9-11
The Response
Lessons Learned
Acknowledgement
• Nobody questions the bravery or the dedication
of the first responders who answered the call to
duty at the World Trade Center on 9-11.
• However, when you lose first responder lives,
there is a duty to question the policies and the
operational systems of public safety agencies so
that we don’t needlessly lose more responder
lives in future operations.
Lessons Learned in
PREPAREDNESS
Planning, Training, Exercising, and
Evaluating Plans
Plans, Training, and Exercises
• New York City did not have, or use, ICS.
• NYC police and fire departments have a
long history of independent response
planning.
• Fire and police response plans are not
particularly compatible.
Plans, Training, and Exercises
• There were no fire department response
plans for multiple complex events.
• There was no system for evaluating
problems associated with multi-complex
events. (Joint Exercises and Joint AAR)
• There were no formal fire department plans
at the operational level.
Plans, Training, and Exercises
• There was an agreement (signed in 1993)
for fire and police to share police helicopter
services during high-rise fires, and to train
together for fighting high-rise fires.
• There was one known “familiarization
flight” prior to 9-11. (No record). No joint
training occurred.
Plans, Training, and Exercises
• Fire department response plans above the
“tactical” level are largely handled “on-thefly” with serious gaps in command and
control.
• “Nobody had a plan.” (Aide to Fire Chief
killed in the collapse of the north tower.)
Plans, Training, and Exercises
• The attacks exceeded anything emergency
planners had anticipated. (Why?)
– 1945 Aircraft versus Empire State Building
– 1993 Bombing of the World Trade Center
• Disaster drills rarely drew more than 100
firefighters. Over 1000 firefighters
responded to the World Trade Center.
Plans, Training, and Exercises
• Firefighters who survived, stated that they
went into the towers with no clear mission.
• NYC first responders do not train together,
and the fire department does not trust the
police.
Plans, Training, and Exercises
• Fire Department Perception of the Police
– “Most agencies try to be cooperative, helpful,
but the police have a very limited ability to
cooperate.”
– “They report to nobody and they go and do
whatever they want.” (Chief Turi, NYFD)
Plans, Training, and Exercises
• Senior Fire Chiefs talking about interagency
cooperation.
– “There was none.”
– “You will never change the P.D.”
– “There’s a reason people hate cops.”
Plans, Training, and Exercises
• Police Perception of the Firefighters:
– “If someone tells them (firefighters) to do
something, they say, ‘I don’t work for
him,’ however, if a sergeant tells a group
of cops to hold up, they do.” (Lt. John
McArdle, Police Emergency Service Unit)
COMMAND
Lessons Learned
Command
• A Unified Command was not established.
• Fire Chiefs set up command in the lobbies
of the towers.
• The police set up command three blocks
away at the corner of Church and Vessey
Streets.
Command
• “The police did not hook up with the Fire
Department, I don’t know why” (Thomas Von
Essen, Fire Commissioner, 1996 – 2001.)
• Police and fire managers barely spoke and
did not coordinate strategies.
Command
• “The Fire Commissioner has limited
authority to hold senior fire chiefs
accountable, because they all enjoy Civil
Service protection.”
• (Thomas Von Essen, Fire Commissioner 1996 –
2001.)
CONTROL
Lessons Learned
Control
• Individual firefighters jumped on
overcrowded fire trucks against policy.
• When ordered off of the trucks, they rode to
the towers in private cars and on subways.
• Port Authority police officers deserted their
posts at bridges, tunnels, and ports.
Control
• Too many firefighters were sent into towers.
• Many firefighters entered without being
deployed. (60 off-duty firefighters died).
• Many of the firefighters self-deployed and
bypassed staging areas. Command did not
know which firefighters were in the towers.
Control
• The Police Department’s Emergency
Service Unit (ESU) sent teams into both
towers.
• The Police ESU is trained in rescue tactics,
and often performs the same functions as
firefighters.
Control
• In the stairwells, fire department and police
ESU members helped each other carry
equipment, administer first aid and pass
messages.
• ESU members did not check in with fire
commanders who were in charge of the
rescue.
Control
• We need a much more controlled
response… because we have to be
concerned about secondary events.
• (Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly)
COMMUNICATION
Lessons Learned
Communication
• The fire department radio system failed, just
as it did in those same buildings eight years
earlier during the response to the 1993
bombing of the trade center.
• No other agency lost communications on
September 11th as broadly as did the fire
department.
Communication
• Assistant Fire Chief Donald J. Jones, who
had fought the trade center fire following
the bombing in 1993, wrote, “Pre-plan and
build contingency plans.”
• Chief Burns also wrote in the 1994 federal
report, “Our effectiveness is only as good
as our ability to communicate.”
Communication
• While enroute to the WTC, Chief Burns reminded
his colleagues of the severe communications
problems experienced during the 1993 response to
the WTC bombing.
• On September 11th, he took command of
operations in the south tower, the second building
to be hit but the first building to crumble. Chief
Burns was killed when the building collapsed.
Communication
• During the final minutes, most firefighters
in the north tower did not know that the
South Tower had crumbled.
• Most firefighters in the north tower did not
know how urgent it was for them to get out.
Communication
• A repeater installed at 5 World Trade Center
after the 1993 bombing did not appear to be
working, according to the fire department.
• A post-incident review of tapes determined
the repeater was working. (Training Issue?)
Communication
• A fire chief arriving at the trade center tried
to use a mobile repeater that was located in
his vehicle. He reports that it did not work.
