CMSP Case Neg
Notes:
Navy: The weakest points are the “space key to military” because alt causes
overwhelm and it is common sense that it will dramatically decline navy.
Biodiversity: Warming thumps pretty hard on the coral reefs – also, their evidence
indicates the plan probably does nothing to prevent fishing, but just regulate it – that
is probably not enough and will be a significant ecosystem stressor.
CX: Executive order 13547 has already passed and it dealt with spatial planning – how
would your plan action improve that?
When has federal regulation of state-own activity ever worked out?
Frontlines
Navy F/L
Naval readiness low now – Budget cuts undermine training.
Alexander 13 David Alexander, an editor and reporter in Washington and writer for Reuters, “U.S. Naval Development, Readiness
Eroded by Budget cuts: Navy Chief”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/19/us-usa-defense-navy-idUSBRE96I18O20130719
Budget cuts have prompted the U.S. Navy to trim the number of warships deployed overseas and
eroded the readiness of forces at home, undercutting its ability to respond rapidly to future crises
around the globe, the top Navy officer said on Friday. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the chief of naval
operations, said the Navy had an aircraft carrier strike group and an amphibious assault ship with U.S.
Marines in the Arabian Sea. A similar group of ships is in the Western Pacific, he said. In the event of a
crisis, however, the Navy has only one fully prepared carrier strike group and one amphibious assault
group in reserve that it could rush to the scene. By comparison, the Navy a year ago had three of each
that could have been used. "The rest of the fleet is not ready to deploy with all the capabilities that are
needed that we would normally have in our fleet response plan," Greenert told a Pentagon briefing. The
Navy has had to cut training and maintenance because of spending reductions to the point where
many other ships and personnel are not fully certified for all the tasks they might ordinarily have to
handle, he said. The Navy chief voiced his concerns about readiness during a news conference to discuss
the state of the Navy several months after the Pentagon was ordered to cut $37 billion in spending
when it was nearly halfway through the fiscal year. The across-the-board cuts, known as sequestration,
took effect in March after Congress and the White House failed to find another way to reduce
government deficits. "Since sequestration sort of set in ... we're down about 10 ships from ... several
months ago, forward deployed," Greenert told reporters. "So there is an impact." Greenert said the
Navy was working with the Pentagon and Congress to try to shift some of its funding between accounts
so it could be used to offset training shortfalls. A similar move helped the Air Force resume flying some
of its grounded planes. He said the Navy still had 95 combat ships deployed abroad to support the
Afghan war, conduct routine operations and respond to other crises. The total fleet is 286 ships. The
number of warships in the Pacific and Mediterranean has risen slightly because of the U.S. strategic shift
to the Asia-Pacific and instability in the Middle East. The number of U.S. combat vessels has fallen
slightly around Africa and the Indian Ocean. The Navy no longer has any combat ships in Latin America.
He said the military had other vessels and air operations in Latin America and would occasionally send a
combat ship there. "But I'm not trying to tell you there isn't reduced presence," Greenert added. "There
is reduced presence there." SCRAMBLING TO CUT SPENDING The Defense Department has been
ordered to slash its spending plans after a decade of war that saw military budgets rise dramatically,
contributing to huge federal deficits. The Budget Control Act of 2011 called for the Pentagon to cut
projected defense spending by $487 billion over a decade. It also approved an additional $500 billion in
across-the-board spending cuts unless Congress and the White House could agree on an alternative
package of cuts and revenues to reduce deficits. No deal was reached, forcing the Pentagon to scramble
to reduce spending. It cut training, grounded air squadrons and canceled ship deployments. Some
680,000 civilian defense employees were hit with 11 days of unpaid leave through September 30, the
end of the fiscal year, an effective 20 percent pay cut for 11 weeks. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel
toured bases across the Southeast this week, delivering the sobering news that the department next
year will likely face a further $52 billion in sequestration cuts, which were not factored into the
Pentagon's proposed $526.6 billion budget request for 2014.
Air power renders navy obsolete in solving sea conflict.
Dyer & McGregor 7/10 Geoff Dyer, Former Financial Times writer and author of “The Contest of the Century” – a survey on
Chinese development in seas, and Richard McGregor, the chief political correspondent, Japan correspondent and China correspondent for The
Financial Times, “Pentagon plans new tactics to deter China in South China Sea”, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/83c0b88e-0732-11e4-81c600144feab7de.html#axzz38RLXm8Mu
“This is a new dynamic,” said a former Pentagon official familiar with the operation. “The message is, ‘we know what you are
doing, your actions will have consequences and that we have the capacity and the will and we are here’.”
A spokesman for the US military’s Pacific Command said that “we do routine operations in these waters and airspace on
a regular basis”. More extensive use of surveillance aircraft in the region could be coupled with a greater willingness to publicise images
or videos of Chinese maritime activity. Some US officials believe the Chinese might be given pause for thought if
images of their vessels harassing Vietnamese or Filipino fishermen were to be broadcast. The US military’s
Hawaii-based Pacific command has also been asked to co-ordinate the development of a regional system of
maritime information, which would allow governments in the western Pacific detailed information about the location of vessels in the
region. Several governments say they have been caught unawares by the surprise appearance of Chinese ships. The US has supplied
the Philippines, Japan and other countries in the region with improved radar equipment and other
monitoring systems and is now looking for ways to build this information into a broader regional network that
shares the data. The Pentagon has also been working on plans for calculated shows of force, such as the flight of
B-52s over the East China Sea last year after China declared an exclusive air defence zone over the
area. The potential options involve sending naval vessels close to disputed areas. US officials say that there is little appetite within
the administration for some of the more confrontational ideas that have been proposed as a means of
deterring China. These include deploying the US coast guard to the South China Sea to counter the activities
of Chinese civilian vessels and using US-led convoys to escort fisherman from the Philippines and other nations into areas where they have
been expelled by the Chinese. The Obama administration declared South China Sea a US “national interest” in 2010. Since then it has watched
China take effective control in 2012 of Scarborough Shoal, 120 nautical miles west of the Philippines’ main island, Luzon. As well as the
altercation at the Second Thomas Shoal this year, Manila has accused Beijing of reclaiming land for a runway in a disputed area while China has
also placed an oil rig in waters also claimed by Vietnam. Despite
Chinese complaints, the US has long conducted aerial
surveillance in the region, although the use of its new generation of P-8A planes in contested areas
represents an intensification of the activity. Bonnie Glaser, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
said that the surveillance flights showed that the US “has an interest in peaceful resolution of these disputes and
opposes China’s coercion”. However, she added: “I’m sceptical such flights will deter Chinese behaviour.” The
Philippines wants to increase its surveillance capabilities to help it shine the spotlight on what it sees as provocative Chinese actions in the
South China Sea.
South China War Unlikely – Plan would result in more tension.
Morris 14 Ian Morris, is Jean and Rebecca Willard Professor of Classics and Professor of History at Stanford University and a Fellow of the
Stanford Archaeology Center, “Sea Change: Asia’s Cauldron by Kaplan”, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/books/review/asias-cauldronby-robert-d-kaplan.html
The parallel Kaplan draws is straightforward and convincing. Between 1898 and 1914, the United States
defeated Spain and dug the Panama Canal. This allowed Americans to link and dominate the trade of the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, transforming the meaning of geography. “It was domination of the Greater
Caribbean Basin,” Kaplan concludes, “that gave the United States effective control of the Western
Hemisphere, which, in turn, allowed it to affect the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere.” In a
rather similar way, he suggests, the South China Sea now links the trade of the Pacific and Indian
Oceans; consequently, “were China to ever replace the U.S. Navy as the dominant power in the South
China Sea — or even reach parity with it — this would open up geostrategic possibilities for China
comparable to what America achieved upon its dominance of the Caribbean.” Because of this, the
South China Sea is “on the way to becoming the most contested body of water in the world.”
Throughout the book, Kaplan tempers hard-nosed geopolitics with an engaging mix of history and
travelogue (no reader is likely to forget his evocative comparisons of Hanoi and Saigon or his description
of Borneo’s water villages) and also stresses the differences between the two cases as well as the
similarities. Probably the biggest of these differences is that in the 1890s the revisionist power in the Caribbean — the United States — was militarily stronger than Spain, the status quo power, whereas in
the 2010s the revisionist power in the South China Sea — China — is militarily weaker than America,
the status quo power. Kaplan is surely right to conclude from this that Beijing is unlikely to risk a
military showdown involving Washington any time soon. Instead, he tells us — mixing historical
analogies slightly — that China will “Finlandize” Southeast Asia. Confronted by the same kind of
pressure that the Soviet Union applied to its Scandinavian neighbor during the Cold War, Southeast
Asia’s governments “will maintain nominal independence but in the end abide by foreign policy rules
set by Beijing.” Because Finlandization is so different from the way the United States threw Spain out of
the Caribbean in 1898, the outcome will differ too. “But,” Kaplan concludes, “the age of simple
American dominance, as it existed through all of the Cold War decades and immediately beyond, will
likely have to pass. A more anxious, complicated world awaits us.” These sentences might tempt readers
to lump Kaplan into the company of “declinists,” writers who rejoice in announcing the imminent fall of
the American Empire, but that would be too simple. Kaplan is in fact a leading proponent of the theory
of international relations known as realism, which traces its ancestry back nearly 2,500 years to
Thucydides. Kaplan is explicit about his intellectual debt to this tough-minded ancient Greek and, like
him, glories in stripping away fondly held illusions to reveal the harsh reality of governments nakedly
pursuing their own self-interest without concern for values, beliefs or ideology. It is realism that keeps
Kaplan’s book so refreshingly free of the breathless “oh my God it’s worse than you think” prose style
that mars so much Western writing on the rise of China. In its place, however, realism encourages a
Thucydidean detachment that some readers will find even more alarming. But that, Kaplan says, is the
way it has to be, because the struggle over the South China Sea is going to be detached and
unemotional. America’s struggle with the Soviet Union raised great moral issues and fired the passions
of all involved; but it has proved hard to invest the South China Sea with the same philosophical
freight as the Berlin Wall, despite the best efforts of some. (While writing a column for a newspaper —
not this one — a few months ago, I was firmly informed that the editor wanted “less history, more scary
stuff about China.”) “The fact is,” Kaplan observes, “East Asia is all about trade and business.” The
heroes in Kaplan’s story are hard, pragmatic men who recognize this, men like Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew
(“head and shoulders above most other leaders worldwide in the 20th century”) and China’s Deng
Xiaoping (“one of the great men of the 20th century”). Realists to their core, both regularly turned on a
dime, ditching what had once seemed to be deeply held convictions. Neither had much time for
democracy; nor, it seems, does Kaplan. Admitting that such thoughts are “heretical to an enlightened
Western mind,” he writes that “if you left the South China Sea issue to the experts and to the elites in
the region, the various disputes would have a better chance of being solved than if you involved large
populations in a democratic process, compromised as they are by their emotions.” The solutions that
would be reached, though, might not be the ones that most people around the South China Sea would
want. In the course of his travels, Kaplan found the spirit of Lee and Deng much in evidence. One realist
after another told him that they did not wish to be Finlandized or to replace America’s embrace with
China’s; but realism teaches us that history is driven more by necessities than desires. “At the end of the
day,” one Singaporean said, “it is all about military force and naval presence — it is not about passionate
and well-meaning talk.” Since 2011, there has been much passionate American talk of a pivot toward
Asia; but Vietnamese officials, realists to a man, respond by quoting a proverb — “A distant water can’t
put out a nearby fire.”
Navy training kills marine biodiversity – sonar influences regions even outside of the
direct area of training.
Berwyn 12 Bob Berwyn, Colorado-based environmental journalist - Forests, water, wildlife & climate, “Lawsuit Challenges Naval Sonar
Testing”, http://summitcountyvoice.com/2012/01/28/lawsuit-challenges-naval-sonar-testing/
Last week, a coalition of conservation and American Indian groups sued the National Marine Fisheries
Service for failing to protect thousands of whales, dolphins, porpoises, seals and sea lions from U.S. Navy
warfare training exercises along the coasts of California, Oregon and Washington. The lawsuit calls on
the agency to mitigate anticipated harm to marine mammals and biologically critical areas within the
training range that stretches from Northern California to the Canadian border. “We are asking for
common-sense measures to protect the critical wildlife that lives within the training range from
exposure to life-threatening effects of sonar. Biologically rich areas like the Olympic Coast National
Marine Sanctuary should be protected,” said Zak Smith, staff attorney for Natural Resources Defense
Council.. The litigation is not intended to halt the Navy’s exercises, but asks the court to require the
Fisheries Service to reassess the permits using the latest science and to order the Navy to stay out of
biologically critical areas at least at certain times of the year. “These training exercises will harm dozens
of protected species of marine mammals — Southern resident killer whales, blue whales, humpback
whales, dolphins and porpoises — through the use of high-intensity mid-frequency sonar,” said Steve
Mashuda, an Earthjustice attorney representing the groups. “The Fisheries Service fell down on the job
and failed to require the Navy to take reasonable and effective actions to protect them.” The Navy uses
a vast area of the West Coast for training activities including anti-submarine warfare exercises
involving tracking aircraft and sonar; surface-to-air gunnery and missile exercises; air-to-surface
bombing exercises; sink exercises; and extensive testing for several new weapons systems. “Since the
beginning of time, the Sinkyone Council’s member tribes have gathered, harvested and fished for
traditional cultural marine resources in this area, and they continue to carry out these subsistence ways
of life, and their ceremonial activities along this Tribal ancestral coastline,” said Priscilla Hunter,
chairwoman and cofounder of the InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness Council. “Our traditional cultural
lifeways, and our relatives such as the whales and many other species, will be negatively and
permanently impacted by the Navy’s activities. Both NMFS and the Navy have failed in their obligations
to conduct government-to-government consultation with the Sinkyone Council and its member Tribes
regarding project impacts.” In late 2010, the Fisheries Service gave the Navy a permit for five years of
expanded naval activity that will harm, or “take,” marine mammals and other sealife. The permit
allows the Navy to conduct increased training exercises that can harm marine mammals and disrupt
their migration, nursing, breeding or feeding, primarily as a result of harassment through exposure to
the use of sonar.
Biodiversity collapse leads to extinction.
Craig 03 (Robin Kundis Craig, “ARTICLE: Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing
and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii,” McGeorge Law Review, Winter 2003, 34
McGeorge L. Rev. 155)
Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial
ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism
values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms
and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856
Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857
More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements
that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as
well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation
of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often
critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an
ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its
biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are
particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of
interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in
any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly
valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on
sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine
ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use
biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in
Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or
economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical
arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how
little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has
traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we
now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every
problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to
admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be
preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory
relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world.
No nuclear escalation for India-Pak War.
Ahmed 09 Ali Ahmed is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “India-Pakistan Conflict Outcome
Probability,” IDSA, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses
In a situation involving limited Indian war aims, Pakistan would respond with its defensive formations
and use its strategic reserves in an offensive mode wherever possible.7 A Pakistani offensive, though in
keeping with Pakistan’s doctrine of ‘offensive defence’8, may not eventuate in the event of an early
war. Following the imposition of costs through air action, India expects to see hostilities terminated
through international pressure. Air operations and pivot corps operations by India would reduce the
windows available for launching Pakistani offensives inside Indian territory, which may prove very costly
for Pakistan. Besides, there would be little scope for launching forces into Indian territory in the face of
India’s broad front attacks. As demonstrated at Kargil, India would wrap up any gains it may make
eventually. Pakistan may employ only a small proportion of its forces in defensive operations, seeking
instead to preserve most of its forces for post-conflict internal political purposes, allowing its Army to
stay at the apex of Pakistan’s political pyramid.9 In any post-conflict scenario military losses would
compromise the Pakistan Army’s grip on power. Termination of India’s limited offensives would enable
Pakistan to declare victory of sorts by claiming that it held up India’s conventional might with only a
partial use of its forces. In such a circumstance, both states would be satisfied in having met respective
conflict aims. India would have inflicted punishment on Pakistan and Pakistan would claim to have
withstood it. Such a juncture of positive perceptions would be useful to begin strategic engagement
for peace making and long term conflict resolution.10 The foregoing indicates that Pakistan’s conflict
strategy is likely to comprise the following elements: war avoidance; conventional defence; counter
offensive with strategic reserves;11 a resort to asymmetric war; and preservation of military assets. For
Pakistan the nuclear dimension of the conflict would include a high nuclear threshold;12 nuclear
signaling for deterrence; catalyzing external pressures; and, preservation of nuclear assets from
attrition. Pakistan has mooted the ‘Samson Option’ only as a last resort.13
Pakistan is secure from collapse – no risk of loose nukes.
IE 13 The Indian Express, Magazine and Political Newspaper, “Pakistan’s Security Weapons to Protected by a Special Security Force”,
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/pakistans-nuclear-weapons-to-be-protected-by-a-special-security-force/1132477/
Pakistan has raised a 25,000-strong special force and put in place extensive measures to protect and
manage its strategic assets, including its nuclear arsenal, Finance Minister Ishaq Dar said today. "A
special security force of 25,000 personnel, who have been specially trained and provided sophisticated
weapons, has been deployed to protect (the nuclear assets)," Dar said, while winding up the debate on
the 2013-14 budget in the National Assembly or lower house of Parliament. Pakistan has raised a
special response force, a special escort force and a marine force to protect and guard its strategic
assets, he said without giving details. Besides, there are also counter-intelligence teams and a
"personnel reliability programme" to oversee the strategic programme, he said. The 25,000-strong
security force has been equipped with the latest equipment and the personnel are fully prepared for
"mobility on the ground or in the air", he said. The Strategic Plans Division, which manages the nuclear
arsenal, has set up a training academy for the security force, Dar said. The security force was always
prepared and it trained for all conditions and eventualities on the basis of past experiences and
potential scenarios involving the strategic assets, he said. The system for identifying dangers is always at
high alert and is constantly being reviewed, Dar said. Pakistan's strategic assets programme is based on
strong foundations and meets international standards for security and management of nuclear assets as
laid down by organisations like the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime, he
said. Over the past year, the military too has provided details of the special security force raised by the
Strategic Plans Division. Several batches of this force have passed out of training academies across the
country.
Biodiversity F/L
Plan can’t solve biodiversity – their framework is influenced by fishery departments as
per their EcoAdapt 13 evidence – this means that overfishing as a stressor still occurs
even if not in the coral reefs.
MSP can’t solve biodiversity.
Jentoft 14 Svien Jentoft, Norwegian College of Fishery Science, Faculty of Biosciences, Fisheries and Economics, University of Tromsø,
Norway, “Marine spatial planning: risk or opportunity for fisheries in the North Sea?”,
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/832/art%253A10.1186%252F2212-9790-1213.pdf?auth66=1406487473_13fb536c6eb5023d5ed45e12c4c3aba8&ext=.pdf
MPAs (and MSP) are meant to be proactive mechanisms of area-based ecosystem management
(Douvere and Ehler 2008). According to the precautionary principle lack of information is no excuse for
inaction. All seven North Sea countries have ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and
therefore this principle governs by implication. Yet, things are more difficult to implement in reality than
they initially seem on the surface. MPAs cannot be easily imposed from the top down. Its development
requires interactive processes at the regional scale. In Belgium this lesson was learned the hard way. As
noted by Bogaert et al. (2009), the initial MPA designation process was top-down and received local
resistance, and therefore failed. It had to be terminated, and could not be resumed before a more
interactive process involving stakeholders was initiated six years later. This would also be a lesson. There
is little reason to assume that MSP would be any different. MPAs are most needed when numerous and
cumulative activities expose risks to the environment. This is usually the situation near the coast and in
limited ocean spaces such as the North Sea. It is not the same as when a MPA is established in the
middle of the Atlantic where human presence is considerably limited. The rule seems to be that the
easier their implementation due to minimal local resistance, the less is the need for them (Gilliland
and Laffoley 2008). Marine ecosystems do not need MPAs if humans do not tamper with them, but that
seems to be the case to a diminishing extent. User-conflicts are likely to magnify and intensify as more
and more MPAs are created. Uses for the same space are often incompatible and, if ways for different
uses to co-exist cannot be found, it remains logical they must be kept apart. No wonder therefore that
MPAs have received mixed support by fishers who find them as an intrusion into their freedom of access
and movement (Jentoft et al. 2007). Fishers have their own precautionary principle in place (Degnbol
and Wilson2008). In the face of uncertainty, they do not easily put their livelihood or community at risk.
That is also one reason why MPAs globally have received less support in the fishing population than
many would have expected, and why they have been much slower in their implementation than
originally anticipated (Chuenpagdee et al. 2013). When fishers talk about MPAs and MSP, issues of
exclusion are of primary concern.
Ocean acidification means marine biodiversity collapse is inevitable in the short term.
Rogers 14 [Alex Rogers, Scientific Director of IPSO and Professor of Conservation Biology at the Department of Zoology, University of
Oxford, 2014, “The Ocean’s Death March,” http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/02/17/the-oceans-death-march/]
This problem is unquestionably serious, and here’s why: The rate of change of ocean pH (measure of
acidity) is 10 times faster than 55 million years ago. That period of geologic history was directly linked
to a mass extinction event as levels of CO2 mysteriously went off the charts. Ten times larger is big, very
big, when a measurement of 0.1 in change of pH is consistent with significant change! According to
C.L.Dybas, On a Collision Course: Oceans Plankton and Climate Change, BioScience, 2006: “This
acidification is occurring at a rate [10-to-100] times faster [depending upon the area] than ever
recorded.” In other words, as far as science is concerned, the rate of change of pH in the ocean is “off
the charts.” Therefore, and as a result, nobody knows how this will play out because there is no known
example in geologic history of such a rapid change in pH. This begs the biggest question of modern
times, which is: Will ocean acidification cause an extinction event this century, within current lifetimes?
The Extinction Event Already Appears to be Underway According to the State of the Ocean Report, d/d
October 3, 2013,International Programme on the State of the Ocean (IPSO): “This [acidification] of the
ocean is unprecedented in the Earth’s known history. We are entering an unknown territory of marine
ecosystem change… The next mass extinction may have already begun.” According to Jane Lubchenco,
PhD, who is the former director (2009-13) of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
the effects of acidification are already present in some oyster fisheries, like the West Coast of the U.S.
According to Lubchenco: “You can actually see this happening… It’s not something a long way into the
future. It is a very big problem,” Fiona Harvey, Ocean Acidification due to Carbon Emissions is at Highest
for 300M Years, The Guardian October 2, 2013. And, according to Richard Feely, PhD, (Dep. Of
Oceanography, University of Washington) and Christopher Sabine, PhD, (Senior Fellow, University of
Washington, Joint Institute for the Study of the Atmosphere and Ocean): “If the current carbon dioxide
emission trends continue… the ocean will continue to undergo acidification, to an extent and at rates
that have not occurred for tens of millions of years… nearly all marine life forms that build calcium
carbonate shells and skeletons studied by scientists thus far have shown deterioration due to increasing
carbon dioxide levels in seawater,” Dr. Richard Feely and Dr. Christopher Sabine, Oceanographers,
Carbon Dioxide and Our Ocean Legacy, Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, April 2006.
Even if they try to garner plan boosting resilience, warming removes the preconditions for coral survivability.
Bridle & Vines 7 John R. Bridle, Institute of Zoology, Zoological Society of London, London, NW1 4RY, UK 2 School of Biological
Sciences, Timothy H. Vines, Department of Zoology, “Limits to Evolution at Range Margins: When and Why Does Adaptation Fail?”
Why do all species have spatially restricted ranges? The simple answer is that populations
cannot become established
beyond their range because they have negative growth rates in these new habitats. However, it is clear that species
can adapt to inhospitable conditions over longer time periods, otherwise there would be no life on land, no mammals in the ocean and only a
few species on oceanic islands. Moreover, there
is abundant evidence for adaptation to different environments
within the range of a species, sometimes over short timescales 1 and 2. What then is happening at range edges to
prevent adaptation and to stop populations from expanding into new territories? Populations typically become smaller and
more fragmented as species approach their ecological limits3 and 4. There are two contrasting explanations for this
failure of local adaptation: (i) if the range edge is highly fragmented, Allee effects (see Glossary), genetic drift and
the low rate of mutational input into marginal populations might limit the availability of locally
beneficial alleles, preventing adaptation and, therefore, range expansion 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9; and (ii) if populations at
the margins remain connected to large, well adapted central populations, the continual immigration of these locally deleterious alleles could
swamp the establishment of locally adaptive alleles, thus maintaining negative population growth, and again preventing expansion (10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, reviewed in [19]). Much discussion of why evolution fails at range margins hinges on determining how much gene
flow is necessary to maintain adaptive potential at the margins without swamping local adaptation (see Ref. [9] for a recent treatment).
Answering this question requires a clear and detailed understanding of the genetics of quantitative traits, as well as the nature of selection on
these traits. Here, we describe theoretical models that explore adaptation at range margins, and then examine how they have fared in the light
of empirical data. We divide these models by the type of range edge that they consider: environmental margins, parapatric margins and hybrid
zones. Although these margins differ in the number and type of factors involved, range expansion in all three depends on locally adaptive
alleles becoming established under the ecological or genetic conditions at the range edge. Integrating range margin research into this broader
theoretical framework will generate important insights into what limits rates of adaptation in nature, a topic that is particularly relevant given
the rapid and widespread ecological changes being generated by climate change (Box 1). Box 1. Extinction and evolution in response to climate
change Climate change
represents a major immediate threat to biodiversity. Models that project the
ecological tolerances of species on future climatic scenarios estimate that at least 11% of species will
become extinct during the 21st century, even if one assumes that they can disperse to track the
distribution of suitable habitat [69]. However, this figure will be an underestimate in cases where dispersal is limited or if local
adaptation already exists throughout a species’ range, meaning that ecological tolerance within a given population will be less than the
models assume [70]. Conversely, extinctions
will be reduced if species can adapt to changing conditions,
particularly at range margins, enabling more widespread habitats to be exploited. Parmesan and Yohe [71]
analysed data for over 1700 species and showed that 73% have recently shifted their ranges, mostly in the poleward or upward direction
predicted by models of climate change. Detailed studies of European butterflies also reveal similar responses 72 and 73 (Figure I), mostly in
generalist, high dispersal species. However, poleward range shifts in specialist, low dispersal species tend to be associated with the evolution of
increased dispersal abilities [74],
or with the ability to use more widespread habitat [75]. Taken together, these studies
range shifts are more common than the local adaptation that
would enable populations to remain where they are [42].
suggest that, at least in the short term, poleward
Energy F/L
Plan does nothing to implement renewable energies, just sets up the framework for it
to happen – this means plan action alone can’t account for renewables being
implemented – they don’t solve.
Additionally, oil shock evidence isn’t given a brink – they don’t specify how much
independence is needed to solve for the impact.
Renewable energies fail.
Bryce 11 Robert Bryce, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, is the author, most recently, of Power Hungry: The Myths of "Green"
Energy and the Real Fuels of the Future, “Don’t Count Oil Out”,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2011/10/oil_and_gas_won_t_be_replaced_by_alternative_energies_anytime_so.html
Explaining the first issue is relatively easy. The global energy sector is by far the world’s biggest industry,
with more than $5 trillion per year spent finding, refining, and delivering energy of various forms to
consumers. Renewable sources like wind and solar have their virtues, but they cannot compare with
hydrocarbons when it comes to economics. A recent analysis by the Energy Information Administration
estimates that wind-generated electricity from onshore wind turbines costs $97 per megawatt-hour.
That’s about 50 percent more than the same amount of electricity generated by natural gas, which the
EIA estimates costs $63. Offshore wind is even more expensive, coming in at $243 per megawatt hour.
The least-expensive form of solar-generated electricity—the type generated by photovoltaic panels—
costs $210, or more than three times as much as the juice produced by burning natural gas. If renewable
sources of energy were dramatically cheaper than hydrocarbons, then perhaps we could be more
optimistic about their ability to capture a larger part of the global energy mix. But even if that were true,
a wholesale change in our energy mix will take a long time. “There is one thing all energy transitions
have in common: they are prolonged affairs that take decades to accomplish,” wrote Vaclav Smil in
2008. Indeed, for 109 years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, wood was the
dominant source of energy in America. It wasn’t until 1885—the year that Grover Cleveland was first
sworn in as president—that coal finally surpassed wood as the largest source of energy in the United
States. Coal remained king until 1950, when it was deposed by oil. “And the greater the scale of
prevailing uses and conversions, the longer the substitutions will take.” Smil, a polymath, prolific author
on energy issues, and distinguished professor at the University of Manitoba, believes that while a “world
without fossil fuel combustion is highly desirable … getting there will demand not only high cost but also
considerable patience: coming energy transitions will unfold across decades, not years.” Smil’s point can
be proven by looking at oil’s share of U.S. primary energy consumption. According to the EIA, in 1949, oil
provided 37 percent of America’s total energy needs. In 2009, oil’s share of U.S. primary energy stood at
… 37 percent. Over the past six decades, uncounted billions of dollars have been spent on efforts to
reduce our need for oil, yet petroleum has been remarkably persistent. Conspiracy theorists will, of
course, blame Big Oil. But the conspiracy wasn’t hatched in Houston or Detroit. It’s a conspiracy of basic
physics. Love it or hate it—and all of us love what oil provides even as we are continually taught to hate
the oil companies—oil is a miraculous substance. If petroleum didn’t exist, we’d have to invent it.
Nothing else comes close to oil when it comes to energy density, ease of handling, flexibility,
convenience, cost, or scale. Electric vehicles may be the celebrity car du jour, but modern batteries are
only slightly better than the ones that Thomas Edison developed. Gasoline has 80 times the energy
density of the best lithium ion batteries. A final point on energy transitions. Believe it or not, in 2009,
renewable energy sources had a smaller share of U.S. primary energy than they did back in 1949. Sure,
wind and solar have grown dramatically in recent years, but in 1949, renewables—almost all of it
hydropower—provided 9.3 percent of the country’s energy needs. In 2009, renewables—again, much of
it supplied by hydropower—provided 8.2 percent of U.S. energy. The third issue—scale—is seldom
discussed. And for many people, it’s likely the most difficult issue to comprehend. There’s little mystery
as to why that is so. We use a googol of units to measure energy: Oil is sold in barrels, tons, gallons, and
liters. Natural gas is measured and sold in cubic meters, millions of Btus, therms, dekatherms, and cubic
feet. Coal comes in long tons and short tons, but its pricing depends on myriad other factors, including
heat content, ash content, sulfur content, and most important: the distance between the coal mine and
the power plant. Electricity is sold in kilowatt-hours but electricity terminology spans other units like
volts, amperes, and ohms. Add in joules, watts, ergs, calories, and Btus, and things get even more
complicated. We need a simpler measure for global energy use, which now totals about 241 million
barrels of oil equivalent per day. That sum is almost impossible to comprehend, but try thinking of it
this way: It’s approximately equal to the total daily oil output of 29 Saudi Arabias. (Since 1970, Saudi
Arabia’s oil production has averaged 8.2 million barrels per day.) And of those 29 Saudi Arabias, 25—
about 210 million barrels of oil equivalent—come from hydrocarbons. Furthermore, over the past
decade alone, global energy consumption has increased by about 27 percent, or six Saudi Arabias.
