SO MANY DUTIES, SO LITTLE TIME:
The Fiduciary Duty Exception to the
Attorney-client Privilege,
Supervision of Non-Attorneys, and
Supervision of Junior Attorneys
Robert Marc Chemers
Matthew J. Egan
Donald Patrick Eckler
Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered
March 10, 2015
WHAT IS THE FIDUCIARY DUTY EXCEPTION
TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
Recently, several courts have addressed whether the law
should extend the attorney-client privilege to protect
communications between a law firm’s in-house counsel,
seeking advice from other firm lawyers on how to handle
a client’s potential malpractice claim against the firm.
Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP,
355 Ore 476 (2014); Hunter, Maclean, Exley, & Dunn v. St.
Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. 419 (2013); RFF Family
Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 465 Mass. 702
(2013); Garvy v. Seyfarth & Shaw, 2012 IL App (1st)
110115; MDA City Apartments, LLC v. DLA Piper LLP, 2012
IL App (1st) 111047.
WHAT IS THE FIDUCIARY DUTY EXCEPTION
TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
Communications arguably fall within attorney-client
privilege as the lawyer accused of malpractice
turned to in-house counsel for legal advice on how
to handle the malpractice issue. This exception to
the attorney-client privilege is commonly referred
to as the fiduciary duty exception. Each of these
cases, for sometimes different reasons, have
rejected the application of the fiduciary duty
exception to the attorney-client privilege and has
protected the disputed communications from
disclosure to the former client.
WHAT IS THE FIDUCIARY DUTY EXCEPTION
TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
Before this recent development, courts often required the
production of communications involving a client’s malpractice
claim, even though the communications arguably fell within
the purview of attorney-client privilege.
Koen Book
Distributors. v. Powell, Trachman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman &
Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 285-286 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Bank
Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 220 F.Supp.2d 283,
287 (S.D. N.Y. 2002); SonicBlue, Inc. v. Portside Growth and
Opportunity Fund., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 181, at *26 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Jan. 18, 2008); Thelen Reid & Priest, LLP v. Marland, 2007
U. S. Dist. LEXIS 17482 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007); TattleTale
Alarm Systems v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10412 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 3, 2011).
Hunter, Maclean, Exley, & Dunn v. St.
Simons Waterfront, LLC
• Recently, the highest courts of review of several sister jurisdictions
have squarely addressed the fiduciary-duty exception’s application
to the attorney-client privilege in the legal malpractice context.
• In 2013, the Supreme Court of Georgia examined this issue in
Hunter, Maclean, Exley, & Dunn v. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC.
• In that case, the court applied Georgia’s codified attorney-client
privilege analysis to determine whether an attorney’s communication with his law firm’s in-house counsel regarding a client’s
potential malpractice claim would result in the application of the
fiduciary-duty exception.
Hunter, Maclean, Exley, & Dunn v. St.
Simons Waterfront, LLC
The court held that to avoid production in
discovery, the party seeking the protection of
the attorney-client privilege needed to show: (1)
the existence of an attorney-client relationship;
(2) the communications concerned the purpose
for which legal advice was sought; (3) the
communications were maintained in confidence;
and (4) no exception to the privilege applied.
Hunter, Maclean, Exley, & Dunn v. St.
Simons Waterfront, LLC
•
Regarding the maintenance of confidentiality element, the court said that
intra-firm communications regarding the malpractice must only involve “inhouse counsel, firm management, firm attorneys, and other personnel with
knowledge about the representation that is the basis for the client’s claim
against the firm,” otherwise communications about the malpractice claim may
not be subject to protection.
•
Concerning the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, the court reasoned
that the fiduciary-duty exception did not apply because the client’s
malpractice claim established a clear lack of mutuality between the firm and
its client, which resulted in adverse positions much like in Garvy.
•
The Georgia Supreme Court, however, did not have occasion to address how
the court would rule when reviewing an issue like that offered in MDA, i.e.,
where there is no direct assertion of malpractice or clear adversarial position
when the firm sought legal advice from its in-house counsel or outside
defense counsel.
RFF Family Partnership, LP v. Burns &
Levinson, LLP
• The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
took a different approach to reviewing the
attorney-client privilege’s application concerning
in-house communications regarding a client’s
malpractice claims.
• In RFF Family Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson,
LLP, the court found that the attorney-client
privilege applied to communications with inhouse attorneys regarding malpractice claims
made by current clients.
