AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE
STUDY GUIDE
V 1.5
16 Sep 2012
This document was produced for the 1-211th ARB and is intended for use inside this organization. This guide
contains excerpts of Airworthiness Releases (AWRs), Aviation Maintenance Action Messages (AMAMs), and
Aviation Safety Action Messages (ASAMs). Aviators are still responsible for reviewing the AWRs, and other
related messages in their entirety and becoming familiar with all the available information contained in those
documents. This study guide contains sensitive information and will not be reproduced outside of this
organization. Detailed information about AWRs, and other aviation related messages can be accessed through
the JTDI website (https://upw.jtdi.mil).
1
Table of Contents
AWR #
By Date Posted
Title
Page
2006D-A19 R5
2005D-A52 R2
2007D-A39 R8
2009D-A19 R4
2012/07/01
2012/06/04
2012/05/02
2012/03/27
MSPU…………………………………………………………………………………….……..3
701D/CC Engine Installed with 701C / Transient Tq Split………………3
OPERATION OF AH64D w/ ASPI Gen II………………………………….………4
CPG Map Case Strap/Use of Elect. Logbook CF-19 Toughbook…….6
2009D-A67 R4
2008D-A54 R1
2010D-A28 R1
2010D-A25
2009D-A74 R7
2008D-A08 R11
2004D-A44 R1
2008D-A05 R2
2011/10/04
2011/09/26
2011/09/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/11
2011/08/10
2011/03/23
2011/01/27
Asymmetrical Wing Stores……….……………………………………………….....7
ARC-231 SATCOM/UHF Radio……………………………………………………….10
Block II, Ver. 13 Perf Page Non ASPI 701C/701D-CC engines…..…..10
Fielding of Ver. 13 Software on Block II…………………………………………13
Second Generation ASPI…………………………………………………..…...……..19
UAS Level II System……………………………………………………………………….20
NVGs in Both Crew Stations (AN/AVS- 6) ……………………………………..20
PHODS………………………………………………………………………………………….21
2006D-A28 R9
2010D-A31
2010D-A50
2010D-A29
2006D-A55 R1
2010/12/22
2010/11/23
2010/08/30
2010/08/30
2010/07/09
AFT CG 1.75……………………………….………………………………….…………….22
ELT (EBC-406HM) INSTALLATION ………………………….…………………….22
CMWS 5th SENSOR………………………………………………….……….…….......23
ASE AGP Install w/ v13 Software………………………………………………….25
IR STROBES.…………………………………………………………………….……….....27
2008D-A27 R1
2008D-A72 R2
2009/04/14
2009/04/09
ANTI-ICE VALVE SWITCH………………………………………………….………....27
114F-A MISSLE…………………………………………………………………..……….28
2007D-A34 R1
2008/10/17
IZLID…………………………………………………………………………….…………....29
2005D-48 R1
2007D-A04
2007D-A05
2007/08/21
2007/04/19
2007/03/20
USE OF THE CRV7 ROCKET ON THE AH-64D HELICOPTER…………..30
HELLFIRE MISSILE DEBRIS DEFLECTOR……………………………….………31
114K-2A, 114M FRAG, 114N THERMO…………………………………..…..31
2006D-A02
2006D-A14
2005D-A51 R1
2006/05/08
2006/03/24
2006/03/21
CMF…………………………………………………………………………………….…….32
M-4 STOWAGE……………………………………………………………………..…...33
21M-206 FLARE………………………………………………………………….……..34
2005D-A21
2005/09/08
Firing MK 40/M 151 and MK 40 / M 156 Rockets………………………34
2003D-A09 R1
2003/03/31
MK40 AND MK66 FLECHETTE ROCKETS ………………….…………………36
AMAMs and ASAMs
H64-09-AMAM-11
H64-07-ASAM-17
H64-04-ASAM-02
H64-03-ASAM-03
2009/07/16
2007/07/18
2004/03/10
2003/02/24
CPG CYCLIC STOWED DURING IBIT…………………………………............37
EGI CHECK DURING RUN-UP………………………………….………............37
GUN INSPECTION………………………………………………….…………………..38
COCKPIT CANOPY FOGGING…………………………………..………............39
2
2006D-A19 R5
2012/07/01
MODERNIZED SIGNAL PROCESSING UNIT (MSPU)
CAUTION
After AC power is applied to the MSPU for approximately 1.5 to 2 minutes, UFD or EUFD annunciation "GRBX VIB" or
"Gearbox Vibration" will be displayed for a duration of 5 seconds to indicate a successful MSPU system boot-up.
Failure of the UFD or EUFD annunciation may indicate the MSPU drive system monitoring capability is compromised
resulting in flights without vibration exceedance monitoring of the Intermediate Gearbox (IGB), Tail Rotor Gearbox
(TGB), and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) driveshaft. In the event the UFD or EUFD annunciation does not display,
corrective action must be taken prior to next flight.
NOTE
Some MSPUs with certain vibration cards installed will have a brief flash of the UFD or EUFD annunciation "GRBX VIB"
or "Gearbox Vibration" immediately after applying AC power to the MSPU. This initial flash is one second or less and is
considered normal operation; however, this does not indicate that the MSPU has successfully booted. To ensure that
the MSPU has successfully booted, wait approximately 1 to 2 minutes after applying AC power to the MSPU and
monitor the UFD or EUFD for proper annunciation.
2005D-A52 R2
2012/06/04
T700-GE-701D ENGINE USING T700-GE-701C ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEMS
CAUTION
During testing with a T700-GE-701D engine and a T700-GE-701C engine installed in the same aircraft, transient
engine torque splits as great as 25% were observed during large, rapid collective applications. However, these
torque splits were self-corrected in 2 to 3 seconds without pilot intervention. During transient torque splits, a
flashing torque indication in the HDU may be present and crews should not be complacent in addressing this
cue.
NOTE
The T700-GE-701D and T700-GE-701C engines are nearly identical in appearance. Flight crews should confirm
engine type and note the installed position by referencing the engine core’s identification plates during pre
flight.
CAUTION
Above 13,000 ft pressure altitude, closely monitor the start sequence for T700-GE-701D engines, both during
the start and after starter dropout, for signs of a hot start.
Limited flight test data on the T700-GE-701D engine has shown an increased tendency to experience hot starts
above 13,000 ft pressure altitude. Some of these hot starts occur after starter dropout, with normal TGT indications
prior to starter dropout. In these cases, NG speed actually decreases (below starter dropout speed) with a steady
increase in TGT. This AWR is based on results of U.S. Government performed flight testing (Appendix D10) and Boeing
performed flight testing (Appendix D-11). The Preliminary Airworthiness Evaluation and Safety Confirmation
Recommendation of the AH-64D Helicopter Equipped with T700-GE-701D Engine (Appendix D-10) certifies the
compatibility of the T700-GE-701D as installed on the AH-64D helicopter. This AWR allows flight with any combination
of installation of T700-GE-701D and T700-GE-701C engines.
3
2007D-A39 R8
2012/05/02
OPERATION OF THE AH-64D HELICOPTER w/ ASPI GEN II >see the actual AWR for Performance Charts
NOTE
Mission data (i.e., frequencies, waypoints/flight plans, etc.) loaded from the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS)
should be verified before use, onboard the aircraft and as needed during flight.
NOTE
When operating the aircraft with extreme longitudinal and lateral centers of gravity, or with asymmetric store loading
such as those experienced after selective stores jettison, the electronic yaw trim indicator may lag actual trim and
should not be used as the primary indication of coordinated flight.
NOTE
Performance planning for all ASPI equipped aircraft shall be in accordance with the performance planning charts in
Appendix E for ASPI configured aircraft. Appendix E represents the performance of aircraft with the ASPI exhaust system
(either Gen. 1 or Gen. 2) and the modifications listed in paragraph III.b(5) of that appendix. Appendix F represents the
performance of aircraft with the legacy exhaust system and the modifications listed in paragraph III. b( 5) of that
appendix. These charts will be added to the Operator's Manuals, references D.l through D.3, and shall be used in lieu of
those charts presently contained in these reference Manuals when the aircraft has been modified from the original
Manufacturers’ configuration. The performance charts contained in Appendix D .1- D.3 represents the performance of
aircraft in the original manufacturer's configuration for AH -64 D aircraft.
NOTE
For all configurations not covered in Appendix E and F, the hover torque required charts in Appendix F shall be used for
calculating hover torque required.
NOTE
Use of the Perf Page and Computer based PPC program is not authorized for ASPI equipped aircraft. All performance
data for ASPI equipped aircraft will be calculated using the charts found in App E of this A WR.
CAUTION
The aircraft software performance (PERF) page contains errors and shall not be used for determination of flight
performance capabilities and operating limits of aircraft configuration with respect to weight and balance. Pilots shall
relay upon DD Form 365-4 and applicable AWR’s to determine proper aircraft loading and limits. Prior to flight, pilots
must complete performance planning based upon this loading and limits data using the AH-64D Operator’s manual (D.1)
or Performance Planning Card (PPC) software listed in the approved software memo (D.6, D.7) to determine flight
performance capabilities and limits.
CAUTION
AH-64D Longbow aircraft equipped with T700-GE-701C\T700-GE-701D/CC engines do not correctly indicate TGT limits
for 30 minute and 10 minute limit dual engine operations or 2 ½ minute single engine operation. This can result in
engines being operated at TGTs within the 10 minute limit for as long as 30 minutes, without providing indication to the
pilots of over-temperature limit exceedances and without triggering consequent maintenance actions to inspect for
premature degradation of life-limited engine components. Use the TGT values listed below. The aircraft displayed limits
and AH-64D operators manuals will be changed to reflect the below values.
