NEG
T
1NC: T – Its
Interpretation – its shows possession
Using English 13 , http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)
Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show
possession or ownership. EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and
shows that it belongs to me.)
And, possessive pronouns are exclusive – legal definition
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 2013 [BENCH
BILLBOARD COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF COVINGTON, KENTUCKY, TRANSIT
AUTHORITY OF NORTHERN KENTUCKY, Defendants-Appellees. 2013 FED App. 0940N (6th Cir,
Lexis]
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.324(1) exempts public utilities from receiving prior approval for the location or relocation of any of their service
facilities. § 100.324(1). While the statute does not define "service facilities," the statute grants the exemption only to public utilities. The
statute's use of the possessive pronoun "their" clearly limits the exempted service facilities to those possessed
or owned by the utility itself and which the utility has located or relocated.
Violation – the affirmative increases exploration and development from another countrythat reduces national control
Weiss 5 Joseph Weiss Universidade de Brasilia 2005 Contradictions of International Cooperation in the
Amazon: Why is the nation-state left out? http://www.ispn.org.br/arquivos/bb_.pdf
Sajar and VanDeveer (2005) make clear that while environmental capacity-building attracted multilateral
organization attention again in the late 1990s, it was defined, when applied, to transfer ineffective North
models to th e South to make success more likely for programs defined by the North. By allowing for
NGO participation, national governments are often left with reduced control or power.
Reasons to Prefer
1. Limits – there are tons of potential countries and areas of cooperation – allowing all of
them to be topical makes it impossible for the negative to prepare.
2. Ground – there is a huge difference in the literature between federal government and
international actions – the aff makes international counterplans irrelevant, which is a core
check on small affs
3. Extra-Topicality – they add another countries’ exploration. That’s a voting issue – extraT is unpredictable because it lets affs decide the terms of the debate through extra
advantage ground
Xtn: Its = Exclusive
Possessive pronouns are terms of exclusion
Frey 28 (Judge – Supreme Court of Missouri, Supreme Court of Missouri, 320 Mo. 1058; 10 S.W.2d
47; 1928 Mo. LEXIS 834, Lexis)
In support of this contention appellant again argues that when any ambiguity exists in a will it is the duty
of the court to construe the will under guidance of the presumption that the testatrix intended her property
to go to her next of kin, unless there is a strong intention to the contrary. Again we say, there is intrinsic
proof of a [*1074] strong intention to the contrary. In the first place, testatrix only named two of her
blood relatives in the will and had she desired [***37] them to take the residuary estate she doubtless
would have mentioned them by name in the residuary clause. In the second place, if she used the word
"heirs" in the sense of blood relatives she certainly would have dispelled all ambiguity by stating whose
blood relatives were intended. Not only had [**53] she taken pains in the will to identify her own two
blood relatives but she had also identified certain blood relatives of her deceased husband. Had it been her
intention to vest the residuary estate in her blood relatives solely, she would certainly have used the
possessive pronoun "my" instead of the indefinite article "the" in the clause, "the above heirs."its is
geographical
Xtn: Violation
International collaboration reduces national control
British Government Feb 2014 Review of the Balance of Competences between the United
Kingdom and the European Union Research and Development
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279331/bis_14_592_balan
ce_of_competences_review_government_reponse_to_the_call_for_evidence.pdf
In these fields of activity,
international collaboration is vital to deliver projects of the scale of the Galileo satellite navigation
class research. The EU provides many platforms and frameworks for joint working and knowledge
exchange. Whether it is the most effective and efficient means of achieving it and whether the negatives of reduced control over
priorities, constraints of other regulations and sheer bureaucracy outweigh the benefits is the subject of
this report.
programme and to deliver world
AT: Overlimits
Plenty of direct federal exploration affs
McNutt, 13 - chair of the Ocean Exploration 2020 group (Marcia, “The Report of Ocean Exploration
2020” http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/oceanexploration2020/oe2020_report.pdf)
Ocean Exploration 2020 participants agreed that there is a critical need for effective coordination among
the federal agencies in all aspects of ocean exploration and research. Likely federal budget ocean exploration
allocations for these agencies are too small for independent approaches. The community noted that a national program must
be flexible, responsive, and inclusive, and called for NOAA to act as a coordinator and facilitator of all exploration
activities. The program must have the means to grow partnerships of all kinds to seize the opportunity—and respond to the urgent need to
understand the global ocean. Finally, Ocean Exploration 2020 participants noted the value of this National Forum and the need for regular
opportunities for the community of ocean explorers to come together. Maintaining the momentum from Ocean Exploration 2020 is critical, and
NOAA and its partners need to take advantage of all opportunities to capture the energy and maintain the commitment of the ocean exploration
community.
Icebreakers CP
1NC Icebreakers CP
Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its icebreaker
fleet.
Ice breakers are the biggest internal link to all US activity in the Arctic – the plan is key to
ensuring US leadership
O’Rourke 12 (Ronald O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs, 6/14/12, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and
Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf )
***[The study] concludes that future
capability and capacity gaps will significantly impact four [Coast Guard]
mission areas in the Arctic: Defense Readiness, Ice Operations, Marine Environmental Protection, and
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security. These mission areas address the protection of important national
interests in a geographic area where other nations are actively pursuing their own national goals.... The
common and dominant contributor to these significant mission impacts is the gap in polar icebreaking
capability. The increasing obsolescence of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet will further exacerbate mission performance gaps in the coming
years.... The gap in polar icebreaking capacity has resulted in a lack of at-sea time for crews and senior
personnel and a corresponding gap in training and leadership. In addition to providing multi-mission capability and
intrinsic mobility, a helicopter-capable surface unit would eliminate the need for acquiring an expensive shore-based infrastructure that may
only be needed on a seasonal or occasional basis. The most capable surface unit would be a polar icebreaker. Polar
icebreakers can transit safely in a variety of ice conditions and have the endurance to operate far from
logistics bases. The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers have conducted a wide range of planned and unscheduled Coast Guard missions in the
past. Polar icebreakers possess the ability to carry large numbers of passengers, cargo, boats, and helicopters. Polar icebreakers also
have substantial command, control, and communications capabilities. The flexibility and mobility of polar
icebreakers would assist the Coast Guard in closing future mission performance gaps effectively.... 17 For
examples of bill and report language in recent years relating to the study of Coast Guard missions and capabilities for operations in high latitude
areas, see Appendix C. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 9
Existing capability and capacity gaps are expected to significantly impact future Coast Guard performance in two Antarctic mission areas:
Defense Readiness and Ice Operations. Future gaps may involve an inability to carry out probable and easily
projected mission requirements, such as the McMurdo resupply, or readiness to respond to less-predictable events.
By their nature, contingencies requiring the use of military capabilities often occur quickly. As is the case in
the Arctic, the deterioration of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet is the primary driver for this significant
mission impact. This will further widen mission performance gaps in the coming years. The recently
issued Naval Operations Concept 2010 requires a surface presence in both the Arctic and Antarctic. This
further exacerbates the capability gap left by the deterioration of the icebreaker fleet.... The significant
deterioration of the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet and the emerging mission demands to meet future functional requirements in the high latitude
regions dictate that the Coast Guard acquire material solutions to close the capability gaps.... To meet the Coast Guard mission functional
requirement, the Coast Guard icebreaking fleet must be capable of supporting the following missions: • Arctic North Patrol. Continuous
multimission icebreaker presence in the Arctic. • Arctic West Science. Spring and summer science support in the Arctic. • Antarctic, McMurdo
Station resupply. Planned deployment for break-in, supply ship escort, and science support. This mission, conducted in the Antarctic summer,
also requires standby icebreaker support for backup in the event the primary vessel cannot complete the mission. • Thule Air Base Resupply and
Polar Region Freedom of Navigation Transits. Provide vessel escort operations in support of the Military Sealift Command’s Operation Pacer
Goose; then complete any Freedom of Navigation exercises in the region. In addition, the joint Naval Operations Concept establishes the
following mission requirements: • Assured access and assertion of U.S. policy in the Polar Regions. The current demand
for this mission requires continuous icebreaker presence in both Polar Regions.
This allows the US to play a critical role in de-escalating Arctic conflict
NRC 7 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life Studies (DELS)Transportation Research
Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “ Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online
PDF at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
In the Arctic, economic activity is expected to increase as the southern extent of the Arctic summer ice
pack thins, providing opportunity for ice-capable ships to travel through these regions. Greater human
activity will increase the need for the United States to assert a more active and influential presence in the
Arctic to protect not only its territorial interests, but also its presence as a world power concerned with the
security, economic, scientific, and international political issues of the region. Icebreakers will play a
critical role in supporting U.S. interests because the sea-ice margin does not retreat uniformly or
predictably, which may create difficult ice conditions in these waters. Possible U.S. ratification of the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea will require the United States to collect data to extend its economic zone and/or to counter territorial claims by other
Arctic nations. Icebreakers will be needed to provide access to ice-covered waters to acquire this necessary
data.
Solves Oil Spills
Icebreakers are key to solve oil spills—plan can’t solve but the CP does
Doggett 11 (Tom, Reuters, 2/11/11, “U.S. icebreakers can't handle Alaska oil spills: official”,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/11/us-arctic-oil-vessels-idUSTRE71A5RM20110211, aps)
(Reuters) - The U.S. Coast Guard does not have enough working icebreakers to respond to a major oil
spill in Alaskan waters, the top official who oversaw the containment of the BP oil spill warned Congress
on Friday. "The current condition of the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet should be of great concern to the
senior leaders of this nation," General Thad Allen testified at a House Transportation subcommittee
hearing on last summer's oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Allen said two of the three ice breakers do not
work and decisions on future funding for the fleet continued to be delayed. "Nobody is talking about the
icebreaker capability problem," he said. Similar concerns about icebreakers were raised by the special
presidential commission that looked into the BP oil spill and government offshore drilling regulations.
Allen said current infrastructure is inadequate to support extensive response and recovery operations off
Alaska's North Slope, except for oil industry facilities at Dead Horse and Prudhoe Bay.
Solves Shipping
Icebreakers key to arctic shipping
Keil 12 (Kathrin, Research Associate- Arctic security, cooperation, and institution, “The Arctic Institute”, 4/27, 12,
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/arctic-shipping-routes-forecasts-and.html, Canada in the Arctic - Arctic Shipping: Routes, Forecasts, and Politics)
According to the above-mentioned report, the routes that will benefit the most from these changes are Hudson Bay and the Beaufort Sea because they show a very
different ice regime in comparison to the rest of the Canadian Arctic, and are thus likely to see an increasing number of transits by large ships. A longer summer
shipping season is expected to encourage shipping through the port of Churchill in Hudson Bay, and in the Beaufort Sea longer summer shipping seasons will increase
the appeal of offshore hydrocarbon development as well as transport of oil and gas through the Bering Strait. Although ships on these routes will see generally easier
navigating conditions, processes of climate change also change the nature and severity of many risks to marine traffic. For example, rather than being confronted with
an extensive ice pack that necessitates icebreaker escort, ships will be confronted will multi-year ice in low concentration that is difficult to detect, and extreme
despite decreased ice extent and ice thickness
there will be a continued if not even an increasing demand for icebreaking and other navigational support
for shipping activities in the north, also because of the increased traffic on some routes. In general, the
increase in marine traffic on some Arctic routes together with more frequent and more intense hazards like more
mobile ice and increased winds, waves and surges will increase the demand for marine services in the
north. This includes for example updated navigational charts, up to date weather forecasts, ice reconnaissance and forecasting, icebreaking
support, search-and-rescue capabilities, marine traffic surveillance, control and enforcement, ports for fuelling and cargo loading, ice-class vessels and specialised
crews. Canadian Shipping Policy The Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy says that “ Arctic shipping is another key area of focus” in
variability of conditions from one year to the next. The paradoxical situation may arise that
order to achieve the second aim of the Northern Strategy, which is promoting social and economic development in the North. The 2009 Strategy reads that “[i]n 2007,
satellite imaging verified that the Northwest Passage had less than 10 percent ice coverage, making it, by definition, “fully navigable” for several weeks. This was well
ahead of most recent forecasts [and] in the near future, reduced ice coverage and longer periods of navigability may result in an increased number of ships undertaking
destination travel for tourism, natural resource exploration or development”.
need icebreakers to open up the NSR
Zeeshan Raza was writing this as his Masters thesis, 2013 [“A Comparative Study of the Northern Sea
Rout (NSR) in Commercial and Environmental Perspective with focus on LNG Shipping”, Masters thesis,
Vestfold University College Faculty of Technology and Maritime Sciences, Tønsberg, Norway,
November 2013, Page 22-23,
http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/192946/Raza_Z_2013_Masteroppgave.pdf]sbhag
6.30.2014
The following table shows the distance to some of the ports located in Asia and Europe using the NSR in
relation to the Suez Canal. Figures derived from different sources vividly depict that NSR is the most
attractive option on the trade route between Europe and Asia. the researcher of this study had a chance to
interview Willy Ostreng about the comparative scope of the NSR and Suez Canal. Willy Ostreng headed
the International Northern Sea Route program (INSROP) and currently is serving as a senior researcher
and the president of Norwegian Scientific Academy for Polar Research. The interview held in down town
Oslo in October 2013. During the interview, some interesting points were unveiled about the Northern
Sea Route and Suez Canal. A transcript of this interview with Willy Ostreng related to this section is
presented here to deliver a professional viewpoint to the readers and to form a theoretical base for the
research questions of this study. For the details of the interview questions and the concerning answers
(See Appendix). What would you say about the potential of the Northern Sea route as an alternate to the
Suez Canal, for the LNG shipping? ´´That’s is a big question, but in the light of accelerating sea ice
melting there is no doubt that between northern European , northern Asia and northern American
countries the northern sea route or the north east passage has a huge potential because its shortcut
between the most economically developed parts of the world. Thus in that respect, if the sea ice is
removed by global warming as it is, and even this is accelerating, and if the sea ice that is left is weekend
then of course the potential of the suit is enormous. If you go London to Yokohama in Japan, you save 40
% of the trade distance in comparison with going through the Suez Canal that is 6 600 nautical miles
through the NSR and 11 400 nm through the Suez Canal. It goes around same, when you have set a
saving in distance it can be transformed in to savings in sailing days and we know that there are multiple
examples that 15 up to 18 days can be saved by using the northern sea route instead of the Suez Canal. So
in general the very fact this is the shortcut geographically speaking and the fact that the ice both retreating
throughout the north pole and the marginal seas are getting ice free and the remaining ice getting weaker,
then of course you can use the passage with existing shipping technology. What you will have to do is all
the investments to build up a fleet that can cope with ice-infested waters because even if it is free there
will always be icebergs and drifting in the sailing lanes of the ship. Consequently, you will need to have
ice-strengthened hull on the freighters and there would need to have icebreakers assistance.
Solves Mapping
Icebreakers solve mapping—prevents sovereignty disputes
Cohen et al. 8 (Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security and
Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D., is a Researcher in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Jim Dolbow is a defense analyst and a mem- ber of the Editorial
Board at the U.S. Naval Institute. 10/30/08, “The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic”, pdf)
The Arctic is quickly reemerging as a strategic area where vital U.S. interests are at stake. The
geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the Arctic region is rising rapidly, and its mineral wealth
will likely transform the region into a booming economic frontier in the 21st century. The Arctic coasts
and continental shelf are estimated to hold large deposits of oil, natural gas, methane hydrate (natural gas)
clusters, and large quantities of valuable minerals. With the shrinking of the polar ice cap, extended
navigation through the Northwest Passage along the northern coast of North America may soon become
possible with the help of icebreakers. Similarly, Rus- sia is seeking to make the Northern Sea Route along the northern coast of
Eurasia navigable for consid- erably longer periods of the year. Opening these shorter routes will significantly cut the time
and costs of shipping. Despite the Arctic’s strategic location and vast resources, the U.S. has largely
ignored this region. The United States needs to develop a comprehensive policy for the Arctic,
including diplomatic, naval, military, and economic policy components. This should include swiftly
mapping U.S. territorial claims to determine their extent and to defend against claims by other countries.
With oil and gas prices recently at historic highs in a tight supply and demand environment, the rich hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic may
bring some relief to con- sumers. These resources, especially the hydrocarbons, also have the potential to
significantly enhance the economy and the energy security of North America and the world. Russian
Ambitions. Russia recognizes the multifaceted potential of the Arctic and is moving rap- idly to assert its
national interests. Moscow has submitted a claim to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to an area of 460,000 square miles— the
size of Germany, France, and Italy combined. The Kremlin is pursuing its interests by projecting military power into
the region and by using diplomatic instruments such as the Law of the Sea Treaty. Russia made a show of planting its flag on
the Arctic seabed in August 2007 and has resumed strategic bomber flights over the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War.
While paying lip service to international law, Russia’s ambitious actions hearken back to 19th- century
statecraft rather than the 21st-century law- based policy and appear to indicate that the Kremlin believes
that credible displays of power will settle conflicting territorial claims. By comparison, the West’s posture
toward the Arctic has been irresolute and inadequate. This needs to change. Reestablishing the U.S. Arctic Presence.
The United States should not rely on the findings of other nations that are mapping the Arctic floor.
Timely mapping results are necessary to defending and asserting U.S. rights in bilateral and multilateral
fora. The U.S. needs to increase its efforts to map the floor of the Arctic Ocean to determine the extent of
the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and ascertain the extent of legitimate U.S. claims to territory
beyond its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. To accomplish this, the U.S. needs to upgrade its
icebreaker fleet. The U.S. should also continue to cooperate and advance its interests with other Arctic nations through venues such as the
recent Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland. Specifically, the United States should: Create an interagency task force on the
Arctic bringing together the Departments of Defense, State, Interior, and Energy to develop the overall U.S. policy toward the region. The U.S.
should use diplomatic, military, and economic means to maintain its sovereignty in the Arctic, including establishing a Joint Task Force–Arctic
Region Command, headed by a Coast Guard flag officer. The U.S. should also establish an Arctic Coast Guard Forum modeled after the
successful Northern Pacific Coast Guard Forum. Accelerate the acquisition of icebreakers to support the timely
mapping of the Arctic OCS and the Arctic in general to advance U.S. national interests. The U.S. needs to
swiftly map U.S. claims on the OCS and areas adjacent to Alaska to preserve its sovereign territorial
rights. Timely mapping will be important as the other Arctic nations submit their claims within the 10year window. The U.S. should not rely on mapping from other countries to advance its claims or to
defend against the claims of other countries.
AT Perm
Unilateral naval action in the Arctic is mutually exclusive with cooperation—icebreakers
will be the breaking point for Russia
Davis et al 11 (Darrin D. Davis Lieutenant, United States Navy B.A., University of New Mexico, 2006, Approved by: Anne L. Clunan
Thesis Co-Advisor Mikhail Tsypkin Thesis Co-Advisor Daniel Moran, PhD Chair, Department of National Security Affairs, ARCTIC
SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY IN THE HIGH NORTH)
As discussed in Chapter II, states are generally setting cooperation as a policy priority in the Arctic.
However, regional military cooperation has been limited. In the meantime, states are preparing to operate
in the “new ocean.” The military certainly has a role in the Arctic. However, as the thesis describes, the
degree in which the region is 70 militarized (even in the absence of outright conflict) shapes the Arctic in
ways that realists predict. Russian Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov of the Ministry of Defense
justified his decision to create an Arctic Spetsnaz unit by citing U.S. exercises in Alaska in 2008, which
involved 5,000 military personnel.163 This summer saw additional exercises and attention to the Arctic
by the U.S. Navy. Acknowledging that unilateral military operations may be sub-optimal is a natural
outgrowth of this research. The military has a role to play, doing the expensive and dangerous business of
opening the Arctic frontier. However, an emphasis should be placed on operating in a multilateral military
environment, including annual international exercises to continue a cooperative spirit and to avoid
unnecessary security competition. As we look toward the future of the Arctic it is important to understand
the fallibility of predictions.164 Even recent articles discussing the “future” of the arctic with regard to
shipping and resource exploration are rapidly becoming out of date. As of Summer 2011, Exxon and
Rosneft signed a deal to begin developing Arctic oil resources, the sea ice reached another near record
minimum, and several ships transited the northern sea route to from Murmansk to the far East. The future
of the Arctic is here, now.