RFF Family Partnership, LP v. Burns &
Levinson, LLP
The party asserting the privilege must establish: (1)
the law firm had designated an attorney or
attorneys within the firm to represent the firm as
in-house counsel; (2) the in-house counsel had not
performed any work on the client matter at issue or
any substantially related matter; (3) the time spent
by the attorneys in these communications with inhouse counsel was not billed to the client; and (4)
the communications were made and maintained in
confidence.
Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP
• Most recently, in Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP, 355 Ore 476 (2014), the Supreme
Court of Oregon reversed the holding of the trial and
relying upon the language of the codified attorneyclient privilege, found that the privilege applied to
protect communications, between the former lawyers
of the plaintiff and their in-house counsel, and that the
exception did not apply.
• Davis Wright Tremaine ("DWT") was engaged by
Crimson Trace to prosecute certain claims related to a
patent infringement dispute with LaserMax.
Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP
• As the litigation turned poorly for Crimson Trace, based upon a
counterclaim in the patent litigation brought by LaserMax that the patent,
that was the basis for the patent infringement claim, was invalid, a dispute
arose between DWT and Crimson Trace.
• DWT had prepared the original patent application and therefore, a
potential conflict of interest arose between DWT and Crimson Trace.
• A settlement was ultimately reached between Crimson Trace and
LaserMax in the patent litigation. That agreement was to be confidential.
However, DWT, acting as counsel for Crimson Trace, disclosed part of the
settlement agreement in a way that implied that LaserMax had conceded
liability. LaserMax complained and the court required that the entire
agreement be disclosed. A legal malpractice lawsuit brought by Crimson
Trace against DWT ensued.
Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP
• Once the dispute between DWT and Crimson Trace arose, the
lawyers representing Crimson Trace consulted with the Quality
Assurance Committee ("QAC") at the firm. Id. at 479. The QAC was
a small group of lawyers at DWT that had been specifically
designated by the firm as in-house counsel.
• During the course of the legal malpractice claim, Crimson Trace
sought the communications between the lawyers who represented
Crimson Trace in the underlying litigation and the QAC.
• Finding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply because of
the conflict of interest by the QAC in representing members of the
firm in conflict with clients of the firm, and in spite of the fact the
communications were kept confidential, the trial court ordered that
DWT produce the communications.
Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP
• In reversing the trial courts' opinion, the Supreme Court of Oregon first
addressed whether the attorney-client privilege applied at all to this
situation.
• Oregon's attorney-client privilege is codified in Oregon Evidence Code
Section 503. Id. The Court viewed its tasked as determining what the
legislature intended in codifying the attorney-client privilege.
• Similar to most states: there are three elements for the attorney-client
privilege to apply in Oregon: 1) the communication is between the client
and lawyer, 2) the communication was confidential, and 3) the
communication was made for the purpose of obtaining advice.
• The Court rejected Crimson Trace's argument that there is a fourth
requirement: the reasonable expectations of the parties that an attorneyclient relationship existed. Id.
Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP
• The Court rejected this argument on two bases. First,
the Court stated that there was no support in the
statute for such a requirement.
• Second, the Court rejected the attempt by Crimson
Trace to apply lawyer discipline cases regarding
disputes about whether an attorney-client relationship
existed, holding that the reasonable expectation of the
client as to the existence of a relationship has nothing
to do with the issues in this case in which the attorney
and client agree that there was an attorney-client
relationship.
Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP
• After rejecting the existence of a fourth element, the Court turned to the
first element of whether there was an attorney and client at all in this
case.
• The Court first stated that there was no dispute that if the DWT lawyers
had consulted outside counsel there would be no dispute.
• The Court stated that nothing in the statute could by construed to
preclude an in house lawyer from being an attorney and the lawyer in the
same firm as being the client in an attorney-client relationship.
• The Court rejected the argument that allowing attorneys within a firm to
be counsel for other lawyers in the same firm would undermine the
attorney-client relationship by holding that it does not matter.
Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP
• Looking at the second element, whether the
communications were confidential, the Court
held that the communications were confidential
despite having been made with lawyers in
Washington, who Crimson Trace argued were
subject to the more stringent restrictions of
Washington law.
• The Court rejected this argument and relied upon
the requirement that Oregon applies its own law
to determine evidentiary issues.
Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP
• As to the third element, while acknowledging the trial court's
finding that the attorney-client privilege would apply but for the
fiduciary duty exception, the Court found that the communications
were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice as to the fulfillment
of professional responsibilities to Crimson Trace.
