CHAP I. THE PROBLEM W/
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
A. FAITH - KEEPING
 Americans
chose:
- peace in ‘64 and got Vietnam
- law & order in ‘68 and got Watergate
- to restore an effective presidency in ‘76
and got a “crisis of confidence,” gas lines
and helplessness vs. a hostage-taking
Iran
A. Faith - Keeping (cont)
 Americans
chose (cont)
- bold leadership in ‘80 but got a secret
“arms for hostages” deal
- prosperity in ‘88 and got a slump in ‘99
- “the most ethical administration in
history” in 92 and saw a president
impeached on grounds of perjury and
obstruction of justice
A. Faith - Keeping (cont)
 Thus
… the problem with American
democracy is that it too often does not
keep faith with the public
B. American Democracy

Democracy divides and distributes
power much more broadly than any
other form of government
B. American
Democracy
(continued)
 With
no single source of control,
tyranny nearly impossible in a
demo.
 Fragmentation and stalemated
leadership and …
 the consequent failure to follow
through are much more typical of
democracy
B. American Democracy
(continued)
 Fragmentation likely in the U.S. where
government was divided from the start
Question: Is American democracy working?
 Answer: “No” or, at least, “not well
enough.”

 With
weakened parties - the chief
instrument of democracy - American
democracy delivers less dependably on
paths the American public has chosen
 Weak
B. American Democracy
(cont)
parties reduce the practical
consequences of voting
 The legitimacy of American
government suffers …. not because
elected officials do not want to keep
promises
 but because they lack the means viable
parties once provided
B. American Democracy
(cont)
With notable exceptions (?) , today’s parties
do not produce working governing
majorities capable of keeping a promised
public agenda
 Nor do they have the power to curb special
interests
 As a result, victories of diverse interest
groups have grab-bag effect on policy
 instead of enacting a promised public
agenda in recognizable form

B. American Democracy
(cont)
Participation declined in last 1/3 of 20th
century
 Why vote if government does not respond to
“people like me” anyway?
 Feelings of cynicism and inefficacy have
increased


Partisanship and the belief in the utility of
voting have decreased

B. Am. Democracy
(cont.)
The
impossibility of holding officials
accountable = 1 consequence
 2nd follows from the 1st: i.e.,
Democracy itself is an issue in the United
States.
- Democracy requires political
institutions capable of proposing and
insisting on public agendas and that, in
turn, requires resilient electoral and
governing majorities
B. Am. Democracy
As
coalition builders working parties:
(cont)
 put the pieces together to achieve
majorities
 are the electorate’s means of making
and implementing public choices
When parties are weakened as coalition
builders
 power of interest groups increases
 … majorities do not drive policymaking - - - - minorities do
B. Am. Democracy
(cont)


Groups represent much narrower “publics”
Governmental divisions + strong groups +
weak parties = problems with American
government’s :1. Efficacy of government
2. Accountability of
government
3. Legitimacy of government
B. Am. Democracy(cont)
 One
could argue that popular
sovereignty in United States
centers NOT in the public or
electorate…
in the organized public
(i.e., universe of interest group
constituencies)
 …but
C. Democracy,
Pluralism and Elitism
 Democracy
= making and
implementation of public choices
through majoritarian means
Democracy may be direct or indirect
(define.)
 Necessarily indirect in the United States
... (Why?)

C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)

Indirect democracy leads readily lead to
pluralism
 Pluralism
= the competition over
policy between organized groups

Many would consider pluralism part &
parcel of democracy
C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)
 BUT
…
pluralism responds to the organized
public
 democracy responds to the general, or
at least the attentive, public - especially
as represented through electoral and
public opinion processes

C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)
The organized public is a subset of the
general or attentive public
 BUT … the organized public is more
advantaged demographically ….
 … and so, advantaged psychologically
and,
 … and so, more involved politically
 ERGO: two publics are not the same

C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)


Political associations (i.e., groups) are a
legitimate part of pluralist democracy
Groups specialize in the vital function of
interest articulation = expression of
support, expectations, needs, interests,
preferences & demands to government
C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)



BUT … the group’s leadership - usually an
oligarchy - may act more on its own than out
of responsiveness to the organized public or
even to its own constituency
In that case, the oligarchy replaces the
group and pluralism moves toward elitism
Political Elitism = the development of
public policy by oligarchies
C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)

Pluralism and elitism merge as interest
group oligarchies or elites articulate
interests not just to and from their own
members, ….
…
but directly to public policy
elites or oligarchies (e.g., ?) who
make policy
C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)
American government - like any other
government - is not wholly democratic
nor pluralist nor elitist
 Rather … some issues are addressed by
democratic process, others by
pluralism, others by elitism and still
others by some combinations or blends

C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)

e.g.,
- Who shall lead and with what agenda?
resolved democratically
- Policies having to do with various
group stakes resolved pluralistically
- Policy oligarchies (elites)
determine the most specific policies ….
unless …...
C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)
 Unless
…. (continued)
- the oligarchy or elite represents a coalition
- the broader the array of interest
represented…the broader the oligarchy’s
policy concerns
- may then enact policy agendas
- coalitional elites may represent a majority
C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)
1992 and ‘94 elections looked like
democracy or majoritarianism in action
 Public to Clinton: restore the economy
 BUT public expected moderate policies
 Promise re economy seemed to be kept
 BUT public got liberal spending (e.g.,
health care proposals) initially

C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)
In apparent attempt to correct Clinton’s
expensive, leftward leanings, public elected
opposition party to Congress in 1994
 BUT … 1994 results can just as easily be
described as pluralism in action.
 Republican members of Congress had
convinced interests to switch contributions
to Republican candidates for Congress