Nearly all of that new energy came from hydrocarbons. Scientists and policymakers can claim that
carbon dioxide is bad. We can talk about wind, solar, geothermal, hydrogen, and lots of other forms of
energy production. But the question that too few people are willing to ask is this one: Where, how, will
we find the energy equivalent of 25 Saudi Arabias and have it all be carbon-free? The hard reality is that
we won’t. The Saudis have invested hundreds of billions of dollars over the past few decades drilling
wells and building their infrastructure so that they can remain the world’s most important oil exporter.
And remember that all of those billions invested have given them exactly one Saudi Arabia, or about 3.4
percent of total global energy demand.
No risk of oil shocks – measures, growth, and supply mixture.
EIU 14 The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Iraq and Global Oil Markets: The ISIS”, http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/1791923963/iraqand-global-oil-markets-the-isis-effect/2014-06-18
Any interruption to Iraqi production will have implications for OPEC, and for world markets. At its most
recent meeting, OPEC kept its production target of 30m b/d unchanged for another six months. Supply
from the region has been mixed in 2014: output from major producers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and
(so far) Iraq is up on year-earlier levels. But production from marginal exporters, like Libya and Algeria,
has disappointed. We still expect OPEC’s production to expand in 2014, but disturbances to Iraqi
production would call for compensatory measures. Even without interruptions to Iraqi supply, major
producers—especially Saudi Arabia—will probably find it necessary to raise production in 2014-15 to
ensure global oil markets are well-supplied. On balance, though the risks of an impact on physical
supplies are growing, The EIU does not for now expect a sustained oil-price shock. Iraqi production is
unlikely to face imminent danger, as Iraq’s oil fields are mainly in the south. On top of this, global oil
markets present a healthy supply picture, underpinned by growth outside OPEC. This is led by the US,
where oil output is at levels not seen since the mid-1980s and will continue expanding. We forecast
global oil production will grow by 2.6% on average in 2014-15. Based on this assumption, Brent will
average US$107.47/b this year. Still, there is a risk we will have to raise our forecast if conditions in Iraq
continue to deteriorate and investors push oil prices higher.
Economic decline doesn’t cause war
Deudney 91 – Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton
(Daniel, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Ebsco)
Poverty Wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil. then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect
their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures,
liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If
authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are warprone because of their
ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The
record of previous depressions supports
the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to
international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is
arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap
natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like
Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental
constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production
In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict.How societies
respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as
people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard
Brodie observed about the modein era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not
empty ones.”’” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant,
because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource
prices. In the 1930 increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by
environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem. Power Wars. A third scenario is that environmental
of goods and services.
degradation might cause war by altering the relative power of states; that is, newly stronger states may be tempted to prey upon the newly
weaker ones, or weakened states may attack and lock in their positions before their power ebbs firther. But such alterations might not lead to
war as readily as the lessons of history suggest, because economic power and
coupled as in the past. The economic
military power are not as tightly
power positions of Germany and Japan have changed greatly since World War 11, but these
changes have not been accompanied by war or threat of war. In
the contemporary world, whole industries rise, fall, and
relocate, causing substantialfluctuations in the economic well-being of regions and peoples without
producing wars.There is no reason to believe that changes in relative wealth and power caused by the uneven
impact of environmental degradation would inevitably lead to war. Even if environmental degradation were to destroy
the basic social and economic fabric of a country or region, the impact on international order may not be very
great. Among the first casualties in such country would be the capacity to wage war. The poor and
wretched of the earth may be able to deny an outside aggressor an easy conquest, but they are themselves a minimal threat
to other states.Contemporary offensive military operations require complex organizational skills,
specialized industrial products and surplus wealth.
Methane F/L
Offshore drilling is safe in the status quo – regulations and partnership vision.
Steffy 13 Loren Steffy, an award-winning business columnist for the Houston Chronicle, and before that, as a senior writer at Bloomberg
News and author of Drowning in Oil: BP and the Reckless Pursuit of Profit, and The Man Who Thought Like a Ship, “A Long Overdue Change
Could Make Offshore Drilling Safer”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorensteffy/2013/10/29/a-long-overdue-change-could-make-offshoredrilling-safer/
Even before cleanup in the Gulf of Mexico was complete, the oil and natural gas industry started
working with federal regulators on a comprehensive review of offshore operations. We in the industry
clearly understand that the future of offshore drilling depends on our ability to conduct operations
safely. Federal regulators and the public should rest assured. Despite claims to the contrary, the oil and
natural gas industry and the federal government have together taken great strides to enhance the safety
of offshore operations. Four joint industry task forces have now reexamined every aspect of offshore
drilling, from equipment and operating procedures to subsea well control and oil spill response. Working
with experienced regulators from the Department of Interior, industry experts developed new
recommendations and standards for operations in both deep and shallow water exploration. One of the
most urgent needs was clearly to boost the rapid response capability for containment in case of a leak.
New collaborative containment companies established after the 2010 spill now stand ready to deploy
state-of-the-art containment technology at the first indication of a spill at the wellhead. Our task forces
found room for improvement in numerous other areas. The industry is now following newly
established or revised standards in areas ranging from well design and cementing to blowout
prevention, subsea equipment for capping wells, and protections for workers responding to a spill.
The American Petroleum Institute maintains more than 600 industry standards covering all aspects
related to production, and more than 100 have been incorporated into federal regulations. Even before
the Deepwater Horizon accident, spills were rare. Over the past decade, 99.999% of oil shipped to the
United States reached its destination without incident. More than 40,000 total wells have been drilled in
the Gulf of Mexico, and at the time of the spill, 699 wells were operating at depths of 5,000 feet or
greater, while more than 3,900 were in production at 1,000 feet or more. It’s a common and
understandable misconception that deep water operations are inherently more risky. While deep water
wells present greater technical challenges in some cases, safety standards also change to reflect the
difference. As a result, working in deeper water does not equate to greater risk. Obviously, even one
incident is too many, let alone one on the scale of the 2010 crisis. That’s why the industry has also
created the Center for Offshore Safety (COS). Its mission is to work with independent third-party
auditors and government regulators to create an industry-wide culture of continuous safety
improvement. The federal Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) has already
incorporated a number of guidelines COS devised into its own regulations. BSEE is one of three new
agencies formed from the reorganization of the former Minerals Management Service in response to
the Gulf spill. In recent congressional testimony, Director Brian Salerno noted that 25 of the 33 BP
Deepwater Horizon Commission recommendations have been acted upon or are in the process of being
addressed. COS is also working on a major initiative on prevention. The Center collects and analyzes
data to better detect potential problems before they occur. The prevention protocol includes a “blind
source” reporting system, which allows companies to provide data without incurring punitive action,
enabling us to learn more and faster.
Methane leaks are gradual and can be stopped.
Oppenheimer 14 Michael Oppenheimer, is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Geosciences and International Affairs at Princeton
University and a consultant on scientific matters to the Environmental Defense Fund, “Plug Methane Leaks in the Booming Natural Gas
Industry”, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/plug-methane-leaks-in-the-booming-natural-gas-industry/
In 2012 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated the total methane emissions from natural
gas supply chain and petroleum sources to be 1.5 percent of U.S. natural gas produced. But that may
understate the problem. A 2013 study led by Harvard University scientists found that total U.S.
anthropogenic methane emissions in 2008, including industrial and agricultural sources, could be 50
percent higher than EPA estimates. A series of peer-reviewed studies will be published in the coming
year, deepening our understanding of methane emissions from various geographies and supply chain
segments. We already know enough to start cutting methane leakage, however. A study released this
year by the consulting firm ICF International analyzed 11 methane-reduction techniques for 19 sources
of industrial emissions. Some measures, such as shifting to lower-emitting pneumatic valves and
requiring routine leak detection and repair, would save the industry money; others would impose
manageable costs. Overall, ICF found that using currently available technologies, 40 percent of methane
emissions from the natural gas supply chain could be eliminated within five years for less than a penny
per thousand cubic feet of gas produced. Others have found similarly low costs. At both state and
federal levels, political support for regulatory controls is building. In February Colorado adopted the
first rules in the U.S. that directly control methane emissions. After Gov. John Hickenlooper declared
“zero tolerance” for methane emissions, the Environmental Defense Fund and three of Colorado’s
largest oil and gas producers—Anadarko Petroleum, Encana and Noble Energy—developed a proposal
that shaped the regulations. Under the new rules companies must find and fix leaks and use stronger
emission controls for storage tanks, dehydrators and gas vents from wells. The Colorado rule-making is a
model for other states and the nation. Last June Pres. Obama included methane controls in his Climate
Action Plan, and in the months since an interagency task force has been examining regulatory options.
The Administration announced a "methane strategy" on March 28, a first step toward comprehensive
regulation. Whereas local water pollution issues resulting from the use of hydraulic fracturing
technologies still remain to be resolved, moving ahead with this federal rule-making on methane
leakage is in the interests of both the nation and the global climate system.
Their evidence is all hype – methane lasts in the atmosphere for a very short time – even a
large release would be barely noticeable
Archer 12 (David, PhD, computational ocean chemist at the University of Chicago, “Much ado about methane”, 1/4/12,
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2012/01/much-ado-about-methane)
Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas, but it also has an awesome power to really get people worked up, compared to other equally frightening
pieces of the climate story. What methane are we talking about? The largest methane pools that people are talking about are in sediments of the
ocean, frozen into hydrate or clathrate deposits (Archer, 2007). The
total amount of methane as ocean hydrates is poorly
constrained but could rival the rest of the fossil fuels combined. Most of this is unattractive to extract for
fuel, and mostly so deep in the sediment column that it would take thousands of years for anthropogenic
warming to reach them. The Arctic is special in that the water column is colder than the global average, and so hydrate can be found as
shallow as 200 meters water depth. On land, there is lots of methane in the thawing Arctic, exploding lakes and what not. This methane is
probably produced by decomposition of thawing organic matter. Methane could only freeze into hydrate at depths below a few hundred meters
in the soil, and then only at “lithostatic pressure” rather than “hydrostatic”, meaning that the hydrate would have to be sealed from the
atmosphere by some impermeable layer. The great gas reservoirs in Siberia are thought to be in part frozen, but evidence for hydrate within the
permafrost soils is pretty thin (Dallimore and Collett,1995) Russian gas well Is methane escaping due to global warming? There have been
observations of bubbles emanating from the sea floor in the Arctic (Shakhova, 2010; Shakhova et al., 2005) and off Norway (Westbrook, 2009).
The Norwegian bubble plume coincides with the edge of the hydrate stability zone, where a bit of warming could push the surface sediments
from stable to unstable. A model of the hydrates (Reagan, 2009) produces a bubble plume similar to what’s observed, in response to the
observed rate of ocean water warming over the past 30 years, but with this warming rate extrapolated further back in time over the past 100
years. The response time of their model is several centuries, so pre-loading the early warming like they did makes it difficult to even guess how
much of the response they model could be attributed to human-induced climate change, even if we knew how much of the last 30 years of ocean
warming in that location came from human activity. Sonar images of methane plumes, from Westbrook Lakes provide an escape path for the
methane by creating “thaw bulbs” in the underlying soil, and lakes are everywhere appearing and disappearing in the Arctic as the permafrost
melts. (Whether you get CO2 or a mixture of CO2 plus methane depends critically on water, so lakes are important for that reason also.)
Methane bubbles captured in freezing lake ice in Alaska So far
there hasn’t been strong evidence presented for detection
enhanced methane fluxes due to anthropogenic warming yet. Yet it is certainly believable for the coming century
however, which brings us to the next question: What effect would a methane release have on climate? The climate
impact of releasing methane depends on whether it is released all at once, faster than its lifetime in the
atmosphere (about a decade) or in an ongoing, sustained release that lasts for longer than that. chronic vs
catastrophic release cartoon When methane is released chronically, over decades, the concentration in the
atmosphere will rise to a new equilibrium value. It won’t keep rising indefinitely, like CO2 would, because
methane degrades while CO2 essentially just accumulates. Methane degrades into CO2, in fact, so in
simulations I did (Archer and Buffett, 2005) the radiative forcing from the elevated methane concentration
throughout a long release was about matched by the radiative forcing from the extra CO2 accumulating
in the atmosphere from the methane as a carbon source. In the figure below, the dashed lines are from a simulation of a
fossil fuel CO2 release, and the solid lines are the same model but with an added methane hydrate feedback. The radiative forcing from the
methane combines the CH4 itself which only persists during the time of the methane release, plus the added CO2 in the atmosphere, which
persists throughout the simulation of 100,000 years. response of carbon cycle / hydrate model to fossil fuel CO2 forcing The
possibility of a
catastrophic release is of course what gives methane its power over the imagination (of journalists in particular it
seems). A submarine landslide might release a Gigaton of carbon as methane (Archer, 2007), but the radiative
effect of that would be small, about equal in magnitude (but opposite in sign) to the radiative forcing from a
volcanic eruption. Detectable perhaps but probably not the end of humankind as a species. What could happen
to methane in the Arctic? The methane bubbles coming from the Siberian shelf are part of a system that takes
centuries to respond to changes in temperature. The methane from the Arctic lakes is also potentially part of a new, enhanced,
chronic methane release to the atmosphere. Neither of them could release a catastrophic amount of methane (hundreds
of Gtons) within a short time frame (a few years or less). There isn’t some huge bubble of methane waiting to
erupt as soon as its roof melts. And so far, the sources of methane from high latitudes are small, relative to the big player, which is
wetlands in warmer climes. It is very difficult to know whether the bubbles are a brand-new methane source caused by global warming, or a
response to warming that has happened over the past 100 years, or whether plumes like this happen all the time. In
any event, it doesn’t
matter very much unless they get 10 or 100 times larger, because high-latitude sources are small
compared to the tropics. Methane as past killing agent? Mass extinctions like the end-Permean and the PETM do
typically leave tantalizing spikes in the carbon isotopic records preserved in limestones and organic
carbon. Methane has an isotopic signature, so any methane hijinks would be recorded in the carbon isotopic record, but so would changes in
the size of the living biosphere, soil carbon pools such as peat, and dissolved organic carbon in the ocean. The end-Permean extinction is
particularly mysterious, and my impression is that the killing mechanism for that is still up for grabs. Methane is also one of the usual suspects for
the PETM, which consisted of about 100,000 years of isotopically light carbon, which is thought to be due to release of some biologicallyproduced carbon source, similar to the way that fossil fuel CO2 is lightening the carbon isotopes of the atmosphere today, in concert with really
warm temperatures. I personally believe that the combination of the carbon isotopes and the paleotemperatures pretty much rules out methane
as the original carbon source (Pagani et al., 2006), although Gavin draws an opposite conclusion, which we may hash out in some future post. In
any case, the 100,000-year duration of the warming means that the greenhouse agent through most of the event was CO2, not methane. Could
there be a methane runaway feedback?. The
“runaway greenhouse effect” that planetary scientists and
climatologists usually call by that name involves water vapor. A runaway greenhouse effect involving
methane release (such as invoked here) is conceptually possible, but to get a spike of methane concentration in
the air it would have to released more quickly than the 10-year lifetime of methane in the atmosphere.
Otherwise what you’re talking about is elevated methane concentrations, reflecting the increased source,
plus the radiative forcing of that accumulating CO2. It wouldn’t be a methane runaway greenhouse effect,
it would be more akin to any other carbon release as CO2 to the atmosphere. This sounds like semantics, but it puts
the methane system into the context of the CO2 system, where it belongs and where we can scale it. So maybe by the end of the century in some
reasonable scenario, perhaps 2000 Gton C could be released by human activity under some sort of business-as-usual scenario, and another 1000
Gton C could come from soil and methane hydrate release, as a worst case. We set up a model of the methane runaway greenhouse effect
scenario, in which the methane hydrate inventory in the ocean responds to changing ocean temperature on some time scale, and the
temperature responds to greenhouse gas concentrations in the air with another time scale (of about a millennium) (Archer and Buffett, 2005). If
the hydrates released too much carbon, say two carbons from hydrates for every one carbon from fossil fuels, on a time scale that was too fast
(say 1000 years instead of 10,000 years), the system could run away in the CO2 greenhouse mode described above. It wouldn’t matter too much
if the carbon reached the atmosphere as methane or if it just oxidized to CO2 in the ocean and then partially degassed into the atmosphere a few
centuries later. The fact that the ice core records do not seem full of methane spikes due to high-latitude sources makes it seem like the real
world is not as sensitive as we were able to set the model up to be. This is where my guess about a worst-case 1000 Gton from hydrates after
2000 Gton C from fossil fuels in the last paragraph comes from. On the other hand, the deep ocean could ultimately (after a thousand years or
so) warm up by several degrees in a business-as-usual scenario, which would make it warmer than it has been in millions of years. Since it takes
millions of years to grow the hydrates, they have had time to grow in response to Earth’s relative cold of the past 10 million years or so. Also, the
climate forcing from CO2 release is stronger now than it was millions of years ago when CO2 levels were higher, because of the band saturation
effect of CO2 as a greenhouse gas. In short,
if there was ever a good time to provoke a hydrate meltdown it would
be now. But “now” in a geological sense, over thousands of years in the future, not really “now” in a
human sense. The methane hydrates in the ocean, in cahoots with permafrost peats (which never get enough respect), could
be a significant multiplier of the long tail of the CO2, but will probably not be a huge player in climate
change in the coming century. Could methane be a point of no return? Actually, releasing CO2 is a point of no return if
anything is. The only way back to a natural climate in anything like our lifetimes would be to
anthropogenically extract CO2 from the atmosphere. The CO2 that has been absorbed into the oceans would degas back to
the atmosphere to some extent, so we’d have to clean that up too. And if hydrates or peats contributed some extra carbon into the mix, that
would also have to be part of the bargain, like paying interest on a loan. Conclusion It’s the CO2, friend.
Warming is unstoppable- new IPCC report doesn’t account for long term CO2 or the
rate of CO2 uptake.
Eby et al 09 – M. EBY, K. ZICKFELD, AND A. MONTENEGRO (School of Earth and Ocean Sciences,
University of Victoria) D. Archer (Department of the Geophysical Sciences, University of Chicago) K.J
Meissner and A.J Weaver (School of Earth and Ocean Sciences, University of Victoria) (“Lifetime of
Anthropogenic Climate Change: Millennial Time Scales of Potential CO2 and Surface Temperature
Perturbations”, Journal of Climate, May 15, 2009, Available at:
http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/2008JCLI2554.1, Accessed On: 7/18/2014, IJ)
The projection of the climatic consequences of anthropogenic CO2 emissions for the twenty-first
century has been a major topic of climate research. Nevertheless, the long-term consequences of
anthropogenic CO2 remain highly uncertain. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) reported that ‘‘about 50% of a CO2 increase will be removed from the
atmosphere within 30 years and a further 30% will be removed within a few centuries’’ (Denmanet al.
2007, p. 501). Although the IPCC estimate of the time to absorb 50% of CO2 is accurate for relatively
small amounts of emissions at the present time, this may be a considerable underestimation for large
quantities of emissions. Carbon sinks may become saturated in the future, reducing the system’s ability
to absorb CO2. Atmospheric CO2 is currently the dominant anthropogenic greenhouse gas implicated in
global warming (Forster et al. 2007); therefore, estimating the lifetime of anthropogenic climate change
will largely depend on the perturbation lifetime of CO2. The perturbation lifetime is a measure of the
time over which anomalous levels of CO2 or temperature remain in the atmosphere (defined here to be
the time required for a fractional reduction to 1/e). Carbon emissions can be taken up rapidly by the
land, through changes in soil and vegetation carbon, and by dissolution in the surface ocean. Ocean
uptake slows as the surface waters equilibrate with the atmosphere and continued uptake depends on
the rate of carbon transport to the deep ocean. Ocean uptake is enhanced through dissolution of
existing CaCO3, often referred to as carbonate compensation. As CO2 is taken up, the ocean becomes
more acidic, eventually releasing CaCO3 from deep sediments. This increases the ocean alkalinity,
allowing the ocean to take up additional CO2. Carbonate compensation becomes important on
millennial time scales, whereas changes in the weathering of continental carbonate and silicate are
thought to become important on the 10 000 100 000-yr time scale (Archer 2005; Sarmiento and Gruber
2006; Lenton and Britton 2006).
Extensions
Navy
Naval Readiness ext.
Navy readiness is low now
Larter ‘14( David Larter, Reporter at Navy Times and DefenseNews. “CNO: Cutbacks reducing US Navy’s Surge Readiness” 7 April 2014.
(http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140407/DEFREG02/304070016/CNO-Cutbacks-Reducing-US-Navy-s-Surge-Readiness)LP)
The US Navy’s top officer warned Monday that deep budget cuts have hampered the Navy’s ability to
surge in a crisis, saying that the service could only surge deploy one carrier strike group and one
amphibious ready group under current levels. “We have a covenant to provide three carrier strike
groups and three amphibious ready groups in a crisis,” said Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon
Greenert. “And if we go back to sequestration, we’ll be at one. And, by the way, right now we’re at one.
We’re still recovering from this period of fiscal uncertainty.” Greenert used his speech at the Navy
League’s annual Sea-Air-Space expo outside Washington, D.C. to make the case for the Navy’s presence
missions in a panel alongside Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Jim Amos and Coast Guard Commandant
Adm. Robert Papp. Greenert said that the Navy’s goal was to grow to 308 ships over the next five years,
but that the deep sequestration spending cuts would limit the fleet’s growth to just over 300. Congress,
Greenert said, should lift these automatic spending cuts if the Navy is to maintain its core missions.
Budget Cuts ext.
Budget cuts directly impact navy training measures – regardless of space.
Schafer et al. 13 Susanne M. Schafer and Brett Barrougquere, AP writers for military affairs, “military training altered due to budget
cuts”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/24/military-training_n_4333561.html
Budget cuts to the military have forced installations around the country to alter training exercises and
daily routines to save money. For airmen and pilots, that means fewer flights. For soldiers and Marines,
it means fewer drills or delaying them until a deployment nears. In Air Force and Navy, similar
adjustments have been made. The automatic budget cuts are known as sequestration. They come as
the military is in the midst of a drawdown in Afghanistan and shrinking its overall size. George Wright
is a civilian spokesman for the Army. He says training has been retooled to focus on soldiers deploying to
hostile areas soonest, such as Afghanistan and Korea. Some soldiers at Fort Campbell along the
Tennessee-Kentucky line are being retrained to work as MPs.
Defense cuts are the biggest threat to your impacts
Dunn 13 Richard J. Dunn III is currently a private consultant on international security affairs. He is a retired Army colonel who led soldiers
in Vietnam, Korea, and throughout the U.S. and has also worked in defense industry for 14 years. Heritage Foundation, “The Impact of a
Declining Defense Budget on Combat Readiness” July 18, 2013. Online: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/the-impact-of-adeclining-defense-budget-on-combat-readiness
Answering the “what, when, and where” question is particularly challenging and complicated in the current era of strategic uncertainty. The
world is still a violent and dangerous place, and major existential
threats remain vague and unfocused. In the Pacific, U.S.
relationships with emerging powers and the future threats they may pose remain unclear. In the Middle East, the political instability
that accompanied the Arab Spring may vastly alter the geopolitical landscape established in the 1920s, creating opportunities for
a wide spectrum of Islamist parties to advance their undemocratic agendas. Terrorism by non-state actors like al-Qaeda
continues to metastasize. At the same time, warfare is expanding into the economically vital cyberspace domain, and revolutionary
developments in unmanned systems may be changing the very nature of conflict. Rapid
reductions in the defense budget are
leading to the restructuring or elimination of many programs. This will damage the ability to deter and, if
necessary, defeat threats to vital U.S. national interests. Maintaining a military posture capable of achieving these
aims requires both sufficient forces of various types and the readiness of those forces for combat.
Lack of ships crushing readiness
Skoning ’14 Gerald D. Skoning is a Chicago lawyer who specializes in labor and employment law.THE PUBLIC POLICY¶ THE NAVY
DEPARTMENT’S NEW MATH¶ Inflating numbers won't replace a shrinking fleet.¶ The American Spectator, March 19.
Faced with the dire prospect of a rapidly shrinking fleet of 280 ships, the Navy’s top brass are simply
reclassifying a couple hospital ships and its small patrol craft deployed overseas to inflate the numbers. It’s an
accounting sleight-of-hand that will fool no one and should be an embarrassment to the entire defense establishment.¶ There was a
time when counting ships in the fleet was really simple. Just count up those big, gray ships one-by-one and you were done. Now, in a thinly
veiled effort to disguise the troubling lack of newly constructed warships joining the fleet, the Navy is reclassifying a few non-combatants to
make up for glaring holes in the fleet.¶ The changes, quietly noted in the recently released Defense Department’s 2015 budget proposal, add
the dozen vessels to the battle force to help make up for the planned retirement of 10 frigates, a submarine and other ships.¶ The Navy’s
proposed 2015 budget, part of an austere $496 billion defense spending plan, also calls for adding eight new ships to the fleet. Under what it
calls “revised counting rules,” the Navy calculates, it will have 283 ships next year. However, if the dozen existing ships aren’t transferred to the
battle force, the
fleet sharply drops to 271 ships. The expanded new “battle force” definition is all part of
the Navy’s smoke-and-mirrors program to mask what’s really going on… stark reductions in the Navy’s
mission readiness.
No India-Pak Escalation
War motives are ongoing but mutually assured destruction prevents impact.
Carafano 14 James Jay Carafano, Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy at the Heritage Foundation, “The Hamas Way of War”,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-hamas-way-war-10860
Those seeking to understand the Hamas way of war can gain great insights by reading a book on the
Pakistan military. In “Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War,” Georgetown University
Professor C. Christine Fair unpacks the "strategic culture" which drives an endless military competition
with India—a contest that logic dictates can never be won. The Pakistan-India long war, Fair argues,
isn't about the border dispute over Kashmir. In fact, she labels Pakistan a "greedy" state. If India just
handed the district over and walked away, the Pakistan Army would still see New Delhi as an
existential threat. That's because Pakistan’s military defines its core purpose as opposing the larger and
more powerful state to the south. Similarly, Hamas defines its raison d’etre as fighting Israeli
occupation. That is a worldview without end as long as Israel exists—and even then, one wonders if
Hamas would not turn on its Arab neighbors as the next oppressors. From the Hamas perspective, not
fighting is not an option. The struggle is not about winning and losing, it's what justifies the group’s
existence. The casualties, the destruction, the deaths of innocents on both sides, all are secondary in the
group’s strategic calculus. At its core, the Hamas strategic culture calls for constant conflict. India and
Pakistan share a subcontinent. Their endless struggle can go on forever, and both states can still—
maybe—go about their business. Palestine is a very different place. Hamas can't have its wars without
outsized human tragedy for the size of the ground that lives under its shadow. Israel can defend itself. It
can punish Hamas. But Israel can no more win its war with Hamas than India could force the Pakistani
army to play nice. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons—a reality that effectively constrains
the scope of direct confrontation. Hamas has no nukes. But Israel could not root out Hamas without
leveling Gaza and salting the earth. And, Hamas knows that Israel’s humanity will constrain them the
way nuclear weapons hold back other states.
Nuclear proliferation solves escalation
Gartzke & Jo 09 2009 [Eric, Associate Professor of Political Science, UCSD, PhD, University of Iowa, 1997, International Relations,
Formal/Quantitative Methods, Doon-Joon, Department/ of International Relations, University of Seoul, Korea, “Bargaining, Nuclear
Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, April, JSTOR]
nuclear proliferation, optimists see the opportunity to promote stability. Precisely
because nuclear contests promise to inflict unprecedented trauma, nuclear war is unlikely to occur. A
looming risk of nuclear conflagration will tend to deter conventional forms of international violence, given
the risk of escalation faced by nuclear powers.4 Waltz (1990) argues that the chilling effect of nuclear weapons means that
proliferation among “stable powers” is bound to promote peace. Mearsheimer (1984, 1990) suggests that proliferation
generally is defensible and that the desire for nuclear weapons is understandable. Jervis (1989b) claims that nuclear deterrence can
be credited with the lack of major war since 1950. Was it not nuclear weapons that kept the United States and the Soviet
Where pessimists fear conflict resulting from
Union at bay during the Cold War?
We win empirics – proliferation prevents escalation.
Rauchhaus 07 2007 [Robert W. Rauchhaus* Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of California, Santa Barbara,
“Evaluating The Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach”, http://iicas.ucsd.edu/papers/PIA/rauchhaus_paper.pdf]
From the vantage point of 1946 the stability of emerging postwar order and the long-term prospects for peace. The interwar period (19181939) had shown the ineffectiveness of collective security, the fragility of the international political economy, and the danger of nascent
democracies. As the wartime alliance
between the United States and USSR deteriorated and each side implemented new
suspected that another great military contest was inevitable (Lippmann 1947). The fear of
another world war was only compounded by the splitting of the atom and the spread of nuclear
weapons. Although the Cold War was often fierce, especially in the developing world where it frequently played out, it
never managed to escalate to World War III. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, this has prompted some to argue that Cold
War is better thought of as the “Long Peace” (Gaddis 1986; Gaddis 1987; Kegley 1991).1 Despite the worries of some, the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity has not, or at least has not yet, undermined the Long Peace. At present, we remain
in the longest period of great power peace since the advent of the modern state system. Despite the mutation
of violence into other forms, we can point to World War II as a watershed event that was followed by a sixty
year decline in battle deaths from interstate war (Human Security Report 2005; Lacina, Gleditsch, and Russett 2006).2 What is
strategic doctrines, many
responsible for the Long Peace over the last six decades? The three main approaches to international relations (IR) have each offered answers
to this question.3 The most widely cited explanation is that of neo-liberals. Building on Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795), modern liberals point to
democracy (Maoz and Russett 1993), trade (Keohane and Nye 1977), and international organizations (Keohane 1984) as key causes of peace. As
a related approach, constructivism also views democracy, trade, and international organizations as important factors, but it parts company with
neo-liberalism by attributing the root cause of the Long Peace to evolving norms and the social construction of identity (Katzenstein 1996;
Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999).4 Neo-realism, in contrast, is fundamentally at odds with both approaches and rejects the importance of the Kantian
Tripod and evolving norms. Instead, the
Long Peace is generally attributed to absence of multi-polarity and the
presence of nuclear weapons (Waltz 1979; Waltz 1990).5
War won’t happen – strong linkages, Indian restraint, and lack of incentives to
escalate for Pakistan
Karnad 5, Bharat Karnad, Research Porfessor, National Security Studies, Center for Policy Research, "South Asia: The Irrelevance of
Classical Nuclear Deterrence Theory," INDIA REVIEW, April 2005, p. 187.
