Business Case and Intervention Summary
Intervention Summary
Title:
Executive Masters Programme in Security Sector Management (Ethiopia) 2012 - 2017
What support will the UK provide?
The UK will provide £1,929,375 pounds to fund the Executive Masters programme for senior and mid-ranking
Ethiopian civil servants from ministries of defence, justice, federal affairs, police, customs and military officers
for an additional 3 cohorts. The period of funding would be from Oct 2012 to Mar 2017 to cover one year of
teaching and a second year of dissertation / evaluation for each of the 3 cohorts.
Why is UK support required?
What need are we trying to address?
This project will directly address weaknesses in the security sector policy environment. It will develop
knowledge and skills of senior and mid-ranking officials within the civil service, military and police to ensure
security sector transformation results in improved accountability and provides improved security for citizens as
well as the state. It will build on the positive early results of two previous cohorts. Specifically, it will tackle
problems related to:
 Low levels of internal expertise, knowledge, analysis and documentation to support transformation of
security sector to modern, accountable armed forces
 Small number of officials with skillsets to develop strategic policy, performance management, project
and financial management to drive security sector transformation
 Limited coordination of police and military planning and management including national security policy,
roles and responsibilities
These weaknesses lead to poor overall security sector policy, planning and implementation, resulting in a
more insecure environment for people (especially poor people) in which their access to services and
livelihoods is constrained. Security and development are closely associated (see A2 below). A better security
policy environment will be important for Ethiopia to meet its broader Millennium Development Goals.
What will we do to tackle this problem?
 Expose and educate high level and mid-ranking security sector officials to strategic management ideas
using local case studies;
 Improve understanding of the rule of law, human rights and the various security needs of the
population, and how such issues can be integrated into policy development;
 Improve technical capabilities in project and performance management and strategy to effectively
support security sector transformation;
 Encourage and demonstrate the benefits of cross-sector cooperation and coordination
 Develop local ‘indigenous’ capacity within the Ethiopian Civil Service College to deliver this training at
MSc level after 2017
Who will be implementing the support we provide?
Cranfield University with support from the Ethiopian Security sector.
Are there any other donors supporting this or similar projects?
No. The US used to provide support to military staff college but no longer do so.
What are the expected results?
What will change as a result of our support?
The project will contribute to the transformation of the Ethiopian security sector through the creation of a cadre
of highly educated senior and mid ranking officials, able to develop and implement a coherent approach to
security sector management.
What are the planned Outputs attributable to UK support?
All programme outputs are attributable to UK support. They are:
 better informed security sector policy development and implementation in Ethiopia
 up to 100 selected senior and mid-ranking officials in security sector and related institutions trained in
assessing progress of transformation
 up to 100 selected senior and mid-ranking officials in security sector and related institutions trained in
the management of projects, performance and strategy development to support transformation
 capacity development of the Ethiopian Civil Service College to deliver a high quality Executive Masters
in Security Sector management by 2017.
How will we determine whether the expected results have been achieved?
On-going monitoring by Cranfield University through annual reviews will ascertain whether the programme is
on track to reach its targets. An independent evaluation of the whole programme will be undertaken mid way
through the programme and also after the final cohort has completed their dissertations to assess whether the
expected results have been achieved.
Business Case
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
A1 The Ethiopian Contexti
Ethiopia matters to the UK for a range of development, foreign policy and security priorities. It is populous,
poor, vulnerable but comparatively stable in the Horn of Africa. From a low base, Ethiopia’s growth and
expansion of basic services in recent years have been among the most impressive in Africa. The UK
Government has an opportunity to make our support more transformational and accelerate Ethiopia’s
graduation from aid dependency. The Government of Ethiopia (GoE) is capable and committed to growth
and development, and is a proven partner in making rapid progress towards the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). But its approach to political governance presents both substantive challenges to
sustainable development and reputational risks to partners.
Ethiopia lies at the heart of an unstable region that has experienced almost continuous conflict and
environmental shocks in recent decades. Ethiopia and its neighbours – including Somalia, Sudan and
Eritrea – languish at the bottom of the Human Development Index. Poverty and instability in the Horn of
Africa are among the drivers of migration to Europe, and also contribute to an environment in which
fundamentalism and radicalisation can prosper. UK interests in the region include progress towards the
MDGs, resolving conflict, bolstering stability, accelerating sustainable growth and development, mitigating
the impact of climate change, tackling migration, and countering terrorism. A stable, secure and
prosperous Ethiopia is critical to UK interests.
Ethiopia has come a long way in a short time, and has achieved stability through decentralised regional
government. But Ethiopia has yet to successfully manage its democratic transition. The Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took power in 1991 and have held it since then. Ethiopia has a
capable government that is demonstrably committed to addressing poverty, with an impressive record of
pro-poor spending, sound financial management and relatively little corruption. Prime Minister Meles and
others in GoE play a role on global issues, including climate change, reform of the international financial
architecture, and global health.
Ethiopia has made impressive progress towards the MDGs. In the last five years, with substantial support
from the UK and others, Ethiopia has: halved the incidence of malaria; deployed 32,000 more health
extension workers; doubled the immunisation rateii; rolled out an innovative social safety net to protect
almost 8 million of the most vulnerable peopleiii; and put 4 million more children in primary schooliv. Strong
macroeconomic leadership has helped Ethiopia achieve annual growth of over 7 per cent for the last
decade. GoE’s new Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) targets a doubling of the economy and
achievement of the MDGs by 2015, and a greater (if still limited) role for the private sector and accelerated
industrialisation. The GTP provides a platform to align UK support with GoE’s ambitions, make it more
transformational, and accelerate Ethiopia’s graduation from aid dependency.
Despite recent progress, Ethiopia remains one of the world’s poorest countries, with more than 30 million
people living in extreme poverty. It is comparatively under-aided, receiving less than the African average
per capita aidv. Strong progress towards some of the MDGs is from a very low base, and will be difficult to
maintain as the needs of harder to reach populations are prioritised. Population momentum will see the
current estimated population of 83 million people rise to around 120 million by 2030vi, which is likely to be
accompanied by rapid urban growth. Ethnic nationalism and underdevelopment fuel instability and
insurgency in parts of the Ethiopian periphery, threatening the delivery of Ethiopia’s development
objectives. External shocks, including climate change and fluctuating commodity prices, threaten growth.
Ethiopia can absorb more aid and use it well. DFID is a leader within the development community,
championing results, aid effectiveness and transparency. DFID works closely with UK Government
partners in pursuit of shared objectives for a stable, secure and prosperous Ethiopia.
A2. Sector context and need for intervention
There are a number of overarching but linked reasons for engaging in the security sector in Ethiopia.
First, there is abundant global evidence of an association between high levels of crime and insecurity, and
poverty (eg World Bank 2011; Kaufman and Kraay 1999; Ball et al 2007vii). DFID Fighting poverty to build a
safer world: A strategy for security and development (2005) is based on the recognition that development
and security are linked: violent conflict destroys life and development; slow or uneven development fuels
fragility and conflict. The Geneva Declaration estimates the cost of lost productivity from non-conflict or
criminal violence at between $95 -163 billion per year. Crime affects the poor disproportionately. Given that
the ability to work and earn income is often the most valuable asset of the poor, violent crime not only
restricts movement in high crime areas but can also result in a loss of opportunities as businesses choose to
relocate (e.g Louw & Shaw 1997)viii. DFID’s Building the State and Securing the Peace (2009) policy paper
identifies security and justice issues as ‘state survival functions’, a reflection of their essential importance to
the fundamental purpose of an effective state.
Conflict prevention in the Horn of Africa is a commitment in DFID’s Structural Reform Plan, and important to
UK national security objectives. In recognition that development, politics and security are linked, DFID’s
strategic approach has consistently involved a whole-of-government approach: this includes paying greater
attention to the regional dimensions of insecurity.ix Stability in the Ethiopia’s Somali Region and Oromiya, in
particular, is important to this. GoE is now starting to shift from military to development-led solutions to
address instability and rebel groups but there is much more to be done at a strategic level.
At federal and regional level, Ethiopia faces significant challenges in security and justice provision. A local
study (Woreda and City Benchmarking Survey 2011) finds that only 24% of people interviewed said that they
trusted the police ‘a lot’. 24% also believe that police ‘are involved in corruption’. In Ethiopia’s Second
Corruption Perception Survey (2012) commissioned by the Ethiopian Anti Corruption Commission, the
judicial system as a whole was likewise poorly trusted by the vast majority of respondents.x Finally, the
Bradford perception survey (2009) commissioned by HMG found that in some areas, substantial proportions
of people perceive themselves to be at security risk from state security forces. Thus, although the Ethiopian
police and defence forces are considered amongst the best in the region in terms of effectiveness and with
some respect for human rights, clearly more needs to be done in a number of areas to improve their capacity
and accountability at federal, regional and local levels so that people perceive the security forces as
providing a service to them, not a threat.
These challenges all underline the importance of supporting security sector reform. Security sector
management is the over-arching framework within which programming to improve service delivery is set.
Without people-centred, development-oriented security policy (development and implementation), any
improvements on the ground are likely to be ad hoc and unsustainable. Poor overall security sector policy,
planning and implementation results in a more insecure environment for people (especially poor people) in
which their access to services and livelihoods is constrained. Security and development are closely
associated. A better security policy environment will be important for Ethiopia to meet its broader Millennium
Development Goals.
The new National Security Strategy flags 3 new strategic policy goals for the country: sustainable
development, poverty eradication and good governance. This new strategic direction is different to previous
national security documents, which focused on traditional security threats such as the threat of external
terrorist groups such as Al-Shabab, and issues relating to stability along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. The
historical state-focused approach tends to exacerbate grievances, as is happening in the Somali Region.
The strategy is supported by initial but limited awareness of the necessity of providing security for the
population of Ethiopia including marginalised groups such as women and youth, not just for the state and
party.
Transformation of the security sector needs to start at the centre and be championed at the highest levels
but with a background of guerrilla fighting there is little experience in the armed forces or civil service to lead
and manage it. Although the transformation has already begun through the advances made through the
previous provision of an MSc in Security Sector management to 48 students in two cohorts, a critical mass
has yet to be achieved at senior and middle ranks. The previous cohorts, however, have opened up the
space, and future cohorts will therefore be working with the grain of progressive change. For example,
milestones already achieved in Cohort 2 include:





40% of the students demonstrate a critical understanding towards the evolving security and
development debates.
Cross-government meeting held in one policy area to promote enhanced dialogue
17 good pieces of evidence-based critical analysis based on the completion of two foundation
modules.
10 further students demonstrate proper use of Project Management frameworks
10 further students demonstrating the proper use of strategic planning tools and frameworks
The Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence (EMOND) and the military, in particular, is keen to be more
informed about management of the sector and originally asked for an MSc course to be put together by
Cranfield University (CU). The Minister of Defence and Chief of Defence Staff were insistent that the course
be UK-accredited to start off with high standards that they intend to maintain. Top level staff attended the
first (ACPP-funded) MSc course, whilst the second course was funded from DFID Ethiopia, and included a
wider mix of students from senior and mid-levels in a range of government ministries, as well as senior
police and military personnel. Feedback is that it has overwhelmingly satisfied their requirements and their
commitment is evident. An independent evaluation confirmed that milestones are being met and the course
is achieving its objectives. EMOND is now requesting a further three years of funding in order to build on the
success of the programme and develop a critical mass of trained officials across the sector.
A3. Why DFID’s intervention is justified
A history of engagement
The Ethiopians view the UK as their partner of choice in the security sector. The UK/DFID has some history
of intervening in the Ethiopian security sector including:
- A large police train-and-equip programme (mid 1990s)
- An institutional appraisal of Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence
- A study visit to the UK for the National Security Adviser and other senior justice officials (2011)
- A needs assessment and functional review for a National Security Council Secretariat
- Advice on security legislation for National Intelligence and Security Service and generic training
- Support to Ministry of Federal Affairs on conflict management
- Support to EMOND on functional reform and capacity building (HRM, logistics, financial management and
procurement) – ACPP funded
- Study on the Security Needs of the Poor by University of Bradford (2008)
- PSCAP support to the justice sector (2004-2009)
- Election security support to the Federal Police (2010)
- MSc in SSM delivered to 48 top level military and civil servants in two cohorts – (2010, ACPP funded,
2011, DFID funded) by Cranfield University (CU)
Maintaining and building on early success: the MSc programme to date
In order to address the challenges outlined in section A2 above, DFID Ethiopia is currently funding the
second year of delivery of an MSc in Security Sector Management (SSM) to senior and mid-ranking officials
in the Ethiopian government. The Executive MSc in security sector management aims to utilize education as
a tool for reform by teaching theoretical and practical perspectives both relevant to public sector reform in
general, and security sector contexts specifically; the instruction is guided both by global theory and practice
in the new public management paradigm as well as the local conditions and structures in place in Ethiopia
where local reform is underway.
The first year of the MSc was funded from the Conflict Pool. Officials on the MSc include government
ministers, the head of the armed forces, and other senior staff from ministries of defence (EMOND), justice,
federal affairs, revenue and customs, and the federal police. The course has been extremely well received
by participants. The second cohort is funded by DFID, and includes a wider mix of grades (senior and midranking) and ministries. There is a greater proportion of civilians (as opposed to military officials), wider
ownership across the various security sector institutions, and a stronger focus on inter-governmental
coordination. The Ethiopian Government remains very proud of the Course and retains a significant amount
of ownership by providing a local administrator, drivers, a well-equipped training institute and catering
facilities and a number of staff which support the on-site administrative and information technology support.
In this context, capacity is gradually being developed to support wider cross-Government training and
education programmes in the future.
In October 2011, we received an independent evaluation of the MSc, conducted mid-way through the
second cohort. The relatively early timing for this (before the dissertations of Cohort 1 have even been
submitted) was necessary in order to permit us to consider further funding with adequate time to actually
enable successful delivery of funds if we wish to pursue this course of action.
The evaluation notes that the programme is well on track to reach all of its intended outcomes, and is
already meeting the various milestones expected to date. The report highlights that this relatively small
investment (c. £643,000 per year) creates goodwill and opportunities for meaningful HMG dialogue with key
GoE interlocutors around professionalism and accountability within the security sector. The evaluation
identifies evident synergies with DFID’s wider programme, for example with the new Community Security
and Justice (CSJ) programme and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS).
HMG will work closely with GoE in developing selection criteria for the students themselves. Issues such as
gender balance and diversity, sector mix, levels of seniority and career opportunities, and capability
(including English language skills) will all be considered. Whilst GoE will make the final decision on
nominations, it has agreed to factor in any HMG considerations that may be raised.
The strategic capacity-building element is also realised in the institutions in which the students are
employed. As Government ministries and agencies enhance their own professional capacities and transition
into democratic institutions, SSM students find themselves leading and ‘coaching’ on the development of
strategies in areas such as human resources, financial management, change, performance, governance and
domestic security. By leading in these critical areas, important training and mentoring-by-leading takes
place, thereby creating a programme multiplier effect. This effect results in the creation of value for money.
In sum, the report recommends further funding of the course for three years. Funding a further three Cohorts
will increase the pool of graduates who are able to use knowledge gained from the MSc to help effect policy
change and promote good governance, transparency and accountability of the security sector. The
continuation of the programme permits the development of a critical mass of trained individuals within the
security sector, across different grades and sectors. This will help promote a greater sense of common
purpose across the security sector, and thus greater consistency in the emerging policy framework and its
implementation at different levels - increasing the likelihood of transformational impact.
Sustainability of impact
Maintaining and developing the progress of the five cohorts will be a critical issue for HMG when the
proposed new programme comes to an end. A responsible exit strategy for HMG is essential. A capacitybuilding programme with the Ethiopian Civil Service College (ECSC), supported by the selected service
provider, is therefore being proposed. This institution will then be well placed to continue with delivery of the
various modules of the Executive Masters after the proposed programme has finished in 2017. The ECSC
has been recommended by Senior Ethiopian Government officials as being the most appropriate ‘likeminded’ partner that has the capacity not only for academic excellence but also for the delivery of quality
Executive part-time post-graduate programmes which cater for busy Government officials. Initial discussions
with the President of the ECSC have led to a commitment in principle to taking forward the proposed
capacity-building strategy, and to hosting the MSc SSM programme at the ECSC in the future. In this
context, ECSC has proposed a partnership approach between the preferred service provider and the
College’s Institute of Leadership and Good Governance. Based on the multi-disciplinary focus of the
Institute (i.e. management science, political science and policy studies), this seems highly relevant and
appropriate.
Links to other HMG/ DFID strategic priorities
The proposed 5-year funding to support a further 3 cohorts of senior and middle management
representatives from across the Ethiopian security sector on an MSc SSM programme provides a real
opportunity to support meaningful security reforms and the longer-term capacity to ensure that generational
change continues across the sector. The MSc SSM programme also supports wider cross-Government
objectives for the reduction of poverty and national growth targets, many of which require security and
stability as a pre-requisite for further development.
The continuation of the MSc in SSM is intended to complement the Community Security and Justice
programme (CSJ - currently in design phase) by providing a better over-arching security policy context. The
latter will be generated through a greater number of highly-skilled senior and mid-ranking officials across the
security sector, working in a more coordinated fashion, and using best-practice approaches. This high level
transformation process will then be complimented by the more bottom-up community-focused nature of CSJ.
The Peace and Development Programme also stands to benefit in the same way.
By increasing the interface between HMG staff engaged in CSJ and the students on the MSc, relevant
lessons from the former can be fed into MSc discussions. Equally, the senior and influential officials on the
course are likely to be well disposed towards engagement with HMG staff on a range of security and justice
issues that will be relevant to our programming.
Working across Whitehall is a permanent feature of DFID’s strategic approach to engagement in fragile
states. For example, DFID (2005)xi commits to ensure policy coherence across Whitehall – noting that
“in countries where we have a bilateral programme, we will base our policies on a common analysis that
includes contributions from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD), the
Cabinet Office and other relevant Departments”. This principle also comes out strongly in the UK 2009
White Paper Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future, in which the UK government
pledges, amongst others, to develop new joint government strategies in fragile countries xii.
Defence Section: the delivery of this MSc would contribute to three of the core objectives of Defence Section
in Ethiopia. These are: encouraging defence reform; assisting Ethiopia to develop an effective counter terror
capability; and maintaining Ethiopian confidence in UK Defence as a trusted and reliable partner.
FCO Democracy and Good Governance: DFID support for the MSc course would complement FCO’s focus
on political governance, in particular the democratic governance strategy and its objectives around
promoting and upholding human rights, strengthening service delivery and deepening understanding and
knowledge of context.
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
The impact from this project is a people-centred approach to security sector management driven from
the highest levels of the Ethiopian Government. The course will affirm to the top levels in the security
forces the need for change, the benefits of security sector transformation and offer sound methodologies for
how to implement it, as well as managing the sector more generally. It will introduce the rationale for
ensuring the security of all citizens, including the marginalised, as well as the state. This type of reform will
progressively promote increased accountability and responsiveness. The continuation of this relevant and
strategic education course will provide strong building blocks towards Ethiopian top level security sector
officials delivering a transformed security sector that no longer appears daunting and oppressive but works
for people and the state. Early and limited investment in influencing high level officials will help to ensure the
success of work to deliver more ambitious change in the Community Security and Justice programme.
The outcome of this programme is the creation of a cadre of highly educated senior and mid ranking
officials, able to develop and implement a coherent approach to security sector management. This
will include, amongst others, skills in critical analysis, policy development, cross-government harmonisation
and strategic planning. By equipping around 100 students with these skills, we can realistically expect to see
a change in the way that security sector policy is developed and implemented. Even with reasonably high
levels of staff movement and turnover, a critical mass of reform-minded officials will remain in key posts
across the sector. Exposure to theories and ideas which are discussed within an Ethiopian context is needed
to provide a solid background for students to use critical analysis skills in assessing the right approaches to
major transformation issues such as policy development and cross-government harmonisation. The right
technical abilities such as performance management and project management are required to ensure
accountability in the process.
By introducing an institutional capacity building element to the programme, which will focus on developing
the capacity within the Ethiopian Civil Service College to deliver the various modules of this Security Sector
management Masters to senior and mid-ranking government officials, we also expect to achieve greater
sustainability of the impact of this programme.
Appraisal Case
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic case?
This business case explores options for helping the GoE to increase its ability to meet the security
needs of its people in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound governance principles,
including transparency and the rule of law. Given that there is huge capacity gap in security
management in Ethiopia, capacity building at various levels is of paramount importance. In order to
facilitate country-driven transformation of the sector, it is most realistic to target available resources at
senior and mid-ranking federal level officials.
A generic security sector reform capacity-building programme is one option for consideration. However,
there are various reasons why we would not choose to pursue this option: transaction costs for DFID
staff would be extremely high in designing and managing this programme (it would not be suitable for
contracting-out to a management agent in the current context); and the programme would duplicate
some of the functions being developed in the new Community Security and Justice (CSJ) programme.
It should be noted that the CSJ is a more progressive, bottom-up and holistic alternative (in line with
DFID’s latest policies on justice) to a more traditional security sector reform programme (such as was
common some ten years ago). It will encompass those elements of reform with security sector
institutions that result in most positive outcomes for poor people. In sum, strategic capacity building of
security sector institutions (principally at local and regional level) will be embedded within CSJ, and is
not necessary to duplicate here. However, CSJ will not include a specific focus on security sector
policy development, or target senior/ mid-ranking professionals specifically.
Bearing in mind the above, possible options to achieve the intended outcome and impact include shortterm training in security management; a Diploma programme; advanced degree at Bachelors’ level; or
MSc in security management.
Considering feasibility issues, however, shorter–term training and diplomas hold little interest (and
would lead to lower uptake) as they have less academic weight. Moreover, short term training is often
criticised for failing to lead to significant change in knowledge, skills and behaviour. Since most of the
selected officials already hold undergraduate degrees, and could not anyway commit to a three year
undergraduate training programme, a Masters degree is the only realistic and feasible option for further
appraisal. There is a very clear value placed by GoE on Masters degrees accredited in UK, as opposed
to locally.
Based on careful assessment of need and feasibility, the following four feasible options for Masters
Programme in Security Sector management were considered:

Masters in Security at the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa

MSc in SSM conducted by Cranfield University in UK

MSc in SSM conducted by Cranfield University in Ethiopia

Do nothing counterfactual
1. Masters in Security at the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa
Apart from the University of Cranfield there are only 2 other similar courses available globally: one
is the US and one is South Africa. The US option is discounted immediately for high cost reasons.
The Witwatersrand course costs approximately £24,534 per person including travel,
accommodation and subsistence, and lasts three years.
2. MSc in SSM conducted by Cranfield University in UK
This would be a more traditional approach to capacity building whereby students follow the MSc
based in the UK for 12 months alongside other international students. Cost is £31,588 per student
including travel, accommodation and subsistence.
3. MSc in SSM conducted by Cranfield University in Ethiopia (plus capacity building
Ethiopian Civil Service College)
This is the option that HMG have used so far. A total of 16 Cranfield and other academics visit
during the two year period for each cohort to deliver the course with travel and subsistence costs.
GoE contribute some costs ‘in kind’ (eg venue, food, transport etc). Cost is £18,375 per student
(there are no further travel and accommodation costs anticipated).
Also included in this option is a capacity-building programme with the Ethiopian Civil Service
College. Cranfield University will work closely with a number of ECSC staff (eg through partnership,
guest lecturing, provision of MPhil in SSM for the ECSC academics if desired, etc) and by year 2,
will have developed a detailed plan – reflecting GoE demand – for the forward agenda. This would
be dependent on GoE demand and commitment to future financing of the course.
4. “Do nothing” counterfactual
Under this option, DFID will stop funding subsequent cohorts at the end of the current MSc in SSM
course.
Note that embedding this MSc into the Community Security and Justice programme is not considered
an efficient way of managing the programme. Cranfield University (CU) already have their own
management systems and established relationships with GoE, which are working well and not incurring
heavy transaction costs for DFID staff. Moreover, the selected Management Agent for CSJ would then
apply management charges to the MSc, on top of CU’s charges, which would not be good value for
money. Finally, the complexity of the CSJ may mean that the Business Case takes considerable time
to approve, whereas the GoE are expecting the next cohort of the MSc to start in Oct 2012, for the
sake of smooth transition, and considerable time is required to nominate and agree students etc.
Other UK universities that might be prepared to offer this course were considered. However, the GoE
has already developed excellent working relations with CU, and would be unhappy to have to start a
new relationship from scratch with a new service provider. Other ‘new’ service providers would face
high transaction costs in getting such a course started, which would lead to at least a year of delay.
And in addition, we would then have very little evidence with regards to the likely success of the
course, as a brand new offer. For these reasons, this possibility was not pursued.
Theory of Change & Assumptions
Snapshot Theory of Change:
By developing a cadre of highly educated senior and mid ranking officials, able to develop and
implement a coherent approach to security sector management, we will help to create an enabling
environment for implementing security measures that respect human rights, facilitate and encourage
development and reduce conflict. A people-centred approach to security sector management, driven
from the highest levels of the Ethiopian Government, will enhance the longer-term democratic
governance of the security sector and contribute to wider regional peace and stability in the Horn of
Africa.
MSc Security Sector Management (SSM)
Programme – Theory of Change
Inputs
Funding for MSc
SSM
and CapacityBuilding
Programme
Outputs
Key senior officials
across the security
sector possess the
knowledge and
skillsets to manage
more effective and
well-informed
institutional policies
and strategies.
Outcomes
Creation of a sustainable
cadre of highly educated
senior and mid ranking
officials, able to develop and
implement a coherent
approach to security sector
management.
Ethiopian Civil
Service College
enabled to deliver
Masters Course in
SSM
There is often limited
knowledge of the range
of skill sets and
approaches required to
address reform-related
challenges
Senior leaders in developing countries
value accredited education
opportunities
Sustainable change can
only take place by
promoting ‘generational
change’; transferring
capacity to a local
institution is likely to
continue promoting
change in the long-term
future.
Impact
Super goal
People-centred approach to security
sector management, driven from the
highest levels of the Ethiopian
Government
Political will
continues to exist
for security sector
transformation to
take place
Greater peace and
stability in the Horn
of Africa region
Associated growth
and poverty
reduction outcomes
More effective and
better informed
security policy and
strategy will address,
and resource, key
issues impacting on
national security and
development
Education is an important tool
for reform, enhancing quality
shared dialogue amongst
national and regional
stakeholders
Enhanced knowledge of ‘global
practice’ and simulated trials of
methodologies/management
skillsets will lead to improvements
in the workplace
Theory of Change Narrative:
Inputs:
The programme offers a permissive and conducive environment for meaningful debate, shared
knowledge and the opportunity to build relationships with other national and regional security sector
decision-makers, which will support more consensual and better informed policymaking in the future.
The curriculum includes issues such as human rights and international humanitarian law, conflict and
climate change, protection of vulnerable groups, etc.
The selection of students is very important. First, in terms of their seniority. Within the Armed Forces
(who retain most of the course seats), two groups of people are needed to work together to make an
effective force: the “conceptualisers” who have ideas and make plans, and the “operators” who
implement the plans. The leaders at the top bring the two groups together. Leaders can and do come
from both groups. By mixing officials from different sectors and from senior and middle grades in situ in
Ethiopia (where they can apply their learning directly to their day jobs and reflect on it in real time), we
expect to achieve a greater sense of common purpose and consistency in the emerging security policy
framework and its implementation at different levels. Although we will not manage to include all the key
senior staff across the security sector within the group of 100 students over the next three cohorts, we
should achieve enough to form a critical mass that can achieve change throughout the organisation
due to their levels of influence, their networking opportunities facilitated by the course, and due to the
continued strong political buy-in for the course and its acquired learning and skillsets.
Outputs
Programme outputs include both critical learning, products and events that can inform the security
sector transformation process as a whole (eg workshops, articles and essays), and the approx 100
individuals who have developed new skillsets and knowledge will then be tasked with applying these
skills and actually facilitating that transformation. The acquisition of management skillsets in the field
will also encourage a better evidence-based approach to analysis supporting policy decisions, as well
as associated accountability measures.
MSc programme will educate participants to develop and implement strategic security sector plans and
analyse, communicate and evaluate the broader implications for related areas within state, regional
and local community frameworks. By the end of the MSc, students will be able to:

Display knowledge of the actors, processes and structures across a state’s wider security sector;

Understand the skill-sets required to implement the effective governance of national security
policy and resources;

Fully comprehend the way in which national security requirements and development priorities are
managed in a mutually supportive way;

Develop transferable skills in areas such as strategic management, human resource
management, financial management, project management and risk management;

Critically analyse and evaluate strategic national security policy, donor policy and a development
agenda;

Produce coherent and rigorous security strategies, programme plans, change management
schemes and performance assessment criteria;

Implement and control national security plans within identified constraints;

Understand and implement the linkages between security sector management and national
development programmes;

Understand and implement the linkages between human rights, the rule of law and management
of the security sector, particularly with reference to vulnerable groups and gender issues;

Plan and implement more sophisticated approaches to good practice and lesson learning;

Understand and analyse the security sector and the international and legal political environments
in which it operates; and

Critically evaluate scholarly research papers in security sector management.
All students will be trained in all areas but not all will be able to apply it to a high standard in practice,
since this will depend on their specific posts, seniority, individual strengths and capacities, and the
specific environment in which they are operating which will vary by individual and institution.
Outcomes
The sustainable cadre of highly educated senior and mid ranking officials, able to develop and
implement a coherent approach to security sector management, is greater than the sum of the parts.
Education in leadership, decision-making and policy-making across the Ethiopian security sector
(including the capacity of civil society groups) will also enhance the plurality of actors who influence
planning across the security sector. Just as important as the skillsets and knowledge are the networks
between course participants that are developed in the course of the MSc, providing them with support
and alliances – at the most senior levels – to help them implement the changes that they have studied
upon their return to their day jobs. This impact will have a wider effect not only across different areas of
government but also on the approaches taken by regional partners. By drawing on regional
representatives from both Ethiopia and neighbouring countries, a larger constituency and network is
built which supports more professional and well-governed security institutions.
Ultimately, the MSc program aims to provide both education and training to a diverse group of actors
involved in Ethiopian security reform, from top government officials to support administration staff,
offering high-level and practical skill sets to all students and instruction methods to conceive, plan,
implement and run responsible and reliable reform programs within Ethiopia’s justice and security
sectors, programs that adhere to international standards of human rights and fully consider public
reform impact on its citizens.
Critically, the knowledge transfer to the Ethiopian Civil Service College with regards to delivery of
Security Sector Management modules will promote sustainability of the programme and gains made
over the five HMG-supported cohorts. As responsible donors, it is essential that HMG considers its exit
strategy and the options for shoring-up the gains made within the security sector. In a complex political
governance context, this is a very important issue (see covering submission for more details).
Impact and super-goal
The people centred approach to security sector management, driven by the highest levels of the
Ethiopian government, is the desired impact of the programme (understood, however, that the impact
lies outside the gift of the programme alone). It relies on the continued commitment to security sector
transformation by the Government (see assumptions section below). The programme should make a
strong contribution to the achievement of this impact, however, by providing both the skills, knowledge,
trained individuals, ‘cadre of professionals’, and on-going dialogue and discussion with most senior
levels of government with regards to the value of a professional, modern, accountable security sector.
The super-goal, likewise outside the gift of the programme alone, is nevertheless increasingly
achievable with a professional, modern, accountable security sector. Strengthening the stability of
Ethiopia’s security situation is an important element in maintaining peace and stability in the region as
a whole, given the regional significance of Ethiopia at every level (including counter-terror). And there
is plenty of evidence (see strategic case) linking improved security and justice with poverty reduction
and growth outcomes.
Evidence underpinning theory of change
The section below summarises the evidence that underpins the key assumptions highlighted in the
Theory of Change. We should note that the concept of security sector reform is complex and its
implementation not systematically practiced or understood; therefore, any literature on security
sector reform, the education of its active implementers, or its implementation per se, is scarcely
published and often only anecdotally understood.
1. Senior leaders in developing countries value accredited education
Notwithstanding the enormous experience of many of the Ethiopian’s senior security leaders, and the
education gained from previous post-graduate degrees, such participants are interested in acquiring
relevant frameworks and methodologies used to address today’s security and development-related
challenges and to organise thought processes. Such approaches, tools and skillsets also enable
decision-makers and managers to undertake better evidence-based policy-making/strategy
development, and therefore the more efficient and effective resourcing of security-based institutions.
This facilitates improved democratic governance of the sector and an enhanced and better functioning
culture of oversight.
The evidence from experience on Cohorts 1 and 2 demonstrates that places on this course are highly
sought after. Only a very small number of students have dropped out, and even then this has been for
reasons outside their control (eg transfer to an overseas Peace Keeping role). Lewer (2011) notes:
“Word is getting out that this is a good course to be admitted to that is beneficial in being exposed to
ideas and knowledge that is helpful for national policy formation, and also for career prospects in the
security sector”. Thus the popularity of the course is evident. The GoE’s on going commitment to the
Cranfield model is also a reflection of their commitment to (internationally) accredited education.
Many political leaders and senior ranking officials in Ethiopia have undertaken internationally
accredited studies such as Masters and PhDs, a further demonstration of the importance awarded to
education within the leadership. An example is the deputy commissioner of the Ethiopian Federal
Police who is currently undertaking a PhD with a UK based university.
2. There is often limited knowledge of the range of skill sets and approaches required to address
reform-related challenges in Ethiopia
Evidence for this is provided by assessments conducted by Cranfield University during cohorts 1 and 2
of learning needs of students. Further (verbal) evidence to this effect has been provided by UK
Defence Attache who is attending the current MSc cohort 2, and is thus well familiar with the strengths
and weaknesses of his peers in the classroom.
Evidence can also be found in the profile of many of the military students, who have a background in
guerrilla fighting and were heroes of the civil war leading to the overthrow of the Derg regime. This
background – which is not universal, but certainly true of a number of the existing military high
command – obviously implies considerable hands-on experience in the security sector, but not
necessarily exposure to issues around best practice in security sector reform and the required
knowledge and skillsets to create a professional, modern, accountable fighting force.
The case study by Awortwi (2010), although focused on conditions in Mozambique, lends strong
and balanced arguments for the support of educational and technical programs that emphasize
global and local learning for Ethiopian officials active in government reform. Such programs aim to
teach practical-skill competencies to support and administrative staff, as well as critical-thinking
and policy reform implementation principles to staff and senior management.
3. Sustainable change can only take place by promoting ‘generational change’; transferring capacity to
a local institution is likely to continue promoting change in the long-term future.
Ball et al (2007), in an evaluation of security sector interventions by HMG, also firmly endorse this
assumption: “…achieving positive impacts requires …well designed, locally owned and financially
sustainable programmes and projects.” (p 15)
Given a certain amount of fluctuation within senior staff in the security sector (estimated as about
20% per year joining or leaving), it is evident that the gains made in cohorts 1 and 2, and then 3- 5,
will need to be sustained by on-going capacity building. HMG does not plan to resource this
beyond the existing programme of three further cohorts. It is therefore essential to promote
sustained generational change through transferring capacity to an indigenous institution that can
continue to provide this kind of capacity building and education. Evidence that this is a responsible
and effective model for shoring-up such gains and promoting generational change can be found in
the following literature:
If generational changes refers to the degree to which new ideas are sustainable and are shared
across ranks of personnel and levels of seniority, understanding communication and institutional
memory is important (Rogers 1995)xiii. This assumption may be distantly related to certain theories
of organizational behaviour change (i.e., social norms, Kurt Lewin’s “force field analysis”).
Awortwi's case study of Mozambique lends evidence that building local capacity, and expanding
that capacity by creating localized, capacity-building structures, is important for promoting change
for policy itself and encouraging structural/cultural adoption of that reform.
4. Enhanced knowledge of ‘global practice’ and simulated trials of methodologies/management skillsets
will lead to improvements in the workplace
Lewer, N (2011) Cranfield University MSc Security Sector Management (Ethiopia). Consultancy
report. Evidence underpinning this assumption is explicit in this report, which refers to Cohorts 1
and 2 of the HMG funded MSc in SSM in Ethiopia. This evaluation clearly documents the way in
which students are achieving the various milestones based on their learning from the first two
Cohorts supported. Specific examples include findings that ‘learning on the MSc has supported
deeper and more nuanced dialogue and innovative thinking for the purposes of policy and
project/programme planning…. [and] has translated into a better understanding of regional policy
development and relationships with neighbouring countries. This regional engagement has now
been formalised in wider diplomatic objectives, and is connected with analysis at the local and
national levels’.
However, it is important to recognise that there is plenty of evidence that training in isolation does
not lead to improvements in the workplace. Examples of this span many different sectors, from
media training to public sector reform. Although one study has shown that increased tertiary
education of the general public can be associated with countries’ economic growth, little evidence
was found to demonstrate that tertiary education of government leaders produces the same
degree of economic growth or development (Bloom, Canning, & Chan, 2005 xiv). The risk identified
is that mid-career students - senior officials and executive leaders – who are extracted from their
‘day jobs’ will return to their in-country posts confronted by tension and competition within the
existing local structures, neither of which support or nurture (let alone implement) their newly
learned skills or knowledge. This disconnect between further education of upper-level government
officials and the implementation of reform is especially deconstructive when such educational
opportunity is unevenly distributed within a government's agencies, including both leaders and
supporting practitioners, without the co-occurrence of other supporting, structural changes
(Awortwi, 2010).
Awortwi (2010) draws on evidence from several countries to argue that competence training for
public servants would have to be linked with other aspects of human resource management such
as salary increment, promotion, placement, utilization, and other incentives before it can become
an important motivating factor for improving public sector management. He cites a study by
Tassema et al. (2005) showing that a major challenge facing the government of Eritrea is how to
effectively utilize ex-trainees.
This evidence further supports the approach taken in this MSc programme to train a critical mass
of government employees, with full support from the most senior levels of the security sector, in
order to ensure that knowledge acquired on the course can be applied in real time. The Masters
course in itself addresses the very issues that the research flags as critical – e.g. human resources
management, incentivisation, institutional change etc – so that the students are equipped to then
address such issues.
The research supports the assumption with evidence demonstrating that students, and the
programs built to educate them, extract meaningful and practical value when they collaborate on
framing global practice within local context by extracting utility of global methods tailored for the
specificity needed for local structures undergoing reform (Awortwi, 2010).
In sum, the evidence suggests that whilst education of the powerful does not necessitate reform
"for the better," nor does it guarantee that leadership enforces human rights protections or the
prevention of criminal or corrupt practices within its operations (Law 2010), it can do so when it