4
TGT Limits
The following warning will be added to the 1-1520-251-10-1 Operator’s Manual BLOCK I:
WARNING
In the event of a GUN EL MISTRACK fault, the gun will be stowed in elevation. Gun azimuth may not provide proper
Wire Strike Protection due to wire cutter angle.
In the event that a GUN EL MISTRACK fault is encountered, the WP will sever power to the gun. This will freeze the gun
turret in its current azimuth and stow in elevation. An EUFD advisory, “GUN EMERG EL STOW” will display to alert the
aircrew that the gun has been disabled.
All software authorized is defined in the software memorandums (Appendix D.5 and Appendix D.6).
The following applies to the Block II remanufactured aircraft serial numbers 0905667 and subsequent and new
production Block II aircraft serial numbers 0907053 and subsequent equipped with the RT-1912(C)/APX-123
transponder. The use of Mode 5 is NOT ALLOWED when the APX -123 is configured with the Version 6.71 software being
introduced under this Airworthiness Release. In this configuration, the following NOTE applies:
5
NOTE
Upon power up, the UFD advisory will indicate NO M5 KEYS and give an IFF M5 CAUTION. This advisory can be removed
by disabling Mode 5 and Mode 5 Squitter in the IFF page. Upon disabling Mode 5 and Mode 5 Squitter the IFF
M5 CAUTION will be disseminated and the Mode 5 information will also be disabled including the National Origin,
Mission Code and PIN. This action has to be repeated every power up as the aircraft is set by requirements to Enable
Mode 5 upon power up.
In the event of a conflict between this A WR, applicable manuals, and other A WRs, the information in this A WR shall
prevail. This A WR does not take precedence over SOF or ASAM messages.
2009D-A19
2012/03/27
CPG Map Case Strap Install and Use of Panasonic CF-19 Toughbook
The laptop will be stored and secured in the CPG map case during flight, except as noted by this AWR.
WARNING
The lithium batteries are capable of ignition and subsequent explosion due to overheating resulting in thermal runaway,
and the resulting fire can flare repeatedly as each battery cell in turn ruptures. The laptop may overheat and fail at high
temperature, and instances of fires in laptop lithium batteries are known. Do not attempt to pick up and move a
smoking or burning device, or bodily injury may result. Do not cover the device or use ice to insulate or cool the device,
as doing so increases the likelihood that additional battery cells will also reach thermal runaway. If thermal anomalies or
fumes are detected, disconnecting/removing power from the laptop may help to resolve the problem, but do not
remove the batteries in these circumstances.
CAUTION
Use of the electronic logbook shall only be allowed during aircraft weight on wheels. The laptop shall be permanently
stowed horizontally in the copilot's map case and secured during flight by buckling the strap. Failure to buckle the strap
could result in injury during a crash. Failure to install the laptop horizontally in the map case could impair full travel of
the seat and result in injury during a crash.
CAUTION
The laptop shall remain battery operated while on the aircraft.
NOTE
Wireless 802.11 and Bluetooth functionality on the laptop shall be prohibited from use.
The laptop must remain securely strapped into the map case during flight. Use of the laptop as an electronic
logbook is only permitted during aircraft weight on wheels. Use of the laptop in flight for data collection is only
permitted during MTFs lAW the MSPU A WR (Appendix 0.7).
The laptop is authorized to remain secured in the map case during flight only after the copilot's map case strap
installation per the instructions in Appendix D.4.
6
2009D-A67 R4
2011/10/04
ASYMMETRICAL WING STORES
This AWR supersedes AWR 2009D-A67 R3 dated 31 May 2011 and AWR 2002D-A13 dated 3 June 2002. AWR
2002D-A13 permitted rocket firings from the inboard position on either inside store station during combat
only. The information from that AWR has been added to this AWR. This AWR is valid whenever asymmetrical
wing store configurations, as defined in Appendix E (below), are used on AH-64D helicopters.
CAUTION
For the two outboard M261 rocket launchers and single inboard Hellfire launcher per Appendix E Configuration 2, the
lateral center of gravity can be exceeded by asymmetric rocket loads. To ensure lateral limits are not exceeded, rockets
shall be loaded and expended symmetrically to the greatest extent possible.
CAUTION
For the outboard and inboard M261 rocket launchers on one wing and one outboard M261 rocket launcher on the
opposite wing (Appendix E configuration 5) the lateral center of gravity can be exceeded by asymmetric loads. To insure
lateral limits are not exceeded, rockets shall be loaded and expended symmetrically to the greatest extent possible.
CAUTION
Rocket firing restrictions have been made to limit the chance that engine compressors will surge due to ingestion of
excessive rocket motor exhaust gas. These surges result in loss of power in one or both engines and cumulative engine
damage.
Firing of rockets from the inside stores locations, in any configuration permitted in this release (Appendix E
Configuration 4 or 5) or the Operators Manual, is only permitted in combat.
The use of the inner pylon rocket launcher shall be restricted to only firing at airspeeds above 60 knots, and firing of up
to a single pair every three seconds. Ripple fire is not permitted in this configuration.
When configured with outboard and inboard pylon mounted M261 rocket launchers on the same wing and one
outboard Hellfire launcher on the opposite wing (Configuration 4 of Appendix E) the takeoff gross weight shall be limited
to 18,000 lbs and total rocket stores shall be limited to 700 lbs.
CAUTION
The maximum gross weights for authorized configurations are conditional to normal stores expenditures. Weapon
stores malfunctions will result in excursion outside the lateral CG envelope and degraded handling qualities. Caution
should be used when performing aggressive maneuvers in a Lateral CG condition. Correction of the degraded handling
qualities can be rectified by jettisoning of the external wing stores.
CAUTION
Slope landing data is not available for this asymmetric configuration. Attempts to land on terrain which produces a roll
attitude greater than 5* should be avoided.
CAUTION
Ground stability data is not available for this asymmetric configuration. Potential for aircraft roll over during ground taxi
or ground maneuvering is unknown and may be critical during adverse wind conditions. Precaution should be taken in
forecast winds or wind gusts over 25 knots.
7
NOTE
The determination of a safe lateral center of gravity condition has been made for using these asymmetric
configurations only. Permission for any other desired asymmetric configurations must be requested
separately.
NOTE
For performance planning with asymmetric store configurations, use the (Delta)F and MULTIPLYING FACTOR
from the applicable configuration in Appendix E and apply to cruise torque in accordance with Chapter 7 of
Reference D.1, D.2, or D.3.
8
9
2008D-A54 R1
2011-09-26
ARC 231 SATCOM / UHF RADIO SET ON AH-64D
The following ARC-231 SATCOM system cautions apply:
CAUTION
In the AH-64D aircraft, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing has indicated that transmitting on the ARC-231
SATCOM radio may cause interference on some AN/ ARC- 164 radio frequencies; transmitting on the AN/ARC-201D #2
may cause interference on some AN/ ARC-231 SATCOM radio frequencies. The full extent of interference and
frequencies affected has not been determined due to the limited AN/ ARC-231 SATCOM frequencies/channels tested. If
such interference occurs and does not allow satisfactory communications on the receiving (victim) radio, the aircrew is
advised to request an alternate frequency or channel for one ofthe radio nets or, otherwise, avoid concurrent
transmissions on the offending radio while receiving on the victim radio. Affected radios and frequencies should be
noted and reported to the POC provided in the AWR.
CAUTION
Testing with the ARC-231 installed and operational has determined several frequencies where excessive Radio
Frequency (RF) interference is generated during transmission with the ARC-231. This interference occurred at
frequencies at which navigational and communication equipment operate. In conditions where critical communications
and navigation are required, transmission on the ARC-231 should be minimized.
Operation with the ARC-231 radio is authorized with the following hardware and software versions.
a. ANI ARC-231 Mod 7 radio set
b. AN/ARC-231 Mod 10 with version 9 CI
2010D-A28 R1
2011/09/15
Block II, Aircraft Software Version 13 Performance (PERF) Page for NON-ASPI equipped aircraft utilizing
T700-GE-70 1 C and T700-GE-701D/CC engines.
The aircraft performance data has been updated for Go-to-War configured aircraft. The results of the update have been
published in reference D.2, but are not reflected in the existing on-board PERF Page. Because of this, commanders and
crew may only use the PERF Page as called out in this memorandum if performance planning would otherwise be done
utilizing the charts and data in the operator's manual, reference D.1. Appendix A indicates which calculations can be
used, which can be used with limitation or restrictions, which cannot be used, and numerous advisories provide
explanations why.
WARNING
Aircraft basic weight and basic moment must be verified from DD Form 365-4 reference 1 and if needed a correction
made on the Weight (WT) page. G WT on CUR page must be verified as correct within ± 100 pounds on DD Form 365-4
Reference 12, Takeoff GWT ± any fuel difference when comparing DD Form 365-4 to the Performance Page. The pilot in
command shall verify the correctness of GWT on CUR page to account for fuel burned and expendables throughout the
mission. Incorrect GWT values invalidate PERF Page values.
WARNING
The values displayed by the PERF page reflect pre-wartime configurations which exclude kits such as such as the
Common Missile Warning System, ARC231, IR Laser, AVR-2B, etc., resulting in increased torque required with diminished
torque margins for performing maneuvers. Attempting to perform maneuvers without adequate torque margins will
result in loss of airspeed or altitude, or both.
10
NOTE
Max Q available dual engine represents Maximum Torque Available 10 Min-limit chart for T700-GE-70 1 C and T700-GE70 1 D/CC engine configurations lAW TM 1-1520-251-10. Max Q available single engine represents Single Engine
Maximum Torque Available 2.5 Min-limit chart for T700-GE-701C and T700-GE-701D/CC engine configurations lAW
TM 1-1520-251-10.
a. Restricted Performance Page elements:
CAUTION
CRUISE Status Window values are prohibited from use due to inaccuracies in PERF pg calculations. Drag effects are not
taken into account for aircraft configured with CMWS, ARC231, IR Laser, A VR-2B, etc., or other go to war kits.
b. Validated / Verified Performance Page elements:
CAUTION
CUR PERF Hover Q Status Window Go-No/Go Q IGE is not calculated lAW ATM TC 1-251, page 4-21 items, 13 and 14.