C. Democracy,
Pluralism & Elitism (cont)
 It
is difficult for a president to keep
promises if pluralist and elitist
elements in decision-making (d/m)
supplant the majoritarian election
processes organized by parties
 P.S.: 2000 election was extremely
partisan - but can pres keep promises?
1. Two Mandates
 Compounding
the difficulties that
arise from pluralism and/ or
elitism is that the president must
respond not to one but to TWO
mandates:
 One DOMESTIC
 the other INTERNATIONAL
1. Two Mandates
(cont)
It is to this double mandate - NOT to a
specific promise - that the public holds
presidents to account
 Public will forgive breaking 1 or
several promises


BUT it will NOT forgive breaching
the domestic NOR international
mandate
1. Two Mandates
(cont)

In the last 1/3 of the 20th century
a less partisan and more
evaluative public has required a
passing grade on both agenda tests
for a president to be returned to
office
1. Two Mandates (cont)




Since Eisenhower (1952 - 1960) only two have
earned passing marks on both tests
Both unable to keep specific promises (Reagan:
balanced budget, Clinton: health care reform)
(JFK did not get the chance)
Both RR & WJC were judged to have kept faith
w/ public expectations domestically and
internationally (not always the personal
faith - e.g. Lewinskygate)
1. Two Mandates
(cont)
Today’s public can be very supportive of
a president judged to keep 2 mandates
 RR reelected & helped successor, Bush (R)
 WJC reelected in 1996 plus his party gained
5 seats in the mid-term elections of 1998
during impeachment of him by Republican
Congress

1.Two Mandates







BUT … public in last 1/3 of 20th swift to punish
for failing to keep faith with either mandate
LBJ passed domestic but failed international test
RMN was the other way around
GF healed but pardoned domestically
JC failed both Domestic & International tests
GHWB passed “big I” but failed “big D”
(Public classic: What have you done for me lately?)
“Dubya”??
2. Partisanship
and Political Consumerism
Weak partisanship results in “shopping” ..
 .. discarding of incumbent presidents
 Voter/shoppers may “buy” 1 candidate’s
appeal over another whatever “brand”
(i.e., party) label
 Results : change over continuity in gov.
more than in more partisan eras and …...

2. Partisanship &
Political Consumerism (cont)
 …. and (continued),
in today’s “fixit,” technocratic society, the public
expects presidents to solve
problems (i.e., lead) BUT ..
 without supplying structured
and dependable (i.e., partisan)
support to do so
2. Partisanship
& Pol. Consumerism (cont)
Public mandates would be easier for pres
to honor if public more inclined to stick
with a party choice
 BUT … w/ decline of partisanship in the
last 1/3, 2nd terms were rarer than in
middle 1/3 (‘32 - ‘64: Democratic) or the
first 1/3 (1900 - ‘32: Republican)

2. Partisanship
& Pol. Consumerism (cont)
A more apartisan and evaluative public
disposed to judge a president as failing
either at home or abroad or both
 Also less likely to empower a winning
candidate as president with a partisan
maj. in the leg. to enact their promises

2. Partisanship &
Pol. Consumerism (cont)
Increasingly, dividing vote meant
divided government
 5 of last 7 presidents (prior to Dubya)
have faced opposition Congresses
during all or parts of their term(s)
 (i.e., Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Bush &
Clinton) Dubya may in 2004

2. Partisanship
& Pol. Consumerism (cont)
Contrast: in 1st 2/3 of 20th only 2 of
9 pres.s were frustrated in staying pres
 Hoover was defeated in 1932
 Truman would have lost in 1952 had he
chosen to run
 Two presidents died prior to running a
2nd time (Harding and Kennedy)

2. Partisanship
& Pol. Consumerism (cont)
Only 3 of 9 presidents in the 1st 2/3
of 20th faced opposition Congresses
for all or part of their term(s)
 i.e., Woodrow Wilson, Truman S
Truman and Dwight David Eisenhower

3. Weak Parties
and Strong Groups
Interest Groups operate in a widened
sphere of influence when parties fail to
organize consistent, resilient majorities
 Fluidity in public support for parties leads
to policy-making w/o clear pattern
 … groups pursue particular and diverse
goals not public mandates nor party
agendas (grab bag not agenda politics)

3. Weak Parties
and Strong Groups (cont)
In 1992 candidate Clinton promised the
public affordable health care rates.
 BUT coalition of anti’s nickeled & dimed
 Every bill in Congress is time limited
 Pressure groups compromised &
delayed health care bill to death.

3. Weak Parties
and Strong Groups (cont)
Moreover, 1 group coalition may win
only to see opposing coalition win the
same issue the next time.
 e.g., organized labor got a minimum
wage increase in November of 1997.
 Clinton tried to give them another
when he needed political support
(“Lewinskygate”)

3. Weak Parties
and Strong Groups (cont)
A conservative coalition defeated the
2nd attempt to raise labor’s wages
 So… policy zigzagged in 1 year because
of shifting fortunes & the resultant
opportunism of groups coalitions
 Little sign of a public or party agenda

3. Weak Parties
and Strong Groups (cont)




In U. S., pluralism/elitism largely supplanted
majoritarianism in policy-making…
.. due to party/group imbalance (mediation)
Narrowly based group power fills the vaccuum
left by weak parties - minoritarianism
Historically parties - more than groups - have
been chief link between public majorities and
gov policy-making elites
4. Prospects
Party/Group Redress

What are prospects for solving mediation
problem (strong groups / weak parties)?
One possibility: Restore Parties
 That would check groups somewhat
and improve majoritarianism.
 But is it possible?

