~ Basics of Disparate Treatment ~
What is disparate treatment?
•
Likely the most apparent form of discrimination outlawed by Title
VII; to NOT use protected group status in making personnel
decisions
The role of intent: "Disparate treatment ... is the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment.” Teamsters v. United States 431 U.S. 324, 33536 (1977)
How do you know if disparate treatment exists?
~ Disparate Treatment Process ~
Step 1: Challenger must establish a prima facie case
(presents presumptive evidence)
Step 2: The company must articulate that a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason exists for the rejection of the
challenger (burden of production, not prove)
Step 3: The challenger must prove that the organization's
reason for their rejection is a pretext for discrimination
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973)
Challenger Burden (Step 1): To establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, a complainant must:
1) Belong to a racial minority
>>> Green was Black
2) Apply and be qualified for the job in which the employer
was seeking applications
>>> Green applied for a mechanic position and his past work for
the company was “satisfactory”
3) Be rejected for the job in question despite being qualified
>>> Green was not hired
4) After being rejected, the position must remain open and
the company has to continue to seek applicants from
person’s of the complainant’s qualifications
>>> Company continued hiring applicants
Disparate Treatment
Company Defense (Step 2)
• The employer needs to only “articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection”
>>> Company stated that Green was rejected because of his
participation in an illegal “stall-in and “lock-in” against the
organization
Challenger Can Demonstrate Pretext (Step 3)
“ ... the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate
reason offered by the defendant were not its true reasons
but were a pretext for discrimination.”
How might this be done (with what information)?
Company’s treatment of challenger during his prior employment
(e.g., to his legal civil rights conduct)
Organization’s policies/practices regarding minority employment
(e.g., prior evidence of a pattern of discrimination – statistics)
Evidence that Whites involved in the illegal activities were hired
Implementation by lower courts of the
criteria set forth by McDonnell Douglas
was not seamless!!!
Key issues were:
1) Burden of proof for defense
2) Usefulness of indirect evidence to establish pretext
Furnco Construction v. Waters (1978)
Brief Facts:
• No permanent workforce at company; staffing done per job. In this case, hiring
done based on those individuals known to be qualified and by recommendations.
No applications were accepted at company site.
• Race discrimination suit filed when black applicants were not hired
• District Court --- No evidence for prima facie case under McDonnell v. Green rules
and viewed hiring practices as justifiable
• Ct. Appeals --- Prima facie case made; Co. could not defend it’s practices
• Court of Appeals imposed a remedy for the company to “... take applications,
with inquiry as to qualifications and experience, and then check, evaluate, and
compare those claims against the qualifications and experience of other bricklayers
with whom the superintendent was not already acquainted.”
• Court of Appeals also criticized the company’s efforts to use statistics to
refute the charge of race discrimination (Title VII protects individuals)
Furnco Construction v. Waters (cont.)
SC decision --- Critical comment: “The burden which shifts to the employer is
merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate
consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race”
• CA made an error in assuming the company was guilty after successful
prima facie case was made (and failure of company to successfully rebut)
• The imposing of a system that would require the company to possibly hire
more minority applicants was not justifiable under Title VII
• The use of statistics to show the racial composition of the workforce is
legitimate regarding the question of motive (CA rejected use of stats)
“Proof that his work force was racially balanced or that it contained a
disproportionately high percentage of minority employees in not wholly irrelevant
on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided.” The racial mix of the
workforce may be useful to help determine the motivations of a given
organization
Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine (1981)
Brief Facts: Sued for sex discrimination in promotion and termination decisions
District Ct. --- No gender bias in promotion/termination decisions; Evidence
based on testimony from supervisor that:
• Not as qualified as person promoted
• Did not work well with some others
Court of Appeals: --1) Company needs to prove the use of a non-discriminatory reason with a
preponderance of evidence
2) Objective evidence must be presented that the person hired/promoted
possessed the highest qualifications
“ ... to satisfy this burden, the defendant “must prove that those he
hired ... were somehow better qualified than was plaintiff, in other
words, comparative evidence is needed.”
Supreme Court Decision in Burdine
1) Defendant burden is one of production/articulation (not
persuasion)
We have stated consistently that the employee’s prima
facie case ... will be rebutted if the employer articulates
lawful reasons for the action, ... the employer need only
produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of
fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision
had not been motivated by discriminatory animus
... the defendant’s explanation of its legitimate reasons
must be clear and reasonably specific (e.g., so challenger
can have an opportunity to prove pretext)
Supreme Court Decision in Burdine (cont.)
2) Defendant does not have to prove that the plaintiff’s
qualifications are less than the person hired
The views of the Court of Appeals can be read ... as
requiring the employer to hire the minority or female
applicant whenever that person’s objective qualifications
were equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title
VII does not obligate an employer to accord this
preference
3) Plaintiff must show direct or indirect evidence that the
defendant’s reason(s) were a pretext for discrimination
Two Similar Cases Using Indirect (Circumstantial) Evidence
St. Mary’s v. Hicks (Hicks loses) Judge decision
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing (Reeves wins) Jury decision
Company hired 3 people in
their 30s to fill Reeves
position; another supervisor
with a similar record as
Reeves was not fired
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993
[Hicks presented strong indirect evidence presented
and lost]
Brief Facts: After reorganization, Hicks
• received several disciplinary actions from his new supervisor
(before his performance was satisfactory)
• was suspended (and later fired) for rules violations by his
subordinates (failing to inadequately investigate a brawl between
inmates, not ensuring his subordinates entered vehicle use in log
book, arguing and threatening his supervisor)
Hicks filed a race discrimination suit alleging disparate treatment
District Ct. decided in favor of St. Marys
Court of Appeals reversed this decision
Court of Appeals Decision in Hicks
>>> Reasons given by the organization were NOT the true factors in the
termination decision.