HOVER Q GONO/GO IGE is calculated based on MAX GWT OGE at current environmental conditions.
CAUTION
Recent flight test data indicate current fielded configurations operating under A WR instructions may require up to 5%
increase in HOVER Q required IGE and OGE.
CAUTION
In the event of a single engine configuration MAX Q SE and TM 1-1520-251-10 T700-GE-701C Max Torque Available
Chart - 2.5 Minute Limit accounts for Yz of total bleed losses associated with IPAS. MAX Q SE can be optimistic by as
much as 3% Q available, affecting Max Q SE, VSSE, and Max GWT to hover SE.
CAUTION
Max Torque available DE and SE can be relied upon if ETF is 1.0. Max Torque available DE and SE can be relied upon if
ETF is less than 1.0 if the ambient temperature falls between -5°C and +35°C. ETF on the engine page must be verified
against aircraft health indicator test (HIT) log. MAX Q DE and SE displayed on PERF Page is optimistic up to 4% if
FAT falls outside of allowable ambient temperature range and ETF < 1.0. MAX Q DE and SE, HOVER Q GO-NO/GO IGE and
OGEQ, MAX GWT and VSSE are affected.
CAUTION
PERF Page interpolates between charts to obtain a valid VSSE calculation. In regions where there is no upper bound
value VSSE will return a '?' where VSSE capability may exist. These regions correspond to upper VSSE limits. For example,
if a given GWT, PA, FAT solution returns a valid VSSE at 4,000 FT and no solution exists at 6,000 FT, the performance
pages will display'?' at 4,001 FT. Crewmembers should be aware of minimum single engine speeds for mission profile,
based on cruise charts.
NOTE
Hover Q Status Window REQUIRED IGE and OGE are lAW TM 1-1520-251-10 provided the aircraft basic weight and
moment are verified per DD Form 365-4 reference 1 and GWT is within ±1 00 of aircraft GWT throughout the flight.
NOTE
PERF Page VNE calculation is IA W TM 1-1520-251-10.
11
NOTE
PERF Page VSSE calculation is lAW TM 1-1520-251-10 provided aircraft GWT range is 13,000 to 23,000 pounds and VSSE
solution is bound by a known upper limit (see above caution).
PERF Page display limitations:
NOTE
Max G WT to Hover is calculated using the lesser of Max Q and the transmission limit, 100% for dual engine operation
and 110% for single engine operation.
NOTE
The PERF page will compute and display a maximum GWT of 23,000 pounds if environmental conditions permit,
exclusive of tactical or ferry mission configuration. Go-No/Go is calculated on the maximum GWT displayed.
Actual GWT must be lAW TM 1-1520-251-10, chapter 5 limitations.
NOTE
The PERF Page Torque display is limited to 140%.
NOTE
The PERF Page Pilot and CPG weight is limited to 300 pounds each entry.
NOTE
The CUR PERF page dynamically calculates anti-ice penalty when anti-ice inlet is activated. The MAX or PLAN
performance pages contain an ANTI ICE switch, independent of CUR PERF page setting to account for anti ice penalty in
the MAX or PLAN performance page calculations.
NOTE
The PERF Page does not account for applicable drag for any modified configuration requiring A WR instruction for the
completion of performance planning. Drag must be calculated lAW TM 1-1520-251-10 and A WR instructions for
modified configurations. No ability exists to adjust drag on performance pages and the lack of drag additions invalidates
Cruise status window values and T AS Range.
NOTE
T AS VNE is calculated on dual engine operation unless there is a greater than 12% torque split between engine 1 and
engine 2. TAS VNE then becomes calculated as TAS VNE SE which is the greater of 67% ofVNE or maximum rate-of-climb
airspeed in accordance with TM 1-1520-251-10, Chapter 5, airspeed limits with one engine inoperative.
NOTE
Jettison weight is calculated as the aircraft gross weight minus wing stores, external fuel tank weight and weight of any
external fuel in pounds.
NOTE
Jettison Weight VSSE displays the VSSE calculated using the Jettison weight.
NOTE
VSSE is limited by single engine contingency limit, 122%
NOTE
The PERF Page displays TAS RNG airspeed values that may be beyond aircraft limits. Reference cruise charts for
applicable airspeeds.
12
2010D-A25
2010/08/16
Fielding of version 13 aircraft software on all Block II, Extended Block II, and War Replacement AH-64D
helicopters.
CAUTION
Manual selection of a single SP on the processor select panel may result in continuous single DP operation. Reselection
of the AUTO position or selection of the other SP should restore the system to normal DP operation.
NOTE
During the degraded SP operational mode, data is not being written to the Maintenance Data Recorder (MDR).
2. The Warnings, Cautions and Notes (WCNs) for digital, satellite and chart maps are as follows:
CAUTION
The "DIG" map selection of the Digital Map shall not be used for navigation. The available data is inadequate toproduce
a zoomed resolution suitable for navigation of terrain.
3. The WCNs for communications and navigation are as follows:
NOTE
EMERGENCY PANEL ZEROIZE function does not zeroize SOl or UTO data. If SOl or UTO data will be compromised a
MASTER ZEROIZE should be initiated.
4. The WCNs due to environmental and electromagnetic environmental effects or incomplete testing are as follows:
WARNING
Testing has determined that during exposure to certain electromagnetic environments the aircraft will exhibit the
following behavior due to erroneous activation of the squat switch: Altitude Hold will be disengaged; no station
keeping commands will be generated; Heading Hold will be lost; the Directional Controls become "sluggish"; and the
weapons will go to ground stow thereby limiting the usefulness of the weapons and requiring that the crew activate the
ground override to utilize the weapons in a limited method in scenarios where weapons firing is not prohibited. Upon
exiting the electromagnetic environment, the crew will have to reinitialize and activate the weapons and the flight
control augmentation system.
NOTE
In an electromagnetic (HIRTA) environment, false fault codes for the AEPMS may be displayed on the applicable
maintenance pages.
NOTE
The ECS limited testing accomplished indicates the ECS may fail to operate entirely, trigger fail messages, or fail to
maintain the set temperature when encountering an electromagnetic environment.
5. The WCNs associated with software anomalies are as follows:
13
WARNING
A generator power interrupt will result in single DP operation for approximately 21 seconds. If the power interrupt is
from the #2 generator, various combinations of BUCS FAIL messages and FMC axis disengagement may also occur. If,
during NVS flight, a power interrupt occurs, the CPG HDU video will change to the PLT FORMAT (PLT video), which will
not correlate to the CPG head position. If the CPG is on the controls, the combination of loss of CPG FUR video and
degradation of aircraft stability could be hazardous to the aircrew. If a power interrupt occurs during NVS flight, the PLT
shall immediately assume control of the aircraft.
NOTE
The pilot and CPG C-Scope targets are placed incorrectly with respect to the other virtual symbols and underlying video
on the MPD Video page. This can cause the pilot to point the aircraft in the wrong direction during target engagement.
These symbols are placed correctly on the HMD and ORT/TEDAC displays and these displays should be used for C-Scope
target engagement.
6. The WCNs associated with APX-118 are as follows:
CAUTION
MODE 4 CAUTION indications may be generated every 2-3 minutes when the Mode 4 selection on the transponder page
is set to OFF. Care should be taken to avoid complacency when canceling the caution audio tone.
NOTE
Mode S was not fully tested. The correct functionality and accuracy of data has not been verified.
NOTE
Ground initiate transponder IBIT may result in a "TRANSPONDER MODE S FAULT" message.
NOTE
Deactivation of the XPNDR button on the emergency panel will reset the transponder mode 31 A from 7700 to the
previously selected transponder code contrary to the operators manual.
7. The WCNs associated with the -304 IDM and BFT operation for the Lot 9 configuration and subsequent are listed
below:
WARNING
Significant latency, unrelated to voice traffic, may be experienced during transmission of digital messages over both the
Tactical Internet and Fire Support protocols. Present position/SA icons shall not be used for combat identification of
friendly forces. Digital messages should not be used to issue time sensitive commands.
WARNING
The BFT system shall not be used as an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system or as a backup to the IFF system. The BFT
system is not an approved Combat Identification system.
NOTE
The BFT transceiver may occasionally lose satellite lock without automatically regaining it. If the transceiver does not
regain lock for several minutes, power cycle the BFT transceiver.
8. WCNs associated with the MTADS/PNVS are as follows:
14
WARNING
The M-TADS/PNVS has exhibited susceptibility to certain electromagnetic fields that cause the turret to slew to the hard
stops. Strict adherence to the published HIRTA messages should prevent occurrences due to known sites. However,
unknown and mobile emitters are not accounted for in the published HIRTA messages. If these conditions are
encountered follow the procedures for MTDS/PNVS failure under Mission Equipment as described in Chapter Nine of
the Operator's Manual.
WARNING
The CPG workload associated with the multi-target tracker (MTT) significantly reduces the overall crew capacity to
manage collision avoidance. Pilots should be well trained in using MTT to mitigate this risk.
9. The other WCNs are as follows:
WARNING
Threat inter-visibility is based on threat ring size and may show incorrect inter-visibility depending on selected map
scale. Do not rely on displayed threat inter-visibility to prevent detection by threats.
WARNING
During cooperative Rocket engagement the aircraft will accept manual range. Once the selected sight is switched back
to HMD and the GUN is actioned, the previously selected manual range will be displayed. The crewmember must then
reenter the desired manual range.
CAUTION
The MFD/MPD performance planning pages shall be disregarded and performance data obtained from Appendix D.1.
