J. (1961). The Succession Struggle in Late Elizabethan England. In:
Bindoff, S. T., Hurtsfield, J. and Williams, C. H. Elizabethan Government and
Society: Essays Presented to Sir John Neale. London: The Athlone Press. 374.
18 Hurtsfield, 1961: 374-5.
19 ‘Thomas Windebank, her clerk of the signet, recorded the inner conflict which
at times paralysed the Queen’s power of decision’. Hurtsfield, 1961: 370
20 After Essex’s death, Cecil would have become significantly more able to further
the claims of the Infanta. Such actions would indeed have made sense, for Cecil
was amongst those that feared for James’ vengeance over the death of his mother
on his succession.
17
Additionally, to suggest that England’s Catholic population was by any means
united on the idea of the Infanta’s succession is to assume that such a diverse
grouping of individuals can neatly unify over an issue so important to the lives of
English subjects. Conversely, though not to deny the threat posed by Persons’
appeal to Catholics, the promotion of a foreign Catholic monarch did not spur a
systematic uprising, rather splitting the denomination in two opposing ideologies.
Indeed, those ‘Appellants’ who were strengthened in their opposition to a Catholic
monarch’s right to the throne “were led to try to negotiate direct with the English
government some modus vivendi for their co-religionists”. 21 In essence, the
Appellants realised the safety in tolerating their place as a minority religion “than
hurl itself in vain against the established church”. 22 Certainly, in the light of the
Catholic suppression of the late 16th century, the Appellant ideology appears
somewhat ahead of its time. Thus, despite Jesuit promotion over the boarders, the
Infanta’s claim lacked any support from the Elizabethan courts, a unified Catholic
church and, perhaps most importantly, Elizabeth herself.
Concerning the other claimants, various justifications were promoted by the
Queen’s court to invalidate their right to succession. Henry VIII’s younger sister,
whom according to his will was to inherit the throne after Elizabeth, was declared
unsuitable on account of her invalid marriage to the earl of Suffolk. Similarly,
Mary’s eldest daughter, Lady Catherine Grey, was declared unsuitable on account
of her invalid marriage to Edward Seymour and the birth of her two illegitimate
sons. With these two set aside, then, Philip II stood out as a contender due to his
decent from John of Gaunt. Philip, however, was to pass away in 1598 leaving the
Spanish throne to his son, Philip III, who believing his own claim was unhopeful,
found it to be more suitable to support the Infanta, who as we have seen failed to
21
22
Hurtsfield, 1961: 373-4
Hurtsfield, 1961: 384
find adequate support in the English courts. Arabella Stuart’s own claim was one
of importance – certainly, “it is well known that her claim was… taken seriously
enough for her to spend much of her life under close surveillance23” – however
her failure to find a suitable spouse, instead worrying the English court first with
prospects of a Catholic marriage to the House of Savoy and then to William
Seymour, enthused councillors including Cecil to favour her cousin James.
Persons, in scrutinising James’ claim to the throne, returns to the arguments made
by Hales, Morgan, Highinton and Leslie of the 1560-70s; namely, by descent James
is accused to retain a weaker right than that of the Infanta due to James’ descent
from the bastard children of Catherine Swynford, rather than the Lady Blanche.
Thus, James’ previously superior claim through the Lancastrian line is belittled,
leaving him to rely on a significantly weaker – and, in Persons’ opinion, irrelevant
– descent through Elizabeth of York. Already suffering from legal uncertainties
over his foreign birth and the exclusion of the Stuart line in the Henry’s last
statutory will, James had reason to worry about damaging Jesuit tract.
24
Fortunately for James, the damage in his mind that this would certainly cause was
not reflected in the mind of Elizabeth. Rather, Elizabeth’s reaction failed to exceed
beyond the punishment of those in connection of the traitorous tract. Indeed, the
only claimant to throne that was to suffer from Person’s actions was not James but
the earl of Hertford.25 Increasingly angered over James’ open discussion on the
Myers, N. (2004). The Gossip of History: the Question of the Succession in State
Papers (Domestic and Foreign). In: Mayer, J. C. The Struggle for the Succession in
Late Elizabethan England: Politics, Polemics, and Cultural Representations.
Montpellier: Institut de Recherche sur la Renaissance. p51.
24 “Although James VI claimed to be unworried by the Conference, he was said to
be both “heyhly offended” and unsettled by its appearance”. Doran, 2004: 96.
25 The tract’s importance, then, lies in the reception of the English subjects
amongst whom it was to circulate; a situation worsened by the English
government’s inability to produce ‘counter-propaganda’ without confronting the
Queen’s “prohibition of any debate or speculation on the succession”. Doran, 2004:
95
23
succession question, Elizabeth claimed there to be “no need for James to justify his
claim to the throne in answer to Doleman’s book”.26
Elizabeth’s ability to act rationally in defence of her promise to not place obstacles
before James’ succession arrives in 1958, concerning the case of Valentine Thomas.
