1AC 1
Hegemonic decline goes nuclear
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth
College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at
Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of
Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,”
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)
A core premise of deep
engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security
environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain
partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states
with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive
to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S.
power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the
scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John
Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races,
nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale
great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are
complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in
Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of
theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security
setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker
argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international
relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that
the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal
benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment
would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic
governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however,
that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net
security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great
power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense
cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that
is incapable of securing
itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s
Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the
influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence?
Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably
Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security
dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the
principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase
their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War,
both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United
States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that
undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very
much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its
basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is
the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under
that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely
expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning
research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core
assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they
engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of
many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior.
Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of
major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly
knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some
of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the
withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated
insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be
beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including
regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted
above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States
could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the
economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there
are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of
conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one
overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional
would see
proxy wars and arming of
client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the
United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of
these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many
retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in
the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism
rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are
inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and
resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such
probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In
dyadic terms,
addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including
the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem
prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out
of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage,
and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is
not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace
dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy
for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore
balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The
United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible
contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that
China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes,
“The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it
by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the
Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to
onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity
to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the
United States is doing. 83 In sum, the
argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is
countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is
unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a
latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and
onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which
the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance,
deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby
preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade
partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’
formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at
historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they
have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S.
allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap
between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85
Independently, science leadership is a conflict filter- prevents nations from going to war
Koppelman et al 10, Ben, research officer at the foreign policy center, Natalie Day, Senior Researcher at
Demos and Project Manager for The Atlas of Ideas, dr Neil Davison, senior policy adviser (security &
diplomacy) in the Science Policy Centre at the Royal Society, Dr Tracey Elliott, Head of International, The
Royal Society, Dr James Wilsdon, Director of the Science Policy Centre at the Royal Society, Professor
Anthony Cheetham FRS, Department of Materials Science, University of Cambridge, Professor Mohamed
Hassan, President, Academy of Sciences for the Developing World, Dr Ragunath Mashelkar FRS, President,
Global Research Alliance, Dr Jim McQuaid FREng, Former Chairman, Environmental Security Panel, NATO
Science for Peace and Security Committee, Dr Vaughan Turekian, Director, Centre for Science Diplomacy,
AAAS, USA [“New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy,” January, the royal society] HURWITZ
Cooperation on the scientific aspects of sensitive issues may sometimes be the only way to initiate a wider political
dialogue. The soft power of science, and the universality of scientific methods, can be used to diffuse tensions even in
‘hard power’ scenarios, such as those relating to traditional military threats. For example, technologies to verify nuclear
arms control agreements were a rare focus of joint working between the US and USSR during the Cold War. Lessons from the Cold War are once
again highly pertinent. In the run-up to the May 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear disarmament is
firmly back on the international agenda. However, the timescale for disarmament is long, as illustrated by the history of negotiations over the
Chemical Weapons Convention. After the Geneva Convention banned the use of chemical weapons in 1925, negotiations for a treaty banning
their production and stockpiling did not start until the 1980s, and the convention entered into force only in 1997. Even now, stockpiles of chemical
weapons in the US and Russia have yet to be destroyed. So focusing in 2010 on the challenges of the final stages of a nuclear disarmament process
may be premature. A more practical next step could be to establish the scientific requirements for the verification regime necessary to support
future stages of negotiation (Pregenzer 2008). In 2008, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that a high-level Intergovernmental
Panel on Nuclear Disarmament could be established (based on the model of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). This panel could
begin by identifying the scientific and technical aspects of disarmament, and then set out a research agenda necessary to achieve them.
International cooperation would be essential, both between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, as all would need to have confidence that
reductions are taking place. The recent initiative between the UK and Norwegian governments on disarmament verifi cation sets a precedent
security threats now extend beyond the
military domain, with environmental security attracting particular attention (Abbott C, Rogers P & Sloboda S 2007).
Essential resources, such as freshwater, cultivable land, crop yields and fish stocks, are likely to become scarcer
in many parts of the world, increasing the risk of competition over resources within and between states (UNEP 2009). This
here, and could be expanded to include additional States (VERTIC 2009). However,
could intensify as previously inaccessible regions, such as the Arctic Ocean, open up as a consequence of climate change and ice melt. Substantial
parts of the world also risk being left uninhabitable by rising sea levels, reduced freshwater availability or declining agricultural capacity. Many of
the regions that are vulnerable to the impacts of these multiple stresses are already the locus of existing instability and conflict (see Figure 2). 5
Conclusions The main conclusions to emerge from the discussions at the Royal Society/AAAS meeting were as follows: 5.1 The three dimensions
of science diplomacy The concept of
science diplomacy is gaining increasing currency in the US, UK, Japan and elsewhere. It
is still a fluid concept, but can usefully be applied to the role of science, technology and innovation in three related areas: • informing
foreign policy objectives with scientific advice (science in diplomacy); • facilitating international science cooperation (diplomacy
for science); • using science cooperation to improve international relations between countries (science for diplomacy). 5.2
Science and universal values Scientific values of rationality, transparency and universality are the same the world over. They can help to
underpin good governance and build trust between nations. Science provides a non-ideological environment for
the participation and free exchange of ideas between people, regardless of cultural, national or religious backgrounds. 5.3 The soft power
of science Science is a source of what Joseph Nye terms ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004). The scientific community often works beyond
national boundaries on problems of common interest, so is well placed to support emerging forms of diplomacy that require non-traditional
scientific
exchange can contribute to coalition building and conflict resolution. Cooperation on the scientific aspects of sensitive
alliances of nations, sectors and non-governmental organisations. If aligned with wider foreign policy goals, these channels of
issues—such as nuclear nonproliferation—can sometimes provide an effective route to other forms of political dialogue. Similarly the potential
of science as an arena for building trust and understanding between countries is gaining traction, particularly in the Middle East and wider Islamic
world (see Case study 1). 5.4 Motivations for science diplomacy Science diplomacy seeks to strengthen the symbiosis between the interests and
motivations of the scientific and foreign policy communities. For the former, international cooperation is often driven by a desire to access the
best people, research facilities or new sources of funding. For the latter, science offers useful networks and channels of communication that can
be used to support wider policy goals. Foreign ministries should place greater emphasis on science within their strategies, and draw more
extensively on scientific advice in the formation and delivery of policy objectives. In the UK, the appointment of Professor David Clary FRS as the
Chief Scientific Adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office creates an important opportunity to integrate science across FCO priorities, and
develop stronger linkages with science-related policies in other government departments.
Current prohibition on US embryonic stem cell research causes competitiveness gaps- other nations
are entering the market, causing “embargo-like” effects on US scientific leadership
DeRouen et al 12 (Mindy C. DeRouen1 , Jennifer B. McCormick2 , Jason Owen-Smith3 and Christopher
Thomas Scott1, 4 (1) Program on Stem Cells in Society, Stanford University Center for Biomedical Ethics,
Stanford, CA 94305, USA (2) General Internal Medicine & Health Care PolicyResearch, Mayo Clinic,
Rochester, MN 55905, USA (3) Sociology and Organizational Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
MI 48109, USA (4) The National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC,
Canada The Race Is On: Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research Goes Global
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12015-012-9391-6/fulltext.html)
The reversal of the Bush policy was lauded for several reasons. Proponents argued it would decrease US researcher’s
reliance on a small set of legacy lines, many of which were made with outdated culture methods. It would also increase the genetic diversity of
registered lines, and enable the deposit of new, disease-specific lines. Coupled with expanded
funding from the NIH, the policy
would counter the ambitious efforts of countries such as China and Singapore, maintain and extend the
productivity of US-based scientists, and advantage US corporations in the development of treatments.
However, the effects of hESC policies on individual nations are just beginning to be explored. We previously
reported a growing international gap in hESC research. Our search of the primary literature between November 1998 and
December 2004 examined articles authored by investigators in 97 institutions around the globe. Though 46% of the authors’ institutions were
US-based and US researchers out-published any other individual country, we
found a growing gulf between US and total
non-US publication rates. US labs lagged after 2002, with the deficit increasing through 2004. Also apparent were the appearance of
newly derived hESC lines not on the NIH registry, which outnumbered approved lines over two to one (44/18). We argued in 2006 that if
these trends continued unchecked, US research competitiveness would suffer [2]. In a bellwether of the results
presented here, we surveyed research presented at the 2010 International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) meeting. Most of the lines
(75%) reported at the meeting were not on the NIH registry and the appearance of many new lines resulted from research conducted outside of
the United States [3]. In
recent years it appears that more nations are joining the hESC “race” by aggressively
publishing in the peer-reviewed literature. Here we present data on primary research articles published between 2008 and
2010. We extracted these papers from a larger dataset of articles using hESC and human induced pluripotent stem cells (hiPSC). We used this
strategy in prior work to report on the use and distribution of human pluripotent stem cell (hPSC) lines [4]. For each hESC article published
between 2008 and 2010, we identified the location of the senior (last) author on the publication and used this as a proxy for the primary
location for the work. With this data we determined the frequency of hESC used in publications (hESC alone or in combination with hiPSC) from
the US and the top ten most productive foreign countries. Figure 1 shows the rate of publication by US-based authors slowing in comparison to
international labs, and then declining over the final year of the period. By contrast, the publication rates of non-US authors were not
significantly different than US authors in 2008–2009 (chi sq; p = 0.165) but were significantly different between 2009 and 2010 (chi sq; p = 0.024). In addition, non-US authors increased the number of their papers by a startling 70% between 2008 and 2010. The future ramifications
of a relative decline in US productivity are yet to be determined. On the one hand, a greater number of productive nations in hESC research
may result in therapeutic developments that are more numerous and more immediate. On the other, with
more competitors in the
hESC race, the US may cede its position at the forefront of discovery and innovation. hPSC publications 2008–
2010, USA and total non-USA. Legend: Worldwide frequency of the appearance of pluripotent human stem cell (hPSC) publications in the
primary literature for the period 2008–2110 Figure 2 compares publication rates of the ten most productive foreign countries between 2008
and 2010. With the exception of Canada, these countries dramatically increased their 2008 publication totals. The UK (82) and China (65) led
the way, followed by Singapore (56) and Japan (55). Four countries (China, Sweden, Australia and Spain) doubled the number of their hESC
publications during the period. Even with a leveling trend in 2010, the US (496) leads productivity for the three-year period. Yet, all the non-US
countries depicted in Fig. 2 show overall positive trajectories, with especially strong growth in 2010, adding to the publication gap observed in
the starting year. We
believe the leveling and decline of US productivity in the latter years may be due to lingering
and an uncertain policy environment the first half of the Obama
administration. This lasting hangover might be due to any number of mechanisms, including loss of US scientists
from the stem cell field as junior researchers opted not to pursue academic careers with human
embryonic stem cell lines, laboratory and research group skills and infrastructure that were optimized for early, dominant hESC cells
lines, or time spent identifying, developing, and maintaining alternatives to federal funding sources. The challenge raised to US
productivity may also be exacerbated by the robust response of hESC laboratories in other nations,
especially in the UK and China. We note that all of the listed countries have generally permissive or flexible hESC policy. Along the
effects of Bush era prohibitions
spectrum of nations on our list, Canada’s policy is considered to be the most restrictive: though spare IVF embryos may be used under certain
conditions, it is not ethically permissible to create embryos for research purposes [5]. We further add that the use of hESC and hiPSC lines are
tightly linked, with experienced hESC laboratories also experimenting with hiPSCs in comparative studies. For US-based researchers, then,
policies that would restrict or prohibit hESC research may negatively impact the nascent hiPSC field. Fig. 2
hPSC publications 2008–2010, top-10 non-USA countries. Legend: Frequency of the appearance of human pluripotent stem cell (hPSC)
publications in the primary literature for the period 2008–2010, by the top ten non-USA countries We further our analysis by examining the
diversity of hESC lines used by researchers in our dataset. The scientific community has long called for a genetically diverse set of lines derived
under new culture methods [6]. Overall, the number of different lines used in the literature has been startling, growing nearly tenfold from 44
in 1998–2004 to 414 during 2008–2010. Increases in the diversity of new lines can also be found on the NIH registry. While only 21 lines were
available during the Bush era, 163 lines are now listed [7]. Even considering the flood of new lines, researchers continue to rely on a few lines
derived before the turn of the century. We previously showed that just two of these—H1 and H9—were used with any frequency, with H9
appearing in over 80% of peer-reviewed publications [8]. Three years later this trend continues. Figure 3 shows the absolute frequencies of the
32 lines appearing most often in the published literature between 2008 and 2010. Here, H1 and H9 continue to predominate. We note whether
the lines appeared on the Bush registry, the Obama registry, both registries, or are unregistered. While the increase in registered lines is
encouraging, most of the lines added since July 2009—when the new accession policy began—have yet to appear in the literature. Frequency of
top 5% of hESC lines, 2008–2010. Legend: World wide frequency of the top 5% of human embryonic stem cell lines appearing in the primary
literature, by line type, for the period 2008–2110. Lines are categorized by whether they were approved during the Bush administration, the
Obama administration, both administrations, or neither Several things stand out in Fig. 3. The “H” lines, derived in 1998 by James Thomson,
dominate the literature and are globally wide-spread. These lines are used more in the US than abroad, but non-US use is robust and growing.