CAUTION
The Electronic Trim ball may not indicate accurate yaw trim during climbing and descending.
CAUTION
The SP's continuous built in test (BIT) may continue after the ALQ-13 6 is powered off resulting in a reported BIT failure
of the ALQ-136 by the primary SP #1 and a subsequent erroneous detected failure of the primary SP #1. When
powering off the RF jammer during a mission, a system processor (SP) failure (SP# SRU 3 FAIL) may be reported on the
fault page of the primary SP #1, and an automatic SP switchover may occur immediately. Possible pilot techniques to
avoid the ALQ-136 & primary SP failures are to either (1) continuously leave the RF jammer in powered operation, (2)
switch the RF jammer to standby mode, or (3) leave it powered off throughout the mission if the ALQ-136 is not
required. These techniques will prevent an automatic primary SP #1 switchover to the backup SP #2 as a result of
powering down the ALQ-136 in-flight. If an automatic SP #1 switchover to the backup SP #2 should occur, the RF jammer
should be switched to either the operate or standby modes in order to clear the BIT fault, SP #1 should be manually
selected, and the SP automatic mode should be reselected.
NOTE
After transition to flight with dual external auxiliary fuel tanks, verify the fuel quantity entered into the system data.
External fuel quantities may zeroize following take off and must be re-entered.
NOTE
Following the EG I alignment verifications required in Appendix D.l, operator's manual, the automated EGI switchover
function is still operable. However, the Velocity Error comparison of both EGIs is no longer taken into consideration by
the Navigation System in determining an EGI switchover.
15
NOTE
A noticeable jitter of the rocket CCIP reticule, approximately 2 to 3 pixels vertically exists and increases with aircraft
vibration and speed.
NOTE
The operator may have to reselect the desired TSD MAP settings upon completion of a ground initiated DP IBIT. A
ground initiated DP IBIT may not restore the TSD to the previously displayed TSD MAP selection.
NOTE
The operator may have to cycle the IDM to STBY and OPER if the AMPS AWE IDM SWB 1 or 2 setting loaded on the DTC
is different than the current IDM SWB setting when a MASTER load is initiated. Command fail indications may be
displayed at the various IDM page settings if the new IDM SWB mode is different than the last stored IDM SWB mode.
NOTE
The aircraft AUTO-SA present position message transmission may be delayed and therefore present an incorrect aircraft
location. Increased message latencies may occur over the Tactical Internet during high situational awareness (SA)
loading with high bandwidth BFT connectivity (2X beam speed).
NOTE
Roll attitudes beyond 90 degrees will result in incorrect turn rate indications upon aircraft recovery to wings level
attitude. The system may take up to 20 seconds before proper turn rate indications are restored.
NOTE
If GROUND STOW is selected (via MPD) and aircraft is powered down in this mode, the status is saved in Nonvolatile
Random Access Memory (NOVRAM). Upon next aircraft power on, GROUND STOW will be restored and will not be
released until crew de-selects GROUND STOW from the MPD.
NOTE
If the RF handover target reference altitude is invalid and the target is selected for AF or ARTY message population, the
altitude data can either be rejected as being out of range or may provide an incorrect altitude reference which could
result in pre-pointing to the wrong point on the ground.
NOTE
When entering or exiting RIPL mode, the WP commands SAL missiles to be "Powered" instead of ACQ/PLCH" causing the
missiles to not search for laser energy. Deselecting and then reselecting the missiles will allow the missile to function
properly.
NOTE
The Engine 1 and Engine 2 torque color representation as displayed only on the PERF HIT PAGE do not change from
green regardless the actual Torque values. The numeric displays of Torque on this page are correct
Additional WCNs unique to Version 13 are as follows:
a. Appendix A
WCNs for CMWS contained within AWRs 2007D-A61-RS and 2006DASO-RS (reference D.S and D.6, respectively) applies
to the federated (non-AGP) configuration.
The following CAUTION also applies:
16
CAUTION
CMWS will not detect sequencer or dispenser failures. The only way for the pilot to verify sequencer and dispenser
functionality is to temporarily select "BYPASS" and return to the "Auto" mode with the federated CMWS control head.
The updated inventory provides the updated sequencer and dispenser status and indicates flares available as
countermeasures.
b. WCNs associated with weapons:
NOTE
Changing rocket types on the LOAD page while in the weapons system training mode may result in the incorrect display
of rocket types on the rocket page and inability to select different rocket zones. All discrepancies can be cleared by
reselecting the rocket types using the tactical LOAD page.
c. WCNs associated with the Enhanced Data Transfer Unit (EDTU):
NOTE
Use of commercial cards may result in degraded EDTU operation or EDTU failure (disconnected from the fibre channel),
which will prevent use until aircraft power is cycled. Commercially available PCMCIA card read/write speeds vary
and may impact EDTU functionality.
d. WCNs associated with the Improved Data Modem (IDM):
NOTE
Performing a MASTER or THRU FLIGHT load from the DTC may result in incorrect data on the IDM page with numerous
associated faults. The pilot may have to reload or manually re-enter data on the IDM page after completing a MASTER or
THRU FLIGHT load.
NOTE
A DTC load will not correctly change the IDM page SWB mode button from SWB2 to SWB 1. The pilot must set the IDM
SWB mode manually.
NOTE
The DTU/ A VIONICS UPDATE page UTO selection may be barriered under certain circumstances. If the barrier is present
change the own-ship URN to all zeros. The barrier will then be removed and a UTO upload can be completed.
Then reload the correct own-ship URN to restore normal IDM functionality.
e. WCNs associated with the COMM Page COMSET tuning:
NOTE
Do not use COMSETs that contain an HF entry when the ARC231 is installed. Performing a COMSET tune with a COMSET
that contains an HF frequency when the ARC231 is installed will result in a continuous OIP TUNE button that cannot be
cleared. This condition renders any further COMSET tuning inoperative for the remainder of the flight.
f. WCNs associated with RF Handover (RFHO) Target Range Display:
WARNING
When an aircraft without an FCR (or FCR turned off) receives and uses an IDM RFHO the correct range and range source
to the RFHO target are not displayed in the range and range source of the high action display (HAD). The previously
17
established range and range source are displayed in the HAD. To update the HAD range and range source with RFHO
range and range source information: After the CPO receives the RFHO, sight select TADS, CAQ the newly received
target on the TSD page and slave the TADS to the target. Sight select FCR and proceed with the missile handover. After
the pilot receives the RFHO, sight select HMD, CAQ the newly received target on the TSD page. Sight select FCR
and proceed with the missile handover.
g. WCNs associated with ARC-201D operations:
NOTE
Do not use the ARC-20ID with radio software version 7.3 (displayed on the aircraft versions page as HIB34 SOD04) in the
aircraft. Anomalies can occur when using the radio, including voice and digital muting when attempting to transmit.
h. WCNs associated with Display Processor (DP) operations:
NOTE
If a display discrepancy is observed between the CPG and pilot TSD where symbology does not match between cockpits
a DP fibre channel chip failure may be present. A DP IBIT will not detect this failure and a DP replacement is required to
restore correct matching TSD symbology between cockpits.
NOTE
The ground initiated DP IBIT will intermittently return a false SQUAT SWITCH INPUT FAIL message upon the conclusion of
the DP IBIT. A valid squat switch input failure has occurred if the SQUAT SWITCH INPUT FAIL message is displayed on the
FAULT page.
1. WCNs associated with System Processor (SP) switchover operations:
NOTE
An SP switchover will result in an ASE BACKUP fault logging on the W/C/A page. This fault indication is a software
anomaly associated with SP switchovers and does not indicate an AGP failure.
J. WCNs associated with Environmental Control System (ECS) operation:
NOTE
The ECS page pilot HEAT MODULATION indicates zero and does not change with changes in the modulation valve
position.
k. WCNs associated with Anti-Ice controls:
WARNING
The pilot must de-select SENSOR anti-ice prior to de-selecting sensor ground (GND) override. De-selection of the anti-ice
page sensor ground override button (GND) will not result in de-selection of SENSOR anti-ice, which may present a shock
hazard to ground personnel.
2. The aircraft software configuration shall be as defined in the software memorandum referenced in Appendix DA and
the following table.
Item Cockpit ID #
SP SA V 13 006000
WP WAV13 007000
DP DAV13 013000
18
2009D-A74 R7
2011/08/11
Authorizing flight for AH-64D Helicopters with the Installation of the Second Generation ASPI Kit
WARNING
The ASPI kit significantly increases torque required at high speeds, especially at high gross weights and high density
altitudes. This increase in torque required will result in diminished torque margins for performing maneuvers, including
turns. Attempting to perform maneuvers without adequate torque margins will result in loss of airspeed, altitude, or
both.
WARNING
The ASPI kit has not been tested for dive recovery data. There may be a loss in capability to perform dive recovery.
WARNING
Autorotation correction testing for One Engine Inoperable (OEI) has not been performed. Autorotation checks in this
mode may result in loss of capability.
CAUTION
Rotor-locked engine starts shall not be performed with a rotor blade directly over the exhaust of the engine being
started. Extreme temperatures from the upturned exhaust will damage the underside of the rotor blade. Dual engine
rotor lock starts shall not be performed.
CAUTION
During preflight inspections, when entering and exiting the aft equipment bay area (turtleback area), crew shall not use
the exhaust shroud as a handhold. Damage will occur to the cantilevered shroud assembly.
CAUTION
During preflight and post flight inspection, crew should ensure that the drain holes in the bottom of the scoops are clear
of dirt and debris. Collected water and dirt in the shroud or scoops will reduce component life.
NOTE
The maximum bank angle at which level flight (constant airspeed and altitude) can be maintained has not been defined.