forms part of a wider enabling context/ reform programme.
5. Political will continues to exist for security sector transformation to take place
Chapman and Vaillant (2010), in their evaluation of DFID country programmes in fragile states,
provide some supporting evidence for this assumption. They note:
“SSR is an endogenous process, which requires a realistic timeframe to change behaviour.
Ultimately success in this sector hinges principally on government goodwill and with it, readiness
by law enforcement officials to respect, as well as enforce, the rule of law.”
This comment, drawing upon evidence from 9 DFID country programmes, is a clear endorsement
for the need to think beyond short-term capacity building (often the norm in security sector
support), and to work with multiple security sector institutions. Widespread, senior political buy-in
is essential.
On-going discussions by HMG with the Minister of Defence (EMOND) and Head of Armed Forces
indicate clear commitment to the course and to its core messages around security sector
transformation. This first-hand, direct evidence is vital for the continuity of this programme. Moreover,
EMOND provides significant resources in kind to the course itself (estimated value of £100,000 per
cohort), a demonstration of commitment that matches the verbal pledging. Finally, the publication of the
new National Security Strategy, reflecting the kind of transformational objectives very much at the heart
of SSM, are a further indication that the political will for reform remains firm.
6. Education is an important tool for reform, enhancing quality shared dialogue amongst national and
regional stakeholders
Harris and Lewer (2008) report that there is a growing literature related to education in conflict and
emergency situations (Anderson et al. 2006; Bekerman and McGlynn 2007; Bensallah et al. 2000;
Davies 2004; Salomon, 2004; Seitz 2004; Sibbons 2004; Tomlinson and Benefield 2005). Although
most of this is concerned with primary and secondary education, it points towards the recognition of the
role of education in promoting and helping to establish sustainable peace by the dozens of nongovernmental organisations and international donors who currently support and fund peace education
programmes.
Bezes et al. (2011)xv contrast two “ideal types” of professionalismxvi in the public service sector,
organizational professionalism and occupational professionalism. The authors provide evidence
that this kind of professionalism requires long-term education:
“Occupational professionalism is characterized by a discourse constructed within
professional occupational groups and incorporates collegial authority. It involves relations
where employers and clients trust practitioners. Authority is based on practitioner
autonomy, discretionary judgment, assessment, particularly in complex cases. Such
authority depends on common and lengthy systems of education and vocational training
and the development of strong occupational identities and work cultures” (p. 334).
A case study by Nicholas Awortwi (2010)xvii of Mozambique's implementation of public sector
education and training programs, lends strong, research-based evidence and insight on the benefit
of educational/training programs for successful public sector reform. Awortwi utilized desk
research of global reform strategies in conjunction with his personal experience and expertise in
observing public sector reform within Mozambique. He argues that “of all the capacities needed to
build an efficient and effective developmental state, the most critical is the capacity of higher-level
civil servants – the top technical and administrative personnel (Brautigam, 1996; Grindle,1996;
World Bank, 1997)" (p. 730). While he concludes that training/education necessarily contributes to
responsible and humane reform efforts, he very clearly states that education alone is not a solitary
solution for implementing successfully humane, progressive reforms within developing African
nations. This points towards the complementarity of the MSc programme with the wider security
and justice programming that DFID E is planning to implement through the Community Security
and Justice and Peace and Development Programmes.
There is also some evidence from HMG-supported efforts to promote security sector transformation in
Sri Lanka through MSc delivery to senior officials in the sectorxviii. Harris & Lewer (2005) and Harris &
Lewer (2008) provide evidence that: “in conflict or post-conflict situations, formal tertiary-level peace
education programmes are important. This is because they provide local stakeholders with a safe
educational space – one in which they can engage and experiment with the discourse of peace without
overtly political implications. Such programmes also help develop peacebuilding capacity by offering
people the necessary knowledge with which to analyse and think about the causes, management,
resolution and transformation of violent conflict in a depoliticised, safe and educationally rewarding
context.”
Focusing specifically on the Ethiopian security sector context, further evidence is found in Lewer, N
(2011) Cranfield University MSc Security Sector Management (Ethiopia): Consultancy report in an
evaluation of Cohorts 1 and 2 of the HMG funded MSc in SSM in Ethiopia, which identifies “increased
co-operation between the police, army and border agencies (which have always been large,
independent organisations) in approaches to crime and terrorism. This has meant better joint
responses to threats… Interviews with senior officers show that learning on the MSc has supported
deeper and more nuanced dialogue and innovative thinking for the purposes of policy and
project/programme planning”.
7. More effective and better informed security policy and strategy will address, and resource, key
issues impacting on national security and development
Evidence for this within the Ethiopian security sector is provided by Lewer (2011) which examined
cohorts 1 and 2: “The MSc course content has fed through into the three new strategic policy
objectives (poverty eradication, sustainable development and good governance) of the national
security strategy, broadening it out from a previous focus on military objectives with respect to
Ethiopia’s position towards Eritrea, border security, and deterring fundamentalist activity” (p 7).
Practice-based education and training geared towards problem-solving is highlighted in the
literature as an essential element of effective management within a reform context. (See also
response to assumption #4.) Training upper and lower level officials together could help to mitigate
problems of communication across rank structure and better “diffuse” reform and strategic
management “innovation." This is where organization theory may apply; in particular, theories
developed by Everett Rogers (1995)xix on “diffusion of innovations” and "critical mass" are
particularly useful:
“Diffusion is “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over
time among the members of a social system.. (p. 35). Critical Mass occurs at the point at which
enough individuals have adopted an innovation so that the innovation’s further rate of adoption
becomes self-sustaining” (p. 313).
Note that in this case, we plan to train 100 senior and mid-ranking officials. It is not feasible to try and
quantify in percentage terms as to what a ‘critical mass’ would be, but combined with the c. 60 officials
trained on Cohorts 1 and 2, and bearing in mind the very senior levels of authority of a good proportion
of these (ie people who will then be in a position to demand change throughout their departments/
divisions/ ministries), we believe that the learning and skillsets will become self-sustaining.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
In the table below the quality of evidence for each option is rated as either Strong, Medium or Limited
Option
1
2
3
4
Evidence rating
Weak
Medium
Strong
Limited
The evidence base for option 1 is weak because we have never funded any Ethiopian officials to
complete the S African Masters, and cannot verify as to the quality of the training and its real relevance
to security sector officials. Clearly, it would not be tailored for the Ethiopian context, and therefore we
can confidently speculate that the Ethiopian students would have less opportunity for grounding
theoretical discussions in their own reality at every point during the class. Moreover, as only a limited
number of Ethiopian students would be able to attend the course, it would be hard to achieve the
desired inter-sectoral mix of professionals all working to develop a common understanding and
approach to drive change in the sector. Moreover, we do know that the Ethiopian government request
is specifically for a UK-accredited option, so we can be confident that this Masters course would not
meet demand from our counterparts. There would also be no way of linking it to existing Ethiopian
institutions in order to consider sustainability and exit strategy.
The evidence base for option 2 is medium because we have had some experience of the Cranfield
course as delivered in the UK, owing to the fact that 5 students from the existing cohort were sent to
UK for one week of training. We know that the same quality of the course delivery would be achieved
as with option 3. And we also know the precise costs, having had confirmation of this directly from the
course organisers. However, the latter have confirmed that they could not give availability to all 35
students of each year’s Ethiopian cohort, since they also need to meet demand from other quarters. In
addition, they could not insist that most discussions were focused on the Ethiopian context, due to the
range of different students from other countries. As only a limited number of Ethiopian students would
be able to attend the course, it would be hard to achieve the desired inter-sectoral mix of professionals
all working to develop a common understanding and approach to drive change in the sector. So, the
evidence is fairly good, indicating that this option would have some benefits, but would not offer
enough spaces or be Ethiopia-focused enough.
The evidence base for option 3 is strong because HMG has already funded 2 cohorts, and we have
received an independent evaluation of the course in Oct 2011 indicating that all milestones are being
met and that the course is extremely well received. We know the service provider, and are confident
that Cranfield is able to deliver the course successfully, and to respond to any changes that we request
in terms of course contents, etc. The quarterly report from end 2011 provided evidence through the
modules’ consolidated validation forms that over 90% of the class rated both modules as being either
‘Excellent’ or ‘very good’. The scores for the Administration supporting the course were also very good
and indicative of a steady and ongoing improvement from module to module. We also have strong
evidence that the Cranfield University lead on this –Ann FitzGerald – is extremely well-connected to the
security sector officials and happy to promote HMG relationships with them. The evidence is strong,
and the option is our preferred one.
The evidence for the successful development of an MSc in SSM at Ethiopian Civil Service College is
somewhat weaker. This will depend on GoE demand, and although we are confident that at present
GoE is keen on this option, we will need to make a judgment based on the mid term evaluation with
ministers nearer the time. Cranfield University has plenty of capacity to deliver the capacity building
programme, but the evidence lacking to date is a firm commitment by GoE that it will be prepared to
cover the costs of continuing to educate officials in SSM after CU (and DFID funding) is withdrawn.
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for each
feasible option?
Categorise as A, high potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity;
C, low / no risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
Option
1
2
3
4
Climate change and environment risks Climate
change
and
environment
and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
B – medium/manageable risk
C – no opportunity
B – medium/manageable risk
C – no opportunity
B – medium/manageable risk
C – low opportunity
C – no risk or impact
C - no opportunity
The principal environmental risks of the various options involve the flights of the students (in options 1
and 2) and course lecturers (in option 3) to and from Ethiopia. These risks are all minimal. We will
ensure that economy class tickets are used rather than business class, reducing the carbon costs.
The principal opportunity is to be found in option 3, which is the MSc delivered by Cranfield University
in Ethiopia. Here, the opportunity relates to the introduction of a new component in the MSc that would
consider the links between climate change, climate security, conflict and the security sector. Climate
change and environmental destruction are already understood as major sources of conflict and
insecurity, especially in the Horn of Africa. The security sector has an important role to play in
understanding this agenda, ensuring that policy and practise adequately respond to these challenges,
and even taking a specifically pro-active role where relevant (for example, the role of one Ethiopian
military brigade in rehabilitating degraded land won them the National Green Award (2011). Inculcating
such forces with environmental and climate change ideals and values could have a substantial impact
on nearby communities due to the extent of their influence. The possibility of including this topic in the
existing course was flagged in the independent evaluation of the existing Cranfield MSc delivered in
Ethiopia, and is an issue to which Cranfield University are open for discussion. If it were to be explored,
it would result in a better understanding within senior levels of GoE of the links between climate
change/ security, and could bolster the existing GoE commitment to the climate change agenda.
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
Option 1 University of Witwatersrand - Costs per cohort:
i)
Costs
 Flights to Johannesburg are approx £616 return and this may be necessary four times
during the course totalling £86,240 for 35 students,
 Course - £8,000 per student or £280,000 for 35 students,
 Accommodation – approx £260 per month or £109,200 per year for 35 students,
 Subsistence – £30 per day per student or £383,250 for 35 students for a year


