1
BRAZILIAN COOPERATION AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICAN
AGRICULTURE
JOHN WILKINSON
Report prepared for Actionaid.
Rio de Janeiro, Novembro de 2013
2
INTRODUCTION
In recent years Brazil has emerged as one of the bigger Southern countries engaged in what is
traditionally known as aid – South-South cooperation for Brazil and other large developing
countries. Given its size and the size of its own agricultural sector – over 5% of GDP and
involving roughly 20% of Brazil’s population – it is perhaps not surprising that agriculture is a
major area of focus for Brazil’s involvement on the African continent.
But Brazil is home to two distinct and often conflicting agricultural traditions. The first, which
includes the majority of the people who are involved in farming is smallholder family farming.
In recent years this tradition has been influenced by agroecology such that even those farmers
who have access to modern technologies (hybrid seeds, GMOs, chemical pesticides and
fertilizers) are reluctant to use them, preferring instead to use farming techniques that may
date back centuries.
The other is the so-called green revolution agriculture that came out of an “industrialized”
model developed in the United States. While the other model may account for most of the
people involved in agriculture, this model accounts for most of the money – Brazil is expected
to export more than a billion gallons of ethanol (mostly from sugar cane) in 2014.
Brazil has expertise in both of these areas, but which does it plan to export to Africa? And how
will the export of different agricultural models affect life for communities in the countries
where Brazil is providing support? These are some of the key questions we hope to address in
this paper.
SECTION ONE: BRAZIL AND SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
While remaining a recipient country, Brazil has increasingly positioned itself, since the turn of
the millennium and more particularly since the beginning of the Lula Presidency in 2003, as a
new “partner in development” (the term donor is rejected) within a framework of SouthSouth “cooperation for development” strategies and policies. Its cooperation initiatives have a
specifically Brazilian content but have also become integrated into a broader vision of
emerging country cooperation primarily concretised in the BRICS summits, the latest of which
in 2013 has agreed on the formation of a BRICS Development Bank.
This new style horizontal, South-South cooperation oriented to development set itself off from
the traditional North-South cooperation of the countries grouped in the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, seen to be hierarchical or vertical and focused on
3
aid rather than development. Around the turn of the millennium the two groups of countries
appeared to be evolving in diametrically opposed directions. The BRICS countries´ notion of
cooperation for development, combining traditional “aid-style” activities with financing,
investment, trade and business involvement, contrasted with the DACs moves to “untied aid”
and financing only on especially favourable or “concessionary” terms.
North-South cooperation, however, was at the same time being subject to radical internal
review. In a series of meetings beginning in Rome and then consolidated in Paris and Accra,
the DAC Group established sustainable development as the goal of cooperation and defined a
number of principles for the future government of cooperation, highlighting the protagonist
role of developing countries in the definition of priorities, mutual partnership, a focus on
results and the need for transparency and accountability. It also opened its forum to civil
society participation.
These shifts prepared the way for a growing convergence between North-South and SouthSouth cooperation which was to be formally consolidated in the Busan Declaration for
Effective Development Cooperation of 2013 whose signatories included the BRICS countries,
albeit under the proviso of assuming “differential commitments”, the most important of which
was voluntary adherence to the goals and principles.
This macro level convergence also finds its expression at micro level in the emergence of
trilateral projects, to be discussed below, involving Northern donors, emerging economy
country cooperation and developing country(ies).
There is little doubt that the inauguration of the Lula government in 2003 saw an important
shift in the Brazilian Government´s international focus with the African continent assuming
centre stage. Most of the literature on this subject highlights the number of visits to African
countries by the Brazilian President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, often with significant
government and private sector delegations. In the wake of these visits, embassies in African
countries were doubled, a tendency which was reciprocated with a similar increase in African
country embassies in the Brazilian capital.
This focus, however, was part of a broader concern with Brazil and “the South´s” role in
multilateral forums and negotiations. Two years earlier the Doha “development round” had
begun, and there was widespread dissatisfaction with Northern country dominance as
expressed in the G8 and particularly the restricted number of permanent members of the UN
Security Council, to which both India and Brazil aspired. These two countries along with South
4
Africa formed the IBSA Dialogue Forum in 2003 to promote coordinated action by these
countries´ foreign ministries in multilateral negotiations and the Forum was instrumental in
the creation of the G20 later in the same year.
Although its formalization would only occur with the Summit in 2009, the notion of a new
global economic pole provided by the large emerging countries, christened the BRIC (Brasil,
Russia, India and China), later BRICS (with the inclusion of South Africa), was already being
popularized as from 2001. For its part, the Millennium Goals placed the African continent as
the decisive challenge and its, then, fifty four countries with their very active presence in the
UN structures provided a decisive base and lobby for the emerging countries´ aspirations to
greater clout in the multilateral arena. A key result in this direction was to be the election, in
2011, of Jose Graziano da Silva, who had been responsible for Brazil´s Zero Hunger
programme, to the head of the FAO, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization based in Rome.
As the first decade of the millennium progressed, Brazil´s general geopolitical concerns
became complemented with a specific, multifaceted agenda. Already in 2003, the IBSA Forum
registered Brazil´s concern to promote biofuels which had been given a decisive impulse with
the launching of the flex-fuel car in Brazil in the same year. Ethanol from sugarcane was
increasingly presented as a key development strategy for African countries, a position
reinforced by its characterization as “good ethanol” in contrast to the bad ethanol based on
corn or wheat. In addition to its flagship role as a development model, the promotion of
ethanol in Africa became an attractive option for Brazilian investors interested in accessing the
EU market, without tariff barriers. The Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) has
played a leading role in the financing of these biofuels projects.
With the success of Brazil´s Zero Hunger and Family Grant conditional cash transfer
programmes in raising some 29 million above the poverty line and reaching/exceeding the
Millennium Goals, these programmes became presented as strategies appropriate for the
global struggle against poverty and food insecurity, particularly on the African continent. As
the decade progressed, these initiatives were accompanied by the promotion of broader
programmes for family farming judged to have been successful in Brazil – the public
purchasing programme for family farm products (PAA), the 30% public school meals market
reserve for products from the family farm sector (PNAE), and the “More Food” (Mais
Alimentos) programme comprising credit lines for farm improvements, particularly equipment
and machinery geared to increasing productivity.
5
Brazil has traditionally developed a special relation with the Lusophone countries in Africa, and
Angola and Mozambique respectively are the principal recipients of investments and technical
cooperation. Nevertheless, Brazil´s interests extend to the African continent as a whole.
EMBRAPA, Brazil´s national agricultural research and development organization, set up an
Africa office in Ghana in 2006 and has been responsible for implementing technical
cooperation activities in a large number of African countries as we shall see below. In 2009, in
the wake of the food prices crisis and the unfolding of the broader financial crisis the
preceding year, the Brazilian President laid out an ambitious proposal for cooperation at the
Africa Union summit. This in turn led to the Brazil-Africa Dialogue meeting in Brasilia in 2010
where Brazil´s agricultural experience and public policies were debated and cooperation
agreements signed with a range of African countries.
Brazil presents itself as a model both for large-scale agribusiness and for family-farm-based
development and food security. The degree to which the two are compatible is hotly contested
by members and representatives of each but both models have their own institutional
expressions and policies, with a Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) broadly associated with
agribusiness and a Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) dedicated to the promotion of
family farming, particularly through the PRONAF, the national family farm programme, created
along with the MDA in 1999. This dualism, therefore, is not associated with any one political
party and the family farm is a legally constituted social category in Brazil.
With the election of Graziano da Silva as director-general of the FAO, Brazil´s family farm and
food security policies have become the basis of an all-Africa cooperation for development
programme, involving the World Food Programme, and the UK Department for International
Development (DFID), agreed on in 2011 and with pilot projects planned for some 10 African
countries.