19
2008D-A08 R11
2011/08/10
Helicopters with the Video from UAS for Interoperability Teaming Level II (VUIT-2) System Installed.
WARNING
The OSRVT provided grid as displayed on the VUIT-2 video can be in error up to 6 km. Do not use the VUIT video and
OSRVT provided grid for weapons employment such as call for fire.
CAUTION
The VUIT-2 equipment located in the EFAB is heat sensitive and has been shown to fail when operated without
conditioned cooling air when operating in a hot ambient environment. The VUIT-2 system should not be powered until
the ECS has cooled the EFAB to its normal operational temperature (maximum return air temperature of 105*F).
CAUTION
The MDR-80V Video Recorder operational environment is ambient temperature of +25*C +/- 10*C, and altitude less
than or equal to 7000 FT MSL. If the flight profile requires operations outside of the above standard temperature and
altitude ranges, then the MDR-80V shall be monitored for anomalous operation.
2004D-A44 R1
2011/03/23
NVGs in Both Crew Stations (AN/AVS-6)
This AWR authorizes the use of NVGs (ANVIS-6) in both crew stations in US. Army AH-64D helicopters. This release does
not render invalid any other AWRs currently covering the AH-64D helicopters indicated above.
When using the ITT NVGs during exposure to certain electromagnetic emitters, the low battery voltage light may be
observed as constantly lit. The battery connector to the goggles may also get warm to the touch. The goggle operating
time on battery power or normal goggle operation should not be affected. This light should extinguish after non
exposure of six hours. For true low battery voltage, this light should blink.
Video Underlay reflection in the CPG overhead canopy may negatively impact NVG performance in the pilot station.
WARNING
TYPE 1, 2, and 3 ANI A VS-6(V) 1 are no longer authorized for flight crew use. The only NVDs authorized for use by Army
aircrew members operating Army Aircraft are Type 4 (MX-I0160A tube) and above NVDs specifically belonging to the
designated ANVIS AN/AVS-6(V) 1, AN/AVS-6(V)lA, and AN/AVS-6(V) 3 version.
This memorandum does not certify safe use of any NVG not controlled by Product Manager Sensors and Lasers.
NOTE
This A WR does not render invalid any other A WRs currently covering the aircraft indicated above. Any interference
(physical or operational) between this installation and other installations shall be reported, prior to flight, to the POC in
paragraph 4.
NOTE
Any change in ANVIS configuration is not authorized and will void this AWR
20
2008D-A05 R2
2011/01/27
Aqualung Portable Helicopter Oxygen Delivery System (PHODS) on AH-64D Helicopters
Special Inspections and Instructions:
A visual inspection of each PHODS installation shall made prior to flight operations to ensure that no operational or
physical deterioration is occurring. Any occurrence of the preceding shall be corrected prior to further flight operations.
An operational check shall be performed immediately prior to use at high altitudes.
The following operating restrictions should be noted:
WARNING
When operating PHODS around high power emitters PHODS may stop providing oxygen, or may start pumping oxygen
when not expected or required. If unit is not operational, power cycling shall be required. An operational check shall be
performed immediately prior to use at high altitudes.
WARNING
PHODS oxygen cylinder may burst from impact of small arms fire, resulting in blast overpressure and/or flash fire.
Temporary loss of hearing and internal injury may be experienced from the blast overpressure.
CAUTION
PHODS Regulator Warning indicator light is difficult to see under night Vision Goggles (NVGs) unless looking directly at
warning indicator. Users are required to periodically check warning light during NVG operations to ensure proper
PHODS operation.
CAUTION
Daytime ambient conditions may make detection of the warning light difficult. Users are required to periodically check
the status to ensure proper PHODS operation.
CAUTION
Operation at temperatures below -2SoF has not been verified and performance may be degraded resulting in altitude
sickness or hypoxia at these temperatures.
CAUTION
During high or moderate levels of exertion it is human nature to breathe through the mouth. Usage of a nasal cannula
during these times could potentially lead to oxygen deprivation. Complete PHODS training to learn the correct breathing
techniques and become more familiar with the proper use of the system.
CAUTION
The Portable Helicopter Oxygen Delivery System (PHODS) has not been tested for full environmental qualification (Rain,
Sand/Dust, Salt Fog, etc.). Proper operation of the PHODS system in the AH-64D when exposed to these environments
cannot be verified. If exposed to these environments the PHODS shall be inspected for degradation and functionally
tested prior to use.
21
CAUTION
There is a potential for the oxygen tubes to bend or kink resulting in degradation in oxygen flow. Check tubes
periodically for bending.
NOTE
The pigtail hose poses a potential snag hazard during egress.
2006D-A28 R9
2010/12/22
TO EXTEND THE CENTER OF GRAVITY (CG) ENVELOPE AFT 1.75 INCHES FOR ALL AH-64D’S
The intent of this AWR is to provide an extended center of gravity envelope for the Apache Longbow helicopter with
Blue Force Tracker, ARC 220 Radio, CMWS, Block II survivability Modification Kit, and Robertson Aviation IAFS (Internal
Auxiliary Fuel System) installed.
Commanders should ensure that aircrews and maintainers are briefed on taking appropriate measures to ensure that
the CG is maintained within the 1.75-inches aft as shown for all flight regimes currently approved by the Operator’s
Manual (Appendix D-1). Emphasis should be placed on minimizing the time spent in the extended aft CG condition and
on using fuel management when possible as the means to do that. At no time should the aircraft be flown beyond the
1.75-inch aft CG extension.
The CG envelope for this AWR will consist of a new chart with the maximum aft CG of 208.2 inches for gross weights
of less than 15,620 lbs. This new aft CG line will parallel the existing AH-64D aft CG line up to a gross weight of 20,900
lbs, where the aft CG will be 205.2 inches. The aft CG line for gross weights in excess of 20, 900 lbs. will be the same
as the existing AH-64D aft CG limit.
2010D-A31
2010/11/23
ELT - (EBC 406HM) INSTALLATION
The EBC-406HM is authorized for operation under an FAA certification. Operate the ELT lAW the ELT operation and
maintenance manual, reference D.6.
NOTE
The SSU fairing does not provide sufficient structural rigidity to ensure that the ELT will activate in the event of a crash.
Crewmembers must manually ensure ELT activation in the event of a crash.
NOTE
Due to possible interference between metallic airframe and the ELT antenna, it is recommended that the ELT be
removed from the airframe after activation to ensure signal reception by rescue crews.
NOTE
Electromagnetic testing has not been conducted on the EBC-406HM ELT. Inadvertent activation of the ELT may lead to
communication, navigation, flight control or other aircraft system interference.
22
2010D-A30
2010/08/30
FLEET WIDE INSTALLATION OF COMMON MISSLE WARNING SYSTEM/5TH SENSOR ON AH-64D
(All CMWS AWR’s were incorporated into this section. Review of all AWR’s in their entirety is encouraged.)
All crews shall receive the US Army Aviation Warfighting Center (USAAWC) approved CMWS AH-64D training prior to
operating 5S CMWS/ICMD B-kit equipped AH-64D helicopters.
All crews shall review the memorandum (appendix D.8) containing the classified CMWS restrictions and operating
information prior to operating 5S CMWS/ICMD B-kit equipped AHA-64D helicopters.
For performance planning, increase frontal area (ΔF) by 2.4 sq ft. and increase the multiplying factor by 0.24.
WARNING
The following should be taken into account when deciding whether to arm the CMWS in-flight:
Flares can cause ground fires when launched from altitudes of 400 feet above ground level and below. The proximity of
the aircraft to personnel, vehicles, fuel depots, etc. should be considered.
Flares launched from low altitude (50-100 feet above ground level) may bounce off the ground, potentially striking the
aircraft. During low speed, low altitude flight over hard surfaces, launched flares may cause burning flare fragments or
other debris to strike the aircraft.
Flare dispensing at night will illuminate the aircraft, potentially exposing the aircraft to hostile fire.
The following Caution is associated with the CMWS built in test functionality and failure modes:
CAUTION
CMWS will not detect sequencer or dispenser failures. The only way for the pilot to verify sequencer and dispenser
functionality is to temporarily select ‘BYPASS’ and return to the ‘AUTO’ mode. The updated inventory provides the
updates sequencer and dispenser status and indicates flares available as countermeasures.
The following Warnings are associated with CMWS Human Factors (HF) issues:
WARNING
Dispensing flares during Night Vision Goggles (NVG) operations can shut down the NVGs for 2-3 seconds. Consider
restricting use of NVG to a single cockpit to ensure safe control of the aircraft can be maintained through crew
coordination measures.
WARNING
During NVG operations from the pilot station, the CI/CCP will obstruct the Pilot’s FOV on the right side. This may cause
degraded ability to maintain approach path and reduce depth perception cues on the right side of the aircraft during the
approach sequence. Consideration should be given to restricting use of NVG in the pilot station to allow full ability to
maintain approach path on the right side of the aircraft during the approach sequence.
23
WARNING
Dispensing of flares during Night Vision System (NVS) operations may cause binocular rivalry and loss of night vision in
the unaided eye. Concentration on the NVC imagery for pilotage tasks is required. Use caution when performing
aggressive maneuvers and increase formation flight separation during NVS/NVG operations with 5S CMWS/ICMD
operational.
Other CMWS Warnings/Cautions/Notes:
WARNING
Flares have the potential to hang fire or become trapped in the dispenser payload module after being fired. In addition,
flares may be impacted and ignited by small arms fire. Fire/sustained burning of lodged flares could occur and result in
damage to the aircraft. If flares are ignited and lodged in the dispenser, jettison all flare munitions and land as soon as
possible.
WARNING
The CMWS system may fail to respond to threats if the EOMS lenses are dirty. The EOMS should be inspected prior to
flight to determine if the lenses need to be cleaned. The inspection and cleaning procedures shall be IAW the CMWS
technical manuals.