Cost of replacing senior level staff in Ethiopian government post - unknown
Total - £858,690 per cohort (known costs only)
There would also be an administrative burden of booking courses, flights and accommodation as well as the
burden of replacing staff. Students selected would be less likely to be key senior level officials as GoE would
not wish to have them absent for one year (this would be a significant cost to the GoE). GoE is likely to reject
this option as not meeting their criterion of a UK-accredited course.
This option does not include any capacity building of an indigenous Ethiopian institution that could help
support an exit strategy of HMG support in three cohorts time.
ii)
Benefits
The benefits of this option are that senior and mid-ranking officials across the security sector in GoE are
educated and skilled in security sector management. This Option in particular offers the benefit of a strong
African focus, beyond that of Ethiopia, with discussions likely ranging around a number of different contexts.
o Direct benefits:
 Greater accountability within security sector
 Stability and improved resource reallocation effects
 Meaningful dialogue with key Government of Ethiopia interlocutors
 Synergies with DFID’s and HMG’s wider programmes (eg Community Security and
Justice, Peace and Development Programme, MoD engagement)
o Indirect (long term) benefits
 Growth & Poverty Reduction outcomes (improved security is associated with growth
and poverty reduction) – see strategic case.
iii)
Balance of Costs versus Benefits
The benefits of this option outweigh the costs, if the GoE were to approve a non-UK-accredited course and if
GoE were to permit the absence of so many key officials during the course. The transformational potential of
educating selected security sector officials in the value of security sector reform is highly significant, even if
the longer-term capacity building of a local institution were absent. For a relatively small sum, security policy
in Ethiopia would benefit significantly, leading to a pro-poor and pro-development national security policy
benefitting millions of Ethiopians.
Option 2 Cranfield University UK - Costs per cohort:
i)
Costs
 Flights to London are approx £668 return and with four trips per course this totals £93,520
 Course £15,500 per student or £542,500 for 35 students
 Travel and Subsistence cost per student is £15,420 per student or £539,700 for 35 Students
 Cost of replacing senior level staff in Ethiopian government post - unknown
 Total £1,175,720 per cohort (known costs only) – (No capacity building of ECSC)
Usually there is only capacity on courses to take a few students of each nationality so would not be able to
take 35 and therefore reducing the spread and impact of the course. Costs of replacing staff for one year has
not been costed but likely to be substantial and with considerable administrative burden. The course would
not be tailored to meet Ethiopian demand specifically.
ii)
Benefits
The benefits of this option are that a limited number of senior and mid-ranking officials across the security
sector in GoE are educated and skilled in security sector management. This option also offers the benefit of
being a UK-accredited course, which answers the demand from GoE. Cranfield University are well known to
HMG, and can be relied upon to deliver a high quality course. Relationships already exist between Cranfield
and HMG and GoE. This option does not include capacity building of an indigenous Ethiopian institution to
deliver the modules after the end of the three cohorts.
o
o
Direct benefits:
 Greater accountability within security sector
 Stability and improved resource reallocation effects
 Meaningful dialogue with key Government of Ethiopia interlocutors
 Synergies with DFID’s and HMG’s wider programmes (eg Community Security and
Justice, Peace and Development Programme, MoD engagement)
Indirect (long term) benefits
 Growth & Poverty Reduction outcomes (improved security is associated with growth
and poverty reduction) – see strategic case.
iii)
Balance of Costs versus Benefits
The benefits of this option do outweigh the costs, albeit the costs are significantly higher than options 1 and
3. The transformational potential of educating selected security sector officials in the value of security sector
reform is highly significant, even if the longer-term capacity building of a local institution were absent. For a
relatively small sum, security policy in Ethiopia would benefit significantly, leading to a pro-poor and prodevelopment national security policy benefitting millions of Ethiopians.
Option 3 Cranfield University deliver MSc in Ethiopia - Costs per cohort:
i)
Costs
 Travel and Subsistence £1,246 per student per cohort which totals £ 43,600 including flights from
London to Addis Ababa return (Note: T&S for the Ethiopia MSc delivery model is based on the total
cost of Academic travel (£43,600) split between 35 students)
 Course fees £12,486 per student or £437,010 for 35 students (NB there is marginal cost variation
between the three cohorts so we have taken Cohort 4 fees (the most expensive) as average.
 Course materials- £1,220 per student or £42,700 for 35 students
 English Language and in country support - £30,000
 Capacity Building to Ethiopian Civil Service College (ECSC)- £81,190
 Evaluation per cohort £8,620
Average cost per cohort is £643,125 for 35 students (including capacity building of ECSC)
ii)
Benefits
The benefits of this option are that senior and mid-ranking officials across the security sector in GoE are
educated and skilled in security sector management. This option also offers the benefit of being a UKaccredited course, which answers the demand from GoE. Cranfield University are well known to HMG, and
can be relied upon to deliver a high quality course. Relationships already exist between Cranfield and HMG
and GoE. There would be space for at least 35 students per cohort, and although around 30 would be
Ethiopians, approximately 5 spaces would be offered to other African students (as suggested by GoE) in
order to benefit both from Ethiopian focussed discussions but bringing in some examples from other
countries (this mix has been very successful in the existing cohort).
GoE will pay for the venue, student accommodation, food and travel during teaching periods, and some
dissertation costs, providing both better value for money for HMG, as well as guaranteeing buy-in at both
individual and corporate levels. Contribution in kind is estimated at approx £100,000 per cohort.
This option allows students to maintain their day jobs and to start using new skillsets and knowledge
immediately. Upon completion of the Masters, they would also benefit from ownership of a laptop, ensuring
their on-going access to information and materials beyond the end of the studies. This option is also
significantly cheaper than the overseas options.
Finally, this option includes a significant capacity building initiative (of Ethiopian Civil Service College) which
is not included in any other option, but is critical for sustaining and developing the progress made during
Cohorts 1-5. This provides significant value for money. It also presents a striking alternative to the normal
Defence Diplomacy and Chevening Scholarships approach, the impact of which is extremely difficult to track.
The capacity building programme envisaged in this option will be easier to monitor and assess impact.
o
o
Direct benefits:
 Greater accountability within security sector
 Stability and improved resource reallocation effects
 Meaningful dialogue with key Government of Ethiopia interlocutors
 Synergies with DFID’s and HMG’s wider programmes (eg Community Security and
Justice, Peace and Development Programme, MoD engagement)
 Provides significant value for money compared to the other options
 Capacity development of Ethiopian Civil Service College
Indirect (long term) benefits
 Growth & Poverty Reduction outcomes (improved security is associated with growth
and poverty reduction) – see strategic case.
iii)
Balance of Costs versus Benefits
The benefits of this option certainly outweigh the costs. The transformational potential of educating selected
security sector officials in the value of security sector reform is highly significant, and bolstered still further by
the capacity building of a local institution. For a relatively small sum, security policy in Ethiopia would benefit