Here’s more ev—Russia considers American icebreakers in the Arctic an invasion of its
waters
Byers 2012 (Michael Byers, The Moscow Times, Canada Can Help Russia With Northern Sea Route,
http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2012/06/canada-can-help-russia-with-northern-sea-route.html#more
06/08/2012)
The Arctic Ocean's coastline belongs mostly to Russia and Canada, the two largest countries in the world.
Each country owns territory on either side of a series of contested, and increasingly ice-free, Arctic straits.
Russia considers the narrowest parts of the Northern Sea Route to be "internal waters." Canada takes the
same view of the Northwest Passage. Internal waters are not territorial waters, and foreign ships have no
right to access them without permission from the coastal state. Russia and Canada face a single, common
source of opposition to their claims — namely, the United States, which insists that both the Northern Sea
Route and the Northwest Passage are "international straits." The United States thus accepts that Russia
and Canada "own" the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage, while asserting that foreign vessels
have a right of "transit passage" through the straits that exceeds the right of "innocent passage" in regular
territorial waters. A right of transit passage entitles foreign ships to pass through a strait without coastal
state permission. It also means that foreign submarines can sail submerged, something that they are not
allowed to do in regular territorial waters. The Northern Sea Route has become seasonally ice-free.
Thirty-two ships traversed the waterway last summer, most of them transporting natural resources from
Russian ports to Asian markets. The Kremlin is intent on turning the Northern Sea Route into a
commercially viable alternative to the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal. In September 2011, thenPrime Minister Vladimir Putin said: "The shortest route between Europe's largest markets and the AsiaPacific region lies across the Arctic. This route is almost a third shorter than the traditional southern one. I
want to stress the importance of the Northern Sea Route as an international transport artery that will rival
traditional trade lanes in service fees, security and quality. States and private companies that choose the
Arctic trade routes will undoubtedly reap economic advantages." The dispute over the legal status of the
Northern Sea Route began in 1965 when the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Northwind set out to traverse
the Vilkitsky Strait between the Kara and Laptev seas. Strong diplomatic pressure was applied by the
Soviet Union, pressure that, according to a U.S. State Department spokesman, extended to a threat to "go
all the way" if the American ship proceeded into the strait. Washington responded by ordering the
Northwind to turn around. Since then, no foreign surface vessel has sailed through the Northern Sea
Route without Moscow's permission. The Northwest Passage has been ice-free for four of the last five
summers. Twenty-two ships sailed through in 2011. The United States has twice sent surface vessels
through the Northwest Passage without seeking Canada's permission: the SS Manhattan, an American
owned-and-registered ice-strengthened super-tanker, in 1969; and the USCGC Polar Sea, a coastguard
icebreaker, in 1985. On the 1985 occasion, the press attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa publicly
expressed support for Canada's claim: "Whether it is the Northwest Passage or the Northeast Passage does
not matter. Our position is based on provisions of international law. The waters around islands belonging
to a country are the internal waters of that country." But there is no evidence of any prior or subsequent
statements of support by the Soviet Union or Russia for Canada's position, nor any evidence of Canadian
statements in the reverse. During the Cold War, it would have been difficult enough for Canada to oppose
the United States — its most powerful NATO ally — on the Northwest Passage issue. Taking the Soviet
Union's side in the Northern Sea Route dispute was simply not an option. As for the Soviet Union's nearcomplete silence on the Northwest Passage, one can postulate that Moscow decided not to disrupt the
delicate balance that allowed Ottawa and Washington to "agree to disagree" on the issue. Had Moscow
expressed more support for Ottawa's position, Washington might have decided that Ottawa's independent
stance was no longer tolerable. But the Cold War is long over, and Russia has become an important
trading partner of the West, as reflected in its recent admission to the World Trade Organization.
Economic opportunities and environmental concerns dominate the policy landscape, and cooperation has
replaced conflict as the dominant paradigm in the North. In January 2010, according to WikiLeaks,
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper told NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen that the
alliance had no role to play in the Arctic because "there is no likelihood of Arctic states going to war."
Harper also said that "Canada has a good working relationship with Russia with respect to the Arctic, and
a NATO presence could backfire by exacerbating tensions." Nine months later, Putin told an international
conference: "It is well known that if you stand alone, you cannot survive in the Arctic. Nature alone, in
this case, demands that people, nations and states help each other." Putin's comments came just a week
after the Russian and Norwegian foreign ministers signed a boundary treaty for the Barents Sea, where
the two countries had previously disputed 175,000 square kilometers of oil- and gas-rich seabed. Then, in
May 2011, Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland signed an
Arctic search-and-rescue treaty. All this cooperation provides Russia and Canada with a narrow window
of opportunity. With foreign shipping companies looking north, it is only a matter of time before other
countries join the United States in overtly opposing Russia and Canada's internal waters claims. It is time
for a joint Russian-Canadian position on the legal status of the Northern Sea Route and Northwest
Passage — before it's too late.
Red Spread
1NC Arctic DA
Russia won’t be able to develop the arctic alone – cooperation and shipping development
are key
Fadeyev ’13 [Alexei, PhD in Economics, Head of the Production Support Department at GazpromneftSakhalin, Developing the Arctic Territories Efficiently, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=1332#top]
Due to its vast hydrocarbon reserves and the greater role played by fundamental factors determining political and energy security, many
industrialized
states regard the Arctic as a key strategic region. Its industrial development would see intensive oil and gas production, extraction of biological
resources, massive cargo transshipment and, that would in turn require better transportation and the relevant infrastructure. International cooperation
in this field is vital for the region’s efficient and safe advancement, since organizing transport services is technologically
complicated and legislation in the different Arctic states varies greatly. Transportation Interests in Russia’s Arctic Zone and Infrastructure Status Today The
extensive development of the Arctic in the near future requires scores of new solutions, some of which should
produce highly effective breakthrough technologies, as well as sophisticated approaches to logistics support for remote facilities, vehicle propulsion and ensuring
minimal impact on the fragile environment. Russia possesses unique transportation and logistics capabilities and can therefore
play a major role in converting the country into a competitive transit territory with an advanced services sector and a service economy. The full-scale realization of its
transportation and transit potential seems most promising. It would involve creating a network of international transit corridors across the territory and waters under
Russia’s jurisdiction, in addition to the development of a capillary transport infrastructure to connect remote Arctic communities. Poor
and sometimes
nonexistent transportation infrastructure causes a mismatch between the significance of resource
development in Russia's polar territories and the continental shelf and national security requirements.
This undermines Russia’s competitiveness, despite its exceptional geographical advantages. A
comprehensive transportation system and infrastructure would not only remove existing hurdles to utilizing transit potential but would also clear away infrastructural
Arctic ports are less than promising, given the absence of
long-distance railway lines, raising the importance of the Belkomur project that involves building the absent sections along the Archangelsk-Perm
restrictions on resource activities in the Russian Arctic Zone (RAZ).
railway line (Karpogory-Vendinga), connecting the Archangelsk seaport with Syktyvkar, Kudymkar and Perm (Solikamsk). The line would carry products from these
regions to foreign markets. To this end, projects such as the Sosnogorsk-Indiga (Barentskomur) and Vorkuta-Ust Kara lines seem especially important, as does the
North-South corridor linking the Persian Gulf states, India and Pakistan with Central and East Europe and Scandinavia via the Caspian. Moreover, building the
Polunochnaya-Obskaya railway line, completing the Obskaya-Bovanenkovo line to the port of Kharasaway, extending the Nadym-Salekhard railway line to
Labytnangi, and continuing the Korotchayevo-Igarka railroad line to Dudinka and Norilsk would forge a link between the ore fields of the polar Urals and Yamal
hydrocarbon deposits with industrialized areas in the Urals. [1] Meridian railway lines to ports on the White, Barents, Kara and Laptev seas should boost the cargo
potential of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and open direct access to West Europe. Some complications can be expected from building the Salkhard-Nadym-Novy
Urengoy railroad that to reach Igarka and Norilsk, as cargos may leave via the Dudinka connection, the NSR’s best link. This could mean the emergence of
competition between railway and marine transportation with regard to tariffs, logistics and reliability. There would be growing demand for rapid cross-Polar transit,
including air routes (similar to the shortest routes between the Eastern and Western hemispheres), and for a multifunctional transcontinental traffic route through a
tunnel under the Bering Strait. Feasibility is based on the future use of the high-latitude Northern Transport Corridor: Russia’s multi-purpose sea-and-land route
incorporating the NSR and its adjacent meridian river and railway communications. The cities of Murmansk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky – its extreme points –
would allow the transshipment of cargos to ice-class vessels, icebreaker servicing and feeder route support [1]. Despite
the numerous technical
difficulties of Arctic sailing, the NSR offers the shortest route between Europe, the Far East and North America's western coast,
which could be used not only for transit but also for Russian exports that are currently delivered to
Southeast Asia via the Suez Canal. Interestingly, in recent years, government decisions have also stressed the NSR’s
key role in developing the Arctic areas and resources. There is now a clear and pressing need for the
modernization of existing and construction of new seaports, export terminals, icebreakers and transport
vessels, and for the creation of a marine platform for offshore geological survey and servicing.
Russia needs a developed Arctic as a power base for Russian expansionism and US-Russian
war
Hodges 13 [Dave is an award winning psychology, statistics and research professor, and a political activist and writer who has published
dozens of editorials and articles, “Why Russia Needs Alaska”, http://www.thecommonsenseshow.com/2013/02/27/why-russia-needs-alaska/]
Soviet Russia had to be contained within the heartland. Mackinder’s
that whosoever controlled Eurasia, controlled the world, so long as the controller had access to
useable ports. The problem for Russia is that they have so few usable ports thus impacting commerce and the movement of men and
material in a time of war. So long as Russian could be prevented from being a major sea power, the forces of the
United States and Western Europe were safe. However, if Russia should become a sea power in
conjunction with its massive land-based power, Russia could rule the world. Zbigniew Brzezinski confirms the Heartland Theory,
Containing Russia Is the Key to World Peace From Mackinder’s perspective,
believed
in his book, A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US-Soviet Contest (pp 22-23), n which he echoed the words of Mackinder when he stated that “Whoever controls Eurasia
If the Soviet Union captures the peripheries of this landmass … it would not only win control
of vast human, economic and military resources, but also gain access to the geostrategic approaches to the
dominates the globe.
Western Hemisphere – the Atlantic and the Pacific.” For Russia, controlling the peripheries of the landmass means controlling Alaska and having access
to its ports. This would make Russia the world’s most preeminent land and sea power and the world would have to pay homage to the new global master. Stalin’s Secret Plans to Invade Alaska In
Stalin had undergone extensive
planning in preparation to invade North America as early as 1951. The event was one of a series of programs sponsored by the Washington
1951 In 1999, at a conference held at Yale University, previously-secret Russian documents revealed that Russian Dictator Joseph
D.C.-based Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), which monitors new documents pertaining to the Cold War. The Yale conference centered on Stalin’s relationship with the United
Stalin had a definitive plan to attack Alaska in 1951-52 and had
undergone major military preparations in anticipation of the invasion. Russia has always considered itself
to be landlocked and this served as the major motivation for Russia’s planned incursion which would
have given Russia access to good sea ports. Stalin subsequently died and the plans were abandoned, at least temporarily. Suspicious Happenings In Alaska In
States. These documents, from the Cold War, revealed that
light of the evidence, it is abundantly clear that there are clear economic, political and military reasons why the Russians would want to occupy Alaska. My interest in this topic surfaced quite
serendipitously as a couple of listeners to my radio program sent me information on the Agenda 21 invasion of small Alaska communities, and oh, by the way, they also reported that they were
The sighting of Russian troops in small Alaskan towns such Ketchikan,
seeing Russian troops in their respective communities.
Alaska,
got my undivided attention. Ketchikan is the southeastern most city in Alaska. With an estimated population of 8,050. Ketchikan is the fifth-most populous city in the state. Another area where
there are civilian sightings of Russian troops is in Sitka, Alaska. The City of Sitka, formerly New Archangel under Russian rule, is located on Baranof Island and the southern half of Chichagof
one military veteran reports seeing Russian submarines, on a
frequent basis, just off the coast. Further, there are civilian reports of Russian vehicles and troops moving
through Alaska north of Anchorage. These are only anecdotal accounts and further proof is required in to validate these eyewitness accounts. Yet, there
are indeed verifiable, reported media accounts of Russian troops on American soil. The presence of Russian troops on
Island in the Alexander Archipelago of the Pacific Ocean. Additionally,
American soil is very troublesome. America does not need to rely on the anecdotal accounts of Alaskan civilians to be concerned about the presence of Russian troops on American soil. Russian
commandos are also “training” at Fort Carson, in Colorado Springs since last spring. Why is this concerning? The United States is about to go to war with Iran for selling its oil to Russia, China
Russia is, and should be considered
to be an enemy of the United States. A Stunning Act of Treason Obama has given away seven strategic, oil-rich Alaskan islands to the Russians at a time when we
could be going to war with Russia. At minimum, the oil, alone, from these Islands should be considered to be a military asset. I remain very concerned that these seven islands in the
Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea could also be used as a military staging area from which to invade Alaska and
defend its new claims of the mineral rich resources at the North Pole. The Department of Interior estimates billions of barrels of oil are at
and India for gold instead of the Petrodollar. Russia and China have threatened to nuke the United States if it dares to attack Iran.
stake, related to these seven Islands. Didn’t Obama promise energy independence. Didn’t this proven communist president promise to help the economy bounce back by lessening our
dependence on foreign oil? And despite our ongoing economic depression, Obama killed the Keystone Pipeline a few months ago. Perhaps, very soon, America will not need the Keystone
Pipeline because Alaska will not be remaining as a viable member of the United States. To those who think that Obama would never sacrifice Alaska to Russia, then please tell us “conspiracy
theorists” why he would give away seven Islands, one as big as Delaware, with great natural resources, to the Russians? This is a case of bold-faced treason plain and simple. Obama and his
cabinet should be arrested, tried and sentenced as we would with any traitor. Yet, there is more. The Giveaway of Alaska There exists documented facts which support the reasons why Alaska
Russia recently sent four brigades to the Arctic. The Arctic can be used as a staging area
for the invasion of the North Pole to protect its recent mineral claims, but more importantly, this area of
the Arctic could serve as a base of operations from which to invade Alaska with the help of prepositioned assets within the state. In March of 2012, with a microphone left on. Obama made an unguarded comment to Russian leader Dmitry Medvedev to be “more
should be placed on high alert.
lenient on nuclear issues” because he could be more flexible “after the November election”. Does more flexible mean killing the Keystone Pipeline prior to giving away seven rich Alaskan
Islands to the Russians? Does more flexible mean letting the Russians train in Colorado Springs and in Alaska? Does being more flexible mean compromising our defense of Alaska? More
Treason From Obama Although some journalists have said that they suspect that Obama is preparing to give away Alaska to Russia. I previously did not see how a sitting president could do such
a thing and remain in office. However, if Russia were to militarily seize Alaska, that would provide Obama with a plausible excuse in which he claims America was caught off guard and the
danger was unforeseen. Obama could best accomplish this by weakening the defenses of Alaska and the evidence is supportive of this suspicion. The evidence does not support a timetable,
however, I would guess that this event may transpire in Obama’s last year in office, or possibly in the lame duck session where he cannot be held accountable. This article will hopefully remove
Obama’s ability to excuse away the notion that America lost Alaska because it go caught with its proverbial pants down. The giving away of seven strategic, oil-rich Islands is a good start to
support a claim of treason because Obama is purposely weakening the defense of Alaska. Also, local residents along the Alaskan coast have reported to me that the massive over flights along the
coast have all but ceased. The F-22′s have disappeared. The Air Force says the flights have been suspended because of oxygen concerns which are impacting the pilots. Then shouldn’t the flights
be replaced by F-16′s? What about national security?These over flights have been a staple of Alaskan defense since the Cold War. If we are close to war with Iran and its ally, Russia, then
shouldn’t we beefing up our patrols in Alaska? Recently the ATF asked for gun registration records in Alaska. Perhaps the Russians need to know, in advance, where the most civilian opposition
It is now on the record that Putin said that he
was going to make his country the greatest country, economically, as he said in print that he is claiming
part of Alaska. Adding fuel to the fire, it is now clear that Russia is also establishing plans for an Arctic
industrialization. In geopolitical and military terms, it could be an easy to claim to make if the military
resistance in Alaska is greatly compromised, and it has been. The last thing that country should do on a potential front line area is to close
will come from when they take over Alaska. Are Plans Being Made For a Post-Russian Takeover of Alaska?
military facilities and bases, yet, this is exactly what is happening in Alaska. Obama and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission have been closing bases and/or reducing base operations
all through Alaska. It has gotten so bad that the Alaskan Governor hired a lobbyistto prevent military reduction. Two years ago, a prominent Russia Professor predicted the end of the United
think it’s very
clear that Russian ambitions are to restore the old Russian Empire. Not the Soviet Union, but the Russian
Empire.” There is also a tunnel from Russia to Alaska being constructed. Are we funding our own demise with our tax money which is designed to set up Russia’s future? Last summer,
Russia challenged west coast detection capabilities of our military by making provocative moves with
their submarines inside of our territorial waters. Also, in a stunning move, Putinbanned adoptions of Russian children by American parents. Could it be
States. The professor stated that Alaska would return to the control of Russia and that the United States would be split into six pieces. John McCain recently said “I
likely that he is looking out for the Russian adoptees as this is a reaction to what Putin knows is coming? Conclusion Should we be closing bases on the potential front lines? Should we be failing
to patrol off of our coast? Should we allow the unchallenged sightings of surfaced Russian subs close to the coastline? Any one of these events should be considered to be a serious national
security concern. Yet, the media and Obama act as if all is well. There are a lot of dots on this wall to connect. However, there is one monumental dot to seriously consider. Subsequently, I have
some final questions. If Obama is willing to give away seven oil-rich Islands in the area of Alaska, during these tough economic times, then what exactly isn’t he capable of doing to the United
? Aren’t the apparent Russian plans to seize Alaska part of
the fulfillment of the Heartland Theory in which Mother Russia propels itself in the status of the world’s
super power by making itself both a land and sea power through the seizure of Alaska? When someone can provide a
States? Is the sacrifice of Alaska so far-fetched in light of these other considerations
plausible set of answers to the questions that I have raised here, then I will continue to sound the alarm that
“The Russians are coming, the Russians are
coming.”
US-Russia war causes extinction
Baum 3/7/14
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/seth-baum/best-and-worst-case-scena_b_4915315.html
Seth Baum is Executive Director of the think tank Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. He recently
completed a Ph.D. in Geography at Pennsylvania State University and a Post-Doctoral Fellowship with
the Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions. Based in New York City,
Baum's research covers a variety of topics including ethics, economics, climate change, nuclear war, and
life in the universe.