In addition to its promotion of biofuels, Brazil has also become recognized as, and sees itself
as, having developed a general model of agro-industrial development for savannah regions
based on its transformation of the Brazilian “cerrado” region into the world´s most dynamic
agribusiness pole for grains/oils. This is also seen to be particularly relevant for the African
continent which is considered to have an abundance of similar lands. The role of Brazilian R&D,
developed by EMBRAPA, is recognized to have been decisive in adapting these soils to grains
production. Japanese aid to Brazil was also central to the financing of pilot colonization
projects in different regions of the cerrados during some 20 years. This model is now being
6
promoted in a tripartite arrangement with Japan again as a partner for the 14 million hectares
of savannah land located along the Nacala corridor in Mozambique.
Brazil, therefore, is centrally involved in the promotion of cooperation for development in
Africa and with this aim offers its whole range of agricultural policy and strategy options,
whether promoting the family farm and food security, biofuels, or agribusiness more generally.
At the same time, while African countries have become the principal global focus of food
security and agricultural development concerns, this continent has also been identified as the
last agricultural frontier, attracting waves of investment projects. Such investments, widely
dubbed as “land grabbing”, are provoking heated debates over notions of “available land”,
traditional farming and food provision practices and land tenure rights. In analysing Brazil´s
presence on the African continent we will be particularly concerned with evaluating impacts
on land use and land tenure and the degree to which Brazil contributes or not to the “landgrabbing” phenomenon.
SECTION TWO: A PROFILE OF BRAZILIAN COOPERATION
2.1 BRAZILIAN COOPERATION: DIMENSIONS AND COMPONENTS
Brazil describes its solidarity diplomacy and development cooperation as demand driven, nonconditional and without commercial interests. This may be true with regard to a large part of
humanitarian aid, student grants, technical cooperation and contributions to multilateral
organisations, the traditional categories associated with aid. Even here, though Brazil has
shifted its focus from isolated initiatives to what are called “structuring projects” such as the
“Cotton 4” project offering Brazil´s experience in reviving its cotton production after the
decimating effects of the cotton boll weevil, to Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin and Chad. Such
projects clearly imply a more proactive organization of the “supply” side of cooperation and, in
this particular case, also stem from mutual trade interests in contesting US cotton subsidies.
Also, as we have seen, in addition to these projects, cooperation is increasingly taking the form
of adapting Brazilian policies on food security and family farm based agriculture to the realities
of different African countries and regions. These programmes clearly involve elements of
7
conditionality, with the “Mais Alimentos” programme, for instance, providing credit for the
exclusive purchase of Brazilian equipment and machinery and specifying in addition the type of
machinery permitted. Purchases, however, are provided on a concessionary basis via the
Ministry of Industry and Trade´s (MDIC) PROEX credit line administered by the Banco do Brasil.
The promotion of biofuels and agriculture in savannah regions has a more clearly commercial
component and receives financing from the BNDES on favourable but not concessionary terms
(as would be required by DAC cooperation principles). These activities are developed in close
cooperation with private actors and will be discussed in more detail below.
Brazilian technical cooperation is coordinated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), a
Department of the Ministry for Foreign Relations (MRE) which was constituted when Brazil
was exclusively a recipient of donor cooperation. A first official review of international
cooperation activities was prepared by IPEA in 2010 entitled: Brazilian Cooperation for
International Development (Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional,
2005-2009). This study defined cooperation as involving “entirely non-reimbursable funding”
comprising four categories: humanitarian aid, student grants, contributions to international
bodies and regional banks, and technical cooperation.
In the period under study the total amount of cooperation was calculated at some US$1.4
billion, (R$2.9 billion), the result of international cooperation actions by over a hundred federal
public bodies. 76% of these resources corresponded to contributions to international
organizations and regional banks with the remaining 24% divided between humanitarian aid,
student grants and technical cooperation. On an annual basis cooperation doubled during this
period in current values and increased by 50% calculated in constant values. Humanitarian aid
is overwhelmingly directed to Latin American countries, whereas aid, in the form of student
grants, includes special programmes for Mozambique and more generally for Portuguese
speaking African countries (CPLP).
Technical scientific and technological cooperation activities (TSTC), developed within a
framework of “solidarity diplomacy”, accounted for over R$250 million during this period with
values in 2009 tripling those of 2005. 27% of expenditures were directed to CPLP countries on
a bilateral basis and Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for over two thirds of
this cooperation. With regard to agriculture of relevance to Africa, the IPEA study singles out
cooperation on cocoa in the Cameroons and the Congo, and, as an example of the shift to
structuring cooperation, the initiatives on agro-ecological zoning and agroenergy, the latter
involving two “Ethanol Weeks” with the participation of 111 Brazilian government technicians
8
and 58 developing countries representatives. The Table below shows that as from 2009 TSTC
cooperation with Africa was on a par with Latin America and was increasing much faster.
Trilateral cooperation activities involving a northern donor are also being adopted. These have
the advantage of additional access to funding, which becomes more important in the case of
structuring cooperation projects, and can build on prior experiences of cooperation when
Brazil was a recipient country (the Mozambique savannah initiative in partnership with Japan
would fit into this category). At the same time, they might call in question the distinctiveness
of South-South cooperation.
Agriculture is the largest single item of TSTC accounting for some 22% of total expenditure.
Such cooperation takes the form of Brazilian researchers and technical personnel working in
situ with developing country partners, primarily from EMBRAPA although as many as 20
organizations during this period have been involved. As we have seen above, such technical
cooperation is shifting from isolated demand-driven cooperation towards structuring projects.
Cabral (2011), in her study of Brazil-Africa cooperation includes also a reorientation from
individual training to the adaptation of Brazilian public policies to the African setting, the
promotion of concessional credits and the increasing importance of tri-lateral cooperation
initiatives.
Excluded from the IPEA study (but to be included in a subsequent updating) is the increasingly
important category of economic and financial cooperation, which (following Cabral, 2011)
includes: the pardoning of debts (calculated at US$474.2 for the period 2005-2009),
9
concessional credit for Brazilian exports (some US$1.7 billion in the same period) and cash
donations. The former two are linked since debts are an obstacle to receiving credit. The
figure for concessional credit may also include credit supplied by the BNDES which has become
increasingly important, especially the “Exim Automático” whereby BNDES takes on the credit
risk of the banks involved and the political risk of the importing countries.
Information specific to cooperation with Africa which also includes data for 2010 is contained
in the ABC on-line publication, Brazilian Technical Cooperation (2011). According to this
publication, Brazil programmed some US$71 million for the three years 2010-2013 involving
126 bilateral projects in execution with 42 countries, 82 of which in CPLP countries, and two
pluri-lateral, “structuring” projects, the Cotton 4 mentioned earlier, and one concerning the
storage and use of native seeds. The budget of US$22 million for 2010 was more than twice
that of the previous year. This document insists that cooperation is demand driven but
translates this as being “responsive to national priorities”. It then provides a detailed
description of two Brazilian programmes – the food acquisition programme (PAA) and the
school meals programme (PNAE) - which became strategic focuses of cooperation initiatives in
the wake of the 2010 Brazil-Africa Dialogue meeting in Brasilia.
2.2. ACTORS INVOLVED IN COOPERATION: PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Above we have drawn attention to the large number of organizations involved in Brazilian
cooperation initiatives. This has been interpreted by some authors (Cabral, 2011) as a
fragmentation of cooperation and a lack of clear priorities, (associated perhaps with the
affirmation of a demand-driven policy), leading to a pulverisation of activities. Brazil has been
compared unfavourably in this respect with Chinese cooperation, whose priorities are
presented in its White Paper on China´s Foreign Aid, (2011). Such a view, however, has been
challenged and the Proceedings document of the 2010 Brazil-Africa Dialogue indicated as
providing the guidelines of Brazil´s cooperation discussed and agreed on with African country
representatives, (Pierri, 2013).
The multiplicity of actors and the multi-layered nature of Brazilian cooperation can be
understood in part as a reflection of Brazil´s diversified and decentralised higher education and
research structure. In addition, current cooperation has been built on to its historic relation
10
with Portuguese speaking African countries (CPLP), evident in the concentration of projects
referred to above.