significantly, increasing the likelihood of a more pro-poor and pro-development national security policy
benefitting millions of Ethiopians.
Option 4 Do nothing
i)
Costs
No monetary costs. However, a critical mass of trained officials has not yet been established, and, with
turnover and movement of the alumni, the overall effect of two years of HMG funding will be very diluted.
Without this important contribution to security sector transformation, it is difficult to see how GoE will turn
desired reforms into progressive policy and implementation. No other institution in Ethiopia currently has
capacity to deliver this training. Stopping the course also means that there will be less goodwill and
opportunities for meaningful HMG dialogue with key GoE interlocutors around professionalism and
accountability within the security sector. Other programmes such as Community Security and Justice and
Peace and Development Programme would also potentially lose out as HMG loses dialogue opportunities at
senior levels within ministries.
ii)
Benefits
The benefits are that DFID E could save almost £2 million to be put to an alternative use. We would also
save in terms of human resources inputs.
iii)
Balance of Costs versus Benefits
The costs of doing nothing significantly outweigh the benefits. Doing nothing would have major implications
for other parts of DFID Ethiopia programming, including our Community Security and Justice programme
and Peace and Development Programme. Also, for wider HMG interests including those of MoD. We
strongly recommend against this option.
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the intervention?
Monetary costs are as follows:
Witwatersrand MSc
Delivery
Cost
UK MSc
Delivery
Cost
Ethiopia MSc Delivery
Cost
Student Fee
£8,000
Student Fee
£15,500
T&S
TOTAL
£16384
£24,384
T &S
TOTAL
£15,420
£30,920
Student Fee
T&S and other capacity building
supports to ECSC*
TOTAL
£12,486
£5,887
£18,375
* T&S for the Ethiopia MSc delivery model is based on the total cost of Academic travel (£43,600) split between 35 students
D1. Economy
When the aggregate costs of each MSc option are calculated, option 3 (Cranfield University delivery in
Ethiopia) is clearly significantly cheaper per student. As denoted in the table above, the figures for
comparison show that the cost per cohort per student of Ethiopia MSc delivery is less by £6,009 and
£12,545 from Witwatersrand and UK MSc delivery respectively.
There is one caveat of this estimation. This relates to the fact that it is not possible to assess the cost of the
students’ absence from their jobs, in the case of sending them overseas for the duration of the Masters in S
Africa or in UK. This costs represents another significant cost burden that would need to be considered in
assessing best VfM, further bolstering the cost savings of option 3.
D2. Efficiency
Option 3, the preferred option, provides a significant system-strengthening function by building up local
capacity to deliver security sector management training. The Ethiopian Civil Service College is an important
institution with close links to the Ministry of Defence, and has demonstrated its interest in being part of a
capacity building programme. The capacity building envisaged would mean that HMG support to this
Executive Masters could cease after three further cohorts in the confidence that opportunities for continuous
professional development of the sector could continue in a sustainable fashion.
In terms of efficiency, training the GoE officials in-country is also a significantly more efficient option, since
GoE is not then obliged to recruit temporary replacements for absent officials. The only travel and
subsistence costs are therefore for the tutors, and are significantly less than for an entire cohort of students.
D3. Effectiveness
The effectiveness of the intervention will be tracked through the LogFrame monitoring and evaluation
process. Milestones reached will reflect whether the programme constitutes an effective use of resources.
An independent evaluation will be conducted at the mid-way point and at the end of the programme.
Outcome indicators in the LogFrame include 75 (incl 8 Female) educated students from Cohorts 3-5 with
relevant background and practical management-related skillsets to support implementation of security sector
management programmes; 36 graduated students able to influence policy, processes and behaviour at their
levels of civil service, police and military; and the Ethiopian Civil Service College being ready to launch a
locally owned, local award bearing, post-graduate degree course in Security Sector Management. Over the
duration of the programme, we would expect to see some strong home grown security sector policy
emerging.
The evaluation of Cohorts 1 and 2 found the following:
23 out of 27 students on Cohort 1 are expected to complete their dissertation and be awarded an MSc.
The annual review (Mar 2012) of Cohort 2 showed that all outputs are scoring minimum A, and in some
cases A++.
We will continue to track progress against these and similar measures, and look for a significant increase
measurable impact.
Cranfield University will also be tasked with some light-touch research into the question of the effectiveness
and impact of delivering in-country en masse education to Ethiopian students, versus the impact of the non
Ethiopian students (approx five from diverse countries and backgrounds): this research will address the
question of the value-added of mixing sectors and grades of Ethiopian officials, and whether this facilitates
the likelihood of transformation of the security sector, as opposed to the impact of the non-Ethiopians when
they return to their parent institutions.
Equally, the quality and frequency of HMG engagement with the security sector and key ministries involved
in the MSc (EMOND, MoFA, ERCA, MoJ, EFP) will also provide a helpful reflection of whether the MSc is
facilitating dialogue with key senior counterparts in GoE.
D4: Cost Effectiveness
The number of additional staff trained through this programme is approximately one hundred.
The Ethiopian Civil Service College will also receive significant capacity building through the programme.
Other direct benefits include:
 Greater accountability within security sector
 Stability and improved resource reallocation effects
 Meaningful dialogue with key Government of Ethiopia interlocutors
 Synergies with DFID’s and HMG’s wider programmes (eg Community Security and
Justice, Peace and Development Programme, MoD engagement)
 Provides significant value for money compared to the other options
 Capacity development of Ethiopian Civil Service College
Indirect (long term) benefits include growth and poverty reduction outcomes (improved security is associated
with growth and poverty reduction – see strategic case). Although not quantified, the various benefits
enumerated above would generate more than one pound return for each pound invested in this programme.
D5: Possible VfM indicators to be tracked over time
The following value for money indicators will be tracked over the life of the programme.
 Travel cost per cohort (NB tutors will be travelling, not students, therefore for purposes of this
indicator cost of overall travel will be split between total number of students)
 Course cost per student
 Overall cost per cohort
These indicators will be developed further, and new indicators added during the implementation of the
programme. Tracking of the VfM indicators will be made through a combination of regular project monitoring
and through the results framework for the overall programme. Where relevant, Vfm indicators will be
compared with other similar programmes in Ethiopia or elsewhere.
Cranfield University will be delivering this programme, and will provide annual assessments of value for
money by comparing overall course costs with existing options (as per options 1 and 2 in this business case)
as well as any other emerging options over the period of the programme. When Cranfield procures laptops
for each of the students, it will also ensure that value for money considerations are paramount.
E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
Option 3 is the preferred option. Not only is it the lowest cost option, it also offers the best value for money
for a number of reasons:
 Allows students to continue with their day jobs
 Clearly meets existing demands from GoE
 Allows Ethiopia and broader regional contextualisation within the course,