4. Prospects for
Party/ Group Redress (cont)
Historically, parties achieve new
life via new mandates stemming
from realigning issues
 i.e., a “realigning” election (e.g.,
1800, 1828, 1860, 1896 & 1936)
 electorate’s partisanship & voting
predispositions were realigned by
such elections for the next 28 – 36 yrs

4. Prospects for
Party / Group Redress (cont)

May never be another nat. realignment :
- power of media in mediation
- multiplication of primaries
- finance reforms & individualization of
candidate donor bases
- candidate more than party-centered
campaigns
4. Prospects for
Party / Group Redress (cont)
More than party cues, TV transmits
candidate appeals into voter/ viewer’s
home
 Political consumers less loyal to a party
“brand” than traditional partisan voters
 Results: one-term presidencies, divided
gov’ent and policy-making NOT
constrained by a majority agenda

4. Prospects for
Party / Group Redress
SO… democratic and majoritarian politics
have lost ground to pluralism & elitism
 At times, policy-making is driven by
elect/gov majority w/ policy agenda ...

 But
… often the result of various groups
articulating demands to responsive elites
in government especially mid-term
4. Prospects for
Party / Group Redress (cont)
chief instrument of democracy = party
 Party must regain strength if majoritar
- ianism to be revitalized
 Realignment less likely today than in
past (why?)
 Alternative Scenaro: “New Machines”

Machines”
5. The “New
A theory: The New Machines
 A set of new oligarchies in government
will emerge called the
- “President’s Party”
- “Speaker’s Party” and …
- “Majority Leader’s Party.
 These would be the “new machines.”

5. The “New
Machines” (cont)

Like old party machines, new machines
would have resources to influence
office seeking & so office holding
How?
 … By putting party and group
resources (i.e., #’s & $’s) together.
 Examples ------ ?

D. Structural/Functionalism
1. The Point is Decision
Politics stresses decisionmaking
government the
implementation of decisions
Decision-making plus decision
- implementation = leadership
within social collectivities
•
•
•
2. Political Functions
and Structures
 So pol or gov functions = activities
involved in making or implementing
decisions for social collectivities.
 Pol or gov structure (or agency,
institution, organization, etc.) =
adaptive yet patterned behavior
affecting decision- making &
implementation over time
2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
For every function there is structure(s)
 many structures perform several
functions
 as society changes, structures (etc.)
evolve to ensure decision-making and
implementation (i.e., patterned yet
adaptive)

2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
Political Socialization Function :
 = learning pol. relevant attitudes & behavior
 = induction of individuals into citizenry
 … collectively creates political culture

Socialization Structures = family, peer group,
church, media, formal & informal
associations, parties, etc.
2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
Recruitment Function = special form of
socialization - goes beyond citizenship
 … inducts people into specialized
political or governmental roles
 Structures = election systems, parties,
groups, bureaucratic exams, appointive
processes & co-option (?) into pol/gov
structures

2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
Communication Function =
dissemination of pol info or propaganda
 Structures of Political Communications:
e.g. formal (?) or informal (?) media
 via primary (?) AND secondary or
reference groups (?)
 e.g., parties or interest associations

2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
Interest Aggregation Function = activities
that combine interests into coalition that
determines leaders & paths in social
collectivities
 Elect & gov coalitions - majorities may be
formed thru interest aggregation. If so …
 insures majority rule or majoritarianism

2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
Structures: interest aggregation =
central party function since 1790s
 Other institutions: temporary or “per
issue” coalitions of groups. BUT …
 …. latter are temporary and …
 … have less behavioral constraint or
pattern (little commitment to public
policy agendas)

2. Political Functions
& Structures (cont)
Function: Interest Articulation = act’s
that express demands for policies
 It is via interest articulation that leaders
learn of constituent needs AND …
 minority rights are protected
 Structures: interest group’s primary
function, other structures ____ ???

2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
Parties share in function of interest
articulation to some degree BUT …
 interest aggregation & articulation are
negatively related
 parties have broad (inclusive)
membership base SO... if they get too
specific (articulate) about policy their
coalition will divide

2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
Groups have a narrow (exclusive) base
 If groups stress aggregation more than
articulation they become too broadly
structured to get specific about policy
 Ergo: inclusive parties specialize in
interest aggregation and exclusive
groups in interest aggregation

2. Political Functions
& Structures (cont)
Structures & Functions of political
social., recruitment, communication,
interest aggregation and interest
articulation together = overarching
function of political mediation
 Political mediation = linkages of
support, expectations and demands
from society to government

2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
Rule-Making, rule-application and rule adjudication are phases in transition from
decision-making to decision-implement.
 Handled respectively - but not exclusively
- by leg., exec. and jud. branches
 all occur w/i broad process of converting
societal inputs into governmental outputs

2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
rule-making, -application & adjudication
together = conversion function.
 Gov’tal elites (oligarchies) perform the
conversion function. (e.g., __?)
 Parties are formally involved in convers.
 Interest groups are informally involved

2. Political Functions &
Structures (cont)
(Again, agg & art negatively related)
 U.S. politics tend to move from stress
on interest aggregation toward stress on
interest articulation ….
 …then toward a new balance that is
itself redressed all over again (cycle)

E. Mediation in Am.
Politics
Mediation may emphasize democracy,
pluralism or elitism
 Emphasis is determined by the relative
powers of structures (i.e., parties,
groups and oligarchies)

1. Democracy and the
Building of Majorities

Demo= provision & implementation of
public choices in leaders and paths thru
majoritarian means

Electoral & governmental majorities
are aggregated thru such agencies as
elections, public opinion and parties
a. the Public Threat





Am. electorate can “fire” elected officials
… by voting other majority party in
power to hire and fire = the public threat
Demo requisites of democracy guaranteed by
public threat
most fundamental democratic requisite =
public choices in leaders and paths
a. the Public Threat (cont)



The cacophony of sound bites and
kaleidoscope of photo opts along with the
horse-race & hoopla created by infinite # of
candidate appeals is reduced in U.S. to …
…two enormous public alternatives by the
Republican & Democratic Parties as …
public choice-definers (i.e., choice-givers)
a. the Public Threat (cont)