The Brazilian Association for Cooperation (ABC), a department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MRE) is responsible, for cooperation initiatives. This body was created when Brazil was a
recipient country and it has, therefore, had to restructure its priorities. Proposals for
cooperation must be channelled through the ABC and in this sense its modus operandi may be
said to be demand-driven. In practice, however, as cooperation has shifted to structuring
projects and the promotion of Brazilian public policies other Ministries and federal bodies have
become involved in the execution of cooperation programmes.
While Lusophone countries remain central, cooperation as from 2003 assumed the continent
as a whole as its field of operation. The establishment by EMBRAPA of an Africa Office in
Ghana in 2006 was the clearest expression of this orientation. From its base in Ghana
EMBRAPA entered into dialogue with 61 institutions and 35 countries. By 2012, 35 projects
were underway, 26 under negotiation and 9 in the phase of implementation. This cooperation
was developed within a strategy of establishing synergies with regional and all-African
programmes, especially New Partnerships for African Development launched by the African
Union, (NEPAD/AU), and the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP).
This demand-driven, “retail” approach was, however, progressively replaced by more
coordinated initiatives and the EMBRAPA Africa Office was discontinued and refocused as a
Ghana office. EMBRAPA has representatives in a small number of other African countries.
We have already mentioned the strategy of structuring projects. These have been
complemented by the creation of the Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Platform, promoted
by the World Bank, EMBRAPA, and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), which
has seen been supported by DFID, IFAD, and the Gates Foundation. This platform provides a
competitive framework for the promotion of networked research and aims to create scale in
research cooperation. A complementary training centre has been established by EMBRAPA in
Brasilia, particularly directed to African researchers.
A second development has been the refocusing of cooperation on the reproduction of Brazil´s
public policies, particularly those relating to food security and the strengthening of the family
farm base of agriculture. This latter, however, is complemented with a similar promotion of
large-scale models of agricultural development in the case both of sugarcane/ethanol and
savannah grains/oils cultivation.
11
In the former case, two of these programmes, the food acquisition and the local/family-farm
school meals supply policies, involve the Ministry for Agrarian Development (MDA) and the
Ministry for Social Development (MDS) and have been adopted as UN programmes led by the
FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP).
A third, related programme, Mais Alimentos Africa, is focussed on the supply of Brazilian
agricultural equipment and machinery, particularly, tractors with a view to consolidating a
family farming sector. This is also an MDA programme but is strongly promoted by the private
sector, the Brazilian Association of Equipment and Machinery (ABIMAQ). Its main feature is a
line of “tied” credit opened up by Brazil´s Chamber for Foreign Trade, (CAMEX) of some
US$640 million for the import of clearly specified Brazilian products. The Brazilian Mais
Alimentos has currently become the principal market for small tractors in Brazil and as this
market matures exports become increasingly important. The PROEX credit line managed by
the Bank of Brazil which includes concessionary credit is a major instrument in exports linked
to cooperation. We will discuss these programmes in more detail in section three.
In an interview with Leovegildo Lopes, head of the EMBRAPA-AFRICA office 2010-11, Brazil´s
interest in actively promoting sugarcane/ethanol is clearly indicated: “Normally, the ABC works
on the basis of demand and we attend demands coming from governments locally. The only
thing we have introduced, and which is not part of their traditional agricultural culture is
sugarcane, because we want to develop ethanol as a global energy commodity.” (GGN,
25/05/2012).
He continues by indicating that it is now the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) which has
assumed responsibility for researching the technical-economic feasibility of producing
sugarcane ethanol in different African (and Latin American) countries. This project has received
wide-based international financing and includes also funding from FINEP, (Financer of Studies
and Projects linked to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation), and APEX,
(Brazilian Agency for the Promotion of Exports and Investments) in Brazil. Depending on the
individual governments responses this may lead to productive and infrastructure investments.
The Nacala savannah project is a special case aimed at reproducing the success of the Brazilian
cerrados agricultural development model. Here the Fundação Getulio Vargas Projects, an
Institute created by the FGV, has assumed responsibility for the initial elaboration of the
project which includes a legal framework and the development of a long-term investment fund
of some US$1-2 billion. A contract to this effect has been signed by the ABC, UNDP, the
Japanese International Cooperation Agency, (JICA) and the FGV. This latter has also been
12
responsible for promoting visits to the region by farmer delegations from the Brazilian
cerrados. We will discuss this project, which also includes a family farming component, in
greater detail below.
Brazil´s National Development Bank (BNDES) is the principal source of financing to African
Governments and Brazilian firms in Africa. This been overwhelmingly concentrated in Angola
and Mozambique and has primarily benefitted Petrobras, Vale and the leading Brazilian
construction firms. In recent years, BNDES has developed a series of instruments and actions
aimed at facilitating its investments outside of Brazil. In 2003, it established a credit line for the
internationalization of Brazilian firms. BNDES subsidiaries have been set up in London and
Uruguay and one is now planned in South Africa, for the African continent as a whole.
Agreements have been reached with the BRICS countries and with the African Development
Bank which includes the creation of a fund for project finance.
The goal is now to create conditions for investing broadly in Africa and the proposed pardoning
of the debt of some 12 African countries to the value of US$900 million is a measure designed
to enable BNDES financing to these countries. The BNDES EXIM Brazil has been created for this
purpose as has the new Directorship for Latin America and Africa. Investment in Angola,
amounting to US$5.8 billion, has been underwritten with petroleum, and similar guarantees
and risk management mechanisms are now being explored for other African countries.
To date, BNDES investments have been centred on infrastructure, minerals and petroleum.
Some of these investments have important indirect impacts on agriculture and rural
communities since they may provoke displacements and resettlement projects. Vale and
Odebrecht have been the objects of mobilizations in this sense and similar opposition is
emerging in the case of the Nacala corridor in Mozambique. The BNDES finances
sugarcane/ethanol projects in Angola (Odebrecht in cooperation with Damer and the State
firm Sonangol), Ghana (Northern Sugar Resources), Mozambique (Petrobras with Companhia
de Sena and the State firm Petromoc). It also financed Dedini for the construction of a plant, in
partnership with Kenana Sugar Company, in the Sudan. These investments are part of the
systematic promotion of biofuels in Africa as part of Brazil´s efforts to create a global ethanol
market. These include the adoption of biofuels policies in African countries and the import of
Brazilian ethanol. They also include tripartite agreements whereby the export of ethanol from
African countries is guaranteed – by the UK in the case of Sudan and Sweden in the case of
Ghana. The BNDES has signed an agreement with the Ethiopian Development Bank and is
financing ethanol investments also in this country.
13
In 2010, the BNDES organized a seminar in Rio de Janeiro, to celebrate its 60th anniversary
entitled “Investing in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges and Infrastructure for Economic
Cooperation”. At this seminar, the BTG Pactual bank declared that it was launching an Africa
Investment Fund of some US$1 to 2 billion. Another private bank, BRADESCO, has also shown
interest in Africa entering with the BNDES in its agreement with the African Development
Bank.
We have already mentioned APEX in relation to the studies being carried out by the FGV. This
agency is also active in Africa where it has set up offices in Luanda. In 2009, APEX organized an
agricultural equipment and machinery fair in Dakar, Senegal. This was followed the year later
with an agreement signed between the Brazilian Chamber for Agricultural Equipment and
Machinery (CSMIA) and EMBRAPA to set up an Agrishow Pro-Africa on-line site to promote the
sale of equipment and machinery. BNDES and APEX signed a three year agreement in 2009 for
the diversification of exports to Africa. At the same time, APEX has been promoting the
establishment of Brazilian small and medium firms in Africa and data compiled by IPEA identify
the presence of such firms in Algeria, Angola, Ghana, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal,
South Africa, and the Sudan (World Bank, IPEA, 2010).
