Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181)
Case 2: I-35W Mississippi River Bridge [Real-World]
 Background o Who/What:
 Minnesota Department of Transportation / Bridge Collapse o Where/When:
 Minneapolis, Minnesota / August 1, 2007 (opened in November 1967)
 Outcome o Who/What:


13 casualties & 145 injured (involving 100 vehicles) the structure & deck collapsed into the river (during rush hour traffic) o How/Why:
 A design flaw - additional weight on the bridge
Collapse of I-35W Highway Bridge - extracted from Highway Accident Report Collapse of I-35W Highway
Bridge Minneapolis, Minnesota accessed at: http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2008/HAR0803.pdf
About 6:05 p.m. central daylight time on Wednesday, August 1, 2007, the eight-lane, 1,907-foot-long I-35W highway bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota, experienced a catastrophic failure in the main span of the deck truss. As a result, 1,000 feet of the deck truss collapsed, with about 456 feet of the main span falling 108 feet into the 15-foot-deep river. A total of 111 vehicles were on the portion of the bridge that collapsed. Of these, 17 were recovered from the water. As a result of the bridge collapse, 13 people died, and
145 people were injured. On the day of the collapse, roadway work was underway on the I-35W bridge, and four of the eight travel lanes (two outside lanes northbound and two inside lanes southbound) were closed to traffic. In the early afternoon, construction equipment and construction aggregates (sand and gravel for making concrete) were delivered and positioned in the two closed inside southbound lanes. The equipment and aggregates, which were being staged for a concrete pour of the southbound lanes that was to begin about 7:00 p.m., were positioned toward the south end of the center section of the deck truss portion of the bridge and were in place by about 2:30 p.m. About 6:05 p.m., a motion-activated surveillance video camera at the Lower St.
Anthony Falls Lock and Dam, just west of the I-35W bridge, recorded a portion of the collapse sequence. The video showed the bridge center span separating from the rest of the bridge and falling into the river.
Major safety issues identified in this investigation include insufficient bridge design firm quality control procedures for designing bridges, and insufficient Federal and State procedures for reviewing and approving bridge design plans and calculations; lack of guidance for bridge owners with regard to the placement of construction loads on bridges during repair or maintenance activities; exclusion of gusset plates in bridge load rating guidance; lack of inspection guidance for conditions of gusset plate distortion; and inadequate use of technologies for accurately assessing the condition of gusset plates on deck truss bridges. As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) and the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials. One safety recommendation resulting from this investigation was issued to the FHWA in January 2008.
(See the full report
for more details.)

Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181)
Case 4: Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster [Real-World]


Background o Who/What:


Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)
Equipment failures, nuclear meltdowns and releases of radioactive materials following an o earthquake and tsunami
Where/When:
 Ōkuma, Fukushima, Japan / March 11, 2011
Outcome o Who/What:


37 physically injured and 2 with radiation burns largest nuclear disaster since the Chernobyl disaster of 1986
 second disaster to measure 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale o How/Why:
 Inadequate design to handle some tsunamis and improper safety precautions by TEPCO
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident - extracted from The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission Report accessed at: http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/
On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake triggered an extremely severe nuclear accident at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, owned and operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO).
This devastating accident was ultimately declared a Level 7 (“Severe Accident”) by the International Nuclear
Event Scale (INES).
When the earthquake occurred, Unit 1 of the Fukushima Daiichi plant was in normal operation at the rated electricity output according to its specifications; Units 2 and 3 were in operation within the rated heat parameters of their specifications; and Units 4 to 6 were undergoing periodical inspections. The emergency shut-down feature, or SCRAM, went into operation at Units 1, 2 and 3 immediately after the commencement of the seismic activity.
The seismic tremors damaged electricity transmission facilities between the TEPCO Shinfukushima
Transformer Substations and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, resulting in a total loss of off-site electricity. There was a back-up 66kV transmission line from the transmission network of Tohoku Electric
Power Company, but the back-up line failed to feed Unit 1 via a metal-clad type circuit (M/C) of Unit 1 due to mismatched sockets.
The tsunami caused by the earthquake flooded and totally destroyed the emergency diesel generators, the seawater cooling pumps, the electric wiring system and the DC power supply for Units 1, 2 and 4, resulting in loss of all power—except for an external supply to Unit 6 from an air-cooled emergency diesel generator. In

Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181) short, Units 1, 2 and 4 lost all power; Unit 3 lost all AC power, and later lost DC before dawn of March 13,
2012. Unit 5 lost all AC power.
The tsunami did not damage only the power supply. The tsunami also destroyed or washed away vehicles, heavy machinery, oil tanks, and gravel. It destroyed buildings, equipment installations and other machinery.
Seawater from the tsunami inundated the entire building area and even reached the extremely high pressure operating sections of Units 3 and 4, and a supplemental operation common facility (Common Pool Building).
After the water retreated, debris from the flooding was scattered all over the plant site, hindering movement.
Manhole and ditch covers had disappeared, leaving gaping holes in the ground. In addition, the earthquake lifted, sank, and collapsed building interiors and pathways, and access to and within the plant site became extremely difficult. Recovery tasks were further interrupted as workers reacted to the intermittent and significant aftershocks and tsunami. The loss of electricity resulted in the sudden loss of monitoring equipment such as scales, meters and the control functions in the central control room. Lighting and communications were also affected. The decisions and responses to the accident had to be made on the spot by operational staff at the site, absent valid tools and manuals.
The loss of electricity made it very difficult to effectively cool down the reactors in a timely manner. Cooling the reactors and observing the results were heavily dependent on electricity for high-pressure water injection, depressurizing the reactor, low pressure water injection, the cooling and depressurizing of the reactor containers and removal of decay heat at the final heat-sink. The lack of access, as previously mentioned, obstructed the delivery of necessities such as alternative water injection using fire trucks, the recovery of electricity supply, the line configuration of the vent and its intermittent operation.
The series of events summarized above are an overview of the severe accident that ultimately emitted an enormous amount of radioactive material into the environment. These are described in detail in the full-length report. (See the full report for more details.)

Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181)
Case 6: Gifts from Contractors/Suppliers [Hypothetical]
 Background o Who:
 o
Engineers Scott Bennett and Larry Newman, Supplier of Upscale Company
What:
 Engineer Scott Bennett and Larry Newman, Supplier of Upscale Company both
 participate in a local recreational golf league
 During a game, Scott mentions he is in the process of planning a vacation to
Florida
 Larry has an uncle who owns a condo in Florida and offers Scott a discounted price on it
 New Company Policy at Scott’s engineering firm: “accepting incentives from vendors is strictly prohibited”
Question(s) o What should Scott say and do?
Gifts from a Supplier - extracted from The Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Research accessed at: http://www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/condo.aspx
Scott Bennett is the engineer assigned to deal with vendors who supply needed parts to the Upscale Company.
Larry Newman, sales representative from one of Upscale’s regular vendors, plays in the same golf league as
Scott. One evening they go off in the same foursome. Sometime during the round Scott mentions that he is really looking forward to vacationing in Florida next month. Larry says his uncle owns a condo in Florida that he rents out during the months he and his family are up north. Larry offers to see if the condo is available next month -- assuring Scott that the rental cost would be quite moderate.
Larry tells Scott he can rent his uncle's condo for $100 a week. "My uncle," Larry says, "gets nervous when he rents to total strangers. He likes to have reliable people stay in his condo; the condo is paid for, and my uncle isn't interested in making money on it -- he just wants a little help meeting basic operating expenses and the taxes." Scott accepts the offer and begins making plans for his vacation. Just before leaving, an Upscale vice president sends out a new policy statement that says, among other things: "Accepting incentives from vendors is strictly prohibited".

Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181)
Case 8: Testing by a Co-Op Student [Hypothetical]
 Background o Who:
 o
Co-op Jack Jacobs and the XYZ Company
What:
 Stress tests were needed for a redesigned component
 Jack is assigned the task of completing the task and indicates that the component
 successfully passes the stress tests after completing the assignment on time
Upon completion of the test report, Jack returned to school but a catastrophic failure of the component occurs raising questions about the accuracy of the data
 Question(s) o What ethical issues, if any, does this scenario raise?
Testing by a Co-Op Student - extracted from The Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Research accessed at: http://www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/co-op.aspx
Project leader Bruce Barton was being sorely pressed to complete the development of several engineering prototypes for a field test of a new appliance model for the XYZ Company. One particular plastic component of the new model had given difficulty in laboratory tests as it failed repeatedly before reaching the stress level necessary for successful operation. Bruce had directed a redesign of the component using a tough new engineering plastic recommended by the Research Laboratory's Material Science Department. Stress tests needed to be run on the redesigned component, but Bruce was running short of time and needed to get on with building the prototype. Bruce sought out the manager of the Material Science Department for help in running stress tests on samples of the new component. With this assistance he could go ahead with prototype building and conduct the tests concurrently. The prototypes, of course, would not be released to field test until the stress tests on the redesigned component proved its design to be satisfactory.
Tom Mason, manager of the Material Science Department, was willing to assist because he knew how critical completion of the development was to XYZ's future appliance plans. However, this was also a busy time for
Tom's department. So, Tom suggested to Bruce that he could assign the test work to one of the engineering coop students. Tom was also coordinator of engineering co-op students, and he liked to use the co-op students in demanding situations to give them practical experience. Tom assigned the test work to Jack Jacobs, an engineering co-op student from the State University who was completing his second work session at XYZ.
Jack was familiar with the test equipment and previously had done similar test work. Jack was a good student and his co-op work had been usually well done. Tom commented to Jack that he would need to work diligently to complete the tests before he had to return to State University. Jack completed the tests on schedule and turned in a report to Tom indicating the component had successfully passed the stress tests. Upon completion of the test report Jack returned to the university for his next school session. Tom gave Bruce the good news. The prototypes were completed and the field test of these prototypes got underway on schedule.
A few weeks later, Bruce rushed into Tom's office to tell him that most of the prototypes were out of operation because of a catastrophic failure of the component that had been tested in Tom's lab. Bruce wanted to discuss the test immediately with Jack; but since Jack had already returned to the university, he and Tom settled for studying Jack's lab notebook in detail. After review Tom said, "Bruce, I hate to say it but these data look too good. I know the equipment and there should be more scatter in the measurements Jack took. I think some, if not all, these measurements are in error or they have been faked! At best, Jack probably took a few points and
'extrapolated' the rest!"

Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181)
Case 10: Dissent about Quality [Hypothetical]
 Background o Who:
 New employee Bernie Reston and senior engineers at Larom, Inc. o What:



Several senior engineers recommend catalyst A for use by Larom, Inc.
Bernie believes catalyst B may actually be best (based on testing he has been doing)
Bernie needs more data to be sure and he doesn’t have enough time to conduct the trials
 Question(s) o What recommendation should Bernie offer, if any?
Gifts from a Supplier - extracted from The Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Research accessed at: http://www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/Dissent.aspx
A recent graduate of Engineering Tech, Bernie Reston has been employed in the Research and Development
(R&D) Chemical Engineering Division of Larom, Inc. for the past several months. Bernie was recommended to
Larom as the top Engineering Tech graduate in chemical engineering. Alex Smith, the head of Bernie's unit, showed immediate interest in Bernie's research on processes using a particular catalyst (call it B). However, until last week, his work assignments at Larom were in other areas.
A meeting of engineers in Bernie's unit is called by Alex. He announces that the unit must make a recommendation within the next two days on what catalyst should be used by Larom in processing a major product. It is clear to everyone that Alex is anticipating a brief, decisive meeting. One of the senior engineers volunteers, "We've been working on projects like this for years, and catalyst A seems to be the obvious choice."
Several others immediately concur. Alex looks around the room and, hearing no further comments, says, "Well, it looks like we're in accord on this. Do we have consensus?"
So far Bernie has said nothing. He is not sure what further testing will show, but the testing he has been doing for the past week provides preliminary evidence that catalyst B may actually be best for this process. This is also in line with what his research at Engineering Tech suggested with somewhat similar processes. If catalyst B should turn out to be preferable, a great deal of money will be saved; and, in the long run, a fair amount of time will be saved as well. Should he mention his findings at this time, or should he simply defer to the senior engineers, who seem as determined as Alex to bring matters to closure?
Bernie somewhat hesitantly raises his hand. He briefly explains his test results and the advantages catalyst B might provide. Then he suggests that the unit might want to delay its recommendation for another two weeks so that he can conduct further tests. Alex replies, "We don't have two weeks. We have two days." He then asks
Bernie to write up the report, leaving out the preliminary data he has gathered about catalyst B. He says, "It would be nice to do some more testing, but we just don't have the time. Besides, I doubt if anything would show up in the next two weeks to change our minds. This is one of those times we have to be decisive--and we have to look decisive and quit beating around the bush. They're really getting impatient on this one. Anyway, we've had a lot of experience in this area."
Bernie replies that, even if the data on B is left out, the data on A is hardly conclusive. Alex replies, "Look you're a bright person. You can make the numbers look good without much difficulty--do the math backwards if you have to. Just get the report done in the next two days!" Bernie likes working for Larom, and he feels lucky to have landed such a good job right out of Engineering Tech. He is also due for a significant pay raise soon if he plays his cards right.

Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181)
Case 11: Ford Pinto Car Accidents[Real-World]


Background o Who/What:


Ford
Automobile Explosions o Where/When:
 all over the US
 1960s - 1970s
Outcome o Who/What:


~500 burn deaths and countless injuries
Ford Pinto subcompact car explosions in fender-benders.
o How/Why:
 Defective fuel system design
 Use of cost-benefit analysis by Ford to justify not resolving the defect.
Ford Pinto Car Accidents - extracted from a case study by Wake Forest University accessed at: http://users.wfu.edu/palmitar/Law&Valuation/Papers/1999/Leggett-pinto.html#Text
The case involving the explosion of Ford Pintos due to a defective fuel system design led to the debate of many issues, most centering around the use by Ford of a cost-benefit analysis and the ethics surrounding its decision not to upgrade the fuel system based on this analysis. Should a risk/benefit analysis be used in situations where a defect in design or manufacturing could lead to death or seriously bodily harm, such as in the Ford Pinto situation? There are arguments both for and against such an analysis. It is an economically efficient method which has been accepted by courts for numerous years, however, juries may not always agree, so companies should take this into account.
Although Ford had access to a new design which would decrease the possibility of the Ford Pinto from exploding, the company chose not to implement the design, which would have cost $11 per car, even though it had done an analysis showing that the new design would result in 180 less deaths. The company defended itself on the grounds that it used the accepted risk/benefit analysis to determine if the monetary costs of making the change were greater than the societal benefit. Based on the numbers Ford used, the cost would have been $137 million versus the $49.5 million price tag put on the deaths, injuries, and car damages, and thus Ford felt justified not implementing the design change. This risk/benefit analysis was created out of the development of product liability, culminating at Judge Learned Hand's BPL formula, where if the expected harm exceeded the cost to take the precaution, then the company must take the precaution, whereas if the cost was liable, then it did

Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181) not have to. However, the BPL formula focuses on a specific accident, while the risk/benefit analysis requires an examination of the costs, risks, and benefits through use of the product as a whole. Based on this analysis,
Ford legally chose not to make the design changes which would have made the Pinto safer. However, just because it was legal doesn't necessarily mean that it was ethical. It is difficult to understand how a price can be put on saving a human life.
There are several reasons why such a strictly economic theory should not be used. First, it seems unethical to determine that people should be allowed to die or be seriously injured because it would cost too much to prevent it. Second, the analysis does not take into all the consequences, such as the negative publicity that Ford received and the judgments and settlements resulting from the lawsuits. Also, some things just can't be measured in terms of dollars, and that includes human life. However, there are arguments in favor of the risk/benefit analysis. First, it is well developed through existing case law. Second, it encourages companies to take precautions against creating risks that result in large accident costs. Next, it can be argued that all things must have some common measure. Finally, it provides a bright line which companies can follow.
In May of 1968, the Ford Motor Company, based upon a recommendation by then vice-president Lee Iacocca, decided to introduce a subcompact car and produce it domestically. In an effort to gain a large market share, the automobile was designed and developed on an accelerated schedule. During the first few years sales of the
Pinto were excellent, but there was trouble on the horizon.

Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company
In May 1972, Lily Gray was traveling with thirteen year old Richard Grimshaw in a 1972 Pinto when their car was struck by another car traveling approximately thirty miles per hour. The impact ignited a fire in the Pinto which killed Lily Gray and left Richard Grimshaw with devastating injuries. A judgment was rendered against Ford and the jury awarded the Gray family $560,000 and Matthew
Grimshaw $2.5 million in compensatory damages. The surprise came when the jury awarded $125 million in punitive damages as well. This was subsequently reduced to $3.5 million.

The Criminal Case
Six month following the controversial Grirnshaw verdict, Ford was involved in yet another controversial case involving the Pinto. The automobile's fuel system design contributed (whether or not it was the sole cause is arguable) to the death of three women on August 10, 1918 when their car was hit by another vehicle traveling at a relatively low speed by a man driving with open beer bottles, marijuana, caffeine pills and capsules of "speed." The fact that Ford had chosen earlier not to upgrade the fuel system design became an issue of public debate as a result of this case. The debate was heightened because the prosecutor of Elkart County, Indiana chose to prosecute Ford for reckless homicide and criminal recklessness.
Some felt the issues raised in the Ford Pinto cases were an example of the "deep pocket" company disregarding consumer safety in pursuit of the almighty dollar. Others feel they are an example of runaway media coverage blowing a story out of proportion.
5
Regardless of opinion, the Ford Pinto case is a tangled web of many complex legal and ethical issues.

Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181)
To determine if the proper result was achieved in this case, one has to evaluate and weigh these many issues. The central issue in deciding whether Ford should be liable for electing not to redesign a defective product in order to maximize its bottom line, one must analyze the so-called "cost/benefit" analysis Ford used to defend this decision. Within the scope of this paper, this cost/benefit issue (and associated sub-issues) will be the focus of discussion. Other issues, such as the ethics involved in Ford's decision, the choice of prosecuting Ford criminally, whistle-blowing, the assignment of punitive damages and the Court of Appeals decision reducing the damages are all important issues of this case that will not be the focus herein.
The controversy surrounding the Ford Pinto concerned the placement of the automobile's fuel tank. It was located behind the rear axle, instead of above it. This was initially done in an effort to create more trunk space.
The problem with this design, which later became evident, was that it made the Pinto more vulnerable to a rearend collision. This vulnerability was enhanced by other features of the car. The gas tank and the rear axle were separated by only nine inches. There were also bolts that were positioned in a manner that threatened the gas tank. Finally, the fuel filler pipe design resulted in a higher probability that it would to disconnect from the tank in the event of an accident than usual, causing gas spillage that could lead to dangerous fires. Because of these numerous design flaws, the Pinto became the center of public debate.
These design problems were first brought to the public's attention in an August 1977 article in Mother Jones magazine. This article condemned the Ford Motor Company and the author was later given a Pulitzer
Prize. This article originated the public debate over the risk/benefit analysis used by the Ford Motor Company in their determination as to whether or, not the design of the Pinto fuel tank be altered to reduce the risk of fire as the result of a collision.
The crux of the public debate about The Ford Motor Company was the decision not to make improvements to the gas tank of the Pinto after completion of the risk/benefit analysis. Internal Ford documents revealed Ford had developed the technology to make improvements to the design of the Pinto that would dramatically decrease the chance of a Pinto "igniting" after a rear-end collision.
This technology would have greatly reduced the chances of burn injuries and deaths after a collision. Ford estimated the cost to make this production adjustment to the Pinto would have been $11 per vehicle. Most people found it reprehensible that Ford determined that the $11 cost per automobile was too high and opted not to make the production change to the
Pinto model.
In determining whether or not to make the production change, the Ford Motor Company defended itself by contending that it used a risk/benefit analysis. Ford stated that its reason for using a risk/benefit analysis was that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) required them to do so. The risk/benefit approach excuses a defendant if the monetary costs of making a production change are greater than the "societal benefit" of that change. This analysis follows the same line of reasoning as the negligence standard developed by Judge Learned Hand in United States vs. Carroll Towing in 1947 (to be discussed later). The philosophy behind risk/benefit analysis promotes the goal of allocative efficiency. The problem that arose in the Ford Pinto and many other similar cases highlights the human and emotional circumstances behind the numbers which are not factored in the risk/benefit analysis.
The Ford Motor Company contended that by strictly following the typical approach to risk,/benefit analysis, they were justified in not making the production change to the Pinto model. Assuming the numbers employed in

Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181) their analysis were correct, Ford seemed to be justified. The estimated cost for the production change was $11 per vehicle. This $11 per unit cost applied to 11 million cars and 1.5 million trucks results in an overall cost of
$137 million.
The controversial numbers were those Ford used for the "benefit" half of the equation. It was estimated that making the change would result in a total of 180 less burn deaths, 180 less serious burn injuries, and 2,100 less burned vehicles. These estimates were multiplied by the unit cost figured by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration. These figures were $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, and $700 per vehicle equating to the total "societal benefit" is $49.5 million. Since the benefit of $49.5 million was much less than the cost of $137 million, Ford felt justified in its decision not to alter the product design. The risk/benefit results indicate that it is acceptable for 180 people to die and 180 people to burn if it costs $11 per vehicle to prevent such casualty rates.
The main controversy surrounding the Ford Pinto case was The Ford Motor Company's choices made during development to compromise safety for efficiency and profit maximization. More specifically, it was Ford's decision to use the cost/benefit analysis detailed in section 11 to make production decisions that translated into lost lives. During the initial production and testing phase, Ford set "limits for 2000" for the Pinto. That meant the car was not to exceed $2000 in cost or 2000 pounds in weight. This set tough limitations on the production team. After the basic design was complete, crash testing was begun. The results of crash testing revealed that when struck from the rear at speeds of 31 miles per hour or above, the Pinto's gas tank ruptured. The tank was positioned according to the industry standard at the time (between the rear bumper and the rear axle), but studs protruding from the rear axle would puncture the gas tank. Upon impact, the fuel filler neck would break, resulting in spilled gasoline. The Pinto basically turned into a death trap. Ford crash tested a total of eleven automobiles and eight resulted in potentially catastrophic situations. The only three that survived had their gas tanks modified prior to testing.
Ford was not in violation of the law in any way and had to make the decision whether to incur a cost to fix the obvious problem internally. There were several options for fuel system redesign. The option most seriously considered would have cost the Ford Motor Company and additional $11 per vehicle. Under the strict $2000 budget restriction, even this nominal cost seemed large. In addition, Ford had earlier based an advertising campaign on safety which failed miserably. Therefore, there was a corporate belief, attributed to Lee Iacocca himself, of "safety doesn't sell."
Ultimately, the Ford Motor Company rejected the product design change. This was based on the cost-benefit analysis performed by Ford (see Exhibit One). Using the NHTSA provided figure of $200,000 for the "cost to society" for each estimated fatality, and $11 for the production cost per vehicle, the analysis seemed straightforward. The projected costs to the company for design production change were $137 million compared to the project benefits of making the design change which were approximately $49.5 million. Using the standard cost/benefit analysis, the answer was obvious--no production changes were to be made.
Exhibit One: Ford's Cost/Benefit Analysis Benefits and Costs Relating to Fuel Leakage Associated with the Static Rollover Test Portion of FMVSS 208
Benefits
Savings: 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2100 burned vehicles
Unit Cost: $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, $700 per vehicle
Total Benefit: 180 x ($200,000) + 180 x ($67,000) + 2100 x ($700) = $49.5 Million

Ethics Cases – Schedule 2 (ENG1181)
Costs
Sales : 11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks
Unit Cost : $11 per car, $11 per truck
Total Cost : 11,000,000 x ($11) + 1,500,000 x ($ I 1) = $137 Million