The BG (Bresagen) series of lines, while derived in Australia, appear on more US-authored publications. This may be because Bresagen
distributed the lines through a US affiliate, and because the lines were originally approved under the Bush rules and were thus available for
federal funding. There were questions about whether the BG lines were ethically derived, and later they were not re-registered under the
stricter Obama guidelines [9]. Though the BG lines are used in relatively low numbers, we note their continued presence in the US-authored
literature as an instance of the legacy of established research materials that persist irrespective of changing regulatory and funding policy. The
reverse seems to hold true for older lines approved under Obama but not under Bush. In response to the Bush restrictions, in 2004 Harvard
University’s Doug Melton derived a suite of hESC lines with private funds. Though they were not NIH-eligible at first, Harvard distributed the
lines widely, offering a less expensive alternative to the high fees charged by WiCell, the curator of the government-approved H lines. In a 2009
analysis, we tracked legal instruments called materials transfer agreements that enable the exchange of hESC lines. We found that compared to
the distributions from the US stem cell bank, four times as many Harvard lines were shipped overseas during the period 2003–2007 [10]. In the
primary literature, we pick up at 2008 and move through 2010. Here, we see that a suite of Harvard lines (HUES 1, 7, 8, and 9) continues to have
an overseas presence. We believe this may be due to three factors: 1) between 2004 and July 2009, HUES lines could not be used in NIH
projects because they were made with private funds; 2) during that period the lines were offered at low cost to those who requested them; and
3) though the lines were eventually approved under the new Obama guidelines, their current use in the US is restricted to federally-funded
diabetes research. The Harvard lines may not be used for federal projects that study neural and cardiac cells and their associated diseases. We
note that the last point may have had a small effect in the present analysis, which tracks only 18 months of usage under the Obama policy. With
the exception of the robust use of the H lines, location effects may play a role in whether a line crosses the border to the US. Of the top lines
appearing in the literature, many stay near to their points of origin. This fact holds even for foreign-made lines registered in the US over ten
years ago. For example, Bush-approved lines derived in Singapore are used mostly or exclusively in non-US labs. In addition, lines derived in
Sweden (HS-181, 293, 401), Singapore (HES-2, 3), and Japan (KhES-1, 3) dominate non-US publications, and some lines derived outside of the US
– HS181, SA01 (Sweden), SNUhES-3 (South Korea), Shef 1, 4 (UK), HES 1 (Singapore), and CA-1 (Canada), are not affiliated with US last authors
at all. Surprisingly, only 8 newly accessioned, NIH approved lines appear in our top 32: HUES1, 3, 7, 8, 9, SA01, 02 and KhES-1; but these Obamaera additions are used more in non-US locations. Nearly 60% (19/32) of the most frequently used lines are not on the US registry. Finally, less
than 10% of the 142 lines on the current NIH registry appear in the top 5% of our census. In conclusion, while the Obama policy has been
generally positive for US scientists, legal
wrangling, the effects of the Dickey-Wicker amendment, and the
persistence of social and political controversy have dampened the impacts of a more permissive hESC policy.
The rate of US-authored
publications appears to have slowed in contrast to other nations, which exhibit
surprising increases in publication frequency. In terms of the diversity of lines, these data suggest lingering
“embargo” effects on the US stem cell field. Over time, non-US labs have freely used lines on the US registries, and this is
reflected in increasingly competitive publication frequencies. By contrast, during 2008–2010, US labs—which were mostly federally funded
or anticipated federal grants—were limited to using NIH approved lines. A limitation of this study is the link we draw
between last authors and the locations of lines used in their research. It is possible that cross-border collaborations among several authors
create a mix of lines of national origin and registry status. In addition, it is not clear how state funds have contributed to US publication activity.
Further interrogation of our database will help settle these questions.
Legalizing stem cell research ensures international cooperation- continued uncertainty guarantees US
scientists will be left out
Luo et all 11
Science and Technology Policy Program, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University,
Houston, Texas, United States of America Jesse M. Flynn Department of Biochemistry and Molecular
Biology, The University of Texas M. D. Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, Texas, United States of
America Elaine Howard Ecklund Department of Sociology, Rice University, Houston, Texas, United States
of America International Stem Cell Collaboration: How Disparate Policies between the United States and
the United Kingdom Impact Research.
http://www.plosone.org/article/authors/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0017684)
The scientific community is increasingly global; new scientific results are disseminated worldwide within
hours of publication. From 1998 to 2008, the absolute number of internationally co-authored publications in science (including social
sciences) and engineering almost doubled from 98,424 to 180,783 (representing over 20% of total publications in 2008) [1]. As the
number of internationally co-authored journal articles proliferates, it is imperative to understand the
impact that cross-border collaborations may have on the quality, productivity, and effectiveness of the
research produced. Previous research has established that articles with authors from multiple countries were cited twice as frequently
as publications authored by scientists working at a single institution or within a single country [2], [3]. Moreover, scholarship reveals that multiinstitutional collaboration, particularly collaborations that involve institutions in different nations, also increased citation rate [2], [4], [5].
Reviewing overall science and engineering publications in 2008, 43% of internationally co-authored papers included US-based researchers.
Germany and the UK shared the next highest percentage, with 19% each [1]. While Germany shares the second highest percentage of stem cell
publications, Germany's stem cell policy is similar to US policy from 2001 to 2008, with restrictions on human embryonic stem cell (hESC)
research based on the time the cells were derived [6]. In contrast to the US, the UK has a more permissive approach within a highly detailed
regulatory system. The UK and US were therefore selected for this study due to their policy differences and high frequency of collaborations.
Examining the impact of collaboration in these two countries will highlight the effects of disparate policy
regimes on scientific research. Due to policy disparities between nations and extant international research networks, stem cell
research is the ideal research area for a study of the impact of international collaboration. Stem cell
research—embryonic, cord blood, adult, and induced pluripotent (iPS)—has the potential to revolutionize medicine and
provide scientists with an improved understanding of cell development and specialization. Prior studies of
stem cell research in the Middle East suggest that international collaborations resulted in stem cell publications with a higher citation rate than
articles published by a single nation from the region [7]. However, no studies of collaborations in stem cell research have been conducted on
publications with co-authors from two of the leading countries in this field, the US and the UK. Potential
stem cell therapies offer
the promise of possible treatments for debilitating injuries, e.g., spinal cord and brain trauma, and cures for
debilitating diseases and conditions such as Parkinson's disease, diabetes, and blindness [8], [9]. At the same time, progress on
hESC research in the US, in particular, is limited by policy restrictions and political uncertainties. For these
reasons, stem cell research presents a unique opportunity not only to study international collaboration per se, but collaboration under very
different policy regimes. Research from the US and the UK involving hESCs is conducted under quite different legislative policies. US
policy
on stem cell research has developed sporadically, has historically been more inhibitive than supportive, and
has included only federal government funding of the research. By contrast, UK policy has developed in a more permissive, although highly
regulated, manner [10]–[12]. Since 1978, following the first successful in vitro fertilization (IVF) birth, the UK has progressively built upon its
policy. The first set of recommendations governing embryo research appeared in the Warnock Report, which was released in 1984 [13]. This
report encouraged regulated embryo research. It also limited embryo research to the first 14 days of development, a standard now applied
worldwide. In 1990, legislation to regulate embryo research, the Human Fertilization and Embryology (HFE) Act, was passed in the UK. This
established the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA), which monitors and grants licenses for all embryo research, regardless of
the source of funding [14]. As science progressed, the UK revised the HFE Act in 2001 and 2008 to take into account scientific advances such as
the creation of the first hESC line [15]. In 2003, in order to provide storage for hESC lines created using HFEA licenses, the UK also launched the
UK Stem Cell Bank. The UK has identified new funds specifically for stem cell research, apparently with little controversy [16]. It has also
encouraged international collaborations through its commonwealth offices. In contrast to the UK, the
US has been slow to adopt a
comprehensive human embryo policy. In 1978, President Carter established the Ethics Advisory Board to monitor embryonic
research, but after the election of President Reagan, the board never met and never approved a single project [10]. The board was eventually
dismantled by the Clinton administration, which planned to provide funding for human embryo research. However, while the Clinton policy was
being put in place, Congress
passed the Dickey-Wicker amendment. This amendment, which has been added to the
funding bill for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) each year since 1995, forbids the use of federal funds for research in
which a human embryo is destroyed or subjected to risk of injury or death [17]. The amendment also
bans federal funding for the creation of hESC cell lines, which were first derived in 1998, four years after the amendment
was enacted. NIH carefully studied the Dickey-Wicker amendment and determined that it would permit funding of hESC research on stem cell
lines derived from donated IVF embryos supported by non-federal funds. However, before any such research could be funded, Clinton left
office. Limited hESC research funded by the federal government was allowed under President G.W. Bush, but only for lines created before
August 9, 2001 (21 hESC lines) [18]. In 2009, under the Obama administration, federal funding for stem cell lines created after August 9, 2001,
became available to researchers, but under strict guidelines. It
is still not possible to use federal funds for the derivation
of hESC lines regardless of the method used. In the US, there is no restriction on hESC research or even reproductive cloning as
long as no federal funds are involved. Any potential stem cell therapy, however, requires demonstration of safety and efficacy and final
approval by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The
lack of a coherent approach and set of policies for human
embryo and hESC research in the US has resulted in the most recent policy crisis. On August 23, 2010, US District
Judge Royce Lamberth ruled that the Dickey-Wicker amendment prohibited federal funding of any hESC for
research [19]. This decision translated into an immediate injunction halting research at the NIH (both intramural and extramural research)
and impacted grant decisions worth $140 million [20]. Approximately two weeks later, on September 9, 2010, a federal appeals court lifted the
injunction and agreed to listen to arguments for and against the ban. The
court still has not ruled on the case itself. With
policy implications ranging from a permanent injunction or ban of hESC research to possible congressional
legislation explicitly permitting federal funding of hESC, the current precarious nature of hESC research
in the United States highlights the difficulties scientists face and serves as a possible barrier to
international collaborations involving US researchers. In addition to policy disparities among nations, a second
aspect of stem cell research that makes it an ideal research area for the study of international
collaborations is its intrinsically international nature. This is evident in the various existing organizations that facilitate the
exchange of research findings and policy information, e.g., the International Society for Stem Cell Research (www.isscr.org), the International
Stem Cell Forum (www.stem-cell-forum.net), and the International Consortium of Stem Cell Networks (www.stemcellconsortium.org). These
international organizations formed while the field was still young. This presents the opportunity to study
a field that is characterized by high levels of international collaborative research from the start.