Efficacy, dependability & legitimacy of
democratic gov are underwritten to
extent parties effective in implementing
public mandates

ERGO: working majority parties are
choice-givers and faith keepers
a. the Public Threat (cont)
In the process of choice-making and
implementation there is the enormous
gift to democracy of the peaceful
resolution of conflict: e.g., leaders vs.
led &/or public v. gov. choices in paths
 parties resolve such conflicts by offering
alternatives in leaders and paths

a. the Public Threat (cont)
While election results are subject to
much interpretation re paths, their
answer to the question of “who shall
lead” is determinative (except 2000!!)
 Elections thereby resolve a profound
and potentially violent societal question
(i.e., “who shall lead.” )

a. the Public Threat (cont)
The peaceful transfer of power thru
competing parties guarantees majority
rule as well as minority rights
 Also, the means by which a minority
can become a majority which, in turn, ...
 Insures political equality and
individual freedoms

a. the Public Threat (cont)
(One of the most neglected lessons in all
of politics is that protecting minority
rights is in majority’s self-interest ….
 … because the ultimate right of a
minority is to become a majority and …
 … if they do, they’ll remember !!)

a. the Public Threat (cont)
 Exercising
public threat is popular
sovereignty & limited gov. in action
 Pop. consultation guaranteed when
officials worry about being “fired”
 Popular consultation also served by
“loyal opposition” party tattling on
the party in power
a. the Public Threat (cont)
Pol. parties stress #’s more than $’s
 In fact, modern parties originated in
U.S. in 1790s to mobilize #’s vs natural
political advantages of $’s
 In aggregating majorities parties
provide persuasive pol communication,
stimulate voting & organize gov’ment

a. the Public Threat (cont)
Pol communication of parties serves to
inform and mobilize the pubic and ...
 helps insure gov’tal accountability of
party in power
 Once elected, the winning party
organizes popular branches (i.e., leg.
& exec.) – and, in time, …
 affects jud branch (87 of first 100 judges)

a. the Public Threat (cont)




Theory: Jefferson’s responsible party gov.
i.e., parties offer & honor public agendas
then stand for public judgement
Practice: responsible party model is
problematic & only sporadically successful
Model is especially difficult when parties
are weak and groups are strong …
BUT ...
a. the Public Threat (cont)
All democratic theory insists individual
liberties be guaranteed
 protection of such participation rts (e.g.,
__?) insures broadest structuring of
preferences in demo - e.g., elections
 Elections = the making of public choices
in leaders and paths.

a. the Public Threat (cont)
Elections are democracy in action
 since public choice-making (&
implement.) is what democracies do
 Elections express public mandates and
agendas (i.e. paths) via majoritarianism
 Ironically, public agenda is subject to
many interpretations (i.e., hidden)

a. the Public Threat (cont)

Since public alternatives in leaders
and paths are the 1st requisite of
democracy, political theorists insist that

…parties must be competitive.
 Party theorists also insist that party
structures have to be inclusive (why?)
a. the Public Threat (cont)
If parties are competitive & based on
enduring socioeco. divisions (e.g., ?) ..
 … issue and ideological differences
become well known over time
 … ergo: public choices clearer over time
 …parties will try to broaden support by
extending suffrage (esp. which party?)

a. the Public Threat (cont)
Two important American Party
Theorists: Key & Schattschneider
 E.E. Schattschneider favored
“socialization” of conflict w/ nat issues.
“privatization” dominated by haves
 Parties socialize conflict since majorities
or near majorities drive them - - not
minorities

a. the Public Threat (cont)
Schattsneider felt political power of
haves was their wealth whereas ...
 …political power of have-nots was
numbers
 In 2-party systems, parties consolidate
& mobilize masses of have-nots (1800)
 In one-party system no countervailing
power to eco & pol power of the haves

a. the Public Threat (cont)
V.O. Key illustrates E. E. Schattsneider’s
point in finding $ interests stronger in
1-party areas (i.e., old American South)
 Key: The grand objective of the haves
is obstruction … Organization is not
always necessary to obstruct; it is
essential, however, for the promotion of
a sustained ...

a. the Public Threat (cont)
Key (cont)
 ….. program in behalf of the have-nots
… over the long run the have-nots lose
in a disorganized politics
 Conservative, moneyed groups become
stronger in 1-party situations since can
dominate funding of office seekers
a. the Public Threat (cont)
In a competitive (e.g., 2-party) situation,
elected officials heed #’s of have-nots if
mobilized by alternative party
 Key & Schattsneider both note: when
parties are not competitive, it is the
have-nots that suffer

b. The Fluidity in
Am. Majoritarianism



Have & have-not orientations = fundamental
& resilient distinctions between constituencies
of 2 majority parties in U.S.
In addition - and often derived from - have
vs. have-not distinctions are other
demographic differences
e.g., regional, age, ethnic/racial, educational,
religious & gender characteristics
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
In addition to demographic differences,
party coalitions differ by their
constellations of allied political
organizations
 i.e., social movements and interest
groups tend to favor either the have or
have-not party coalition (why?)