Three conventional military conflicts and near conflicts in the subcontinent have unfolded against
“the nuclear backdrop” in the last 20 years – four, if including the crisis precipitated by the largest ever
Indian military exercise to date, Operation Brasstacks in 1987, which led to Pakistan’s first hinting at the
nuclear weapons it had acquired or was in the last stages of putting together.36 Invariably, these
eruptions have included exchanges of hot words, saber rattling, and the trading of veiled nuclear
threats, a process usually initiated by the weaker party, Pakistan, and have constituted what may be
seen as a viable signaling process communicating firm intention or resolve. This signaling included
precautionary measures, such as raising the alert status by both countries of their respective nuclear
forces. But, notwithstanding a limited conventional military war in 1999 – the only time in the last two
decades when a crisis eventuated in hostilities – neither India nor Pakistan, it is important to note, felt
pressured to up the ante or to call the other’s nuclear bluff.37 There are three interlinked sets of
reasons why India–Pakistan confrontations have tended to peter out and why, contrary to some
alarmist writings, crises have not escalated, and are unlikely ever to spiral out of control into total
conventional wars, leave alone nuclear exchange. These reasons pertain to (1) the strong and intimate
linkages between the two countries owing to ties of kinship, shared religion and culture, and the
growing political consciousness and clout of the Indian Muslim community – factors which politically
prevent the Indian government from prosecuting a war of annihilation against Pakistan; (2) the
resulting Indian system of restraint represented by passive-defensive and reactive policy and the
acceptance of essential conventional military parity with Pakistan, which makes decisive wars
infeasible; and (3) the manifest nuclear disparity (in terms of potential) and an exchange ratio highly
unfavorable to Pakistan in case of nuclear war, which together not merely undermine the credibility of
Pakistan’s nuclear threats but mock deterrence theory models and concepts from the Cold War. Indeed,
whatever the reasons for it, the governments of India and Pakistan are agreed that the possibility of
nuclear hostilities between the two countries is remote. The Joint Statement issued at the end of the
first round of talks on nuclear confidence-building measures in June 2004, for instance, denounced the
myth of South Asia as nuclear flashpoint.38
No US-China War
Interdependence and deterrence check South China Sea conflict.
Dibb 14 (Paul Dibb is emeritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, The Spectator, March 15,
2014, "2014 won’t be like 1914", http://www.spectator.co.uk/australia/australia-features/9158871/2014-wont-be-like-1914/)
The Jeremiah strategists are coming out of the woodwork to predict that Asia in 2014 will be a repeat of Europe in 1914. In other words, that
there will be an outbreak of war between the major powers in our region, just like in Europe 100 years ago. This line of reasoning predicts that
a rising China will inevitably go to war with the United States, either directly or through conflict with Japan.¶ Some commentators are even
suggesting that the Sarajevo incident that provoked the first world war will be replicated between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands in the East China Sea. Kevin Rudd has likened this situation to what he calls ‘a 21st-century maritime redux of the Balkans a century ago
— a tinderbox on water.’ My colleague Hugh White has proclaimed that the risk of war between China and Japan is now very real.¶ There is
undoubtedly a significant risk that China’s increasing aggressiveness in the East China Sea and the South China Sea over its territorial claims will
result in a military confrontation, either by miscalculation or design. But a
warship being sunk or military aircraft colliding is
a long way from all-out war. These sorts of incidents have occurred in the past and have not escalated —
for example, the North Korean sinking in 2010 of the South Korean warship and the Chinese collision in 2001 by one of its fighters with a US
reconnaissance aircraft. Unfortunately, however, a military incident between China and Japan might be more serious than this.¶ The
commander of US air forces in the Pacific has said in an interview on 9 February that the recent comments by the leaders of Japan and the
Philippines drawing parallels between China’s assertiveness in the region and events in prewar Europe are ‘not helpful’. But he did caution that
any move by China to extend unilaterally an air defence identification zone over the South China Sea would be ‘very provocative’.¶ It is true that
whereas a war in Europe these days has become inconceivable that is not the case in Asia. In our region there is a potentially potent
combination of rising military capabilities and ugly nationalisms. But, unlike
in Europe 100 years ago, there is no sense of
the inevitability of war and, unlike in the Kaiser’s Germany in 1914, there is no fear in Beijing that time is not on its side.
The distinguished British historian Max Hastings points out in his book, Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War 1914, that there was nothing
accidental about the first world war. Germany was bent on launching a European war because of its fears of a rising Russia in the east, a strong
France and Britain on its west and unrest at home. From Beijing’s perspective today, the strategic correlation of forces in Marxist-Leninist terms
is much more favourable than this. Moreover, China
continues to need to give priority to economic development if it is to
avoid domestic upheaval.¶ The current German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has recently highlighted the diplomatic
failures that led to the outbreak of the first world war when there were rash predictions of a swift, successful military campaign that in the
event lasted for four years and resulted in 17 million dead. This was a failure of political and military elites, but also of diplomacy.¶ And this is
where there is a concern about Asia. The fact is that the multilateral organisations in our region are immature when it comes to developing
arms control and disarmament agreements and concrete approaches to conflict avoidance. There
is a lot of talk and plenty of
meetings and that in itself is a good thing. But we desperately need such confidence-building measures as an avoidance of naval incidents at
sea agreement — along the lines of the one that was agreed between the US and the Soviet Union in 1972.¶ Even so, the key underpinnings for
my confidence about a major power war in Asia being unlikely are twofold. First, there is the iron discipline of nuclear deterrence. For almost 70
years now the fear of nuclear war, even at the most dangerous heights of the Cold War, has prevented a major war. An allout nuclear war between the US and China would involve the deaths of hundreds of millions of people on both sides in a matter of hours. For
all intents and purposes, they would cease to exist as modern functioning societies. This is an existential threat unlike any faced by humankind
previously. Once nuclear weapons are used it would be practically impossible to avoid full-blown escalation.¶ The second factor is the
unprecedented economic and technological interdependence that now intertwines all our economies
with each other in a way that has never existed before. It is simply untrue to assert that globalisation was even deeper in 1914 than it is
today. Global supply chains for almost every product we consume make every country in our region crucially vulnerable to the outbreak of war.
And that includes China as much as any other country — or even more so. China is now crucially dependent on imports for its economic
security (for example, it accounts for 60 per cent of global seaborne iron ore trade and by 2030 it will have to import 80 per cent of its oil).¶ So,
as the doyen of US international relations studies Joseph Nye argues, we
should be wary of analysts wielding historical
analogies, particularly if they have a whiff of inevitability. War, he observes, is never inevitable, though the belief that it is can
become one of its causes.
New regional developments solve Asian war
Robert, 13
(Brad Roberts was a visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan in spring 2013. From 2009 to
early 2013 Dr. Roberts served in the Obama administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy;
“Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia” NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, 9th August 2013)
Abstract A changed and changing security environment has created interest in Northeast Asia in the role of U.S. extended deterrence and the
requirements of strategic stability in the 21st century. North Korea’s continued progress in developing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons
brings with it new challenges, as does China’s progress in military modernization and its increasingly prominent regional military role. The
Obama administration is pursuing a three-part strategy to: (1) comprehensively strengthen the regional
deterrence architecture, (2) preserve strategic stability with China (and Russia), and (3) cooperate with allies
towards these ends. In recent years, Japan and the United States have taken significant steps to strengthen their
cooperation for deterrence and stability, with positive results. The regional deterrence architecture is
strong and getting stronger, especially with the introduction of non-nuclear elements such as ballistic missile defense. Japan’s
contributions to this regional deterrence architecture are significant and increasing, and add credibility to U.S. security guarantees. As Japan
and the United States continue to work together to advance this strategy, they face a number of emerging policy questions. Four such
questions are likely to attract significant attention in both Tokyo and Washington in the coming months and years. First, on missile defense of
Japan: how much is enough? Second, on conventional strike: what should Japan contribute, if anything? Third, on the U.S. nuclear umbrella: is
more tailoring of the U.S. posture required for Northeast Asia? Fourth, on strategic stability: can China, the United States, and Japan agree on
the requirements? The analytic communities in all of the interested countries can help generate the new insights needed to advance policy
objectives.
Interdependence and deterrence check
Dibb, 14
(Paul Dibb is emeritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, The Spectator, March 15, 2014, "2014
won’t be like 1914", http://www.spectator.co.uk/australia/australia-features/9158871/2014-wont-be-like-1914/)
The Jeremiah strategists are coming out of the woodwork to predict that Asia in 2014 will be a repeat of Europe in 1914. In other words, that
there will be an outbreak of war between the major powers in our region, just like in Europe 100 years ago. This line of reasoning predicts that
a rising China will inevitably go to war with the United States, either directly or through conflict with Japan.¶ Some commentators are even
suggesting that the Sarajevo incident that provoked the first world war will be replicated between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands in the East China Sea. Kevin Rudd has likened this situation to what he calls ‘a 21st-century maritime redux of the Balkans a century ago
— a tinderbox on water.’ My colleague Hugh White has proclaimed that the risk of war between China and Japan is now very real.¶ There is
undoubtedly a significant risk that China’s increasing aggressiveness in the East China Sea and the South China Sea over its territorial claims will
result in a military confrontation, either by miscalculation or design. But a
warship being sunk or military aircraft colliding is
a long way from all-out war. These sorts of incidents have occurred in the past and have not escalated —
for example, the North Korean sinking in 2010 of the South Korean warship and the Chinese collision in 2001 by one of its fighters with a US
reconnaissance aircraft. Unfortunately, however, a military incident between China and Japan might be more serious than this.¶ The
commander of US air forces in the Pacific has said in an interview on 9 February that the recent comments by the leaders of Japan and the
Philippines drawing parallels between China’s assertiveness in the region and events in prewar Europe are ‘not helpful’. But he did caution that
any move by China to extend unilaterally an air defence identification zone over the South China Sea would be ‘very provocative’.¶ It is true that
whereas a war in Europe these days has become inconceivable that is not the case in Asia. In our region there is a potentially potent
combination of rising military capabilities and ugly nationalisms. But, unlike
in Europe 100 years ago, there is no sense of
the inevitability of war and, unlike in the Kaiser’s Germany in 1914, there is no fear in Beijing that time is not on its side.
The distinguished British historian Max Hastings points out in his book, Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War 1914, that there was nothing
accidental about the first world war. Germany was bent on launching a European war because of its fears of a rising Russia in the east, a strong
France and Britain on its west and unrest at home. From Beijing’s perspective today, the strategic correlation of forces in Marxist-Leninist terms
is much more favourable than this. Moreover, China
continues to need to give priority to economic development if it is to
avoid domestic upheaval.¶ The current German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has recently highlighted the diplomatic
failures that led to the outbreak of the first world war when there were rash predictions of a swift, successful military campaign that in the
event lasted for four years and resulted in 17 million dead. This was a failure of political and military elites, but also of diplomacy.¶ And this is
where there is a concern about Asia. The fact is that the multilateral organisations in our region are immature when it comes to developing
arms control and disarmament agreements and concrete approaches to conflict avoidance. There
is a lot of talk and plenty of
meetings and that in itself is a good thing. But we desperately need such confidence-building measures as an avoidance of naval incidents at
sea agreement — along the lines of the one that was agreed between the US and the Soviet Union in 1972.¶ Even so, the key underpinnings for
my confidence about a major power war in Asia being unlikely are twofold. First, there is the iron discipline of nuclear deterrence. For almost 70
years now the fear of nuclear war, even at the most dangerous heights of the Cold War, has prevented a major war. An allout nuclear war between the US and China would involve the deaths of hundreds of millions of people on both sides in a matter of hours. For
all intents and purposes, they would cease to exist as modern functioning societies. This is an existential threat unlike any faced by humankind
previously. Once nuclear weapons are used it would be practically impossible to avoid full-blown escalation.¶ The second factor is the
unprecedented economic and technological interdependence that now intertwines all our economies
with each other in a way that has never existed before. It is simply untrue to assert that globalisation was even deeper in 1914 than it is
today. Global supply chains for almost every product we consume make every country in our region crucially vulnerable to the outbreak of war.
And that includes China as much as any other country — or even more so. China is now crucially dependent on imports for its economic
security (for example, it accounts for 60 per cent of global seaborne iron ore trade and by 2030 it will have to import 80 per cent of its oil).¶ So,
as the doyen of US international relations studies Joseph Nye argues, we
should be wary of analysts wielding historical
analogies, particularly if they have a whiff of inevitability. War, he observes, is never inevitable, though the belief that it is can
become one of its causes.
It won’t escalate anyways
Kaplan, 14
(Robert D. Kaplan, Chief Geopolitical Analyst for Stratfor, a private intelligence firm. He is a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for a New
American Security, Foreign Policy, March 17, 2014, " The Guns of August in the East China Sea",
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/17/the_guns_of_august_in_the_east_china_sea_world_war_one)
But before
one buys the 1914 analogy, there are other matters to consider. While 1914 Europe was a landscape, with large
armies facing one another inside a claustrophobic terrain with few natural barriers, East Asia is a seascape, with vast maritime distances separating national capitals.
The sea impedes aggression to a degree that land does not. Naval forces can cross water and storm beachheads, though with great difficulty, but moving
inland and occupying hostile populations is nearly impossible. The Taiwan Strait is roughly four times the width of the English
Channel, a geography that continues to help preserve Taiwan's de facto independence from China. ¶ Even the fastest warships travel slowly,
giving diplomats time to do their work. Incidents in the air are more likely, although Asian countries have erected strict
protocols and prefer to posture verbally so as to avoid actual combat. (That said, the new Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone is a particularly
provocative protocol.) Since any such incidents would likely occur over open water there will be few casualties, reducing the prospect that a single incident will lead
to war. And because of the speed, accuracy, and destructiveness of postmodern weaponry, any
war that does break out will probably be
short -- albeit with serious economic consequences. Something equivalent to four years of trench warfare is almost impossible to imagine. And remember that it
was World War I's very grinding length that made it a history-transforming and culture-transforming event: it caused 17 million military and civilian casualties; the
disputes in the Pacific Basin are certainly not going to lead to that. ¶ World War I also featured different and unwieldy alliance systems. Asia
is simpler:
fears China and depends -- militarily at least -- on the United States. This is not the Cold War where few
Americans could be found in the East Bloc, a region with which we did almost no trade. Millions of Americans and Chinese have visited
each other's countries, tens of thousands of American businessmen have passed through Chinese cities, and
almost everyone
Chinese party elites send their children to U.S. universities. U.S. officials know they must steer between the two extremes of allowing China's Finlandization of its
Asian neighbors and allowing nationalistic governments in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan to lure the United States into a conflict with China. ¶ Nationalistic as
these democracies may be, the best way to curb their excesses and make them less nervous is to give them the assurance of a U.S. security umbrella, born of
credible air and sea power. A strong U.S.-China relationship can keep the peace in Asia. (South Korea also fears Japan, but the United States is successfully managing
that tension.) Unlike empires mired in decrepitude that characterized 1914 Europe, East Asia
features robust democracies in South
Korea and Japan, and strengthening democracies in Malaysia and the Philippines. An informal alliance of democracies -that should also include a reformist, de facto ally like Vietnam -- is the best and most stable counter to Chinese militarism. Some of these democracies are fraught,
and fascist-cum-communist North Korea could implode, but this is not a world coming apart. Limited
eruptions do not equal a global
cataclysm.¶ Yet the most profound difference between August 1914 and now is historical self-awareness. As Modris Eksteins meticulously documents in his
1989 book Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, European capitals greeted the war with outbursts of euphoria and a feeling of liberation.
Because 19th century Europe had been relatively peaceful since the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, people had lost the sense of the tragic that enables them to
avoid tragedy in the first place. Aging, one-child societies like those of China, Japan, and South Korea, with memories of war, revolution, and famine, are less likely
to greet violent struggle with joy and equanimity. And the
United States, the paramount military player in Asia, by its very conscious fear of a
World War I scenario, will take every measure to avoid it.¶ A profusion of warships in the Pacific certainly suggests a more anxious,
complicated world. But U.S. generals and diplomats need not give in to fate, especially given the differences with a century ago. The United States entered World
War I too late. Projecting a strong military footprint in Asia while ceaselessly engaging the Chinese is the way that conflict can be avoided this time around.
No impact – US and China will cooperate – no risk of militarization.
Paal ‘12
[Douglas, August, Vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. e was on the National Security Council staffs
of Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush between 1986 and 1993 as director of Asian Affairs and then as senior director and special
assistant to the president.¶ , Dangerous Shoals: U.S. Policy in the South China Sea¶ http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=397]
In view of the potential disruptive effects brought about by China’s rise and its neighbors’ responses, the
United States has a further
interest in a peaceful settlement. Moreover, reinforcement of the rule of international law is in America’s
interest in reducing the cost of maintaining stability and managing change going forward.¶ Today, the South China
Sea is not at the “Sudetenland” moment of the twenty-first century, which calls for standing up to aggression and the
rejection of appeasement. China has not militarized its foreign policy and does not appear equipped to do so
for a long time. Its neighbors are not supine, and they show on occasion, when needed, that they are
able to coalesce against Chinese actions that they judge as going too far. At the same time, China and those
neighbors have more going constructively in trade, investment, and other relations with each other than is at
risk in this dispute.¶ This suggests the makings of a manageable situation, even if it remains impossible to
resolve for years to come. Different Asian societies are quite accustomed to living with unresolved
disputes, often for centuries.¶ In light of this reality, the United States would do well to adhere to principled positions it has already
articulated, and stand for a process that is fair to all disputants and those who will be affected at the margins. To do that, Washington will need
to protect its position of impartiality and avoid repetition of the misconceived State Department press statement.
Even if there was a dispute, China and Japan won’t escalate
Sieg, 12
(Linda Sieg, 9-23-12, Reuters, “Japan, China military conflict seen unlikely despite strain” http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/23/us-chinajapan-confrontation-idUSBRE88M0F220120923)
¶ (Reuters) -
Hawkish Chinese commentators have urged Beijing to prepare for military conflict with Japan as tensions mount over disputed
islands in the East China Sea, but most experts say chances
the Asian rivals will decide to go to war are slim.¶ A bigger risk is
and Beijing
are expected to seek to manage the row before it becomes a full-blown military confrontation.¶ "That's the real risk
the possibility that an unintended maritime clash results in deaths and boosts pressure for retaliation, but even then Tokyo
- a maritime incident leading to a loss of life. If a Japanese or Chinese were killed, there would be a huge outpouring of nationalist sentiment,"
said Linda Jakobson, director of the East Asia Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney.¶ "But I still cannot seriously
imagine it would lead to an attack on the other country. I do think rational minds would prevail," she said, adding economic
retaliation was more likely.¶ A feud over the lonely islets in the East China Sea flared this month after Japan's government bought three of the
islands from a private owner, triggering violent protests in China and threatening business between Asia's two biggest economies.¶ Adding to
the tensions, China sent more than 10 government patrol vessels to waters near the islands, known as the Diaoyu in China and the Senkaku in
Japan, while Japan beefed up its Coast Guard patrols. Chinese media said 1,000 fishing boats have set sail for the area, although none has been
sighted close by.¶ Despite the diplomatic standoff and rising nationalist sentiment in China especially, experts agree neither Beijing nor Tokyo
would intentionally escalate to a military confrontation what is already the worst crisis in bilateral ties in decades.¶ U.S. PRESSURE¶ "The
chances of a military conflict are very, very slim because neither
side wants to go down that path," said former People's
Liberation Army officer, Xu Guangyu, now a senior consultant at a government-run think tank in Beijing.¶ Pressure from the United
States, which repeated last week that the disputed isles were covered by a 1960 treaty obliging Washington to come to Japan's aid if it were
attacked, is also working to restrain both sides, security experts said.¶ "I very seriously do not think any of the involved parties Japan, China and including the United States because of its defense treaty (with Japan) - want to see a military conflict over this dispute," said
the Lowy Institute's Jakobson.¶ "They don't want to risk it, they don't seek it and they do not intend to let it happen."¶ Still, the possibility of a
clash at sea remains.¶ While the presence of the Chinese surveillance ships - none of which is a naval vessel - and Japan Coast Guard ships in the
area might appear to set the stage for trouble, military experts said each side would try to steer clear of the other.¶ "The bad news is that China
sent ships to the area. The good news is that they are official ships controlled by the government," said Narushige Michishita at the National
Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo.¶ "This is good news because they are not likely to engage in aggressive action because that would
really exacerbate the situation and turn it into a major crisis," said Michishita.¶ The Chinese ships, he said, had another mission besides
asserting China's claims to the islands and nearby waters.¶ "My guess is that some (Chinese) official patrol boats are there to watch out for
fishing boats ... to stop them from making problems," Michishita said.¶ FISHING BOATS WILD CARD¶ Military specialists say the Chinese patrol
vessels are well disciplined as are the Japan Coast Guard ships, while the two sides have grown accustomed to communicating.¶ "Both sides are
ready, but both sides are very well under control," said a former senior Japanese military official.¶ What worries observers most
is the risk that a boat carrying Chinese fishermen slips through or activists try to land, sparking clashes with Japan's Coast Guard that result in
deaths - news of which would spread like wildfire on the Internet.¶ In 1996, a Hong Kong activist drowned in the nearby waters.¶ Diplomatic
and economic relations chilled sharply in 2010 after Japan arrested a Chinese trawler captain whose boat collided with a Japan Coast Guard
vessel. This time, tensions are already high and China is contending with a tricky once-in-a-decade leadership change while Japan's ruling party
faces a probable drubbing in an election expected in months.¶ "Two rational
governments of major countries would not
intentionally decide to enter into a major war with each other over a few uninhabited rocks," said Denny Roy,
an Asia security expert at the East-West Center in Hawaii.¶ "But unfortunately, you can arrive at war in ways other than that - through
unintended escalation, in which both countries start out at a much lower level, but each of them think that they must respond to perceived
provocation by the other side, both very strongly pushed into it by domestic pressure. That seems to be where we are now and it is difficult to
see how countries can get out of that negative spiral."¶ Others, however, were more confident that an
unplanned clash could be
kept from escalating into military conflict.¶ "That's not really a major possibility, because there are still broad
channels of communication between the two sides, and they would help prevent that happening. Both sides could still talk
to each other," said former senior PLA officer Xu.¶ "Even before anything happened, you would also have the U.N Secretary
General and others stepping in to ensure that the situation does not get out of control."
Biodiversity
Warming Kills Biodiversity Ext.
Warming kills coral reefs, specifically.
Roberts, 12 (Callum, marine conservation biologist at the University of York, “Corrosive Seas,” The Ocean of Life, May 31, pg. 109-110,
it’s a book, AW)
As carbon dioxide levels in the sea rise, carbonate saturation will fall, and the depths at which carbonate
dissolves will become shallower. Recent estimates suggest that this horizon is rising by three feet to six
feet per year in some places. So far, most carbon dioxide added by human activity remains near the
surface. It has mixed more deeply—to depths of more than three thousand feet—in areas of intense
downwelling in the polar North and South Atlantic, where deep bottom waters of the global ocean
conveyor current are formed. Elsewhere the sea has been stirred to only a thousand feet deep or less. All
tropical coral reefs inhabit waters that are less than three hundred feet deep, so they will quickly come
under the influence of ocean acidification. If carbon dioxide in the atmosphere doubles from its current
level, all of the world's coral reefs will shift from a state of construction to erosion. They will literally
begin to crumble and dissolve, as erosion and dissolution of carbonates outpaces deposition. What is
most worrying is that this level of carbon dioxide will be reached by 2100 under a low-emission scenario
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The 2009 Copenhagen negotiations sought to limit
carbon dioxide emissions so that levels would never exceed 450 parts per million in the atmosphere. That
target caused deadlock in negotiations, but even that, according to some prominent scientists, would be too
high for coral reefs. Just as Ischia's carbonated volcanic springs provide a warning of things to come,
bubbling carbon dioxide released beneath reefs in Papua New Guinea give us tangible proof of the fate
that awaits coral reefs.' 3 Reef growth has failed completely in places where gas bubbles froth
vigorously, reducing pH there to levels expected everywhere by early in the twenty-second century
under a business-as-usual scenario. The few corals that survive today have been heavily eroded by the
corrosive water. The collapse of coral reefs in the Galapagos following El Nino in the early 1980s was
hastened by the fact that eastern Pacific waters are naturally more acid due to their deep-water upwelling
than those in other parts of the oceans.'4 Corals there were only loosely cemented into reef structures and
collapsed quickly.
Climate change kills ocean biodiversity and ecosystems – thumps the affirmative.
Doney et al, 12 (Scott C, Marin Chemistry and Geochemistry Department at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Mary
Ruckelshaus, J. Emmett Duffy, James P. Barry, Francis Chan, Chad A. English, Heather M. Galindo, Jacqueline M. Grebmeier, Anne B. Hollowed,
Nancy Knowlton, Jeffrey Polovina, Nancy N. Rabalais, William J. Sydeman, and Lynne D. Talley, “Climate Change Impacts on Marine
Ecosystems,” Annual Review of Marine Science,
http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1957/34553/DoneyScottCZoologyClimateChangeImpacts.pdf?sequence=1, AW)
Marine ecosystems are maintained by the flow of energy from primary producers at the base of food
webs through to intermediate consumers, top predators (including humans), and pathogens, and then
back again through decomposition and detrital pathways. Thus, marine communities are biological
networks in which the success of species is linked directly or indirectly through various biological
interactions (e.g., predator-prey relationships, competition, facilitation, mutualism) to the performance
of other species in the community. The aggregate effect of these interactions constitutes ecosystem
function (e.g., nutrient cycling, primary and secondary productivity), through which ocean and coastal
ecosystems provide the wealth of free natural benefits that society depends upon, such as fisheries and
aquaculture production, water purification, shoreline protection, and recreation. However, growing
human pressures, including climate change, are having profound and diverse consequences for marine
ecosystems. Rising atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) is one of the most critical problems because its
effects are globally pervasive and irreversible on ecological timescales (Natl. Res. Counc. 2011). The
primary direct consequences are increasing ocean temperatures (Bindoff et al. 2007) and acidity (Doney
et al. 2009). Climbing temperatures create a host of additional changes, such as rising sea level,
increased ocean stratification, decreased sea-ice extent, and altered patterns of ocean circulation,
precipitation, and freshwater input (Figure 1a). In addition, both warming and altered ocean circulation
act to reduce subsurface oxygen (O2) concentrations (Keeling et al. 2010). In recent decades, the rates
of change have been rapid and may exceed the current and potential future tolerances of many
organisms to adapt. Further, the rates of physical and chemical change in marine ecosystems will almost
certainly accelerate over the next several decades in the absence of immediate and dramatic efforts
toward climate mitigation (Natl. Res. Counc. 2011). Direct effects of changes in ocean temperature and
chemistry may alter the physiological functioning, behavior, and demographic traits (e.g., productivity)
of organisms, leading to shifts in the size structure, spatial range, and seasonal abundance of
populations. These shifts, in turn, lead to altered species interactions and trophic pathways as change
cascades from primary producers to upper-trophic-level fish, seabirds, and marine mammals, with
climate signals thereby propagating through ecosystems in both bottom-up and top-down directions.
Changes in community structure and ecosystem function may result from disruptions in biological
interactions. Therefore, investigating the responses of individual species to single forcing factors,
although essential, provides an incomplete story and highlights the need for more comprehensive,
multispecies- to ecosystem-level analyses.
Energy
Russian Oil DA
Renewables displace natural gas, this drives production because of the rivalry,
increase production causes lower prices
Weber 12|Michael “THE LOOMING NATURAL GAS TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES “(www.c2es.org/docUploads/natural-gastransition-us.pdf) A.B.
In addition to the complex pricing landscape described earlier, there is also a complicated relationship
between natural gas and renewables in the power sector stemming from two aspects: 1) competition in
the dispatch order between natural gas and renewables, and 2) the potential to produce renewable
forms of natural gas. For the most part, the relationship between natural gas and renewables is
interpreted as competition in the power sector, by which renewables are seen as a threat to natural gas
because they push natural gas-fired power plants off the bid stack. This phenomenon occurs because
the power markets take bids on marginal costs, rather than all-in costs. Because the marginal cost of
wind is zero, it bids zero (or negative in some cases, reflecting the effect of production tax credits for
wind power). Consequently, it is a price-taker in the markets, and displaces the highest bidders, which
are the price-setters. Historically, those price-setters are natural gas power plants, and so wind power
displaces natural gas. Consequently the relationship between gas and wind is one of rivalry. Natural gas
interests audibly complain about this rivalry, with the criticism that policy supports for wind give it an
unfair advantage in this competition. Renewable energy supporters counter that gas interests are not
required to pay for their pollution (which is a form of indirect subsidy) and have enjoyed government
largesse in one form or another for many decades.
That collapses Russia’s economy.
Reguly 12 (Eric Reguly For Russia, high energy prices a necessity, not a luxury 9/14/12)
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/for-russia-high-energy-prices-a-necessity-not-aluxury/article4546314/
Oil and gas prices, and market share, can make or break Russia. The Russian economic collapse of the
1990s was largely driven by sinking crude prices, which dipped below $11 in 1998. Russia duly defaulted
that year, wiping out most of its banks and sending the ratio of national debt to gross domestic product
to more than 80 per cent. Russia was saved when oil prices reversed direction, reaching $147 before the
2008 financial crisis hit. The energy bonanza – oil contributes about 50 per cent of federal government
revenues – pushed down its debt to a mere 10 per cent of GDP (Italy’s is 120 per cent).
Comparatively worse risk of nuclear war than the affirmative.
Filger, 09 (Sheldon, Global economic forecaster, founder of GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, named one of
the most viable websites focused on global economic crisis, writer for Huffington Post, “Russian
Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction”, Huffington Post, 5/10/09,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html, 7/17/14)
In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely
encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former
Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted
with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will
endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise
of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing
unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme
popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the
financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets
in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where
economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such
an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more
relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from
superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient
scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President
Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national
economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just
may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him
about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all,
the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already
concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United
States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia,
security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a
time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist
organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure
would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic
Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.