Federal funding prohibitions cause brain drain of tech companies and scientists- devastates US
hegemony
Medina 8 (Joanne, J.D. candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred
2008. “ Is Stem Cell Research a One-Way Ticket to the Island of Dr. Moreau? Singapore and the United
States' Differing Paths” 21 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 125 2008 pg. lexis)
The federal policy has had a substantial impact on the U.S. biotechnology industry and the economy. "
9 It has caused many research delays, putting American researchers at a disadvantage compared to
researchers in other countries. The policy also causes "brain drain" and loss of tax revenues for the United States. 2 if
the United States continues to lag in stem cell research, Americans too will be impacted by the current policy because it is
probable that they will have to wait longer and pay more for the therapies the result from stem cell research.' 22 A. Obstacles in
Research Threaten the United States Position as World-Leader in Biotechnology Although the first human embryonic
stem cells were isolated in the United States, the majority of new embryonic stem cell lines are now being created
overseas. This is a concrete sign that the United States is losing its position as world leader in
biotechnology, specifically, in stem cell research.'24 When President Bush prohibited federal funding of research using human embryonic stem
cell lines created after August 9, 2001, the NIH thought that there would be more than sixty available stem cell lines for research. 5 Today,
however, it is clear that there
are only twenty-two usable cell lines eligible for federal funding.26 And this
number will only decrease as the cell lines age.127 With each division of the stem cells, the likelihood of genetic mutations in
the stem cell line is increased.' In contrast, there are over 100 newly-derived cell lines available to the world's
researchers that are off-limits to U.S. researchers receiving federal funding. 2 9 The off-limits stem cell lines
created since President Bush's announcement include some cells that are easier to use and cells that are tailored for the study of a particular
disease. 30 Some of the new stem cell lines are also safer for patients because all of the stem cell lines that currently qualify for federal funding
are grown on a layer of mouse cells. 3' The layer of mouse cells, called a "feeder layer," nourishes the human cells, but it makes the cell lines
unsuitable for use on humans because they could transmit mouse-borne viruses."' The mouse cells could also lead to an immune response and
rejection when used on humans.' 3 Laboratories in Singapore recently isolated stem cells lines that used human skin cells instead of mouse cells
as a feeder layer.3 4 In contrast, only one American laboratory has accomplished this-Susan Fisher's California laboratory.'35 Fisher's laboratory
does not receive federal funding due to its work on ineligible stem cell lines and is partly funded by the California-based biotech Geron Corp.
36 None of these new stem cell lines, including Fisher's, can be used by American researchers who are
receiving federal funding.'37 As overseas laboratories continue to develop new stem cell lines, they are
learning more from each new line.'38 Human embryonic stem cells are generally difficult to work with and handle.'39 By deriving
each new stem cell, a researcher gains new insight on the stem cell biology and this allows the researcher to gain some new practical skill.' 40
Scientists overseas and privately-funded American scientists are making advances that they can share
freely with each other, but they cannot share these advancements with federally-funded American
scientists. '4' The result is that, with each new line, federally-funded American researchers fall further
behind.'42 The end result of the U.S. federal policy is that American researchers are being placed at a disadvantage to their overseas
counterparts. 143 For many countries and foreign scientists, the U.S. restrictions on stem cell research
represent an opportunity for their biotechnological programs to benefit.'" Governments around the world are
recognizing this opportunity, and a number of them, including Singapore, are capitalizing on it.'45 As a result, Singapore is emerging as a
powerhouse in the biotechnological field.'46 B. Brain Drain of Top U.S. Researchers and Scientists Many
of the world's top scientific
researchers work at universities in the United States, but due to the federal policy, they are largely
unable to work on human embryonic stem cells and are thus unable to move forward with their
research. '47 The federal policy severely constrains the research because scientists are unable to work with newly-created stem cell lines,
which are easier to work with and are safer for use in humans.'4 1 In addition, access to the stem cell lines that are federallyapproved is a slow and frustrating process, causing huge delays in research. 49 Universities are similarly
affected, as they are likely to have more difficulty attracting foreign scientists interested in stem cell
research.'50 Researchers who might otherwise be interested in the field are avoiding it because of the
risk of an uncertain future. 5' And some scientists worry younger scientists, who do not' have an established laboratory in the
United States, will move abroad to study stem cells. 2 Others researchers have moved, or plan to move, their laboratories to
countries, like Singapore, with less restrictive regulations on stem cell research.'53 The current global exchange in the field of biotechnology
makes it easier for those subject to restrictive regulations in one venue to move to another less restrictive venue. 54 This phenomenon is often
referred to as legal or regulatory arbitrage, where "those subject to the law of any one national jurisdiction may alter the location of their
activities in order to take advantage of the legal [or regulatory] difference."'55 Researchers
and pharmaceutical companies
may choose to operate in a particular venue due to the greater legal protection the venue provides, for
example, through strong patent law protection. 1 6 Likewise, they may choose a venue based on laws
that are favorable to their endeavor, such as, laws that allow human embryonic stem cell research.5 7
The decision on where to establish a base of operations may also involve non-legal decisions, such as skill of the labor force, availability of
funding, and confidence in the financial systems.'58 Singapore consciously made regulatory decisions that encourage scientific research and
innovation as a means to their goal of becoming a global hub for biomedical research. 59 With the help of generous salaries, lofty titles, and
favorable laws, Singapore's Biopolis is seeing an influx of big names from all over the world, including from the United States.' 6° Luminaries
currently working at Biopolis include Dr. Edison Liu, who was the former Director of Clinical Science at the U.S. National Cancer Institute; 6' Alan
Colman, the British Nobel laureate whowas part of the group that cloned Dolly the sheep;' 2 and Neal G. Copeland and Nancy A. Jenkins, the
prominent American husband-and-wife cancer research team. 63 Singapore is driven to attract top researchers from around the world to help
in the effort to expand its scientific infrastructure and in so doing, has become internationally competitive in the field of biotechnology. '6 4 In
Singapore, researchers are provided an attractive environment for research with new laboratories and plenty of funding, and there is less
governmental scrutiny than in the United States.' 65 Singapore has taken advantage of the U.S. federal policy by anticipating and meeting the
demands that such policies create. 6 Economic growth depends on science because science leads to technology,and technology leads to
productivity. 67 The
current U.S. policy restricting human embryonic stem cell research is harming the
vitality of the U.S. economy by slowing down the scientific research of this field. 68 The current policy also has
other more direct effects on the economy.' 69 First, the current policy is a factor in the decision of many companies to
leave the United States and move offshore. 7° Second, it deters private investment in the biotechnology
field.' 7' Third, the prohibition of use of federal funds for research with ineligible stem cell lines causes
costly duplication of work, equipment, and facilities for researchers receiving both federal and private funds."' The current
policy puts the United States behind other countries, including Singapore, in the science of stem cell
research. 73 Although knowledge flows in the global scientific community, the people who actually do
the research gain a better and deeper understanding of the science than those who merely read about it in a scientific
journal.'74 Scientists are hopeful that stem cell research will lead to technology in the form of therapies and cures for various diseases.'75
These therapies
and cures could potentially result in major business development in the near future once
they go into main production.'76 If major breakthroughs occur in other countries, it may be difficult for
American scientists to keep pace with the discovering countries and the new technology may not be readily available to American
scientists. Another direct effect of the current policy is that some biotech and pharmaceutical companies are leaving the
United States.'7 7 Companies that find the current policy too restrictive are moving offshore to do their research.'78 This movement
offshore has a real effect on the U.S. economy. 79 When the companies move, they take with them
revenues, tax dollars, and jobs.'80 "In 2001, biotech companies nationally reported net sales of $567 billion, operating income of
$100.5 billion, capital expenditures of $29.5 billion and the employment of approximately 1.1 million people."' 8' This movement
offshore not only affects the biotech industry, but also affects other industries, such as financial institutions,
marketing firms, construction, and legal services, causing a ripple effect in the economy.'8 2 The current U.S. policy also
deters investment in biotechnology by private enterprises'83 and hinders the formation of
partnerships between countries.184 The current policy effectively leaves the regulation of stem cell
research to the individual states. '85 This type of policy makes for a fragmented and unstable
environment that is not attractive to enterprises and investors. 86 The federal policy also prohibits
researchers working on ineligible stem cell lines from using federally funded facilities.187 This wastes
resources because the states have to build separate laboratories to conduct such research.' 88 Eighty-six
percent of state funding for stem cell research has gone to building facilities, purchasing equipment,
and training scientists. 89 In contrast, Singapore launched a biotechnology initiative in 2000, which encourages scientific research,
including stem cell research.' 9 To attract pharmaceutical companies, Singapore is using the same combination of land subsidies, '9' tax
holidays, and incentives it used in the past to attract the world's biggest electronics manufacturers.' 92 Companies like Merck, Pfizer, and
Shering- Plough have set up shop in Singapore and now generate $11.4 billion in annual revenue, which accounts for 5 percent of Singapore's
economy. 1 3 Singapore wants the pharmaceutical companies not only to make drugs, but to conduct drug research and development as well.