WARNING
The Electro-Optical Missile Sensors (EOMS) contain LZI, a hazardous nickel compound that may cause cancer. Avoid
contact with broken internal lenses and inhalation of dust. Handle and dispose in accordance with technical manuals.
CAUTION
Switching from external power to aircraft generator power can cause damage and or system resets, resulting in mission
delays or possible permanent damage to the CMWS hardware. To avoid damaging the CMWS hardware, do not apply
electrical power to the CMWS until the aircraft is running on aircraft generator power.
NOTE
CMWS will not provide a CM DEGR caution to the flight crew if a failure of the ICMD dispenser occurs during flight.
ICMD operation can be determined by switching to BYPASS mode and back to AUTO mode on the CCP. If the indicated
flare inventory varies significantly from prior count, partial or full ICMD dispenser functionality may have been lost. Only
the indicated inventory is available for subsequent dispense.
NOTE
If the CMWS is found to be in a degraded mode after completing IBIT/SBIT and the pilot attempts to fault isolate the
problem to an LRU via the CI, remaining in the fault isolation page of the CI for 30-60 seconds will cause the degraded
mode to extinguish. The CMWS programming logic indicates that the pilot has “acknowledged” the fault even though
the original degraded condition still exists and the fault remains. The only way to verify correct CMWS operational
status in this situation is to recycle power and wait 2-3 minutes for SBIT to be completed.
24
NOTE
Activating the master ZEROIZE switch will destroy the data contained on the UDM PCMCIA card in the ECU, rendering
the JETTISON switch inoperable, and will not permit the crew to jettison flares.
NOTE
The CMWS safety pin is difficult to engage fully and requires confirmation that the pin is fully seated. After insertion,
the safety pin must be tugged by the handle to ensure that it is fully seated.
NOTE
When the CMWS is in BYPASS mode, the Pilot and Copilot/Gunner can only manually dispense a single flare at a time up
to 10 total that was zone loaded in a M206 position in each dispenser. The flares in the M211 and M212 zones will not
manually dispense when CMWS is in the BYPASS mode.
NOTE
Do not power on the CMWS with the EOMS covers installed, or in an enclosed area. Doing so can yield incorrect BIT
results.
2010D-A29
2010/08/30
ASE AGP Install w/ v. 13 Software
Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) Warnings, Cautions and Notes (WCNs), refer to the CMWS Fifth Sensor (5S)
AWR (Appendix D.5). Additional WCNs for the AGP are as follows:
CAUTION
Do not use BYPASS 2 when the chaffbuck.et is inverted and loaded with flares. The CMWS BYPASS 2 program will
dispense multiple rounds simultaneously and could result in tail boom damage.
NOTE
Bypass programs 3 and 4 (BYP3 or BYP4) are not functional. Bypass programs 3 and 4 are available for selection during
missile warning systems degraded operations, but are non-functional.
NOTE
Perform a system start-up or ASE/UTIL page re-inventory to detect dispenser failures. The processor does not poll the
dispensers due to a known issue within the current sequencer software that occasionally reports the dispenser as
inoperative.
NOTE
An ASE IBIT initiated on a failed AGP will result in a "TEST FAILED TO RUN" message. An ASE BACKUP advisory and AGP
FAIL on the DMS FAULT page indicates an AGP failure.
25
NOTE
The software versions ASE page displays the missile warning system software version incorrectly. The Missile Warning
System Operational Flight Program (MWS OFP) decimal point is off by one digit. Example: the MWS OFP is displayed as
50.x- when it should be displayed as 5.0X-, where "X" is a digit, such as 4 or 6.
NOTE
When a specific flare category drops below 20%, the inventory count will not be specific, but will only have a "CMDS INV
LOW" advisory, therefore there is the possibility, when low enough, that the dispense may be incomplete .. The pilot will
not get an indication that it was incomplete. .
NOTE
Degraded CMWS faults were not annunciated to the crew until the ARM/SAFE switch was placed in the ARM position.
NOTE
An AGP failure (ASE BACKUP) only provides an advisory to the aircrew regardless of the ASE system SAFE or ARM status.
NOTE
Laser Detecting System (LDS) Laser Beam Rider threat was incorrectly displayed in the middle threat ring.
NOTE
Occasionally, the ASE page Laser Warning Beam Rider was annunciated as "laser designator" then immediately
annunciated the threat as "laser Beam Rider". The L WR reports the same threat as a lower priority threat and then
follows with a corrected higher priority threat report.
NOTE
The AGP has not passed all required safety of flight testing. If the AGP presents anomalous behavior, it shall be disabled.
Report such anomalous behavior to the POC in paragraph 4 of page 1.
NOTE
A System Processor (SP) switchover will result in an ASE BACKUP fault logging on the W/C/A page. This fault indication is
a software anomaly associated with SP switchovers and does not indicate an AGP failure.
26
2006D-A55 R1
2010/07/09
IR STROBE LIGHTING KITS ON AH-64D HELICOPTERS
WARNING
An IR strobe light-equipped aircraft may not be detected under NVGs when viewed within relative observer to aircraft
aspect angles of ±5 degrees off the nose. Beyond ranges of 500 feet, position lights become obstructed at a 24 degree
look up angle, and at a 42 degree look up angle position lights and strobe are obstructed.
WARNING
Installation of the IR strobe light without IR position lights significantly reduces the ability to detect the aircraft and
increases the risk of air-to-air collisions with NVG equipped aircraft.
WARNING
An IR strobe light-equipped aircraft may not be detected under NVGs when there is little or no relative motion between
the aircraft and a culturally lit background.
WARNING
The IR lighting is visible in excess of 4 kilometers with the aid of night vision equipment. This range should be accounted
for in operations planning.
2008D-A27 R1
2009/04/14
AH64-D HELICOPTERS WITH INGINE INLET ANTI-ICE VALVE SWITCH
CAUTION
It is possible that a switch failure may result in the anti-ice valve sticking open. If abnormally high TGT’s (approximately
30 deg C above expected) are noticed, any time after engine startup – check if switch is in the “Norm” position. If not,
then return switch to the “Norm” Position, notify maintenance personnel as soon as practicable.
CAUTION
If an engine is shut down from above idle without being cooled for two minutes at IDLE and it is necessary to restart the
engine, the restart should be accomplished within five minutes after shutdown. If the restart cannot be accomplished
within five minutes, the engine shall be allowed to cool for four hours before attempting an engine start.
NOTE
When performing Before Takeoff and Before Landing Checks, verify the Warm Start Override switch is in the NORM or
centered position.
The switch is being installed as a fix for engines experiencing warm restart stalls. The switch should be useful in
preventing cold start stalls. The valve allows bleed air to vent overboard reducing the probability of an engine warm
start stall. The switch only affects the aircraft mounted engine inlet anti-ice valve, not the engine mounted anti-ice start
bleed valve. This is an interim hardware fix until a software fix can be developed and fielded.
27
The Warm Start Override Switch is designed to improve the Warm Engine Start of the 701C/D engines. The Warm Start
Override Switch is a three position lever locked toggle switch. The three positions are labeled ENG1 (up position),
NORM (center position), and ENG2 (down position). When the Warm Start Override Switch is activated to either the
ENG1 or ENG2, 28vdc will be removed from the valve, thereby allowing the valve to open. The toggle switch will remain
in the selected position and the valve in the open position until the switch is manually returned to the NORM or
centered position, giving valve control back to the aircraft ELCs.
The pilot should activate the Warm Start Override Switch to either ENG1 or ENG2 prior to engine start if less than 4
hours have elapsed since last engine shutdown (warm engine start). When conducting the warm engine start procedure
the pilot will be required to position the Warm Start Override Switch to the desired engine position prior to initiating the
start. This should be conducted prior to placing the engine start switch to the IGN OVRD position.
In addition, the aborting engine start emergency procedure should include the step “WARM START OVRD switch –
NORM”. This step should be added to the procedure immediately after step 2 placing the start switch in the IGN OVRD
position.
Warm Start Procedure:









WARM START OVRD switch - Select appropriate ENG1 or ENG2.
START switch IGN OVRD – Allow Ng speed to increase to 18-20% then off.
START switch – START after Ng decreases below 5%
POWER lever – IDLE at first indication of Ng increase, TGT below 80°C.
ENG OIL PRESS – Monitor.
Ng – Monitor.
MSTR WARN MSTR CAUT, and EUFD – Monitor.
WARM START OVRD switch – NORM, when Ng stabilized at idle speed.
Second Engine - Same as first start.
If the switch has malfunctioned and the “ENG1 or 2 Inlet anti-ice valve remains open there will more than likely be an
“ENG1 or 2 Inlet Anti-Ice Valve Fail” on the Fault History page. Check Fault History Page on shut down when you are
checking for exceedences.
2008D-A72 R2
2009/04/09
USE OF THE AGM-114F-A MISSILE ON THE AH-64D HELICOPTERS
WARNING
Do not fly aircraft greater than 90 knots TAS when firing the Hellfire AGM-114F-A missiles. Targets shall be a minimum
of 700m from the firing point for hover fire and 800m from the firing point for running fire engagements. In case of
premature fuse detonation, an immediate evasive maneuver should be executed to avoid the debris.
Use of the Hellfire Missile Debris Deflector (HMDD) is required when firing AGM-114F-A missiles that have the ATK
Hercules motors. For such configured missiles, refer to SOF message AH-64-07-01 (D.4), use of Hellfire Debris
Deflector on the Apache AH-64D, for additional notes, cautions, and warnings.
