A Performance Model of Virtue
Chuck Huff & Laura Barnard
Prepare for These
Psychology, St.Olaf College
Most of the accepted models of ethical behavior are unidimensional, emphasizing either
principled reasoning (Kohlberg, 1971), or a virtue model of integrity and character (Crisp &
Slote, 1997; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Both these approaches view the moral life as a series
of decisions held together by commitment to values and implemented by willpower. The
principled reasoning models recommend practice in reasoning as the correct method for
pedagogy. Virtue models emphasize instead character, but other than recommending mentoring
provide little guidance on how virtue might be taught. We propose a four component model of the
influences on the successful performance of ethical computing in the workplace. This model is
based on our interviews with moral exemplars in the computing profession, and on an extensive
review of the current literature in moral psychology. This model outlines the personal and
situational constraints on ethical performance and suggests what can be taught. Finally, we show
how this model guides the teaching of the course Ethical Issues in Software Design, a projectbased class that concentrates on the ethically informed software design rather than on ethical
reflection on computing policy.
Our goal in this exploratory study was to find and interview people who were successfully
integrating ethical concern into their practice of the computing profession. We hoped these
interview would help us understand the factors that supported their successful ethical performance.
We followed a method taken from one of the classic moral exemplars studies (Colby & Damon,
1992). We recruited a panel of 7 experts in computer ethics to establish the criteria for the selection
of exemplars in computing, to provide initial nominations for the sampling, and to approve each
member of the sample. The final criteria on which the panel agreed were:
No one was included in the sample if a panel member had any objection to their meeting the
criteria.
The Sample
The final sample of 24 exemplars had 9 women and 15 men. 13 exemplars had significant
experience in academia, 15 had significant experience in industry, and 3 had significant experience
in government policy (seven had experience in more than one area). 11 were in the final decades of
their career and 4 were retired. The response rate of 71.43% is quite high given the nature of the
sample.
The Exemplars
Many, though not all, of the exemplars gave their permission for their interviews to be publicly
identified with them and for their names to be released as participants in the study. Among these
are:
• Simon Rogerson: Founder of EthiCOMP, first Professor of Computer Ethics
• Elizabeth France: First Data Protection Registrar in the UK
• James Towell: Cambridge Grad, Private Consulting
• Steve Shirley: Early pioneer in business computing
• Enid Mumford: Early pioneer in socio-technical systems
• Francis Grundy: Pioneer in encouraging women in computing
• Alan Newell: Pioneer in developing systems for the handicapped
• Alan Cox: LINUX Pioneer,
• Jan Holvast: Pioneer privacy advocate
• Ove Ivarsen: Developer of the USER Award from LO
The Interview
The 3 hour interview, based on McAdam’s life story protocol (McAdams et al., 2001), asked them
to tell stories from their professional life. There were stories of influential others, of low and high
points, from early in their career and from recent events. It was held in two sessions on consecutive
days and digitally audio-recorded. The recordings were transcribed and the transcriptions approved
by the interviewees. Only minor revisions were made by the interviewees.
Analyzing the Interviews
The transcripts have been informally analyzed for themes and also rigorously coded. We are in the
process of additional qualitative coding. The informal analysis suggests that most of the exemplars
consciously cultivated a network of support for their activities and cited multiple people as positive
influences. In common with other work on exemplars, our exemplars did not think of themselves as
morally extraordinary. However, all were active problem solvers and saw the challenges in their
projects as a mix of moral, technical, and social challenges. In response, they used both social and
technical skills in almost all their work, often explicitly claiming that the two were mutually
supporting in determining their success.
There appeared to be at least two different approaches to our exemplars’ moral careers. We have
labeled these that of the craftsperson and that of the reformer. Craftspersons tended to focus on
their clients or users and to draw on pre-existing values in computing (e.g. user focus, customer
need, software quality) to define the goals of their work. Thus they tended to view themselves as a
provider of a service or product (e.g. computing for the handicapped) and to view difficulties or
disagreements as problems to be solved. Reformers tended to be crusaders who were attempting to
change the values in social systems (organizations, professions, national cultures). They tended to
view individual as victims of injustice and to attempt to remedy that injustice.
Moral Ecologies
The Four Component
Model
Personality
We designed a coding system based on the informal analysis. Two independent coders coded each story
from each exemplar for the presence or absence of 12 items: social support and antagonism, use of
technical or social expertise, the description of harm to victims or need for reform, action taken toward
reform, design undertaken for users or clients, effectiveness and ineffectiveness of action, and negative
and positive emotion. Italicized items were used to create an index of Craft engagement and underlined
items were used to create an index of Reform. The resulting plot clearly shows groups of reformers (above
mean on reform; below mean on craft) and craftspersons (above on craft, below on reform) and two
interesting cases high on both.
Uncovering Successful Performers of Virtue: Moral Exemplars
1. Either a) a sustained commitment to moral ideals or ethical principles in computing that include
a generalized respect for humanity, or b) sustained evidence of moral virtue in the practice of
computing.
2. A disposition to make computing decisions in accord with one's moral ideals or ethical
principles, implying also a consistency between one's actions and intentions and between the
means and ends of one's actions.
3. A willingness to risk one's self-interest for the sake of one's moral values.
4. A tendency to be inspiring to other computing professionals and thereby to move them to moral
action.