Civil society is also involved in cooperation activities and the ABC has signed an agreement
with Mozambique and South Africa for the recovery and use of traditional seeds which is to be
developed in partnership with the Brazilian ONG IBASE and the social movements Popular
Peasant Movement (MPC) and Women Peasants of Brazil (MCB).
2.3 DIFFERENT MODALITIES OF COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
Many cooperation agreements take a bilateral form but these are only rarely isolated from
broader institutional arrangements. Brazil´s early agreements with both Angola and
Mozambique were situated within the special relationship developed with Portuguese
speaking Africa. EMBRAPA has signed numerous agreements with individual African countries,
particularly in the case of developing research capacity, but these have followed a broader
continental strategy expressed first in the establishment of an EMBRAPA-Africa office in
Ghana.
14
As African countries within their various national and continental bodies have adopted
regional and continental strategies Brazil´s cooperation has reflected these global priorities
formalised, for example, in the African Union´s New Partnerships for Agricultural Development
(NPAD) and the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP). Similarly,
visits to different African countries have usually been combined with participation in broader
regional or summit meetings.
At the same time, Brazil has adopted continental wide promotion strategies as in the case of
cooperation for the development of bioenergy. The Brazil-Africa Dialogue Forum held in
Brasilia in 2010 was also directed at African countries as a whole and became a generalized
platform for the promotion of Brazilian public policies on food security and family farm-based
development. With the election of Graziano da Silva as head of FAO, the Brazilian coordinator
of the Zero Hunger programme, cooperation with Africa became situated within a global
cooperation policy.
Whether the cooperation assumes a bi- pluri- or multi-lateral form it is increasingly conducted
on the basis of broad regional and global priorities within which specific national needs are
situated. Brazil presents itself as a major developing country which has successfully designed
and implemented public policies to effectively address globally agreed priorities on food and
energy security. It also presents itself as a model for combining family farm and large-scale
commercial agriculture, although the possibility of such a harmonization is hotly contested in
Brazil itself.
Of particular interest is the emergence of a new modality of cooperation, trilateral
agreements. These involve traditional donor countries in the “North”, the new emerging
economies and traditional recipient countries. There is a natural logic to this evolution in that
the “Northern” partner may well have previously been a donor to the emerging economy now
itself involved in cooperation. This is the case for the project to reproduce the cerrados
“success story” in the Nacala corridor, which brings Japan and Brazil together once again, but
this time in Mozambique. On the other hand, it suggests that efforts to present the emerging
economies´ “cooperation for development” model as a radical alternative to “Northern aid”
are now on the wane. As we saw above, northern donors within the DAC committee of the
OECD have substantially reformulated their aid objectives bringing them more into line with
development goals. In addition, the trilateral model is particularly attractive to Brazil since it
provides a key source of financing and/or access to Northern markets, an ideal complement to
Brazil´s technical and policy design expertise.
15
3. BRAZIL AFRICA COOPERATION: MAJOR PROGRAMMES/PROJECTS AND COUNTRY
EXAMPLES AND IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURE
3.1. A TYPOLOGY OF BRAZILIAN COOPERATION/INVESTMENT
In this section we are less concerned with technical cooperation as such although this is
increasingly integrated into broader investment and policy promotion initiatives. The focus will
be on cooperation/investment activities which have impacts on the agrarian structure, models
of agricultural development and traditional community land and resource access rights.
We refer both to projects and to countries, although these clearly often overlap, and will try to
identify where possible the different national institutional arrangements in place as these
affect the conditions under which cooperation and investments are undertaken. This latter is
an increasingly important consideration given initiatives to establish agreements on the
conditions under which investments in developing countries should be undertaken. We refer
here to the World Bank promoted Principles for Responsible Investment (PRAI) and the
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure on Land, Fisheries and Forests
in the context of National Food Security, adopted by the UN Committee on Food Security (CFS)
The BNDES will be a particular focus of attention since it is responsible for the greater part of
investment credit to firms, countries and regional institutions and is actively structuring its
conditions of operation to increase its activity in Africa. Nevertheless, as we have seen, other
bodies, (APEX), sources of credit, (PROEX, Pronaf), and international agencies (JICA, DFID, FAO,
World Bank) are also involved, often in conjunction with the BNDES.
It is impossible to provide an exhaustive account of the impacts of Brazilian
cooperation/investments in Africa given the difficulty of acquiring reliable information and the
on-going, dynamic character of these activities. The Land Coalition initiative on land-grabbing
which is being continuously updated is probably the best model for tracking cooperation and
investments in real time. In addition, the current study must limit itself to available
documentation.
16
To organize this analysis and provide a framework for identifying types of impacts which can
then also be explored in cases not identified in this Report we will proceed on the basis of a
typology involving the major different forms of cooperation/investment.
The first of these comprises INDIRECT IMPACTS. Here we are concerned with investments in
non-agricultural sectors, particularly mining and infrastructure which lead to dislocation of
farming communities and may be combined with resettlement programmes. Investments by
Odebrecht in Angola and investments in the Nacala corridor in Mozambique include these
types of impacts.
FAMILY FARM/FOOD SECURITY investments provide a second category. Here the effects are
less immediate and perhaps will only be captured over the medium term. We can, however,
identify likely impacts. The issue here is the degree of transferability of the family farm model
and its implications in the African context. There is considerable debate on the appropriate
farming model for African countries (Jayne et al, 2010; Deininger & Byerlee, 2011). The typical
smallholder would have one to two hectares and is thus far removed from the median
beneficiary of the Brazilian Pronaf programme. The impacts to be identified here, therefore,
are those related to the possible social differentiation consequences of adopting Brazilian
programmes particularly when these include hard technology as in the case of the Mais
Alimentos programme.
A third category relates to the impacts of SUGARCANE/ETHANOL promotion. Within the dualist
logic of Brazilian agriculture the large-scale commercial farming model is promoted for
sugarcane/ethanol. At the same time, the sector has adapted to the concerns and demands of
global markets which have led in Brazil to the conditioning of investments on agro-ecological
zoning and the adoption of sustainable certification. Plantation-style sugarcane is also justified
as a “good” source of energy, and one which is adapted to broader development concerns
through the generation of electricity. In Brazil, a preference for own production has led to a
decline in the importance of independent raw material suppliers. The predominant mix in
African countries will only emerge as investments advance and should be a concern for
empirical investigation. A considerable number of African countries are now committed to
biomass energy policies and have benefitted from Brazilian investments. Both direct land
impacts and the degree to which cooperation/investments are conditioned on the
sustainability criteria adopted in Brazil will be examined.
A fourth category, the SAVANNA model, is also concerned with large-scale farming
cooperation/investment, this time associated with Brazil´s occupation of the cerrados,
17
savannah region on the basis of highly mechanised grain/oils production. This model has been
championed by the World Bank as marking a new phase in agricultural development
characterized by the emergence of efficient large-scale farming. The African continent has the
largest tracts of savannah land for which this model is seen to be the most appropriate
development model. Brazil is centrally involved here as we have seen in Mozambique, with
Angola also being considered. An appreciation of the impacts of this savannah model of
cooperation/investments involves issues of displacement and the debates on un/underutilized land versus traditional community land rights. It also includes the broader impacts of
the adoption of this model on rural labour and food security.
Although there may occasionally be pure examples of the above typologies, in practice they
will tend to be a combination of the different elements. Of particular note is the promotion of
family farming in combination with large-scale commercial farming projects. The Odebrecht
Capanda Agroindustrial Pole (PAC) in Angola would be a clear example here and the Nacala
corridor for large-scale grains and oils similarly envisages the incorporation of family farming.
A second caveat in relation to the phenomenon of land-grabbing is also in order. Dominant
interpretations focus on the importance of investments from capital-rich, resource poor
emerging countries, which, in a context of increased uncertainly with regard to the supply of
foodstuffs and their availability in global markets, are engaged in the direct take-over of land in
third countries. Finance capital, and specifically commodity investments funds are also
identified as a source of major land investments. Demand created by Europe´s biofuels targets
(which have subsequently been revised downwards) would be a third driver of these
investments.