No Renewables ext.
A. Takes too long.
Tverberg 10 Gail Tverberg, author of Our Finite World, Has an M. S. from the University of Illinois, Chicago in Mathematics, and is a
Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries, “Nine Challenges of Alternative Energy”,
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6854
For the promise of an alternative energy source to be achieved, it must be supplied in the time frame
needed, in the volume needed, and at a reasonable cost. Many alternatives have been successfully
demonstrated at the small scale (algae-based diesel, cellulosic ethanol, biobutanol, thin-film solar) but
demonstration scale does not provide an indication of the potential for large-scale production.
Similarly, because alternative energy relies on engineering and construction of equipment and
manufacturing processes for its production, output grows in a stepwise function only as new capacity
comes online, which in turn is reliant on timely procurement of the input energy and other required
input materials. This difference between “production” of alternative energy and “extraction” of fossil
fuels can result in marked constraints on the ability to increase the production of an alternative energy
source as it is needed. For example, the tar sands of Canada (although often excluded as an
“alternative” energy, tar sands are subject to the same constraints because the production of oil from
the tar sands deposits is essentially a mining and manufacturing operation) have already achieved a fully
commercial scale of production, and because of the immense reserves indicated in Alberta, tar sands are
looked to be a backstop to declining conventional crude oil production. In 2008, production of oil from
the tar sands reached 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd), less than 2 percent of global production of
conventional crude oil. By 2020, the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers projects that
production will increase by 2.1 million bpd to a total of 3.3 million bpd.1 But the International Energy
Agency (IEA) estimates that the global decline rate from conventional-oil fields is 6.4 percent, or about
4.8 million bpd per year.2 Thus by 2020, the new oil coming from tar-sands production will not even
make up half of what is being lost from ongoing depletion of existing conventional-oil fields. Even with
a “crash” production program, it is estimated that tar-sands production in 2020 could not exceed 4.0
million bpd, an increase still less than the annual rate of conventional crude oil depletion.3 Scale also
matters in comparing projected production of an alternative energy form against expected demand
growth. In 2007, the U.S. Energy Policy Act established a target for the production of ethanol in 2022 at
36 billion gallons, of which 15 billion gallons were to be sourced from corn and the remainder from
cellulosic sources. In terms of gasoline equivalency, this target is equal to 890,000 bpd of additional
supply. In 2008, however, the U.S. Department of Energy, in its Annual Energy Outlook, forecast demand
for gasoline would grow by 930,000 bpd by 2022,4 more than offsetting projected supply growth from
ethanol and leaving gross oil dependency unchanged. This lack of the kind of scalability needed given
the magnitude and time frame of conventional-oil depletion and in the face of continued demand
growth is found as well in other biofuels, coal-to-liquids, and alternative liquids for transportation.
Also of concern is the difficulty of scaling up alternative energy quickly enough to meet greenhouse gas
emissions targets.
B. Intermittency
Tverberg 10 Gail Tverberg, author of Our Finite World, Has an M. S. from the University of Illinois, Chicago in Mathematics, and is a
Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries, “Nine Challenges of Alternative Energy”,
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6854
Modern societies expect that electrons will flow when a switch is flipped, that gas will flow when a knob
is turned, and that liquids will flow when the pump handle is squeezed. This system of continuous supply
is possible because of our exploitation of large stores of fossil fuels, which are the result of millions of
years of intermittent sunlight concentrated into a continuously extractable source of energy. Alternative
energies such as solar and wind power, in contrast, produce only intermittently as the wind blows or
the sun shines, and even biomass-based fuels depend on seasonal harvests of crops. Integration of
these energy forms into our current system creates challenges of balancing availability and demand, and
it remains doubtful that these intermittent energy forms can provide a majority of our future energy
needs in the same way that we expect energy to be available today. One indication of intermittency
challenges in electric power generation is the capacity factor, or the average percentage of time in a
year that a power plant is producing at full rated capacity. As shown in table 18.2, photovoltaic systems
produce at full capacity only 12 to 19 percent of the time over the course of a year, compared to an
average of 30 percent for wind systems. In contrast, a coal-thermal plant will typically run at full capacity
70 to 90 percent of the time, while nuclear power operates at over a 90 percent capacity factor in the
United States.
C. Energy Density – leads to rampant land usage
Tverberg 10 Gail Tverberg, author of Our Finite World, Has an M. S. from the University of Illinois, Chicago in Mathematics, and is a
Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries, “Nine Challenges of Alternative Energy”,
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6854
The more dense an energy form is, the less land is needed for its deployment. Because many alternative
energies are far less energy dense than fossil fuels, large-scale deployment will incur considerable
land costs. For example, a single 1,000-megawatt coal-fired power plant requires 1 to 4 square
kilometers (km2) of land, not counting the land required to mine and transport the coal. In contrast,
20–50 km2, or the size of a small city, would be required to generate the equivalent amount of energy
from a photovoltaic array or from a solar-thermal system. For wind, 50–150 km2 would be needed; for
biomass, 4,000–6,000 km2 of land would be needed. The sprawling city of Los Angeles, in comparison,
covers 1,200 km2. The land-use issue is thus a problem not only of biofuels production; siting of
alternative energy projects will likely be a constant challenge because of the inherent high land
footprint.
Renewables are unsuccessful – won’t ramp up and can’t displace oil.
Tverberg 14 Gail Tverberg, author of Our Finite World, Has an M. S. from the University of Illinois, Chicago in Mathematics, and is a
Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries, “Ten Reasons Why Intermittency is A Problem
for Renewable Energy”, http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Renewable-Energy/The-Ten-Reasons-Why-Intermittency-is-a-Problem-forRenewable-Energy.html
I should mention that there is one small niche where intermittent renewables can substitute for oil. While oil
is not generally burned
to produce electricity, it is used for this purpose on some islands because of its convenience. These island
communities do little manufacturing because their high cost of electricity makes them not competitive in the world market. On these islands,
intermittent renewables can be used to reduce the amount of oil used for electricity production, without driving up the cost of electricity, since
electric costs are already very high. 3. The high cost of wind and solar PV doubles our energy problems, rather than solving them. The
big
issue with oil is its high cost of production. We extracted the easy-to-extract oil first, and now we are
getting to the more-difficult to extract oil. Adding high priced electricity to our fuel mix means we have
price problems with both oil and electricity, instead of only one of the two. Consumers’ wages don’t rise to pay
for these high-priced fuels, so
disposable income is adversely impacted by both. The two high-priced fuels also combine to
make exported goods even less competitive in the world marketplace. 4. Even if wind is “renewable,” it isn’t necessarily long
lived. Manufacturers of wind turbines claim lives of 20 to 25 years. This compares to life spans of 40 years or more for coal, gas, and nuclear.
One recent study suggests that because of degraded performance, it may not be economic to operate wind turbines for
more than 12 to 15 years. Related article: Harvard Research Team has Breakthrough on Battery Storage If we are expecting substantial
changes in the years ahead, there are also issues with whether necessary repairs will really be available. Wind turbines are especially repair
prone. These
repairs can’t be made by just anyone, using local materials. They need the specialized world supply chain
turbines sometimes need helicopters for repairs. If oil is a problem, such
repairs may not be available. 5. Wind and solar PV don’t ramp up quickly. After many years of trying to ramp up
wind and solar PV, in 2012, wind amounted to a bit under 1% of world energy supply. Solar amounted to even less than
that–about 0.2% of world energy supply. It would take huge effort to ramp up production to even 5% of the world’s energy
supply. 6. Wind and solar PV create serious pollution problems. Both wind turbines and solar PV use rare earth
minerals, mostly from China, in their manufacture. Mining and processing these rare earths generates a
tremendous amount of “hazardous and radioactive byproducts.” In the part of China where rare earth minerals are
mined, soil and water are saturated with toxic substances, making farming impossible. If we were to try to increase wind and solar
that we have today. Offshore wind
by a factor of 10 (so that they together amount to 12% of world energy supply, instead of 1.2%) we would need huge amounts of rare earth
minerals and other polluting minerals, such as gallium arsenide, copper-indium-gallium-diselenide, and cadmium-telluride, used in making thinfilm photovoltaics. We could not expect China to take on all of this pollution itself. Instead, the
rest of the world would need to
produce these toxic materials as well. Presumably, many countries would require stringent pollution controls to do this
extraction. These pollution controls would likely require greater use of fossil fuel energy. While pollution problems might be kept
in check, the greater use of fossil fuels would likely raise both CO2 emissions and the prices of the wind
and solar PV. There are many other pollution issues. China is a major center for renewables production, using coal as it primary fuel.
Silicon-based solar cells require heating silica rock to high temperatures in 3000 F ovens, something that which can be done cheaply with coal.
Wind is known for its noise pollution issues and for killing birds. Solar panels on the desert floor interfere with the
local ecosystem. A major reason why wind and solar PV are considered clean is because it is hard to measure their
true pollution costs, whether CO2 or other types. Electric cars have some of the same issues, because they also use rare earth
minerals and have heavy up-front costs. 7. There is a danger that wind and solar PV will make the electric grid less longlived, rather than more long-lived. This tends to happen because current laws overcompensate owners of intermittent renewables relative to
the value they provide to the grid. One point of confusion is what wind and solar PV really replace. Do they replace electricity, or do they
replace the fuel that makes electricity? There is a huge difference, in terms of when an intermittent renewable achieves “grid-parity” in costs.
Fuel costs are typically only a small share of retail electricity costs, so reaching grid parity is extremely
difficult if intermittent renewables only replace fuel costs. In the US fuel costs average about 3 cents per kWh. For
residential users, the retail price averages about 12 cents per kWh, or four times as much as the fuel cost. What we are interested in is the
value of intermittent electricity to the companies that make and sell electricity–utilities or similar companies. In my view, the typical
value of intermittent electricity is the value of the fuel the intermittent electricity replaces–in other
words, the cost of coal, natural gas, or uranium replaced. This is the case because using intermittent electricity doesn’t
generally reduce any costs for an electric utility, other than its fuel costs. It still needs to provide backup power around the clock to customers
with solar panels. Because of the variability in production, it still needs pretty much the same capacity as in the past, and it needs the same
staffing for each of the units, even though some of them might be operating for a smaller percentage of time. The
value of the
intermittent electricity to the utility may be greater or less than the first estimate of the fuel savings. In
some instances, particularly if there is a lot of solar PV in a part of the world where maximum energy use is during the summer, peak capacity
needs may be reduced a bit. This would be a savings above fuel costs. Offsetting such savings would be increased costs for new transmission
lines to try to even out spikes in electricity production and to bring wind from sources where it is strongest to locations where its energy is truly
needed. The problem that occurs is the fact that most plans reimburse users of wind and solar PV at a far higher rate than the cost of the fuel
they replace. Often “net metering’ is used, so the user is in effect given credit for the full retail price of electricity for the electricity generated
by solar panels. This higher reimbursements leaves a revenue shortfall for the companies involved in producing electricity for the grid. The
danger is that some companies will go bankrupt, or will leave the system, endangering the ability of the electric grid to provide a stable electric
supply for consumers. This is a potentially much more dangerous problem than any benefit that intermittent renewables provide. Related
article: Good Year For Green Also, funding for the additional electric transmission lines is likely to become a problem, because neither the
electricity companies nor governments have sufficient revenue to fund them. The reason the electric companies cannot afford them should be
clear–they are being asked to subsidize the costs through overly high reimbursement of the value of the intermittent renewables. I discuss the
reason for the government lack of funds in (8), below. 8. Adding more wind and solar PV tends to make government finances less sound, rather
than more sound. Around the world, extraction of inexpensive oil and gas has historically strengthened the finances of governments. This
happens because governments have been able to tax the oil and gas companies heavily, and use the tax revenue to fund government programs.
Unfortunately, the addition of wind and solar tends to act in precisely the opposite direction. In some cases, the
reduction in
governments revenue comes directly through subsidies for wind and solar. In other instances, the reduction in
government revenue is more indirect. If the high price of intermittent electricity causes a country to become less competitive in
the world market, this indirectly reduces government tax revenue because it leads to fewer people having jobs, and thus
less taxable income. Even if the issue is “only” a reduction in discretionary income of consumers, this still cuts back on the ability of
governments to raise taxes. 9. My analysis indicates that the bottleneck we are reaching is not simply oil. Instead, a major problem is
inadequate investment capital and too much debt. Ramping up wind and solar PV tends to make those problems worse,
not better. As I described in my post Why EIA, IEA, and Randers’ 2052 Energy Forecasts are Wrong, we are reaching an investment
capital and debt bottleneck, because of the higher extraction costs of oil. Adding intermittent
renewables, in which huge costs are paid out in advance, adds to this problem. Because of this, ramping up
intermittent renewables tends to make collapse come sooner, rather than later, to the countries trying to ramp up these energy sources. 10.
Wind and Solar PV come nowhere near fulfilling the promises made for them. Trying to substitute
expensive energy for cheap is like trying to make water run uphill. It is virtually impossible to make such a system work.
It makes everyone from governments to businesses to citizens poorer in the process. Promises that are made regarding future payments for
electricity often need to be reneged on. If there really were benefits from the program–other than making government officials look like they
are doing something–it might make sense to expand the programs. As it is, it is hard to see much benefit to expanding intermittent renewables.
Even if we wanted to, there would be no way we could expand intermittent renewables to cover our entire electricity program–they are just
too expensive, too polluting, and don’t provide the liquid fuels we need.
No Oil Shocks Conflict ext.
No economic impact to oil shocks – IMF study proves
Rasmussen and Roitman, IMF Economists, 2011
[Tobias N. Rasmussen, Senior Economist, Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF and Agustín Roitman,
Economist for the IMF, 9/3, Oil shocks in a global perspective: are they really that bad? AD 9/9/2011]jap
Using a comprehensive global dataset, we outline stylized facts characterizing relationships
between crude oil prices and macroeconomic developments across the world. Approaching the data
from several angles, we find that the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally
small: a 25 percent increase in oil prices typically causes GDP to fall by about half of one
percent or less. While cross-country differences in impact are found to depend mainly on the relative size of oil imports, we also
show that oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although higher oil
prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts. We
provide a small open economy model illustrating the main transmission channels of oil shocks, and show how the recycling of
petrodollars may mitigate the impact.
No impact- market adaptation
Gholz and Press, associate professor Public Affairs at the U of Texas Austin and associate professor
government Dartmouth, 10 (Summer, Eugene and Daryl, “Protecting “The Prize”: Oil and the U.S. National Interest,”
Security Studies, 19:453–485 vol 3) atw
Each day, twenty-four million barrels of crude are pumped from the Persian Gulf region, most of which are loaded onto
supertankers to feed refineries around the world.8 The immediate effect of a major supply disruption in the Gulf would
leave one or more consumers wondering where their next expected oil delivery will come from. But the oil market,
like most others, adjusts to shocks via a variety of mechanisms. These adaptations do not require
careful coordination, unusually wise stewardship, or benign motives. Individuals’ drive for
profit triggers most of them. The details of each oil shock are unique, so each crisis triggers a different
mix of adaptations. Some adjustments would begin within hours of a disruption; others would take
weeks or longer to implement. Similarly, some could only supply the market for short periods
of time, and others could be sustained indefinitely. But the net result of the adaptations
softens the disruptions’ effects on consumers.
No wars from econ collapse.
Morris Miller, Winter 2000, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” V. 25, Iss. 4, p pq
The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that
exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do,
that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to
this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the
people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if
need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken
by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear
to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two
countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the
conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The
severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship
to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of
dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one
form of violence to abort another).
Multiple checks to the impact of oil shocks
Economist, 2011 (March 3, 2011, “The 2011 oil shock,”
http://www.economist.com/node/18281774)
So far, the shocks to supply have been tiny. Libya’s turmoil has reduced global oil output by
a mere 1%. In 1973 the figure was around 7.5%. Today’s oil market also has plenty of buffers.
Governments have stockpiles, which they didn’t in 1973. Commercial oil stocks are more
ample than they were when prices peaked in 2008. Saudi Arabia, the central bank of the oil market, technically
has enough spare capacity to replace Libya, Algeria and a clutch of other small producers.
And the Saudis have made clear that they are willing to pump.
Instability doesn’t increase oil prices – their evidence is speculation
Rob Heidrick, writer for the Texas Enterprise, 3-10-2011, “Oil Disruptions No Longer Very Disruptive, Study
Show,” Texas Enterprise, http://texasenterprise.org/article/oil-disruptions-no-longer-very-disruptive-study-shows
Protests in the Middle East in recent weeks have sparked not only regime change but also concerns about
the rising price of oil. Political unrest in the region has caused oil supply disruption and price hikes before; many
Americans recall – and do not want to repeat – the gas shortages in 1973 spurred by U.S. support for Israel during the
Yom Kippur War. But is the cause for alarm justified? New research by Eugene Gholz, a distinguished
scholar at The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at The University of Texas at Austin,
suggests that it is not. By analyzing every major oil disruption since 1973, Gholz and his colleague
Daryl Press show that the related price increases have been short-lived and with little enduring
economic impact. When oil supplies run short, it turns out, oil purchasers scramble but market
forces kick in to fill the gap. If the market is able to adapt, and the chances of another major oil
shock are slim, what does that mean for American foreign policy toward the oil-rich nations of the Middle East?
No Econ Impact ext.
Empirics
Ferguson, 06 – M.A., Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University, Resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European
Studies, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University (Niall, “The Next War of the
World”, Foreign Affairs, September-October 2006, May 21st 2010, KONTOPOULOS)
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern
historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple
story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not
all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes
start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as
a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of
economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.
And, economic crisis doesn’t cause war—prefer statistical studies over abstract IR
theories
Miller, PhD in economics, 2k—PhD in economics from McGill U, MSc in economics from the London School of Economics, fmr adjunct professor at
U of Ottawa, fmr executive director of the World Bank in Washington D.C. (Morris, August 2000, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, University of Ottawa Center on
Governance, http://www.management.uottawa.ca/miller/poverty.htm, AL)
It seems reasonable to believe that a powerful "shock" factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on
the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership. The leadership, finding that this sudden adverse economic and social
impact destabilizing, would possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the
process leading to war. There would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis according to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei
and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in
Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that
Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong …..The severity
of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes….(or, in
democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence…In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to
crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.)
And, collapse means people can’t sustain conflict
Bennet and Nordstrom, prof pol sci, 2K (D. Scott and Timothy Nordstrom, dept of political science @ the University of Penn, 2000,“Foreign
Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries”, Journal of Conflict resolution, vol.44 no.1 p. 33-61, jstor)
Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may
pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large
amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a
settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic
economy. In a "guns versus butter" world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to
pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce
costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry.
However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions
are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away
from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and
masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to
cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of
continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the
cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically
with the United States. Hypothesis 2: Poor economic conditions increase the probability of rivalry
termination. Hypotheses 1 and 2 posit opposite behaviors in response to a single cause (internal economic problems). As such, they demand are search
design that can account for substitutability between them.
And, recent conflicts prove there is zero correlation between economic decline and
war
Barnett, 09 – Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions LLC, Contributing Editor and Online Columnist for Esquire (Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security
Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, 8/25/09 http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financialcrisis-398-bl.aspx)
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing
conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by
China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's
first truly
worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.
None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly
attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates
the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by
Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was
specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most
important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia
and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix
of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent RussiaGeorgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one
side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with
the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the
planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual
military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn,
occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training
local forces.
Defer to the latest economic climate
Zakaria, 09 – Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard, Editor of Newsweek (Fareed, “The Secrets of Stability,” Newsweek, 12/12/09,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425)
Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the
worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that
"the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed
this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign
Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging
markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial
industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well,
Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have
gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran.
Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by
responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did
in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.
Methane
Methane Defense ext.
Catastrophic methane release extremely unlikely – no impact to current trends
Ruppel and Noserale 12 (Carolyn and Diane, U.S. Geological Survey Woods Hole Field Center AND USGS communications worker,
“Gas Hydrates and Climate Warming—Why a Methane Catastrophe Is Unlikely”, May/June 2012, http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2012/06/)//WL
News stories and Web postings have raised concerns that climate warming will release large volumes of methane from gas hydrates, kicking off a
chain reaction of warming and methane releases. But recent
research indicates that most of the world’s gas hydrate
deposits should remain stable for the next few thousand years. Of the gas hydrates likely to become
unstable, few are likely to release methane that could reach the atmosphere and intensify climate
warming. Gas Hydrates Primer Gas hydrates are an ice-like combination of natural gas and water that can form in deep-water ocean
sediments near the continents and within or beneath continuous permafrost. Specific temperatures and pressures and an ample supply of
natural gas are required for gas hydrates to form and remain stable. An estimated 99 percent of gas hydrates are in ocean sediment and the
remaining 1 percent in permafrost areas (see map). Methane hydrate or “methane ice,” which is the most common type of gas hydrate,
represents a highly concentrated form of methane: one cubic foot of methane hydrate traps about 164 cubic feet of methane gas. The amount of
methane trapped in the Earth’s gas hydrate deposits is uncertain, but even the most conservative estimates conclude that about 1,000 times
more methane is trapped in hydrates than is consumed annually worldwide to meet energy needs. The most active area of gas-hydrate research
focuses on gas hydrates’ potential as an alternative source of natural gas (for example, see
http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/studies/documents/natural-gas-2011/Supplementary_Paper_SP_2_4_Hydrates.pdf [842 KB PDF]); the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) Gas Hydrates Project has several programs addressing this topic (see
http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/UnconventionalOilGas/GasHydrates.aspx). Gas Hydrates and Climate Change Gas hydrate researchers
are
examining the link between climate change and the stability of methane-hydrate deposits. Warming climate
could cause gas hydrates to break down (dissociate), releasing the methane that they now trap. Methane is a potent greenhouse gas. For a given
volume, methane causes 15 to 20 times more greenhouse-gas warming than carbon dioxide, and so the release of large volumes of methane to
the atmosphere could, in theory, exacerbate climate warming and cause more gas hydrates to destabilize. Some research suggests that such
large-scale, climate-driven dissociation events have occurred in the past. For example, extreme warming during the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal
Maximum about 55 million years ago may have been related to a large-scale release of methane from global methane hydrates. Some scientists
have also advanced the clathrate-gun hypothesis to explain observations that may be consistent with repeated, catastrophic dissociation of gas
hydrates and triggering of submarine landslides during the late Quaternary (400,000 to 10,000 years ago). Methane As a Greenhouse Gas The
atmospheric concentration of methane, like that of carbon dioxide, has increased since the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Methane in the
atmosphere comes from many sources, including wetlands, rice cultivation, termites, cows and other ruminants, forest fires, and fossil-fuel
production. Some researchers have estimated that as much as 2 percent of atmospheric methane may originate with dissociation of global gas
hydrates. Currently, scientists do not have a tool to say with certainty how much, if any, atmospheric methane comes from hydrates.
Although methane is a potent greenhouse gas, it does not remain in the atmosphere for long; within
about 10 years, it reacts with other compounds in the atmosphere to form carbon dioxide and water.
Thus, methane that is released to the atmosphere ultimately adds to the amount of carbon dioxide, the
main greenhouse gas. Climate-Driven Gas Hydrate Dissociation For the most part, warming at rates documented by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for the 20th century should not lead to catastrophic breakdown of methane
hydrates or major leakage of methane to the ocean-atmosphere system from gas hydrates that
dissociate. Although most methane hydrates would have to experience sustained warming over thousands of years before dissociation was
triggered, gas hydrates in some places are dissociating now in response to short- and long-term climatic processes. The following discussion
refers to the numbered type locales or sectors shown in the diagram of gas-hydrate deposits below. Sector 1, Thick Onshore Permafrost: Gas
hydrates that occur within or beneath thick terrestrial permafrost will remain largely stable even if
climate warming lasts hundreds of years. Over thousands of years, warming could cause gas hydrates at the top of the stability
zone, about 625 feet (190 meters) below the Earth’s surface, to begin to dissociate. Sector 2, Shallow Arctic Shelf: The shallow-water continental
shelves that circle parts of the Arctic Ocean were formed when sea-level rise during the past 10,000 years inundated permafrost that was at the
coastline. Subsea permafrost is thawing beneath these continental shelves, and associated methane hydrates are likely dissociating now. (For
example, see related Sound Waves article "Degradation of Subsea Permafrost and Associated Gas Hydrates Offshore of Alaska in Response to
Climate Change.") If methane from these gas hydrates reaches the seafloor, much of it will likely be emitted to the atmosphere. Less than 1
percent of the world’s gas hydrates probably occur in this setting, but this estimate could be revised as scientists learn more. Sector 3, Upper
Edge of Stability: Gas hydrates on upper continental slopes, beneath 1,000 to 1,600 feet (300 to 500 meters) of water, lie at the shallowest water
depth for which methane hydrates are stable. The upper continental slopes, which ring all of the world’s continents, could host gas hydrate in
zones that are roughly 30 feet (10 meters) thick. Warming ocean waters could completely dissociate these gas hydrates in less than 100 years.
Methane emitted at these water depths will probably dissolve or be oxidized in the water column and is
unlikely to reach the atmosphere. About 3.5 percent of the Earth’s gas hydrates occur in this climate-sensitive setting. Sector 4,
Deepwater: Most of the Earth’s gas hydrates, about 95 percent, occur in water depths greater than 3,000 feet (1,000 meters). They are likely to
remain stable even with a sustained increase in bottom temperatures over thousands of years. Most of the gas hydrates in these settings occur
deep within the sediments. If the gas hydrates do dissociate, the released methane should remain trapped in the sediments, migrate upward to
form new gas hydrates, or be consumed by oxidation in near-seafloor sediments. Most methane released at the seafloor would likely dissolve or
be oxidized in the water column. A recent article, “Methane Hydrates and Contemporary Climate Change,” provides more detail.
Methane Hydrate detection and mitigation in atmosphere solves in the status quo.
Hunt et al. 13 Andrew G. Hunt, Carolyn Ruppel, Laura Stern, and John Pohlman, members of surveyors in the US Geological Survey
Committee, “Using Noble Gas Signatures to Fingerprint Gas Streams Derived from Dissociating Methane Hydrate”,
http://www.netl.doe.gov/File%20Library/Research/Oil-Gas/methane%20hydrates/MHNews_2013_October.pdf
Based on the knowledge that noble gas molecules partition into the gas hydrate lattice in the order of
their molecular weight, the USGS Gas Hydrates Project, in collaboration with the USGS Noble Gas
Laboratory in Denver, is investigating the potential of noble gas signatures for fingerprinting gas streams
derived from dissociating gas hydrates. Many natural processes can lead to the emission of methane
gas. A critical challenge is determining which gas streams originate from dissociating gas hydrates versus
other sources. The challenge is particularly acute in permafrost settings, where an ardent scientific
debate rages over whether methane leaking into the atmosphere is sourced from dissociating gas
hydrates or from non-hydrate sources, which may include shallow microbial gas, microbial gas
produced from degradation of newly thawed organic carbon, deep thermogenic reservoirs, and
coalbeds. Carbon isotopic signatures are of limited use in distinguishing between hydrate- and nonhydrate sources of gas streams, because gas hydrates often sequester methane with δ13C signatures
similar to those of local thermogenic and/or microbial methane sources. Noble gas signatures, on the
other hand, may provide a useful alternative tool for distinguishing methane gas sources. Previous
Work Noble gas signatures of gas hydrates were previously studied by Dickens and Kennedy (2000) and
Winckler et al. (2002), but not for the purposes of fingerprinting gas streams emitted from dissociating
methane hydrates. These studies provide important background, but the samples experienced
significant air contamination. Conflicting results also led to questions about the true nature of noble gas
storage in the methane hydrate lattice. Experimental Approach Taking advantage of the special
capabilities of the USGS Noble Gas Laboratory, which is equipped with a state-of-the-art gas extraction
line, coupled with a noble gas mass spectrometer, we performed an initial investigation of the
fractionation of noble gas compositions during the formation and dissociation of methane hydrate
under controlled laboratory conditions. The full paper on this project was published as Hunt et al.
(2013). Methane hydrate was synthesized using a modified version of the ice seed method (Stern et al.,
1996). The synthesis gas was a mixture of methane plus pressurized air with uniform noble gas content
(air-like isotopic composition of Ne, Ar, Kr, and Xe). Two samples were synthesized concurrently: a
control sample that was dissociated immediately, and a 24 companion sample that was stored in liquid
nitrogen and used for later testing. Our protocol was to collect gas from (1) the source mixture (initial
gas); (2) excess gas in the sample chambers prior to hydrate formation; (3) excess gas after complete
conversion to hydrate (final gas); and (4) gas released during step-wise dissociation. Following methane
hydrate synthesis, the control sample was quickly vented (while ensuring no air contamination) to
release all unreacted gas. The synthesized hydrate was then heated and dissociated over multiple steps.
Aliquots of the released gas were collected after each step. The companion sample was vented and
quenched in liquid nitrogen, wrapped in aluminum foil and stored for 9 months in liquid nitrogen, and
then dissociated in a similar step-wise manner. Additional samples were later synthesized to verify the
reproducibility of our results and to analyze the bulk composition of the hydrate.
Warming Irreversible ext.
Warming irreversible b/c of feedback loops
Mims 12 (Christopher, staff writer for Grist, “Climate scientists: It’s basically too late to stop warming”, 3/26/12,
http://grist.org/list/climate-scientists-its-basically-too-late-to-stop-warming/, HG)
If you like cool weather and not having to club your neighbors as you battle for scarce resources, now’s
the time to move to Canada, because the story of the 21st century is almost written, reports Reuters.
Global warming is close to being irreversible, and in some cases that ship has already sailed. Scientists
have been saying for a while that we have until between 2015 and 2020 to start radically reducing our
carbon emissions, and what do you know: That deadline’s almost past! Crazy how these things sneak up
on you while you’re squabbling about whether global warming is a religion. Also, our science got better
in the meantime, so now we know that no matter what we do, we can say adios to the planet’s ice caps.