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
Psych characteristics in party motive
structure also from have/ have-not
characteristics
 e.g., partisan strata w/in the public ID
w/ one party over the other given their
have or have-not predispositions
 less partisan “leaners” favor 1 or other but
not so dependably as strong partisans

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
Non-partisan strata - i.e., most
evaluative or “pure” independents  - make party choices per vote per
election (T-splitters, switchers)
 Motive-structures w/in party
constituencies govern the party’s
predisposition towards change vs.
continuity in leaders & paths

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
If a party constituency tends toward
change, assumes & insists on
responsiveness in government
 Continuity in support for leaders & paths
across elections favors gov’tal discretion ..
 …. since public support is structured,
enduring and dependable (i.e., partisan)

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)






Partisans = affective toward choices ….
… Independents more evaluative
Evaluative support promotes change
Affective support promotes continuity
SO.. change in leaders/paths occurs
more often with weak partisanship …
… (i.e., political consumerism goes ^)
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)



Demos & Repubs build temporary majorities
to “throw the rascals out” - in periods of
weak partisanship (consumption by voters of
per election party appeals)
Both also favor change over continuity in
paths - during periods of weak partisanship
Hypo: Changes in paths will not occur every
28 - 40 years or even in 4 year cycles in 2000’s
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
As long as American major’ism is fluid,
American electorate will alter paths or
instructions to officials every 2 years (i.e.,
congressional sessions)
 SO… party coalitions w/ evaluative
public base do not endure across
elections and Am majoritarianism …
 …is very fluid as a result

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
Another element in party motive
structures involves material ($) and
purposive (cause or ideological)
incentives
 Predominance of either haves or havenots w/in a party’s constituency affects
the party’s orientation toward change
or continuity in leaders and paths

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
Have-nots favor change in life situation
whereas haves are more status quo
 “the various and unequal distribution
of property” always divides societies
 So have vs. have-not differences in party
constituencies insure bases for 2
opposing public alternatives

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)



Partisans w/ purposive incentives disposed
toward change or continuity given party have
or have-not predispositions
Purposive voters favoring change like the havenot or moderate to liberal party
Voters favoring tradition, the status quo or
conservatism favor the party of the haves
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
If material divisions are enduring
party bases, an individual’s SES
should tie them to the have or the havenot party
 It does, but not so as securely as past
 Why?

b. Fluidity in Am.
Materialism (cont)
SES separated voters during
Depression when some Republican
voters switched their vote and..
 w/ some, their allegiance, to the
Democrats
 Many non-voters joined the electorate
to vote for the attractive alternative
path offered by the New Deal

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
BUT… the Depression was decades ago
 Party allegiances stemming from the ‘32
realigning election have eroded as one
age cohort succeeded the last since then
 Another realigning election should
have occurred in late 60’s or early 70’s
 That almost happened.

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
The “social issue” could have realigned
but..
 … two things happened
 1. television and 2. Watergate
 Squeezed between Vietnam &
Watergate new voters said “a pox on
both your houses.”

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
TV- new under political sun - transmits
candidate appeals more than party cues
 So voters “shopped” for candidates via
TV
 Parties thus lost some cue-giving power
precisely when a realigning issue was
due

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
Haves and have-nots alike remained less
partisan for a time and …
 Majority building became fluid &
constant enterprise for parties
 Electoral and governing party coalitions
were still tied together by partisanship
(albeit weakened)

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)




Party activists remain bound together and to
party leaders by affective or emotive ties ...
… for activists in the party organization (i.e.,
PO), by solidary (?) incentives as well
So parties continue to offer have and have-not
alternatives to Am. democracy
BUT…who’s buying and what?
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
Independents = @ 1/3 of electorate
 added only temporarily to the affective
base of identifiers by independent
evaluations of party appeals.
 But frequently, Independents “buy” the
appeals of candidates rather than
investing in party agenda or long term
party appeal

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)




Despite SES divisions, even have AND havenot voters became less partisan and …
majoritarianism was more fluid as a result
Parties left w/ a larger contingent who are
subject to rational persuasion or dissuasion
and…
a smaller set of supporters who are resistant
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)




affective partisans remain loyal across
elections because emotive loyalties not
subject to rational dissuasion
evaluative Independents vote per office per
election …. i.e., “shop”
“pure” Independents (@ 15%) are
disproportionately political consumers ….
means governing support is more fluid
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
 rise of pol. consumerism during the
info age explains 2 yr. mandates
 independency and consumerism
explain the quicker and more exact
adjustments in governing mandates
 (every two years)
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
In sum: fluidity in political majorities
increased ….
 from the 1960s until 1990s
 Majoritarianism weakened as
evaluative voting (i.e., consumerism)
increased (or plateaued)
 … and partisan or affective voting
declined (or bottomed out)

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
The “agenda politics” of democracy
and strong parties declined as ….
 … “grap-bag” pluralism increased.
 Electoral and governing majorities have
become less enduring and dependable
 Change in paths is favored over
continuity

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)
Majoritarianism has declined w/ party
power in the U S
 minoritarianism has increased w/
group power
 ERGO: the problem with American
democracy = cannot keep the public
faith well enough

b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)




All governments - whether demo., plural, or
elitist - must be responsive to some degree
BUT … all governments must also exercise some
autonomy or discretion, too
Affective nature of partisanship strengthens
government’s autonomy & discretion
…. even against popular sentiment
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)



Affective (i.e., partisan) voters guarantee the
electorate enduring bases for public choices
and gov’tal autonomy (i.e., leadership)
BUT… evaluative voters (Independents)
determine which choice taken in election
ERGO: evaluative voters guarantee change and
governmental responsiveness
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)





As party power declined, affective/
evaluative balance changed > evaluative
… “shopping” reduced long-term service of
parties to democracy …
In a majoritarian system, leadership is tricky
Followers have little loyalty to leader’s
majority in a majoritarian system
(requires what in a president?)
b. Fluidity in Am.
Majoritarianism (cont)



BUT… w/o some fluidity in party support
the prospects for gov’tal responsiveness and
policy change suffer …
… also a disservice to democracy
SO… affective/evaluative balance in public
support governs policy change v. continuity
AND governmental responsiveness vs.
discretion
c. Majority Parties:
Republicans & Democrats