94 To persuade the pharmaceutical companies to conduct the research and development, Singapore offered land subsidies 95 and subsidized
up to thirty percent of their building costs. 196 More than thirty companies responded including the Swiss drug company Novartis, which
opened the Institute for Tropical Diseases in Singapore to develop drugs against tuberculosis and the dengue virus. 97
Science competitiveness is the critical component to hegemony- technological innovation in biotech
key
Kay 13 4/3 - Robson Professor of Politics and Government and Chair, International Studies at Ohio
Wesleyan University and Mershon Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at
the Ohio State University. His most recent book is Global Security in the Twenty-first Century: The Quest
for Power and the Search ¶ for Peace, 2nd ed. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) ( To cite this article: Sean
Kay (2013): America's Sputnik Moments, Survival: Global Politics and¶ Strategy, 55:2, 123-146)bs
Failure to adjust to repeated shocks to the system has led to strategic ¶ paralysis at a key moment of
systemic international change. America’s ¶ economic position has been falling since the turn of the century
relative ¶ to China, whose economic capacity has been growing rapidly and consistently. In fact, as University of Chicago Professor Robert Pape
the decline in America’s share of the gross world ¶ product is only surpassed in modern history
by that of Russia ¶ after the collapse of the Soviet Union.21 A crucial element of ¶ this trend can be
measured in terms of US decline in world ¶ export share of high-tech manufactured goods, which fell ¶
between 1995 and 2008 from 21% to 14%.22 The irony of this ¶ trend is that many of the key elements that led to
America’s ¶ rise in power after Sputnik proved to be among the least expensive. The total amount of US
funding for federal research and ¶ development between the 1960s and 2010 ranged between a scant
0.2% and ¶ 0.6% of American GDP.23 Meanwhile, Europe and China have made continued growth in state
funding for research and development a priority while ¶ America has stayed flat. The Battelle Memorial Institute
notes that, while in ¶ 2013 China’s overall investment in research and development is half that of ¶ the United
States, its ongoing and projected growth would see it surpass ¶ America by 2023; China and India have been
increasing investment annually by about 10% or more. Meanwhile, Battelle notes, the United States cut ¶ its federal funding for
research and development in 2012 by 1.4%.24 Since the ¶ 1950s, the relationship between federal (then the
dominant role) and industry for research and development has inverted – and within the federal ¶
allocations, by 2007, 75.5% was allocated to two areas of which 49.9% went ¶ to the Department of
Defense and 25.5% to the National Institute of Health. ¶ Only 3.1% went to DARPA and 0.3% to the Department of
Education, which has the overall responsibility for generating the future workforce for areas ¶ in science,
technology, engineering and math skills.25¶ Rather than becoming a topic for debate and reflection, this relative ¶
decline has for the most part become a no-go area in US political discourse, ¶ as if to even acknowledge the issue is
to somehow show weakness. The irony ¶ of the the presence of global competition, a nation should be strong ¶ in all
the facets of technical innovation and should have available a continuously renewed base of knowledge
to inform its decisions and those of its ¶ citizens’.26 In early 2001, the Hart–Rudman Commission (after its co-chairs, ¶ former
Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman) noted that the entire institutional basis of American national security was ‘in
decline and must be ¶ rebuilt’ or the United States risked ‘losing its global influence and critical ¶
leadership role’. The commission surveyed a range of threats, including ¶ catastrophic terrorist attacks against the
United States, and concluded that¶ the key factor driving change in America’s national security
environment ¶ over the next 25 years will be the acceleration of scientific discovery and its ¶
technological applications, and the uneven human social and psychological ¶ capacity to harness them …
Synergistic developments in information ¶ technology, materials science, biotechnology, and
nanotechnology will ¶ almost certainly transform human tools more dramatically and rapidly ¶ than at
any time in human history.27¶ The authors added that ‘second only to a weapon of mass destruction ¶ detonating in an American
city, we can think of nothing more dangerous than a failure to manage properly science, technology, and
education ¶ for the common good over the next quarter century’. At the core of their concern were
declining incentives for qualified people to work in science ¶ and technology education and
underperformance of qualified Americans ¶ who were able to work in areas of math, science and
engineering. The study ¶ recommended doubling federal investment range of challenges, internal and external, which confront American ¶
¶ has shown,
strategic decision-making is that there have been solid recommendations on ¶ how to right the course available for well over a decade.
American decisionmakers have had more than enough warning time, but when they have ¶ invested,
they have largely ignored or undersupplied areas which could ¶ have both addressed immediate security
concerns and laid a new platform ¶ for sustained American competitiveness. In 1997, the National Science Board ¶
stated that ‘in in science and technology ¶ research and development by 2010, to about $160bn. It emphasised that ‘the ¶ American education
system needs to produce significantly more scientists ¶ and engineers, including four times the current number of computer scientists’ and to
achieve this ‘more than 240,000 new and qualified science and ¶ mathematics teachers are needed in our K–12 [primary and secondary
education] classrooms over the next decade (out of a total need for an estimated ¶ 2.2 million new teachers)’.¶
1AC 2
Warming causes extinction- only genetic biotechnology applications solve adaptation and
bioengineered pathogen release
Baum and Wilson 13 (Seth D. Baum* and Grant S. Wilson Global Catastrophic Risk Institute * ‘The Ethics
of Global Catastrophic Risk from Dual-Use Bioengineering’ Ethics in Biology, Engineering and Medicine,
4(1):59-72 (2013). Pg lexis)
Note: “GCR”: Global Catastrophic Risk
In addition to itself being a GCR, bioengineering
can also reduce the chances that other GCRs will occur. One such
GCR is climate change. Catastrophic climate change scenarios could involve sea level rise of up to 10 meters,
droughts, increased extreme weather events, loss of most threatened and endangered species, and temperature increases
of 6 degrees Celsius.37 Still worse than that would be outcomes in which large portions of the land surface on Earth
become too warm for mammals (including humans) to survive.38 And the worst scenario could involve climate engineering
backfiring to result in extremely rapid temperature increase.39 6 Despite the risks of climate change, the international community
has struggled to satisfactorily address the issue, for a variety of political, technological, and economical reasons.
Bioengineering may be able to help. An army of bioengineered algae that is specifically designed to
convert carbon dioxide into a “biocrude” fuel ready to be made into fuel for any vehicle type – a technology
that Craig Venter’s Synthetic Genomics, Inc. is developing with a $600 million investment from ExxonMobil – could remove
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and provide a plentiful, carbon-neutral fuel source that does not
pose many of the downsides of today’s biofuel options (although this technology has its own risks).40 Or, despite being a bizarre proposition,
humans could be genetically engineered to reduce our CO2 output, such as by engineering humans to
be intolerant to meat or to be smaller in size.41 Likewise, while a deadly bioengineered virus has the
potential to escape from a laboratory and cause a global catastrophe, such research may be necessary to
create vaccines for viruses that could cause worldwide pandemics. For example, the Influenza Pandemic of 19181919 (the Spanish flu) killed about 50 million people worldwide.42 Would modern bioengineering technology have been
able to avoid this global catastrophe? In fact, researchers justified the airborne H5N1 virus, discussed above, as helping to
prevent the spread of a similar strain that could mutate naturally. Overall, there is a dynamic relationship between bioengineering and other
GCRs that should be assessed when considering how to respond to these risks.
Its anthro
Powell ‘13 (science author. He has been a college and museum president and was a member of the
National Science Board for 12 years, appointed first by President Reagan and then by President George
H. W. Bush (Jim, “Consensus: 99.84% of Peer-Reviewed Articles Support the Idea of Global
Warming,” http://thecontributor.com/why-climate-deniers-have-no-scientific-credibility-one-pie-chart,
2/25/13)
The gold standard of
science is the peer-reviewed literature. If there is disagreement among scientists, based not on opinion but on hard evidence, it will be found in the peerPolls show that many members of the public believe scientists substantially disagree about human-caused global warming.
reviewed literature. I searched the Web of Science for peer-reviewed scientific articles published between January 1, 1991 and November 9, 2012 that have the keyword
phrases "global warming" or "global climate change." The search produced 13,950 articles. See my methodology. I read whatever combination of titles, abstracts, and entire
articles necessary to identify articles that "reject" human-caused global warming. To be classified as rejecting, an article had to clearly and explicitly state that the theory of
global warming is false or, as happened in a few cases, that some other process better explains the observed warming. Articles that merely claimed to have found some
discrepancy, some minor flaw, some reason for doubt, I did not classify as rejecting global warming. Articles about methods, paleoclimatology, mitigation, adaptation, and
effects at least implicitly accept human-caused global warming and were usually obvious from the title alone. John Cook and Dana Nuccitelli also reviewed and assigned some
of these articles; Cook provided invaluable technical expertise. This work follows that of Oreskes (Science, 2005) who searched for articles published between 1993 and 2003
with the keyword phrase “global climate change.” She found 928, read the abstracts of each and classified them. None rejected human-caused global warming. Using her
criteria and time-span, I get the same result. Deniers attacked Oreskes and her findings, but they have held up. Some articles on global warming may use other keywords, for
out
of 13,950 peer-reviewed articles published on global warming since 1991, only 23, or 0.16 percent, clearly reject global warming or
endorse a cause other than CO2 emissions for observed warming. The list of articles that reject global warming is here. The 23
articles have been cited a total of 112 times over the nearly 21-year period, for an average of close to 5 citations each. That compares to
example, “climate change” without the "global" prefix. But there is no reason to think that the proportion rejecting global warming would be any higher. By my definition,
an average of about 19 citations for articles answering to "global warming," for example. Four of the rejecting articles have never been cited; four have citations in the double-
had any of these articles presented the magic bullet that falsifies
human-caused global warming, that article would be on its way to becoming one of the most-cited in the history
of science. The articles have a total of 33,690 individual authors. The top 10 countries represented, in order, are USA, England, China, Germany, Japan, Canada,
Australia, France, Spain, and Netherlands. (The chart shows results through November 9, 2012.) Global warming deniers often claim that bias
prevents them from publishing in peer-reviewed journals. But 23 articles in 18 differentjournals, collectively making
several different arguments against global warming, expose that claim as false. Articles rejecting global warming can be published, but those that have
digits. The most-cited has 17. Of one thing we can be certain:
been have earned little support or notice, even from other deniers. A few deniers have become well known from newspaper interviews, Congressional hearings, conferences of
climate change critics, books, lectures, websites and the like. Their names are conspicuously rare among the authors of the rejecting articles. Like those authors, the
deniers
have no evidence that falsifies
warming.
