1. Analyze the long-term causes and the short-term causes of the Second World War.
Ali
This essay analyzes the long-term causes and the short-term causes of the Second
World War. It analyzes which long-term cause and which short-term cause was most
responsible, it then weighs the responsibility of long-term against short-term. There is no
doubt that some causes are less direct than others but all events had a significant effect on
the build up towards 1939.
The first long-term cause was the Treaty of Versailles. Since the Weimar Republic
Germans believed Versailles was too harsh and revision was necessary, Hitler took
advantage of this by promising to free Germany of the treaty. In 1936 when Germany
remilitarized the Rhineland he claimed he was revising the treaty, which compromised
German security. In 1938 the annexations of Austria and Sudetenland were justified by the
claim that Versailles was irrational and these territories belonged with the Reich. While
the treaty was created to ensure peace it backfired and proved to be a useful tool for
Hitler’s policies and demands. Moreover, Hitler’s ambitions for Germany were the second
cause since they could only be achieved through war. In Mein Kampf Hitler discussed
achieving Lebensraum or living space in the east, the only possible way to do this was
through war. The Hossbach Memorandum of 1938, which recorded Hitler’s economic
plans for rearmament implied that Hitler was planning war in order to achieve personal
objectives. The third cause of war was British Prime Minister Chamberlain’s policy of
appeasement that started in 1936. Appeasement was a policy aimed and cooperating and
compromising with Germany at any cost in order to avoid war. This emboldened Hitler
and gave him the courage to continue his “conquest of Europe”. If Britain would have
taken action in 1936 Taylor argues war would have been avoided. In conclusion, Britain
through its policy of appeasement allowed Hitler to gain control by compromising its
responsibilities. The last long-term cause was the failure of the League of Nations to take
decisive action against all aggressors. For example, during the Abyssinian crisis the
League’s only action against Italy was to impose sanctions on unimportant goods not
including oil, because Britain would not allow it out of fear of war with Italy. It exposed
the League’s inability to function without British support and how it lacked the machinery
of being the arbitrator of peace. Abyssinia showed Hitler that the League was not force to
be feared or respected. As long as Britain remained sympathetic towards Germany and
they continued to appease, the League would remain helpless. Appeasement betrayed the
League and collective security. If Britain and France would have supported collective
security war would have been avoided, but they put their trust in the wrong hands. In
conclusion the combined effect of Hitler’s ambitions and Britain’s appeasement policy
was the main cause of war because when Hitler demanded Britain appeased and nothing
was done to stop him.
The first short term cause was the annexation of Sudetenland. Hitler announced
that this would be his final request in Europe. Britain and France realized that if they
opposed Hitler he would invade anyway and the only result would be a general war so
Chamberlain argued that peace must be ensured at all costs. Despite attempts to negotiate
with Hitler to not invade Hitler announced invasion to occur on October 10th.
Chamberlain was left helpless he would either support Czechoslovakia and start war, or
stay quite and avoid war. Chamberlain decided to back down and appease Germany; on
October 10th Germany annexed the Sudetenland with no opposition. However, a few
weeks before October 10th Britain, France, Germany, and Italy met a Munich and agreed
that after the Sudetenland was annexed the borders of Czechoslovakia would be
guaranteed. A few months later in March 1939 Hitler annexed Western Czechoslovakia by
bullying the government into calling “for German help”. The borders were violated and
Hitler had betrayed Munich. Technically Britain and France should have taken action
against Germany under obligation of the Munich agreement, however they were able to
avoid responsibility once again. A week later Hitler annexed Memel from Lithuania
without opposition. This was the wake up call for Britain and France; it was now evident
that Hitler would not stop demanding territory. Right afterwards, Britain and France
abandoned appeasement and warned Hitler not to invade Polish territory. The
abandonment of appeasement had instantly created two hostile camps in Europe, Britain
and France against Italy and Germany. Soviet Russia had joined Germany in the 1939
Soviet-German non-Aggression Pact. The pact ensured that both countries would remain
peaceful towards each other, and a secret clause described the carving up of Poland after it
was defeated. Both countries were willing to start war with Poland if the other would fight
simultaneously even if it meant war with Britain and France. By now war was inevitable it
was a matter of timing. In September Germany invaded Poland and Britain and France
were forced to declare war on Germany. In conclusion the most significant short term
cause of war seems to be the annexation of Western Czechoslovakia and Memel because it
was a major wake up call for Britain and it led them to abandon appeasement, creating two
hostile camps in Europe.
In conclusion, this essay analyzes the long-term causes and short-term causes of
the Second World War. The main long-term cause was the combined effect of Hitler’s
ambitions and appeasement, Hitler wanted war to fulfill his own objectives, Chamberlain
wanted to avoid war by appeasing and this gave Hitler to much power. The main shortterm cause was the annexation of Western Czechoslovakia and Memel because it led to
the abandonment of appeasement, which was the only source of short-term peace. It
created two hostile camps and increased the possibility of war. The long-term effect seems
to be more responsible because it put Europe in a place of false hope for peace. Hitler’s
own ambitions were irrational and Chamberlain continued to blindly support him until it
was too late. However, the short-term cause was definitely the trigger in 1939.