Brazil, whose agribusiness is second only to that of the US, is clearly not to be included in this
category. Even with regard to ethanol, its domestic market is still by far more important with
medium/long term growth assured, and the central concern is to promote a global market.
Nevertheless, sugar/ethanol provides an ideal investment opportunity for export to Europe
and the savannah region will likely become increasingly attractive as expansion in the Brazilian
Cerrados becomes legislatively more restrictive and land more expensive.
Given this, it is not surprising that direct land investments by Brazilian firms in African
countries are very modest when compared for instance with Europe, the Middle East and
China. If the Nacala corridor takes off, of course, this may well change, but in the meantime
Brazil, as we have seen, is equally concerned with exporting (machinery and know how) and
18
investing in the growing domestic market for consumer goods in Africa (see our discussion of
Apex, 2012).
3.2 INDIRECT IMPACTS
Brazil´s investments in Africa represented only 0. 6% of total FDI in the continent as of 2012. Of
the BRIC countries, China´s investments amount to over US$100 billion, and India comes
second with over US$30 billion. Brazil is in third place with some US$24 billion, while Russia
trails far behind with only US$4 billion. On the other hand, Brazil´s investments have increased
by 10% a year over the last several years.
Until now such investments have been limited to the extractive and construction industries
and major efforts are now directed at diversifying Brazil´s presence. The greater part of these
investments have been in Portuguese speaking African countries, particularly Angola where
Odebrecht has been present for over 25 years and Mozambique where Vale´s investments
represent over half this country´s GDP. There is great interest in extending Brazil´s private
sector presence to the rest of Africa, particularly to those countries which have stable
governments and have experienced high sustained growth in recent years. Six African
countries are among the world´s top ten fastest growing countries. To the extent that this
diversification is geared to capturing gains from the growing domestic markets in these
countries such investments are less likely to have major consequences for land issues.
Brazil´s extractive and construction firms, on the contrary, are directly concerned with natural
resources which often involve displacement and resettlement and their investments beyond
the Lusophone countries are increasing. Petrobras is present in Nigeria, Tanzania and Namibia.
Vale which moved into Africa in 2004 has investments in Gabon, Liberia, Guinea, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi and South Africa, in addition to Angola and
Mozambique and intends to invest a further US$7 billion in the coming years. OAS has a
presence in Guinea, Ghana and Equatorial Guinea, as also has Odebrecht which is also active in
Liberia and Libya where Camargo Correa also has investments. Andre Guttierez is also active in
a number of African countries. In addition to the immediate impact on local communities
through displacement and (sometimes) resettlement, these investments in roads, energy and
ports make subsequent investment in large-scale commercial agriculture that much easier.
As we saw earlier, the Brazilian government is negotiating a debt pardon which will benefit
twelve countries, only two of which are Lusophone. The motives are economic since this will
19
clear the way for investments from BNDES, by far the largest financer of Brazilian firms in
Africa.
3.3 FAMILY FARM/FOOD SECURITY RELATED INVESTMENTS
This Report is concerned with impacts of Brazilian cooperation on agriculture, land and local
farming communities. Brazil´s social programmes dealing with hunger and food security have
now established themselves as standards for international adoption. Three programmes in
particular – PAA, PNAE and Mais Alimentos - have become integrated into Brazil´s cooperation
with Africa. The first two programmes have become amalgamated in the PAA Africa
Programme which was launched in 2012, jointly by the Brazilian Government, the FAO, the
World Food Programme (WFP) and DIFID (UK). Five countries – Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique,
Niger and Senegal are now implementing this programme and other countries are likely to
follow. The goal is to strengthen local food production through public procurement schemes
particularly focusing on school meals. The programme works through farmers´ organizations,
mobilizes NGOs, and includes seed improvement projects and technical support.
The Mais Alimentos programme was launched in Brazil in 2008 as a line of credit for on farm
infrastructure, equipment and machinery and also for the financing of agroindustries.
Depending on the modality, credit conceded can be up to R$150,000 (individual), R$750,000
(collective) and, in the case of agroindustries, R$300,000 (family), and up to R$35 million in the
case of cooperatives. Interest rates are subsidized (1%-2% per year) with ten years to pay
beginning after two or three years.
Sales of tractors have been a particular feature of this programme. In 2009 over 80% of
tractors from 11-78 CV in Brazil were sold through this programme. These sales, over 17.000 in
this period, represented 38.3% of the sector´s total tractor sales. It is not surprising, therefore,
that as this market matures in Brazil, the agricultural machinery sector has been a key
supporter of the internationalization of the Mais Alimentos programme.
Within the framework of the Mais Alimentos Africa programme, the Brazilian Chamber of
Exports (CAMEX) authorized a line of credit to the value of US$640 million during the two years
2011-2012 for the export of equipment and machinery, principally tractors. BNDES and the
Banco do Brasil operate these resources. By 2012, five African countries had adhered to the
20
programme – Kenya, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Senegal – and were negotiating the
import of tractors.
Two issues need to be further researched in relation to this programme. In the first place, it
would be important to have a greater understanding of the family farm profile of the
programme´s beneficiaries in Brazil, the results which this programme has achieved, and the
degree to which credit repayment conditions are proving viable.
And secondly, this form of technology transfer poses most clearly the question of whether and
under what conditions the Brazilian family farm model can be reproduced in the context of the
different African countries. The development debate in Africa has highlighted the precarious
conditions of much small holder farming on the continent, where median production units
may often be from 0.1-2.0 hectares with use but not ownership rights, and where farming is
often the responsibility of women and where there is very little in the way of technical
assistance. Jayne and colleagues (2010, 2012) have concluded that modernisation programmes
in these conditions, which do not take into account basic access to resources and know how,
tend to favour a small number of already well positioned farmers, marginalizing the majority of
the small holder sector.
African countries participating in this programme are currently negotiating imports of
machinery and particularly tractors and it is therefore too early to discuss impacts. Some
indications of a perceived lack of fit between the Brazilian and African contexts can be gleaned,
however, from the requests for higher powered tractors to be included in the programme.
The above programmes presuppose the possibility of promoting or strengthening family
farming in African countries along the lines in which this is occurring in Brazil. It would be
opportune to explore the similarities and differences between the Brazilian and the (often
varied) African contexts as an input to programme (re)formulation. Without such an
understanding, these cooperation programmes may have unexpected results as regards
farming patterns and access to land. The need for such a discussion is reinforced by the way a
“naturalised” division of labour between family farming and large-scale commercial faming
seems to underscore Brazil´s cooperation programme´s. In Brazil, such a natural division of
labour is contested on either side, and current institutional arrangements, without which a
separate family farming sector would be difficult to envisage, represent an uneasy and
continuously negotiated truce. Not only, therefore, is it unclear whether Brazil and African
countries share sufficiently similar small holder dynamics, it is even less obvious that a small
21
holder sector can flourish without strong institutional underpinning which most African
countries lack.
3.4 THE SUGARCANE/ETHANOL INVESTMENT MODEL
The promotion of a global sugarcane ethanol market was a central plank in Brazil´s geopolitical programme during the first decade of the millennium, and was presented as a
development strategy, a key to energy security, and a contribution to global goals in relation to
greenhouse gases. Various African countries adopted biofuels programmes and became
important markets for Brazilian ethanol exports. This diplomatic and trade offensive has been
accompanied by investments in sugarcane/ethanol plants.
In Angola, Odebrecht has set up a plant in collaboration with Damer, a private, and Sonangol, a
State Angolan firm. With a total of forty thousand hectares, production comes on line in
2013/14 and is scheduled to progressively substitute the 225 thousand tons of sugar imported
annually. Ethanol and electricity will also be produced. When production is at capacity it is
likely that exports will also be envisaged.