Arresting under accusations of conspiring with recusants against Elizabeth,
Thomas claimed to have been under the guiding hand of James VI. Such claims
were indeed troublesome to James, who realised that if Thomas were to be found
honest, James would be excluded from the throne via the 1585 Act of the Queen’s
Surety, a similar case to that of his mother. Despite James’ panic, however, both
Elizabeth and her court were to unanimously dismiss the fanciful claims, though
grew increasingly bothered by James’ repeated pestering over the matter.27
Similar unwarranted fret from James was to instigate at the death of Essex, whom
James had been in close contact with, leaving a much mistrusted Cecil with
substantially greater influence. It was enough for James to warrant, though
unsuccessfully, a rise in taxation to fund an army in support of his succession.28
Cecil, however, was to come in to helpful communication with James, though
‘legally traitorous’, offering advice as to not exacerbate Elizabeth’s growing
suspicion over the increasingly unrefined King of Scots. 29 The advice was
accepted by James, and as a result substantially increased the friendly relationship
between the two monarchs in the last two years of her reign; an improvement in
relations leading Elizabeth to feel able to safely retire her in-depth inspections, via
Doran, 2005: 224
James’ constant badgering over the issue of Thomas was viewed as an
“irritating distraction from more important matters of state”. Doran, 2005: 223
28 Loomis, 2010: 1 and Croft, P. (2003). King James. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
p48.
29 Croft, 2003: 48
26
27
not only ambassadors and spies but also Scottish courtiers, in to James’
government.30
By the end of Elizabeth’s life, we see a situation in which no other candidates had
gained significant approval from both the Queen and her most noteworthy
courtiers. Certainly, had Elizabeth not pursued her unprecedented approach to
marriage, nor had Mary Stuart overstepped the line of acceptability, the
competition for succession in the later years of the English Queen’s reign may have
resulted in the succession of an entirely different individual. However, with the
multiplicity of claimants either found illegitimate or undesirable, Elizabeth was
limited, though not to her disapproval, to rely on the King of Scots. Her close
contact with James via personal letters and close inspection of his government
supports Elizabeth’s interest in the Scottish crown for it extends the necessary
interest had Elizabeth not genuinely desired James to adopt the English crown
after her death. Despite pressures threatening to crumble the treaty of Berwick,
and numerous opportunities for James to use military force to otherwise usurp
the throne, both monarchs – with the exception of a few short term mishaps –
would work in cooperation to ensure the comfortable succession of James I of
England. Thus it is the fundamental contention of this author that whilst the
succession of James was by no means ‘inevitable’, overall successful political
manoeuvring of both James and the English government outshone the difficulties
of Anglo-Scottish relations to elevate James as the most rightful successor to the
English crown.
30
Doran, 2005: 227-8
Bibliography
Books/Chapters:
Alford, S (2002). Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British
Sucession Crisis, 1558-1569. London: Cambridge University Press.
Collinson, P. (1987). The English Captivity of Mary Queen of Scots.
Sheffield: Sheffield History Pamphlets.
Croft, P. (2003). King James. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
Doran, S. (2005). Loving and Affectionate Cousins? The Relationship
Between Elizabeth I and James VI of Scotland 1586-1603. In: Doran, S.
and Richardson, G. Tudor England and Its Neighbours. Hampshire:
Palgrave MacMillan.
Doran, S. (2004). Three Late-Elizabethan Tracts. In: Mayer, J. C. The
Struggle for Succession in Late Elizabethan England: Politics, Polemics
and Cultural Representations. Montpellier: Institut de Rechercerche sur la
Renaissance.
Holmes, P. J. (1988). Mary Stewart in England. In: Lynch, M. Mary
Stewart. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Hurtsfield, J. (1961). The Succession Struggle in Late Elizabethan
England. In: Bindoff, S. T., Hurtsfield, J. and Williams, C. H. Elizabethan
Government and Society: Essays Presented to Sir John Neale. London: The
Athlone Press.
Loomis, C. (2010). The Death of Elizabeth I. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan.
Merriman, M. H. (1988). Mary, Queen of France: Franciscus et Maria Rex
et Regina Francor. Scot. Angl. et Hiber. In: Lynch, M. Mary Stewart.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Myers, N. (2004). The Gossip of History: the Question of the Succession in
State Papers (Domestic and Foreign). In: Mayer, J. C. The Struggle for the
Succession in Late Elizabethan England: Politics, Polemics, and Cultural
Representations. Montpellier: Institut de Recherche sur la Renaissance.
Articles:
Mueller, J. (2000). “To My Very Good Brother the King of Scots”:
Elizabeth I’s Correspondence with James VI and the Question of
Succession. PMLA. 115 (5)