For ice sheets — huge refrigerators that slow down the warming of the planet — the tipping point has
probably already been passed, Steffen said. The West Antarctic ice sheet has shrunk over the last
decade and the Greenland ice sheet has lost around 200 cubic km (48 cubic miles) a year since the
1990s. Here’s what happens next: Natural climate feedbacks will take over and, on top of our prodigious
human-caused carbon emissions, send us over an irreversible tipping point. By 2100, the planet will be
hotter than it’s been since the time of the dinosaurs, and everyone who lives in red states will pretty
much get the apocalypse they’ve been hoping for. The subtropics will expand northward, the bottom
half of the U.S. will turn into an inhospitable desert, and everyone who lives there will be drinking
recycled pee and struggling to salvage something from an economy wrecked by the destruction of
agriculture, industry, and electrical power production. Water shortages, rapidly rising seas, superstorms
swamping hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure: It’s all a-coming, and anyone who is
aware of the political realities knows that the odds are slim that our government will move in time to do
anything to avert the biggest and most avoidable disaster short of all-out nuclear war. Even if our
government did act, we can’t control the emissions of the developing world. China is now the biggest
emitter of greenhouse gases on the planet and its inherently unstable autocratic political system
demands growth at all costs. That means coal. Meanwhile, engineers and petroleum geologists are
hoping to solve the energy crisis by harvesting and burning the nearly limitless supplies of natural gas
frozen in methane hydrates at the bottom of the ocean, a source of atmospheric carbon previously
considered so exotic that it didn’t even enter into existing climate models. So, welcome to the 21st
century. Hope you packed your survival instinct.
Warming – AT: Try or Die
None of their studies have predictive validity – reject “try or die” framing.
Sadar 7/7 (Anthony J., Prof @ Geneva College specializing in Earth and Environmental Science,
Statistics, Air Pollution Meteorology and Engineering, Why the former Ice Age became global warming,
then climate change, Washington Examiner 7/7/14, http://washingtonexaminer.com/why-the-comingice-age-became-global-warming-then-climate-change/article/2550565)//mm
Today, it is fashionable to expect disaster from too much warmth. So the smart money is on promoting
dire predictions and consequences of rising thermometers, even in the face of no global warming for
more than 15 years. From my own 35 years of experience in the atmospheric science profession as an
air-pollution meteorologist, air quality program administrator and science educator, I can attest the fact
that long-range, global climate-change outlooks are nothing but insular professional opinion. Such
opinion is not worthy of the investment of billions of dollars to avoid the supposed catastrophic
consequences of abundant, inexpensive fossil fuels and, subsequently, to impoverish U.S. citizens with
skyrocket energy costs. I have conducted or overseen a hundred air-quality studies, many using
sophisticated atmospheric modeling. Such modeling — comparable to or even involving the same
models as those used in climate modeling — produced results for relatively short-term, local areas that,
although helpful to understanding air quality impact issues, were far from being able to bet billions of
taxpayer dollars on. Yet similar climate models that imagine conditions for the entire globe for decades
into the future are used to do just that — bet billions of taxpayer dollars. Bottom line, nobody can detail
with any billion-dollar-spending degree of confidence what the global climate will be like decades from
now. But, it’s easy to predict that, given enough monetary incentive and the chance to be at the
pinnacle of popularity, some climate prognosticators — and certainly every capitalizing politician — will
continue to proffer convincing climate claims to an unwary public.
Off Case
Military Off-Case
Military 1NC
Counterplan Text: The Department of Defense should establish a national coordinated
coastal and marine spatial planning system for the ocean.
The military should and can lead the effort.
Medina et al. 14 (Monica Medina, previously served as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and a Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere at NOAA, Joel Smith, Research Associate for the Energy, Environment and Security Program at
the Center for a New American Security, Commander Linda Sturgis, the United States Coast Guard Senior Military Fellow at the Center for a
New American Security, January 2014, Center for a New American Security, “National Costal Ocean Mapping”,
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/OceanMapping_MedinaSmithSturgis.pdf, LM)
Given the U.S. military’s history of researching and acquiring technology to advance coastal ocean
awareness, we recommend that it lead the mapping effort, with input from public and private
stakeholders. The military should invest in the development of a national coastal ocean mapping system
that would provide regional planning bodies with a unified tool for ocean planning. Conclusion The
development of a national coastal ocean mapping system would benefit all coastal ocean users
and is an integral step toward more effective and thorough ocean planning. Through
comprehensive awareness of major offshore activity, the United States would simultaneously
advance national security, economic development and ocean conservation.
Military Solvency
The military is key to a successful MSP process
The Maritime Alliance Foundation 14 (The Maritime Alliance Foundation, March 2014, “Marine Spatial Planning in San
Diego & Stakeholder Overview”, http://themaritimealliance.org/pdf/SanDiegoMSP_StakeholderReport_FINAL_March2014.pdf, LM)
MSP is inclusive in its nature and stakeholders should be encouraged to participate in a comprehensive
planning process. Nevertheless, it is possible that some ocean users may feel marginalized during the process for various reasons ranging
from lack of communication, to changing micro-economic factors or mistrust of the process. Some of the key stakeholder groups
that should be involved early in the MSP process include environmental and conservation groups, local
fishermen associations, the military, and tribal organizations.
Only the Navy’s participation in MSP will be able to solve for conflict
Schregardus 14 (Donald R. Schregardus, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, winter 2014, Currents, “Ocean Stewardship through
Marine Spatial Planning”, http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2014/03/Win14_DASNE_Outlook.pdf, LM)
Marine Spatial Planning represents a new and unique opportunity for the Navy to engage with our
communities, states, and regions and other ocean stakeholders early in this voluntary planning process. By
increasing communications and focusing on identifying complementary and sustainable uses for these
areas, we avoid conflicts, improve regulatory efficiencies, and increase ocean productivity/ benefits.
While there have been effective programs addressing these activities in some parts of the country, the National Ocean Policy
represents a first attempt to conduct comprehensive, integrated planning that includes the federal family,
states, tribes, and other stakeholders. Our country is struggling with escalating costs, duplicative activities, and conflicting priorities on
ocean use. A comprehensive planning process, working with all stakeholders, provides an important venue for the
Navy to protect national security equities while jointly working with of our federal, tribal, state, municipal, and
neighborhood partners to responsibly utilize, manage and protect our ocean and Great Lakes resources. 4 DON
represents the Department of Defense (DoD) on the National Ocean Council. We have established a formal executive steering group within DoD
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) comprised of senior executives and flag officers to ensure that DoD leadership is kept abreast of
developments and contributes to national ocean policy implementation. Our
primary objective is to ensure that operational,
training, research and development, test and evaluation, environmental compliance, and
homeland/national security equities are considered in developing national ocean policy and throughout
the marine spatial planning process. The DoD, with special emphasis on the Navy and the unique role of the Army Corps of
Engineers within the DoD, has interests in each of the nine Regional Planning Bodies (RPB). Accordingly, we have formally
designated representatives for both the DoD and Joint Chiefs for each of the RPBs. These RPB representatives participate in
planning activities and. coordinate activities internally to ensure consistency throughout the DoD. DoD
and Navy leadership strongly support regional planning in the coastal and marine systems to both
reduce spatial and temporal conflicts and to promote healthier and more resilient coasts and oceans.
Additionally, the Navy has offered to serve as the federal co-lead for both the South Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico RPBs given the level of
Navy and other military service activities in the region. Together, these two RPBs largely coincide with the Area of Responsibility for our
Southeast Regional Commander.
Specifically, the navy has the best technology for ocean mapping – solves biodiversity
and methane advantage better.
Herkewitz 13 (William Herkewitz is a graduate of the University of California, Santa Cruz, where he earned his B.A. in English literature.
A lifelong lover of science, he is coming to NYU after a year of writing and working for two Philadelphia-based science museums, The Academy
of Natural Sciences and the Chemical Heritage Foundation, “How Scientific Sea Drones Are Becoming the Eyes of the Navy”)
Last fall Rutgers University ocean researcher Oscar Schofield headed a collaborative experiment called Gliderpalooza, which coordinated 15
aquatic, submersible research drones to sample the deep waters off the coastal Atlantic. About 5 feet long and shaped like tomahawk missiles,
the gliders beam home their data every time they surface. The propellerless drones, jam-packed with scientific instruments, swim by changing
their buoyancy—taking on and expelling a soda can's worth of water to sink and float. And they navigate under the waves by themselves. "The
gliders are autonomous, so you just throw them in the water and off they go," Schofield says, though they can also take directions from
operators when they surface. ¶ With this robotic flotilla—part of the new wave of ocean-going drones—Schofield and his colleagues could
gather a detailed picture of the ocean's temperature, currents, wildlife, and water quality at depths up to 650 feet. But even as ocean
researchers use these gliders to track fish and help predict storms, the drones have attracted another admirer—the U.S. Navy. ¶ "Right
now
the Navy is at the forefront of this technology," Schofield says, "and the Office of Naval Research really funded and developed
these gliders in the first place." The Navy currently owns 65 of the same kind of gliders Schofield operates, with plans to expand to 150 by 2015.
But the Navy's interest isn't exactly in science. The
fleet of gliders is helping the Navy gain a tactical advantage in the
ocean's future war zones. ¶ Operational Planning¶ "As the Navy plans for operations, they have to look into the future," says Frank
Bub, the lead ocean modeler at the Naval Oceanographic Office. In other words: As the Navy maps out anything from a SEAL team silently
breaching onto shore to a subsurface naval exercise, it must predict how the movement of the seas will affect its plans. "The
Navy relies
on ocean models not just to forecast future conditions but to fill in the gaps where data may never have
been collected," Bub says. ¶ This is where the gliders come in. By sending a scientific drone through or near an area of interest, the
"gliders provide us real-time ocean data, and that has two major applications," Bub says. The Navy can use that data not only to
check the accuracy of its models, but to adjust or correct them. ¶ "If the Navy SEALs have a mission and they're going
ashore, they definitely want to know what the ocean conditions are from when they leave their mother ship to when they land on the beach,"
Bub says. Gliders could provide temperature data so the SEALs wear the right gear, or gliders could give the most accurate description of
currents so the SEALs swim in the right direction as quickly and quietly as possible. ¶ Where the gliders can have the biggest impact are the
places where the Navy can't or isn't allowed to go. While he's not at liberty to list them all, Bub points to places where the Navy currently has
significant interest: "The Navy is in the western Pacific, the northern Indian Ocean, and the Navy spends time in the Mediterranean," he says.
It's in these places (perhaps even around the increasingly tense East China Sea) that gliders could slip in silently to gather intelligence. "The
gliders are clandestine," Bub says. "They spend very little time on the surface, they're not generally detectable, and although they communicate
through the Iridium satellite system, they've been encrypted." ¶ And Schofield says this type of clandestine mission could be done from far
away. Even though the gliders swim at less than a mile per hour, their propellerless propulsion and battery packs allow them to stay at sea for
up to a year. "And you can launch a glider pretty far away from a region of interest. I could deploy one a hundred miles away from where I have
it fly in," Schofield says. ¶ Hunting and Hiding Submarines¶ Much of the time submarines operate in the dark—they're often deployed to places
with limited oceanographic data. Schofield uses temperature as an example. "Satellites observe sea surface temperature by using infrared
light," he says, "but infrared light penetrates only centimeters into the water, so you can't really extract any information from very deep in the
ocean." Without satellites, ocean modelers rely only on a few thousand global research buoys as well as ships and research stations, which
combine to provide an uneven and low-resolution picture. ¶ Bub says it's crucial for a sub commander to understand both the temperature and
salinity of deep waters. That's because the key to avoiding detection is to understand not only how much sound you're producing but where
and how far it's traveling, and temperature and salinity play important roles in how sound propagates underwater. ¶ "Sound in warm water
goes faster than sound in cold water, and just like light, it will refract and bend," with changes in the salinity, depth, and temperature of the
water, Bub says. "So for submarine warfare, the key is to take these qualities and convert them into sound speed. Then we can run acoustic
models and find out how the sound propagates through the ocean." ¶ Here, too, undersea gliders—which take snapshots of the deep ocean
several times per second—are ideally suited for the job. Although
the current Navy drones can reach a depth of only
3000 feet, the Navy already has plans for a newer version that could dive to more than 1 mile below sea
level. By mapping the deep seas, the Navy thinks it can find places that are best for hiding subs. ¶ "And
on the other hand, our destroyers and other antisubmarine warfare ships want to know where other
submarines are," Bub says. By taking advantage of our glider-aided acoustic models, "we can actively put sound in the
water," with things such as active sonar and sonobuoys, "which travels on paths that are determined by
our ocean models," he says.¶
Only sonar technology is sufficient to solve for mapping and technology – Navy tech is
superior and key
NOAA 10 (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (is a scientific
agency within the United States Department of Commerce focused on the conditions of the oceans and the atmosphere, “Ocean Explorer”,
June 9, 2010, http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/explorations/lewis_clark01/background/seafloormapping/seafloormapping.html)//MW
Still, these systems only produced depth soundings immediately below the ship’s tracks. To produce maps of the shape of the sea floor, one
had to laboriously “contour” an area by connecting lines of equal depth together. Although the advent of digital computers in the 1960s
provided much needed automation to the plotting of such data, the same basic technology was still being used by the civilian scientific
community until the 1970s. In the 1960s, the U. S. Navy began using a new technology called “multibeam sonar.”
Arrays of sonar projectors produced soundings not only along the track, but also for significant distances perpendicular to the ship’s track.
Instead of lines of soundings, these new “multibeam”
systems produced a “swath” of soundings. Combined with
automated contouring, multibeam systems produced the ability to make detailed, complete maps of
large areas of the sea floor, which became available to the scientific community for the first time in the late
1970s, after the Navy declassified the technology. Since these first multibeam systems, this technology has steadily improved
and modern systems can map swaths up to several times the water depth. Combined with positional
information provided by the GPS navigation systems now in common use, these systems provide a
whole new view of the sea floor.¶ This is a critical part of our knowledge of the ocean. It is also
important to map changes in the composition of the sea floor. Whereas depth can be measured using
the timing of the signals going to and from the sea floor, a precise measurement of the “strength” of
the sonar return is required to discern texture. For example, a sound pulse impinging on a mud sea floor will be absorbed for
the most part with only a small percentage returning to the receiver, whereas a rock bottom will absorb very little sound and return most of it.
In this way, modern sea floor survey systems measure relative strength of return signals as well as the depth.
Only sonar tech is sufficient to chart the waters – Navy solves best
Ohab 9 (John Ohab, special to American Forces Press Service, “Navy Hydrographers Provide Critical Mapping of Ocean Floor”, January 30,
2009, navymil.com, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=42238)//MW
WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Advanced ocean-bottom
mapping technologies have enhanced the Navy's ability to
navigate safely throughout the world and have helped support disaster assistance and humanitarian
relief operations, according to the Navy's oldest active diver. ¶ Michael Jeffries, a Navy hydrographer and technical director of the Fleet
Survey Team, was interviewed on "Armed with Science: Research and Applications for the Modern Military" on BlogTalkRadio.com Jan. 28
about the science of hydrography and the tools and techniques used to develop precise nautical navigation charts. ¶ Hydrography focuses on
measurements and descriptions of the physical characteristics of oceans, seas and coastal areas, including lakes and rivers. The primary
purpose of collecting hydrographic information is to support the production of nautical charts, graphical representations of the maritime
environment and adjacent coastal regions. ¶ The most important information contained on a nautical chart is the depiction of soundings, or the
water depths. ¶ "Whether the user is a fisherman or a captain of a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, knowing the depths of the water you are navigating
is paramount to maintaining the safety of the vessel and all of its crew," Jeffries, a hydrographer for more than 30 years, said. ¶ The
Fleet
Survey Team, a subordinate command to the Naval Oceanographic Office at Stennis Space Center in Mississippi,
supports Navy and Marine Corps global operations by conducting hydrographic surveys that provide critical nautical information,
including water depth, tide levels, and the location of navigational aids like buoys, lighthouses, beacons,
shipwrecks, rocks and reefs. ¶ The team also conducts expeditionary hydrographic surveys using
personal watercraft called "expeditionary survey vessels," or ESVs, to identify underwater hazards during
amphibious landing exercises. ¶ "Teams conduct surveys in advance of our amphibious landing forces to
determine the most suitable beach landings for the military exercise," Jeffries said. ¶ An estimated 89 percent of Earth's waters
have not been adequately charted, and some nautical charts still contain source data from the 19th century, Jeffries said. Furthermore, the
marine environment and seafloor are constantly changing due to natural events like hurricanes, tsunamis and earthquakes, and manmade
events like shipwrecks and construction. For these reasons,
emerging navigation and positioning equipment play an
important role in developing the most accurate and up-to-date nautical charts, he said. ¶ "One of the most
remarkable technological advances for the science of hydrography is the use of satellites for positioning and navigation," Jeffries said. "With our
current technology, we can refine [positioning] to less than 1 centimeter." ¶ The
Fleet Survey Team employs a variety of
high resolution sonar systems to define the topographic characteristics of the seafloor. Portable
sensors known as "single beam echo sounders" can be outfitted on ESVs to provide depth information. A
specialized sensor called "side-scan sonar" is the main tool used by the Naval mine warfare community
to locate mine-like objects and other obstructions on the seafloor. ¶ "The key to accurate hydrographic
surveying is precise positioning of your vessel and the sensors that collect information about the
seafloor," Jeffries said. ¶ Comprising 65 military and civilian personnel, the Fleet Survey Team plays a critical role in support of disaster
assistance and humanitarian relief operations. After the 2004 tsunami that struck the coastal town of Banda Aceh, Indonesia, teams surveyed
for underwater hazards and cleared waterways for relief ship traffic. Recently, it conducted joint hydrographic surveys with the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers to ensure that waterways were clear in Texas
and Louisiana after hurricanes Ike and Gustav. ¶ "Whether here in the U.S. or anywhere else in the world, our 'fly-away teams' comprised of
three or four Fleet Survey Team members hand-carry suites of sonar sensors with them," Jeffries said. "Upon arriving at their mission location,
the teams install these sensors on board any platform that is made available to them." ¶ The
Fleet Survey Team also supports
joint hydrographic survey operations with more than 20 international partners. ¶ "Partnership building with other
countries contributes to the security and stability of the maritime domain, and this most certainly benefits all of us," Jeffries said.
Sonar mapping international cooperation and allows for the exchange of information
DoD 10 (Department of Defense, The Department of Defense is an executive branch department of the federal government of the United
States charged with coordinating and supervising all agencies and functions of the government concerned directly with national security and
the United States Armed Forces, “Fleet Survey Team Members Demonstrate ESV Survey for Brazilian Sailors”, March 30, 2010, Infotech.com,
http://it.tmcnet.com/news/2010/03/30/4701729.htm)//MW
PUBLICATIONS/ContentWorks via COMTEX) -- FORTALEZA, Brazil (NNS) -- Members
of the expeditionary division of Fleet
Survey Team (FST) demonstrated a pier clearance survey for Brazilian Sailors from the Naval Hydrographic
Center (CHM) near Fortaleza, Brazil, March 26-27.¶ The four-member team from FST constructed a scenario with the intent to survey a
port after a natural disaster.¶ Their objective was to search for containers and sunken vessels within the vicinity of the port.¶ "We're
typically sent in for pier clearance surveys as a fast response team to identify any navigational hazards
and verify charted depths in order to make a 'go, no go' recommendation. This is done in order to get a
supply or emergency ship into port," said Lt. j.g. Larry Gulliver, FST expeditionary division officer.¶ FST completed the
survey with two expeditionary survey vehicles (ESV), which utilize a single beam echo sounding system
and sidescan sonar capabilities to survey in depths of 1-20 meters. The team surveyed around a partially submerged
wreck and a shoal area.¶ "This is a new experience for us. We use similar but different equipment to do our soundings. It
was exceptional because the equipment is very practical and maneuverable," said Brazilian Navy Meteorological
Master Chief Gilson Dos Santos, from CHM.¶ FST is currently engaged in the first ever Oceanographic-Southern
Partnership Station (O-SPS) with the Brazilian Navy. O-SPS is an exercise focused on oceanographic surveying and the exchange
of information between subject matter experts from partnering navies within the U.S. Southern
Command region.¶ "The exchange was amazing. The language barrier wasn't as difficult as I was expecting it to be," said Aerographer's
Mate 3rd Class Tonia Boyle, assistant hydrographic technician for FST. "The Brazilians were very receptive to experience first-hand our
expeditionary survey capability, and it was easy to demonstrate since they have similar software and equipment." FST is a subordinate activity
of the Naval Oceanographic Office. It
is a rapid response team with capabilities to conduct quick-turnaround
hydrographic surveys anywhere in the world.¶ Southern Partnership Station is a recurring deployment conducted by
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) and U.S. 4th Fleet with a variety of different objectives.¶ COMUSNAVSO is
the naval component command for U.S. Southern Command and is responsible for all naval personnel and assets in its area of responsibility.
COMUSNAVSO conducts a variety of missions in support of the Maritime Strategy, including theater security cooperation, relationship building,
humanitarian assistance and disaster response, community relations and counter-illicit trafficking operations.
Military AT- Perm
The counterplan is mutually exclusive with the affirmative through cross benefit
analysis – the counterplan alones avoids the link to politics – the distinction is that the
military MUST LEAD the way.
The Navy can develop CMSP.
Schregardus 14 (Donald R. Schregardus, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, winter 2014, Currents, “Ocean Stewardship through
Marine Spatial Planning”, http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2014/03/Win14_DASNE_Outlook.pdf, LM)
Marine Spatial Planning represents a new and unique opportunity for the Navy to engage with our
communities, states, and regions and other ocean stakeholders early in this voluntary planning process. By
increasing communications and focusing on identifying complementary and sustainable uses for these
areas, we avoid conflicts, improve regulatory efficiencies, and increase ocean productivity/ benefits.
While there have been effective programs addressing these activities in some parts of the country, the National Ocean Policy
represents a first attempt to conduct comprehensive, integrated planning that includes the federal family,
states, tribes, and other stakeholders. Our country is struggling with escalating costs, duplicative activities, and conflicting priorities on
ocean use. A comprehensive planning process, working with all stakeholders, provides an important venue for the
Navy to protect national security equities while jointly working with of our federal, tribal, state, municipal, and
neighborhood partners to responsibly utilize, manage and protect our ocean and Great Lakes resources. 4 DON
represents the Department of Defense (DoD) on the National Ocean Council. We have established a formal executive steering group within DoD
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) comprised of senior executives and flag officers to ensure that DoD leadership is kept abreast of
developments and contributes to national ocean policy implementation. Our
primary objective is to ensure that operational,
training, research and development, test and evaluation, environmental compliance, and
homeland/national security equities are considered in developing national ocean policy and throughout
the marine spatial planning process. The DoD, with special emphasis on the Navy and the unique role of the Army Corps of
Engineers within the DoD, has interests in each of the nine Regional Planning Bodies (RPB). Accordingly, we have formally
designated representatives for both the DoD and Joint Chiefs for each of the RPBs. These RPB representatives participate in
planning activities and.coordinate activities internally to ensure consistency throughout the DoD. DoD
and Navy leadership strongly support regional planning in the coastal and marine systems to both
reduce spatial and temporal conflicts and to promote healthier and more resilient coasts and oceans.
Additionally, the Navy has offered to serve as the federal co-lead for both the South Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico RPBs given the level of
Navy and other military service activities in the region. Together, these two RPBs largely coincide with the Area of Responsibility for our
Southeast Regional Commander.
The Military must lead the coastal mapping effort to solve for readiness
CNAS 14 (Center for a New American Security, CNAS board members, founders, leaders, scholars, and interns have held or gone on to
prominent positions in the U.S. government, at the departments of Defense and State; the White House; the Central Intelligence Agency;
Congress; and the private sector. CNAS enjoys a strong network of supporters in all corners of the policymaking community as a result, “The
U.S. Military Should Lead A New National Coastal Ocean Mapping Effort Says CNAS Scholars in New Report”, January 30, 2014,
http://www.cnas.org/content/us-military-should-lead-new-national-coastal-ocean-mapping-effort-says-cnas-scholars-new#.U8Z-7Y1dWLq)
Washington, January 30, 2014 -- The
Center for a New American Security (CNAS) has released a new report
calling for the development of a comprehensive coastal ocean mapping system that would compile,
integrate and analyze available data on the coastal ocean to foster information sharing, improve cooperation and conflict
avoidance among the nation's coastal ocean users.¶ ¶ Due to increases in the diversity and volume of coastal
ocean activity, and as numerous users vie for improved access, the potential for conflict rises. The authors believe this is “highly
problematic for the U.S. military, for whom operating in this coastal environment is critical to
maintaining operational readiness.” Monica Medina, Joel Smith and CDR Linda Sturgis, USCG propose that, "the development of a
national coastal ocean mapping system with integrated geospatial data from all coastal ocean users would be an integral step towards
balancing the offshore training needs of the military with the needs of conservation groups and the private sector."
Among their
specific recommendations, Ms. Medina, Mr. Smith and CDR Sturgis, USCG propose that the U.S. military should lead
the coastal ocean mapping effort, with input from public and private stakeholders. Furthermore, they propose
that the nine regional marine planning bodies, created by the national ocean policy, be empowered to address the competing uses of coastal
ocean waters in their respective regions, and that there be a national-level coordination mechanism to ensure consistency across these bodies.
Military Politics Link Shield
Military projects align Republican support – especially when plans are distinct from
values.
Feaver et al. 14 Jim Golby and Kyle Dropp and Peter Feaver, Golby holds a ph.d in political science from Standford University and is an
instructor in the department of American Politics, Policy and Strategy at the US Military Academy at West Point, NY, Dropp is a Visiting
Associate Research Scholar at Princeton University's Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Peter Feaver is an American Professor of
political science and public policy at Duke University and worked at the National Security Council during both Bush and Clinton’s term, "How the
Military Can Influence American Public Opinion",
http://www.gspia.pitt.edu/Portals/26/PDF/How%20the%20Military%20Can%20Influence%20American%20Public%20Opinion%20Golby%20Dro
pp%20Feaver%202014-2-01.pdf, AP
It seems plausible that senior military officers are potential cue-givers that could function in the foreign policy-public opinion space. Military
officers spend long careers developing expert knowledge regarding military strategy and have direct access to classified information concerning
the military capabilities of American forces and potential threats. Average Americans might view
military opinions as
relevant when choosing who will be the next Commander-in-Chief. And they might likewise factor in military opinion
when trying to determine whether to support proposed military missions such as airstrikes against an enemy threatening U.S. interests. Military
cue-givers could operate according to any or all of these three causal mechanisms. For instance, individuals
could believe that the
military share their values - perhaps because they think the military is like-minded in a partisan fashion or because they think
the military viewpoint on foreign policy matches theirs – and credit the military viewpoint accordingly. Despite high
confidence ratings in the military nationally, there are significant differences across political parties -- 92 percent of Republicans
have confidence in the military, compared with 64 percent of Democrats (Golby 2011). Senior military
officers overwhelmingly identify as Republicans and conservatives (Holsti 1998, Feaver 2001, Urben 2010, Dempsey
2009) and evidence suggests that the mass public still views the military primarily as conservative and Republican.2
For example, four times as many Americans said that most members of the military are Republicans than
said that most members are Democrats (39 percent to 9 percent).3 Such like-mindedness could extend to foreign policy views.
Conservatives and Republicans are more likely to support missions involving `militant internationalist' or
`realpolitik' goals, but less likely to support `cooperative internationalist' or `humanitarian goals'; in contrast, liberals and Democrats are
likely to support interventions with `humanitarian' goals (Wittkopf 1990, Feaver 2004, Golby 2011). Likewise, the military would seem
to be logical candidates to offer a “second opinion” on a risky course of action such as proposed use of force. The
military have professional expertise directly relevant to determining the prospects of success for any use of force and so a public skeptical
about a President might welcome the additional information that the military endorsement would provide.
Public is ignorant of military activities – shields the link
Tan 14 (Kimberly Tan, columnist at The Stanford Daily, “Bridging the Civil-Military Divide at Stanford,” March 10, 2014,
http://www.stanforddaily.com/2014/03/10/bridging-the-civil-military-divide-at-stanford/)
I’m not alone. Though
polls indicate that the military has the highest approval rating of any federal
institution in the United States, the growing civil-military divide (in short, the lack of public awareness about the
military) has led to a weakening of ties between the civilian-controlled military and the civilians
themselves. This phenomenon is partially due to the end of the draft in 1973, which eased citizens’
worries about being called to serve, allowed them to become less engaged with military affairs and led
to an overall decrease in the military’s citizen oversight.¶ The effects of this divide are dangerous. According to Kristina
Lobo, director of the Haas Center Military Service as Public Service (MSAPS) program, the public needs to be informed about military affairs “so
we can voice our opinions to our elected officials.” She explains that “our military was designed to operate under civilian control, so failing to
form and voice opinions on military affairs is neglecting our responsibility as citizens.” In doing so, we allow an incredibly powerful force to
undertake risky operations without being scrutinized, making the military almost too easy for the government to use.¶ If we aren’t informed,
the military becomes a hammer for the government to use, and every issue looks like a nail.¶ I attended an event by MSAPS a few weeks ago,
where four former military officers who are current Stanford graduate students discussed their experiences both in combat and after their
return. One officer recounted how, when standing in line at Subway with one of his friends who had lost a leg in combat, a lady standing next to
them pointed to his friend’s leg and asked about what had happened.¶ “I lost it at Fallujah,” he said, referring to the Battle of Fallujah in the
Iraq War.¶ Her response: “What’s a fallujah?”¶ Her reply exemplifies the irony of people’s
perception of the military – though
it is the institution supported by the public the most, it is the one understood the least. This became even more
evident when the panelists unanimously agreed that it was difficult to return to the U.S. after witnessing torture, human shields and the
victimization of women and children, only to realize that civilians have no idea what is happening.¶ “People like to thank us for
our service when they don’t really know what we did,” one panelist said. And it’s true – we love to thank troops for their service, hoist
American flags and admire soldiers for defending our nation. But do we know what these soldiers did and what they fought for?
Military doesn’t influence elections – shields link to midterms
HOOKER 4 (RICHARD D. HOOKER, JR, a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in International Relations
from the University of Virginia, “Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering AmericanbCivil-Military Relations,” Winter 03-04,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a486416.pdf)
A common criticism is that a growing tendency by retired military elites to publicly campaign for specific candidates signals an alarming move
away from the tradition of nonpartisanship. But aside from the fact that this trend can be observed in favor of both parties,20 not just the
Republicans, evi- dence that documents the practical effect of these endorsements is lacking. Except in wartime, most
voters cannot
even identify the nation’s past or pres- ent military leaders. They are unlikely to be swayed by their
endorsements. Nor is there any evidence that the political actions of retired generals and ad- mirals
unduly influence the electoral or policy preferences of the active-duty military. We are in fact a far cry from the
days when senior military leaders ac- tually contended for the presidency while on active duty—a far more serious breach of civilian control.