In Ghana, the BNDES is financing the construction of a plant for the Ghana Northern
Resources. Initially, Constran, a Brazilian engineering company, was mentioned but later
Odebrecht is indicated as the firm which will be responsible for construction of the plant. This
investment is closer to what has been described as the “land grabbing” phenomenon to the
extent that the goal is to produce ethanol for export to Europe in response to the EU biofuels
targets. The Swedish company, Svensk Etanolkemi AB has contracted to purchase the first ten
year´s production (Bizzard, 2008).
In Sudan, the Kenana Sugar Company contracted the Brazilian Dedini, with Brazilian funding, to
build an ethanol plant to complement its long established sugar complex. The production is
primarily directed at the domestic biofuels market where an E10 is in place, but is also geared
to exports to the EU. The Kenana Sugar Company, dates back to the seventies and was the
result of international investments in close collaboration with the Sudan government. The
more recent shift to ethanol is a response to the emerging biofuels market but does not in
itself involve new land investments. On the other hand, there are understood to be a further
22
10 projects for new plants which are envisaged to involve Brazilian participation (Schlesinger,
2012).
Ethiopia and Brazil have signed a broad agreement for the promotion of biofuels. A Brazilian
sugar company, BDFC Ethiopia received over 17.000 hectares to produce sugar in 2007, (Alemu
& Scoones, 2013) in a region prepared with infrastructure for irrigated agriculture. Unable to
implement its project, this land has now been taken back by the government and a portion
handed over to an Ethiopian firm. Sugar and ethanol are priorities for Ethiopia which is totally
dependent on oil imports and will certainly figure in future collaboration in the framework of
the cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 2012.
Zimbabwe signed a cooperation agreement with Brazil in 2011 and is one of the African
countries which is participating in the Mais Alimentos Africa programme. It has also entered
into ethanol production with a large-scale plant, bought from Brazil, which is able to meet the
country´s blending targets and positioned to become a major regional exporter. With
investment costs of some US$600 million, the complex has 60.000 hectares with a further
60.000 still to be incorporated. Employment is calculated at 4.500. In addition to supplying the
plant, Brazilian participation includes the provision of technological knowhow.
Mozambique has become a prime focus of international attention for biofuels and more
broadly for commercial agricultural investments. Official estimates have claimed that only 10%
of its 36 million hectares are cultivated. Other calculations would reduce available land to as
little as 7 million hectares. In 2009, the Mozambique government adopted a national policy for
the promotion of biofuels and in the following year Brazil and the EU created a Sustainable
Development of Bioenergy Project for Mozambique and contracted the Getulio Vargas
Foundation to carry out feasibility studies with financing from Vale. In agreements at
Government level a figure of US$6 billion was placed on the level of proposed Brazilian
investments (Thaler, 2013).
Petrobras, via Petrobras Biocombustíveis, controls, along with Tereos, the Brazilian Guarani
company which has a 75% stake in the Companhia de Sena sugar plant in Mozambique and is
now investing in the production of ethanol from molasses (Schlesinger, 2012). Petrobras also
announced plans for the construction of a biofuels plant to attend domestic demand created
by the ethanol blending target of E10. The Odebrecht subsidiary, ETH Bioenergia proposed
investments of US$1.1 billion in an ethanol plant and the Brazilian Sugarcane association,
UNICA, encouraged investments in Mozambique. It has been suggested that Cosan, Brazil´s
leading sugar/ethanol company (now with Shell) and Copersucar which groups together a large
23
number of sugar companies also have an interest in investing in Mozambique. It is not clear,
however whether these proposed investments will materialize given not only the impact of the
financial crisis on the Brazilian ethanol sector but also the proposed freezing of biofuels targets
to more or less their current levels in the EU (Thaler, 2013).
A number of biodiesel initiatives, largely using jatropha, have also been promoted. Here
Brazil´s biodiesel programme has served as a model for integrating family farming as raw
material suppliers. Brazilian jatropha seeds have been used in the Moçamgalp biodiesel
projects and Petrobras entered into an agreement with the Italian oil company ENI for
biodiesel production. Jatropha, has, however, not proved to be the magic bullet initially
imagined and many investments have been put on hold.
The Mozambique ProCana project has been subject to detailed analysis (Borras et al, 2011).
This project was promoted by a British firm in negotiation with the Mozambique government
which conceded 30.000 hectares. Dedini, the Brazilian firm, was contracted to provide the
sugar/ethanol factory. Before this project finally collapsed it exposed all the ambiguities of
these large-scale investments even when negotiated with African country governments –
displacement of local communities, unavailability of “available” land, and asymmetry in
negotiating power even when formally obeying consultation procedures.
The above are individual examples of Brazilian involvement in the sugar/ethanol and biodiesel
sectors of a number of African countries. To date, construction, equipment and machinery and
technology transfer comprise the main components. Odebrecht, however, as ETH Bioenergy
(in partnership with the Japanese Sojitz), is a leading sugar/ethanol producer in Brazil and its
investments in Angola will make it a leading player in the African market with privileged access
(via the Everything but Arms agreement) to the EU.
Over the last decade Brazil has put together a sophisticated institutional framework for the
global promotion of biofuels. In addition to agreements with the US, it reached an
understanding with the EU, and individually with Holland, for tripartite initiatives on
renewable energies in Africa, and signed an agreement on biofuels with the UEMOA. These
initiatives received a programmatic framework within the Pro-Renova programme, under the
responsibility of the Ministry for Foreign Relations. The Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) was
contracted to elaborate viability studies in collaboration with individual country governments
in Africa and Latin America for food and bioenergy production. Many such studies have now
been completed and await decisions on investments. These studies have incorporated zoning
criteria developed in Brazil but are silent on one aspect of changes in the Brazilian
24
sugar/ethanol sector – the phasing out of manual cane cutting and the adoption of
mechanization. In addition to environmental considerations – the need to burn the cane
before harvesting- the shift to mechanization was motivated by pressure regarding the
unacceptable physical conditions associated with manual sugarcane harvesting. Nevertheless,
it is this manual harvesting model which seems to be proposed for adoption in the African
context.
3.5 THE SAVANNAH MODEL
Brazil´s cooperation for development in Africa is presented as combining a family farm model
oriented to food security and a large-scale commercial farming model which has been seen to
underpin the transformation of the Brazilian “Cerrados” region and is presented as a broader
agricultural development model for the savannah regions of Africa. Currently the Pro-Savana
project in Mozambique is the most important expression of this latter cooperation
programme. The Brazilian model of large-scale mechanized oils/grains farming has been
interpreted by the World Bank, and popularized in important media such as the Economist, as
inaugurating a new phase of efficient large-scale mechanised farming, drawing on the
advantages of information and communications technology and “no-tilling” production
systems, made possible by herbicide resistance genetically modified seeds. In addition, such
large-scale farming models are seen to be particularly effective in environments characterized
by market failures related to faulty infrastructure and support systems, since the scale of these
operations justifies external investments (Deiniger et al, 2011).
The Pro-Savana Project is Brazil´s most important trilateral cooperation initiative, involving the
Japanese Cooperation (JICA), the Brazilian ABC and the Mozambique Institute for Agricultural
Research. This Project is divided into three phases, comprising training, the elaboration of a
plan for agricultural development and a programme of rural extension, of which only the first
dealing with the improvement of research and technical capacity is in operation. The region in
question is the Nacala corridor which, in addition to offering similar agricultural conditions to
those of the Brazilian “cerrados”, is endowed with a deep sea port, a railway connecting the
port to the rich mining region developed by Vale, and an airport which is being transformed to
carry international flights. Japan is undertaking the reforms in the port and Odebrecht the
airport with financing from the BNDES.
25
The project aims to develop both family and large-scale farming. In the first phase, currently
underway, a range of Brazilian seeds are being adapted (soy, maize, sorghum) and it is
envisaged that some 40.000 farmers will receive support from 500 agricultural researchers
extension workers trained within the project.
At the same time, the Mozambique government has conceded land for large-scale Brazilian
farmers and some 40 farmers from the state of Mato Grosso have already visited the region.