No one yet knows how the Ukraine crisis will play out. Indeed, the whole story is a lesson in the perils of prediction. Already we have a classic:
"Putin's Bluff? U.S. Spies Say Russia Won't Invade Ukraine," published February 27, just as Russian troops were entering Crimea. But
considering the best and worst cases highlights some important opportunities to make the most of the situation. Here's the short version: The best
case scenario has the Ukraine crisis being resolved diplomatically through increased Russia-Europe cooperation, which would be a big step
towards world peace. The worst case scenario has the crisis escalating into nuclear war between the United States and
Russia, causing human extinction. Let's start with the worst case scenario, nuclear war involving the American and Russian
arsenals. How bad would that be? Put it this way: Recent analysis finds that a "limited" India-Pakistan nuclear war could kill two billion people
via agricultural declines from nuclear winter. This "limited" war involves just 100 nuclear weapons. The U.S. and Russia combine to possess
about 16,700 nuclear weapons. Humanity may not survive the aftermath of a U.S.-Russia nuclear war. It seems rather unlikely that
the U.S. and Russia would end up in nuclear war over Ukraine. Sure, they have opposing positions, but neither side has anywhere near enough at
stake to justify such extraordinary measures. Instead, it seems a lot more likely that the whole crisis will get resolved with a minimum of deaths.
However, the story has already taken some surprising plot twists. We
cannot rule out the possibility of it ending in direct
nuclear war. A nuclear war could also occur inadvertently, i.e. when a false alarm is misinterpreted as real, and nuclear
weapons are launched in what is believed to be a counterattack. There have been several alarmingly close calls of inadvertent U.S.-Russia nuclear
war over the years. Perhaps the most relevant is the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident. A rocket carrying scientific equipment was launched off
northern Norway. Russia detected the rocket on its radar and interpreted it as a nuclear attack. Its own nuclear forces were put on alert and Boris
Yeltsin was presented the question of whether to launch Russia's nuclear weapons in response. Fortunately, Yeltsin and the Russian General Staff
apparently sensed it was a false alarm and declined to launch. Still, the disturbing lesson from this incident is that nuclear war could begin even
during periods of calm. With
the Ukraine crisis, the situation today is not calm. It is even more tense than
last year, when the United States was considering military intervention in Syria.
Xtn: Co-op = Ruse
Russian international cooperation is a ruse for Russian economic expansionism
CH 5-11-14 [Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, carries out independent and rigorous analysis of critical
global, regional and country-specific challenges and opportunities. It consistently ranks highly in the University of Pennsylvania’s annual Global
Go To Think Tank Index, where it has been assessed by its peers as the No. 1 think tank outside the US for six consecutive years and No. 2
worldwide for the past three years.; “Responding to Putin’s Latest Ruse”, http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/14291#]
Despite – or rather because of – this latest uncertainty, the
West must be clear-minded in its next actions: First, wait. Do not
Putin told journalists on 4 March that Russia was not considering the
annexation of Crimea. That was a lie. Russian leaders consistently claimed the anonymous troops that
took over Crimea were not Russian. That too was a lie. The proportion of truth in Russian media narratives and
leadership statements is shrinking to vanishing point. Putin wanting free and fair elections in Ukraine, as some now believe,
jump to unnecessarily hasty conclusions.
makes no more sense than turkeys voting for Christmas. A newly legitimized Ukrainian government, recommencing a relationship with the West,
would be a huge blow for the Kremlin. Second, keep your eyes on the ball. Ukraine’s future as a unified state is on a knife-edge. It needs support
before, during and after the national elections. Ukraine has never been closer to state failure and civil war. That was
not Russia’s preference at the beginning, but it will do. Russia is quite capable of pushing Ukraine over
the brink under the principle of ’if we can’t have it, no one can’. Third, at the same time, understand that this is part of
a wider problem over how European security should be organized (as articulated by Andrew Monaghan). This is ultimately a fundamental
disagreement about the freedom and independence of countries around Russia’s border. Russia is effectively saying these countries lie within its
Cold War-era protectorate. This must be rejected unambiguously, and (alas) continually. In fact, if we are to do the right thing by Ukraine,
Russia’s call for privileged interests with - and non-alignment among - post-Soviet nations must be ignored – and the West must in turn plan for
the consequences of course. Fourth, come to terms with the idea that the financial cost to the West of sanctions against Russia will be small.
Russian international investments in London only account for 0.5 per cent of total European international assets invested there. Financial services
provided to Russia only amount to one per cent of total UK exports of financial services, business services and insurance. Russia’s vulnerability,
noted by many elsewhere, is far greater. The costs to the UK and its EU partners should be seen as an investment in the future of European
security, alongside the essential increases in defence budgets. Fifth and finally, try not to score own goals – in all sectors. When policy notes
were photographed entering Downing Street, the scandal was not that they were disclosed, but what they contained - a recommendation to put the
interests of Russian business in the City of London ahead of the future of Ukraine. The BBC using employees of Kremlin-backed Russia Today
as reporters and interviewees is unworthy of its standards of journalistic impartiality; CEOs declaring “business as usual” with Russia (and then
finding it is not) looks silly; the inability to explain what the West has done in, say, Kosovo or Libya is simply inept. Not least, senior government
advisers and members of the House of Lords saying that there will have to be recognition of and accommodation to Russia’s interests is
symptomatic of the pernicious and pervasive financial influence which creates vested interests in promoting the Russian line - or simply of
ignorance about Russia. These are all easily avoidable mistakes. On this last point, ignorance about Russia is a common enough affliction. This
is a reflection of the fact that for the past 20 years, the primary interest in Russia has been in making money there. Upton
Sinclair said that it is ‘very
difficult to get a man to understand something if his salary depends on him not
understanding it’. Governments, too, have been prevented from addressing the Russia problem by the
wider (and false) narrative of positive development trajectories, and of Russia as a nation in transit to
democracy. That has to change now. If any good can come of this crisis – the worst between Russia and the West since the 1960s –
Western governments can no longer ignore the evidence of Vladimir Putin’s hard-line nationalism, the
Kremlin’s true ambitions and its determination to pursue them at the cost of others. Better policy should, therefore,
arise from this. But to be truly effective, it may have to wait for a post-Putin era. As this crisis and countless
EU-Russia summits testify, the current regime is simply not interested in international cooperation to
any greater end than its own demands being met.
Beware the bear – empirics proves Russia only pockets concessions
Fund 3/3/14
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/372352/beware-russian-bear-john-fund
John Fund is a national-affairs columnist for National Review Online.
So what must the U.S. and the West do now to deter further Russian aggression in Ukraine? Clearly they
have an obligation to take some action. In 1994, the U.S., Great Britain, and Russia guaranteed
Ukraine’s territorial inviolability in exchange for the new state’s agreement to destroy the nuclear
weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union after its breakup. Timothy Snyder, an Eastern Europe
scholar and author of Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, urges the West to exploit its soft
power. Snyder wrote in this week’s New Republic: Russian propaganda about depraved Europe conceals
an intimate relationship. Tourism in the European Union is a safety valve for a large Russian middle class
that takes its cues in fashion and pretty much everything else from European culture. Much of the Russian
elite has sent its children to private schools in the European Union or Switzerland. Beyond that, since no
Russian of any serious means trusts the Russian financial system, wealthy Russians park their wealth in
European banks. In other words, the Russian social order depends upon the Europe that Russian
propaganda mocks. And beneath hypocrisy, as usual, lies vulnerability. The U.S. should immediately
move to expand its existing Magnitsky Act, which prohibits Russians engaged in illegal activity from
entering the U.S. If it were extended to the regulation of bank accounts and property ownership in the
U.S., we’d hear howls of outrage from many Russian officials and oligarchs. Senator Marco Rubio (R.,
Fla.), for one, supports this kind of restriction: “Living in Miami, I have seen in recent years the wave of
Russian tourists coming to our city and state to spend money and buy property. Many are government
officials or allies whose wealth stems from allegiance to Putin, and we should limit their ability to travel
here.” Kerry will travel to Kiev on Tuesday for a firsthand look at the crisis. On Sunday, as the New York
Times reported, he warned that if Russia doesn’t curb its territorial appetites, Putin “is not going to have a
Sochi G-8,” a reference to the meeting of the top world economies that Putin is slated to host in June this
year. “He may not even remain in the G-8 if this continues,” Kerry continued. After all, Russia’s weak
and underdeveloped economy was admitted to the G-8 only in 1998 as a gesture of friendship after
Russia’s devastating currency collapse. It’s time to put signs of friendship on hold, and if Russian
troops advance deeper into Ukraine, it might also be time to reassess Russia’s membership in the World
Trade Organization. The old adage says, “Fool me once, shame on you – fool me twice, shame on me.”
The earlier version of the saying, attributed to the most famous clown of the Elizabethan era, Richard
Tarlton, offers further wisdom: For who deceives me once, God forgive him; if twice, God forgive him;
but if thrice, God forgive him, but not me, because I could not beware. The U.S. is now on its third
Putin-inspired pratfall, and the routine is getting stale. The lesson is now clear: Beware the Russian
Bear. As Indiana governor Mike Pence, a former member of the House leadership, told me this weekend:
“History shows the Russian Bear’s ambitions never die, they just go into hibernation.”
Russia is inherently aggressive and can’t defeat the US, Putin does not care about relations
and just wants to expand- recent empirics prove
Carafano 3-16-14 [James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security
and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, “It's time to realize that Vladimir Putin can't be trusted
“,http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/3/its-time-to-realize-that-vladimir-putin-cant-be-trusted]
Clearly, the Russians are getting much more clever and efficient in integrating cyberwarfare
techniques with
their usual physical and psychological warfare. And clearly, Putin is less interested in “resetting” relations
with the West and more interested in rewriting the map on Russia's western borders. The big question now, after
Georgia and Ukraine: What happens next time, when Putin feels the need to intervene on behalf of "ethnic"
Russians in a Baltic nation--one that happens to be a member of NATO? The rise of Putin is not the beginning of a
second Cold War. Moscow is a second-rate power that can't compete with the United States. But Russia is a country
with more than enough weapons in its arsenal to start troubles that will be difficult to end. As a first step, the U.S. has to stop being an
enabler of bad behavior. The White House must send a message that Moscow had its chance to be a responsible member of the
international community ... and it blew it. President Obama should start by pulling the U.S. out of New START.
Abrogating the treaty would declare the rather obvious fact that Putin is no reliable partner in arms
control. New START never offered any strategic benefits to the United States. The U.S. offered it as a statement of
"goodwill," in the hope that Russia would then partner in further efforts to reduce the global nuclear
arsenal. But in the last few weeks, Moscow has shown it remains far more interested in adding
territory rather than reducing nuclear weapons. From dirty tricks to territorial expansionism, Putin has demonstrated
his desire to emulate the Soviet Union, not put it in the past. It is time for our president to turn his back on
a false friend.
Xtn: Link – Appeasement
Compromise is appeasement – we must stare down Putin to avoid global war
Saakashvili 3/6/14
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mikheil-saakashvili-the-west-must-not-appeaseputin/2014/03/06/db9e0c82-a4a9-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html
Mikheil Saakashvili was president of Georgia from 2004 to 2013. He is a senior statesman at Tufts
University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
There are striking similarities between the early stages of Russian aggression against Georgia and what is
happening in Ukraine. Watching recent events and the global response, I keep thinking about history
repeating itself — and other instances of aggression in Europe. In the 1930s, Nazi Germany occupied part
of neighboring Czechoslovakia under the pretext of protecting ethnic Germans. Today, Russia is claiming
to protect ethnic Russians — or people with hastily distributed Russian passports — in Crimea or
Georgian territories. In September 1938, when Germany annexed the Sudetenland, British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain called the situation “a quarrel in a far-away country, between people of whom we
know nothing.” Similarly, some today question whether the West should bother about Ukraine, saying
Russia has more at stake than the West. Many in the West are talking about the need to reach some kind
of compromise with Russia, an option that smacks of Munich 80 years ago. They claim to be motivated
by such common strategic interests as nonproliferation and the fight against terrorism; by the same token,
under the guise of needing to contain the Soviet Union and stop the spread of communism, Chamberlain
reached a deal with Hitler. Now, of course, we know that all attempts to appease the Nazis led the big
European powers to feed one country after another to Hitler and, ultimately, led to World War II. Such
global catastrophes are what happens when the established international order collapses and rules
no longer apply. Ukraine is just the most vivid recent demonstration. Imagine if Ukraine hadn’t given up
its considerable nuclear arsenal in the 1990s. To persuade the Ukrainians to do so, the United States and
Britain, together with Russia, signed agreements guaranteeing Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange
for Ukraine giving its weapons to Russia. And yet, here we are. But then, the European Union and Russia
signed an agreement providing for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia in 2008. Russia never
complied — something our European guarantors seldom mention. Putin’s motivations are similar to those
of prewar Germany: He wants to rectify what he sees as unjust treatment and humiliation by Western
powers after the Cold War. He is trying to reconquer lost lands and grab natural resources. Little has been
said about the offshore oil resources in Abkhazia that the Russian state monopoly Rosneft confiscated in
2009. U.S. companies have invested considerably in shale gas fields off Crimea. But Ukraine’s
emergence as self-sufficient in energy, and even a major gas exporter to Europe, would be Putin’s
ultimate nightmare. Putin destabilizes his neighbors in an effort to kill any NATO and E.U. appetite for
further expansion. He also sees periodic land grabs as, somehow, the route to his domestic political
rejuvenation. There is a logic to his perception of ideological threats: If Ukraine ceased to be a corrupt
oligarchy and became a real European democracy, Putin’s opponents would see the contrast — and
potential benefit to fighting their own reality. Why should the West care about what happens in Ukraine?
We are seeing not just the slicing up of Europe’s largest country but also the destruction of post-Cold War
order in Europe. This order was based on clear rules that not only protect small countries but also ensure
stability and prosperity for the bigger ones, protect minorities and settle conflicts by peaceful
mechanisms. Think of the ramifications if borders across the continent were to revert to ethnic lines.
If there are no longer any rules, a spiraling cycle of violence and destruction is inevitable. Such an
outcome could still be avoided. The U.S. sanctions announced Thursday are a good first step. They
should be implemented immediately, and Europe needs to strengthen its own response. Ukraine, Georgia
and Moldova should be put on fast-track accession to the European Union and granted membership action
plans for NATO to demonstrate that Russia cannot seize its ends through illegal means. We don’t need
another visionary like Churchill to know what to do next. Today’s democracies have enough experience;
applied with common sense and a modicum of courage, we can avoid the worst.
Xtn: Link – Perception Key
Perception key – makes now a WINDOW of crisis
Friedman 3/19/14
http://warontherocks.com/2014/03/ukraine-and-the-art-of-crisis-management/
Lawrence Freedman has been Professor of War Studies at King’s College London since 1982. His most
recent book is Strategy: A History (OUP, 2013).
For the same reason the political economy of Ukraine is at the heart of this dispute. This is an area
where the West has levers which it can deploy, to enable Kiev to address its major problems of debt,
corruption, good governance and economic reform.
Words matter. It is easy to dismiss talking shops when tough actions are being taken on the ground.
During crises government statements and the speeches of leaders are studied far more intensively than at
other times, precisely because there is an intense interest in what is being said as the main source of
evidence about current concerns and future intentions. It is through words that crises are framed and their
salient points identified. The inability of Russia to construct a case that gained any support in the UN was
undoubtedly a blow and left it on the defensive internationally.
In the internet age, when news comes quickly through from many sources on the front-line and is
rapidly transmitted, governments will struggle to control a poorly constructed story. Fabricated claims can
catch out governments when they start unravelling as they are checked by those on the ground. This is a
hard factor to measure, but one indicator of its impact may be Putin’s determination to eliminate
independent media outlets within Russia, another disturbing consequence of this crisis.
I suggested earlier that certain lessons had emerged out of the Cold War for crisis management: clarity
over core interests; a sense of both the possibilities and limits of coercive instruments, including where
the actual use of armed force might be appropriate; control over armed forces to prevent inadvertent or
deliberate military escalation; sustained communications with the adversary; a grasp of what the
adversary needs to enable it to de-escalate, or at least to desist from further escalation. These remain
relevant. Writing this during the first month of what could be a prolonged period of tension provides a
reminder of those areas of interest and intention that remain uncertain, and the difficulties of shaping
policies in national capitals and in multi-national settings when events are still unfolding. These dangers
and uncertainties have led some to talk of a new Cold War.
SMALL signals matter – link threshold is low
Dovere 3/3/14
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/barack-obama-ukraine-crimea-russia104203.html#ixzz2wdk7y0yj
Edward-Isaac Dovere is a senior White House reporter. Before coming to POLITICO in April 2011,
Dovere was the founding editor and lead writer of City Hall and The Capitol, where his coverage of New
York City and state politics was recognized by the New York Press Association, the New York Press
Club, the Daniel Pearl Award for investigative journalism. At POLITICO, he oversaw the day to day
coverage of the Republican presidential primary campaign before joining the White House team for the
2012 campaign coverage. A native New Yorker, he graduated from Johns Hopkins before he had a
driver’s license, and from an MA program at the University of Chicago before he learned how to ride a
bike.
Even small developments like that matter in Moscow, where the Russian leader is gauging his next
move based on what kind of international response he thinks he’s likely to get. “Putin is a power player.
If he sees power and things not going his way, he moves,” Richardson said. “He caves when he knows
he’s on the losing end.” But Putin also knows there’s nothing that plays better in Russian domestic
politics than precisely the kind of butting of heads that Obama is trying to organize. “A domestic conflict
in Ukraine became yet another instance of an alleged plot of Russia’s enemies against it,” said Leon
Aron, a Russia scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, “once this was framed as a
contest between Russia and the West.”
Xtn: Russia wants expansion
Putin’s cult is preparing for European domination- prefer evidence from inside the inner
circle
NRO 3-10-14 [National Review Online, a web-leading source of real-time conservative opinion, “Putin Adviser Publishes Plan for
Domination of Europe”, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/373064/putin-adviser-publishes-plan-domination-europe-robert-zubrin]
On March 9, a very influential geostrategic and ideological adviser of the Putin regime, Aleksandr Dugin, published his game
plan for domination of Europe. The plan, which Dugin calls “the Russian Spring,” is presented as one of
three scenarios for resolution of the current Ukrainian crisis. The other two, in which the Kremlin blinks
in the face of Western pressure, result in thermonuclear war or complete global chaos. Following is Dugin’s plan
for the Russian Spring. (The translation is mine. The original, published in Russian, may be viewed on Dugin’s Facebook page.) Scenario
Russian spring 1. Kiev takes a waiting position, concentrates its troops on the border with the Crimea, and threatens, but takes no direct action.