prominent
must
global
Anyone can repeat this search and post their findings. Another reviewer
would likely have slightly different standards than mine and get a different number of rejecting articles. But no one will be able to reach a different conclusion, for only one
Within science, global warming denial has virtually no influence. Its influence is instead on
a misguided media, politicians all-too-willing to deny science for their own gain, and a gullible public. Scientists do not disagree about humancaused global warming. It is the ruling paradigm of climate science, in the same way that plate tectonics
is the ruling paradigm of geology. We know that continents move. We know that the earth is warming and that human emissions of greenhouse
gases are the primary cause. These are known facts about which virtually all publishing scientists agree.
conclusion is possible:
Bioengineered pathogen release causes extinction
Mhyrvold 13 – Nathan Myhrvold founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief
technology officer of Microsoft Corporation. During his 14 years at Microsoft, Nathan founded Microsoft
Research and numerous technology groups. He has always been an avid inventor. To date, he has been
awarded hundreds of patents and has hundreds of patents pending. Before joining Microsoft, Nathan
was a postdoctoral fellow in the department of applied mathematics and theoretical physics at
Cambridge University, and he worked with Professor Stephen Hawking. He earned a doctorate in
theoretical and mathematical physics and a master's degree in mathematical economics from Princeton
University, and he also has a master's degree in geophysics and space physics and a bachelor's degree in
mathematics from UCLA. (“Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action”, July 2013,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2290382)
Even more so than with nuclear weapons, the
cost and technical difficulty of producing biological arms has dropped
precipitously in recent decades with the boom in industrial molecular biology. A small team of people with the necessary technical training
and some cheap equipment can create weapons far more terrible than any nuclear bomb. Indeed, even a single individual might do so. Taken
together, these trends utterly undermine the lethality-versus-cost curve that existed throughout all of human history.
Access to extremely lethal agents—even to those that may exterminate the human race—will be available to nearly anybody. Access to mass
death has been democratized; it has spread from a small elite of superpower leaders to nearly anybody with modest resources. Even the leader
of a ragtag, stateless group hiding in a cave—or in a Pakistani suburb—can potentially have “the button.” Turning Life Against the Living The
first and simplest kinds of biological weapons are those that are not contagious and thus do not lead to epidemics. These have been developed
for use in military conflicts for most of the 20th century. Because the pathogens used are not contagious, they are considered controllable: that
is, they have at least some of the command-and-control aspects of a conventional weapon. Typically, these pathogens have been
“weaponized,” meaning bred or refined for deployment by using artillery shells, aerial bombs, or missiles much like conventional explosive
warheads. They can be highly deadly. Anthrax is the most famous example. In several early- 20th-century outbreaks, it killed nearly 90% of
those infected by inhaling bacterial spores into their lungs. Anthrax was used in the series of mail attacks in the United States in the fall of 2001.
Even with advanced antibiotic treatment, 40% of those who contracted inhalational anthrax died during the 2001 attacks.1 That crime is
believed to have been the work of a lone bioweapons scientist who sought to publicize the threat of a biological attack and boost funding for
his work on anthrax vaccines. This conclusion is consistent with the fact that virtually no effort was made to disperse the bacterium— indeed,
the letters carrying the spores thoughtfully included text warning of anthrax exposure and recommending that the recipient seek immediate
treatment. Despite this intentional effort to limit rather than spread the infection, a surprising amount of trouble was caused when the fine
anthrax powder leaked from envelopes and contaminated other mail. Before this episode, nobody would have guessed that letters mailed in
New Jersey to addresses in Manhattan and Washington, D.C., could kill someone in Connecticut, but they did. And no one would have predicted
that a domestic bioterrorist launching multiple attacks, including one against the U.S. Congress, would elude the FBI for years. But that is what
happened. What if such an attack were made not by some vigilante trying to alert the world to the dangers of bioweapons but instead by a real
sociopath? Theodore J. Kaczynski, better known as the “Unabomber,” may have been such a person. He was brilliant enough to earn a Ph.D. in
mathematics from the University of Michigan yet was mentally disturbed enough to be a one-man terrorist cell: His mail bombs claimed victims
over nearly two decades. Kaczynski certainly had enough brains to use sophisticated methods, but because he opposed advanced technology,
he made untraceable low-tech bombs that killed only three people. A future Kaczynski with training in microbiology and genetics, and an
eagerness to use the destructive power of that science, could be a threat to the entire human race. Indeed, the world has already experienced
some true acts of biological terror. Aum Shinrikyo produced botulinum toxin and anthrax and reportedly released them in Tokyo on four
separate occasions. A variety of technical and organizational difficulties frustrated these attacks, which did not cause any casualties and went
unrecognized at the time for what they were, until the later Sarin attack clued in the authorities.2 Had the group been a bit more competent,
things could have turned out far worse. One 2003 study found that an airborne release of one kilogram of an anthrax-spore-containing aerosol
in a city the size of New York would result in 1.5 million infections and 123,000 to 660,000 fatalities, depending on the effectiveness of the
public health response.3 A 1993 U.S. government analysis determined that 100 kilograms of weaponized anthrax, if sprayed from an airplane
upwind of Washington, D.C., would kill between 130,000 and three million people.4 Because anthrax spores remain viable in the environment
for more than 30 years,1 portions of a city blanketed by an anthrax cloud might have to be abandoned for years while extensive cleaning was
done. Producing enough anthrax to kill 100,000 Americans is far easier to do—and far harder to detect—than is constructing a nuclear bomb of
comparable lethality. Anthrax, moreover, is rather benign as biological weapons go. The pathogen is reasonably well understood, having been
studied in one form or another in biowarfare circles for more than 50 years. Natural strains of the bacterium are partially treatable with long
courses of common antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin if the medication is taken sufficiently quickly, and vaccination soon after exposure seems to
reduce mortality further.5 But bioengineered anthrax that is resistant to both antibiotics and vaccines is known to have been produced in both
Soviet and American bioweapons laboratories. In 1997, a group of Russian scientists even openly published the recipe for one of these
superlethal strains in a scientific journal.6 In addition, numerous other agents are similar to anthrax in that they are highly lethal but not
contagious. The lack of contagion means that an attacker must administer the pathogen to the people he wishes to infect. In a military context,
this quality is generally seen as a good thing because the resulting disease can be contained in a specific area. Thus, the weapon can be directed
at a well-defined target, and with luck, little collateral damage will result. Unfortunately, many
biological agents are
communicable and so can spread beyond the people initially infected to affect the entire population. Infectious pathogens are
inherently hard to control because there is usually no reliable way to stop an epidemic once it starts. This property makes such biological
agents difficult to use as conventional weapons. A nation that starts an epidemic may see it spread to the wrong country—or even to its own
people. Indeed, one cannot target a small, well-defined population with a contagious pathogen; by its nature, such a pathogen may infect the
entire human race. Despite this rather severe drawback, both the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as Imperial Japan, investigated
and produced contagious bioweapons. The logic was that their use in a military conflict would be limited to last-ditch, “scorched earth”
campaigns, perhaps with a vaccine available only to one side. Smallpox is the most famous example. It is highly contagious and spreads through
casual contact. Smallpox was eradicated in the wild in 1977, but it still exists in both U.S. and Russian laboratories, according to official
statements.7 Unofficial holdings are harder to track, but a number of countries, including North Korea, are believed to possess covert smallpox
cultures. Biological weapons were strictly regulated by international treaty in 1972. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed not to
develop such weapons and to destroy existing stocks. The United States stopped its bioweapons work, but the Russians cheated and kept a
huge program going into the 1990s, thereby producing thousands of tons of weaponized anthrax, smallpox, and far more exotic biological
weapons based on genetically engineered viruses. No one can be certain how far either the germs or the knowledge has spread since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Experts estimate that a large-scale, coordinated smallpox attack on the United States might kill 55,000 to 110,000
people, assuming that sufficient vaccine is available to contain the epidemic and that the vaccine works.8, 9 The death toll may be far higher if
the smallpox strain has been engineered to be vaccine-resistant or to have enhanced virulence. Moreover, a smallpox attack on the United
States could easily broaden into a global pandemic, despite the U.S. stockpile of at least 300 million doses of vaccine. All it would take is for one
infected person to leave the country and travel elsewhere. If New York City were attacked with smallpox, infections would most likely appear
on every continent, except perhaps Antarctica, within two weeks. Once these beachheads were established, the epidemic would spread almost
without check because the vaccine in world stockpiles and the infrastructure to distribute it would be insufficient. That is particularly true in the
developing world, which is ill equipped to handle their current disease burden to say nothing of a return of smallpox. Even if “only” 50,000
people were killed in the United States, a million or more would probably die worldwide before the disease could be contained, and
containment would probably require many years of effort. As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the worst attack one
can imagine, for several reasons. First, most of the classic bioweapons are based on 1960s and 1970s technology because the 1972 treaty
halted bioweapons development efforts in the United States and most other Western countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly
committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were never on the cutting edge of biological research. Third and most
important, the science and technology of molecular biology have made enormous advances, utterly transforming
the field in the last few decades. High school biology students routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations that would have been
impossible even for the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biological-weapons research. The biowarfare methods of the
1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as the lumbering mainframe computers of that era. Tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly
bugs to choose from. Consider this sobering development: in
2001, Australian researchers working on mousepox, a
a simple genetic modification
nonlethal virus that infects mice (as chickenpox does in humans), accidentally discovered that
transformed the virus.10, 11 Instead of producing mild symptoms, the new virus killed 60% of even those mice already immune to the
naturally occurring strains of mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any existing vaccine or antiviral drug. A team of
researchers at Saint Louis University led by Mark Buller picked up on that work and, by late 2003, found a way to improve on it: Buller’s
variation on mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of investigators also devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were
partially effective in protecting animals from the engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that the genetically altered virus is no longer
contagious. Of course, it is quite possible that future tinkering with the virus will change that property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that
the genetic modifications Buller made to mousepox would work for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as well. Might the
same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus that infects humans to be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is
resistant to any known antiviral therapy? I’ve asked this question of experts many times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation
couldn’t be done. This case is just one example. Many
more are pouring out of scientific journals and conferences every
year. Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial study done at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in which
virologists enumerated the changes one would need to make to a highly lethal strain of bird flu to make it easily
transmitted from one mammal to another.14 Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential
threats. Nor is it clear that anyone is even trying. In addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played with, given
that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is
contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the
virus harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV, which is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and many other
viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that HIV can take years to progress to AIDS,
which can then take many more years to kill the victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to
infect others. This property has allowed HIV to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately 34 million people are now living with
this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say,
only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV . It could
silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because
most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a
virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and
publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near
future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a
detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research
was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to
molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech
remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern
biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race— or at least of killing a sufficient
number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of
technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these
tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern
biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing
mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody
with a solid background in biology, terrorists included. The 9/11 attacks involved at least four pilots, each of whom had sufficient education to
enroll in flight schools and complete several years of training. Bin Laden had a degree in civil engineering. Mohammed Atta attended a German
university, where he earned a master’s degree in urban planning—not a field he likely chose for its relevance to terrorism. A
future set of
terrorists could just as easily be students of molecular biology who enter their studies innocently enough but later put their
skills to homicidal use. Hundreds of universities in Europe and Asia have curricula sufficient to train people in the skills necessary to make a
sophisticated biological weapon, and hundreds more in the United States accept students from all over the world. Thus it seems likely that
sometime in the near future a small band of terrorists, or even a single misanthropic individual, will overcome our best defenses and do
something truly terrible, such as fashion a bioweapon that could kill millions or even billions of people. Indeed, the
creation of such
weapons within the next 20 years seems to be a virtual certainty. The repercussions of their use are hard to estimate.