This land is being offered for 50 years at the price of US1.38 per hectare, conditioned on the
use of 90% Mozambican labour. Conditions for the import of Brazilian machinery are under
discussion (Nascimento, 2012). The SLC Agricola, one of the largest agricultural firms in Brazil
with some 250.000 hectares planted in 2011-12, is currently initiating investments in
Mozambique after thoroughly prospecting other regions globally (Scheller, 2012). The Pinesso
Group, from Mato Grosso do Sul, is also present in Mozambique (and the Sudan).
For Brazilian farmers from the “cerrados” the Nacala corridor has many advantages. In
addition to cheap land and a more favourable regulatory climate this region is much closer to
Brazil´s principal agricultural commodity market – China. Producing in Africa can also bring the
benefit of more favourable access to Northern markets through the US “African Growth and
Opportunity Act and the EU “Everything but Arms Initiative”.
Through, EMBRAPA, Brazil is also in a second trilateral cooperation agreement with the
Mozambique government and USAID in a four year food security and nutrition project. This is
specifically designed for domestic markets food crops (especially horticulture) and for the
strengthening of family farm production.
Although the Pro-Savana project is still at an early phase, researchers have identified
displacement of local communities and the problems of implementing meaningful consultation
processes where the land belongs to the State and democratic institutions are fragile or
inexistent, (Garcia et al, 2013). According to some estimates, the Nacala corridor, some 14.5
million hectares, is home to 5 million small farmers who produce food for subsistence and
local and regional markets. They are represented by many organizations - UNAC, ORAM, ROSA,
Plataforma de Organizações da Sociedade Civil de Nampula, MUGED, Fórum Terra, União
Provincial de Camponeses de Niassa, Justiça Ambiental – who complain of not being consulted
by the FGV which is carrying out the feasibility study for the Project, (Mello, 2013). These
organizations already have already experienced
the negative effects of investments by
Chinese and European firms which have received land from the Mozambican government
occupied by local communities (Issufo, 2012, Pinto, 2012).
26
SECTION FOUR. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Along with the other BRICS countries, Brazil has presented its “cooperation for
development” as a partnership, radically different from the traditional North-South aid
of the DAC countries. In fact, as we have shown, there has been considerable
convergence in the objectives of both groups of countries, expressed in the joint
signing of the Busan Declaration.
Brazil´s cooperation discourse emphasizes the demand driven nature of its
cooperation and many projects are clearly developed in response to specific requests
from Governments and organizations in African countries. Nevertheless, in its option
for “structuring projects” and its promotion of cooperation along the lines of its
principal social and economic policies for agriculture, food security and development,
Brazil gives clear priority to the promotion of its own development policies as the basis
for cooperation.
These programmes, however, have been debated and negotiated in the leading African
forums, and initiatives are developed on the basis of agreements with individual
Governments interested in participating.
Brazil´s diplomatic concerns are also an important criterion in the priority given to
cooperation with Africa as a whole, as part of its goal for a seat on the UN Security
Council, and to individual projects such as the “Cotton 4”, involving countries which
have supported Brazil´s action against US cotton subsidies at the WTO.
Brazil has, furthermore, integrated major economic goals – the development of a
global biofuels market, and the transnationalization of its agribusiness – into its
cooperation for development.
In both its social and economic cooperation, Brazil has not embraced two major
critiques of traditional aid/cooperation programmes, that credit should not have
strings attached and that it should be provided on concessional terms. In the Mais
27
Alimentos programme, credit is supplied only for Brazilian machinery and only for
tractors within a specified power range. BNDES credit for governments and firms
includes favourable conditions but is not provided on a concessionary basis.
Whether Brazil´s cooperation programmes and the investments funds provided
primarily by the BNDES are contributing to the phenomenon known as land-grabbing
has emerged as an important concern. Some have characterized Brazil´s presence in
Africa as “neo-colonialist”. It should first be emphasized that Brazil´s investments in
Africa are dwarfed by those of China and by Northern investors. Nevertheless, it is
likely that Brazil´s investments in African agriculture will assume an increasingly
strategic role if projects such as the Nacala corridor advance.
The objectives of “land-grabbing” have been the subject of much discussion with the
most important motives being identified as: the concern for food and energy security
by resource-poor capital-rich emerging countries; speculation caused by rising
commodity prices; investment funds diversifying their portfolios; and the perspectives
raised by global, and particularly EU, biofuels targets. “Land-grabbing” has often been
seen as targeting weak states and involving the manipulation of local communities
whose land rights are effectively disregarded.
Only a very few private Brazilian firms have invested to date in agricultural activities in
Africa. Agricultural trade between Brazil and the continent is very modest and highly
favourable to Brazil. In terms of trade and investment, as we have seen, Brazil has a
particular interest in the emerging domestic markets of African countries. Its
cooperation programmes are directed at the continent as a whole and are conducted
at Government level, increasingly within a tri-partite and/or multilateral, UN,
framework.
On the other hand, Brazil has a keen interest in expanding its control globally over
natural resources - mineral, petroleum and biomass – and Africa is a prime target.
Mining investments in particular are often accompanied by the displacement of local
populations and Brazilian firms, particularly Vale, have been implicated. As regards
investments for biofuels/bioenergy, Brazil has taken the welcome step of premising
investments on the elaboration of feasibility studies which draw on its expertise in
28
agro-ecological zoning studies. In the case of the Nacala corridor, however, civil society
organizations have complained that effective consultation with local communities has
not been conducted.
In the case of biofuels, the EU is proposing to freeze its targets to around the existing
levels which is likely, along with the failure of expectations associated with jatropha, to
cool down the bio-fuel component of land-grabbing. Brazil´s earlier aggressive
promotion of biofuels has been negatively affected by the crisis which the sector has
suffered in the wake of the 2008 global crisis, the rapid transnationalization of its
leading firms, and the “pre-sal” petroleum discoveries which seem to have lowered
priorities with regard to biofuels. Given the dependence on energy imports of many
African countries, biofuels//bioenergy will likely remain an attractive option, but the
drive to create a global market, and the levels of investments associated with this, is at
present less in evidence.
On the other hand, global food security concerns are likely to maintain their centrality.
As African countries continue their economic growth domestic demand will be an
important investment driver and Brazil´s food security and family farm cooperation
programmes will become increasingly important.
The global agricultural commodity market, and the demand of the major emerging
economies, particularly in Asia will, however, remain the most important driver of
investments in African agriculture. Brazil, here, is in a particularly favourable position
given the recent development of its “cerrado”-based agribusiness model, highly
adapted to African conditions. As infrastructure is put into place, the competitiveness
of exporting grains/oils and other agricultural commodities to Asia from Africa will
provide a powerful stimulus to Brazilian farmers, faced with increasing costs and
regulatory requirements associated with the incorporation of new lands domestically.
Optimists suggest that that the proposed occupation of Africa´s savannah lands will be
able to take on board all that Brazil and Japan have learned from the experience of
opening up the Brazilian “cerrado” region, including in particular the negative
environmental consequences. Pessimists, or perhaps realists, would argue that this
scenario requires a broad mobilization to ensure that recent conventions on
29
responsible agricultural investments are fully implemented and that local communities
are helped to organize to ensure that their rights are fully respected.
More fundamentally, perhaps, what is at stake is the appropriate model for developing
Africa´s agriculture. Brazil has presented its cooperation for development within a
naturalistic dualist framework in which family farming is associated with domestic food
security and large-scale farming with agricultural exports. This dualism, as we have
discussed above, is strongly questioned on both sides of the spectrum in Brazil, and
will certainly emerge as a central concern given that African countries have become
increasingly committed to agricultural development policies and strategies.
REFERENCES
ABC, Brazilian Technical Cooperation, 2011, MRE, Brasilia
Agroanalysis, “Especial EMBRAPA: Brasil e África”, janeiro, 2011
Alves, A. C. Brazil in Africa: Achievements and Challenges
Alves, A. C., Brazil-Africa Technical Cooperation: Structure, Achievements and Challenges,
Policy Briefing 69, SAIIA, August 2013
APEX, Perfil Angola, Brasilia, 201
Brautigam, D., Chinese Development Aid in Africa: what, where, why and how much?