Majority parties = inclusive & decentralized
pol structures that specialize in interest
aggregation most especially but, also, in pol
recruitment, communications & conversion
Majority parties qualify as majority parties
if they have the potential of building electoral
and governing majorities
c. Maj. Parties:
Repubs & Demos(cont)




Party leaders link gov’ning coalitions to
elect’al coalitions by providing, explaining
and implementing public choices
ERGO: Republicans and Democrats are the
chief instruments of American Democracy
3rd parties = instruments of policy change
balances w/i party motive structures
determine party’s stance toward..
c. Maj. Parties:
Repubs & Demos(cont)
… towards policy continuity/change,
governmental responsive./discretion
 have/have-not balance w/in party motive
structure provides enduring bases for
public choice

 Working
parties are public
choice-givers and faith-keepers
c. Maj. Parties:
Repubs & Demos(cont)
Republicans and Democrats implement
public agendas - if they are working
 As yet there is no substitute for parties
in American Democracy.
 No other structure able to pull pieces of
electoral and gov’tal majorities together

c. Maj. Parties:
Repubs & Demos(cont)
If parties weaken as coalition builders:
fragmentation occurs
 rule by groups and oligarchies occurs
 minoritarianism competes w/
majoritarianism &...
 public agendas and trust compromised

2. Pluralism & the
Threat of Minority Rule



Pluralist theory = conflict arises among groups
as each applies resources to struggle over policy
(gov a means to that end)
Relative importance of different issues plus
changing value & unequal distribution of
political resources yields ….
highly fluid and situational decision-making
2. Pluralism & Threat of
Minority Rule (cont)
Complexity is compounded by multicenteredness of pluralism
 (no 1 source of division in government)
 There are many policy fragments or
oligarchies (e.g., _?_ ) at nat. and state levels
 These ally with some interests and oppose
others in trying to win a policy victory

2. Pluralism & Threat of
Minority Rule (cont)
Pluralism assumes activity by formal &
informal groups or networks of groups
(e.g., iron triangles & policy networks)
 Pluralism also assumes that groups or
group networks operate both outside and
inside government
 - i.e., both private (e.g., ___?) & public
(e.g., ___?) groups

2. Pluralism & Threat of
Minority Rule (cont)
Importance of multi-centeredness of
pluralism = numerous points of access
to policy makers
 Importance of fluidity of pluralism =
lose now, win later
 In a pluralistic system everyone gets to
play and nobody gets left out -- at least
in theory

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism

If elections, parties and public opinion
processes are majoritarian mechanisms
that drive democracy,…
IGs = central structures w/i pluralism
 groups perform critical role of alerting
& pressuring government re needs in
society or - at least - organized society

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
Groups apply their resources in
finances, visibility, expertise, prestige,
organization & leadership and, possibly
“nerve” issues toward winning policy
contests
 Added to these resources are
constituent advantages in numbers,
affluence, strategic location, time and
education

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
As with any other political agency, the
motive or incentive structure within
groups (e.g., ? ) explains much political
behavior
 For instance, material groups have a
tougher time forming than purposive
groups but they have much more
endurance (why?)

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
Have-not materialism w/in a group will
tend to favor change while have
predispositions tend > status quo
 both material/purpose and affective/
evaluative motive structures in
pressure groups may favor
governmental responsiveness over
autonomy and discretion

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
In applying their political resources,
groups inform, advertise, lobby, supply
or deny grass roots and/or financial
support and otherwise pressure
decision-makers to act favorably
towards their interest
 ERGO & AGAIN: they specialize in
interest articulation

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
To a lesser extent than interest
articulation, groups are involved in:
 Political socialization - e.g., whether
government responds to “people like
us”
 political communications: w/i group
communiqués to mobilize, public ads,
or persuasion re decision-makers
a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)



Political recruitment of IGs: PACs,
endorsements, “delivering” a vote, etc
Political Conversion: groups are informally
involved in conversion - e.g., aid & pressure
d/m’ers, recruit allies to office and to right
committees, testify, lobby, etc.
(parties are formally involved in conversion)
a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
But (and again), special function for
groups is interest articulation
 in fact, it is the petitioning of gov that
separates interest groups from all other
voluntary associations.
 ERGO: membership basis must be
exclusive (why?)

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
Group leaders and activists are
motivated especially by affective (and
solidary) incentives and ...
 by either material or purposive goals
 Group leadership tends toward
oligarchy (iron law of oligarchy. R.
Michelles)
 Supporters may be affective or
evaluative

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
IGs narrowly based … may assert
minority against majority in policy
dispute
 SO.. IGs criticized as serving minority
rule (re policy) rather than just minority
rights
 Why control of policy rather than
government as a whole? - exclusiveness

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
Minoritarianism driven by groups
refers to minority rule over policy
rather than government as a whole
 Pressure groups are not broadly
structured enough to control
government as a whole
 May have a “confederacy of oligarchies”
instead of a federal government

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
In sum, Am IGs described as exclusive
and centralized political structures that
specialize in interest articulation but
also > recruitment, communication &
conversion.
 IGs leaders link group constituencies to
gov by applying group resources
toward the persuasion of policy-makers

a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)
Evaluative/affective & material/
purposive balances in group motive
structure may favor gov’tal
responsiveness over discretion and
either change or continuity in policy
 Briefly defined, American interest

groups = policy advocates of
organized publics.
b. The Benevolent
Group
First of modern or “analytic” pluralists
in the U.S. was Arthur F. Bentley
 Bentley: The Process of Government
(1908)
 major break with “staatswissenschaft”
 Inspired political scientists toward
“group approach”

b. The Benevolent
Group (cont)
Bentley’s major points re groups:
 wealth main source of divisions in
society
 “When groups are adequately stated,
everything is stated. When I say
everything, I mean everything.”
 individual interests were trivial in
interpreting society. BUT …..
b. The Benevolent
Group (cont)
(but) … group activity was “first, last
and all the time” essential to such
interpretations
 National interest a myth. “The balance
of groups pressures is the existing state
of society.”
 group pressures were the one and only
determinate of government policy

b. The Benevolent
Group (cont)