• Having concluded that the attorney-client privilege applied, the
Court then considered whether any exceptions to the privilege
applied.
• After looking at the exceptions to the attorney-client listed in the
applicable statute, and determining that none of those applied, the
Court turned to the fiduciary duty exception.
Crimson Trace Corporation v. Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP
• The Court ruled that because the fiduciary
duty exception is not listed as an exception to
the attorney-client privilege in the statute.
• The Supreme Court of Oregon's analysis is
entirely reliant on the language of the statute
codifying the attorney-client privilege.
THE SOURCE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
EXCEPTION
• According to the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S.Ct. 2313
(2011), English courts first developed the fiduciary
exception to the attorney-client privilege based on a
principle of trust law in the 19th century.
• As described in Jicarilla Apache Nation, “[t]he rule was
that when a trustee obtained legal advice to guide in
the administration of the trust, and not for the
trustee’s own defense in litigation, the beneficiaries
were entitled to the production of documents related
to that advice.”
THE SOURCE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
EXCEPTION
• Courts applying the fiduciary duty exception reasoned “that
the normal attorney-client privilege did not apply in [the
situation where the beneficiary was seeking advice for the
administration for the trust] because the legal advice was
sought for the beneficiaries’ benefit and was obtained at
the beneficiaries’ expense by using trust funds to pay the
attorneys’ fees.”
• Relying on Jicarilla Apache Nation, courts have imposed the
fiduciary duty exception for two reasons. First, the
exception applies because the trustee obtains the legal
advice as a mere representative of the beneficiaries, as the
trustee has a fiduciary obligation to act in the beneficiaries’
best interest when administering the trust.
THE SOURCE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
EXCEPTION
•
Consequently, the beneficiaries are the “real clients” of the attorney who advises
the trustee on trust-related matters, and therefore, the attorney-client privilege
belongs to the beneficiaries rather than the trustee.
•
Courts look at several factors in making this “real client” determination, including:
1.
Determining when a trustee sought the legal advice to ascertain whether there was a
reason for the trustees to seek advice in a personal capacity (i.e., protection from claims
against the trustee) rather than in a fiduciary capacity (i.e., protection of the trust corpus);
2.
Determining if the documents or advice at issue was intended for any purpose other than to
benefit the trust; and
3.
Determining if the trust’s funds had been used to pay for the legal advice received by the
trustee or whether the advice was obtained at a trustee’s expense.
THE SOURCE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
EXCEPTION
• Regarding the third factor, courts distinguish between
“legal advice procured at the trustee’s own expense
and for his own protection,” which would remain
privileged, and “the situation where the trust itself is
assessed for obtaining opinion of counsel where
interest of the beneficiaries are at stake.”
• In the latter case, courts would apply the fiduciary
exception, and typically a trustee could not withhold
those communications from the beneficiaries. Id
THE SOURCE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
EXCEPTION
• According to the United States Supreme Court, the second reason
courts impose the fiduciary duty exception is that the trustee’s
fiduciary obligation to furnish trust-related information to the
beneficiaries outweighs the trustee’s interest in the attorney-client
privilege.
• The policy of preserving disclosure in the trustee-beneficiary
relationship is “ultimately more important than the protection of
the trustees’ confidence in the attorney for the trust.”
• Generally, courts applying the fiduciary duty exception find that the
full disclosure of information better assists a beneficiary in policing
a trustee in the trust management, and a beneficiary’s ability to
police in a more informed fashion outweighs “the policy
consideration of attorney-client privilege.”
COMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTROL
GROUP TEST
• Prior to looking at specific steps to be taken, the first
evaluation that must be made is whether the attorneyclient privilege in a given state follows Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) or the "control
group" test.
• The majority of jurisdictions and the federal courts
follow Upjohn, but a significant minority, including
Illinois South Dakota, Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, New
Hampshire, and Oklahoma follow the "control group"
test. Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota and Kansas are in
between the two.
COMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTROL
GROUP TEST
• Under Illinois’ version of the control group test, a court’s threshold
determination is whether an individual is a member of the corporation’s
control group.
• Under Consolidation Coal 89 Ill. 2d 103, 118-19 (1982), a person is within
the control group if he is top management able to make a final decision.
• Other corporate employees must satisfy these elements to be in the
control group: (1) the agent served as an advisor to top management of
the corporate client; (2) the agent’s advisory role was such that the
corporate principal would not normally have made a decision without the
agent’s advice; and (3) the agent’s opinion or advice in fact formed the
basis of the final decision made by those with actual authority within the
corporate principal. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 138 Ill.