The U.S. strongly pressures Russia, freezing accounts, and actively wages information war, but they and NATO avoid direct clashes. Kiev
receives substantial support from the West, but focuses on domestic issues. The border with Russia is closed. The referendum [in the Crimea on
whether to join Russia] passes with minimal problems. The vast majority vote for joining Russia. No country recognizes the referendum except
Russia. Russia raises the question of retaliatory actions if it receives Crimea into Russia. Both chambers of the Duma promptly ratify the
annexation. Crimea is returned to Russia. Russian forces enter. The West rages strong pressure on Russia. Militants in the North Caucasus and the
fifth column in Moscow are activated. Putin is supported by everyone. His popularity among the people climaxes. This helps him cope with
internal challenges. 2. In eastern Ukraine, Kiev starts to take tough punitive measures. There is a straight nationalist dictatorship. Individuals
attempt to attack Crimea or commit acts of sabotage. They start taking revenge on Russians and the Russian-speaking east and south for the loss
of Crimea. This leads to the onset of resistance. The second phase of Ukrainian drama begins: The Battle for New Russia. People
wake up at once and quickly. Ukraine establishes a state of emergency, in connection with what is defined
as “Muscovite aggression.” The last traces of democracy are abolished. Elections are held in May in
wartime. 3. The nationalists arrange a series of terrorist attacks in Russia. In Russia itself, the regime evolves, and starts to
clean out the fifth column. 4. In Novorossia, resistance increases and gradually moves to the phase of direct rebellion against the Kiev
henchmen. There is a bloody civil war. Russia deploys massive effective support structure; symmetrically
the West supports Kiev. At a certain moment, in response to the sabotage in Russia and bloody actions of the nationalists and the
repressive apparatus of Kiev against civilians and the east of Ukraine, Russia sends its troops into the east. The West
threatens nuclear war. This is the existential moment for Putin. But he cannot stop. Going hard (possibly with
heavy losses), Novorossia is liberated. The Left-bank Ukraine is conquered, with its border along the
Dnieper. A new government is founded — for example, Ukraine or Novorossia. Or a version of Crimea may be repeated. 5. The Right-bank
Ukraine, which does not recognize secession (as Yugoslavia under Milosevic and later Serbia against Kosovo), forms a new de facto Ukraine-2
state. NATO bases are immediately located on its territory, stopping the possibility of Russian move to Kiev. 6. The new rigidly nationalistic
Ukrainian government quickly comes to a crisis. Direct clashes begin between ethnic groups (Ruthenians, Hungarians,
Poles, Romanians, other minorities) and on political grounds (power loss blamed for half the territories of
Ukraine). The state weakens. The process of new secessions begins. 7. Russia does not stop there, but
carries activity into Europe, acting as the main element of the European Conservative Revolution. Europe
starts to crack: Some countries are behind the U.S., but more often begin to listen to Russia. Against the background of the
financial crisis, Russia’s position becomes more attractive. Russia takes on the protection of
multipolarity, continentalism, and new conservatism (the Fourth Political Theory). 8. In western Ukraine, Ukraine-2, a proEuropean (pro-German) political force comes to power that begins to soften anti-Russian policy and moves away from the U.S. 9. Across Europe,
the de-Americanization process begins. An autonomous European armed force is created independent of NATO on the basis of the
German Armed Forces and the French. 10. A new great Continental Association is formed, as a confederation of Europe and Eurasia, the
European Union and the Eurasian Union. Russian, Ukrainians and Europeans are on one side of the barricades, the
Americans on the other. American hegemony and dominance of the dollar as well as domination of
Atlanticism, liberalism and the financial oligarchy is ended. A new page in world history begins. The
Slavs are reunited not against Europe, but with Europe in the framework of a multipolar polycentric
world. From Lisbon to Vladivostok.
Xtn: Arctic Key
Russia Needs Arctic for Global Domination and Pre-Emptive Nuclear Strikes
Nazemroaya 12 [Mahdi Darius, award-winning author and geopolitical analyst. Sociologist and
Research Associate at the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), a contributor at the Strategic
Culture Foundation (SCF), Moscow, and a member of the Scientific Committee of Geopolitica, Italy.
Military Encirclement and Global Domination: Russia Counters US Missile Shield from the Seas, Global
Research, 30/10/12, http://www.globalresearch.ca/russia-counters-the-us-missile-shield-from-theseas/5310516]
The US global missile shield is a component of the Pentagon’s strategy to encircle Eurasia and these three powers. In the first
instance, this military system is aimed at establishing the nuclear primacy of the US by neutralizing any Russian
or Chinese nuclear response to a US or NATO attack. The global missile shield is aimed at preventing any reaction or nuclear “second
strike” by the Russians and Chinese to a nuclear “first strike” by the Pentagon. All the new reports about branches of the US missile shield being established in
other parts of the world are sensationalized in terms of how they are portraying its geographic expansion as a new development. These
reports ignore the fact that the missile shield was designed to be a global system with components strategically positioned across the world from the onset. The US
government was repeatedly warned that the steps it was taking would polarize the globe with hostilities that would be reminiscent of the Cold War. The warning fell
on deaf and arrogant ears. The
Russians are now rebutting the Pentagon’s global missile shield through very
practical steps of their own. These steps involve an expansion of their country’s presence in the high seas
and an upgrade of their naval capabilities. Moscow plans on opening new naval bases outside of its home waters and outside of both the
shorelines of the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. The Russian Federation already has two naval bases outside of Russian territory; one is in the Ukrainian port of
Sevastopol in the Black Sea and the other is in the Syrian port of Tartus in the Mediterranean Sea. The Kremlin is now looking at the Caribbean Sea, South China Sea,
and eastern coast of Africa (in close proximity to the Gulf of Aden) as suitable locations for new Russian bases. Cuba, Vietnam, and the Seychelles are the prime
candidates to host new Russian naval bases in these waters. The Russians already had a presence in Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay until 2002. The Vietnamese port was
home to the Soviets since 1979 and then hosted Russian forces after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia also continued to have a post-Soviet military
presence in Cuba until 2001 through the Lourdes intelligence signal base that monitored the US.
The Kremlin is additionally developing its
military infrastructure on its Arctic coast. New Arctic naval bases in the north are going to be opened. This is part of an overlap with the
careful Russian strategy that includes the Arctic Circle. It is drawn with two dual functions in mind. One function is to protect
Russian territorial and energy interests against NATO states in the Lomonosov Ridge. The other purpose is to serve the
Russian global maritime strategy. Moscow realizes that the US and NATO want to restrictively hem in its maritime forces in the Black Sea and
Mediterranean Sea. US and EU moves to control and restrict Russian maritime access to Syria is an indicator of this strategic
inclination and objective. The moves to strategically hem in Russian marine forces are one of the reasons that the Kremlin wants naval bases in the
Caribbean, South China Sea, and eastern coast of Africa. The development of Russia’s Arctic naval infrastructure and the opening of
Russian naval bases in places like Cuba, Vietnam, and the Seychelles would virtually guarantee the global presence of Russian naval
forces. Russian vessels would have multiple points of entry into international waters and secure docking bases abroad.
These bases will give the Russians permanent docking facilities in both the Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean too. The future overseas naval bases, like the one is
Syria, are not being referred to as “naval bases” by Russian officials, but by other terms. Moscow is calling them “supply points” or bases for naval logistics to make
them sound far less threatening. Nothing has been agreed upon in concrete terms between the governments in Havana and Moscow, and there has been no mention of
deploying Russian missiles to Cuba. Any comments about Russian moves in Cuba are speculation. The nuclear upgrades that Russia is making to its navy are much
more significant than any future Russian base in Cuba or elsewhere. Russia’s
new nuclear naval posture actually allows it to
cleverly station multiple mobile nukes around the US. In other words, Russia has “multiple Cubas” in the form of its floating mobile
nuclear naval vessels that can deploy anywhere in the world. This is also why Russia is developing is naval infrastructure abroad. Russia will have the option of
surrounding or flanking the United States with its own sea-based nuclear strike forces. Russia’s naval strategy cleverly is meant to counter the Pentagon’s global
missile shield. Included in this process is the adoption of a pre-emptive nuclear strike policy by the Kremlin as a
reaction to the aggressive pre-emptive post-Cold War nuclear strike doctrine of the Pentagon and NATO. In the same year as the test of the Liner by the Russians, the
commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General Karakayev, said that Russia’s inter-continental ballistic missiles would become
“invisible” in the near future. The world is increasingly becoming militarized. US moves and actions are now forcing other international actors to redefine and
reassess their military doctrines and strategies. Russia is merely just one of them.
Arctic Key to Russian Strength and Military
Mukusch 10 [Caroline, writer, second line of defense and strategy analyst, The Arctic Sea Competition
and Key Strategic Challenges for Europe (Part One), Second Line of Defense, 18/11/2010,
http://www.sldinfo.com/the-arctic-sea-competition-and-key-strategic-challenges-for-europe/]
the Arctic Ocean increasingly has become the focus of international interests. In particular the
competition for resources – notably oil and gas – has significantly raised the importance of this area for the future
For some years,
the Arctic – in its high northern latitudes of Russia, Norway, Greenland, United States, and Canada –
holds about 22 percent of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil and natural gas resource, about 30 percent of the
global economy. Experts estimate that
world’s undiscovered natural gas resources, about 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil resources, and about 20 percent of the world NGL
resources. The U.S. Geological Survey posits that approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion
barrels of natural gas liquids are in the Arctic. Over 400 already discovered oil and gas fields north of the Arctic Circle provide a projected 240
billion barrels oil and oil-equivalent natural gas. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that more than 70 percent of the undiscovered oil
resources occur in five provinces of the Arctic Area: Arctic Alaska, Amerasia Basin, East Greenland Rift Basins, East Barents Basins, and West
Greenland–East Canada. More than 70 percent of the undiscovered natural gas is estimated to occur in three provinces: The West Siberian Basin,
the East Barents Basins, and Arctic Alaska. Approximately 85 percent of these undiscovered oil and gas resources are estimated to be located
offshore. Not surprisingly, the Arctic is becoming an area of great national and international interest for politics, economy, and science. (Russia
warns of war within a decade over Arctic oil and gas riches.) An international race for the Arctic has emerged, including
the possibility of the use of armed forces. Although Russia seems to be ahead after it planted its country’s flag on the
North Pole’s seabed in 2007, Norway, Greenland, Canada, and the U.S. also claim rights to this region. No country completely owns
the geographic North Pole or the region of the Arctic Ocean. Russia, Norway, the United States, Canada, and Denmark via Greenland, the
surrounding Arctic states, have claims based on the 200 nautical mile economic zone around their coasts. And these states are trying successively
to extend their territorial sovereign rights around the North Pole in order to exclusively exploit all natural resources within its economic zone.
Upon ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a country has ten years to make claims to extend its 200-mile
economic zone. Norway (ratified the convention in 1996), Russia (1997), Canada (2003) and Denmark (2004) claim their right to certain Arctic
territories. Since 1982, the U.S. Senate has failed to ratify the convention. This effort finally led to the re-development of northern military and
security capabilities of almost all Arctic neighbor states. For instance, Norway’s main defense policy focuses on northern security. The
Norwegian navy currently is building a new class of ice-strengthened frigates. Russia also is rebuilding the strength of its naval
forces, currently building its submarine force to be stationed in its northern bases. Although, all of the main Arctic states contend
that the improvement of their northern military is only being done to provide an ability to respond to the expected increase in activity in the
Arctic, some Arctic states are increasing their Arctic capabilities with weapon systems that are obviously designed to fight
and not to act in a coast guard-type capability. Beyond that, due to the accelerated melting of Arctic ice vast areas of
sea are opening up which in turn is transforming the untouched and previously iced Arctic to an increasingly globalized
maritime area attracting not only trade and energy transportation traffic, but tourist cruises as well. The Congressional Research
Service remarked that an ice-free Northwest Passage could cut shipping routes between Europe and Asia by 3,000 to 4,000 miles. [1] Hence,
unresolved disputes over international borders in the Arctic and a latent conflict level raise the question: Who controls the Arctic (maritime)
region If Arctic states can prove that they have an extended continental shelf they can extend their control over the ocean soil and subsurface
beyond the exclusive economic zone. The imprecision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea makes it possible for a single
state to control almost the Arctic Ocean’s entire seabed. For instance, Russia, Canada and Denmark are claiming the Lomonosov Ridge. They
is in each case their continental shelf. The Lomonosov Ridge, which has the size of Germany, France, and Italy combined, runs
Access and
control of the Arctic sea are of critical importance to nations’ interests. In essence the state that controls the Northwest
Passage controls who enters these waters and under which conditions. This authority would shape future transit routes, oil and
gas exploration rights, economic development, protection of minorities, and military strategies – training missions and
missiles positioning.
argue that it
some 1,800 kilometers across the Arctic Ocean, stretching from Siberia over the North Pole to Canada’s Ellesmere Island.
Arctic Key to Russia Strength, Could be Base for Invasion
Francis, 27/2/14 [David, has reported from all over the world on a number of topics, from transatlantic
relations, to border security, to finance, and has spoken about his work at the Georgetown University
School of Foreign Service, the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, and the World
Affairs Council of Pittsburgh. The race for arctic oil: Russia vs US, The Week,
http://theweek.com/article/index/256908/the-race-for-arctic-oil-russia-vs-us]
The United States and Russia are at odds over a host of issues, from Ukraine to Syria to Edward Snowden, prompting talks of a new Cold War.
Their next confrontation could take place on the coldest place on earth. Last week, a Russian military official told Russian media
the Kremlin was forming a new strategic military command to protect its interests in the Arctic. It's part of a broader
push from Moscow to establish military superiority at the top of the world. "The new command will comprise the Northern Fleet,
that
Arctic warfare brigades, air force and air defense units as well as additional administrative structures," a source in Russia's General Staff told RIA
Novosti last Monday, The formation of the new command follows a December 2013 order from Russian President Vladimir Putin to ramp up
Russia's military presence in the Arctic. Putin said Russia was returning to the Arctic and "intensifying the development of this
promising region" and
that Russia needs to "have all the levers for the protection of its security and national
interests." These interests are primarily energy related. As Arctic ice has melted, companies from Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the
United States — the five countries that have a border with the Arctic — have been rushing to secure rights to drill for oil and natural gas in places
that are now accessible. Hundreds of billions of dollars are at stakeBut Alaska Democratic Sen. Mark Begich said that the Obama administration
should make the Arctic more of a priority. "It's like they've never heard of it," Begich said in a recent interview with Fox News. "With the Obama
administration we've had to push back pretty hard to convince them and show them why they need to invest in not only icebreakers, but forward
operating bases for the Arctic." The Arctic hasn't been strategically important to the Pentagon since the Cold War, when missile were tested there
and U.S. and Soviet submarines patrolled its waters. But DOD stopped paying attention to the region when the Iron Curtain fell. As Arctic
ice receded and the region became strategically important, DOD shifted its attention back north. Last November, it released
a new Arctic strategy outlining American interests in the region. The new strategy calls for the Pentagon to
take actions to ensure that American troops could repel an attack against the homeland from a foe based in
the Arctic. It's short on specifics, but calls for increased training to prepare soldiers for fights in Arctic conditions and for collaboration with
other federal agencies to determine what ice patterns would look like in the future. The document is careful to point out that the
United States was willing to work with allies. However, it makes clear that the Pentagon believes the
Arctic is becoming contested territory, and the DOD would act to protect American interests. "Throughout human history, mankind
has raced to discover the next frontier. And time after time, discovery was swiftly followed by conflict," the document reads. "We cannot erase
this history. But we can assure that history does not repeat itself in the Arctic."
Arctic Vital for Russian Defense and Military Strength
Anishchuk 13 [Alexei, Reuters correspondent in Moscow, Russia needs arctic presence to guard against
US threat: Putin, Reuters, 3/12/13 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/us-al-russia-putin-arcticidUSBRE9B20VT20131203]
President Vladimir Putin
said on Tuesday Russia had vital defense and economic interests in the Arctic, citing a
potential U.S. military threat from submarine-based missiles there. Russia detained 30 Greenpeace activists protesting against Arctic
drilling at Russian Prirazlomnaya offshore platform in September and they now face charges carrying seven-year jail sentences, underlining
Moscow's strong interest in the Arctic. Putin has ordered a Soviet-era military base reopened in the Arctic as part of a
drive to make the northern coast a global shipping route and secure the region's vast energy resources.
"Not only are there major economic interests for our country there...it is also an important part of our
defense capability," Putin told a meeting of university students in Moscow. "There are (U.S.) submarines there and they carry
missiles," the Russian leader said. "It only takes 15-16 minutes for U.S. missiles to reach Moscow from the Barents Sea. So should we give away
the Arctic? We should on the contrary explore it." Nevertheless, Putin said Russia was unlikely to get involved in any global conflicts,
particularly with the United States. Russia, the world's largest country and its second biggest oil exporter, is vying with Canada, Denmark,
Norway and the United States for control of the oil, gas and precious metals that would become more accessible if global warming shrinks the
Arctic ice cap. Moscow claims a whole swathe of the Arctic seabed, arguing that it is an extension of the Siberian continental shelf. Answering
questions from students, Putin stressed the need for patriotism - a common theme in his third presidential term in which he faces
growing dissent and economic problems.
"If we want to keep our identity overall, we of course need to cultivate the
patriotic sentiment," he said. "The country will not exist without it, it will fall apart from inside like a lump of sugar that has
been dipped in water." Russia initially accused the Greenpeace protesters of piracy but later softened the charges to hooliganism. Some activists
had tried to scale the Prirazlomnaya platform operated by state-owned firm Gazprom. Russia's first offshore oil platform in the Arctic, it is
expected to start production this month. All 30 Greenpeace environmental campaigners were released on bail last month, but still face prison
terms if convicted in a case that has drawn criticism from the West and is seen by Kremlin critics as part of a clampdown on dissent by Putin.
Russian geologists estimate the Arctic seabed has at least 9 billion to 10 billion metric tons of fuel equivalent, about the same as Russia's total oil
reserves.
1NC Case – Relations Bad – Middle East War
Russian engagement fuels Middle Eastern wars
Nyquist 7 (J.R., Former Contractor in Soviet/Russian Analysis Group for U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Former Ph.D. Student at UCIrvine in Political Sociology, and widely syndicated columnist and published author, "ECONOMIC WARFARE IN THE FINAL PHASE",
http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2007/0831.html)
Sarkozy, warned against Russia’s use of energy as an instrument of foreign policy
This week the French President, Nicolas
. Speaking
before his ambassadors, the French President said: “Russia is imposing its return [as a great power] on the world scene by employing its assets, notably oil and gas, with a certain brutality.” A great power ought to be gentle in its
economic or political superiority. The Russians, however, are accustomed to a more cynical use of their advantages. The language of the Russian president includes mockery, condescension and threats. The West cringes, the East
Russia is not only engaged in a military buildup. Russia wants
to use its economic muscles. You might ask what economic muscles Russia could have? It is bankrupt, backward, hobbled, demoralized and generally dismissed as an effective economic actor. We
must remember, however, that positions in the world economy can change, that tables can be turned. Last June, at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg, the Russians called for a “new
international financial architecture.” Here is Russia’s “Final Phase” economic strategy. The financial
vulnerability of capitalism is growing. Keep pushing oil prices higher. Weaken the dollar. Precipitate the
inevitable “crisis of capitalism.” Let the have-not nations rise up. Let them throw off their dollar shackles.
Let them unite with Russia and China in “one clenched fist.” Russian President Vladimir Putin believes the United States
is vulnerable. The emerging economies of Brazil, India and China – combined with Russia – can shove the hollowed-out American economy aside. After all, American economic ascendancy is “archaic, undemocratic
and unwieldy,” according to Putin. As for Europe, its dependence on Russian energy exports will assure a smooth process of
“Finlandization.” Such a process begins with gentle warnings from Russia’s ambassadors in Europe and ends with self-censorship. Russia’s economic penetration of Europe gives special leverage to Moscow. In
advances. Who cares what the weak countries think? Their feelings are without consequence.
other words, the Kremlin has entered into the Fabric of European political life – through agent networks, influence operations and business pressure. These relationships can be used to influence powerful people, to adversely affect the
Economic influence means political influence. As America is humiliated, as
America retreats, Russia advances. The day might come when Europe pays for its energy in rubles. If this occurs, Europe would have to acquire a large store of Russian currency. Russia’s
careers of anyone who opposes Russian interests.
economic position would grow, and so would Russia’s hold on Europe. Moscow wants to build a global oil exchange on Russian territory, knocking big financial players to one side. The Russians want to stun the American economy.