28
2007D-A34 R1
2008/10/17
OPERATION OF EITHER 1000P-W OR GCP-2C FANG IZLID FOR PRE-DEPLOYMENT OR COMBAT
WARNING
The 1000P-W is a Class IV and the GCP-2C Fang is a Class IIIB invisible non eye-safe laser. All personnel should be
alerted to the hazards specific to these lasers. Avoid direct exposure to the beam to prevent eye injury. The laser is not
disabled with the master arm switch; therefore it can be operated with the aircraft weight on wheels. In order to
prevent eye injury, ground personnel should wear eye protection with a minimum optical density of 3.0 at a wavelength
of 860 nanometers if the 1000P-W laser is installed and a minimum optical density of 2.2 at a wavelength from 810-860
nanometers if the GCP-2C Fang laser is installed. The minimum safe skin distance is 43 meters for the 1000P-w laser and
12m for the GCP-2C Fang laser. Use with the precautions of any direct fire weapon.
WARNING
The purpose for this installation is to provide the pilot and gunner with the capability to confirm target location with
ground forces and thereby minimize the potential for fratricide. The lasers should be limited to target
illumination/pointing and not be used as a means of directing AWS fire.
WARNING
Energy from the lasers may be reflected back at the crew during use. The minimum safe employment range for the
1000P- W laser is 620 meters. If the 1000P- W is installed, recommend an employment range of greater than 620 meters
be maintained to minimize the risk to the crew and ground personnel. The minimum safe employment range for the
GCP-2C Fang laser is 170 meters. If the GCP-2C Fang is installed, recommend an employment range of greater than 170
meters be maintained to minimize the risk to the crew and ground personnel. The lasers should only be powered when
the A WS is weapons actioned and a target is being designated. Direct View Optics (DVO) will increase the minimal safe
range.
CAUTION
Testing has shown that the bore sight alignment on the lasers is not maintained during AWS engagements. If a
noticeable offset is observed between the laser designated point and the area of impact of the AWS, the lasers can be
bore sighted IAW with the procedures in Appendix B paragraph 3.
CAUTION
During operations with the lasers, and night vision goggles are not being worn, a laser-visor or spectacles must be worn
for eye protection. When night vision goggles are being worn, CLEPIR spectacles must also be worn for eye protection.
The use of laser eye protection (spectacles) with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) may degrade the NVGs transmissivity.
NOTE
To illuminate targets with the lasers beyond 1000m, a manual range of 1000m must be entered into the weapons
processor (WP) to prevent the gun barrel from elevating above line-of-sight (LOS).
NOTE
The lasers should be limited to target illumination/pointing and not be used as a means of directing AWS fire.
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Use of these lasers is permitted only during Combat Operations or pre-deployment training. Therefore, the aircraft
aircrew and maintenance personnel shall be thoroughly familiar with the Warnings/Cautions (noted above) associated
with the operation of the lasers.
2005D-48 R1
2007/08/21
AUTHORIZING THE USE OF THE CRV7 ROCKET ON THE AH-64D HELICOPTER
This revision incorporates the weight and balance figures for the CRV -7 rocket. This AWR supersedes 2005D-A48
authorizing the use of the CRV7 rocket on the AH-64D helicopter and will remain effective until superseded or rescinded.
Weight and balance shall be adjusted using the data below:
Unit SOP shall be modified to include local tracking of the number ofCRV7 Rockets fired from each aircraft by tail
number. The number of CRV7 Rockets fired may be recorded in any unused DA Form 2408-12 rounds blocks available as
outlined by unit SOP. The cumulative total ofCRV7 Rockets fired by each aircraft shall be submitted to the POC in the
memorandum on a monthly basis. Monthly submissions should include aircraft tail number, number ofCRV7 rockets
fired and aircraft engine changes in the remarks column (example: #2 Engine changed on 10125107) for each tail
number. The monthly recording period will begin on the first day of each month and conclude on the last calendar day
of each month. Monthly submissions may be completed by email, fax or mail to the POC by the 15th day of the following
month. Below is a basic recording format to use when reporting data.
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2007D-A04
2007/04/19
HELLFIRE MISSILE DEBRIS DEFLECTOR (HMDD) ON AH64D
WARNING
DO NOT jettison an inboard launcher that has launch rails populated with HMDDs above 40 KTAS if no Hellfire missiles
are present.
WARNING
Jettison of an inboard launcher that has launch rails populated with HMDDs should occur during level flight with minimal
sideslip and downward motion.
2007D-A05
2007/03/20
USE OF THE AGM-114K-2A, AGM-114M (FRAG), AGM-114N (THERMO) MISSILE ON AH-64D HELICOPTERS
WARNING
Unlike the armor penetration versions of the Hellfire Missile, the AGM-114K-2A and AGM-114M blast fragmentation
Missiles and AGM-114N thermo baric missile disperse fragments in all directions upon detonation. These missiles may
prematurely detonate at distances as close as 181 meters from the firing point. The explosion debris is potentially
hazardous to the aircraft and crew. In case of premature fuse detonation, an immediate evasive maneuver should be
made to avoid the debris. Targets shall be a minimum of 800m from the firing point when firing these missiles.
NOTE
Installation of the blast fragment sleeve turns the AGM-114K into a dual-purpose munition, effective against both hard
and soft targets, capable of both armor penetration by the warhead, as well as immediate shrapnel dispersion by the
blast fragment sleeve. If employed against personnel in the open, aiming at the ground just short of the target may
achieve the maximum shrapnel dispersion.
NOTE
The -114M and -114N missiles cannot be uniquely inventoried by the aircraft software, and therefore cannot be
uniquely identified in the cockpit displays. The missiles will display as -114K missiles. Therefore, the crew will have to
know exact station and rail position of the missiles so they can manually select the missiles when needed.
When loading AGM-114K-2A missiles, verify that there is no interference between the blast fragmentation sleeve (BFS)
on the missile and the launcher.
Make entries for items added as required on DD form 365-4 weight and balance clearance form F. Changes to the
appropriate technical manual (if applicable) must also be made to list these new form F items.
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2006D-A02
2006/05/08
COMBAT MANUEVERING TRAINING
CAUTION
Maneuvering flight requiring large abrupt collective, pitch, roll or yaw inputs at airspeeds below 45 knots should be
avoided. Flight at reduced G levels aggravate the normal flapping which occurs in this environment and if combined with
aggressive control inputs can result in damage to the aircraft. Regardless of the control strategy used to recover from
this environment the control inputs should be made at a rate no faster than the aircraft fuselage can react.
CAUTION
In lot 7 and previous aircraft the turn rate indicator is unreliable for up to 1 minute following a roll attitude of greater
than 90 degrees. If bank angles of greater than 90 degrees are required or encountered and turn-rate should
subsequently be important to the crew the pilot should use bank angle to estimate turn rate until the turn rate
indication becomes functional.
The aircraft shall be operated IAW Appendix D references 1, 4, and this AWR. In the event of a conflict between
Appendix D reference 1 or 4 and this AWR, the limitations in this AWR shall prevail. A weight and balance form must be
executed or be on file per AR 95-1. Exceeding flight limitations of Appendix D reference 1, up to +/- 60 degrees in pitch
and/or +/- 120 degrees in roll, while performing flight operations IAW Appendix D, reference 4, is authorized.
WARNING
Extended maneuvering flight below 0 G and / or high sideslip angles with nose low attitudes with low fuel can result in
the fuel pickup in the fuel cell ingesting nitrogen instead of fuel. This can result in momentary loss of power or engine
flameout. The lower the fuel quantity the more sensitive the fuel system becomes too high sideslip angles and or low G
maneuvering, thereby increasing the possibility of flameout. If indications of loss of engine oil pressure or potential
impending engine flameout occur, return to level flight as soon as possible.
During training, these maneuvers shall not be flown with less than 400 pounds fuel remaining in each fuel cell.
Performing aggressive aircraft maneuvers may cause oil leaks past the engine #3 bearing seal which could result in high
oil consumption.
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1. Unit instructor pilots must be trained by Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization /US Army Aviation Center
(USAAVNC) or WAATS instructors in an established curriculum.
2. Maneuvers beyond +/- 30 degrees in pitch or +/- 60 degrees in roll are only permissible in combat or when conducting
authorized training that has been outlined in the mission brief. Units will establish approval authority for combat
maneuver training at company/troop commander level or higher, unless conducting training per the program of
instruction (POI) at USAAVNC or WAATS.
3. After receipt of this AWR, the quantity of each maneuver flown listed in the spreadsheet provided by DES
(Maneuvering Flight Reports example enclosed) shall be reported to the point of contact (POC) on a weekly basis.
4. The aircraft shall be inspected and maintained IAW all applicable maintenance manuals and associated Maintenance
Advisory and Safety of Flight Messages. Any discrepancies shall be evaluated / repaired prior to the next flight to ensure
continued airworthiness of the helicopter.
2006D-A14
2006/03/24
M4 RIFLE STOWAGE SYSTEM IN THE AH-64D HELICOPTER
WARNING
Do not stow the rifle in the rack with a round chambered.
NOTE
Flight crews shall familiarize themselves with emergency egress procedures with the rifle racks installed.
NOTE
All M4 slings (if available) shall be securely fastened to the weapon in such a manner so as to prevent a trip or snag
hazard.
NOTE
The front seat strap on the upper clamp may get in the way of the SSU when there is no weapon in the clamps.
NOTE
The M4 rifle mount in the CPG station does not have any positive restraint against rotation. When the M4 rifle is
present, ensure that the mount does not rotate prior to flight as this would be an indication of loss of security. Report
any rotation to the POC in memorandum paragraph 4 for disposition.
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2005D-A51 R1
2006/03/21
FIRING OF THE M-206 FLARE FROM THE M-141 CHAFF DISPENSER IN THE AH-64D HELICOPTER
WARNING
Flares can cause ground fires when launched from altitudes of 400 feet and lower. The proximity of the aircraft to
personnel, vehicles, fuel depots, etc should be considered.
