Section 3.2 The Mother of Invention Freedom as Necessity McGraw-Hill © 2013 McGraw-Hill Companies. All Rights Reserved. The Dilemma of Determinism and Indeterminism If causal determinism is true, then we cannot act freely because everything we do is caused by forces beyond our control. If causal indeterminism is true, then again we cannot act freely because random movements are not up to us. 3.2-2 Compatibilism (Soft Determinism) Compatibilists (soft determinists) believe that causal determinism is compatible with free will. In this view, one’s actions can be both causally determined and free. 3.2-3 Principle of Alternative Possibilities The Principle of Alternative Possibilities says that one can be held responsible for doing something only if one could have done otherwise. The different paths in this “garden of forking paths” represent the different courses of action that you can take at a particular point in time. 3.2-4 Thought Experiment: Locke’s Trapped Conversationalist “Suppose a man is carried, while fast asleep, into a room, where there is a person he longs to see and speak with; and suppose he is locked in the room…” In this case, the man’s action is voluntary because he’s doing what he wants to do but, according to the principle of alternative possibilities, it’s not free because he couldn’t leave if he wanted to. 3.2-5 The Conditional Analysis of “could have done otherwise” Traditional compatibilists offer a conditional analysis of "could have done otherwise:" you could have done otherwise just in case if you had chosen to do otherwise, then you would have done otherwise. On this view, even if an action was caused by forces beyond your control, it could still be considered a free action. 3.2-6 Traditional Compatibilism Traditional compatibilism is the doctrine that free actions are (1) caused by one’s will and (2) not externally constrained. Traditional compatibilists define freedom negatively; freedom consists in the absence of external constraint or coercion. 3.2-7 Punishment Punishment has traditionally been justified on the grounds of (i) retribution, (ii) rehabilitation, (iii) or deterrence. Compatibilists cannot justify punishment on the grounds of retribution because, on their view, what people do is not up to them. 3.2-8 Prepunishment Prepunishment is punishing someone for a crime before they commit it. Because compatibilists believe that all of our actions are caused by forces beyond our control, they have no principled reason for not allowing prepunishment when someone’s committing a crime can be accurately predicted. 3.2-9 Thought Probe: Minority Report The movie Minority Report depicts a society that practices prepunishment. Should prepunishment be practiced if people’s behavior can be accurately predicted? Why or why not? 3.2-10 Thought Probe: Guilty Minds and Pre-Crime Neuroscientists have developed a brain scanning technique that allows them to read people’s intentions. Should people with the intention to commit a crime—a guilty mind—be locked up before they commit it? Why or why not? 3.2-11 Thought Experiment: Taylor’s Ingenious Physiologist “Suppose…that while my behavior is entirely in accordance with my own volitions…my volitions themselves are caused [by an ingenious physiologist]”. In this case Taylor’s actions meet both conditions of traditional compatibilism, but are not free. 3.2-12 Thought Experiment: Taylor’s Drug Addiction Suppose one is given a compulsive desire for a drug. The drug addict’s subsequent behavior would fulfill both conditions of traditional compatibilism. Nevertheless, it would not be free. 3.2-13 Thought Probe: Religious Cults People who join religious cults often acquire a whole new set of beliefs and desires. Parents often try to forcibly rescue them on the grounds that the cult has taken away their free will. Could a compatibilist justify such a rescue? Why or why not? 3.2-14 Thought Probe: The Manchurian Candidate MKULTRA was a secret program conducted by the CIA that tried to brainwash unsuspecting subjects into doing the agency’s bidding. Suppose it’s possible to implant new beliefs and desires into someone by using brainwashing techniques. According to compatibilism, would that person be acting freely when he was following orders? Why or why not? 3.2-15 Thought Probe: Brain Stimulation Neurophysiologist Jose Delgado developed a device called a “stimoceiver” that could monitor and control brain activity. If Delgado’s stimoceiver could make people more productive and well-adjusted, could a compatibilist object to using it? Why or why not? 3.2-16 First-order Desires A desire directed on an object or a state of affairs. For example, desires for food, clothing, and shelter as well as conditions like being healthy, wealthy, and wise are first-order desires. 3.2-17 Second-order Desires A desire that is directed on a first-order desire. For example, a desire not to desire to smoke is a second-order desire. 3.2-18 Second-order Volitions A second-order volition is a second order desire on which one wants to act. 3.2-19 Hierarchical Compatibilism The theory that free actions are caused by second-order volitions that one decisively identifies with. This view is known as hierarchical compatibilism because it is based on the belief that there is a hierarchy of desires and volitions. 3.2-20 Thought Experiment: Frankfurt’s Unwilling and Wanton Addicts Consider two addicts: the unwilling addict desires not to have the desire to take drugs and the wanton addict has never thought about his drug habit. According to Frankfurt, neither act freely-because neither are acting on second order volitions. 3.2-21 Thought Experiment: Frankfurt’s Happy Addict Consider an addict who has reflected on his addiction and has decided that he likes being addicted to drugs. According to Frankfurt, even if this addict could not stop taking drugs, his action is free because he is acting on a second order volition. 3.2-22 Thought Experiment: Frankfurt’s Decision Inducer In this thought experiment, Frankfurt challenges the principle of alternative possibilities. Suppose that Black monitors Jones’s behavior and is prepared to alter it if Jones doesn’t behave as Black wants him to. Black insures that Jones couldn’t do otherwise than he does. Does Jones act freely? 3.2-23 Thought Experiment: Slote’s Hypnotized Patient Suppose that someone had a second- order volition implanted in him by a hypnotist. In that case, acting on a second-order volition would not make the act free. 3.2-24 Ultimate Responsibility Our actions flow from our character and motives. If we did not have a hand in shaping our character and motives, we are not ultimately responsible for the actions that flow from them. 3.2-25 Thought Probe: The Willing Bank Teller Suppose that you are a bank teller and are held up at gun point. You decide that heroics are out of the question and hand over the money. According to Frankfurt, do you act freely? Why or why not? 3.2-26