They want to weaken an already weakened dollar. In 1984 a Russian defector named Anatoliy Golitsyn wrote of the period following the collapse of communism. He warned of a renewed attack on the West, engineered by KGB
strategists. He said that this attack had an economic dimension. In his 1984 book, New Lies for Old, he wrote: “’Liberalization’ in Eastern Europe on the scale suggested could have a social and political impact on the United States
itself, especially if it coincided with a severe economic depression. The communist strategists are on the lookout for such an opportunity.” According to Golitsyn, the communist bloc tracks Western economic developments. They
watch for developing weaknesses. “The communist bloc will not repeat its error of failing to exploit a slump as it did in 1929-32.” The smartest political observers know that a financial slump resurrects Marxism and its critique of
the bloc is short of oil and grain
should be treated with particular reserve, since it could well be intended to conceal preparation for the
final phase of the policy and to induce the West to underestimate the potency of the bloc’s economic
weapons.” The economic weakness of Russia led Europe to feel safe about their growing dependence on Russian oil and gas. And now it is too late. Now we see how Russia and China have formed a military bloc. We see
them supporting the nuclear ambitions of Iran, the paranoid buildup of Syria and Venezuela – the seduction of Latin America and the bloody unraveling of sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. financial
situation worsens as the old communist bloc gathers its economic, political and military forces. Look at the new Russian
weapons – nuclear missiles, tanks, jet fighters and more. Look at Latin America and notice what is happening in Venezuela, Bolivia and Colombia. The communists are advancing under various false flags. They seek
the destruction of the United States. It doesn’t matter who is in the White House. It doesn’t matter what policy the U.S. is following. They want to destroy
America, because America stands in the way of their plans. If you live in America and want your children to be free, you’d better wake up. The actions of Russia
economic freedom. Referring to a deceptive phase of self-advertised Russian weakness, Golitsyn warned: “Information from communist sources that
are not in reaction to American “aggression” or “imperialism.” They are part of a long-established pattern of deception and exploitation. This is how the Russians behave. This is how they’ve always behaved. Most political pundits
and “experts” will scoff at this statement. But let me ask them: Is it a coincidence that a KGB-regime has emerged in “democratic” Russia? Is it happenstance that this regime has formed a military alliance with communist China?
Shortly before her death, the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya asked whether the rise of Putin’s Russia was mere happenstance. In answer to this question she took a bullet in the back of the head. The silencing of those who ask
the right questions is part of the old communist pattern. According to Mark Riebling, KGB defector Golitsyn’s 1984 book contains 148 falsifiable predictions. Of these predictions, 139 were “fulfilled by the end of 1993 – an accuracy
rate of nearly 94 percent.” Today, Golitsyn’s accuracy rate is higher. Having predicted Russia’s use of oil as a weapon, having predicted a future alliance between Russia and China, it might be said that 141 out 148 of Golitsyn’s
Russia tried to provoke a war between Israel and Syria. It turns out that the paranoia
in Damascus was fueled from Moscow. The conventional analyst thinks the Russians are motivated by the prospect of further
arms sales to Syria. But this is not the whole answer. Russia seeks to foment a greater military crisis with which to intensify the economic and energy crisis. The
Russians and their allies are making trouble where they can. The hour is ripe. The U.S. president is weak. The American economy is troubled. One great push, one more straw upon the
camel’s back, and capitalism might be overthrown – once and for all.
predictions have come to pass. In recent months
Middle East war causes global nuclear war
Primakov 9 (Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry – Russian Federation,
Member – Russian Academy of Science, “The Middle East Problem in the Context of International
Relations”, Russia in Global Affairs, 3, July/September, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13593)
The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War,
amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union
supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time
objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the
United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers
in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed
Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including
Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action.
Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash
with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War
of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each
other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms
for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations
on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces,
which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement
of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation
repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S.
military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the
Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of
interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a
private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done
amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in
Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in
response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and
Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion
that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into
a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real
threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st
century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the
balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore
as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian
leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a
technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already
possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East
settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have
catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively
strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which
increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the
Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive
strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such
a strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s
position does not completely rule out such a possibility.
1NC Case – Relations Bad – Terrorism
Cooperation turns Iran prolif and causes nuclear terrorism—severing ties prevents nuclear
war
Nyquist, 8 (J.R., Former Contractor in Soviet/Russian Analysis Group for U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Former Ph.D. Student at UCIrvine in Political Sociology, and widely syndicated columnist and published author, "The Enemy's Scheme of Attack",
http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2008/0627.html)
A small war can grow into a great war. Superpowers may confront each other. In fact, it’s happening now. The world’s superpowers are suppressing Islamists in
Iraq and Chechnya. Adjoining each conflict is another conflict, ready to flare up. On May 6 the Russian press declared: Russia-Georgia ‘close to war’, Tbilisi
to blame – Russian NATO envoy. At the same time, Russia has warned the U.S. against preemptively striking Iran . The
Americans are presented with a dilemma. If the U.S. doesn’t strike Iran before the November presidential election then Israel will launch a strike. Either way,
the Middle East comes unhinged within seven months. Many pundits assume that Russia and America are natural partners in the War on
Terror. If only they could find common ground and work together. This idea is mistaken, however, since Russia’s war against Islamic
terror isn’t the same as America’s war. The difference between the two superpowers is most obvious, most glaring when we realize that Russia is not
afraid to pass nuclear secrets to Iran. She is not afraid to arm Palestinian terrorists or Latin American terrorists. From the very start, the war in
Chechnya was a provocation. The speaker of the Chechen parliament, Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, has publicly stated that “Russia created Dudaev, Maskhadov and Basayev [the leaders of the Chechen revolt].” He added that Basayev
“was a GRU officer in Abkhazia….” He also said that Chechnya had “saved Russia from NATO” and would save Russia in the future. To understand his remark you must understand Russia’s long range policy. The entire Chechen
justify Russia’s totalitarian revival under Putin. It feeds the vital diversionary rumor that Al Qaeda
when Russian nuclear weapons are detonated in New York and
Washington, Moscow will not be blamed. The Chechen alibi is in place.
Earlier this month U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that Russia is
modernizing and improving its missile and nuclear weapon technology. Russia is also building a highly professional army, based on mobile
concepts and advanced weaponry. Early last year, in testimony before Congress, Gates noted that Russia and China are both “Pursuing
sophisticated military modernization programs” that threaten U.S. security. These are not new developments. They are ongoing
War, with all its death and tragedy, was used by Moscow to
smuggled nuclear weapons out of Russia via Chechnya. Therefore,
developments that government officials, pundits and the media have generally chosen to ignore – with occasional exceptions. One such exception occurred on Aug. 8, 1998 when Stanislav Lunev
testified before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee of the House of Representatives. Lunev was formerly a colonel in the GRU (Russian military intelligence) with knowledge
Moscow “continues to perfect war plans that
would assassinate U.S. political and military leaders and sabotage key targets in the United States by using small man-portable
nuclear weapons.” But didn’t the Cold War end with the collapse of the Soviet Union? According to Lunev’s 1998 testimony, “Russian intelligence
activity against this country [America] is much more active than it was in time of the former Soviet Union…. And this activity … is
of Russian military intentions. As the subcommittee chairman explained, Lunev’s testimony suggests that
much more dangerous for this country than it was before.” He further warned, “you can accept my information or not. But I can tell you … that before the USSR disintegration, we worked very hard trying to penetrate through this
country’s national security secrets. And sometimes we were successful….” Before the events of 9/11, before the American people knew anything about al Qaeda, Lunev was warning about Kremlin nukes being smuggled into the
United States. “According Soviet military plans,” said Lunev, “very well in advance, maybe few months, maybe few weeks … before real war … Russian Special Operations Forces [will] come here to pick up weapons systems,
because they will fly here as tourists, businessmen.” Once inside the United States they would locate prepositioned weapons of mass destruction. According to Lunev,
“They need to come here with
clean hands, only with documents. Maybe some money, that is all. But according to their tasking, in a few hours they need to physically
destroy [and] eliminate American military chains of command, President, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Vice President, Speaker of the House, military commanders,
especially to cut [the] head from American military chain of command. They need to destroy communications system in this country and grow panic and chaos in this country before real war would be in place.” Lunev defected from
the GRU. He was familiar with Russian military plans. According to these plans, Russian military teams will come to America, pick up weapon systems, and fulfill their operational mission. When a Congressman tried to account for
all this as Russian paranoia, Lunev corrected him: “they are not paranoid; they are really smart people. And they know if their policy will push to the next world war, it would be thermonuclear war…. As a result of this, they
constructed huge underground facilities in Moscow, close to Moscow, with communications, underground communications with other places and cities, including Yamantau [Mountain]….”
Russian war
preparations have continued through the 1990s up to the present moment. Congressman Owen Pickett of Virginia made the
following statement before Lunev’s testimony: “I understand Col. Lunev will share with us his belief that Russian military service and intelligence personnel still regard the United States as the
they are actively planning for a World War III.”
enemy, consider war between our two nations as inevitable, and that
There is something else out of
Russia that confirms Lunev’s testimony. It is the so-called “Surikov document” described by Weldon as “an internal Russian advisory document which also says that ultimately the United States
will be Russia’s long-term enemy [and] considers a war with the United States as likely and even inevitable….” This document also refers to a future merging of Russia’s interests with those of
One should also consider Russia’s official military doctrine, confirmed in
1999, which emphasizes nuclear first strike “under a broad range of scenarios.” Some will say this is old news. What everyone
seems to miss is the steady consistency of Russian policy. The Kremlin knows where it is going and stays on course. Russian belligerence has become even
more apparent since 1998, with the assassination of prominent dissidents like Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko. Through murder, oppression and support of rogue
regimes the Kremlin has tipped its hand for all to see. Unfortunately, men are deluded by false concepts and wishful thinking. The Spanish
philosopher, Jose Ortega y Gasset once wrote: “To create a concept is to leave reality behind.” Propaganda is superficially thought to consist in simplistic
arguments or slogans to promote a cause. But there are higher, intellectual weapons available. With the aid of false concepts, facts can be misinterpreted. Reality itself can be distorted.
The masses can be aroused against their leaders, the patriot can be led into treason, and the proletariat can be mobilized against the bourgeoisie. Just as naval supremacy gives an
advantage in time of war, disinformation supremacy provides an even greater advantage – scrambling the
enemy’s brain, dividing and conquering the various groups within the enemy camp.
various rogue states (i.e., Libya, Iraq, Syria, etc.).
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction
Morgan 9 - Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea (Dennis, Futures, November, “World on fire: two
scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Science Direct)
In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is Nuclear War Inevitable??’’ [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out
what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out
that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore
points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and
explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian ‘‘dead hand’’ system, ‘‘where regional
nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,’’ it is likely that any
attack would be blamed on the United States’’ [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that
if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal ‘‘Samson option’’ against all
major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even ‘‘anti-Semitic’’
European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be
involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds
would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future
generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well.
And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken
communication, false signal or ‘‘lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes,
unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation
of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since
each country would act under the ‘‘use them or lose them’’ strategy and psychology; restraint by one
power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of
opportunity to ‘‘win’’ the war. In other words, once Pandora’s Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it
will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people
embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, ‘‘everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use
internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will
attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self determination, some of
those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors’’ [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit
threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once
even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of
global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human
remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.
Xtn: Co-op Bad – Terror
Russian relations lead to the rise of Islamic extremism and other terrorist sects
Nyquist 8 (J.R., Former Contractor in Soviet/Russian Analysis Group for U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency , Former Ph.D. Student at UCIrvine in Political Sociology, and widely syndicated columnist and published author, "The ABCs of Global Power",
http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2008/0404.html)
Russia and the United States have the world’s largest nuclear arsenals. Both countries have powerful armies, fleets and air forces. The same can be
said for China, as well, which stands as the world’s third most powerful country. The three countries are large, in land area and population. Together they possess a quarter of the world’s surface land area, almost a third of the world’s
As the greatest of these three powers, the United States is
dominant. If this domination suddenly came to an end (due to a financial crash) the current alliance between Russia and China would
quickly fill the vacuum left by the collapse of American power. What would the world look like without America in a dominant role? To answer this
population and over 90 percent of the world’s most powerful and advanced weapons.
question we need to consider the differences between Russia, China and the United States. If there are no significant differences, especially regarding the use of power, the three countries would be interchangeable. The world would
Whatever sins the United States has committed, whatever
there is no comparison between America and the two other powers – Russia and China. The East and West differ in
history, politics and culture. Most of all, in the methods used to gather and maintain power. American history is completely different from Russian and
Chinese history. America’s history is not a parade of tyrants. It is not the story of the first Ch’in Emperor who unified China in 221 B.C., or of the first Tsar, Ivan the Terrible. Most nations are born in bloodshed, it
remain stable, with no threat of a major world war breaking out. Unfortunately, the three powers are not the same.
harm the Americans have done,
is true, but not all blood is spilled for similar ends. One seeks in vain for Chinese emperors or Russian tsars who resemble George Washington or Abraham Lincoln. Russia and China have always been ruled by despots. These were
, Russia and China are still ruled by despots.
not concerned with liberty, but for self-aggrandizement. Today
To better illustrate the character of Russian power – in the past and
present – readers are urged to read an article by Jamie Glazov titled The Russian-Al-Qaeda Axis. It is basically an interview Glazov conducted last month with the prime minister in exile of the Chechen Republic, Ahmed Zakayev.
, Zakayev explained that Islamist ideology is a KGB-organized
“provocation” against the Muslim population of the former Soviet Union. At that time the KGB founded the “Party of Islamic Revival of the
USSR.” Its purpose was, in Zakayev’s words, “to split every Muslim nation by dividing it into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims.” It has been a long tradition in Russia to divide
and conquer; to penetrate, infiltrate and subvert rival powers; to create false opposition fronts with which to corral enemies. According to
Zakayev, Islamic radicalism was “the Kremlin’s vaccine” against the national independence of various Muslim groups within the USSR. “For all those years,” said Zakayev, “the main
mission of the ‘Islamic’ ideologists was to discredit and disorganize the Chechen Resistance.” He further
explained that the FSB/KGB is “the most experienced terrorist organization in the world, whose foundations were laid
even before the Bolsheviks captured power….” Russia’s special services know how to conduct “every kind of terrorist activity,
including kidnappings, explosions, hijacking planes, hostage-taking, use of poisons and nuclear materials
for assassinations, etc.” But the KGB’s most prized capability, Zakayev noted, “is the FSB’s ability to form and develop extremist ideologies.” It is not widely appreciated, but
the most influential and destructive conspiracy ideology of the 20th century was created by the Russian
special services in Paris. I am referring to the forgery known as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Hitler believed in the Protocols and Nazism based its genocidal campaign
When asked whether the Chechen Resistance is nationalist or Islamist
against the Jews on this very document. Much of the conspiracy nonsense animating the extreme right in America, as well, has been influenced by this forgery. One only has to cite the case of
Timothy McVeigh. If the Russian secret police had not fabricated the Protocols, the Oklahoma City bombing would have had no conceptual antecedent whatsoever (see The Turner Diaries).
After 1917 the Soviet government persevered in the tsarist tradition of feeding extremist ideology. One such example involves Soviet encouragement of the JFK assassination conspiracy cult (see
The Mitrokhin Archive). To cultivate widespread distrust, hatred and pessimism, the FSB/KGB has developed sophisticated intellectual tools to disrupt target societies. Extremist ideas have
The Islamic terrorism threatening the world today
is yet another example of the KGB’s creation of extremist ideologies. According to Zakayev, al Qaeda is “a global
provocation, designed to clash the Islamic world with the Western world, thus weakening both sides as
much as possible. Those who capitalize on that are Russia, China and their allies in the totalitarian camp.” Zakayev is almost certainly correct. Reflecting on the facts of Russian
greatly impacted the patriotism of many Americans, leading them into disillusionment and paranoia.
history, on the KGB’s employment of extremist ideologies, what would be the result of America’s decline? What would be unleashed? What violence would be committed, and what nations
there is only one nation capable of resisting the nuclear threat of Russia
and China. If America weakens and retreats the power of Russia and China necessarily advances. For those
would suffer? As I explained at the beginning of this column,
who curse the United States and Israel, who embrace various conspiracy theories, I offer this caveat. Do you want Russia and China to dominate the world? Would you trust the heirs of Mao
Zedong and the disciples of Felix Dzerzhinsky to keep the peace, to maintain freedom, to further global prosperity? Do you want the legacy of Ivan the Terrible and the first Ch’in Emperor?
One power is going to dominate. One legacy is going to find itself realized. Will it be a legacy of global
terror and oppression? Or will it be a legacy of free markets and free elections?
Case – Russia
1NC No Science Co-op
no arctic science – territorial claims inadvertent bureaucracy
Daniel Cressey is a reporter with Nature in London, 2011 [“Scientific challenges in the Arctic: Open
water”, Published online 12 October 2011 | Nature 478, 174-177 (2011) | doi:10.1038/478174a,
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/111012/full/478174a.html]/sbhag 6.30.2014
The territorial ambitions of different nations may also end up restricting scientific access. In theory, the
areas claimed under the UNCLOS apply only to the sea floor and do not give a country rights over the
water above. In practice, however, such claims could hinder scientific work. "If a coastal state wanted to,
it could, by declaring regions to be of special interest for exploration, require that other states request
permission to conduct research in the area of the extended continental shelf," says Larry Mayer, a marine
geologist at the University of New Hampshire in Durham. This is more than just idle speculation, he says,
because Russia has a history of impeding access to scientists from other nations seeking to work in its
waters. Some researchers say that their attempts to put out or collect equipment from areas under Russian
control have been thwarted when applications for permits were either denied or went unanswered. The
Integrated Ocean Drilling Program, for example, could not obtain permission to drill in Russian parts of
the Bering Sea in 2009. Some scientists familiar with Russia say that the permission problems stem more
from the nation's massive bureaucracy than a deliberately obstructionist policy. "Inertia here coming from
the Soviet era is really huge," says Igor Polyakov, a Russian Arctic researcher who now works at the
University of Alaska Fairbanks. He says that gaining permission for research in Russian waters is much
easier now than in the past. Others report just the opposite. Cheryl Rosa, deputy director of the US Arctic
Research Commission in Anchorage, Alaska, says that researchers are still experiencing problems with
permits, visas, taxations on funding, getting data out of Russia and other issues.
1NC No Uq
No US-Russia crisis – everything is fine now
Gudev 3/19/14
enior Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the
Russian Academy of Sciences,
http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/arctic-cooperation/?id_4=1053
n the last years, we have witnessed a deep evolution in the understanding of the Arctic issues among both
American and Russian experts. We have understood that we are allies rather than enemies and that we
have shared interests in the Arctic. At the time being, all countries are willing to cooperate in the Arctic.
This willingness remains in spite of the crisis in Ukraine or in any other sphere. The Arctic has been and
will be a very fruitful field of cooperation between Russia and the U.S., Norway, and Canada. I don’t
think there will be any problems
No impact on programs
RIA Novosti 4/25/14
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140425/189367444/Sanctions-Wont-Impact-Arctic-Projects--Russian-ScienceOfficial.html
Potential sanctions imposed by the West will have no impact on Russia’s international projects in the
Arctic, because the country’s partners are interested in further polar cooperation, a senior Russian science
official told RIA Novosti Friday. “No sanctions, I emphasize that, even Canada’s demarche in the Arctic
Council, will affect working relations," said Arkady Tishkov, deputy head of the Institute of Geography at
the Russian Academy of Sciences. "The [international] cooperation continues, information exchange
continues, as well as an actual realization of the projects, including major investments,” Tishkov said
during a panel discussion entitled “Arctic: Defense of Russian Interests.”