Spending cuts don’t prove – DoD still avoids opposition
Belogolova 12
(Olga Belogolova, National Journal, 7/25/12, “Insiders: GOP Won’t Stop Pentagon’s Green-Energy Push” http://news.yahoo.com/insiders-gopwon-t-stop-pentagon-green-energy-213006497.html)
Republicans in both the House and Senate this year have proposed cutting funds for alternativeenergy programs in the defense authorization bill. But these efforts won’t gain much traction, National
Journal’s Energy & Environment Insiders say.¶ More than 70 percent of Insiders say that the Defense
Department’s move to use more biofuels will survive congressional opposition, arguing that
lawmakers will have trouble saying no to the Pentagon.¶ “Despite the GOP’s overzealous pursuit to end any program
that doesn’t line the pockets of big oil, this program likely survives because DOD doesn’t actually answer to Congress,” one Insider said.¶ In
particular, arguing
in favor of cutting military biofuels spending becomes an uphill battle when Pentagon
officials, military veterans, and former lawmakers are saying that the spending is needed to save lives
in war zones.
Military can influence Independent voters.
Feaver et al. 14 Jim Golby and Kyle Dropp and Peter Feaver, Golby holds a ph.d in political science from Standford University and is an
instructor in the department of American Politics, Policy and Strategy at the US Military Academy at West Point, NY, Dropp is a Visiting
Associate Research Scholar at Princeton University's Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Peter Feaver is an American Professor of
political science and public policy at Duke University and worked at the National Security Council during both Bush and Clinton’s term, "How the
Military Can Influence American Public Opinion",
http://www.gspia.pitt.edu/Portals/26/PDF/How%20the%20Military%20Can%20Influence%20American%20Public%20Opinion%20Golby%20Dro
pp%20Feaver%202014-2-01.pdf, AP
When we disaggregate by party identification, however, a different pattern emerges. As shown in Table 2 and Figure
1, the treatment (military and veterans support Obama/Romney) has a markedly different effect, depending on whether it is administered
to self-identified Democrats, Republicans or Independents. Independents who were told that most military and
veterans supported Obama swung 9 points in his direction compared with the control group, which received no prompt
about such endorsements. Romney, however, did not receive a similar bump.11 The movement among self-identified partisans was less
dramatic. These overall effects are depicted graphically in Figure 1.
The effect is even more pronounced among those Independents who report that they do not follow foreign policy news very closely (see Figure
2). For this group, Obama garners a 14-point bump when respondents are told that he has the support of the military and veterans. However,
when we include in the “independent” category those self-described Independents who indicate that they are actually leaning toward one
candidate or another, Obama only receives a 4-point swing among Independents; this effect is no longer statistically significant, even among
those who do not follow foreign policy closely. Since leaned vote choice typically is a good predictor of one’s voting intentions, this difference
suggests that the net effect for Obama among all Independents is quite modest. Nevertheless, it does indicate that military
endorsements would potentially help Obama shore up his support among independent voters who are
considering voting for him, but who have not yet made up their minds.
Bureaucracy Sucks
Federal decision making fails and is inefficient.
Wilson 12 James Q. Wilson, Authority on Public Adminsitration and served on many national committees and boards, and was elected
president of the American Political Science Association, “The Bureaucracy Problem”, http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/thebureaucracy-problem
There is not one bureaucracy problem, there are several, and the solution to each is in some degree
incompatible with the solution to every other. First, there is the problem of accountability or control —
getting the bureaucracy to serve agreed-on national goals. Second is the problem of equity — getting
bureaucrats to treat like cases alike and on the basis of clear rules, known in advance. Third is the
problem of efficiency — maximizing output for a given expenditure, or minimizing expenditures for a
given output. Fourth is the problem of responsiveness — inducing bureaucrats to meet, with alacrity
and compassion, those cases which can never be brought under a single national rule and which, by
common human standards of justice or benevolence, seem to require that an exception be made or a
rule stretched. Fifth is the problem of fiscal integrity — properly spending and accounting for public
money. Each of these problems mobilizes a somewhat different segment of the public. The problem of
power is the unending preoccupation of the president and his staff, especially during the first years of
an administration. Equity concerns the lawyers and the courts, though increasingly the Supreme Court
seems to act as if it thinks its job is to help set national goals as a kind of auxiliary White House.
Efficiency has traditionally been the concern of businessmen who thought, mistakenly, that an efficient
government was one that didn't spend very much money. (Of late, efficiency has come to have a
broader and more accurate meaning as an optimal relationship between objectives and resources.
Robert McNamara has shown that an "efficient" Department of Defense costs a lot more money than an
"inefficient" one; his disciples are now carrying the message to all parts of a skeptical federal
establishment.) Responsiveness has been the concern of individual citizens and of their political
representatives, usually out of wholly proper motives, but sometimes out of corrupt ones. Congress,
especially, has tried to retain some power over the bureaucracy by intervening on behalf of tens of
thousands of immigrants, widows, businessmen, and mothers-of-soldiers, hoping that the collective
effect of many individual interventions would be a bureaucracy that, on large matters as well as small,
would do Congress's will. (Since Congress only occasionally has a clear will, this strategy only works
occasionally.) Finally, fiscal integrity — especially its absence — is the concern of the political "outs" who
want to get in and thus it becomes the concern of "ins" who want to keep them out. Obviously the
more a bureaucracy is responsive to its clients — whether those clients are organized by radicals into
Mothers for Adequate Welfare or represented by congressmen anxious to please constituents — the
less it can be accountable to presidential directives. Similarly, the more equity, the less
responsiveness. And a preoccupation with fiscal integrity can make the kind of program budgeting
required by enthusiasts of efficiency difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, of all the groups interested in
bureaucracy, those concerned with fiscal integrity usually play the winning hand. To be efficient, one
must have clearly stated goals, but goals are often hard to state at all, much less clearly. To be
responsive, one must be willing to run risks, and the career civil service is not ordinarily attractive to
people with a taste for risk. Equity is an abstraction, of concern for the most part only to people who
haven't been given any. Accountability is "politics," and the bureaucracy itself is the first to resist that
(unless, of course, it is the kind of politics that produces pay raises and greater job security). But an
absence of fiscal integrity is welfare chiseling, sweetheart deals, windfall profits, conflict of interest,
malfeasance in high places — in short, corruption. Everybody recognizes that when he sees it, and none
but a few misguided academics have anything good to say about it. As a result, fiscal scandal typically
becomes the standard by which a bureaucracy is judged (the FBI is good because it hasn't had any, the
Internal Revenue Service is bad because it has) and thus the all-consuming fear of responsible
executives.
Bureaucratic decision-making leads to serial policy failures.
Durbin 14 Brent Durbin, teaches courses in U.S. foreign policy, strategic intelligence, military conflict and culture, and international
relations, “Bureaucratic Policy Approach”, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1904171/bureaucratic-politics-approach , accessed
through encyclopedia Britannica
The prima facie evidence for the social learning consists of changes in fundamental aspects of a policy,
including redefined objectives (e.g., increasing access to education rather than ensuring quality of
educa-tion), changes in target groups (e.g., targeting more restrictive popula-tions than in the past), or
altering rights associated with a policy (e.g., creating a newly defined right or restricting previously
granted rights). These are indicators of changes in policy that are presumably based on new social
consensus about a fundamental aspect of the policy. Social learning can be confused with policy change
unrelated to social constructions of policy problems. Changes in targeting of a given policy that define
new classes of beneficiaries may simply be a symbolic under-taking designed to expand political
constituencies. The expansion could occur without any change in, or reaffirmation of, the social
construction of the problem or policy goals. Policy retrenchment may result from bureaucratic
responses to budget problems that are independent of a new construction of the problem. Neither of
these changes entails alter-ation of beliefs about the fairness or appropriateness in targeting par-ticular
groups that would be suggestive of social learning. Distinguishing non-learning-based motivations for
policy changes from ones entailing social learning is a difficult task. It is hard to measure causal beliefs
about policy problems at one point in time, much less assess change over time in causal beliefs. One
promising direction for documenting social learning is to look for changes in alignments of different
interest groups with respect to key policy objectives, targeting features, or fundamental policy direction
(Jenkins-Smith et al., i99i). Changes in interest group alignments with respect to such features could be
suggestive of fundamental changes in belief systems across interest groups, which lead to new coalitions
of interest groups. This conceptualisation of social learning has been the implicit defini-tion for those
scholars who in recent years have argued for strengthening the quality of public policy debate as a
means of fostering better policies. For example, John Dryzek (i990) calls for a 'discursive democracy' in
order to incorporate a more representative set of values into policy. Robert Reich (I988) argues for
public deliberation about policy as a means of fostering civic discovery and potential policy redefinition.
These prescriptions for improved policy embody the notion that social interaction acts as the agent of
social learning (Heclo, I974; Lindblom, 1990; Stone, I985).
Bureaucratic decision making causes internal conflict.
Kettl 12 Donald F. Kettl, s a professor at the School of Public Policy and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution,
“Bureaucratic Breakdown”, http://www.regblog.org/2012/07/12-kettl-wilson-breakdown.html
Deep inside James Q. Wilson’s 1989 classic, Bureaucracy, is a nugget with lasting insight. Why, too often,
do bureaucracies fail? Wilson explains that different administrators, at different levels of the
bureaucracy, have different perspectives, roles, and incentives. Too often, these roles fail to mesh,
problems fall through the cracks—and, as a result, programs can fail, sometimes catastrophically. He
identifies three different levels of bureaucrats. “Operators” work the front lines, performing the most
basic of an agency’s work. They define the agency’s culture by what they do, how they do it, and how
they pass along the accepted modes of business. “Managers” are the critical shock absorbers between
the front lines of operation and the often-turbulent political environment. Finally, “executives” guard
the organization’s turf, seek to preserve its autonomy, build political support, and struggle to secure
the resources needed to do the agency’s work. At each level, the agency’s officials do different jobs.
They need different skills. That produces different perspectives, both on the agency and on its mission.
When they mesh well, and especially when the in-between managers build strong bridges between the
three cultures, the agency performs well. When those bridges crack or crumble, trouble usually follows.
States Off-Case
1nc
The United States’ coastal states should establish a national coordinated coastal and
marine spatial planning system for the ocean.
States key to MSP – regional conditions and spillover to federal cooperation.
Maes 8 Frank Maes, PhD in Law from Ghent University (1996), is professor at Ghent University, Department of Public International Law, in
charge of IA courses on International and European Environmental Law. He is Director Research of the Maritime Institute of Ghent University,
responsible for national and international research projects. Main publications (books, articles) are in the field of marine environmental law and
policy, as well as on maritime spatial planning, “The International Framework for Marine Spatial Planning”,
http://classroom.oceanteacher.org/pluginfile.php/3504/mod_resource/content/0/Maas_MSP_International_Legal_Framework_2008.pdf
Marine ecosystem approaches [6,7]1 have since long been advocated in biological sciences and
fisheries. The concept of ‘‘large marine ecosystems’’ or LMEs was introduced in the 1980s, to delimitate
ecosystems for management purposes [8–11]. Out of the 64 LME defined worldwide,2 13 are pertinent
to the European environment [12]. Since 1995, the International Waters Programme of the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) has provided funding to support selected country-driven projects introducing
ecosystem-based assessment and management practices for LMEs [13,14].3 These LME projects support
the objectives of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 adopted at United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) in 1992.4 However, UNCED rejected the idea of including references to LMEs in
Agenda 21[7]. The boundaries of most LMEs extend beyond the national boundaries of a single coastal
state and require co-operation among more than two coastal states bordering the LME [15]. Since
national boundaries do not conform to ecosystem boundaries, the boundary question is often seen as a
constraint for effective management.5 Some examples of successful management of LMEs are found in
cases where the LME is fully situated under the jurisdiction of a single coastal state (e.g., Northeast
Australian Shelf/Great Barrier Reef LME in Australia). Today, coastal states already make use of various
forms of coastal and ocean management in areas under their jurisdiction [16,17], while in some cases
leading to integrated MSP initiatives [3,18,19]. Nature conservation and protection as part of MSP is
generally done at scales smaller than regions within politically, not ecologically, defined units [20].
European states and other states bordering a regional sea have besides taking national initiatives,
preferred to co-operate in first instance on the basis of regional conventions. The European Union in its
Thematic Strategy for the Marine Environment, relies on marine regions for an ecosystem-based
approach,6 most of them delimitated on the basis of European regional seas, such as the Baltic Sea, the
North Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea and identified subareas (e.g., Iberian coastal sea, Celtic-Biscay
Shelf) in the North East Atlantic Ocean.7 For those European regional seas there already exist legal cooperation frameworks among the states bordering those seas in the form of regional conventions that
established regional commissions.8 From a legal perspective, the main component of the Marine
Strategy is a proposal for a Marine Strategy Directive (COM(2005)505) to achieve good environmental
status of the marine environment by 2021 at latest. This proposed directive confirms the European
marine regions as management units for implementation.9 Member states will be required to develop
marine strategies for the Baltic Sea, the North East Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, and for
their sub-regions.10 Concerning third countries bordering EU oceans and seas, the Maritime Strategy
foresees co-operation, but leaving the planning and execution of measures to the regional level,
taking into account the diversity of conditions, problems and needs of marine regions that require
tailor-made solutions.
State Solvency
States have more direct regulatory power to control non-climate stressors.
Maes 8 Frank Maes, PhD in Law from Ghent University (1996), is professor at Ghent University, Department of Public International Law, in
charge of IA courses on International and European Environmental Law. He is Director Research of the Maritime Institute of Ghent University,
responsible for national and international research projects. Main publications (books, articles) are in the field of marine environmental law and
policy, as well as on maritime spatial planning, “The International Framework for Marine Spatial Planning”,
http://classroom.oceanteacher.org/pluginfile.php/3504/mod_resource/content/0/Maas_MSP_International_Legal_Framework_2008.pdf
UNCLOS provides an international framework for the conservation and management of marine living
resources. In their TS and EEZ coastal states are empowered to establish fishery zones and determine
zones in which fisheries activities are prohibited or restricted. Fisheries jurisdiction in the TS is based on
the sovereignty of the coastal state. Fishing activities without the approval of the coastal state are
‘‘considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state’’, with the effect
that the foreign fishing vessel loses its right to innocent passage (art. 19). Sailing in the TS without
fishing is considered as innocent passage. In the EEZ, the coastal state determines the allowable catch of
the living resources and has the duty to maintain and restore the living resources through proper
conservation and management measures, taking into consideration a multi-species approach and ensure
that the living resources are not endangered by over-exploitation (art. 61). Fisheries in the EEZ by third
parties are very much dependent on agreements and arrangements that give those states access to the
surplus of the allowable catch. Nationals of third states fishing in the EEZ of the coastal state have to
comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state (licensing of fishermen, fishing vessel and
equipment, determination of species that may be caught trough quotas or catch per vessel over a period
of time, seasonal and area limitations or prohibitions, number of vessels and gear specifications, y (art.
62). A major problem is enforcement of the coastal states regulations. Although the coastal state is
empowered to take enforcement measures (boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings) (art.
73), in practice enforcement is difficult. The jurisdiction of the coastal state is only limited by the
obligation to agree with states fishing stocks straddling in the EEZ and in the area adjacent to or beyond
it (high seas) upon measures to ensure conservation of these stocks in the high seas, and to coordinate
measures to ensure conservation of these stocks within the EEZs of two or more coastal states (art. 63).
There are several duties for states to cooperate in conserving certain species (highly migratory species
and marine mammals) (art. 64, 65). Besides the duty to conserve marine living resources in the TS and
EEZ, the same duty applies on the high seas. However on the high seas a coastal state cannot unilaterally
regulate fishing activities. To enhance cooperation and enforcement in the conservation and
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory stocks, states concluded the 1995 agreement
for the implementation of the provisions of UNCLOS.53 The Fish Stock Agreement (FSA) introduces, inter
alia, the precautionary approach in the exploitation, conservation and management of those fish stocks
and promotes the establishment of sub-regional and regional fisheries management organizations and
arrangements [6]. UNCLOS and FSA are supplemented by the non-binding 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries.54 The Code applies to all fisheries within and beyond national jurisdiction. To
promote compliance with international conservation and management measures on the high seas a FAO
Agreement was concluded in 1993.55 The 1995 FSA and 1993 FAO compliance agreement, as well as the
FAO Code, are important improvements to UNCLOS in terms of managing fisheries on the high seas.
These agreements interpret, amplify and develop the existing provisions of UNCLOS. From a MSP
perspective those fisheries agreements do not immediately contribute to MSP since they are dominantly
focussing on fish species. Although the Code of Conduct does mention closed areas or zones as a
management tool for fisheries (7.6.9 Code of Conduct), the Code and the agreements themselves
cannot divert from UNCLOS provisions regarding place-based jurisdiction of states at sea.56
Have the authority to regulate coastal activity.
Maes 8 Frank Maes, PhD in Law from Ghent University (1996), is professor at Ghent University, Department of Public International Law, in
charge of IA courses on International and European Environmental Law. He is Director Research of the Maritime Institute of Ghent University,
responsible for national and international research projects. Main publications (books, articles) are in the field of marine environmental law and
policy, as well as on maritime spatial planning, “The International Framework for Marine Spatial Planning”,
http://classroom.oceanteacher.org/pluginfile.php/3504/mod_resource/content/0/Maas_MSP_International_Legal_Framework_2008.pdf
All states have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment (art. 192). While
exercising their sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies, they have the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment (art. 193). These two
fundamental principles of international law, the duty to protect the (marine) environment and the right
of states to exploit their natural resources, the latter as a corollary right of permanent sovereignty and
the right to development of states, balance global interests with national interests. The roots of article
193 go back to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and the position of developing states.
Reference to the ‘environmental policies’ of individual states introduces a ‘double standard’, one stricter
environmental standard for developed states, the other less strict for developing states [30].
Furthermore ‘‘States have to take all measures to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction and
control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment,
and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread
beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention’’ (art. 194(2)).
In UNCLOS a relationship is established between activities and the duty to prevent pollution,61 while in
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration (1972), in principle 2 of the Rio Declaration and in art. 3 of the
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) this duty is not limited to prevention of pollution. It is a more
general duty not to cause damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. In its Advisory Opinion the International Court of Justice reaffirms that: ‘‘y the
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health
of human beings, including generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation of States to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of
areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
environment’’.62 States have to ensure that activities taking place under their jurisdiction, ratione loci
(internal waters, TS, EEZ) or under their control, ratione materiae (ships flying their flag) do not cause
damage to other states or areas beyond national jurisdiction. In UNCLOS this customary law duty is
narrowed down to ‘‘damage by pollution’’. According to UNCLOS, states shall take all measures to
prevent, reduce and control pollution from any source (art. 194 (1)), while UNCLOS further focuses on
the duty to adopt laws, regulations and other measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution from
land-based sources (art. 207), pollution from sea-bed activities under national jurisdiction (art. 208),
pollution from activities in the Area (art. 209), pollution by dumping (article 210), pollution from vessels
(art. 211) and pollution from the atmosphere (art. 212). Landbased pollution is regulated at the level of
regional seas by regional conventions; dumping, shipping and atmospheric pollution is regulated by
conventions at global and regional seas level [31]. In order to assess potential substantial pollution or
significant and harmful changes to the marine environment of activities under their jurisdiction or
control, states are expected (‘‘shall, as far as practicable’’) to make use of environmental impact
assessments (EIAs) (art. 206). EIAs are necessary tools in MSP. Important from a MSP perspective is the
duty for states to take measures that are necessary to protect and preserve rare and fragile ecosystems
as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other form of marine life (art.
194(5)).
EU proves – regional framing solves.
Maes 8 Frank Maes, PhD in Law from Ghent University (1996), is professor at Ghent University, Department of Public International Law, in
charge of IA courses on International and European Environmental Law. He is Director Research of the Maritime Institute of Ghent University,
responsible for national and international research projects. Main publications (books, articles) are in the field of marine environmental law and
policy, as well as on maritime spatial planning, “The International Framework for Marine Spatial Planning”,
http://classroom.oceanteacher.org/pluginfile.php/3504/mod_resource/content/0/Maas_MSP_International_Legal_Framework_2008.pdf
MPAs in the European Union are mainly based on small ecologically defined areas under the Birds
Directive92 and the Habitats Directive.93 Member states need to designate Special Protection Areas
(SPAs) under the Birds Directive for rare, vulnerable or regularly occurring migratory species and bird
migration must be secured. Under the Habitats Directive Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) have to be
designated in order to support valuable natural habitats for plants or animals. The establishment of SPAs
and SACs are measures that are mandatory under Community law and that affect MSP. Taken together
they should form a network of protected areas across the EU, known as Natura 2000, for which Member
states have to take protective measures. Indeed, MPAs should not be dealt with in isolation but need to
be integrated in spatial development strategies for larger sea areas [35]. The Natura 2000 network is a
key contribution to the commitment of the 2002 WSSD and the CBD Decision VII/28 to establish by 2012
a representative system of marine and coastal protected areas. According to the European Court of
Justice,94 the Habitats and the Bird Directives also apply to the EEZ of Member States. The need for an
ecosystem-based MSP of sea areas under jurisdiction of coastal states is also recognized by the
European Commission in its Green Paper, ‘‘Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European
vision for the oceans and seas’’ (2006).95 The EU Green Paper considers an ecosystem-based marine
regional spatial planning as a tool to ensure investment decisions at sea and refers to licensing,
promoting or placing restrictions on maritime activities. It is recognized that under the current legal
circumstances ‘‘individual decisions on activities should be taken at a national or local level’’ but that ‘‘a
degree of commonality between the systems will be needed to ensure that decisions affecting the same
ecosystem or cross-border activities, such as pipeline and shipping routes, are dealt with in a coherent
manner.’’96 Cross-border co-operation should encompass all activities for which co-operation is
needed, such as cross-border MPAs, the best environmental and economical suitable sites for sand and
gravel exploitation, a renewed fisheries policy to better manage fishery zones and fish stocks, risk
assessment of activities a sea that can affect neighbouring countries, etc. However, the main challenge
will be to link data on human activities, with ecosystem, social and economic data, and integrate these
data in a spatial planning process (see St. Martin in this issue). Without any doubt, this process needs
the involvement of all relevant stakeholders and the public at large. MSP can raise awareness
concerning the marine environment, its complexity and ecosystem services that are often not well
known by the general public. Many stakeholder reactions to the Green Paper97 are in favor of regional
ecosystem-based MSP and making use of the principles of integrated coastal zone management, as
reflected in the EU recommendations on ICZM (2002).98
States Solve Environment
States solve
Boledovich 1 Glenn Boledovich, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration “YOU SAY YOU
WANT A DEVOLUTION: FEDERALISM AND COASTAL ZONE CONSISTENCY”
http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/4916229/FID3790/pdf_files/boledovi.pd
f emk
A more defensible, consistent, and devolutionary approach would be to embrace the CZMA and
consistency as an example of best practices for intergovernmental cooperation. On its face, the
CZMA seems a near perfect fit with the Administration’s devolutionary policies. The Act provides
national goals and objectives, but leaves the specifics of how to achieve those goals to the States. At
its core it is a grant program, providing matching funds for State development and implementation
of their plans. It acknowledges regional differences and needs. It encourages States to develop
innovative management approaches and to serve as “laboratories of experimentation” that can
serve as models for others. It provides a conduit to funnel federal technical and scientific expertise
in support of State efforts. It promotes regional, interstate coordination. In short, the CZMA
promotes the kind of cooperative federalism and intergovernmental partnership that is consistent
with and supportive of devolution and provides a “national” (as opposed to solely federal) paradigm
for meeting the challenges of the new century. 75 Of course, after nearly 30 years, the CZMA model
may need some tweaking. For example, instead of overturning or limiting the reach of consistency,
efforts should be focused on improving the procedures and processes under which it operates—not
to weaken the provisions, but to clarify and support the timely conclusion of the consistency review
process. In addition to consistency, the CZMA provides a well-established federal/state revenue
sharing mechanism. Recent efforts to provide a share of federal OCS oil and gas revenues to
impacted States could be codified into the CZMA. For example, the Coastal Impact Assistance grants
proposed under the Conservation and Reinvestment Act (CARA), could be readily administered
through the existing CZMA program. At present, H.R. 701 would create a duplicative grant program
in the Department of Interior, requiring States to develop what amounts to a second coastal
management plan. Duplicating the existing CZMA program would create confusion and overlapping
responsibilities at the federal level. CONCLUSION Devolution is part of an inherent cycle of
federalism that is characterized by shifting balances of power between States and the federal
government. Today we are 30 years into a devolutionary trend and the power of States has
increased over this time. Barring a major crisis, the trend will continue. In the interim, States have
become increasingly sophisticated and capable. They also have become more active in defending
and promoting their interests. The new Administration has been outspoken in its support for
devolving authority to the States, and its budget proposal specifically targets shifting increased
authority to the States on environmental issues. Regarding the coast, this commitment to States’
rights is about to be tested as the pro-State consistency provisions are weighed against the national
interest in increased OCS oil and gas development. To date, the energy concerns have not risen to
the point of a major national crisis, and it will be politically difficult and risky to try to weaken
consistency under these conditions. Furthermore, the benefits of doing so are much in doubt, i.e.,
weakening CZMA consistency arguably will do little to increase OCS development. A better and more
consistent course for the Administration and Congress would be to support the CZMA, while
improving the consistency process and procedures. In fact, the CZMA could serve as model for
effective intergovernmental coordination and communication in this age of devolution.
Current regulations fail because states need more power for effective environmental
protection
Adler 7/14 JONATHAN H. ADLER- Johan Verheij Memorial Professor Of Law Director, Center For Business Law And Regulation Case
Western Reserve University School Of Law Senior Fellow Property & Environment Research Center “House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy Hearing” http://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/2014/07/14/house-energy-and-commercesubcommittee-on-environment-and-the-economy-hearing-a-529739.html#.U8fUN41dXIo emk
There are many reasons to believe that environmental protections
would be more successful, and environmental
programs would be more cost-effective, were responsibility divided between the federal and state
governments in a more justifiable manner. Ideally, the federal government should reorient its efforts toward those areas in
which the federal government possesses an institutional advantage, due to economies of scale (as with scientific research), or where state
and local governments are incapable of addressing environmental problems, such as where there are substantial interstate spillovers.
Ensuring a greater "match" between the scope of environmental problems and the institutions entrusted with addressing such concerns
would enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of existing environmental protection efforts. n88 Seeking
to expand
federal environmental regulations to the outermost limits of federal regulatory authority is not a
recipe for effective environmental policies. The federal government, like all governments, has limited
resources. Congress only appropriates so much money to federal regulatory agencies and there is only so much time federal regulators
may devote to any given concern. In addition, there are inherent limits to what central regulatory agencies are able to accomplish due to
information and other constraints. These realities strongly counsel focusing federal efforts on those environmental concerns that have a
distinctively federal character and in those areas where states are particularly unlikely or unable to address environmental problems, such
as when activities in one state spill over into another. Authorizing
- or, worse, mandating - the federal government
to oversee and regulate all manner of localized environmental concerns is wasteful and inefficient and sacrifices opportunities for meaningful environmental gains. Short of rewriting existing environmental
statutes, one way of providing greater state flexibility and freeing the federal government to focus on truly national concerns would be to
create a formal mechanism whereby states could opt out of some federal regulatory requirements. Elsewhere I have proposed a policy of
"ecological forbearance," under which states could petition federal agencies for waivers from federal requirements where there are no
compelling reasons to enforce the federal rule. n89 Such a policy would enable states to experiment with alternative means of
environmental protection, thereby reopening the laboratories of democracy in environmental policy. It also would have the potential to
free up federal resources to focus on those areas in which interstate spillovers or economies of scale require greater federal involvement.
Despite the environmental successes of the past three decades, the
overlapping and contradictory state and federal
rules do not lead to efficient or effective environmental protection. It is in some senses an historical
accident that state leadership in environmental policy was supplanted by federal regulation, and
environmental policy could be improved if states regained more of their historic role. The federal
government did not come to dominate environmental policy because a more decentralized system was leading to environmental ruin, and
much of the what the federal government does in environmental policy could be left to the states. Thus constitutional constraints on
federal power in environmental policy is nothing to fear. Indeed, environmental protection could be improved if federal dominance was
confined to those areas in which the federal government has something unique to contribute.
States tighten more than the federal government
Hogue 3/31/14 Cheryl Hogue U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulation of chemicals; international climate change policy;
global environmental treaties; governance of geoengineering; EPA research; federal regulatory policies. Congress Considers States’ Regulations
http://cen.acs.org/articles/92/i13/Congress-Considers-StatesRegulations.html
For years,
states have taken steps to regulate commercial chemicals that aren’t controlled by existing
federal rules. Washington, Maine, and California have led the way. For instance, makers of toys, potty chairs, and other
children’s items must report to Washington state whether their products contain vinyl chloride,
cobalt compounds, or some 60 other substances the state lists as “chemicals of high concern to
children.” Maine has reporting requirements similar to Washington’s. Through these, Maine officials learned which household paints
contain nonylphenol ethoxylates—surfactants being phased out of laundry detergents because they break down into nonylphenol, a
compound toxic to aquatic organisms. California is taking a different approach. A state initiative will require consumer product
manufacturers to find safer alternatives or to eliminate substances the state determines are risky to people’s
health. Now, Congress is weighing whether to strip Washington, Maine, California, and other states of the authority to regulate chemicals
in these and other ways. As it stands, if the Environmental Protection Agency hasn’t regulated a commercial chemical under the federal
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), states now are free to restrict that chemical. And states—concerned with the health and safety of
their citizenry—are acting because the 38-year-old TSCA makes it cumbersome to nearly impossible for EPA to control chemicals in
commerce. States are taking on key roles that EPA can’t because of weaknesses in the outdated TSCA, said Michael Belliveau, executive
director of the Environmental Health Strategy Center, a Maine-based advocacy group. The laws in Maine and Washington, for instance,
have provided information about chemicals in products that wasn’t publicly available before, Belliveau told C&EN. Industry and advocacy
groups, including Belliveau’s, are calling for Congress to modernize TSCA and make it easier for EPA to act on chemicals that pose serious
risk to health or the environment. Legislators on Capitol Hill are actively working on doing just that. But a major sticking point for
lawmakers is whether states should keep their authority on commercial substances. Environmental
and health activists,
joined by a number of state attorneys general and some businesses, want states to retain their
existing authority. Democrats, for the most part, agree. On the other hand, chemical manufacturers are calling for TSCA rewrite
legislation to override existing and future state laws on commercial substances. Many Republicans back this stance. Chemical
manufacturers are worried about the increasing number of bans that states have imposed on certain substances in products, such as
bisphenol A in baby formula cans. But
they are most alarmed about laws establishing state programs for
chemical regulation, like those in Washington, Maine, and California. They see a growing patchwork of state regulations. “This year
alone, 15 state legislatures have introduced unique chemical regulation proposals,” the American Chemistry
Council, an association of chemical manufacturers, told C&EN. Uncertainty about how these wide-ranging state efforts will shake out has
ACC troubled. “If enacted, these
programs would take varying approaches for identifying chemicals and
products that would be potentially targeted for action.” Sympathetic to the chemical industry’s concerns is Rep. John
M. Shimkus (R-Ill.). He is a pivotal player in TSCA reform as chairman of the House of Representatives Energy & Commerce Subcommittee
on Environment & the Economy. In late February, Shimkus released a draft Republican bill, not yet formally introduced, to modernize TSCA.
