Accounting for Inter-Organizational Relations:
the EU, the UN and the Iranian Nuclear
Program (2003-08)
Spyros Blavoukos (sblavo@aueb.gr) and
Dimitris Bourantonis (bouranto@aueb.gr)
Paper for the GOSEM Summer School
Rethymnon, Sep. 2013
Introduction
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Inter-organizationalism in IR neglected; still
large variety of insights from other disciplines
(e.g. sociology and management)
Research question: which parameters condition
relations between IOs?
Narrow down the focus: nested organizations
(e.g. regional organizations in the UN system →
EU in the UN)
Case study: EU-UN and the sanctions towards
Iran (2003-8)
IOs and Interorganizationalism (I)
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IOs strive for organizational autonomy; then
why engage in a relationship with another IO?
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Three causes:
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resource scarcity → performance distress
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normative congruence:
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Contingencies: necessity, asymmetry-reciprocity, efficiency,
stability, and legitimacy
ideological and normative attraction of cooperative
engagement
existence of a powerful extra-organizational force:
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induces or enforces joint activities between IOs, motivating
‘voluntary’ inter-organizational cooperation
in nested IOs, consider also differentiated membership and
institutional format (e.g. veto right in the UNSC)
IOs and Interorganizationalism (II)
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How do we chose the partner IO?
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complementarity of resources:
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to maximise benefits of cooperation
domain similarity:
similar, not identical;
 potential of turf competition and eventual
absorption
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normative orientation of an IO vis-à-vis
international cooperation:
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embrace of multilateral and cooperative
approaches to IR
Regionalism in the UN
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Regionalism welcomed in the UN Charter (Art. 52-54):
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supremacy of universalism over regionalism undermined
in practice
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ROs activities consistent with the UN purposes and principles
states encouraged to go first to ROs before UNSC
UNSC may use ROs for the settlement of regional conflicts
no enforcement action by ROs without the UNSC authorization.
UNSC should be kept fully informed for the activities of ROs
‘ROs have imposed economic sanctions without UNSC
authorization
UN gets from ROs: more material and personnel
resources, better understanding of the political and
cultural underpinnings of a regional crisis
ROs get from the UN: legitimacy
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty System (NPT)
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NPT (1968): NNWS will not acquire nuclear
weapons and NWS will not proliferate them
balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations
of the NWS-NNWS
Guarantees offered to NNWS by NWS:
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NNWS not to be deprived of the potential benefits from
the peaceful use of nuclear energy; in return, NNWS
accept system of inspections by IAEA
security guarantees to NNWS
EU Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy
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Basic documents:
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(June 2003)
European Security Strategy (ESS)
EU Strategy against the Proliferation of the WMD (both
December 2003)
Objectives of EU policy:
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Basic Principles for a Strategy against Proliferation of WMD
universalization and strengthening of the NPT
greater effectiveness and further improvement of inspection and
verification practices and increased detectability of significant
violations
improving export control and practices
EU stresses diplomatic containment: use of political and
economic ‘sticks and carrots’; coercion (economic, not
military) may follow after UN authorization
The EU and the Iranian Nuclear
Program (2003-08) (I)
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Stage 1 (2003-5): EU takes the diplomatic lead
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EU offers only economic ‘carrots’ unable to offer the security
guarantees that might have sealed the deal or invoke credibly the
option of ‘sticks’ to coerce Iran
Stage 2 (2005-8): negotiations break down, after the
Iranian Presidential elections and full securitization of the
issue
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EU could have imposed sanctions unilaterally (like other ROs)
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however, it takes the issue to the UN
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to enhance effectiveness of any collective response
to legitimize possible enforcement action in concordance with
its own normative adherence to multilateralism
The EU and the Iranian Nuclear
Program (2003-08) (II)
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from 2006 onwards, US, Russia and China increasingly
involved ( ‘EU3+3’)
options: either more ‘carrots’ (especially the security
guarantees that the EU was unable to offer initially) or
‘sticks’.
the US tipped the balance to the latter
the EU orchestrated the first round of economic
sanctions in mid-2006, having to accommodate in the
course of intra-UN negotiations the Russian and Chinese
concerns (to avoid their veto)
in 2007, intra-EU cohesion in question; US intervention
came in support of ‘hardliners’
Conclusions
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functional and normative pillars of the EUUN relationship as well as the US presence
and the UNSC institutional set up (veto
power of permanent members) account
for the EU diplomatic role in the crisis and
especially the path to the UN-imposed
economic sanctions from 2003 to 2008
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Resource scarcity:
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Normative congruence:
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delay in materialising the economic incentives of the 2004 Paris
agreement,
incapacity to offer security guarantees
a priori exclusion of military intervention: no coercion potential
(even as a threat)
EU in quest of political legitimization
this was a lacking resource, but its importance depends on the
value it has for an international actor
decision to move the Iranian dossier to the UN rather than
impose sanctions unilaterally reflects also the EU’s normative
commitment to collective responses
US presence as well as the other two UNSC
permanent members with veto right:
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accommodation of American, Russian, and Chinese concerns