1NC Russia Says No
Ignore their cooperation defense—Russians are intentionally hiding their belligerence to
encourage complacency in the US
Huebert 10 (Rob, PhD and Professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security
Environment,” http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf)
It should be clear that the Russians have been according a growing importance to the Arctic region
. They
continually issue statements affirming their commitment to peaceful cooperation in the Arctic, which
show up in the form of public statements by their leaders and in their primary documents. These same
leaders are also very quick to condemn the actions of the other Arctic states as being aggressive and a
threat to international peace and security in the region whenever they engage in any form of military
related activity. It is clear, however, that the Russians have embarked on a much more assertive use of military
force in the region by taking various action – the missile test launches near the pole, the sudden and
substantial resumption of the long-range bomber patrols, and the voyages of their surface units into the
disputed zones – which exceeds that of any of the other Arctic states. Furthermore, the Russians’ proposed
rearmament plans greatly exceed the plans of any other Arctic state. Thus, the Russians have excelled at
portraying themselves as cooperative while taking increasingly assertive action. The question remains as to why?
Are they merely reasserting themselves as a global power, or, does this new action point to an increasingly assertive Russia? This is not known.
1NC No Arctic War
Zero chance of Arctic war---experts
Mahony 3/19 Honor, EU Observer, "Fear of Arctic conflict are 'overblown'", 2013,
euobserver.com/foreign/119479
The Arctic has become a new frontier in international relations, but fear of potential conflict in the resourcerich region is overblown, say experts. For long a mystery because of its general impenetrability, melting ice caps are revealing more and more of the Arctic regio n
to scientists, researchers and industry. Climate change experts can take a more precise look at a what global warming is doing to the planet, shipping trade routes once considered unthinkable are
now possible, and governments and businesses are in thrall to the potential exploitation of coal, iron, rare earths and oil. The interest is reflected in the growing list of those wanting to have a foot
in the Arctic council, a forum of eight countries with territory in the polar region. While the US, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Canada form the council, the EU
The Arctic has become a new meeting
place for America, Europe and the Asia Pacific," says Damien Degeorges, founder of the Arctic Policy and Economic Forum. During a recent conference
commission, China, India, South Korea and Japan have all expressed an interest in having a permanent observer status. "
on Arctic shipping routes in the European Parliament, Degeorges noted that "China has been the most active by far in the last years." He points to its red-carpet treatment of politicians from
Greenland, a territory that recently got full control over its wealth of natural resources. Bejing also cosied up to Iceland after the island's financial meltdown. The two undertook a joint expedition
to the North Pole and the Chinese have the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik. Meanwhile, South Korea's president visited Greenland last year and shipping hubs like Singapore are holding
Arctic conferences. The interest is being spurred by melting icebergs. Last year saw a record low of multi-year ice - permanent ice - in the polar sea. This means greater shipping and mineral
exploitation potential. There were 37 transits of the North East Passage (NEP), running from the Atlantic to the Pacific along the top of Russia, in 2011. This rose to 47 in 2012. For a ship
travelling from the Netherlands to China, the route around 40 percent shorter than using the traditional Suez Canal. A huge saving for China, where 50 percent of its GDP is connected to
shipping. Russia is also keen to exploit the route as the rise in temperatures is melting the permafrost in its northern territory, playing havoc with its roads and railways. According to Jan Fritz
Hansen, deputy director of the Danish shipowners’ association, the real breakthrough will come when there is a cross polar route. At the moment there are are two options - the North East Passge
for which Russia asks high fees for transiting ships - or the much-less developed North West Passage along Canada. His chief concern is that "trade up there is free. We don't want protectionism.
Everyone should be allowed to compete up there." And he believes the biggest story of the Arctic is not how it is traversed but what will be taken out of it. According to the US Geological
Survey (2009), the Arctic holds 13 percent of undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered gas supplies. Greenland is already at the centre of political tussle between the EU and China over
future exploitation of its rare earths - used in a range of technologies such as hybrid cars or smart phones. "The biggest adventure will be the Arctic destination. There is a lot of valuable goods
This resource potential - although tempered by the fact that much of it is not
economically viable to exploit - has led to fears that the Arctic region is ripe for conflict. But this is
nonsense, says Nil Wang, a former Danish admiral and Arctic expert. Most resources have an owner "There is a
general public perception that the Arctic region holds great potential for conflict because it is an
ungoverned region where all these resources are waiting to be picked up by the one who gets there first. That is
completely false," he said. He notes that it is an "extremely well-regulated region," with international rules
saying that coastal states have territorial jurisdiction up to 12 nautical miles off their coast. On top of that is a
further 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone "where you own every value in the water and
under the seabed." "Up to 97 percent of energy resources is actually belonging to someone already," says Wang. He
suggest the actors in the region all want to create a business environment, which requires stable politics
and security.
that should be taken out of nature up there," he said.
1NC Relations High
Empirics prove US-Russian relations will remain stable despite Ukraine crisis –
overlapping interests in containing China
Eland, 4/29/14 – Senior Fellow and Director, Center on Peace & Stability, Independent Institute (Ivan,
“Despite the Crisis Over Ukraine, America Will Likely Need Russia Soon,” Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-eland/despite-the-crisis-over-u_b_5226435.html)//SY
Despite all of the hand wringing in the United States about Russia's soft invasion and annexation of
Crimea and its intimidation of eastern Ukraine, President Barack Obama's tour of East Asia demonstrates
why U.S.-Russian relations probably will avoid plummeting into a new Cold War. Although President
Obama insisted during his trip to four East Asian countries worried about China's rapid rise (while not
visiting China) that, "We're not interested in containing China," some experts nevertheless were correctly
calling it the "containment tour." Obama visited Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia -- the
first three being nations that the United States has pledged to defend and the last being a nation that would
like U.S. support in its territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea. Similarly, the Philippines
and Japan would also like American support in their territorial disputes with China in the South and East
China Seas, respectively. The U.S. has pledged to defend South Korea against North Korea, a major
Chinese ally. In addition to past strengthening of U.S. Cold War-era alliances in East Asia, Obama, on
this trip, is bringing back American military use of Philippine military bases, from which Filipinos ejected
the United States in 1992 after the Cold War ended. But what does all this have to do with Russia?
Foreign policy realists make a good case that most countries, whether democratic or autocratic, behave
similarly on the global stage. The United States fears a rising China, and thus Obama's "pivot" to Asia has
renewed and revitalized America's East Asian alliances that were originally directed against the Soviet
Union. Russia has long border with China and also fears its rise, especially because Siberia is resource
rich and sparsely populated and may thus be vulnerable to penetration by a populous China. And despite
more than 40 years of Cold War with the Soviet Union and recently strained relations with Vladimir
Putin's Russia, believe it or not, for the last two hundred years, the country in the world that the United
States has shared the most strategic interests with is Russia. According to Michael Lind, in the book The
American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life, American strategists
always have counted on Russia to oppose the rise of potentially hegemonic powers in Europe and East
Asia. For example, communism came to the Soviet Union in 1917 and the United States has been
suspicious of Russia ever since (this suspicicvon has lingered even after the Soviet Union collapsed in
1991), yet during two world wars, the United States teamed up with the Soviets to stop Germany and in
the second one, t o some extent, Imperial Japan. In the future, to contain a rapidly rising China, the United
States would need Russia again -- and Russia would need the United States. That's why Russia's behavior
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, despite its unacceptability, will probably be forgotten rather quickly in
Washington. That is not to say that future U.S.-Russian relations will be without incident; Putin's
autocratic ways grate on the democratic United States, but he is certainly only a shadow of the once
principal U.S. ally Joseph Stalin in human rights abuses. However, history shows the United States can
forgive much if it believes its security or vital interests are at stake -- for example, America's long-time
Saudi Arabian ally has one of the worst human rights on the planet, but it is also awash in the perceived
strategic commodity of oil. Of course, a larger question is whether the United States and Russia need to
contain China at all, but they probably will band together to do so anyway -- as they have in the past to
contain other rising powers. U.S. containment was perceived to have "worked" in toppling the Soviet
Union, and it probably had some effect. However, the policy was also expensive, both in terms of U.S.
soldiers' lives and trillions from the U.S. Treasury. A smarter policy might have been to realize that a
communist empire, probably even more so than other more economically efficient empires, simply would
have collapsed from financial overextension in bailing out and administering economic basket cases such
as Korea in the 1950s, Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, Nicaragua, Cuba, Angola, etc. Letting the Soviet
Union have these non-strategic countries would have, if anything, hastened its demise.
1NC Iran Defense
No impact to Iran Prolif
Layne 10 (Christopher, Christopher Layne holds the Mary Julia and George R. Jordan professorship of international affairs at Texas A & M
University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. He is the author of The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy
from 1940 to the Present (Cornell University Press, 2006), and (with Bradley A. Thayer) American Empire: A Debate (Routledge, 2006), and is a
contributing editor to the American Conservative, “who lost Iraq and why it matters: the case for offshore balancing,” august 19,
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/who-lost-iraq-and-why-it-matters-case-offshore-balancing)
Even if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the worst-case scenarios—that there could be a nuclear arms race in the
Middle East; that Iran might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and that Tehran could use its nuclear weapons aggressively or
to blackmail other states in the region—are improbable. A nuclear Iran is unlikely to touch off a proliferation
snowball in the Middle East. Israel already is a nuclear power. The other states that might be tempted to
attain nuclear weapons capability—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—would be under strong pressure not to do
so. (Saudi Arabia also lacks the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously.) Despite the
Bush administration’s hyperbolic rhetoric and Tehran’s close links to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran is not likely to
supply nuclear weapons to terrorists. If it did and the terrorists were to use these weapons against the United States or its
allies, the weapons could be traced back to the donor state, which would be at risk of annihilation by an
American retaliatory strike. Even if one believes the administration’s claims that rogue state leaders are indifferent to
the fate of their populations, they do care very much about the survival of their regimes. For the same reason, Iran’s
possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran with options to attack, or intimidate its neighbors.
Israel’s security with respect to Iran is guaranteed by its own formidable nuclear deterrent capabilities. By
the same token, the United States can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region—
Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Turkey—just as it did in Europe during the Cold War. American security guarantees not only
will dissuade Iran from acting recklessly, but also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for states like Saudi Arabia and
Turkey to build their own nuclear weapons. Given the overwhelming U.S. advantage in both nuclear and conventional military
capabilities, it is highly implausible that Iran would risk national suicide by challenging America’s security commitments in the
region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran hardly is desirable, neither is it “intolerable,” because it could be contained and
deterred successfully by the United States. Containment, deterrence, and diplomacy are a far wiser policy than attacking Iran.
Xtn: No Arctic War
Past trends prove – cooperation is more likely
Fries 12 [Tom Fries, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Arctic Institute, Apr 18 2012, “Perspective
Correction: How We Misinterpret Arctic Conflict,”
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/perspective-correction-how-we.html]
It’s not
only the handcuffs of many colors worn by the Arctic states that will keep them from getting
aggressive, it is also the good precedents that exist for cooperation here. Russia and Norway recently
resolved a forty year-old dispute over territory in the Barents. There are regular examples of military
cooperation among the four littoral NATO states and between Norway and Russia. Even the US and Russia
are finding opportunities to work together. Meanwhile, the need to develop search-and-rescue capabilities is
making cross-border cooperation a necessity for all Arctic actors. There are numerous international
research and private-sector ventures, even in areas other than hydrocarbons. These will only grow in
importance with time. In fact, it would seem that for many of these countries, the Arctic is a welcome relief - a site
where international collaboration is comparatively amicable.
Xtn: Relations High
US-Russia relations still high – overlapping foreign policy interests
Lukyanov, 4/4/14 – Chairman, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (Fyodor, “Does Russia need
America?,” Russia Beyond the Headlines,
http://rbth.com/opinion/2014/04/04/does_russia_need_america_35629.html)//SY
But its goal in the international arena is not to simply oppose the U.S. However, this may be the way that
Russia reminds others about the line. In everything else, Moscow is not going to turn into an automatic
opponent of America. It is noteworthy that against the background of the very emotional debate over
Ukraine, chemical weapons are still being removed from Syria on schedule, and the Kremlin has not
changed its position on settling the Syrian situation politically, or on nuclear talks with Iran. It is
especially worth noting that Russia is not questioning its agreement with NATO to allow cargo to be
transported from Afghanistan via Ulyanovsk. And this is even in light of the quite unfriendly statements
being made by both the military and political leadership of the alliance. Russia, it seems, doesn't plan on
abandoning its cooperation with the United States in areas where the interests of the countries do not
contradict each other. But it will not give in where interests diverge. This model is quite natural for
relations between two major powers that are not allies, especially in today's multi-layered world, where
there aren't any simple oppositions or linear dependencies anymore. In which areas do our interests
converge? There is the Arctic, where, contrary to emotions that are often blown out of proportion,
Russian and American interests are not so far apart. There is the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, in
which Moscow and Washington, whether they like it or not, remain the main players and carry the
primary responsibility. The topic of terrorism has been exhausted, mostly it has just been talk, but
objectively there are still some points where our interests converge.
US-Russian relations are re-stabilizing post-Ukraine – Russian return to diplomacy
Yucai, 4/21/14 – Professor, Crisis Management Center, PLA National Defense University (Yang, “Russia
sets example of strong crisis management with firm legal basis,” Global Times,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/855865.shtml)//SY
Meanwhile, US-Russia relations, which were once on the verge of a new Cold War, are gradually
heading back on the track of dialogue and cooperation. It seems that along with diplomatic measures
and economic dialogues, Russia's "assertiveness" which the West finds hard to tolerate, may be gradually
diluted. The Putin administration's high efficiency in managing the regional crisis is impressive. Such a
high efficiency stems from a united security institution, a high level of strategic planning, and government
agencies' strong enforcement capabilities. Russia's crisis management is based on a unified national
security institution, at the core of which is the Federal Security Service (FSB). Through the FSB, Russian
President Vladimir Putin grasps the overall strategic pattern and makes the most important decisions.
Xtn: No Iran Impact
US deterrent and decreased value of nukes means no impact
Bahgat ’11 [Gawdat, professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, “A Nuclear Arms
Race in the Middle East: Myth or Reality?”, Mediterranean Quarterly 22:1, Project Muse]
The analysis in this essay focuses on a fundamental question: How would Arab countries react to a nuclear Iran? Obviously, any attempt to
predict the behavior of a nuclear Iran would be speculative. Still, it is important to underscore key security facts. The value of nuclear
weapons needs to be reassessed. With its presumed nuclear capability, Israel was not able to bring the 2006
war against Hezbollah to a decisive end. Furthermore, for most of the second half of the twentieth century the Arab-Israeli conflict
was the prominent feature of the Middle East. Despite frequent military confrontations with Israel and claims of Arab
leadership, Egypt has refused or failed to engage in a nuclear arms race with the Jewish state. A war between Iran and
either Egypt or Saudi Arabia (or any other Arab country) is highly unlikely. Finally, both Cairo and Riyadh enjoy
very close security and strategic ties with the United States. Washington is strongly committed to the security of its
Arab allies. In recent years the United States has agreed to sell missile defense systems to a number of
Persian Gulf states. To sum up, an Iran with nuclear weapons capability is likely to further destabilize the Middle East, but it is
not likely to ignite a regional nuclear arms race.
AT: Nuclear Terror Impact
No loose Russian nukes, and not possible for unauthorized explosion
MUELLER 2010 [JOHN Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political
Science, “Think Again: Nuclear Weapons”, January/February Foreign Policy]
If these attention-grabbing rumors were true, one
might think the terrorist group (or its supposed Chechen suppliers)
would have tried to set off one of those things by now or that al Qaeda would have left some trace of the
weapons behind in Afghanistan after it made its very rushed exit in 2001. Instead, nada. It turns out that getting
one's hands on a working nuclear bomb is actually very difficult. In 1998, a peak year for loose nuke stories, the
head of the U.S. Strategic Command made several visits to Russian military bases and pointedly reported, "I want
to put to bed this concern that there are loose nukes in Russia. My observations are that the Russians are indeed
very serious about security." Physicists Richard Garwin and Georges Charpak have reported, however, that this forceful firsthand
testimony failed to persuade the intelligence community "perhaps because it [had] access to varied sources of information." A
decade later, with no credible reports of purloined Russian weapons, it rather looks like it was the general, not the
spooks, who had it right. By all reports (including Allison's), Russian nukes have become even more secure in
recent years. It is scarcely rocket science to conclude that any nuke stolen in Russia is far more likely to go off in
Red Square than in Times Square. The Russians seem to have had no difficulty grasping this fundamental
reality. Setting off a stolen nuke might be nearly impossible anyway, outside of TV's 24 and disaster movies.
Finished bombs are routinely outfitted with devices that will trigger a nonnuclear explosion to destroy the
bomb if it is tampered with. And, as Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and
development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, stresses, only a few people in the world know how to cause an
unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon. Even weapons designers and maintenance personnel do not
know the multiple steps necessary. In addition, some countries, including Pakistan, store their weapons
disassembled, with the pieces in separate secure vaults.
Case – Oil
1NC No Spills
No spills – Drilling will be safe if it happens
Ossipov 12-11-13
(Igor Ossipov. M.A. 'Distinction' Higher School of Economics / Univeristy of Kent. December 11th, 2013.
The Arctic Frontier – “Armed with Cooperation”.http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/casingpoint/?id_4=868
With a series of major accidents that rocked the tabloids it can easily feel that the big oil business is all
about profits with no regard for the environment. It may well be the case for some firms; however it is not
the case in the Arctic. If we recall those series of major accidents, the Exxon Valdez spill of the coast of
Alaska had a total cost of $5-9 billion, as about 40-72,000 tons leaked into the water in 1989. It was not
too severe as the cargo was not too large nor did the oil hit ice. In 2002 the Prestige grounded near Spain costing €5 billion as
64,000 tons of mazut hit the coast. In 2010 the Deepwater Horizon Incident broke all records as the most infamous
and biggest oil spill in history. This tragic event not only took the lives of 11 people, but only a small portion of the oil was successfully removed, or
burned, leaving huge pollution in the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, BP who charted the drilling platform ended up with a cleaning up and damages bill of $25 billion as
the potential of such disaster is unthinkable
for any firm in the Arctic. It would far exceed the Gulf of Mexico incident and likely wipe out even one
of the global oil majors. To no surprise not many take on this region. As A. Krivorotov of Shtokman
Development Company highlighted Royal Dutch Shell is the most active with investments of $4.5 billion,
but most cannot enter the market due to risk or huge costs. Even the French oil supermajor Total had to exit, whereas Exxon Mobil
well as more than $40 billion in asset losses (Business Week, 2013). As David Hayes outlined,
that receives a lot of public attention in the region is highly selective. As LUKoil's Alexander Abashin outlined Russian firms are not left behind either, as his major
invests 10% of their investment in selected areas towards safety and even though there is competition amongst LUKoil and Gazprom, they have a deal in place to
assist each other in the event of an accident. As
clear there is a change of behaviour towards the Arctic as no corporate
headperson wants to attend the funeral of their firm and their likely career, but aside from majors, state
governments are also doing their bit. Hayes stressed that the US is forcing firms like Shell to only enter the
Arctic if they bring their best equipment and know-how. As the Arctic is absent of infrastructure and there
is no stationed tools in the case of an accident, so a major cannot just try to redirect from nearby. USA has
demanded that capping-stacks are always available if drilling as well as oil well replacement parts and
special collector vessels that can quickly sweep up spills if they do occur. In 2012 drilling was postponed
as Shell did not have such vessels in the vicinity, as the risk of oil hitting ice is unthinkable – purely
because there is no technology that can clean or collect oil back under ice. In May 2013 President Obama also launched an
Integrated Arctic Management System, whereby any construction of ports or oil type installations had to be openly discussed with all the potential stakeholders as the
US hopes to avoid such an event whereby investment is made that soon becomes unnecessary . In all, from an American perspective, we must be realistic that oil
production will take place as at the end almost everything is ran on oil, but it must be done in the safest of ways for this region. As Hayes puts it, USA has a “managed
approach”.