It would preempt state chemical laws (C&EN, March 10, page 7).
States have already implemented antiwarming efforts
Cama 07/14 Timothy Cama-TheHill reporter http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/212165study-states-can-handle-epa-power-plant-rules “Study: States can handle EPA power plant rules”
An independent analysis of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) proposal to limit carbon
dioxide pollution from power plants concluded that states are “well positioned” to handle the federal
government’s requirements under the rules. The Analysis Group said Monday that there will be costs
associated with compliance, but “such costs will be much lower than the benefits to public health
and to the overall economy from lower CO2 and other air emissions.” If states design programs
effectively, near-term electricity rate increases will be modest, and electric bills will fall in the long
run, the group said. “Several states have already put a price on carbon dioxide pollution, and their
economies are doing fine,” Susan Tierney, an adviser at the group who worked on the report, said in
a statement. “The bottom line: the economy can handle — and actually benefit from — these rules.”
The Analysis Group, a consulting firm, made its conclusions based on states that have already made
efforts to reduction carbon pollution. The Energy Foundation and the Merck Family Fund — two
groups that advocate for energy efficiency — provided funding for the research, but the Analysis
Group said its report was independent. The EPA has devoted much of the last month and a half to
promoting the proposal, aiming for a smooth rollout while shoring up support for it. The agency
predicted that electricity prices would increase due to the rule, but energy efficiency measures would
result in net decreases in power bills.
States can do more
Chou 7/16/14 Ben Chou policy analyst for NRDC's water program in Washington, DC “Obama Administration Recognizes the ClimateResiliency Benefits of Green Infrastructure” http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bchou/obama_administration_recognize.html
As we‘ve seen play out repeatedly in communities across the U.S., the impacts of climate change are
already here. Multiple wildfires are currently burning in Western states, California’s drought is only
intensifying, and extreme storms have caused flooding and heavy winds from the East Coast to the
Rockies. To help manage these extremes, federal agencies, states, and local communities are
increasingly taking action. For example, California state officials just yesterday took unprecedented
action to curtail water waste amid an historic drought. And today, the Obama Administration
revealed a range of actions to help state and local communities better prepare for climate change
impacts. These actions provide critical resources and further help communities across the country
become more resilient to the climate change impacts already being experienced and those expected
in the future. As part of President Obama’s announcement, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is launching a Green Infrastructure Collaborative to further the implementation of
green infrastructure practices in communities across the U.S. Working collaboratively, federal
agencies will provide funding for green infrastructure projects in at least 25 communities across the
country, provide technical assistance to help cities incorporate green infrastructure into planning
efforts, and recognize and award innovative green infrastructure projects. As I’ve written about
previously, green infrastructure techniques (e.g., green roofs, rain gardens, roadside plantings,
porous pavement, and rainwater harvesting) are an important component for making communities
more resilient to climate risks. These techniques use soils and vegetation in the built environment to
absorb runoff close to where it falls, helping to reduce the flooding risks associated with more
frequent and intense rainfall events. They also provide numerous other benefits such as greening the
urban landscape, enhancing water supplies, cutting heating and cooling energy costs, and enhancing
property values. While we fully support President Obama’s efforts to make communities better
prepared for climate change impacts, there are more opportunities for federal agencies to act to
promote green infrastructure. First and foremost, EPA should resume its efforts to set national
standards to control runoff pollution using green infrastructure. As my colleague Jon Devine
explained last year in this post – and as remains true today – EPA passed on a golden opportunity to
implement green infrastructure to protect water quality and to reduce urban flood risks. States also
can provide more opportunities for green infrastructure projects. We recently completed an issue
paper discussing how EPA’s Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds (SRFs) can be
utilized to make communities more resilient. Specifically, the SRFs can better support green
infrastructure projects by scoring projects that integrate green infrastructure higher, requiring
projects intended to reduce sewer overflows or improve stormwater management to implement
cost-effective green infrastructure measures, and setting aside a certain percentage of funds for
green infrastructure projects and programs. Today’s announcement is certainly a step in the right
direction, but we’ll continue to push federal agencies to fully consider climate risks in their planning
and operations – and to increase reliance on green infrastructure as a climate resiliency strategy – so
that all communities have the necessary tools and resources to be better prepared.
Federal enforcement depends on the states
Gallucci 7-16 /14 Maria Gallucci covers energy & the environment “White House Outlines Climate Change Initiatives To Protect
States, Cities And Tribes From Effects Of Global Warming” http://www.ibtimes.com/white-house-outlines-climate-change-initiatives-protectstates-cities-tribes-effects-1629842
President Obama
is set to unveil a series of climate change initiatives on Wednesday aimed at helping
communities across the country prepare for rising sea levels, enduring droughts, more frequent flooding
and other warming-related issues. The actions are based on earlier recommendations by the president’s State, Local and Tribal
Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness. The group of 26 officials has been meeting since November to discuss how federal agencies can
best respond to communities’ needs as more disruptive weather events could strain water and electricity supplies, the New York Times
reported. A White House climate change report in May, called the National Climate Assessment, found that climate change is likely to affect
every location in the United States The task force and its initiatives are part of Obama’s broader Climate Action Plan, which operates under the
aegis of the president’s executive power, to take decisive action in the face of political resistance and gridlock in Congress. Last month, he
outlined an Environmental Protection Agency plan to require states to reduce carbon dioxide emissions
from power plants within their borders. The proposal faces stiff opposition from some Republican lawmakers and coal-state
Democrats who argue the carbon cuts would hamstring state economies and destroy the coal industry. Obama will meet with the task force on
Wednesday for the final time, the Hill reported. The members, including four Republican officials, will submit their final recommendations to
the White House this fall. The measures involve a slew of initiatives at a number of federal agencies, including: · Department of Agriculture.
The department will award nearly $240 million to eight states to help improve electricity infrastructure in rural areas. A
government study released earlier this year found that climate change will hamper utility companies’ ability to provide power as extreme
weather damages power lines and hotter temperatures drive up electricity demand, the Times noted. The agency is also expected to announce
funds for rural areas struggling with drought. · U.S. Geological Survey. The scientific agency and other federal partners will spend $13.1 million
to develop an advanced 3-D mapping system that will help local governments with water resource planning, identifying landslide areas and
reducing coastal erosion. · Department of Interior. The largest U.S. landowner will establish a $10 million program through its Bureau of Indian
Affairs to train tribal leaders on climate resilience initiatives and provide technical assistance. Obama will also direct Interior Secretary Sally
Jewell and EPA chief Gina McCarthy to create an interagency group that will provide tribes with climate change data, the Hill said. · Federal
Emergency Management Agency. FEMA will release new guidance for multi-hazard mitigation plans -- last issued in 2008 -- to ensure that states
consider climate change as they plan for future natural disasters. The agency will also create a Mitigation Integration Task Force to help
communities struck by disasters not only with recovery, but by making them stronger and safer. · National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. The
NOAA, a scientific agency, will provide new guidance on coastal management to help
localities account for the impacts of climate change on coastal environments, including higher sea levels,
eroding beaches and stronger storm surges. · Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. America’s public health institute will
publish a guide called “Assessing Health Vulnerability to Climate Change” to help identify health risks associated with climate change. The guide
will follow a White House report released in June that outlines six major health issues that Americans could face because of rising global
temperatures, including an increase in heat strokes, higher incidents of asthma attacks and the spread of infectious diseases.
National Ocean Policy fails
Hall 12 Marleanna Hall projects coordinator at the Resource Development “Looming ocean policy: How
will it impact Alaska?” http://www.akrdc.org/newsletters/2012/april/loomingoceanpolicy.html emk
The National Ocean Council recently accepted comments on the Draft Implementation Plan of the
National Ocean Policy, a policy that will likely add another layer of bureaucracy with no added
benefit to the environment. The National Ocean Policy will likely negatively impact the nation’s
economy, adding more regulations to industries including fishing, transportation, oil and gas
development, and tourism, causing harm to the livelihood of millions of Americans. Alaskans, with
34,000 miles of coastline, 3,000 rivers, and over three million lakes, have a significant stake in
National Ocean Policy, and will be impacted more than other states by the Policy. Coastal and rural
Alaskan communities may become financially devastated by National Ocean Policy enforcement. In a
March 2 letter, Department of Fish and Game Commissioner Cora Campbell, wrote “Alaska is
committed to protecting the health and productivity of its coastal and marine resources.” She noted
that any major proposed policy change related to the oceans has the State’s full attention. The Draft
Plan includes 53 actions and almost 300 benchmarks, of which more than half are supposed to be
completed by the end of 2013. The Draft Plan calls for the federal government to make a “land grab”
of millions of acres, both on and offshore, as well as apply regulations to both land and water based
activities. It is a policy of RDC to support efforts to reduce federal interference and devolve more
authority to the states. The National Ocean Policy does not do that. Alaska’s resources are vital to
its economy. Alaska, and the U.S., can benefit from largely untapped resources such as the estimated
27 billion barrels of oil and the 132 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the Outer Continental Shelf.
RDC recently advocated that development of these resources must not be further restricted or
further hindered by unnecessary bureaucratic delay. As currently proposed, National Ocean Policy
will further limit domestic energy development and harm the nation’s economy, business and
industry leaders warn. They maintain that access to resources must be allowed, and uncertainty and
unnecessary regulations that offer no added benefit to the environment avoided. Responsible
development of these resources creates jobs in rural Alaska communities. Local economies could be
at risk if overly burdensome regulations are added to existing and new projects. In part, Alaska was
granted statehood due to its vast natural resources, with Congress expecting the new 49th state to
utilize its natural resources to build and sustain its economy. RDC Executive Director, Rick Rogers,
testified April 2 to the U.S. House Natural Resources Committee’s Subcommittee on Fisheries,
Oceans, Wildlife and Insular Affairs in Anchorage addressing “Alaska’s Sovereignty In Peril: The
National Ocean Policy’s Goal To Federalize Alaska.” Congressman Don Young hosted the Alaska
meeting, and U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski was also present.
States have better regulations-regionalism
Adler 98 Johnathan H. Adler Professor of Law at Case Western “A New Environmental Federalism”
http://home.earthlink.net/~jhadler/federalism.html
Comparing state and federal resource management creates another stark picture. National
forests lose money on timber
sales and have a poor record of environmental protection; state forests, such as those in Montana,
turn a profit form timber management and have superior environmental performance.16 States such as
Texas and New Hampshire have taken steps to make their parks self-sufficient while improving the services offered to local residents.17
Environmental concern has focused on the plight of fisheries in recent years, and with good reason. Overfishing
plagues many
fish stocks. Virginia implemented individual transferable quotas for a state fishery, and the program
is popular with environmentalists and fishers alike. Yet federal law prohibits regional fishing councils
from adopting similar steps in coastal fisheries purportedly under federal protection. State officials,
closer to the environmental and economic concerns of their residents than those of federal officials,
are seeking to solve environmental problems. Regrettably, federal environmental standards and
regulatory requirements stand in the way. States that attempt new approaches to pressing problems
often must seek federal approval; failure to comply with EPA demands can result in severe sanctions, including the loss of
highway funds and the direct imposition of federal controls. Federal environmental regulations, along with the
mindset that all environmental problems require national solutions, are a serious obstacle to the
policy innovation necessary to address contemporary environmental concerns.
States Renewables Solvency
States’ RPS policies are effective solvency mechanisms for renewable energy
development
EIA 12 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Most states have Renewable Portfolio Standards”,
Energy Information Administration, February 3, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850
Although several RPS proposals have advanced part way through the U.S. Congress in recent years,
there is currently no RPS program in place at the National level. However, 30 States and the District
of Columbia had enforceable RPS or other mandated renewable capacity policies, as of January 2012.
In addition, seven States had voluntary goals for renewable generation. These programs vary widely
in terms of program structure, enforcement mechanisms, size, and application. A large range of
policies are considered to be under the RPS umbrella. In general, an RPS sets a minimum
requirement for the share of electricity to be supplied from designated renewable energy resources
by a certain date/year. Often, the selected eligible resources are tailored to best fit the State's
particular resource base or local preferences. Some States also set targets for specific types of
renewable energy sources or technologies to encourage their development and use. Many State RPS
programs have "escape clauses" if the extra cost of renewable generation exceeds a specified
threshold. (Detailed descriptions of State RPS programs are available from the Database of State
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency.) Another common feature of many State policies is a
renewable electricity credit (REC) trading system structured to minimize the costs of compliance.
Under these policies, a producer who generates more renewable electricity than required to meet its
own RPS obligation may either trade or sell RECs to other electricity suppliers who may not have
enough RPS-eligible renewable electricity to meet their own RPS requirement. In some cases, a State
will make a certain number of credits available for sale. Such a system accommodates timing
differences associated with planning and construction of new generation. Only one entity—the
generator or the REC holder—may take credit for the renewable attribute of generation from RPSeligible sources. An RPS is one policy mechanism to encourage development of renewable energy.
States with RPS policies have seen an increase in the amount of electricity generated from eligible
renewable resources. At the same time, other States without RPS policies have also seen significant
increases in renewable generation over the past few years resulting from a combination of Federal
incentives, State programs, and market conditions. Increases in renewable generation have been
driven by the availability of Federal tax incentives, as well as by State RPS policies.
State Standards force renewables into a competitive market position
UCS13 Union of Concerned Scientists, “How Renewable Electricity Standards Deliver Economic
Benefits”, Renewables: Energy You Can Count On, May 2013,
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/Renewable-Electricity-Standards-DeliverEconomic-Benefits.pdf
Essential to this clean energy success story has been the state “renewable electricity standard” (commonly called an RES)1 —one of the most popular and effective tools for encouraging renewable energy
development. This report discusses the central role that state RES policies are playing to help stimu-late such development and
its economic benefits. Experiences with RES policies in several states are highlighted to illustrate the scale and diversity of these
policies and outcomes. We also review some critical challenges that jeopardize the continued success of state RES policies—and the
nation’s transition to a clean, sustainable, and prosperous energy economy. Finally, we conclude with recommendations for overcoming these challenges. RES
policies require electric utilities to gradually increase the amount of
renewable energy in their power supplies. This goal is typically accomplished by specifying a percentage that must
come from renew-able energy resources by a certain year—25 percent by 2025, for example. An RES policy is a marketbased policy that stimulates competition among renewable energy developers and creates an
ongoing incentive to reduce costs. The RES also represents a way to value the environmental and other important
public benefits that are not priced in the energy market. The standard thus provides a more level playing field for
renewable energy to compete with fossil fuel resources, which have received decades of subsidies and
preferential treatment. In states with RES policies in place, at least 33,000 mega-watts (MW) of new renewable
capacity—equivalent to about 50 average-sized coal plants— were added between 1998 and
2011 (Barbose 2012).2 Moreover, the required amount of renew-able energy will ramp up over time; the Union of
Concerned Scientists projects that RES policies will support more than 103,000 MW of renew-able energy
capacity by 2025 (Figure 2). At least 87,000 MW of this total is expected to come from new renewable energydevelopment3 —
enough new clean power to meet the electricity needs of 50 million typical homes.
RPS serves as a model for renewable energy development and regional cooperation—
more effective and long-term than federal control
Leon 13 Warren Leon, Executive Director of the Clean Energy States Alliance, “The State of State
Renewable Portfolio Standards”, Clean Energy States Alliance, June 2013,
http://www.cesa.org/assets/2013-Files/RPS/State-of-State-RPSs-Report-Final-June-2013.pdf
RPSs have catalyzed far-reaching changes, altering the decisionmaking and operations of electricity
regulators, utilities, the energy industry, and other stakeholders In many states, the RPS has been the catalyst for a wide
range of changes. When a state institutes an RPS goal, such as requiring ten percent of a state’s electricity supply to come from designated
clean energy sources,
it concentrates the mind and alters the behavior of the various players involved in
supplying and overseeing the state’s electricity. These organizations, businesses, and individuals begin to think of all the
changes they need to make in order to meet the RPS mandate. This can involve changes in how utilities and other electricity suppliers
contract for electricity, how public utility commissions plan for new transmission capacity, and how project developers decide about which
projects to develop. It
has required the creation of new systems for tracking the production and sale of
electricity from renewables and to modify existing systems.10 Because of RPSs, electricity planning, regulation, and
tracking are all different than they would otherwise be. RPSs have also given many participants in the electricity
system experience with clean energy technologies. For diverse stakeholders, the implications of significant
renewable energy development are now much better known and are given much greater attention.
For example, before RPSs, most utilities had little familiarity or experience with smaller-scale, more distributed, variable-output electric
power generation technologies. RPSs
have caused market players to think about renewable energy
development in a context that transcends state boundaries. For one thing, almost all states use renewable energy
certificates (RECs) as the mechanism for compliance with the RPS. These certificates typically occur in electronic form. A REC is created
every time a qualifying renewable energy facility generates one megawatt-hour of electricity. Tracking RECs verifies that the correct
quantities of renewable energy have indeed been generated to satisfy the RPS. RECs have become the common currency for renewable
energy generation, serving as a building block for a national market for renewable energy. Beyond the existence of tracking systems
, with their out-of-state compliance feature, encourage state energy policymakers
to think beyond the boundaries of
their state and to consider the potential renewable energy resources throughout their region. This
has increased the cross-state contact among policymakers. In almost all cases, government policies work best
when they are stable and give market players clear guidance on what the rules will be for an
extended period of time. In that way, those players can develop and implement plans that respond efficiently and appropriately
to what the rules and regulations will be. One of the problems with federal clean energy policy—which has largely been
promoted through the tax code—is that it is unpredictable, with changes coming frequently and without
sufficient time for developers, utilities, or the clean energy industry to plan. The production tax
credit for wind energy has exemplified this inefficient approach, with the credit lapsing several times
before being renewed, generally for just a short period of time.15
Neoliberalism
Neolib 1nc – plan specific
Spatial planning reproduces neoliberalism – the aff’s mapping imposes neoliberal
subjectivity on oceanic actors, reducing them to rational utility-maximizers – that
erases recognition of existing oceanic inequality and prioritizes the zoning priorities of
the socially privileged
Olson 10
(Julia Olson, department member of Northeast Fisheries Science Center, “Seeding nature, ceding
culture: Redefining the boundaries of the marine commons through spatial management and GIS,”
Geoforum, 2010)
These mappings and transformations happen within broader spatial imperatives that are fundamentally
reshaping the ocean. The majority of the world’s fisheries are estimated to be fully exploited,
overexploited or depleted (FAO, 2007). Political conflict over fisheries pit the many fishermen arguing
that fisheries are rebounding against the many fisheries scientists and environmentalists arguing
otherwise; many resource-users have demanded a greater voice in the very process of knowledge
production, and efforts at co-management, cooperative research, and traditional ecological knowledge
point to potential directions such involvement may produce. Yet conventional arguments about the
tragedy of the commons finger the rational, self-interested resource user—economic man of
neoclassical economic theory—operating in a socio-ecological environment of incorrect institutional
norms and economic incentives. With too many fishermen chasing too few fish in an open sea, such
understandings seek privatizing, neoliberal solutions to fisheries dilemmas—solutions many advocates
fear destroy fishing communities and cultures. While this hegemony of bio-economics in fisheries
management has been maintained, as St. Martin (2001) argues, through a geographic imagination that
places the rationalist and self-interested “economic man” in a spatially homogenous commons,2 the
increasing efforts to use area-specific forms of fisheries management signal the potential for a
“paradigm shift” from individuals to communities and ecosystems, in which the “promise of GIS” hinges
especially on the integration of social and biological data ( St. Martin, 2004). Though the actual practice
of ecosystem-based management is still taking shape, its recognition of connections and multiple spatial
scales, as well as its use for local knowledge in time and space, may be a way to involve people as
members of social groups (rather than simply individuals) more integrally in the management process (
St. Martin et al., 2007 and Clay and Olson, 2008). The actual implementation of ecosystem-based
fisheries management, some argue, should happen through a planned system of “ocean zoning” that
replaces the patchwork of ad hoc, uncoordinated regulations whose goals have been decoupled from a
broader notion of the ecosystem that concerns itself as much with sustaining fisheries as “the nonfisheries benefits of marine ecosystems to society” (Babcock et al., 2005, p. 469). As marine biologist
Elliot Norse has written, because the ocean has many competing users—“shipping, defense, energy
production, telecommunications, commercial fishing, sportfishing, recreational diving, whale watching,
pleasure boating, tourism and coastal real estate development”—whose conflicts can lead to resource
degradation, zoning provides a solution for it “is a place-based ecosystem management system that
reduces conflict, uncertainty and costs by separating incompatible uses and specifying how particular
areas may be used” (2002, pp. 53–54). Such a comprehensive system of zoning is envisioned as a more
rational “system of finely specified spatial and temporal property rights” (Wilen, 2004). The 2003 Pew
Report also mentions “implement[ing] ecosystem-based planning” in the same breath as zoning, for
fisheries management, it argues, should more fully consider context: “incompatible” user conflicts that
affect target species (2003, p. 47). Economists who promote zoning as a way to “account for spatial and
intertemporal externalities” picture it reaching its rational equilibrium through the market, rationing
numbers of users in search of a “rent-maximizing equilibrium” (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2005, p. 25), and
ultimately creating property rights (Holland, 2004) and stewardship (US Commission on Ocean Policy,
2004, p. 64). Yet while ocean zoning is seen as something of a new solution for marine conflicts, the
model of terrestrial zoning upon which it is based is hardly without its critics. Proponents of smart
growth, new urbanism, and mixed-use communities have pointed to the myriad problems—including
sprawl, traffic, pollution, loss of farmland, and so on—created by separating the activities of daily life.
The view that zoning will end conflict assumes that such conflicts center only on doing different things in
the same place, while creating zones of “use-priority” areas begs the question of whose values will
dictate a given zone’s “most important” activities. As such, conflict may simply be displaced from the
ocean to places where policies are crafted or where their impacts are lived. Indeed scholars have long
noted how zoning laws are colored by cultural ideas (for example, public versus private/domestic
space) that are distinctly bourgeois, raced and gendered and thus favor certain groups of people
(Ritzdorf, 1994, Perin, 1977 and LiPuma and Meltzoff, 1997). Some economists have also been critical of
marine zoning’s creation of “divided” property rights that do not fully consider “the opportunity costs of
foregone production” that might otherwise “maximize joint wealth” ( Edwards, 2000, p. 4). In other
words, the “economic benefits” of zoning cannot be assumed for “it is an empirical question whether
ocean wealth would be improved” (ibid, p. 7). A focus on aggregate wealth though leaves unanswered
the effect of an initially unequal distribution of wealth on the prices and outcomes in a market-based
economy, as well as the changes in subjectivity and practices that the neoliberalization of resource
economies and identities can engender.
The impact is massive environmental destruction and social inequality – imposition of
neoliberal landscapes on local landscapes produces fast capitalist extraction and
causes displacement and dehumanization
Nixon ‘11
(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the
Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 17-18)
In the global resource wars, the environmentalism of the poor is frequently triggered when an
official landscape is forcibly imposed on a vernacular one." A vernacular landscape is shaped by the
affective, historically textured maps that communities have devised over generations, maps replete
with names and routes, maps alive to significant ecological and surface geological features. A
vernacular landscape, although neither monolithic nor undisputed, is integral to the
socioenvironmental dynamics of community rather than being wholly externalized-treated as out
there, as a separate nonrenewable resource. By contrast, an official landscape-whether
governmental, NGO, corporate, or some combination of those-is typically oblivious to such earlier
maps; instead, it writes the land in a bureaucratic, externalizing, and extraction-driven manner that
is often pitilessly instrumental. Lawrence Summers' scheme to export rich-nation garbage and
toxicity to Africa, for example, stands as a grandiose (though hardly exceptional) instance of a highly
rationalized official landscape that, whether in terms of elite capture of resources or toxic disposal, has often been projected onto ecosystems inhabited by
those whom Annu Jalais, in an Indian context, calls "dispensable citizens.'?" I would argue, then, that the exponential upsurge in indigenous
resource rebellions across the globe during the high age of neoliberalism has resulted largely from a
clash of temporal perspectives between the short-termers who arrive (with their official landscape
maps) to extract, despoil, and depart and the long-termers who must live inside the ecological
aftermath and must therefore weigh wealth differently in time's scales. In the pages that follow, I will highlight and explore resource rebellions against developer-dispossessors
who descend from other time zones to impose on habitable environments unsustainable calculations about what constitutes the duration of human gain. Change is a
cultural constant but the pace of change is not. Hence the temporal contests over how to sustain,
regenerate, exhaust, or obliterate the landscape as resource become critical. More than material
wealth is here at stake: imposed official landscapes typically discount spiritualized vernacular
landscapes, severing webs of accumulated cultural meaning and treating the landscape as if it were uninhabited by the living, the unborn, and the animate deceased. The
ensuing losses are consistent with John Berger's lament over capitalism's disdain for
interdependencies by foreshortening our sense of time, thereby rendering the deceased immaterial:
The living reduce the dead to those who have lived; yet the dead already include the living in their
own great collective. Until the dehumanization of society by capitalism, all the living awaited the
experience of the dead. It was their ultimate future. By themselves the living were incomplete. Thus
living and dead were interdependent. Always. Only a uniquely modern form of egoism has broken
this interdependence. With disastrous results for the living, who now think of the dead as the
eliminated.40 Hence, one should add, our perspective on environmental asset stripping should
include among assets stripped the mingled presence in the landscape of multiple generations, with all the hindsight and foresight that entails. Against this backdrop, I consider in
this book what can be called the temporalities of place. Place is a temporal attainment that must be constantly
renegotiated in the face of changes that arrive from without and within, some benign, others
potentially ruinous. To engage the temporal displacements involved in slow violence against the poor
thus requires that we rethink questions of physical displacement as well. In the chapters that follow, I
track the socioenvironmental fallout from developmental agendas whose primary beneficiaries live
elsewhere; as when, for example, oasis dwellers in the Persian Gulf get trucked off to unknown
destinations so that American petroleum engineers and their sheik collaborators can develop their
"finds." Or when a megadam arises and (whether erected in the name of Some dictatorial edict, the free market, structural adjustment, national development, or far-off urban or
industrial need) displaces and disperses those who had developed through their vernacular landscapes their own adaptable, if always imperfect and vulnerable, relation to riverine
possibility. Paradoxically, those forcibly removed by development include conservation refugees. Too often in the global South, conservation, driven by powerful transnational nature
NGOs, combines an antidevelopmental rhetoric with the development of finite resources for the touristic few, thereby depleting vital resources for long-term residents. (I explore this
paradox more fully in Chapter 6: Stranger in the Eco-village: Race, Tourism, and Environmental Time.) In much of what follows, I address the resistance mounted by impoverished
communities who have been involuntarily moved out of their knowledge; I address as well the powers transnational, national, and local-behind such forced removals. My angle of vision
is largely through writers who have affiliated themselves with social movements that seek to stave off one of two ruinous prospects: either the threatened community capitulates and is
scattered (across refugee camps, placeless "relocation" sites, desperate favelas, and unwelcoming foreign lands), or the community refuses to move but, as its world is undermined,
effectively becomes a community of refugees in place. What I wish to stress here, then, are not just those communities that are involuntarily (and often militarily) relocated to less
I want to propose a more radical notion of
displacement, one that, instead of referring solely to the movement of people from their places of
belonging, refers rather to the loss of the land and resources beneath them, a loss that leaves
communities stranded in a place stripped of the very characteristics that made it inhabitable.
hospitable environs, but also those affected by what I call displacement without moving. In other words,
Alternative text: the judge should vote negative to endorse an ethic of social flesh
An ethic of social flesh foregrounds embodied interdependence, substituting an
ecological view of relationships for the aff’s commodity thinking – only the alternative
can produce ethical institutional decisionmaking
Beasley & Bacchi 7
(Chris, Prof. of Politics @ University of Adelaide, Carol, Prof. Emeritus @ University of Adelaide,
“Envisaging a new politics for an ethical future: Beyond trust, care and generosity -- towards an ethic of
`social flesh'”, Feminist Theory, 2007 8: 279)
The political vocabulary of social flesh has significant implications for democratic visions. Because it
conceptualizes citizens as socially embodied – as interconnected mutually reliant flesh – in a more
thoroughgoing sense than the languages of trust, care, responsibility and generosity, it resists accounts
of political change as making transactions between the ‘less fortunate’ and ‘more privileged’, more
trusting, more caring, more responsible or more generous. Social flesh is political metaphor in which
fleshly sociality is profoundly levelling. As a result, it challenges meliorist reforms that aim to protect the
‘vulnerable’ from the worst effects of social inequality, including the current distribution of wealth. A
political ethic of embodied intersubjectivity requires us to consider fleshly interconnection as the basis
of a democratic sociality, demanding a rather more far-reaching reassessment of national and
international institutional arrangements than political vocabularies that rest upon extending altruism.
Relatedly, it provides a new basis for thinking about the sorts of institutional arrangements necessary to
acknowledge social fleshly existence, opening up ‘the scope of what counts as relevant’ (Shildrick, 2001:
238). For example, it allows a challenge to current conceptualizations that construct attention to the
‘private sphere’ as compensatory rather than as necessary (Beasley and Bacchi, 2000: 350). We intend
to pursue the relationship between social flesh and democratic governance in future papers. Conclusion
In this paper we focus on various vocabularies of social interconnection intended to offer a challenge to
the ethos of atomistic individualism associated with neo-liberalism and develop a new ethical ideal
called ‘social flesh’. Despite significant differences in the several vocabularies canvassed in this paper,
we note that most of the trust and care writers conceive the social reform of atomistic individualism
they claim to address in terms of a presumed moral or ethical deficiency within the disposition of
individuals. Hence, they reinstate the conception of the independent active self in certain ways.
