Peacock 1
Marcus Peacock
Prof: Kenny Harmon
ENG 1020, Spring Term
Research Paper/Rough Draft
4/23/13
On April 20, 2010 the Deep Water Horizon oil rig owned by the BP Oil Company, exploded in the Gulf claiming eleven lives. Reports show this incident has not only brought to light the risk involved in offshore drilling, but has lead to question the reliability oil companies put in the technology. Many scientists believe this to be the worst disaster to happen in the Gulf of Mexico and ranks among the top incidents in history surrounding the topic of oil spills.
Records show oil spills from offshore rigs are not uncommon this incident however is the first to happen almost a mile underwater. Survey studies have also shown after the incident people wanted BP held accountable for damage caused to the environment.
To understand the extent of the damage caused by the BP oil spill observing an article by,
Itzchake E. Kornfeld faculty of law, at Hebrew University titled “Of Dead Pelicans, Turtles, And
Marshes: Natural Resources Damages In The Wake Of The Bp Deepwater Horizon Spill."
Kornfeld reveals the extent of the damage to animal populations and the gulf shores, and discusses how we can put a price on an acre of marshland, Brown Pelican, and the Kemps Ridley
Turtle (Kornfeld 3). Kornfeld states restoring the gulf’s natural environment resources is among the government and states top priorities. He mentions however, any restoration plan must take into consideration the environment, people, and history of the location (Kornfeld 4). Research

Peacock 2 shows the spill did not just affect animals and the environment, but the economy as well. As noted by Kornfeld, the spill also destroyed livelihoods of fishermen, shrimpers, and crab processors (Kornfeld 7). He argues the affects of this disaster will take decades to recover from
(Kornfeld8).
There are many alarming factors about this incident looking at “WHAT THE SPILL
WILL KILL” by Sharon Beagle, Ian Yarett, and Daniel Stone. Ed Overton of Louisiana State
University explains that “I’m not too worried about oil on the surface, it’s going to cause very substantial and notable damage—marsh loss and coastal erosion and impact on fisheries, dead birds, dead turtles,--but we’ll know what that is. It’s the things we don’t see that worry me the most”(qtd in Beagle, Yarett, and Stone). This is not the worst oil spill in history, but it is the first to happen almost a mile underwater. Beagle et al noted the deep water horizon spill may enter the record books not for how much but for where. Beagle et al, has further mentioned oil has not only spread to shorelines and marshes, but also into unexplored depths of the sea. They argue the consequences to vulnerable ecosystems of the gulf and vast cycles of nature are as incalculable as they are devastating (Beagle, Yarett, and Stone).
After the BP blowout many scientists have questioned the technology used in offshore drilling. In the article “Five Thousand Feet and Below: The Failure to Adequately Regulate
Deepwater Oil Production Technology” by Professor Mark A. Latham a graduate of the
University of California, one can find the answer. Latham noted one can certainly marvel at the feats accomplished in technology that allow us to discover and extract oil from below the ocean surface. According to Latham the oil spill has taught us however the technology has significant limitations when the technology fails there is no readily available way to deal with this type of

Peacock 3 crisis (Latham344,345). He informs the biggest challenge when drilling for oil thousands of feet below the surface is controlling the pressure. Latham states that when the pressure can no longer be contained the last line of defense is the blowout preventer. In the case of the BP spill the preventer failed. Latham argues the (MMS) mineral management services failure to regulate the most heavily relied on piece of technology in the case of an out of control well. (Latham 349).
According to MMS the BP spill is not the first case of a blowout preventer failing. In
1979 Mexican national oil company PEMEX, was drilling for oil on the Ixtoc I encountered pressure control problems. Reports show worker activated the shear rams on the blowout preventer, however the rams failed to shear through the pipe stemming the flow of oil. MMS stated the lesson from the Ixtoc I one is blowout preventers can fail (Latham 350). Reports show the Ixtoc I was located only160 feet underwater, and leaked 140 million gallons of crude oil over the course of ten months (Latham 350).
MMS has conducted numerous data on the likely hood of blowout preventers failing.
According to MMS the Ixtoc I and Montara represent rare cases of blowout preventers failing.
Reports reveal from 1971 to 1990 eighty-seven blowouts occurred on the Outer continental shelf.
MMS also discovered from1992 to 2006 an additional thirty-nine blowouts occurred. The thirtyfive year period studied by MMS revealed a total of 126 blowouts occurred on the Outer
Continental Shelf. MMS correlated one blowout for every 246 wells drilled from 1971 to 1990 and one blowout for every 387 wells drilled from 1991 to 2006. These numbers are startlingly high when you consider there are 4000 wells in the Gulf of Mexico 700 of which are located at depths below 5000 feet (Latham 351).