1NC No Drilling
Oil companies won’t drill in arctic
Cockerman 1/30/14
Sean Cockerman. Sean Cockerham is a reporter for McClatchy Newspapers, based in Washington, D.C. He writes for the Anchorage Daily News
and the Idaho Statesman.
January 30th,2014. “Shell won't drill offshore in Alaska Arctic this year”. http://www.adn.com/2014/01/30/3298785/shell-abandons-plans-foralaska.html
Royal Dutch Shell is abandoning hopes of drilling in the Arctic waters off Alaska this year, the
latest blow to the company's effort to exploit huge potential in the petroleum-rich but sensitive region. The
WASHINGTON --
decision came as Shell reported a steep drop in earnings and its new CEO announced plans to restructure operations to improve the company's cash flow. CEO Ben van Beurden cited last week's
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with environmental and
Alaska Native groups that the federal government had underestimated how much oil drilling would
happen when it sold the leases in 2008. Van Beurden told investors that the ruling raised "substantial
obstacles" for Shell's plans in Alaska waters. "This is a disappointing outcome, but the lack of a clear path
forward means that I am not prepared to commit further resources for drilling in Alaska in 2014," he told the
court ruling that threw offshore Arctic oil leases into question.
investors Thursday. "We will look to relevant agencies and the court to resolve their open legal issues as quickly as possible." Van Beurden told reporters in London that, in addition to not
drilling the Arctic waters in 2014, "we are reviewing our options there." Shell and others had explored offshore in the Alaska Arctic in the 1980s and early 1990s. But before Shell's recent push
there had been little activity in the last two decades and none by Shell. A series of mishaps doomed its 2012 effort. Those included the grounding of a drilling rig, reports of safety and
environmental violations, and fines for breaking air pollution limits. Ken Salazar, the interior secretary at the time, said Shell "screwed up" the historic Arctic effort. The Coast Guard conducted a
full marine casualty investigation into the circumstances of the grounding. But its report has not yet been released. The problems led Shell to drop plans to drill last year, but it had interest in
Shell has spent almost $6 billion so far on its Arctic offshore effort,
the company said Thursday. "We needed more certainty and didn't get it, making it impossible to justify
the commitment of resources needed to explore safely in 2014," Pete Slaiby, Shell's vice president for
Alaska, said in an email. It has yet to extract oil or even drill a single, complete well. While Salazar allowed Shell to start
resuming this year if the federal government agreed to issue permits.
wells in both the Chukchi and Beaufort seas in 2012, the company wasn't allowed to drill into oil-rich geologic zones because its novel oil-spill containment dome failed tests. The entire drilling
"Shell is finally recognizing what
we've been saying all along, that offshore drilling in the Arctic is risky, costly and simply not a good bet
from a business perspective," said Jacqueline Savitz, Oceana's vice president for U.S. oceans. Erik Grafe, the
season was shortened because of a series of equipment problems. Environmental groups hailed Shell's decision to suspend the effort.
Earthjustice attorney who led the lease challenge, called on the Obama administration to do a new environmental study. "The Department of the Interior now needs to take a hard look at whether
the Chukchi Sea should be open for oil drilling at all, beginning with a full and public environmental impact statement process that addresses the Ninth Circuit decision and does not minimize the
Greenpeace urged other companies that are considering
offshore Arctic drilling to learn from Shell's experience and "conclude that this region is too remote, too
hostile and too iconic to be worth exploring." "The decision by Shell's new CEO to suspend Arctic Ocean
drilling in 2014 was both sensible and inevitable," Lois Epstein, an engineer and Arctic program director for The Wilderness Society, said in a statement.
"The Arctic Ocean has proven to be logistically challenging for drilling and mobilization, and a
bottomless pit for investment." Political leaders faulted the federal government and court rulings and
downplayed Shell's own difficulties. Alaska Republican Sen. Lisa Murkowski said she was disappointed that Shell wouldn't be going ahead this year. She said it
risks of oil drilling in this vibrant but vulnerable sea," Grafe said in a statement.
was understandable given the uncertainty due to the federal court ruling on its leases. "Companies willing to invest billions of dollars to develop our country's resources must have confidence that
the federal agencies responsible for overseeing their efforts are competent and working in good faith. I'm not convinced that has been the case for Alaska," Murkowski said in a statement. Alaska
Democratic Sen. Mark Begich blamed "judicial overreach" for the situation. "I'll be talking with Interior Secretary Sally Jewell today, and expect her agency to move quickly to address the
court's questions and concerns and do everything possible to get this process back on track," Begich said in a statement. Gov. Sean Parnell said Shell's decision was understandable, given the
recent court ruling. "Multiple years of federal regulatory delay, litigation delay, and one year of operational issues have created barriers to Alaskans' near-term economic prospects," Parnell said
in a statement. "Still, offshore energy development will play an enormous role in Alaska's economic future, and I remain committed to responsibly developing our vast offshore resource basin."
The decision came as the company told investors that its fourth-quarter profits had plummeted, in part because of expensive exploration projects around the world. Van Beurden said project
delays in several countries and Nigeria's worsening security situation had contributed to a changing outlook for the Dutch oil company. He said Shell would reduce its capital spending this year
by about $10 billion, increase sales of its assets and attempt to improve its operational performance. "We are making hard choices in our worldwide portfolio to improve Shell's capital
. Other oil companies also have reservations about developing in the harsh Arctic environment.
efficiency," he said
In April, ConocoPhillips announced it was abandoning its plans to drill this year in its Devil's Paw prospect about 80 miles off the Alaska coast because of uncertainty over government
requirements. Statoil, a Norweigian oil and gas company, announced in September 2012 that it was delaying exploration plans. Spanish oil company Repsol also holds leases offshore. The
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management estimates there are 27 billion barrels of "undiscovered technically recoverable" oil offshore Alaska. Daily News reporter Lisa Demer contributed to this
story from Anchorage.
1NC Climate Alt Cause
Alt Cause – Climate Change is the worst threat to Arctic biodiversity
Meltofte 2-4-14
DSc. Hans Meltofte. University-of-Aarhus at Alaska News. February 4th, 2014. “Arctic biodiversity under
serious threat from climate change according to new report”.
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2014-02/au-abu021214.php
Unique and irreplaceable Arctic wildlife and landscapes are crucially at risk due to global warming
caused by human activities according to the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA), a new report
prepared by 253 scientists from 15 countries under the auspices of the Conservation of Arctic Flora and
Fauna (CAFF), the biodiversity working group of the Arctic Council. "An entire bio-climatic zone, the
high Arctic, may disappear. Polar bears and the other highly adapted organisms cannot move further
north, so they may go extinct. We risk losing several species forever," says Hans Meltofte of Aarhus University, chief
scientist of the report. From the iconic polar bear and elusive narwhal to the tiny Arctic flowers and lichens that paint the tundra in the summer
months, the Arctic is home to a diversity of highly adapted animal, plant, fungal and microbial species. All told, there are more than
21,000 species. Maintaining biodiversity in the Arctic is important for many reasons. For Arctic peoples,
biodiversity is a vital part of their material and spiritual existence. Arctic fisheries and tourism have
global importance and represent immense economic value. Millions of Arctic birds and mammals that migrate and connect
the Arctic to virtually all parts of the globe are also at risk from climate change in the Arctic as well as from development and hunting in
temperate and tropical areas. Marine and terrestrial ecosystems such as vast areas of lowland tundra, wetlands, mountains, extensive shallow
ocean shelves, millennia-old ice shelves and huge seabird cliffs are characteristic to the Arctic. These are now at stake, according to the report.
IMAGE: This image shows a colony of thick-billed murres on Kippaku, northwest Greenland. Historically, overharvest has been the largest threat
to Arctic biodiversity, but with few exceptions, overharvest is no longer... Click here for more information. "Climate change is by far
the worst threat to Arctic biodiversity. Temperatures are expected to increase more in the Arctic
compared to the global average, resulting in severe disruptions to Arctic biodiversity some of which are
already visible," warns Meltofte. A planetary increase of 2 °C, the worldwide agreed upon acceptable limit of
warming, is projected to result in vastly more heating in the Arctic with anticipated temperature increases
of 2.8-7.8 °C this century. Such dramatic changes will likely result in severe damage to Arctic
biodiversity. Climate change impacts are already visible in several parts of the Arctic. These include
northward range expansions of many species, earlier snow melt, earlier sea ice break-up and melting
permafrost together with development of new oceanic current patterns. IMAGE: This image shows a sea butterfly
(Limacina helicina), a key Arctic sea snail. With the acidification expected in Arctic waters due to the increased
concentration of CO2, populations of sea... Click here for more information. It is expected that climate change
could shrink Arctic ecosystems on land, as northward moving changes are pressed against the boundary
of the Arctic Ocean: the so called "Arctic squeeze". As a result, Arctic terrestrial ecosystems may
disappear in many places, or only survive in alpine or island refuges. Disappearing sea ice is affecting
marine species, changing dynamics in the marine food web and productivities of the sea. Many unique
species found only in the Arctic rely on this ice to hunt, rest, breed and/or escape predators. Other key findings
Generally speaking, overharvest is no longer a primary threat, although pressures on some populations remain a serious problem. A variety of
contaminants have bioaccumulated in several Arctic predator species to levels that threaten the health and ability to reproduce of both animals
and humans. However, it is not clear if this is affecting entire populations of species. Arctic habitats are among the least anthropogenic disturbed
on Earth, and huge tracts of almost pristine tundra, mountain, freshwater and marine habitats still exist. Regionally, ocean bottom trawling, nonrenewable resource development and other intensive forms of land use pose serious challenges to Arctic biodiversity. Pollution from oil spills at
sites of oil and gas development and from oil transport is a serious local level threat particularly in coastal and marine ecosystems. Uptake of
CO2 in sea water is more pronounced in the cold Arctic waters than elsewhere, and the resulting acidification of Arctic seas threaten calcifying
organisms and maybe even fisheries. Shipping and resource development corridors are rapidly expanding and may dramatically increase the rate
of introduction of alien species. There is an enormous deficit in our knowledge of species richness in many groups of organisms, and monitoring
in the Arctic is lagging far behind that in other regions of the world. The multitude of changes in Arctic biodiversity – driven by climate and other
anthropogenic stressors – will have profound effects on the living conditions of peoples in the Arctic.
1NC Biodiversity Defense
No brink—biodiversity is a linear impact—ecosystem resiliency ensures no impact to more
losses
Sedjo 2k – Fellow, Resources for the Future (Roger, Conserving Nature’s Biodiversity, p 114)
But, as with other resource questions, including public goods, biodiversity is not an either/or question, but rather a question of “how much.”
Thus, we may argue as to how much biodiversity is desirable or is required for human life (threshold) and how much is desirable (insurance) and at what price, just as
societies argue over the appropriate amount and cost of national defense. As discussed by Simpson, the value of water is small even though it is essential to human
life, while diamonds are inessential but valuable to humans. The reason has to do with relative abundance and scarcity, with market value pertaining to the marginal
unit. This water-diamond paradox can be applied to biodiversity. Although biological diversity is essential, a single species has only limited value, since the global
system will continue to function without that species. Similarly, the value of a
piece of biodiversity (e.g., 10 ha of tropical forest) is small to negligible
since its contribution to the functioning of the global biodiversity is negligible. The global ecosystem can function with “somewhat
more” or “somewhat less” biodiversity, since there have been larger amounts in times past and some losses in recent times. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to
indicate that small habitat losses threaten the functioning of the global life support system, the value of these marginal habitats is negligible. The “value question” is
that of how valuable to the life support function are species at the margin. While this, in principle, is an empirical question, in practice it is probably unknowable.
However, thus far, biodiversity
losses appear to have had little or no effect on the functioning of the earth’s life support system,
to the resiliency of the system, which perhaps is due to the redundancy found in the system. Through
most of its existence, earth has had far less biological diversity. Thus, as in the water-diamond paradox, the value of the marginal unit
presumably due
of biodiversity appears to be very small.
Multiple alt causes to species loss
EDF 7 (Environmental Defense Fund, The Importance of Wildlife and the Diversity of Life,
http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=445, AG)
The major cause of species loss in the U.S. and worldwide is the loss and degradation of habitat. As forests, wetlands, prairies,
coastal estuaries and other habitats are converted to residential, commercial or agricultural use and other types of development,
wild plants and animals vanish. In addition, many areas known as "hotspots" for their unusually rich biodiversity, such as
Florida and Southern California, also have rapidly expanding human populations, which accelerates the loss of
biodiversity. In the U.S. non-native species are the second largest cause of species loss. Hundreds of Hawaii's
unique wildlife and plants are being driven to extinction by non-native plants and animals. Other factors are pollution,
disease, over-fishing and over-hunting.
Xtn: No Drilling
No drilling coming
Connely 1-22-14 (Joel Connely. Columnist Joel Connelly has been a P-I staffer for 39 years. January
22, 2014. “Federal court deals latest blow to Arctic oil drilling”.
http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/2014/01/22/federal-court-deals-latest-blow-to-arctic-oil-drilling/
The federal government failed to adequately evaluate environmental risks and the potential size of oil
spills when it approved oil drilling in Alaska’s remote Chukchi Sea, a federal appellate court ruled on
Wednesday. The Kulluk, Shell’s conical oil drilling unit, broke loose from tow lines and ran aground on Alaska’s Sitkalidak Island. It’s off
to Asia for repairs. AFP PHOTO/Greenpeace/Robert Meyers The ruling, by a panel of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, once again throws
into doubt plans by Shell Oil to begin drilling for oil in Arctic waters . Shell experienced repeated mishaps when it tried to
drill in 2012, and did not return to the Chukchi last year. The court said the feds’ Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management relied on an estimate of 1 billion barrels of potential production, but overestimated in a way
that was “arbitrary and capricious.” The case was remanded back to U.S. District Judge Ralph Bestline in Alaska. Bestline has
already once before, in 2010, held up Arctic exploration because of flaws and inadequate evaluations of environmental risks. The federal
government, under the Bush administration, sold offshore oil leases in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas off
Arctic Alaska. The Shell drilling ship Noble Discoverer drifts near shore near Dutch Harbor on Unalaska
Island last summer after losing its moorings. Photo: Capt. Kristjan B. Laxfoss / AP Shell Oil shelled out more than
$2 billion on acquiring leases. Environmental and some native groups have furiously opposed the leasing.
They have cited the power of storms coming from Siberia, the distance (1,000 miles) from any Coast Guard presence, and the inability to clean
up any spill beneath ice-choked waters. Shell launched its Chukchi drilling in the summer of 2012. Just about everything that could
go wrong DID go wrong. Drilling ships were late in arriving from the “lower 48.” The spill-containment
barge, being prepared in Bellingham, failed its tests. The drilling ship Noble Discoverer lost its moorings and nearly went
ashore on Unalaska Island in the Aleutians. Last but not least, the conical drilling ship Kulluk — which had been re-equipped at great cost —
broke loose from its moorings and ran aground on New Year’s Eve on an island in the Gulf of Alaska. Shell did not return in 2013, but has filed
drilling plans in 2014. The company has reported falling profits, however, and has noted the high cost of drilling
projects. “We are reviewing the (9th Circuit) opinion,” the company told Alaska news organizations. The feds’ estimates on production were
challenged by environmental groups including Oceana, Defenders of Wildlife, the National Audubon Society, the Center for Biological Diversity,
as well as the native village of Point Hope. “Today’s ruling is a victory for the Arctic,” the plaintiffs said in a
statement. “The government has no business offering oil companies leases in the Chukchi Sea. The area is
home to iconic species such as polar bears, bowhead whales, and to a vibrant indigenous subsistence culture.” They left out one key species. The
Chukchi is increasingly a feeding area for gray whales, which migrate north from Baja California all the way to Alaska, passing through inland
waters of Washington and British Columbia each spring.
Xtn: No Impact
Biodiversity doesn’t dictate ecosystem strength.
Science 1997 [ August 29, 2997, No. 5330 vol 277, page 1260-61]
We continue to lose species and genetic diversity locally, nationally, and planet-wide. In deciding priorities for
conservation, there is an urgent need for criteria that help us to recognize losses with potentially serious consequences . It would be naive
to assume that species-poor ecosystems are always malfunctional; some of the world's most extensive and
ancient ecosystems--boreal forests, bogs, and heathlands--contain few species. For both species-rich and species-poor ecosystems,
we need to establish whether current losses in biodiversity are likely to seriously impair functioning and reduce benefits to humans. This problem
is serious enough that the United States and the United Kingdom have invested recently in costly ventures specifically designed to test
experimentally the consequences of reduced diversity on ecosystems. Model communities with controlled levels of species diversity have been
created in the Ecotron at Silwood Park in southern England and at the Cedar Creek Reserve in Minnesota to assess the effects of diversity on
various ecosystem properties such as primary productivity, nitrogen mineralization, and litter decomposition. Early publications from both sites (
1, 2) claimed to demonstrate benefits to ecosystem function arising from higher levels of biodiversity, and these have been highlighted by
commentators ( 3, 4) excited by the prospect of a scientific underpinning for conservation measures. This view that "biodiversity
begets superior ecosystem function" is not shared by all ecologists ( 5, 6). There are obvious conflicts with
published evidence from work on natural rather than synthesized ecosystems. As early as 1982, Leps et al. ( 7)
had suggested that ecosystem processes were determined primarily by the functional characteristics of
component organisms rather than their number. The same conclusion was drawn by MacGillivray et al. ( 8) who showed that
differences between five adjacent ecosystems in northern England in their responses to frost, drought, and burning were predictable from the
functional traits of the dominant plants but were independent of plant diversity.
Case – Shipping
1NC No Suez Impact
No closure and no impact even if closure happens
Dr. Frank Yu is Assistant Professor of Finance at CEIBS (China Europe International Business School)
since 2009, August 18, 2013 [“Egypt, Higher Oil Add to Stock Market Woes”, Epoch Times,
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/251715-egypt-higher-oil-add-to-stock-market-woes]/sbhag 7.2.2014
Egypt is hugely important to the oil industry. The Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline—both connect the Red Sea to
the Mediterranean—are controlled by the country. Nearly three million barrels of oil passes through the Suez Canal per day. Another 1.5 million
barrels of oil are transferred via the pipeline. Closure, or threats of closure, will have a dramatic impact on supply, and therefore the price of oil.
In addition to the effects of the canal’s closure, it remains to be seen how unrest in Egypt will affect the political and social climate in other
nations in the region. The Egyptian military knows this, and has made security at the canal a top priority. Few
analysts expect a closure of the Suez Canal to be imminent. Insurance agencies also don’t seem to be
worried. “We don’t consider it necessary that shippers tell us they are going there,” Neil Roberts, an executive at
insurer Lloyd’s of London, told UAE’s The National. “We are very conscious of Egyptian authorities to take the Suez as a high priority asset—to
keep it running and open.” The Suez is not on Lloyd’s “watchlist,” a list of assets considered by the insurance
giant to be risky during insurance underwriting. Even if the Suez were to close, some experts say that disruption
shouldn’t be catastrophic. “There are still more than enough container ships to cope with the extra distance
of sailing between Asia and Europe around the Cape of Good Hope, with transit times remaining little longer due to their reserves of speed,”
according to a study by Drewry Maritime Research, an industry consultancy based in the UK. Drewry argued that
navigating around the Cape of Good Hope (at the southern tip of Africa) will allow ships to travel at
slightly faster overall speeds, while the additional cost of fuel is partially offset by a recent 2 percent
increase of tolls at the Suez Canal.