App. 3d 276, 279-280 (1st Dist. 1985).
MANNER TO PROCEED
• Once the nature of the applicable law is considered,
there is good guidance from the court in Hunter,
Maclean, Exley, & Dunn v. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC,
317 Ga. App. 1 (2012).
• In that case, that the Georgia Court of Appeals, sitting
in a state which has not decided whether the subject
matter or control group test applies, held that to
determine whether an attorney-client relationship
existed in this context, the court looked at several facts
regarding the nature of the legal relationship.
MANNER TO PROCEED
• Those factors included
(a) whether the firm maintained a designated in-house attorney
for purposes of handling the firm’s malpractice claims;
(b) whether the firm maintained separate files for the client’s legal
work and the firm’s malpractice defense work;
(c) whether the firm billed the client for the malpractice defense
work or billed the defense work to the file; and
(d) whether the in-house attorney designated to handle the
malpractice claim for the firm had worked for the client.
MANNER TO PROCEED
• Regarding the maintenance of confidentiality
element, the court said that intra-firm
communications regarding the malpractice
must only involve “in-house counsel, firm
management, firm attorneys, and other
personnel with knowledge about the
representation that is the basis for the client’s
claim
against
the
firm,”
otherwise
communications about the malpractice claim
may not be subject to protection.
MANNER TO PROCEED
• To apply these principles for an Illinois practitioner, a
review of the applicable Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct is important.
• Both Rules 1.6(b)(4) and 5.1 permit communications by
lawyers in a firm with in-house lawyers.
• Specifically, Rule 1.6(b)(4) provides an exception to the
general confidentiality requirements of Rule 1.6 for a
circumstance in which a lawyer seeks “to secure legal
advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these
Rules.”
MANNER TO PROCEED
• Comment 9 to Rule 1.6 provides color to this
exception:
A lawyer’s confidentiality obligations do not preclude a
lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the
lawyer’s personal responsibility to comply with these Rules.
In most situations, disclosing information to secure such
advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out
the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly
authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such disclosure because
of the importance of a lawyer’s compliance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
MANNER TO PROCEED
• Rule 5.1 sheds light on the responsibilities of managing lawyers and
firms of all sizes to ensure that the Rules are followed. Comment 3
to Rule 5.1 specifically contemplates the role of in-house counsel:
Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in
paragraph (a) can depend on the firm’s structure and the nature of its practice. In
a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of
compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in
practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more
elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure
whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly
to a designated senior partner or special committee.
• These Rules were specifically cited by the Illinois appellate court in
Garvy and provide the framework for establishing procedures to
comply with the Rules and to eliminate or at least mitigate the
damage from any disputes with a client.
MANNER TO PROCEED
• These suggestions should be coupled with additional steps to be taken.
• First, while it is preferable to have outside counsel for claims against the
firm that may arise, in house counsel should be identified and
communicated to the lawyers in the firm.
• Second, the in house lawyer and any fees paid to outside counsel must not
be paid by or billed to the client with whom the firm is in conflict. As
articulated by the Supreme Court that would vitiate the protection.
• Finally, any communications regarding the dispute with the client must
specifically identify that they are intended for that purpose and not for the
purpose of the client's interests. The easiest way to do this, and to
prevent billing to the client, is likely to open a separate file for the dispute
with the client.
MANNER TO PROCEED
• As it relates to cross-border communications within a firm related
to a conflict with a client, a firm should prepare for a ruling similar
to the holding in Crimson Trace that the rules regarding privilege in
the state in which the malpractice action is brought apply,
notwithstanding the rules in another state that may be more or less
restrictive.
• In Crimson Trace, the action was brought in Oregon and the lawyers
had communication with in-house counsel from Washington.
• The plaintiff argued that the more restrictive privilege in
Washington should apply. The Oregon Supreme Court disagreed.
RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR
ATTORNEYS - RULE 5.1
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers
possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in
the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct
involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in
which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other
lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or
mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
RESPONSIBILITY OF SUBORDINATE
ATTORNEYS - RULE 5.2
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional
Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted
at the direction of another person.
(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in
accordance with a supervisory
lawyer’s
reasonable resolution of an arguable question of
professional duty.
RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPERVISE NONATTORNEY PERSONNEL
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a
lawyer:
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers
possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance
that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct
involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which
the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of
the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take
reasonable remedial action.