One approach is to look at how the scale of destruction they may cause compares with that of other calamities that the human race has faced.
Extinction inevitable- try or die for sustainable GM food production
Trewavas 2000 [Anthony, Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology – University of Edinburgh, “GM Is the
Best Option We Have”, AgBioWorld, 6-5, http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotechart/best_option.html]
But these are foreign examples; global warming is the problem that requires the UK to develop GM technology. 1998 was the warmest year in the last one thousand
years. Many think global warming will simply lead to a wetter climate and be benign. I do not. Excess rainfall in northern seas has been predicted to halt the Gulf
Stream. In this situation, average UK temperatures would fall by 5 degrees centigrade and give us Moscow-like winters. There are already worrying signs of salinity
changes in the deep oceans. Agriculture would be seriously damaged and necessitate the rapid development of new crop varieties to secure our food supply. We
would not have much warning. Recent detailed analyses of arctic ice cores has shown that the climate can switch between stable states in fractions of a decade.
Even if the climate is only wetter and warmer new crop pests and rampant disease will be the consequence. GM
technology can enable new
crops to be constructed in months and to be in the fields within a few years. This is the unique benefit GM offers. The UK populace needs to
much more positive about GM or we may pay a very heavy price. In 535A.D. a volcano near the present Krakatoa exploded with the force of
200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least
two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population
survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the
planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our
environment. There are apparently 100
such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. And
even smaller volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply. Our hold on this
planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would destroy much of our civilisation. Only those with
agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival. Colliding asteroids are
another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that technological advance may be the only buffer
between us and annihilation.
Food conflict guarantees nuclear war
Cribb 10 (Julian, the principal of Julian Cribb & Associates, specialists in science communication, 19962002 he was Director, National Awareness, for Australia’s national science agency, CSIRO, has received
32 awards for journalism including the Order of Australia Association Media Prize, fellow of the
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering. The Coming Famine: The Global Food
Crisis and what we can do to avoid it, University of California Press, 2010, p. 20)
The threat of conflict over food, land, and water is not, however, confined to the marginal world.
Increasingly it imperils the economic powerhouses of the global economy in the early twenty-first
century. In 2001 the Australian strategic analyst Alan Dupont predicted, “Food is destined to have greater strategic weight
and import in an era of environmental scarcity. While optimists maintain that the world is perfectly capable of meeting the
anticipated increases in demand for essential foodstuffs, there are enough imponderables to suggest that prudent
governments would not want to rely on such a felicitous outcome." Anticipating the food crisis of 2007-8 by several
years, he presciently added, "East Asia's rising demand for food and diminishing capacity to feed itself adds an
unpredictable new element to the global food equation for several reasons. The gap between production and
consumption of key foodstuffs globally is narrowing dangerously and needs to be reversed." Bearing out his words, Singapore president Lee
Hsieng Loong told a 2008 international defense conference, "In
the longer term, the trends towards tighter supplies and
higher prices will likely reassert themselves. This has serious security implications. The impact of a chronic food shortage will
be felt especially by the poor countries. The stresses from hunger and famine can easily result in social upheaval
and civil strife, exacerbating conditions that lead to failed states. Between countries, competition for
food supplies and displacement of people across borders could deepen tensions and provoke conflict
and wars."15
Genetic research key to biotech agriculture- solves food instability
Zilberman 14 (David Zilberman is a professor and holds the Robinson Chair in the Department of
Agricultural and Resource Economics at UC Berkeley. He is also a member of the Giannini Foundation of
Agricultural Economics. The research leading to this paper was supported by the Energy Biosciences
Institute and Cotton, Inc. The author thanks Scott Kaplan, Eunice Kim, and Angela Erickson for their
assistance. The Economics of Sustainable Development
http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/content/96/2/385.short)
The major applications of the new bioeconomy considered here include genetic modification, biofuels, and green chemistry. Genetic
modification has had a large range of applications in medicine and is a foundation of the fast-growing
medical biotechnology industry (Lebkowski et al. 2001). Agricultural biotechnology has also grown rapidly. However, the use of
genetically modified crops (GMOs) is a subject of restrictive regulation, and their utilization has been limited to four major crops (corn,
soybeans, cotton, and rapeseed). Furthermore, the
United States, Brazil, and Argentina are the major users of GM
technology in these four crops, and China and India have adopted GM cotton. In spite of its limited use,
GM technology already provides major benefits by increasing the estimated supply of corn and
soybeans by 13% and 20%, respectively, and reducing their estimated prices by 20% and 30%, respectively
(Barrows, Sexton, and Zilberman 2013). The adoption of GM varieties in Europe and Africa, and the expansion of its
use to major food crops like wheat and rice, is likely to significantly reduce the food price inflation seen
in recent years (Sexton and Zilberman 2011). Some of the key elements of the new bioeconomy are listed below, and include genetic
modification, and biofuels and developments in green chemistry. Genetic modification: Genetic modification of crops is a major
contributor to sustainable development. Existing GM varieties significantly reduce crop damage (Qaim and
Zilberman 2003), greenhouse gas emissions, and the footprint of agriculture (Barrows, Sexton, and Zilberman 2013).
Today GMOs are in their infancy, but they provide new and more precise means to improve crops and adapt to
changing conditions. New innovations instituted at various stages of developments are likely to increase the input use efficiency of
water and fertilizers in crop production and of grains as sources of animal feed. The development and adoption of these innovations has stalled
because of regulations (Bennett et al. 2013). Nonetheless, GMOs
improve the speed of development or modification of
crop varieties and thus can provide a means of adapting to climate change (Zilberman, Zhao, and Heiman 2012).
Biofuels: For millennia, wood, dung, and oils supplied energy for cooking, heating, and other functions. Here we refer to the agricultural
(broadly defined) production of feedstocks and their industrial processing for modern applications. Examples include the production of ethanol,
biodiesel, and wood chips to replace fossil fuels. The production of biofuels for transport fuel was motivated by the high price of oil and other
fuels, balance of trade considerations, and concerns about climate change (Rajagopal and Zilberman 2007). However, direct and indirect effects
on food prices (Zilberman et al. 2013) and the environment (greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation (Khanna and Crago 2012) raised
questions about biofuels. Yet liquid fuels have relative advantages in major applications and are most likely to be produced sustainably through
biofuels. Learning by doing in sugarcane and corn biofuels production has improved their environmental and economic performance (Khanna
and Crago 2012). Research on second and third generation biofuels is promising, and several will be produced on nonagricultural lands in the
foreseeable future (Youngs and Somerville 2012). The evolution of biofuels is dependent on policy, and the emergence of clean and efficient
biofuels is more likely to be followed by continued investment in research and appropriate pricing of carbon (Chen and Khanna 2013). The
future of biofuels is also affected by the future of GMOs. Policy changes that will enable the
introduction and large-scale adoption of GMO rice and wheat varieties, which will increase rice and
wheat yields by more than 10%, and the adoption of GM traits in Africa and Europe may reduce food
commodity prices and free up lands that will allow the adoption of sugarcane for biofuel in India and
other developing countries. Greater acceptance of transgenic technology is likely to increase its
utilization in biofuel feedstock production and improve the productivity of sugarcane, grasses, and trees considered for the
production of second-generation biofuels. The design of biofuel policy and the interaction of biofuels and biotechnology policies are
subjects for future research. Green chemistry (broadly defined): Green chemistry represents a transition from petroleum-based chemicals to
biomass-based chemicals (Clark, Luque, and Matharu 2012). Green chemistry emphasizes a reduction in the toxicity of outputs, recycling,
energy efficiency, and production of decomposable products with minimal waste. Its principles of operation are consistent with some of the
concepts associated with sustainable development elucidated above. The reliance on biomass suggests that the transition to green chemistry
will lead to a more spatially distributed network of bio-refineries instead of the highly centralized refinery systems in place today, suggesting
that the transition to green chemistry will be an engine for regional development. Increased reliance on plant and animal feedstocks will
enhance investment in bio-prospecting in order to discover new feedstocks and valuable chemicals. Research
to develop advanced
biotechnology methods and products will be crucial to the development of the bioeconomy. For example,
one of the impediments to using many crops as feedstocks is their high lignin content, and the development of varieties with lower lignin
content will reduce the cost and increase the range of products that can serve as feedstock for fuel and other applications.
The stem cell market is a major stepping stone for technological innovation- solves all impacts
Lane and Matthews 13 (Neal F. Lane, Ph.D. Senior Fellow in Science and Technology Policy Kirstin R.W.