Is validated by the first and second cohort of students,
Is UK-accredited which is a GoE criterion,
Allows GoE to pay for the venue, student accommodation and travel which will be much cheaper
than if DFID were to cover this and encourages GoE buy-in to the course
Permits the development of sustainability strategy in terms of discussions concerning Cranfield
franchising the course to a local partner, Ethiopian Civil Service College, and the capacity building of
a local partner to deliver the course after this three year period is completed
The course is endorsed by Minister of Defence and Chief of General Staff who are students on the
first course and therefore providing a strong incentive for other students to attend and complete it.
Funding a further three Cohorts will increase the pool and critical mass of graduates who are able to use
knowledge gained from the MSc in SSM to help effect policy change and promote good governance,
transparency and accountability of the security sector that is appropriate for the Ethiopian political
environment at this stage of its transformation towards a democratic structure.
Funding a further three Cohorts will give sufficient time to plan an exit strategy that is transparent and
understood by all the stakeholders.
Funding a further three cohorts is good VFM because the initial investment of time and resources in
establishing the course (especially the investment of time by HMG staff in making this possible) has been
reasonably heavy. The further three cohorts wll build on those gains already made, helping to shore up and
accelerate momentum for change within the sector as initiated in cohorts 1 and 2.
Developing capacity of ECSC ensures progress made can be built upon in the future, at no further expense
to HMG.
Commercial Case
Direct procurement
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
The intervention will not require any contracts to be issued to Cranfield University. Rather an accountable
grant arrangement letter has been issued to Cranfield University to support cohort 2 and an amendment to
this arrangement will be made for subsequent cohorts. Cranfield University has a Not for Profit status so is
eligible to be funded through an accountable grant arrangement.
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial advantage for
DFID?
There are limited commercial providers of MSc in Security Sector Management. In comparing fees and
implementation modalities, we have assessed Cranfield University’s delivery of the MSc in Ethiopia as being
the best option in terms of impact, cost effectiveness, efficiency etc. Within this option, we will ensure that all
travel is on the cheapest economy flights available, and the procurement of laptops will also be done as
cheaply as possible (but retaining attention to issues such as quality, reliability, maintenance etc).
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
Provision of MSc courses in Security Sector Management is limited to 3 organisations as outlined in the
options section of the BC. The market place does not adequately address the need for this course and
therefore this intervention is the only feasible option.
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value added and how will
we measure and improve this?
The expected cost per student is £18,375. This will be used mainly for tutors’ fees (£12,486), travel costs for
28 flights and other expenses such as accommodation and subsistence totalled £1,246 per student per
cohort (these travel and accommodation expenses will be incurred by the tutors, but have been calculated
per student in order to get a useful comparator for other options). Course fee and travel costs are calculated
based on the proposal from CU . In both instances, allowances have been made for a small increase in fees
and travel costs for the duration. eg Course fee per student per cohort are £12,000, £12,378 and £12,978 for
the three cohorts respectively, ie £326 allowance per student for increase in course fees each year. (DFID
E’s in-house travel agent has quoted us a flight cost of £547 - £590 per flight whereas CU proposal is
£650. This means that £100 allowance is included in the budget for increase in air fares over the
programme period.
Cranfield University will provide capacity building support to the Ethiopian Civil Service College during this
period with a cost of £81,190 per cohort (£2,320 per student) and monitoring and evaluation cost of £8,620
per cohort (£246 per student).
Cranfield will also provide English language induction and workshop and in country support for the students
at a cost of £30,000 per cohort.
The value of this programme cannot be quantified as there are no other providers other than the tutors to
implement it but this can be put into perspective by comparing this intervention to a scenario where there are
no other providers. Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence (EMOND) is providing flight, transport, food,
student accommodation, venue and administrative support worth approx £100,000 per cohort.
Value added will be measured by the outcome of the course namely the number of people who pass the
course and value would be improved through experience and learning.
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
There will not be a procurement process to be put in place to support contract award as an accountable
grant has already been put in place.
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life of the
intervention?
Cranfield University’s performance will be monitored by the Governance Adviser and Deputy Programme
Manager for the duration of the initiative through milestones i.e quarterly reports from Cranfield with
students’ progress as well as performance indicators such as number of students and grades of
performance.
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
Only academic institutions are able to provide the requisite expertise and rigour needed for an MSc. The
proposal has been initiated by an academic institution so no competition is required. Academic institutions
have charitable and non-profit making status so require an accountable grant.
B. Value for money through procurement
The supplier has already been tested and found highly satisfactory by GoE and HMG, using high quality
academic staff. This has been endorsed in the initial independent evaluation report carried out in 2011. The
course is run at a cheaper rate per student than in UK so savings are being made despite the offset costs of
flights and accommodation for tutors. The cheapest flights at economy rate will be booked for the dates of
the course.
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate forecasting?
£1,929,375 million for 2012-2016
Core
delivery
costs
Capacity
Building
Evaluation
budget
Total
Cohort 3
2012-2014
£536,300
Cohort 4
2013-2015
£553,100
Cohort 5
2014-2016
£570,545
£112,384
£80,982
£50,204
£12,930
£12,930
£647,012
£633,679
£648,684
Funding is currently available within the agreed resource allocation for the Governance and Security team for
this Spending Review period. However, since each Cohort lasts two years, this programme will run into 2017,
and therefore approval is sought to extend into the next spending period.
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
Programme costs - although laptops which will be used by students will be purchased (with the view of
transferring ownership to the students). Note that student ownership of laptops would be conditional on
completion of the course, and provides a further incentive for students to complete the study programme.
C. How will funds be paid out?
Funds will be paid out through an accountable grant with quarterly payment arrangement in arrears upon
receipt of a detailed statement of actual expenditure during the previous quarter as well as request for funds.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
Cranfield University will submit annual audited reports for each year covered by the accountable grant,
signed off by the finance officer on behalf of Cranfield University and be certified by Cranfield University
auditors as being a true reflection of the organisation’s finances for the appropriate period.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
Cranfield University will submit quarterly financial and narrative reports and there will be a joint end of year
review between Cranfield and DFID. An independent evaluation will be carried out at the end of the three
years.
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
DFID is funding the delivery of an MSc course to the GoE. GoE has already clearly stated their preferred
option of using the University of Cranfield to deliver it and have tested the course once already to their
satisfaction. The course was reviewed once with the student body and feedback was overwhelmingly positive
for 8 out of 9 modules with some small amendments that have already been implemented.
The Governance and Security team will manage the project. The governance adviser will be responsible for
the oversight of progress for the programme in collaboration with Cranfield University and provide relevant
advice, eg ensuring a mix of students from across the security sector including civil service, police, military and
justice dissertation options etc. Defence section will provide point of contact for ensuring the smooth running of
the course.
General Samora, head of Armed Forces, and the Ministry of Defence (Ethiopia – EMOND) are the primary
interlocutors for this initiative, although several other ministries will also be sending students.
A Memorandum of Understanding will govern the agreement between DFID and GoE (signed by Ethiopian
Ministry of Defence). The agreement with Cranfield University is governed by an accountable grant.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
This programme is medium risk. The risks identified and mitigation measures are as follows:
i) Inappropriate students may be put forward for the course (academically, linguistically or in terms of their
career point). English language testing will be arranged in advance for any students who are thought to have
an insufficient working ability which may also indirectly address the other two areas. Certificates providing
evidence of students having taken a post-grad or undergraduate programme taught in English or otherwise
demonstrate good English academic writing and understanding will be sought. GoE has final decision over
who should attend the course, and UK influence is limited, but we are working with GoE on a list of criteria for
consideration. To date, the overwhelming majority of students sent on the course have been suitable. A small
number have failed their English language tests.
ii) Due to Ethiopian security sector sensitivities, there is a risk that students may be inhibited from examining
the political nature of the sector in relevant dissertations. Previous cohorts have not found this inhibition to be
too problematic, although there is variation in the degree to which each student feels comfortable articulating
his or her views (mainly varying according to seniority). The non Ethiopian students, and the mix of different
sector representative, have apparently been very important factors in helping breakdown such inhibitions.
iii) Risk that theories and approaches encountered on the course are not used in practice. GoE appears keen
to use the course and anecdotal evidence as well as the independent evaluation suggest that it is already
being put into practice. On-going feedback from the course participants regarding relevance of the teaching to
their jobs will also provide an opportunity for monitoring and, where relevant, adapting the course focus.
iv)Risk that students could gain a masters degree and then leave the government for the private sector. The
course is aimed at senior and mid-ranking officials with a stake in their career and (future or actual) senior
level appointments. This, combined with possible unwillingness from the top of the sector to let their staff go,
means that students are likely to stay on. A small level of turnover is inevitable, but to date the vast majority of
former students have either remained in post or been moved to other strategic posts in government. A small
number have left government for various reasons.
v) Risk that capacity building of Ethiopian Civil Service College cannot be carried out due to directorial
changes outside CU control. Although preliminary investigation and discussions suggest ECSC is the most
appropriate and promising institution in which to invest capacity building efforts, it is possible that a decision is
taken within GoE or the institution itself not to prioritise the investment of staff time that the capacity building
programme involves. Every effort will be made to engage with ECSC on an on-going basis even before the
beginning of the capacity building programme is due, and to ensure GoE remains enthusiastic about the
proposed handover to this institution.
The human rights assessment has been completed, and risk mitigation agreed. On balance, we believe that
the benefits in terms of realisation of human rights outweigh the risks, such that we are happy to go ahead with
the initiative.
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
N/A
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
An independent evaluation will be conducted mid-way through the programme as well as after the course has
finished, assessing how the acquired skills and information are being used. The cost of these evaluations is
integrated into the project (12,930 pounds each).
Funding a further three Cohorts will enable a ‘longitudinal’ study of the impact of Cohorts 1, 2 and 3 (and to
some extent Cohort 4). This impact would be captured in the mid-term and final independent evaluations. This
in itself will be a valuable contribution to the impact assessment literature and contribute to providing DFID
with a more accurate assessment of the value of funding such programmes.
The logframe is the principal mechanism through which the programme will be monitored, and through which
Cranfield University will be accountable. The independent evaluation team will need to be sufficiently wellversed in the context and sector to be able to make judgments as to whether qualitative aspects of the
programme’s indicators (eg what constitutes a strategic policy document) have been achieved.
Logframe
(see attached annex 1)
Quest No of logframe for this intervention: 3455189
i
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iii
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v
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vi
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vii
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ix
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x
The findings clearly suggest a significant credibility gap between the public and the judiciary. All four subsamples show that only a small minority of respondents have faith in the fairness of the justice delivery
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courts to the federal supreme court. A little over two-fifths of the household respondents considered both the
federal high court (43%) and the federal supreme court (42%) as fair in most instances or at all times.
xi
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xii
Chapman and Vaillant (2010) Synthesis Of Country Programme Evaluations Conducted In Fragile States.
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xiv
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xv
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xvi
It must be recognized that the "ideal" typologies they conceive are born from and within Western, postindustrial societies and not developing African nations undergoing major social, political and justice reform.
Therefore, neither typology should act as unilateral evidence that education enables public sector reform
through the different improvements education may provide to professional actors.
xvii
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xviii
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xix
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