Brautigam, D. The Dragon´s Gift: the real story of China in Africa, OUP, 2009
Cabral, L., Cooperação Brasil-África para o desenvolvimento : caracterização, tendências e
desafios, Textos CINDES 26, december 2011
Cabral, L. & A. Shankland, Narratives of Brazil-Africa Cooperation for Agricultural Development:
New Paradigms?, march, 2013, Working Paper 05, Future Agricultures
Campolina, A. “Novos paradigmas para a cooperação internacional”, Le Monde Diplomatique
Brasil, ano 5, no 49, agosto, 2011
Cheru, F. & R. Modi, Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa: the impact of
Chinese, Indian and Brazilian Investments, Zed Books, London, 2013
30
Chichava, S., J. Duran, L. Cabral, A. Shankland, L. Buckley, T. Lixia & Zhang Yue, Chinese and
Brazilian Cooperation with African Agriculture: The Case of Mozambique, Working Paper 04,
Future Agricultures www.future-agricultures.org
CINDES/CEBRI, Africa e a agenda econômica do Brasil, Seminario,22/11/2011, Rio de Janeiro
Deininger, K. & D. Byerlee, Rising global interest in farmland; can it yield sustainable and
equitable benefits?, Washington, D. C., 2011
Dreher, A., P. Nunnenkamp & R. Thiele, Are “New” Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation
of Bilateral Aid between Non-DAC and DAC Donor Countries, CEGE Discussions Papers no 96,
march, 2010
Dupressoir, M. La diplomatie de l´éthanol em Afrique, vecteur de l´influence brasilienne, dec
8th, 2011, Unasur
DW, Camponeses moçambicanos desconfiam do projeto ProSavana, 03/10/2010
Folds, S., The Financing of Brazilian Companies in Africa: the role of the BNDES, Seminário
CEBRI, 12/08/2010, São Paulo
Gabas, J-J & F. Goulet, Les Coopérations agricoles chinoises et brésilennes em Afrique, Afrique
Contemporaine (accessed via Cairn Info, 10/09/2013)
Garcia, A.S., K. Kato & C. Fontes, A historia contada pela caça ou pelo caçador? Perspectivas
sobre o Brasil em Angola e Moçambique, PACS, 2013
Iglesias, R. M. & K. Costa, O Investimento Direto Brasileiro na África, Textos CINDES no. 27,
2011, Rio de Janeiro
IPEA et al, Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional:2005-2009, (SAE,MRE,
ABC), 2010, Brasilia
Issufo, N., Governo moçambicano desaloja milhares de camponeses, DW, 06/11/2012
Jayne, T. S., D. Mather &E. Mghenyi, “Principal challenges confronting smallholder agriculture
in sub-Saharan Africa”, World Development, 23(10),2010
Jayne, T.S., J. Chamberlin & M. Muyanga, Emerging land issues in African agriculture:
implications for food security and poverty reduction strategies, Stanford Symposium Series on
Global Food Policy and Food Security in the 21st Century, CSE, Stanford, 2012
31
Kharas, H., Trends and Issues in Development Aid, Wolfensohn Center for Development,
Working Paper 1, 2007
Leite, B. Suyama & L. T. Waisbich, Para Além do Tecnicismo: a cooperação brasileira para o
desenvolvimento internacional e caminhos para a sua efetividade e democratização, Policy
Brief, julho de 2013, Articulação Sul, Cebrap, IDS
Lewis, D. Special Report: In Africa, can Brazil be the anti-China?, Reuters, feb 23, 2011
Lewis, D., In Africa, Brazil takes a different track, feb 21, 2011, Reuters
Lima, J. D. F de, A ABC e a EMBRAPA na África, Parceria na Cooperação Técnica: O Caso de
Moçambique, UNB, Brasília, 2012
Matos, P., “Política africana do governo Lula”, Outras Palavras, 26/06/2011
www.outraspalavras.net
MDIC/BNDES, Investing in Africa: oportunidades, desafios e instrumentos para cooperação
econômica, Seminário, BNDES 60th Anniversary, may, 2012
Mello, F. Camponeses erguem suas vozes e mudam o jogo ProSavana, Brasil no Mundo, agosto
19, 2013
Mello, F. O que Quer o Brasil com o ProSavana?, FASE, 21/03/2013
Mello, P.C., “Moçambique oferece terra à soja brasileira”, Folha de São Paulo, 14/08/2011
Milgroom, J., Policy Processes of a Land Grab : Enactment, content and misalignment in
Massingir, Mozambique. LDPI, Working Paper, 34, 2012
Mourão, J. Programa de Cooperação Triangular para o Desenvolvimento Agrícola das Savanas
Tropicais de Moçambique, ProSAVANA-JBM, JICA, Brasilia, 2011
Nascimento, L. J., “Oferta em áreas atrai agricultores brasileiros para investir na África,
G1.Globo.com, 18/06/2012
NEPAD-OECD/OSAA, Aid to Africa, Policy Brief no. 1, October 2010
Newsome, M. Developpement: Ce qui est bon pour le Brésil est bon pour l´Afrique,
Patriota, T. C. Le Brésil, un Partenaire de l´Afrique que s´affirme, Les Études IFRI, 2011
32
Patriota, T. C. & F. M. Pierri, “Brazil´s cooperation in African agricultural development and food
security” in Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa, ed. Cheru, F. & R. Modi, Zed
Books, 2013
Pay, C. Biocarburants: Le Brésil prêt à appuyer les pays de l´UEMOA, L´Observateur Paalga,, 17
march 2010, lefaso.net
Pierri, F. M., “How Brazil´s Agrarian Dynamics Shape Development Cooperation in Africa”, IDS
Bulletin, China and Brazil in African Agriculture, eds. Scoones, I., L. Cabral & H. Tugendhat, vol.
44 no.4, 2013
Pimental, J. V. de Sá, “Relações entre o Brasil e a Africa subsaárica”, Revista Brasileira de
Polítical Internacional, 43, 2000
Pinto, M. J. Segurança Alimentar em Risco em Moçambique, DW. 03/10/12
Pires, C. “A Savana vai virar Cerrado”, Presença Internacional do Brasil IV(15)
Rizet, L. Le Brésil, un géant qui emerge en Afrique, 13/06/2012, SlateAfrique, Slate.com
Rosa, B. BNDES cria nova diretoria para América Latina e África, O Globo, 24/04/2013
Santander, S. La cooperation brésilienne avec l´Afrique, IBSA, 1 april 2011
Scoones, I., L. Cabral & H. Tugendhat, New Development Encounters: China and Brazil in
African Agriculture, IDS Bulletin, vol. 44, no. 4, july 2013, Sussex
Seibert, G. Brazil in Africa: Ambitions and Achievements of an Emerging Regional Power in the
Political and Economic Sector, Centro de Estudos Africanos, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa
Schlesinger, S., Cooperação e Investimentos Internacionais do Brasil, FASE, 2012, Rio de Janeiro
Scheller, F. “SLC Agrícola inicia expansão internacional por Moçambique”, Estado de São Paulo,
10/02/2012
Stolte, C. Brazil in Africa: just another BRICS country seeking resources?, Briefing Paper,
Chatham House, nov. 2012
Stuenkel, O., Brazil in Africa, Bridging the Atlantic?, KAS International Reports, 01/02/2013
Thaler, T., “Brazil, Biofuels and Food Security in Mozambique”, in Agricultural Development
and Food Security in Africa, Zed Books, 2013
33
World Bank/IPEA, Bridging the Atlantic: Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa. South-South Partnering
for Growth, 2011
Vaz, A. C. & C. Y. A Inoue, Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The Brazil
Case, IDRC, 2007
Vigevani, T. & G. Cepaluni, “Lula´s foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through
diversification”, Third World Quarterly, 28 (7), pp1309-1326