Mostly, group pressures yielded decisions =
reasonably fair
while class divisions were most common
basis for groups, numbers were more
important than wealth as a group resource
Larger, more nearly general interests would
defeat smaller, narrower special interests
closest thing to “control by the people.”
b. The Benevolent
Group (cont)
David Truman another group theorist
 much influenced by Bentley
 also felt that groups were benign
 groups weakened and divided by greed
 overlapping memberships across
groups with different interests
 Some members would object as a result
b. The Benevolent
Group (cont)
Another check on greed = “potential
group”
 if, for instance, a tariff was excessive,
consumers would organize an opposing
lobby - specter checks group’s greed
 (Truman is author of the “disturbance
theory” - more later)

c. The Malevolent
Group
Most group theorists are less optimistic
 These authors assume that majoritarian
government is often frustrated by the
exclusiveness of groups and that …
 minority rule re policy that can result

c. The Malevolent
Group (cont)
Madison: important advantage of well
constructed union was “its tendency to
control the violence and mischiefs of
faction.”
 1 lesson of Am rev. clear: if loyalties
attached more to groups than political
community as a whole, unity of action
was impossible, anarchy would result

c. The Malevolent
Group (cont)
Madison’s thought always included the
notion of balance in government
 In fact, constitutionalism was a balance
between anarchy on the one hand and
tyranny on the other
 BUT… which did Madison fear more:
anarchy or tyranny (?)

c. The Malevolent
Group (cont)
Madison feared the suppression of factions
more than the violence of faction
 How to maintain a balance between T/A?
 Madison’s answer: structuring government (1) a republican form of government and
(2) a division of governmental authority
 (How does that keep balance?)

c. The Malevolent
Group (cont)



But Madison’s greater fear = tyranny tyranny would be thwarted by divisions and
representativeness
But still feared “tyranny of the majority”
 ?: What of power within divisions?

Could fragmentation provide sufficient
minority power to thwart majoritarianism?
c. The Malevolent
Group (cont)
E.E. Schattschneider:
 Group greed had worsened Depression - i.e.,
U.S. tariffs spawned retaliatory tariffs
 Solution to group greed: broaden scope of
conflict - results more nearly nat’al or maj.
 Broadening conflict was better achieved by
inclusive parties than exclusive groups
F. CONVERSION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS



Parties & groups are part of mediation or the
linking of society with government
What happens as a result of mediation is
called conversion or the translating of
demands into policy
Political conversion is necessarily a
specialization of small groups or oligarchies
or elites BECAUSE …..
F. Conversion in Am Pols
(cont)
 …..
of the the unweldiness of large
bodies in the exact and detailer
work of enacting specific and
complex policies
 SO …. political conversion
inherently involves some form of
elitism
1. Elitism & Decision Implementation
elitism = public policy
making by oligarchies.
 Political
Oligarchies are therefore the central
structure in elitism
 Some of the fragments in America’s
fragmented political situation are elites
or combinations of elites

1. Elitism & DecisionImplementation (cont)
Structure of oligarchies ranges from
very narrow to representative coalitions
 As the structure of elites expands so do
their functions
 At a minimum, oligarchies convert
demands into policy or ….
 …. articulate interests

1. Elitism & Decision Implementation (cont)




In their broadest form - i.e., representative
coalitions - elites may aggregate and
articulate interests as well as convert
demands into policies
a. Kinds of Elites:
single purpose and multifunctional elites
private and public elites, and
..combinations of these
a. Kinds of Elites
(cont)
Example of combo: committees and
subcommittees often ally with pertinent
executive agencies and with private
interest groups to form ….
 “iron triangles” or, …
 in more elaborate form, “policy
networks.”

1) SinglePurpose Oligarchies
Very exclusive, composed of only a few
powerful individuals
 narrowest of all political orgs would be
a faction w/i a single-purpose oligarchy
 In private sector, 1 purpose elites
specialize in interest articulation
 w/i public sector, specialize in
conversion

1) 1 Purpose
Oligarchies (cont)
Examples of governmental or public
elites or oligarchies:
 congressional subcommittees and
committees, as well as
 executive offices, agencies, bureaus and
regulatory commissions
 Federal courts are also oligarchies
1) 1 Purpose
Oligarchies (cont)
1 purpose elites in private sector stress
int art in relating to gov’tal oligarchies
 Examples: leadership components of
most interest groups, third parties,
social movements, etc.
 Also some of the actual fragments in
America’s fragmented political
situation

2) “Per Issue
Coalitions” and Iron Triangles
Temporary or “per issue” coalitions are
short-lived coalitions of some of these
fragments in Am. Politics. Namely,
interest groups
 “Per issue” coalitions are not single
purpose oligarchies
 Are a form of multifunctional
oligarchies

2) “Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)
per issue coalitions disband after an
issue resolved and reformulate into
other combinations to address
subsequent issues
 Per issue coalitions aggregate and
articulate interests but they must
persuade govern’tal elites to convert
demands into policy

2) “Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)
Iron triangles (IT’s) and policy
networks (PN’s) endure across issues.
 “Iron tri’s” and “policy nets” are unlike
per issue coalitions because they last
across issues
 IT’s and PN’s are unlike 1 purpose oligs
because they are multifunctional

2) “Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)




Broader structure of iron tri’s & policy nets
means two specializations - not one
Iron tri’s and policy nets articulate interests
(given private group component)
Given their legis. & exec. components iron
tri’s and policy networks also perform
political conversion
i.e. they enact and implement policy
2) “Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)
Policy nets and iron tri’s are threesomes
since they usually exclude the president
 Exception: LBJ - particularly adept at
negotiation
 LBJ could make it in the trilogy’s selfinterest to become a foursome