Matthews, Ph.D. Fellow in Science and Technology Policy “2013 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION” http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/ab3a2eb0/STP-pubPolicyRecommendations.pdf)
Human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research is an emerging field of biomedical research that started in 1998 with the
derivation of the first cell line. Scientists look forward to the possibility that hESCs, along with other types of stem cells found in adults,
can advance research in areas as diverse as developmental biology, cancer research, and regenerative
medicine. Early in his administration, President Obama passed an executive order that directed NIH to develop new guidelines for regulating federally funded
hESC research.13 As with the previous administration, and consistent with the “Dickey-Wicker Amendment” appropriation rider, the NIH only funds research that
uses hESC lines previously approved by an ethics review committee and created through private funds. As of November 2012, there are 184 hESC lines eligible for
federal funding, a nine-fold increased from 21 lines in 2008. 14 Following the adoption of the new NIH guidelines, a lawsuit was brought against the federal
government, Sherley v. Sebelius, which challenged the new NIH guidelines. A
district court judge subsequently granted a
preliminary injunction halting all funding of hESC research at NIH. Ultimately, the injunction was dismissed as well as the case,
but scientists had already begun to question the sustainability of this type of research. During the past 15 years,
each presidential administration—Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and now Obama—have created their own stem cell
policies using executive orders. While there was consistency during each administration, the executive orders were altered
when a new president was elected. This inconsistency is negatively impacting stem cell research, causing
scientists to shy away from the field and making them unsure about the area’s funding future. Working
with Congress, the president should create new legislation that will make his 2009 executive order permanent. The law should: •
Support research on all types of human stem cells, including embryonic and adult. Rice University’s Baker Institute
• Authorize federal funding of hESC research on lines derived according to NIH ethical guidelines,
regardless of the date the cell lines were derived or created. • Clarify which research is eligible for
federal funding (i.e., research utilizing approved hESCs) and which research is not (i.e., the creation of hESC lines). This law would assure
scientists that federal policy would remain the same year-to-year and administration-toadministration. Conclusion Science and technology impact most areas of public policy, including domestic
and national security, energy and climate change, the environment, health and safety, agriculture,
transportation, education, and, of most immediate concern, the economy and jobs for Americans. From
federal investments in science and engineering R&D, particularly basic and applied research, we obtain new
knowledge and technologies that improve the ability of our nation to meet its economic, security, and
social goals. In the United States, scientific discoveries and technological breakthroughs have been
shown to drive innovation, which plays a vital role in sustainable economic growth. The second term of
the Obama administration will provide a unique opportunity to keep the nation on track to advance
U.S. science and technology research and ensure its applications to societal goals. That will require that
the administration’s S&T team give particular attention to the integrity of scientific advice to government, research funding,
STEM education, the creation of a permanent U.S. stem cell policy , and the development of new tools for science policy.
Legalization of stem cell research revolutionizes the biotech industry – allows for innovation and
lowers costs- causes spillover of genetic methods to biotech applications
Cadden 8 (Laura Cadden, investment strategist at Today’s Financial News, 11/5/08, “New administration
could mean advances — and profits — for U.S. stem cell biotech companies”,
http://www.todaysfinancialnews.com/us-stocks-and-markets/new-administration-could-mean-profitsfor-us-stem-cell-companies-5269.html)
One of the biggest impacts of the new administration could be in stem cell research, according to Laura
Cadden. Support for the use of embryonic stem cells would open a whole world of opportunity for
specialist biotech firms. Laura picks 5 small-cap biotech stocks that would make huge gains on new
stem cell legislation. This from Today’s Financial News: The theoretical benefits of stem cell therapy
could have a revolutionary effect on biotechnology and medicine. Stem cell technology could create a
renewable source of specifically differentiated cells to replace and regenerate cells and tissues damaged
by conditions such as heart disease, Alzheimer’s, diabetes, spinal cord injury, Parkinson’s etc… It could
provide tools for the identification and (hopefully) prevention of the causes of abnormal cell division
that lead to birth defects and cancer. And it could change the way we test new medications entirely.
Adult vs. embryonic stem cells As a general rule, adult stem cells can only be relied upon to divide and
replenish into cell types of their original tissue. This is fine in situations where a patient’s own cells can
be used and such treatment thereby avoids immune rejection. Embryonic stem cells, on the other hand,
can develop into any and all cell types. And they are much easier to grow in culture as compared to
adult stem cells. What does this mean for stem cell biotech companies? Most of the smaller American
companies engaged in stem cell research have had to focus on a specific adult stem cell for narrow
applications because of limitations to Federal funding for new stem cell cultures. For example…
StemCells, Inc. (NASDAQ:STEM), is currently focused on human neural stem cell and human liver
engrafting cells. Stem Cell Therapeutics Corp. (CVE:SSS) and BrainStorm Cell Therapeutics (OTC:BCLI)
take cells from patients’ own bone marrow in order to treat, Parkinson’s, ALS, spinal cord injury, etc.
Transitions Therapeutics Inc. (NASDAQ:TTHI) and Ixion Biotechnology, Inc. focus on using islet beta cells
in the pancreas to treat diabetes. The addition of embryonic stem cells to genetic therapy has the
potential to revolutionize the revolutionary. Imagine… rather than focusing all their money and time on
one specific type of cell, they could apply their science to cells affecting areas throughout the body.
These unspecified embryonic cells can (again, in theory) be specialized to fix whatever ails you, once the
science catches up. The tiny biotech firms would no longer have to rely on qualified adult donors (think
of all the restrictions the Red Cross now has regarding acceptable blood donors!). And with the relative
ease of embryonic stem cell culture proliferation, experimentation can reach new levels. Obama
Administration to support stem cell research President-elect Barrack Obama has clearly stated his
opinion, “ … we must all work together to expand federal funding of stem cell research and continue
moving forward in our fight against disease by advancing our knowledge through science and medicine.”
And that could mean lower costs and higher ROI for these small biotech companies (many of which are
trading under $2 today!).
1AC Solvency
Plan: The United States Congress should amend the Dickey-Wicker amendment to legalize the sale of
human organs produced through human embryonic stem cell regenerative research.
Organs can be produced through stem cell bioprinting now, but a clear regulatory framework is key to
the sales market
Gwinn 14 (James Gwinn is a rising senior at the University of Kentucky – Paducah Campus, where he will
graduate with dualdegrees in Economics and Mechanical Engineering. ASME helps the global
engineering community develop solutions to real world challenges. Founded in 1880 as the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME is a not‐for‐profit professional organization that enables
collaboration, knowledge sharing and skill development across all engineering disciplines, while
promoting the vital role of the engineer in society. ASME codes and standards, publications,
conferences, continuing education and professional development programs provide a foundation for
advancing technical knowledge and a safer world. ASME’s mission is to serve diverse global communities
by advancing, disseminating and applying engineering knowledge for improving the quality of life; and
communicating the excitement of engineering*. “Bioprinting: Organs on Demand” pg. 15)
Breakthroughs in bioprinting are being made regularly, but there is currently no clearly defined
regulatory framework in place to ensure the safety of these products. (8) Many of the best and brightest minds in the
world are working to bring bioprinted products to the marketplace; however, the potential and functional
limitations of bioprinting are not yet fully understood. The technology, as a whole, is so new that public policy has not
had the opportunity to catch up to the current state of the industry. (9) Products made via bioprinting technology
span a number of product review divisions within the FDA due to the wide range of potential applications. (10) Additionally, FDA
regulations for biosimilar biologics† do not yet address biosimilarity between human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) and
induced pluripotent stem cells (iPS cells). The FDA evaluates all devices, including any that utilize 3‐D printing technology, for safety and
effectiveness, and appropriate benefit and risk determination, regardless of the manufacturing technologies used.
In the US, a number
of regulatory and legislative hurdles must be cleared before the first lab‐printed kidney, liver, or heart
implant will make it to market. As it is with all biologics, the critical regulatory challenges with bioprinted organs
will revolve around demonstrating the safety of the final product and establishing consistent manufacturing methods. (11)
There are also a number of technological advancements: software needs refinement; advances in regenerative medicine
must be made; more sophisticated printers must be developed; and thorough testing of the products must be conducted. (12) To ensure
that bioprinted products reach the marketplace in a safe and timely manner, an effective game plan will need
to be enacted. (13) This plan would include clearly identified goals, well‐established short‐ and longterm expectations, and the creation of
models and actions for linking investments to outputs. Additionally, the plan ought to clearly identify roles and responsibilities, milestones and
metrics, and reasonable time frames.
Only Congress clarifying the Dickey-Wicker amendment to legalize stem cell markets generates longterm stability for research scientists
Cummings 10 (Layla, JD UNC School of Law. “SHERLEY V. SEBELIUS: A CALL TO CONGRESS TO EXPLICITLY
SUPPORT MEDICAL RESEARCH ON HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS” NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
LAw & TECHNOLOGY 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 77 (2010) pg lexis)
It is imperative that Congress changes the language of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment while there is an
appeal pending and before the preliminary injunction can be reinstated. With the latest advances, including the start
of an FDA-approved trial using hESCs," 5 it is more important than ever to secure funding for this type of research.
Francis Collins, Director of the NIH and a named defendant in Sherley, stated in reference to the current state of hESC research, "[lt]his
is
one of the most exciting areas of the broad array of engines of discovery that NIH supports. This
decision has just poured sand into that engine of discovery."" In order to reverse the negative
consequences the district court's decision has had on the scientific community, Congress needs to
amend or repeal the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. This would give scientists the confidence and stability necessary to pursue
research that can potentially benefit those with currently incurable conditions. The decision in Sherley rested on the definition of the word
"research" as definitively meaning "a systematic investigation."7 In the government's memorandum to the U.S. Court of Appeals in support of a
stay of the preliminary injunction, defendants' counsel contests the overly-broad definition of the word "research" in favor of a more narrow
definition or, in the alternative, reading the word "research" in context of the surrounding text." While such textualism is common practice in
the judicial arena, it gives the appearance of splitting hairs over something necessarily subjective and relatively insignificant. 9 Potential
clinical treatments involving stem cell research can take years to develop and serious commitment on
the part of researchers in the field. 9 o Given the social and political debate surrounding this issue and
the high stakes of the research involved, it is probable that the loser at the appellate level will try to take
the issue to the Supreme Court. This will likely be a long and drawn out process. To let this issue play
out in the courts where opposing counsel will argue over the scope of the word "research" will result
in a loss of confidence in the federal government. Congress has had the opportunity to clarify the
language of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment every fiscal year for over a decade, but has failed to do so
in favor of permitting the long-standing agency interpretation. The Rabb memorandum presented a way for HHS and
the NIH to fund critical research in the face of an explicit appropriations limitation. However, an agency's adoption of a legal
opinion does not have the same force as direct congressional action. At this point, only the courts or the
legislature have the authority to decide if the new Guidelines can be implemented. As a matter of
policy, this is more appropriately settled by the legislature where it can be debated and viewed as a
whole issue rather than as a matter of statutory interpretation. C. Congress Should Pass a Comprehensive Stem Cell
Bill In addition to narrowing the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, Congress should pass a bill that will
expressly state its intentions regarding embryonic stem cell research. Preferably, such a bill will codify
President Obama's executive order and open the door to a transparent set of rules that will regulate future hESC
research. There is already a bill in Committee that would accomplish this objective. The Stem Cell Research Advancement Act of 200991 was
introduced to the House of Representatives on March 10, 2010, one year after President Obama's executive order was signed. 92 On
September 13, 2010, a companion bill was introduced to the Senate, similarly titled the Stem Cell Research Advancement Act of 2010.93 These
bills call for the support of stem cell research, explicitly including embryonic stem cell research where the stem cells were derived from excess
embryos donated from in vitro fertilization clinics. 94 Additionally, the bills require that a consultation with the donors be conducted to ensure
that the embryos would otherwise be discarded and those individuals donating their embryos provide written, informed consent without
receiving financial or other inducement. 95 The legislation would require the NIH to maintain guidelines and update them every three years or
as "scientifically warranted."96 These provisions, if enacted, would provide a codification of President Obama's executive order. The only
notable difference between the bills is that the more recent Senate bill explicitly states that this act shall not supersede section 509 of the most
recent HHS appropriations bill. 97 This is a direct reference to the language of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment restricting funding of research
that results in the destruction of embryos. Both the House and Senate bills would amend the Public Health Service Act98 "[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law," so technically the additional language found in the Senate bill would make no applicable difference. 99 However,
the new language does evidence the Senate's intent to comply with the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. In order for this bill to have its intended
effect, the appellate courts will have to uphold the Rabb interpretation of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment.o" The Rabb interpretation is
essentially a legal workaround that should not serve as a permanent solution, but rather should have worked as merely a stopgap until
Congress could act. Congress
should make it a priority to get this legislation through committee and onto
the floor for debate. Also, those representatives who support stem cell research should make it a goal to
amend the Dickey-Wicker Amendment to allow for research on pre-implantation stage embryos obtained
under the ethical boundaries set forth in the Act. The Bush Administration succeeded in delaying important research, and President Obama
tried to reverse the policy through an executive order. Unfortunately, with the recent court ruling, the Obama Administration's effort may fail.