• Early in 2002, the fire department replaced
old analog radios with digital radios. The
new radios worked on a higher frequency
and were better at penetrating buildings.
Communication
• However, several firefighters said they had
been unable to communicate during
emergencies, so the digital radios were
pulled from service in March 2001.
• They went back to the old radios that years
before the September 11th attacks were
proven to be inadequate in the trade center.
Communication
• The fire department did try to make some
improvements after the 1993 bombing, such as
installing the new repeater at 5 World Trade
Center.
• NYPD and Port Authority police have repeaters
similar to the fire department, and neither agency
experienced significant radio problems on
September 11th. (Training/Exercise Issue?)
Communication
• Some firefighters were on one channel
while evacuation orders were passed on
another channel.
• Firefighters on higher floors were able to
communicate. However, numerous
firefighters said they never got the order to
leave because the radios were intermittent.
Communication
• One Fire Chief reported that he could not talk with
the fire dispatcher because a vital radio was
missing. Phone lines were jammed. No one
answered (phones or radios).
• When helicopter pilots saw that the north building
was near collapse (21 minutes before it fell) their
warnings reached police on the street and inside
the tower – but not firefighters.
Communication
• After years or bickering, the police and fire
agencies did not squabble on September 11th.
They simply did NOT communicate.
• Fire officials don’t know where many firefighters
died, in part because the magnetic command
boards used to track companies were lost in the
collapsed buildings.
INTELLIGENCE
Lessons Learned
Intelligence
• Police and fire supervisors and managers
did not share intelligence about building
conditions.
• When radios failed, supervisors failed to do
the one thing that they could do easily –
meet and discuss conditions eye-to-eye.
Intelligence
• No one in authority ever realized that a
stairwell was open in the south tower.
• At least 18 people escaped from above the
impact area by way of the stairwell, but
word of their escape route never reached the
hundreds of people trapped above them.
Lessons Learned
(Again)
Lessons Leaned (Again)
• The jurisdiction’s Emergency Operations
Plan (EOP) should describe basic functions
and responsibilities for every agency (not
just first responder agencies).
• It identifies lead and support agencies for
each hazard -- for both response and
recovery operations. (Plan to recover.)
The Five Basic Assessments of
Emergency Management
Hazard Assessment
Vulnerability Assessment
Risk Assessment
Capability Assessment
Special Needs Assessment
Understand the Differences
• Hazard – a natural or man-caused occurrence that
impacts human habitation.
• Vulnerability – The degree of destructive impact
on people and property including buildings and
infrastructure.
• Risk – Quantification of vulnerability and hazard
frequency. (How often does it occur?)
Understand the Differences
• The basic plan is a legal document that
explains how government will function
during major emergencies and disasters.
(Strategic – available to the public.)
• Annexes describe how specific agencies
will respond to a major emergency or
disaster. (Tactical - Not for public release.)
Understand the Concepts
• The basic plan must describe the incident
management system that will be employed.
• Unified Command should be established
when more than one jurisdiction responds to
an emergency or disaster.
• Train like you fight – fight like you train.
Emergency Support Functions (ESF)
Annexes to the Idaho State Plan
•
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ESF-1
ESF-2
ESF-3
ESF-4
ESF-5
ESF-6
ESF-7
ESF-8
Transportation
Communications
Public Works and Engineering
Firefighting
Information and Planning
Mass Care
Resource Support
Health and Medical Services
Emergency Support Functions (ESF)
Annexes to the Idaho State Plan
•
•
•
•
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ESF-9 Urban Search and Rescue
ESF-10 Hazardous Materials
ESF-11 Food
ESF-12 Energy
ESF-13 Law enforcement
ESF-14 Agriculture
ESF-15 Military Support
Plan, Train, and Exercise for
Terrorism and CBRNE Hazards
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Agroterrorism
Arson and Incendiaries
Assassination of high profile personnel
Chemical Agents (C)
Bioterrorism (B)
Radiological contamination (R)
Nuclear Detonation (N)
Explosives (E)
Cyber-terrorism
What Was Learned (Again)
• Planning separately = lives lost.
• Training separately = lives lost.
• Exercising separately = lives lost.
• Failure to communicate = lives lost.
Lessons Leaned (Again)
• Exercise “The Plan”
• If the plan is wrong – change it (in writing).
• Exercise multi-agency tasks TOGETHER.
• Exercise Unified Command (Together)
Lessons Leaned (Again)
• Require responders to use staging areas –
self deployments must never be tolerated.
– Volunteer fire agencies may require firefighters to selfdeploy to the scene. (Written policy)
– Volunteers must be trained to check in with command
before engaging in operations. (Written policy)
• Ensure that managers have the tools, (and
authority) in writing, to manage an incident.
Lessons Learned (Again)
• Plan to RECOVER (Restore the community to
pre-disaster condition.)
• Recovery Plans should be an Annex to the
jurisdiction’s Emergency Operations Plan.
– Describes lead and support agencies for
recovery operations. (PDA/Site Inspections for
Federal Assistance.)
• Response verses Recovery.
Lessons Leaned (Again)
• Find, and exercise the use of alternative
communications systems.
• Establish common channels for multiagency communications.
• Establish and exercise the use of multiagency C3I.
Most Important Tools of
Preparedness
• Facilitate and promote intergovernmental and
inter-organizational cooperation.
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Communications (together)
Planning (together)
Training (together)
Exercises (together)
• Together = Unity of Purpose
Thank You
John J. Cline, CEM
State Director
Idaho Bureau of Disaster Services
(208) 334-3460
jcline@bds.state.id.us