2. For what reasons, and to what extent, did attempts to achieve collective security
between 1919 and 1939 fail?
This essay analyzes the reasons, and the extent to which the attempts to achieve
collective security between 1919 and 1939 failed. Collective security was a concept that
the League of Nations created after the First World War. Its basic idea was “an attack
against one, is an attack against all”. If a member attacked another member with no real
justifications it was the duty of all other members to defend the victim by firmly opposing
the aggressor. Upholding collective security was the League’s and it’s individual
members’ main purpose and priority during this time period. The essay analyzes why
collective security was not upheld. It also analyzes several occasions in which collective
security was successful and for what reasons.
The first reason as to why collective security failed was because the League lacked
the necessary machinery for collective action against an aggressor. Too many gaps
allowed an aggressor to wage war with impunity, under article 15: war had to be officially
declared before the League could intervene and also a government could simply disown an
invasion by claiming it was not governmentally affiliated. For example, when Polish
forces invaded Lithuania in 1920 the government disowned the invasion hence the League
could not take immediate action. The League’s ability was curbed because loopholes such
as these allowed aggressors to evade consequences. A big part of their ability relied on the
cooperation of the Great Powers such as Britain and France. Great Powers that were
expected to militarily help with crises avoided duties because they did not have the will or
the financial ability. If the Great Powers disconnect themselves from their duties, how was
the League supposed to deal with aggressors and smaller nations. With no dedicated army
it could not uphold “collective security”. For example, when Persia appealed for help
against a Soviet invasion in 1920, no Great Power was interested and the League was left
helpless.
The second reason as to why collective security failed was because the League’s
purpose and objectives were sub-ordinate Great Powers political objectives. The League
relied too heavily on the support of the Great Powers to help solve big-scale issues; if they
did not intervene it was extremely difficult to do anything. For example, during the
Manchurian crisis the League did not take serious action against Japan because no Great
Power was willing to support the issue or give up resources, once again the League failed
to intervene because of the Great Powers’ unwillingness to cooperate. Furthermore, the
League’s decisions were frequently over-ridden or ignored by the great powers. For
example, during the French occupation of the Ruhr France forbade the League to intervene
or try mediation again the league was restricted by a Great Power. Furthermore, the
League’s position worsened after 1936. Britain’s policy of appeasement or cooperation
with aggressors conflicted with the idea of collective security. Britain’s duty to the league
was overridden by the government’s policy of appeasement. Instead of using force to
support the covenant they appeased to avoid war, the League’s purpose was greatly
undermined after 1936 seeing that it conflicted with Britain’s foreign policies. For
example, during the Czechoslovakia crisis Britain did not take a stance against Germany
even though it had clearly threatened collective security. Instead Britain approached
Germany with concessions and compromises instead of taking a firm stance. Finally, the
last reason why attempts were unsuccessful was because of the absence of Germany,
Russia, and the United States. Their absence undermined the League’s ability to take real
decisive action on a global level. This led to many countries losing faith in or ignoring the
League’s authority and leadership. For example, when sanctions were placed on Italy
because of Abyssinia they simply turned to Germany for trade and the League could not
stop this. However, the counter-arguments would be that Germany and the USSR
eventually joined the League by 1933 (Germany left in 1934) and also the United States
often complied with sanctions. By 1935 after the Abyssinian crisis the League was more
or less a useless institution, members did not have faith in its ability to do anything largely
because the Great Power had pursued a different path of politics (appeasement) and that it
why the League was absent during the crises of 1938 and 1939.
However, there were several successful attempts throughout. Rare occasion in
which issues were solved was because nations were willing to accept verdicts on their own
grounds, not because of League pressure. For example the Swedish-Finland issue over the
Aaland in 1921 was resolved because both countries accepted an equally fair agreement.
Also the League resolved the Bulgarian-Greek war of 1925 because both countries wanted
an immediate ceasefire. Both these examples are small-scale achievements, despite the
fact that they could not solve big-scale issues without Great Power support they still had a
purpose and functioned well in their capacity. Another example of attempted collective
security was the Anglo-French guarantee of Polish borders in 1939. Britain and France
were finally able to embrace collective security by guaranteeing all Polish borders against
a German invasion, however their attempt came to late. Germany eventually invaded
because of the promising Nazi-Soviet non-Aggression pact, which increased the likelihood
of victory. While their true motivations were not to protect Poland because of loyalty to
collective security at the end of the day the attempt was there even if it had failed later on.
In conclusion, this essay analyzes the reasons, and the extent to which the attempts
to achieve collective security between 1919 and 1939 failed. Even though there were
several successful attempts they were small-scale achievements that had no affect on the
course of peace in Europe. Collective security failed with large-scale issues such as the
Czechoslovakia crisis because the Great Powers were not loyal to their initial dedication to
collective security. The major responsibility of the failure of collective security lays on the
shoulders of the Great Powers, who sought a different path of policies, not the League of
Nations.