Relying on the appellate process to vindicate the agency interpretation of the Amendment is a gamble.
The more appropriate solution is to have our elected representatives pass legislation that will
reassure the research community of continued funding. V. CONCLUSION The decision in Sherley v. Sebelius is a setback
for potentially life-saving medical research. Public funding of embryonic stem cell research benefits the public welfare. Therefore, Congress
should take action that will explicitly support this type of research. In this economy, the absence of
public funding could truly hinder further medical breakthroughs involving human embryonic stem
cells. Judge Lamberth rested his holding in the case on the language of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. The Amendment, which
was added to the appropriations bill before embryonic stem cells could be isolated and grown in culture, is outdated and should be
narrowed to allow for research that has been implicitly approved by Congress and the Executive Branch
for over ten years. Furthermore, Congress should finally pass a stem cell bill that reflects the executive order issued by President Obama
in 2009. Scientists still have a lot to learn from studying human embryonic stem cells, and we should allow
those scientists the opportunity to decide which cells to study and to what extent."' American scientists
should have the best opportunity to follow through on the promising research they have been
conducting and an incentive to continue with progressive research. Otherwise, the denial of federal
funds could mean the denial of hope for many Americans struggling with debilitating diseases.
Certainty key- otherwise, scientists simply won’t research embryonic stem cells
Levine 11 (Aaron, School of Public Policy and Institute of Bioengineering and Bioscience, Georgia
Institute of Technology. Policy Uncertainty and the Conduct of Stem Cell Research
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1934590911)000038
One consequence of the ethical controversy inspired by human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research has been an
atypically uncertain policy environment. For stem cell scientists in the United States and, in particular, those scientists working
with hESCs, frequent policy changes have made the years since these cells were first derived (Thomson et al., 1998)
something of a roller coaster. Similar challenges have faced stem cell scientists around the world, as numerous countries in Europe,
South America, and Asia, as well as the European Union as a whole, have engaged in protracted debates over stem cell policy (see Gottweis et
al., 2009 for a discussion of global stem cell policy debates). In
the United States, scientists have faced several hESC policy
changes (reviewed in Gottweis, 2010). First, following a legal review, the Clinton Administration adopted a policy in August 2000 that
permitted federal funding of hESC research, but not the derivation of new hESC lines (65 Fed. Reg. 51,975). Before any grants could be funded,
however, the Bush Administration put this policy on hold and President Bush announced a new policy in August 2001 limiting federal funding to
research using hESC lines derived prior to the date of his speech. Although this policy remained in place for nearly eight years, uncertainty
persisted. Congress, for instance, twice passed legislation to overturn the temporal restrictions central to the
policy, yet President Bush vetoed both these bills. During the Bush Administration, stem cell policy was frequently
addressed at the state level with some states supporting stem cell research and others restricting it, creating one of the many
heterogeneous “policy patchworks” that have become typical of the field, even on an international scale
(Caulfield et al., 2009). Supportive state policies aimed to provide a workaround for scientists affected by federal funding
restrictions, yet even these programs were plagued by uncertainty, as legal challenges and state budget
problems hindered their implementation. California's stem cell program, for instance, was delayed for nearly 2 and a half years
by litigation, causing difficulties for scientists considering starting new stem cell projects or moving to new institutions. California's funding is
now flowing and the state has awarded more than $1 billion, yet the future of this program remains uncertain as the end of its 10 year term
approaches (see Karmali et al., 2010 for a recent review of state stem cell funding). More recently, at the federal level, the Obama
Administration adopted a new stem cell research policy in July 2009 (74 Fed. Reg. 32,170), only to throw the field into chaos when scientists
realized the limited number of hESC lines that had been eligible for federal funding during the Bush Administration were no longer on the
approved list and needed to be reevaluated. Key hESC lines, including the two most heavily studied lines, have since been added to the registry,
but not before months of uncertainty during which some scientists were placed in the awkward position of choosing to delay projects until their
preferred cell lines were approved or switching to other lines and facing the delays associated with reoptimizing experimental protocols. A
legal challenge filed following the promulgation of the Obama Administration's policy adds additional
uncertainty to the field. This challenge claims that the Obama Administration's policy violates the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment, a rider added to the Department of Health and Human Services appropriations bill each year since fiscal
year 1996. This lawsuit received minimal attention from the scientific community until August 23, 2010 when U.S. District Court Judge Royce
Lamberth granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction barring implementation of the Obama Administration's policy pending the
outcome of the court case. This
ruling led the NIH to suspend funding and review of pending hESC research
proposals as well as evaluation of new hESC lines (see Gottweis, 2010 for a general discussion, U.S. NIH Notice NOT-OD-10-126 for details).
The Obama Administration appealed and on September 9, 2010 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enjoined the preliminary
injunction, allowing the NIH to resume funding hESC research while the case proceeded. Both
the ultimate outcome of this case
and the length of time before the outcome is known are uncertain, placing some scientists in the situation of checking
the news each day to determine the legal status of their research (Harmon, 2010). Although the ultimate outcome of the
litigation will depend on statutory interpretation of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, much of the legal
wrangling thus far has focused on the issue of potential harm to stem cell scientists associated with these policy changes. In his ruling
announcing the injunction, Judge Lamberth concluded that the plaintiffs—two adult stem cell scientists—would “suffer irreparable injury in the
absence of the injunction” due to increased competition for limited federal research funding, while the ruling “would not seriously harm ESC
researchers because the injunction would simply preserve the status quo and would not interfere with their ability to obtain private funding for
their research” (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia). In its appeal, the Obama Administration disagreed, arguing that the harm to the
plaintiffs was speculative and “cannot outweigh the disruption or ruin of research into promising treatments for the most debilitating illnesses
and injuries” caused by the preliminary injunction (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit). Despite this ongoing legal debate in the United
States and the prevalence of policy uncertainty in this field around the world, relatively few empirical studies address these issues. In order to
begin to fill this gap, this Forum reports responses from 370 individuals who participated in a survey of U.S. stem cell scientists in November
2010 and assesses the reported impact of the preliminary injunction and ongoing uncertainty about the future of federal funding for hESC
research on their work (see Supplemental Information available online for details of survey design and analysis strategies employed). These
data show that both Judge Lamberth's ruling and the ongoing
uncertainty have had a substantial impact on stem cell
scientists and illustrate that this impact extends beyond hESC scientists to affect, often negatively, a larger group of stem cell scientists.
Status quo state and private efforts fail and destroy collaboration- only federal regulation
commercializes stem cell organ technology
Simson 2009 (Sylvia E. Simson B.A., New York University; J.D., Brooklyn Law School (expected 2009);
Executive Articles Editor, Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2008-2009) NOTE: BREAKING BARRIERS,
PUSHING PROMISE: AMERICA'S NEED FOR AN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL REGULATORY SCHEME 34
Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 531 pg lexis)
Despite the fact that embryonic stem cells are regarded as the holy grail of medicine, there is still no
American federal regulatory scheme in place to deal with such research. n8 During his administration, President
George W. Bush twice vetoed legislation that would support, promote, and fund embryonic stem cell research, n9 and consequently,
individual [*533] states have chosen not to wait. n10 Several states have not only legalized embryonic stem cell
research, but also authorized millions in funding and [*534] developed institutes to administer state stem cell research
programs. n11 California, for example, passed Proposition 71 in November of 2004, n12 which provided $ 3 billion in funding for [all kinds of]
stem cell research at California universities and research institutions . . . and called for the establishment of a new state agency [the California
Institute for Regenerative Medicine] to make grants and provide loans for stem cell research, research facilities and other vital research
opportunities. n13 However,
there are also states that specifically prohibit most or all forms of embryonic stem cell
research, like Arkansas, Louisiana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. n14 Other states, like Iowa, permit embryonic stem cell researchbut do
not fund the effort. n15 States like North Carolina and West Virginia have no law on the subject. n16 And some states are [*535] deadlocked on
the issue, like Florida. n17 Clearly, "a
void of nationally cohesive regulation on the issue [of embryonic stem cell
research] remains," n18 and this lack of uniformity among states will cause only some states to prosper
economically and medically, with others lagging behind. n19 It will also be difficult for researchers to
engage in interstate collaboration. n20 Most importantly, however, this wide range of embryonic stem
cell research policy and regulation makes the United States look polarized and in disarray, with the more
"blue" states surging ahead with research and the more "red" states sticking to a conservative approach, likely due to religious influence. n21 It
is necessary for the United States to construct a federal framework of rules and guidelines to govern the
use of embryos for research purposes, particularly since American society is one that aspires towards both
government [*536] monitoring and a green light for research. Countries like the United Kingdom n22 have thorough
regulation for embryonic stem cell research, and even Germany, which has been notoriously "conservative about genetic research," n23 has
passed the Stem Cell Act of 2008, which allows for the importation of "human embryonic stem cell lines that were extracted before May 1,
2007." n24 In
order for the United States to stay at the forefront of medical research, be able to develop
new drugs to cure disease, and be able to pioneer new technologies to aid in the transplantation of
organs and tissue, our nation needs to dispel ambiguities and unite our country's states with thorough
regulation that supports and funds embryonic stem cell research.