External
Control
Developing Indexes of Craft and Reform
Reform Score (in SD from mean of 0)
Introduction
For the Innovations in the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning Conference, February, 2007, Northfield MN
2.0
Moral Skill Sets
Be aware of this
Teach These
Integration of
Morality into the
Self System
Influence this
Personal
Control
Less
Mutable
More
Mutable
Moral Skill Sets
Elizabeth France
1.0
Francis Grundy
Ove Ivarsen
Jan Holvast
Steve Shirley
Integration of Morality in the Self System
Simon Rogerson
0.0
Viiveke Fåk
James Towell
Alan Cox
Alan Newell
Andrew McGettrick
Enid Mumford
-1.0
-1.0
Affiliations &
Relationships
Niklas Halberg
0.0
1.0
2.0
Elements of the
temporally extended and
contextually distributed
self
Personal
Projects
Craft Score (in SD from mean of 0)
Stories & Defining
Memories
Roles, Life Tasks,
Possible Selves
Conclusions
Adapted from McGregor & Little (1998).
The four-component model we propose (see figure in upper right) grounds moral action in relatively stable
personality characteristics, guides moral action based on the integration of morality into the self-system,
facilitates moral action with morally relevant skills and knowledge, and shapes moral action by the context of
the surrounding moral ecology. The model seeks to explain the daily performance of moral action of
computing professionals and to illuminate ways that computing professionals might be trained to be more
active, ethically committed, and ethically effective in their daily performance.
Personality
Among our exemplars, we found that craftspersons were more likely to score high on the personality
characteristic of openness to experience, while reformers were more likely to score high on extraversion. Thus
personality can ground moral action, but it does not solely determine moral character and action. Aristotle
proposes a ship metaphor for the influence of personal inclination. If a ship has a natural inclination to one
side, the wise pilot will steer a bit towards the other to correct. New work in personality theory (Roberts et al.,
2006) suggests that this kind of steering, particularly when reinforced by social roles, can actually produce
changes in personality characteristics in early adulthood and later. Thus, though we treat personality as an
anchoring point for moral inclination, it can be influenced by appropriate life experiences.
Integration of Morality into the Self System (see the figure at upper right)
Much has been made of the centrality of moral commitment. Psychologists (Blasi, 2005) and philosophers
(Crisp & Slote, 1997) treat moral commitment, or moral integrity, or moral will, as the critical determinant of
moral action. But though moral commitment has played this central role, few theorists have spoken carefully
about the components of moral commitment, how it is cultivated and achieved, and the ways that it influences
moral action. Again, recent work in psychology can help us build a multi-faceted view of how moral
commitment is important to the self that guides moral action.
Skills and Knowledge (see examples at upper right)
The literature on virtues has usually portrayed them as dispositions that one can improve by practice (Peterson
& Seligman, 2004). But just what is it that is strengthened by practice? Is a virtue like a muscle that gets
stronger with use? Or is it like a skill that gets better with appropriate coaching and practice? Again, current
literature in moral psychology can help untangle this question. There are aspects of willpower that are like
muscle (Vohs & Baumeister, 2004), but much of what we call virtue is based in skills and knowledge of how to
act in particular worlds (Narvaez 2005). Skills can be practiced to the level of expertise and automaticity, and
knowledge can be learned even to the level of implicit use without conscious reflection. Together these shape
the successful expression of, but do not solely determine, moral action.
Moral Ecology
Finally, moral action is embedded in a social surround that can either support or thwart it. We call this social
surround a moral ecology, or more accurately, a system of interlinked moral ecologies. Countries, cultures,
industries, companies, divisions, workgroups, mentorship networks, and professional organizations all have
morally relevant expectations and pressures that constrain and sometimes support moral action. Individuals
can enter and leave moral ecologies, can influence them and can even act in defiance of them. Thus, knowing
how to navigate in the relevant moral ecologies is a crucial moral skill for computer professionals. Moral
ecologies thus constrain and support, but do not solely determine moral action.
Supporters:
Student Collaborators
• National Science Foundation
• Curriculum Based Resources DUE-9980786 and DUE-9972280
• Life Stories of Moral Exemplars in Computing SES-0217298
• Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility, Demontfort University, UK
• St. Olaf College
•
•
•
•
•
Britta Anderson
Nathan DeWall
Erin Engelbart
Mike Knoll
Cassie Seningen
Motives &
Strivings
•
•
•
•
•
Joe Stewart
Jenny Ingebritsen
Kristyn Aasen
Craig Enlund
Nicole Gilbertson
Beliefs,
Attitudes, &
Values
Past Behavior
& Experience
• Moral Imagination: projecting oneself into
the perspective of others (e.g. collecting
data about a socio-technical system).
• Moral Creativity: generating solutions to
moral challenges while responding to
multiple constraints (e.g. crafting solutions
that respond to multiple constraints)
• Reasonableness: Gathering relevant
evidence, listening to others, giving
reasons, changing plans/positions based on
reason (e.g. crafting communication
strategies for proposed solutions).
• Perseverance: planning moral action and
responding to unforeseen circumstances
while keeping moral goals intact (e.g.
constructing and navigating ethical dissent
processes).
Guiding a Project-Based Class with the Model
Work on expertise suggests that becoming an expert takes 10,000 hours of practice. This must occur in a
structured environment that rewards correct solutions, matches explicit theory and strategy with coaching
and practice, and provides extensive, focused practice (Hogarth, 2001). Narvaez (2005) provides
evidence that the skills associated with moral action can be taught using an expertise model.
In the required project-based class Ethical Issues in Software Design, computer science majors get
explicit theory, strategy and tactics in the moral skills (e.g. collecting data to understand users and the
socio-technical system in which software is embedded). Students read social science studies of
technology, methods manuals in user-centered design, philosophical and theological work on vacation
and the meaning of work, and detailed cases of computing technology as it effects the interests and
values of stakeholders and social systems.
This explicit instruction is tied directly to a project in which students work in teams to evaluate an
existing or proposed software system for an external client. Clients so far have included the school
registrar (for a proposed student information system), a community based non-profit (for a blogging
site), and the local school district (for their website for the district and 5 schools). Sixty per cent of the
student’s grade is based on team performance on this project.
References
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