2)“Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)
Mancur Olson felt minority factions in
Congress have advantage re majorities
 Iron tri’s, for instance, place group
advocates within fragments that
specialize in group concerns in the
legislature and the executive branches
of government

2) “Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)
Grant McConnell felt poor farmers,
conservationists and consumers hurt by
iron tris operating w/in decentralized
setting created by federalism
 e.g., USDA and county agents + AFBF
+ pertinent members of Congress
destroyed Farm Security Agency
 set up by New Deal to help rural poor

2) “Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)



e.g., local business interests + Army Corp of
Engineers + Public Works Committee pushed
for dams, etc.
profited local businesses who contributed $ to
pertinent congress members who
appropriated $ for Corp of Engineers, etc.
BUT … local environ’tal interests not part of
the iron triangle
2) “Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)





McConnell felt stronger national institutions
were needed
Agreed with E.E. Schattschneider on stronger
parties but ...
also stronger presidency + Supreme Court
Stronger national government broadened
scope of conflict
counter power of state and local interests
2) “Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)



Andrew S. McFarland sees American gov.
as so many interests split into various policy
domains controlled by iron triangles
e.g., a “turf” conscious “confederation of
oligarchies.”
had several qualifications to fed government
as confederation (of oligarchies)
2) “Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)
McFarland’s qualifications:
 Pres’tial elections
 rise of public interest lobbies
 social movements
So majority rule does at times overcome
minority rule according to McFarland. But..
 need stronger institutions of aggregation
2) “Per Issue” &
Iron Tri’s (cont)




Madison worried about the “tyranny of the
majority” at state and local levels.
Olson, Schattschneider, McConnell &
McFarland worry about minority factions
Madison: fed’lism thwarted tyranny
Modern pluralists: too many divisions fragmentation - needed majoritarian national
institutions
b. Leadership Networks
& the “New Machines”



Multipurpose oligs e.g., party leadership
networks in Congress may perform
aggregation, articulation and conversion
network members may informally represent
organized publics or interest groups
Results in a broader - more representative outlook
b. Lead. Nets & “New
Machines”(cont)
Examples of voting blocs or caucuses
 demographic (women, blacks,
Hispanics or Sunbelt)
 ideological (conservative Southern
Demos or right-wing Republican
freshpersons)
 economic (“steel” or “cotton” caucus)
 may be bi-partisan
b. Lead. Nets. &“New
Machines” (cont)



Some governmental oligarchies created by
Constitution: e.g., Supreme Court or pres.
and “principle Officer(s) in each of the
executive Departments”
Usually occurred on their own over time:
e.g., committee system, White House
entourage, various individual & allied
Departments, ad hoc policy “czars”, etc.
b. Lead. Nets. &“New
Machines” (cont)



Multipurpose oligarchies such as party
leadership networks may evolve into the
“new machines.” (discuss)
new machines redress balance between
interest aggregation and articulation toward
former
If party leadership in government enacted a
promised public agenda, a majority …..
b. Lead. Nets. & “New
Machines” (cont)
… of the electorate could “buy” into the
party that delivered on an agenda
 that would realign party loyalties in the
electorate for at least as long as public
support lasted for furthering that
agenda

2. Elitism




Thomas Dye in Who’s Running America
Corporate Directors, the Money Elite, Governing
Circles, the Media Moguls, the Civic
Establishment
Gov policy-makers are proximate d/m
ultimate oligarchies = CFR, Trilateral Com.,
Business Roundtable, Committee on Eco
Development, Brookings, Am. Enterprise
Institute and Heritage Foundation, etc.
2. Elitism (cont)




Beginning place for Dye’s oligarchic decisionmaking is the corporate elite – funnel $ into?
Elites in wealth, government, media and civic
establishment build an agenda that is
representative - even includes poor at times
Policy planning oligarchies such as CFR,
Business Roundtable and Brookings reduce
consensus to specific policy recommenda’s.
Pluralism occurs when??
2. Elitism (cont)
So private elites are the actual decision
makers in Dye’s model
 Government agencies - e.g., committees
- are “proximate decision-makers” only carry out decisions made by
private elites

2. Elitism (cont)




Difference in Dye and Davis:
Davis: Dye’s proximate decision makers are
actually the decision makers
private elites in Dye are actually involved in
interest articulation when they decide what
recommendations to make to government
To the extent Dye’s elites reflect broad
concerns they also aggregate interests
2. Elitism (cont)



Dye’s elites, like other multipurp. elites, do
help drive the agg/art/con cycle
Dye’s private elites are oligarchies able to
recommend (articulate) policies w/in an
agenda given their broad societal concerns
(aggregation)
Dye’s governing elites are actually involved
in conversion according to Davis
2. Elitsm (cont)
Other oligarchies go further in
completing the aggregation/
articulation/conversion cycle because
they are involved in all 3
 Examples: party structures such as
caucuses or conferences or leadership
networks

G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO,
PLURALISM & ELITISM



3 structures central to democracy (party),
pluralism (group) and elitism (oligarchy)
interaction of these three drives the interplay
of democracy, pluralism and elites
is a negative relationship between interest
aggregation and articulation, both affect
conversion so will affect structure and
functioning of governmental elites or oligs
G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO,
PLURAL & ELITISM (cont)



Should there be another realigning election or
…the production of a promised public
agenda through party leadership networks in
government (i.e., the new machines) …
new life would be breathed back into parties,
the aggregative function and American
democracy
G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO.,
PLURAL. & ELITISM (cont)
Oddly enough, it is the evolution of
oligarchies that may invigorate parties.
 In that case, elitism will reinvigorate
majoritarianism and democracy in
America