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In 2010, MMS imposed new obligations on oil drilling operatorations to reduce long term risk, particularly technology regulations. The regulations were mainly targeted blowout preventers. The new regulations include: a requirement to certify compliance with existing regulations, signed by the operator’s chief executive officer; submission of detailed information about blowout preventers in use; retention of blowout preventer records; third-party verification of blowout preventer fitness; and the requirement of having redundant control mechanisms. A judge found the new safety drilling obligations issued by the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) invalid under the Administrative
Procedure Act. Later (BOEMRE) imposed a final rule that required most of the safety requirements, and became effective immediately once published (Latham 354,353).
Surveys reveal one question commonly asked among people is what President
Obama did to handle this crisis? One can understand in the article U.S. President Unveils Gulf
Spill “Battle Plan”-But Against What Enemy? This article can give more depth looking at the steps taken to deal with the oil spill. The Unified Command in charge of the spill listed 29,700 personnel, 8,100 vessels, remotely operated vehicles (ROPs), multiple (MODUs), and in addition several dozen aircrafts. Reports by BP reveal “top hat” collected about 5.3 million gallons of crude oil through mid June. Before “top hat” about 924,000 gallons of oil was collected by a device called a Riser Insertion Tool. According to research an additional 20 million gallons of oil contaminated water had been skimmed and 5 million gallons burned from the surface. Scientist have noted however the amount collected is only equal to about two week of crude oil leaked from the well (Battle Plan).
Soon after the BP fallout congress stepped in to see that BP pay for the damage caused by the spill. In order to understand what congress held BP accountable the article “Legislative

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Background on Offshore Oil Drilling: Recent Action in Congress.” About three weeks after the explosion congress began to address the issues faced in the aftermath of the disaster. Senators had heard testimony from three companies connected with accident BP, Transocean, and
Halliburton as well as MMS, scientific, legal, and local business perspective. In 1989 following the Exxon Valdez accident, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act holding companies responsible for cleanup capping the economic damage at $75 million. This act also authorized use of Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund of eight cents a barrel. On May 13 senators Bill Nelson (FL-
D), Robert Menendez (NJ-D), and Frank Lautenberg (NJ-D) attempted to raise the cap to $10 billion. This was opposed however by senator Lisa Murkowski (AK-R) so the cap could not be voted on. Obama Administration Officials were also in favor of lifting the cap and worked with
Congress to try and pass legislation (Legislative Background).
As stated by the previous article “Battle Plan,” President Obama sounded somewhat defensive when potentially opening additional areas in the gulf to offshore drilling. According to
Gallop Inc, when the plan was unveiled in March 2010 70 percent of registered voters supported
Obama’s decision. By the end of May, supporters had dropped to 52 percent and 44 percent opposed, offshore drilling. In late June, a survey by Public Policy Polling surveyed Louisiana
(USA) voters if they supported off shore drilling, with 77 percent in favor and 12 percent opposed. Obama noted in his speech that the U.S. consumes one-fifth of the world’s oil, but holds less than a fifth of the oil reserves (Battle Plan).
The information provided shows, there will still be offshore drilling conducted in the future. Research has shown offshore drilling is needed to keep up with the growing demand for gas which the land deposits cannot support. Scientists have noted after the BP incident all the

Peacock 6 risks involved in offshore drilling have been brought to light. People have begun to second guess the need for offshore drilling as stated in the survey conducted by the Obama Administration. As stated by the MMS new safety regulations will be imposed to ensure reduced risk in future drilling operations.

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Works Cited
Begley, Sharon, Ian Yarett, and Daniel Stone. "WHAT THE SPILL WILL KILL. (Cover
Story)." Newsweek 155.24 (2010): 24-28. GreenFILE . Web. 9 Apr. 2013
KORNFELD, ITZCHAK E. "Of Dead Pelicans, Turtles, And Marshes: Natural Resources
Damages In The Wake Of The Bp Deepwater Horizon Spill." Boston College
Environmental Affairs Law Review 38.2 (2011): 317-342. GreenFILE . Web. 11 Apr.
2013.
LATHAM, MARK A. "Five Thousand Feet And Below: The Failure To Adequately
RegulateDeepwater Oil Production Technology." Boston College Environmental Affairs
Law Review 38.2 (2011): 343-367. GreenFILE . Web. 10 Apr. 2013.
"Legislative Background On Offshore Oil Drilling." Congressional Digest 89.6 (2010): 177.
GreenFILE . Web. 25 Apr. 2013
"US President Unveils Gulf Spill "Battle Plan" — But Against What Enemy?." Business & The
Environment 21.7 (2010): 1-3. GreenFILE . Web. 25 Apr. 2013

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Reflections
1. The biggest problem I had in writing my paper was carefully choosing and finding important facts because a lot of the databases and sources had upwards of thirty pages.
4. Because of the audience I envisioned writing the research paper for I felt I needed sources with a lot of statistical fact so that way I could present the information unbiased and get my audience thinking.
15. The thing that intimidated me the most about this paper was citing my sources properly so I wouldn’t be accused of plagiarism and get a 0 on the paper.
17. What I had hoped my readers would catch in my paper was the alarming statistics on the failure of blowout preventers.
36. I think the best part of my research paper was the statistics I provide on the failure of blowout preventures