Moreover, there is a disturbing commonality within all these accounts: an ongoing conception of
asymmetrical power relations between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, ‘carers’ and ‘cared for’, ‘altruistic’ and
‘needy’. While widely used terms like trust and care clearly remain vocabularies around which social
debate may be mobilized, and hence are not to be dismissed (see Pocock, 2006), we suggest that there
are important reasons for questioning their limits and their claims to offer progressive alternative
understandings of social life. In this setting, we offer the concept of social flesh as a way forward in
rethinking the complex nature of the interaction between subjectivity, embodiment, intimacy, social
institutions and social interconnection. Social flesh generalizes the insight that trusting/caring/ altruistic
practices already take place on an ongoing basis to insist that the broad, complex sustenance of life that
characterizes embodied subjectivity and intersubjective existence be acknowledged. As an ethicopolitical starting point, ‘social flesh’ highlights human embodied interdependence. By drawing attention
to shared embodied reliance, mutual reliance, of people across the globe on social space, infrastructure
and resources, it offers a decided challenge to neo-liberal conceptions of the autonomous self and
removes the social distance and always already given distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’. There is
no sense here of ‘givers’ and ‘receivers’; rather we are all recognized as receivers of socially generated
goods and services. Social flesh also marks our diversity, challenging the privileging of normative over
‘other’ bodies. Finally, because social flesh necessarily inhabits a specific geographical space,
environmentalist efforts to preserve that space take on increased salience (Macken, 2004: 25). By these
means, the grounds are created for defending a politics beyond assisting the ‘less fortunate’. Social
flesh, therefore, refuses the residues of ‘noblesse oblige’ that still appear to linger in emphasis upon
vulnerability and altruism within the apparently reformist ethical ideals of trust/respect, care,
responsibility and even generosity. In so doing it puts into question the social privilege that produces
inequitable vulnerability and the associated need for ‘altruism’. Vital debates about appropriate
distribution of social goods, environmental politics, professional and institutional power and democratic
processes are reopened.
Neoliberalism Overview
The plan action is a partitioning of the ocean space for the continuation of industrial
activity and marketing – they do nothing to regulate the intake of the environment,
only the space to secure biodiversity hotspots – this reroutes us from the root cause of
the problem of neoliberal expansion. Additionally, this allocation of land allows for
the ease of regulations and permits in designated territories, leading for more oil
companies and market expansion in areas where the plan’s framework says is “okay”
– leading to future corporation growth.
This disproportionately leads to a violent and systemic pushing over of communities
affected in these areas where elitist have declared “less biologically rich or important”
and more of a resource of exploitation, causing an ethically bankrupt dehumanization
of people, as well as a delineation of the environment’s values to the hands of oil
corporations, aquaculture sites, and industrial complexes to deteriorate the
environment – causing extinction.
Prefer ethics –
Prefer environmental destruction – only definite impact, we can come back from a
war but we can’t rebound after the environment is completely overtaken –
And a strong ecological climate and endorsement of social flesh values is crucial to
diplomatic engagement with nations – OPEC producers and threat securitization is
based on ensuring economic sustainability.
Evaluate the ethics of the 1ac before you evaluate extinction level impacts – their
dehumanization is an ontologically bankrupt analysis of the world where we control
space and designate territories absent of their consequences to the rest of the world –
they commodify resources and frame the world in a manner in which obscures the
understanding of ecological impacts and territorial base disputes – ensures error
replication.
Steinberg 13
(Philip E. Steinberg 13 – PhD from Clark University & Professor of Critical Geography at Florida State
University , “Of the seas: metaphors and materialities in maritime regions”, Atlantic Studies: Global
Currents, Volume 10, Number 2, 4/29/2013)
Ocean region studies have their origins in an explicit questioning of the assumption that the land-based
region is the appropriate scope for conducting social analysis. In History departments, in particular,
where academic positions are routinely connected with a specific region and a specific era (e.g.
nineteenth-century Latin Americanist), scholars who have sought to define regions by oceans of
interaction rather than continents of settlement and governance have had to directly challenge the
disciplinary establishment.36 And yet, the regionalization of the sea itself is rarely interrogated. As
Martin Lewis demonstrates, the boundaries, definitions, and namings of ocean regions have been highly
variable (and, at times, quite arbitrary).37 Likewise, the lines that divide ocean regions on a
contemporary legal map of the sea defining territorial waters, contiguous zones, exclusive economic
zones, the High Seas, etc. hide as much as they obscure. From the Papal Bull of 1493 that purportedly
divided the ocean between Spain and Portugal to the zones ascribed to the ocean by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the history of the ocean is filled with attempts to mark off
its spaces, if not as claimable territory then at least as zones where certain activities, by certain actors,
are permitted and others are prohibited. And yet, even when the locations of the lines are clear and
communicated (which, in fact, is often not the case), their meanings are worked out only through social
practices. In particular, because the ocean is characterized by overlapping zonations (from the legal
regions prescribed by UNCLOS to cultural understandings of regional seas to zones of geophysical
interactivity and animal migrations), efforts at understanding an ocean event or image by ‘‘locating’’ it in
an ocean region are likely to rest on simplified notions of the relationship between boundaries and
events. More often than not, the definition and boundaries of an ocean region are defined by how it is
practiced through the reproduction of a regional assemblage, and not the other way around.38 In short,
just as ocean-region-based studies must take heed of the uniquely fluvial nature of the ocean that lies at
the center of an ocean region, so they must also account for the fluidity of the lines that are drawn
around and within the region. Again, this is not a problem unique to maritime regions; many pages in
geography textbooks have been written that expound on where the boundaries of a specific region are
(or where they should be), while more enlightened scholars have stressed that such questions cannot be
answered objectively. Nonetheless, here too the ocean is an extreme case: lines drawn in and around
ocean regions often take on an out- sized level of authority because they are so self-evidently divorced
from the matter that is experienced by those who actually inhabit the environment. In the ocean,
humans’ ability to physically transform space through line drawing is exceptionally limited.39 Therefore,
lines in the ocean speak not with the authority of a geophysicality that cannot be fully grasped but with
the authority of a juridical system that conceivably can.40 The danger, then, is that the maritime region,
although born out of a critique of the idea that the world consists of stable, bounded places where
‘‘society’’ is an explanatory variable, could itself emerge as an organizing trope that, through geographic
shorthand, obscures the contested and dynamic nature of social processes and functions. As an
‘‘inside-out’’ version of the continental region, such a maritime region, like the faux-heterotopic cruise
ship critiqued by Harvey, would reverse our sense of the elements and highlight some social processes
(connections, migrations) over others (state-formation, settlement), but it would fall short of a
fundamental epistemological revolution. ‘‘And what,’’ to quote Harvey again, ‘‘is the critical, liberatory
and emancipatory point of that?’’41 Geographers have long struggled with this problem: How can the
region be employed as a concept for understanding interactions and processes (within and across its
borders) without assigning it existential, pre-social properties of explana- tion? In their attempts at
finding solutions, geographers have turned to a range of philosophical and mathematical approaches.
Some have emphasized the ways in which space is co-constitutive with time while others have sought to
adopt a topological perspective in which scale (and the attendant property of spatiality) is always both
internal and external to the object being ‘‘located,’’ so that different scales cannot be ordered in a
hierarchical, stable manner.42 There are potentially fruitful overlaps between this dynamic approach to
space (and borders and regions) and the Lagrangian approach to fluid dynamics outlined in the previous
section of this paper. In both instances, scholars abandon attempts at finding stable metrics that can fix
and organize spaces and the activities that transpire within and instead turn their attention to the
processes that are continually constructing spatial patterns, social institutions, and socio-natural
hybrids. As I have 162 P.E. Steinberg Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 06:57 15 July 2014 discussed,
this approach is particularly pertinent to the study of ocean regions. By turning to the fluidity of the
ocean that lies in the middle of the ocean region, we can gain new perspectives not just on the space
that unites the region but on space itself and how it is produced (and reproduces itself) within the
dynamics of spatial assemblages. Looking at the world from an ocean-region-based perspective thus
becomes a means not just for highlighting a new series of global processes and connections, but a
means for transforming the way we view the world as a whole.
Neolib – AT: Perm
The permutation links or its severance – mapping is a cultural process and the aff’s
justifications shape its direction and assumptions – force them to defend their
justifications as an intrinsic part of the mapping process
Forest and Forest 12
(Benjamin Forest, Associate Professor, Department of Geography, McGill University, and Patrick Forest,
Member, Centre for the Study of Democratic Citizenship, McGill University, “Engineering the North
American waterscape: The high modernist mapping of continental water transfer projects,” Political
Geography, Volume 31, Issue 3, March 2012)
It is now a commonplace claim in critical cartography that maps both reflect and inform power relations
(Black, 1997; Kitchin, 2010; Pickles, 1992, 2004). That is, maps are neither objective representations of
knowledge, nor are they “objective form[s] of knowledge” (Harley, 1989, 1). Maps are texts that must be
read, interpreted, and deconstructed in order to understand their discursive role. Maps are socially
embedded, reflecting values, norms and judgments from the context from which they emerged (Kitchin
& Dodge, 2007, 332). They help establish authority (Edsall, 2007, 36) and prioritize certain propositions
or conceptions over others. This is not to say that maps are always “read” in the ways intended by their
authors, or that they have the intended effects. Indeed, the illustration of a continental waterscape
could provoke strong negative reactions from Canadians objecting to “their” water being diverted to the
south. Negative reactions in particular, however, rely on the ability of the audience to “read” the
political intent of a map. One might object, for example, to the ostensible purpose of a map illustrating
the transfer of water from Canadian to U.S. territory, while at the same time accepting an implicit
message about human control over nature. In short, maps form the major part of the water transfer
proposals’ visual rhetoric, and, like many maps, are designed explicitly to advance their authors' agenda.
More subtly, these maps exemplify a high modernist or engineering vision of space and nature, where
actions and consequences can be controlled and predicted precisely.8 As Kirsch (2005, 2) observes
about a map of the nuclear excavation of a proposed Central American canal, “The map’s greatest
conceit…was the illusion of technical control that it evokes: the very idea that fallout sectors could be
accurately drawn on a map before being produced in the landscape, and that evacuation areas….could
be determined so precisely.” Similarly, a map illustrating the proposed nuclear excavation of a canal to
link the Tennessee and Tombigbee Rivers in the U.S. omits the Mississippi River entirely (Kirsch, 2005,
164)! We develop these insights in detail for our own case study. The reports on continental water
transfers and publications supporting them contain maps that constitute a visual rhetoric in support of
the plans (Albery, 1966; Kierans, 1964; J. H. J. Smith, 1969; Special subcommittee on western water
development of the committee on public works, 1964; The Ralph M. Parsons Company, 1964). These
maps, above all, promoted a vision of nature and progress that is deeply entrenched in the perception
of humans as engineers of the world, able to (re)shape and control the continental waterscape for their
own benefit through technology. We argue that some of the features of these maps were deliberate
decisions on the part of the mapmakers, e.g., the relative faintness of international boundaries. Other
elements arose from the constraints of cartographic representation rather than strategic decisions per
se, e.g., the representation of channels as unrealistically straight lines. In the former case, the political
intent is relatively easy to infer, while in the latter case, the logic of cartographic representation
reinforces the hubristic assumptions necessary to attempt to re-engineer the continental waterscape.
Politics
PC – Link
Plan politically unpopular with republicans.
Stuaffer 12 Pete Stauffer, Ocean Program Manager at Surfrider Foundation, “Why I Support the National Ocean Policy (And So Should
You)”, http://www.surfrider.org/coastal-blog/entry/why-i-support-the-national-ocean-policy-and-so-should-you
Yet, despite these promising developments, the future of the National Ocean Policy is in jeopardy,
plagued by a lack of support and funding from congress. Just last month, yet another measure was
introduced in the House to restrict funding and implementation of the policy – this despite the fact that
the policy is being advanced with existing agency resources! Furthermore, several Republican leaders
including Rep. Doc Hastings (WA), Chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee, have seized
on the NOP as a partisan issue, labeling marine spatial planning as “burdensome” and accusing the
administration of regulatory overreach (I won’t elaborate on Hastings’ proposals to vastly expand
offshore drilling or the donations he receives from oil & gas companies). But the partisanship and
political attacks in Washington D.C. are obscuring an important truth - the principles of the National
Ocean Policy are taking hold in states and regions across the country despite the lack of support from
the federal government. From the Pacific Northwest to New England, the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific
Islands, regions are making real advances in ocean mapping, habitat restoration, renewable energy
siting, and other key areas. In my home state of Oregon, a process to create a marine spatial plan for
wave energy development has brought together community leaders, fishermen, surfers,
environmentalists, and developers as part of an effective public collaboration. The expected outcome: a
plan that will both protect the environment and existing ocean uses, while also advancing renewable
energy opportunities. Of course, such success stories do not resonate well in Washington D.C., where
controversy is the rule of the day and political parties instinctively oppose each other’s proposals.
Adding to the problem, many supporters in congress have been passive, spending their political capital
on other priorities and cautioning ocean advocates against making the NOP a target in annual budget
discussions. The result is that our National Ocean Policy is neglected and under-supported by congress,
while our oceans and those that depend upon them bear the consequences.
Midterms – Uniqueness
The odds of winning enough races to regain control of the Senate remain in
Republicans' favor, but how favorable depends on whether you listen to The New
York Times or The Washington Post – or neither.
In its most recent forecast, published July 16, The Washington Post's Election Lab
gave the GOP an 86 percent chance of taking control of the Senate.
On the flip side, The New York Times' The Upshot finds the environment less
favorable to Republicans and places their chances at 53 percent, according to its July
22 forecast.
The Upshot is careful to add the caveat that while "the Republicans currently have a
53 percent chance, that doesn’t mean we’re predicting the Republicans to win the
Senate — the probability is essentially the same as a coin flip."
How each organization reaches its conclusion is by more than a coin flip, however.
Andrew Prokop of Vox says the difference boils down to a "discrepancy" in how the
two analyses are calculated. The Upshot relies entirely on polls, while the Election
Lab utilizes polls and a broader set of national, state, and candidate-level
"fundamental" factors.
And that is just the difference between two organizations. The Upshot also offers a
breakdown of predictions all of the 2014 Senate races made by six organizations,
including the Post and its own.
Its scorecard does not include the daily update posted by RealClearPolitics.
So what, if anything, has changed in the last month?
Post reporter John Sides notes on the Lab that nothing on the national landscape has
dramatically changed, but he says the primary reason for the shift from its last
forecast is that polling data is showing less GOP weakness.
"There was a time, though, when the polling data suggested more GOP vulnerability.
Consider, for example, the Kentucky Senate race between Republican Mitch
McConnell and Democrat Alison Lundergan Grimes. In late 2013 and the first few
months of 2014, polls suggested the race was tied. But now the polling has begun to
line up more cleanly with the forecast. McConnell has opened up a narrow lead that,
in combination with the model, is sufficient for us to forecast a Republican victory
there," Sides writes.
Midterms – Link
CMSP Unpopular With Republicans.
Gardner 12 Lauren Gardner, Writer for the Congressional Quarterly, “Ocean Plan Meets a Wave of GOP Resistance”,
http://public.cq.com/docs/weeklyreport/weeklyreport-000004098268.html
But President Obama’s critics in Congress are suspicious about the plan — and are aggressively moving
to block it. House Natural Resources Chairman Doc Hastings, a Washington Republican, fears the
blueprint will usher in ocean “zoning.” Texas Republican Bill Flores succeeded in attaching a rider to the
fiscal 2013 Commerce-Justice-Science appropriations bill that would bar any expenditures to implement
the ocean policy, and Hastings vows to press for similar language in every spending bill that comes to
the House floor. The opposition reflects concerns by many of the industries that make a living in the
coastal waters — including oil and natural gas producers, commercial fishermen and seafood
processors, boat owners and operators, shippers, and sports fishermen. An industry-backed group called
the National Ocean Policy Coalition backs efforts to delay the policy through appropriations riders,
saying that “further policy development and implementation should be suspended until Congress, user
groups, and the public have been fully engaged and all potential impacts have been assessed and are
understood.” Critics worry that the administration will pay for its initiative by siphoning money from
programs that lawmakers intended to fund, and they complain that the White House is moving forward
without congressional authorization. Some lawmakers predict the plan, which is expected to be put in
final form this summer, will inevitably lead to new regulations that further burden business activities
including offshore drilling, wind power, commercial and recreational fishing, deep-sea fish farming, and
boating.
Despite initial framing, questions of regulation still create political partisanship.
Gardner 12 Lauren Gardner, Writer for the Congressional Quarterly, “Ocean Plan Meets a Wave of GOP Resistance”,
http://public.cq.com/docs/weeklyreport/weeklyreport-000004098268.html
The president’s fiscal 2013 Commerce Department budget requested a $161 million funding boost for
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, so the agency could “accelerate” implementation
of the policy. But no overall appropriations line item exists for the oceans framework, and the
Commerce budget description makes no mention of it at all. While the administration emphasizes
features in the policy that would cut through overlapping and sometimes conflicting permit reviews,
critics say the White House has contradicted itself on whether the policy would give rise to new
regulations. Brent Greenfield, executive director of the National Ocean Policy Coalition, points to a line
in the interagency task force’s recommendations that says “effective implementation” would “require
clear and easily understood requirements and regulations, where appropriate, that include
enforcement as a critical component.” The coalition is an umbrella group representing interests that
include large oil companies worried about restrictions on offshore drilling, such as Exxon Mobil Corp.
and Chevron Corp., as well as agriculture, boating, fishing, home building and transportation groups.
Greenfield says his group’s biggest concern is that the administration is charging ahead with little
consideration about the potential effects on business. The coalition has lobbied for a pause to evaluate
the effects carefully and to “make sure that what comes out of this is something that’s going to be
helpful and not harmful.”
CMSP is politically unpopular – various lobbyist and party disputes.
Jentoft 14 Svien Jentoft, Norwegian College of Fishery Science, Faculty of Biosciences, Fisheries and Economics, University of Tromsø,
Norway, “Marine spatial planning: risk or opportunity for fisheries in the North Sea?”,
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/832/art%253A10.1186%252F2212-9790-1213.pdf?auth66=1406487473_13fb536c6eb5023d5ed45e12c4c3aba8&ext=.pdf
MSP is defined as “a process of analyzing and allocating parts of three-dimensional marine spaces to
specific uses, to achieve ecological, economic, and social objectives that are usually specified through
the political process” (Douvere and Ehler 2009:78) The idea of MSP is to foster rational use of a shared
marine space that is scarce, and to secure the sustenance of fragile ecosystems. Additionally, MSP
endeavors to create more conducive interactions among marine user groups in a way that balances the
demands for economic development, human wellbeing and environmental conservation. While some
are more advanced than others, all of the countries that border the North Sea are now engaged in MSP
in one way or other. Jay and colleagues (2012b) refer to MSP as “the new frontier.” Although MSP holds
great promise and widely adopted, it is hardly a panacea. It is a process that is socially, institutionally,
and legally, and therefore also politically, intertwined, which sets the stage for political ambition that
may cause conflict as interests and worldviews differ among the involved parties. Marine spatial
planning as a wicked problem MSP is applied to social and ecological systems (SESs) that are inherently
diverse, complex and dynamic, and work at multiple scales. Accordingly, MSP deals with problems that
Rittel and Webber (1973) termed “wicked” (cf. also Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). In such situations,
one should not expect quick fixes; the problems are not expected to go away anytime soon. As wicked
problems they are not solved once and for all but need constant attention, and it is hard to determine if
and when they are solved, and for how long. They can at best be “tamed.” Solutions are less than ideal
and never given. Instead they are negotiated among stakeholders who tend to have different ideas
about what the problem is. Decisions would therefore require compromise if agreement cannot be
made. In fact, the latter makes MSP a wicked problem in itself. As such it makes sense in theory, but is
onerous in practice. As marine space gets more and more congested by the day, users find themselves in
a situation where more space for one means less for others. Agreeing on how to allocate space among
different user groups requires negotiation and cooperation. A complicating factor is that cross-border
interaction in these spaces is unavoidable. For instance, fishing fleets are mobile and cannot easily be
fenced in. While the fishing grounds may be stationary, the fishers themselves must move between
varying areas depending on the fishing season and the species targeted. Likewise, oilrigs and marine
aquaculture installations situated on fishing grounds or near shipping lanes may interfere with each
other trigger conflict. This also frequently happens when marine protected areas (MPAs) interfere with
fishing patterns.
Plan isolates fishery lobbyists.
Kayyem 14 Juliette Kayyem, is candidate for Governor of Massachusetts and a former Boston Globe columnist, writing about issues of
national security and foreign affairs for the op-ed page, “Ocean Planning and Massachusetts”,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/03/08/ocean-planning-and-massachusetts/NmJeCmyyhUPTA811PPMogK/story.html
People like the oceans; over 50 percent of Americans live near one. The oil industry believes it has
much to gain from unregulated ocean space, but Big Oil isn’t as sympathetic as Little Fishermen. So
those bait-fishers have become the perfect bait to undermine the ocean policy. ESPN.com fell for it,
running an alleged news story that the ocean policy would end “recreational anglers’ ’’ rights. They later
apologized for the misleading article (it was commentary by a conservative writer). By then, however,
the fishermen were angry and that’s not a pretty sight. Trying to manage the unease, the administration
made the proposed ocean policy subject to public comment. Those who may be affected by it - groups
like the Conservation Law Foundation and the industry coalition - could lay out their concerns. As the
comment period ended, the chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee, Representative Doc
Hastings of Washington, demanded an extension because “the mandatory ocean and coastal zoning
initiative. . . could place huge portions of our oceans off limits to all types of recreational and
commercial activities.’’ Not true, but it too catered to the fears of fishermen everywhere.
Plan is unpopular with energy lobbyists – National Ocean Policy Coalition.
Kayyem 12 Juliette Kayyem, is candidate for Governor of Massachusetts and a former Boston Globe columnist, writing about issues of
national security and foreign affairs for the op-ed page, “Ocean Planning and Massachusetts”,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/03/08/ocean-planning-and-massachusetts/NmJeCmyyhUPTA811PPMogK/story.html
IT IS DE RIGUEUR these political days to claim that anything Massachusetts does is bad for the nation as
a whole. Health care aside, a new study shows that the state’s adoption of a comprehensive approach to
ocean planning is not only good for the environment but also for business. It’s a message, however, that
is under attack by the energy industry and its allies in Congress. The nation’s waters are its last
ungoverned area, and many Republicans in Congress want it to be like the Wild West. Instead of
bullets and holsters, though, this is all about getting good bait. Literally, honestly, bait. Here’s how it
works: Join forces and attack a relatively simple ocean planning effort because it could threaten the
sanctity of the business-friendly status quo. Then, call your group something benign like the National
Ocean Policy Coalition. And then tell every fisherman that their right to catch is being threatened by the
federal government. There is, in fact, a movement to establish a federal governance system modeled on
the plan in Massachusetts. As the oceans become more crowded, those who seek to tap its tremendous
resources, or protect its most valued treasures, all compete for space. For years, most ocean planning
was done on an ad hoc basis with little consideration of the multitude of stakeholders who might
actually have an interest.
Republicans hate the idea.
Helvarg 11 David Helvarg, President of the Blue Frontier Campaign and Award-Winning Journalist Mainly in New York Times, “A
Republican Leader Takes Aim at Ocean Protection”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-helvarg/a-republican-leader-takes_b_816141.html
The new chair of the House Natural Resources Committee, Representative Doc Hastings (R. WA),
doesn't understand President Obama's new ocean policy. In the 2010 elections his largest campaign
contributor was the oil and gas industry. Hastings says that the national ocean policy is "an irrational
zoning process" that "will harm the economy and cost jobs." It will, he claims, "place 'off-limits' signs
on huge portions of our oceans and coasts, seriously curtailing... all types of energy development." To
date the largest marine protected area 'off-limits' to extractive uses is in the remote Northwest
Hawaiian Islands and was created by an executive order issued under President George W. Bush in 2006.
Last July President Obama established a new (really first) U.S. ocean policy by Executive Order shortly
after the BP wellhead was capped in the Gulf of Mexico. It is based on the recommendations of two blue
ribbon ocean panels that reported in 2003 and 2004 (one appointed by President Bush, the other
headed by Leon Panetta) and follows a long process of public hearings by an ocean-policy taskforce
attended by thousands of citizen stakeholders (environmental supporters also staged 'Wear Blue for the
Ocean Day' rallies in more than a dozen cities). The policy's inelegantly titled operating principle is
called, "ecosystem- based coastal and marine spatial planning."
Midterms – Energy Lobbyists I/L
Energy Lobbyists key to elections.
David 14 Javier E. David, CBNC Writer and Analyst on current GOP climate specialized in energy, “Energy Group Goes On Offensive Before
Elections”, http://www.cnbc.com/id/101315893#.
The American Petroleum Institute vowed Tuesday to ratchet up the pressure on Washington, saying
its lobbying arm would push for policies—and politicians—more favorably disposed to America's oil
and gas boom. With congressional elections less than a year away, and with the controversial Keystone
XL pipeline still on indefinite hold, the industry's main trade organization said that it would expend
resources to "spur more pro-energy policies and to ensure that our nation's discussion on energy policy
is based on fact and reality, not political orthodoxy and hyperbole," said Jack Gerard, API's president and
CEO. The group will use its political arm, America's Energy, America's Choice, to "use the upcoming
midterm elections as a means to frame and positively influence the long-term energy policy
discussion," he said. Policymakers need to "better align our nation's political science with our geologic
science, because right now the former all too often drives energy policy." Touting figures from a new
API-sponsored study that oil and gas production over the next 12 years would inject $94 billion a year to
the economy and support nearly 1 million jobs, Gerard said it was important to implement "smart, progrowth energy policies" to ensure America's energy independence. Gerard's remarks were unusual for
their political tone. While normally vocal about the need for the U.S. to embrace fossil fuel production,
energy public policy lobbying takes place behind the scenes – and rarely, if ever, are they proceeded by
a public call to influence the electoral process. "In other words, elections matter," he told attendees at
the API's State of American Energy 2014 conference. He used language calibrated to the debate in
Washington over income disparity and raising the minimum wage, calling fracking "essential" to the
nation's development as an energy superpower and insisting that public opinion is on the API's side.
"The truth is, the average upstream oil and natural gas job pays roughly seven times the federal
minimum wage," Gerard said, renewing the call for approval of the Keystone pipeline. "The American
people get it and stand with us on today's most important energy policy questions."
PRO FACT: Energy and oil lobbyists spend at least $145 per year in lobbying for legislation and elections.
They are the third most highly influential lobbyist in legislation.
Midterms Link Block Extension
Prefer our link evidence –
A. Despite existing agencies,
T
T – Development
A. Interpretation: Ocean Development includes naval weapons, underwater
transportation and communications, conversion, extraction, production, and research.
Lipp 60 James E. Lipp, director of development planning of the Lockheed Aircraft Corp, member of the National Academy of Sciences
Panel on New Devices for Exploring the Oceans, and chairman of the National Security Industrial Asso ciation's Task Group on Undersea
Navigation and Oceanography. FRONTIERS IN OCEANIC RESEARCH HEARINGS House COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS APRIL 28
AND 29, 1960 http://archive.org/stream/frontiersinocean00unit/frontiersinocean00unit_djvu.txt
I should like to subdivide the field of ocean development into half a dozen parts and handle each very
briefly. These are ; naval weapons, underwater transportation and communication, fresh water
conversion, mining or chemical extraction of minerals, food production, and finally research
activities.
B. Violation: The affirmative creates a framework for ocean spatial planning – this isn’t
development and restricts future opportunities for development.
Mansfield 4 Becky Mansfield Department of Geography, Ohio State University, Geoforum Volume 35, Issue 3, May 2004, Pages 313–
326 Neoliberalism in the oceans: “rationalization,” property rights, and the commons question, Science Direct
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718503001155
In this paper, I address these questions by analyzing the development of neoliberalism in the oceans,
and in particular in ocean fisheries. Examining the ways that past policy orientations toward fisheries
have influenced the development of neoliberal approaches to ocean governance, I contend that
neoliberalism in the oceans centers specifically around concerns about property and the use of
privatization to create markets for governing access to and use of ocean resources. Within the EuroAmerican tradition that has shaped international law of the sea, the oceans (including the water
column, seabed, and living and mineral resources) were long treated as common property––the
“common heritage of mankind” (Pardo, 1967)––open to all comers with the means to create and
exploit oceanic opportunities. Although historically there has also been continual tension between
this openness of access and desire for territorialization (especially of coastal waters), treating the
oceans as a commons is consistent with the idea that oceans are spaces of movement and
transportation, which have facilitated mercantilism, exploration, colonial expansion, and cold war
military maneuvering (Steinberg, 2001).1 Oceans have also long been sites for resource extraction,
yet it has not been until recent decades that new economic desires and environmental contradictions
have contributed to a pronounced move away from open access and freedom of the seas. New
technologies for resource extraction combined with regional overexploitation have contributed to
conflicts over resources, to which representatives from academia, politics, and business have
responded by calling for enclosing the oceans within carefully delimited regimes of property rights,
be those regimes of state, individual, or collective control.
C. The affirmative’s interpretation is bad for debate:
Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash. Adding to existing efforts
provides a finite set of cases. Creation unlimits. There are limitless possibilities.
Swaminathan 3
Dr K V Swaminathan, Waterfalls Institute of Technology Transfer (WITT)
February 2003 Ocean Vistas
http://www.witts.org/Ocean_wealth/oceanwealth_01_feb03/wista_oceanwealth_feture.htm
The oceans cover nearly two-thirds of the world's surface area and have profoundly influenced the
course of human development. Indeed the great markers in man’s progress around the world are in a
large measure the stages in his efforts to master the oceans. Nations and people who are conscious
of the almost limitless potential of the oceans. Those who have sought to comprehend its deep
mysteries, processes and rhythms and have made efforts to explore and utilize its resources, stand in
the van of progress, while those who have been indifferent to the critical role that oceans play in
human life and its development, have remained mired in stagnation and backwardness.
D. T is a voter for good, prepared debating.
Other Shit
Inherency Violation
Interpretation: The affirmative should have an inherency contention or evidence
explaining barriers to the plan happening in the status quo.
Violation: The affirmative does not present why in the status quo the plan action isn’t
taking into effect.
Reasons their interpretation is bad –
A. Limits – the affirmative justifies by not reading an inherency argument a style of
debate which omits a nexus for negative predictable limits; they explode the topic to
be potentially about anything that could happen in the past.
B. Grounds – they can spike out of any disadvantage like politics by claiming particular
portions of their affirmative that would be controversial has already passed in the
status quo – makes it impossible to be neg.
Vote negative to take a stand against abuse in the debate space.