1NC No LNG Impact
LNG is not the equivalent of a nuclear weapon
HCB ‘6 [Hazardous Cargo Bulletin, Exploding the myth, November,
http://etc.am.szczecin.pl/files/download/HCB%20Nov%2006.pdf]
Despite the major simplification of the scenarios, it is evident that any comparison between an LNG and a
nuclear incident is entirely inappropriate. Even a small nuclear incident releases several million times
more energy in a second than our worst case LNG incident, with the tangible results of blast, thermal
energy and radiation being incomparable in severity. Anyone comparing the two events is clearly
misinformed on both nuclear and LNG issues, and are simply using highly emotive language to agitate and distract attention
from the facts of the matter. Overall the comparison of nuclear and LNG should really be removed from the debate
on LNG safety, allowing more time to be spent on making sure the real hazards are addressed and managed safely.
1NC No Shipping
Arctic routes do not and will not offer an attractive alternative to traditional maritime
avenues – this evidence is the fucking executioner: complexity and economies of scale short
circuit their reductionist interpretation of shipping patterns
Stephen M. Carmel is senior vice president, Maritime Services, at Maersk Line, Limited (MLL),
responsible for all technical and operating activities. Steve began his career sailing as a deck officer and
master, primarily on tankers. He holds an MA in economics and an MBA from Old Dominion University.
Steve is currently a PhD candidate in international studies with an emphasis in international political
economy and second emphasis in conflict. He is a certified management accountant and is certified in
financial management. Steve’s research and publishing interests are in maritime security, trade and
conflict, and Arctic regional issues, 2013 [“The Cold, Hard Realities of Arctic Shipping”, Proceedings
Magazine, July 2013, Vol. 139/7/1,325, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-07/cold-hardrealities-arctic-shipping]/sbhag 6.30.2014
Maritime pundits believe a shrinking ice cap translates to a frenzy of traffic as shippers rush to exploit shorter
sea routes. They’re wrong. On 16 September 2012 the Arctic reached the point at which ice stops receding and begins to form anew with the approach of winter. Last year
that ice minimum set a record at 1.32 million square miles—300,000 square miles less than the previous record minimum. 1 With that news comes the predictable flood of reports about the
pending increase in Arctic shipping, how woefully unprepared the United States is to deal with that onslaught of traffic, and the need for large-scale investment in Arctic capabilities. 2 Worries
about the implications of a thawing Arctic have been around for some time. Conferences and seminars about the Arctic seem to have superseded even piracy as a source of income for the
There is no doubt that the Arctic is in fact thawing, and there naturally will be increased activity up
there. But to formulate appropriate strategy and make intelligent investments it is important to get past the hype and: • Understand what
type of activity is likely to occur • Determine the time frame in which it is likely to happen • Recognize that, at least
conference-for-profit crowd.
for commercial interests, economics trumps all As the Russians found out with the failed Shtokman gas field—a €15 billion (roughly $20 billion) Arctic investment killed due to cheap U.S. shale
Arctic is not melting in isolation from events in the rest of the world. 3 It is the global system, of which the Arctic is just one part, that matters; changes
across that system, including in the Arctic, interact in ways that can be unpredictable at best. It is very unlikely, then,
that the Northern Sea Route across the top of Russia will become a major pathway for the global flow of
commerce, and it is virtually certain the Northwest Passage across the top of Canada will never be useful
for international trade. There are two types of shipping that must be considered when thinking about commercial traffic through
the Arctic: destination shipping and transit shipping. Destination shipping is that which occurs to support some activity in the
Arctic—oil moving from the Barents Sea across the Northern Sea Route to Asia, for example. That type of activity happens now and indeed will
increase in volume. There are large amounts of natural resources in the Arctic, and while the economic viability of all of those discoveries is doubtful—as noted with Shtokman—
gas—the
many will be. Bulk shipping activity necessary to exploit those resources will increase. In addition, the Northern Sea Route offers the Chinese at least a partial solution to their “Malacca
Problem,” providing a source of oil and gas from the Barents Sea that cannot be interdicted, unlike that obtained from the Persian Gulf. This type of destinat ion shipping by definition means that
such traffic will call at ports in at least one of just five countries having an Arctic coast (the United States, Canada, Russia, Denmark–via Greendland–and Norway). Using Port State Control
(PSC), those littoral countries have considerable leeway and authority outside the painfully slow International Maritime Organization (IMO) process to implement the regulatory regime
necessary to protect the environment and control shipping activity to an appreciable extent. Should all five of those states, perhaps through a sub-group of the Arctic Council, join to implement a
Such shipping by its nature is also amenable
to some of the challenges Arctic shipping presents. In particular those ships do not operate in networks, are
not sensitive to variation in schedule, and have less sensitivity to adverse economies of scale. They also do not represent the volume of shipping a
global pathway of commerce—a northern version of the Suez Canal, say—would represent. That sort of transit shipping, using the Arctic as a
shortcut between Rotterdam and Yokohama for example, is far more uncertain. In predicting increased traffic through the Arctic it is often noted that
routes across the top are up to 40 percent shorter than the more traditional routes between Asia and Europe (via the Suez Canal) or the East Coast of the
United States (via the Panama Canal). 4 The assumption is that shorter equals faster and cheaper. But in the Arctic, the
shortest distance is normally neither faster nor cheaper for the type of transit shipping usually associated
with global commerce, particularly that involving containerships. Container shipping is considerably
different from bulk shipping, making the economics of the Arctic as a transit route unappealing. There are many
things, such as construction standards, outfitting, and crew training for example, that make Arctic-capable ships more
expensive to build and operate. In addition, those more expensive construction features are useful only during
the short ice season but represent a cost the ship carries throughout the year. Other issues also make the
Arctic a much more expensive place to operate, such as the need for icebreakers, lack of support infrastructure, and
pending IMO requirements on fuel. 5 But to keep the discussion at a manageable level it is important to focus on a few key issues. First, speed alone is no
longer the major consideration, as fuel costs have made slow-steaming the standard of operation. Where once 24 knots was routine for
a containership, it is now 13 knots or less. What is far more important than speed is reliability. Unlike the bulk shipping discussed earlier,
coordinated PSC regime for access to Arctic ports, the bulk of commercial traffic there is de facto regulated.
schedule integrity is a key service-attribute for containerships. The Arctic will always suffer from periods
of poor visibility and the potential for wind-driven ice, both of which can make routes with a comparatively low average transit time have a large
variability around that average. More than half of all container cargo is now component-level goods—materials destined for
factories for use in production processes operating on a just-in-time-type inventory-management system. That makes consistency, reliability, and
schedule integrity of paramount importance. The key goal of container shipping is 99 percent on-time delivery. If this is attainable at all, it will be
extraordinarily expensive using Arctic transit routes. Thus the variability in transit time that may be tolerable in bulk shipping is unacceptable for container shipping. Containerships
operate in networks with “strings” (routes) of many ports serviced by multiple ships on a steady schedule. For example, a U.S. East Coast to
Southwest Asia route of 42 days round trip serviced by six ships means regular weekly service out of the ports on that route. Routes frequently intersect at key transshipment ports such as
Network economics are a considerable part of the overall cost-efficiency picture in a
container service. Transit across the Arctic, while shorter for certain port pairs, may not be shorter for a network that
services a number of ports on both sides or call at a major transshipment hub. A requirement to call at Singapore for example,
Singapore or Algeciras, Spain.
means the Northern Sea Route would not be shorter. Were the service to be restricted to just those ports where the distance is shorter, then all the economic advantages of network economics are
At the very most, the Arctic is serviceable just three to four months a year, and no one is predicting an
ice-diminished Arctic in the winter. Developing routes that would increase the attractiveness of Arctic paths from a network perspective is not
economically feasible as long as they are useful only a third of the year or less. Perhaps the biggest issue
making Arctic shipping unacceptable from a container-shipping perspective is economies of scale. While
conventional wisdom would focus on total voyage cost, it is actually the cost per container that matters.
Because both the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage are draft-constrained (41-foot and 33-foot controlling drafts, respectively) the largest ship likely to be
able to use the Northern Sea route would be one with a cargo capacity of just 2,500 TEU—and even smaller for the
Northwest passage. TEU, or twenty-foot equivalent unit, is a measure of containership carrying capacity based on a standard 20-foot container length. A 40-foot container
would be 2 TEU, for example. The Northern Sea Route also has a beam restriction of 30 meters, as transiting ships cannot be wider than the icebreakers employed to support them.
For the Asia-to-Europe trade on the other hand, containerships can be as large as 15,000 TEU with a beam
lost.
exceeding 164 feet; 6,000 to 8,000 TEU ships are common. As a back-of-the-envelope example, consider a voyage from Yokohama to Rotterdam, the common benchmark. By the traditional
route it is 11,300 nautical miles (nm) with a transit time of 36 days. The Northern Sea Route is 7,600 nm and takes 26 days (relying on the rather large assumption that the voyage is unhindered
by ice or visibility issues). The ship making the Arctic transit would reasonably be carrying 2,000 containers; the ship on the traditional route would be carrying 6,500. Factoring in all expenses
such as fuel and daily ship-operation, the cost of the traditional route would be $3.5 million, while the Arctic route would be $2.5 million. That is as far as most analyses normally go, showing
that the Arctic route is considerably cheaper. But as noted earlier, what matters is not total cost but cost-per-container—and when put in those terms it breaks down to $538 for the traditional
route, but $1,250 on the Arctic route. So in fact, the Arctic route is more than twice as expensive as the traditional route, and the Arctic route looks worse when a comparison with larger ships on
the traditional route is made. The Maersk Line, for example, will deploy Triple E–class ships with a nominal capacity of 18,000 TEU on the Asia-Europe trade route in the near future. It should
be noted as well that the Northern Sea Route is actually a series of seas—Barents, Kara, and Laptev—connected by narrow straits and it is claimed by the Russians as an internal waterway. Fees
to transit the Northern Sea Route are on par with the Suez Canal, and the Russians also impose a considerable and very formal administrative process in order to transit the route. Lastly, it is
important to remember, as noted at the outset, that changes in the Arctic are not occurring in isolation from the rest of the world—it is but part of a system, and the entire system is changing.
When making ice projections out to 2040, then, it should be remembered that in a similar time span (roughly
three decades) the advent of the container and advances in information technology completely revolutionized
shipping—allowing the development of disaggregated supply chains that are the hallmark of this age of
globalization, and propelling China from a third-world backwater to global economic powerhouse. Clearly, a
great deal can happen in 30 or 40 years, so it is a mistake to try to overlay a melting Arctic on today’s
geo-economic situation. It is the state of the world at that future point interacting with a melted Arctic that matters. Already, changes in the patterns
of global trade have had significant implications for the utility of Arctic routes. Increasingly expensive labor in China, for
example, is pushing Chinese manufacturing to be outsourced to countries in Southeast Asia where costs are lower but Arctic routes offer no advantage. A shift to nearshoring—moving manufacturing closer to markets—is increasing, too. Even advances such as additive manufacturing—3-D printing, for example—have large
implications as local on-demand manufacturing becomes a reality. Advances in that type of disruptive
technology could have a major impact on the fundamental nature of trade within the time projections of
changing ice conditions in the Arctic. There is no question that the Arctic is becoming more ice-free. There will be an attendant increase in commercial presence
in the Arctic that should not be ignored. But a proper understanding of what type of activity there will be, and a realistic
assessment of the volume of that activity are necessary to ensure proper policy and investments are made.
For commercial shipping, and particularly the types that drive globalization today, Arctic routes do not
now offer an attractive alternative to the more traditional maritime avenues, and are highly
unlikely to do so in the future.
Xtn: No Suez Impact
Seriously won’t affect energy
Christopher Helman joined Forbes in 1999 and moved from New York to Houston in 2004. He’s all
about that energy reporting , 1/31/2011 [“Will Egypt's Revolution Mean Oil Armageddon?”, Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/01/31/will-egypts-revolution-mean-oilarmageddon]/sbhag 7.2.2014
But what if? What if Suez was shut down? In short: no big deal. Egypt produces roughly 600,000 bpd of
oil, a drop in the globe’s daily demand of 85 million barrels. Each day roughly 1.8 million barrels of crude and refined
products transit Suez. Today with Brent crude reaching $100 a barrel OPEC and Saudi Arabia are saying here and here that markets aren’t
stretched they have ample spare capacity to deal with any Suez disruption. Kevin Book, analyst at Clear
View Energy Partners, agrees. In a report today, he looks at the potential impact of a Suez closure and all the
options available to ameliorate it. First of all, there’s roughly 25 million barrels of crude and products just
sitting in tankers on the high seas — called floating storage. Those can make up for a few days of Suez
disruptions, and give shippers time to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. Transiting the Suez, writes
Book, takes a tanker about 15 hours, given a 120 mile voyage at 8 miles an hour. Going around Africa means going an additional
6,500 miles at 15 miles an hour — some 500 hours. To make up the difference will require more ships carrying
more oil. Which isn’t a big deal either, given that Clarkson Research Services says enough new tankers
are expected to enter service this year to hold 197 million barrels.
Xtn: No Shipping
Arctic won’t replace suez for LNG
Zeeshan Raza was writing this as his Masters thesis, 2013 [“A Comparative Study of the Northern Sea
Rout (NSR) in Commercial and Environmental Perspective with focus on LNG Shipping”, Masters thesis,
Vestfold University College Faculty of Technology and Maritime Sciences, Tønsberg, Norway,
November 2013, Page 94-95,
http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/192946/Raza_Z_2013_Masteroppgave.pdf]sbhag
6.30.2014
Increased savings in terms of shipping cost, reduced sailing days Political turbulence in the Middle East
and piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden may increase the attractiveness of the NSR for the prospective LNG
shipping. The lack of icebreakers and a scanty fleet of standardized ice classed vessels may delay the
early LNG transit operations across the NSR. . It was discovered that the regional price differences of
LNG in Asia, Europe, and United States would also play a remarkable role in deciding the fate of
Northern Sea Route, up to a certain extent. In future, Northern Sea Route may not emerge as a huge
competitor to the southern route of Suez Canal, but instead it may take away merely a part of the
shipping, mainly the hydrocarbons 95 and bulk that goes through the Suez Canal today, because the Suez
Canal too is a shortcut for some ports and cargo trades.
no arctic shipping or science – too much ice, small timeframes, short supply of suitable
ships, nothing strong enough for scientists
Daniel Cressey is a reporter with Nature in London, 2011 [“Scientific challenges in the Arctic: Open
water”, Published online 12 October 2011 | Nature 478, 174-177 (2011) | doi:10.1038/478174a,
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/111012/full/478174a.html]/sbhag 6.30.2014
Eventually, shipping companies might start to use the Arctic as a short-cut for transporting goods between
cities on the Pacific Rim and those bordering the Atlantic. Experimental voyages have been made along
the north coast of Russia, and a smattering of ships has crossed the Northwest Passage north of Canada.
But don't expect a significant rise in trans-Arctic traffic any time soon. In a 2009 assessment3, the Arctic
Council, an intergovernmental forum for issues affecting the region, projected that most of the shipping in
the region will involve bringing supplies to northern communities and exporting resources such as oil and
minerals, for at least the next decade and possibly much longer. "The notion that the Arctic Ocean will
become a Panama Canal or a Suez Canal is a figment of the media," says Lawson Brigham, a geographer
at the University of Alaska Fairbanks and chairman of the assessment. But, he adds, "there may be a
short, summer 'window of opportunity' for trans-Arctic navigation". These changes are creating a sense of
urgency among scientists trying to answer a string of questions about the region (see 'Top questions in
Arctic research'). Researchers seeking access to the Arctic Ocean have traditionally relied on icebreakers
to get through the ice. But these ships are in short supply in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in
Europe, because of lack of investment. Even ice-strengthened vessels can be difficult for researchers to
secure. "Because of the retreat of the sea ice and the oil development we have pending in the Chukchi and
Beaufort Seas, a lot of the ice-strengthened vessels are being taken up by industry," says Jacqueline
Grebmeier, an Arctic researcher at the University of Maryland in Solomons who has made several trips
through the region on the Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Ice-strengthened vessels,
meanwhile, are not sturdy enough to provide the kind of access that scientists most desire. "A lot of the
processes that are really fundamental to the understanding of how Arctic climate, oceanography and
biology work are not happening in summer time," says Lester Lembke-Jene, a marine geologist at the
Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research in Bremerhaven, Germany. "If you don't have the
full annual observation," he says, "you have a very, very imbalanced and narrow glimpse of what's going
on there."
2050 at the earliest – ipcc data
Andrew Critchlow is the Telegraph's Business News Editor. Andrew helps to oversee business coverage
across print and online for the Telegraph. Formerly Middle East managing editor for Dow Jones
Newswires and Australasia bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal, Andrew is an expert on energy,
commodities and Arab business, 5-30-2014 [“Sea change for commodities as Arctic melt transforms
trade routes”, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/commodities/10733099/Sea-change-forcommodities-as-Arctic-melt-transforms-trade-routes.html]/sbhag 6.30.2014
The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is expected to reveal in a closely watched
report this week that warmer sea temperatures by 2050 could open up new channels across the Arctic
Northern Sea Route (NSR). According to the report, global warming could mean that at current rates the
NSR will remain open to shipping for around 125 days per year, up from an average of about 50 days at
the moment.
Other
Midterms Link
GOP would make the plan the centerpiece of its midterms strategy – public opposes
appeasement of Russia
RCP 3-26-14 [Adam O'Neal and Caitlin Huey-Burns, U.S.-Russia Tensions: A Key Issue in the
Midterms?, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2014/03/26/usrussia_tensions_a_key_issue_in_the_midterms_122055.html]
Russia’s recent geopolitical clashes with the United States -- first over Syria, and now Ukraine -- have been a heated
component of the American political conversation at times during the last year. Unsurprisingly, the issue has become
highly politicized, with Republicans ripping the president as “feckless” and naïve, and Democrats accusing the GOP of
undermining U.S. foreign policy objectives. With the partisan rhetoric escalating and Election Day on the horizon, some Republicans appear ready to
make such international developments a central element in midterm messaging. Texas Sen. John Cornyn told
RCP that the president’s handling of Russia could “absolutely” become a major issue in his re-election
campaign later this year. The former National Republican Senatorial Committee chairman, who supports providing Ukraine with military assistance,
said his constituents are concerned about the president’s foreign policy leadership. “As America retreats [under Obama], more people are filling that void, and
Vladimir Putin just happens to be the most recent one,” he said. When Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham went home to South Carolina during last week’s recess he
received more questions from constituents on foreign policy as it relates to Russia than ever before. “ It’s
not lost on folks that what Russia is
doing is probably a symptom of a greater problem, and how we handle Russia . . . in many ways determines the outcome of Iran, so
people connect those two things,” he said. “The Congress is not doing very well because we can’t get our act together, but there is a growing
perception that our foreign policy is failing.” Graham is a top congressional critic of President Obama’s
foreign policy and recently linked Russia’s invasion of Crimea to State Department failings in the 2012 killing of four Americans
in Benghazi. And such alleged connections are fueling discussion among his constituents. “At Rotary clubs, chambers of
commerce and Republican Party events, it totally dominates. Talk about President Obama’s foreign policy failing and you get almost complete agreement on the
Republican side,” Graham said. Lawmakers
on both sides of the aisle generally agree that the United States should
impose severe penalties on Russia for its aggression in Ukraine. Given that more than two-thirds of Americans consider
Russia a threat to the U.S., it’s not a hard position to take. But arguments over the legislative specifics reflect the partisan divide, and the debate
has grown contentious, delaying movement on a bill to aid Ukraine and impose further sanctions.