WARNING
The chaff arm switch should be placed in the SAFE position (to safe the flares) in the vicinity of a Forward Area Rearming
and Refueling Point (FARRP).
WARNING
The M141 dispenser safety pin shall be installed during all ground operations.
WARNING
During Night Vision Goggle (NVG) multi-ship operations, flare firing can adversely affect the NVG trail aircraft/aircrew,
shutting them down for up to 5 seconds. During multi-ship NVG operations, the crew should be cognizant of the
potential for NVG shutdown due to flare launch.
WARNING
Flares launched from low altitude (50-100ft or less) may bounce off of the ground, potentially striking the aircraft.
WARNING
Shipboard landings are strictly prohibited with Plastic Flare Cartridges (DODIC L410) installed. Plastic Flare Cartridges
(DODIC L410) shall be considered as a Hazard of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) susceptible ordnance.
2005D-A21 2005/09/08
FIRE THE MK40/M151 and MK40/M156 ROCKETS ON AH-64D HELICOPTERS
Operations and Restrictions:
NOTE
When using the 6PD setting to fire the MK40/M151 or the MK40/156 rocket, the impact location will be much shorter
than anticipated (up to 56% of down range). The range should be clear between the firing aircraft and aiming target. Do
not use a mixed load of MK66 and MK40 rocket types. A data table of expected MK40/M151 and MK40/M156 rocket
performance is included for reference.
34
Firing MK40/M151 or MK40/M156 with MK66/M151 selection
35
The aircraft operating instructions, procedures, and limitations shall be IAW reference 1a, as modified by reference 1b,
and this document. In the event of a conflict between these references and this document, this AWR shall take
precedence.
b. A weight and balance form must be executed or be on file per AR 95-1.
c. Select “6PD” to fire the MK40/M151 or the MK40/M156 rockets.
d. As an example, in order to fire the Mk40/M151 Rocket at a target range of 500 meters, the gunner should use
the Mk66/M151 “6PD” setting and manually input a range of 1034 meters. To manually input the new range,
select the WPN page MANRNG button and enter a numeric “1034” using the keyboard unit. The display will
present this in kilometers (1.034).
e. The minimum recommended firing distance is 500 meters.
Special Inspections and Instructions:
The aircraft shall be inspected and maintained IAW all applicable maintenance manuals and associated Maintenance
Advisory and Safety of Flight Messages. Any discrepancies shall be evaluated/repaired prior to the next flight to ensure
continued airworthiness of the helicopter.
2003D-A09 R1
2003/03/31
MK40 AND MK66 FLECHETTE ROCKETS
The following apply for firing MK66 flechettes:
1.
The range to target must be at least 800 meters.
2.
The effective range is 1 to 3 kilometers with reduced effectiveness beyond 3 km.
3.
To fire the MK66 select “6FL”
NOTE
The ballistic coefficients (accuracy of the MK66 flechette rockets) in the AH-64D without version 6 S/W have not been
optimized.
The following apply for firing MK40 flechettes
1.
The range to target must be at least 800 meters.
2.
The effective range is 800 to 1200 meters.
3.
To fire the MK40 select “6PD”
NOTE
Accuracy of the MK40 flechette rockets is not optimized. The difference between the aim point and impact point will be
100 meters long at a hover and 100 meters short at an airspeed of 40 kts.
The following notes apply when firing flechette rockets or any rockets with M439 fuze:
36
NOTE
When firing flechette rockets or any rockets with M439 fuze (6FL, 6SK, or 6MP) and no launch occurs upon trigger pull, it
may be due to an incorrect rocket type, an out of tolerance fuze, or a dirty launcher port for the fuze connector. Pull up
the DMS page on the MPD for more details of the failure. In all three cases noted, the incident will indicate a
LOB/LIB/ROB/RIB PYLON ROCKET FUZE FAIL. If no fault is noted, the aircraft will still report an inventory discrepancy in
the total rockets status window of the rocket page display under the weapons page.
NOTE
In the RKT INV page, make sure the rocket type of each zone is matched with the actual rockets loaded for that zone. If
rockets fail to fire, follow the proper unloading procedures in TM 9-1055-480-13&P.
AVIATION MAINTENANCE ACTION MESSAGE
H-64-09-AMAM-11 (CPG CYCLIC STOWED DURING IBIT) 2009/07/16
Background – Recent field reports indicate that some AH-64D aircraft fail the Backup Control System (BUCS) Initiated
Built-In Test (IBIT) when it is done with the Co-Pilot Gunner (CPG) cyclic in the extended position IAW the Operators
Manual. This may be due to the presence of counterbalance weights on the longitudinal bell crank. These weights were
added to AH-64A aircraft to counteract an imbalance that caused the CPG cyclic to fall forward if the Force Trim is
turned to the "Off" position. Approximately 200 aircraft never had counterbalance weights installed. This condition also
exists on the AH-64D aircraft; however, the Force Trim Switch does not have an "Off" position and the Force Trim
defaults to "On".
Message Purpose
Provide publication changes to the appropriate AH-64D Technical Manuals to perform the BUCS IBIT with the CPG cyclic
in the retracted (stowed) position.
Inspect all AH-64 aircraft for longitudinal bell crank counterbalance weights.
AVIATION SAFETY ACTION MESSAGE
AH-64-07-ASAM-17 (EGI CHECK DURING RUN-UP) 2007/07/18
Background - Since May 2004, Honeywell's Embedded Global Positioning and Inertial Navigation Units (EGI) have been
constructed with Voltage Regulator (VR) diodes without a nickel barrier and can degrade resulting in erroneous
acceleration outputs. These suspect diodes can fail causing increasing errors in position confidence and velocity data, as
well as possible attitude and heading errors. These errors can cause AH-64A and AH-64D navigation and weapon
inaccuracies, as well as erroneous inputs into the AH-64D Flight Management Computer (FMC) for flight control
solutions. AH-64D flight control issues may include incorrect stabilator scheduling, erratic flight symbology, incorrect
hover and bob-up symbology cues, and erratic hold modes. Erroneous position, heading and velocity data from the EGIs
may also cause incorrect weapons constraint calculations and trajectory calculations. This failure will not be detected by
any Built-In Test (BIT). The crew may be able to identify this failure during the preflight operations. However, if the
failure occurs in flight, it will not be detected or reported by the Continuous Built-In Test (CBIT) and may not be obvious
to the crew. Unscreened EGIs produced from May 2004 to March 2005 are the most susceptible to the VR diode failures
(listed in ADDENDUM-List 1).
37
In March 2005 Honeywell instituted a screening procedure testing the EGIs to reduce the VR diode failures in the field
(ADDENDUM-List 2). However, there have also been 8 reported failures in the field from the screened EGI population.
Beginning in June 2007 Honeywell will reintroduce the VR diodes with the nickel barrier which will correct this problem.
These diodes will be installed at production, repair, and overhaul intervals. Product Management, (PM) Aviation Mission
Equipment
(AME) is coordinating these efforts with CECOM and Honeywell.
Message Purpose
Inspect the aircraft to determine if any suspected EGIs are installed. Suspected EGI's are to be removed from service
IAW this message.
Brief all AH-64 crewmembers of the possible EGI failure modes and provide risk mitigation information until the suspect
EGIs are removed from service.
END ITEMS AFFECTED - All AH-64 series aircraft.
AVIATION SAFETY ACTION MESSAGE, MAINTENANCE MANDATORY
AH-64-04-ASAM-02 (GUN INSPECTION) 2004/3/10
There have been multiple recent incidents where firing M789 (DODIC B129, NSN 1305-01-268-9373) 30mm High
Explosive Dual Purpose (HEDP) ammunition resulting in damage to the barrel and/or flash suppressor; with some
causing damage to the aircraft when the barrel ruptured. Damage is caused by in-bore detonation of the M789 HEDP
ammunition. Typical barrel damage includes bulges, longitudinal cracks, holes, and/or missing pieces. Weakened
barrels from previous in-bore detonations may have contributed to barrel ruptures that resulted in aircraft damage.
Damage to the barrel renders it unsafe for further service and presents a risk to aircraft and crew. Subsequent
investigations have identified potential issues associated with the one-piece base fuze 30 mm HEDP ammunition. A
technical team has been formed to further investigate and address potential issues associated with the ammunition.
Message Purpose
Initial inspections of the barrel and flash suppressor of the M230 gun system are required.
THRU-FLIGHT inspections of the barrel and flash suppressor are required when the M230 gun system is fired.
Recurring inspections by armament personnel during rearming procedures are required when the M230 gun system is
fired.
END ITEMS AFFECTED - All AH-64 series aircraft.
38
AVIATION SAFETY ACTION MESSAGE, INFORMATIONAL
AH-64-03-ASAM-03 (COCKPIT CANOPY FOGGING)
Cockpit fogging has been encountered on the ground and in flight when heating is commanded during a moderate
temperature day. A moderate temperature day equates to approximately 40 to 70 degrees Fahrenheit (4.5 to 21
degrees Celsius) with high humidity of 70 percent RH and higher. The fogging of the canopy and all other glass surfaces
in the cockpit can create possible simultaneous loss of outside visibility and electro-optical sensors during all flight
conditions in adverse weather flight conditions. This condition can result in crew disorientation, loss of control and/or
obstacle impact.
Message Purpose - Provide operational procedures to reduce the frequency of cockpit canopy fogging.
END ITEMS AFFECTED - All AH-64D series aircraft.
The following procedures should be used during all flight modes and ground operations when environmental conditions
are in the range of 40 to 70 degrees Fahrenheit (4.5 to 21 degrees Celsius) and greater than 70 percent relative
humidity.
Set the cockpit temperature to 60 degrees Fahrenheit (16 degrees Celsius) and select DEFOG OFF.
Select CANOPY ANTI-ICE ON for the remainder of the flight.
39