(e.g., Hicks was the only supervisor disciplined for acts of his subordinates,
similar/more serious violations by co-workers was ignored or treated lightly,
and Hick’s supervisor began the verbal argument to provoke Hicks)
Consequently, they decided that since the company was unsuccessful
defending its use of legitimate factors, the company was guilty of race
discrimination as a matter of law
“Because the defendants’ proffered reasons were discredited, defendants were
in a position of having offered no legitimate reason for their actions. ... offering
no rebuttal to an established inference that they had unlawfully discriminated
against plaintiff on the basis of his race.”
~ Supreme Court Decision in Hicks ~
>>> Company did offer (produce) non-discriminatory evidence for
its decision. It met burden under the Burdine framework.
>>> Challenger must not only show pretext, but that the reasons
were a pretext for discrimination
“ ... it is not enough … to disbelieve the employer; the
factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of
intentional discrimination.
• Believed the true reason was personal, not based on race
>>> This raised concerns among many SC justices about the
value in offering indirect evidence in disparate treatment cases
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing (2000)
[Indirect evidence was sufficient for plaintiff to win]
• Reeves (age 57) fired for alleged poor work performance;
• Reeves files age discrimination suit
District Court instructions to the jury: “if the plaintiff fails to
prove age was a determinative or motivating factor in the decision
to terminate him. Then your verdict shall be for the defendant.”
Jury decided in favor of Reeves
Court of Appeals (CA 5) reversed:
>>> Plaintiff’s showing that defendants’ reasons were false
were powerful, but insufficient to prove pretext for age
discrimination.
Alleged problems with Reeves performance that were refuted:
1) Poor recordkeeping (cost company $$$)
Reeves showed evidence that records were properly maintained; time
clock malfunctioned and he wrote the actual arrival time on time cards;
company never calculated the dollar loss allegedly caused by Reeves
2) Misrepresentations of records
No evidence of falsifying records introduced
3) Failure to record absences and hours worked by subordinates (especially
important given presence of union and costs for grievances/arbitration)
There had never been a union grievance or complaint about recordkeeping
4) Failure to discipline subordinates
Disciplinary decisions were the responsibility another supervisor
Company Defense
 Age-based remarks not made in the context of the decision to fire
Reeves
 No evidence that others who recommended Reeves be fired were
motivated by age
 Two other decision-makers involved in Reeves’ firing were over
age 50
 All three Hinge Room supervisors were accused of poor
recordkeeping
 Several supervisory positions were filled by those over 50 years old
Additional Evidence by Reeves
>>> Age-related remarks made by the person who was the
decision-making regarding his firing (e.g., “was so old that he
must have come over on the Mayflower,” “was too damn old to
do his job.”
>>> Another supervisor (age 33) with the same production
efficiency levels as Reeves, was not fired
CA only considered this additional evidence to assess pretext
Supreme Court Decision in Reeves
Challenger’s burden is to demonstrate:
• “that the stated reasons were not the real reasons for [petitioner’s] discharge;
• “that age discrimination was the real reason for [petitioner’s] discharge.”
“Proof the the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination … Moreover, once
the employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely
alternative explanation …”
Given that petitioner established a prima facie case of discrimination, introduced enough
evidence for the jury to reject respondent’s explanation, and produced additional evidence
of age-based animus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that respondent
had intentionally discriminated.
~ Mixed-Motive Scenarios ~
What is the basic description of a
mixed-motive scenario?
Essentially it occurs when illegal and legitimate factors
are used in making an employment decision.
Mixed-Motive Scenario (cont.)
Key Issues
1) What standard must the defense meet to establish that it used a legal factor?
• Preponderance of evidence vs. clear and convincing evidence
__________________________________________________________________
Preponderance
Clear and convincing
Beyond a reasonable doubt
2) Does the illegal reason have to be a motivating factor or a substantial
factor?
3) What evidence must be presented by the plaintiff, direct, indirect or either?
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
• Ann Hopkins, a senior manager, was passed over for promotion to
partner in two successive years
– She proved that several partners (decision makers) made
stereotypical sex-based derogatory remarks (e.g., her poor
interpersonal skills could be “corrected by a soft-hued suit or
new shade of lipstick,” she was “macho,” and she had been
“overcompensated for being a woman”)
• Defence countered with proof that Hopkins was brash and
abrasive and her contrary behaviour was the reason why she was not
promoted (legal reasons)
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (cont.)
• Lower courts ruled for Hopkins
Agreement:
• “Clear and convincing” evidence was the proper defence
standard
• An illegal motive (e.g., sex) must be a motivating factor in
the decision
- Disagreement on employer liability:
- District court: Liability exists regardless if the use of a
legal motive is proven
- Court of Appeals (DC circuit): Defendant is NOT liable if
legal motive is proven
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (cont.)
Supreme Court decision:
• Proper defense standard for proving a legal motive is a “preponderance of
evidence” (not “clear and convincing evidence” used by lower courts)
• Disagreement on whether an illegal motive (e.g., sex) must be a motivating
factor or a substantial factor
• O’Conner stated that proof of an illegal must be in the form of direct evidence
(used by subsequent lower courts even though she was alone on the Court in this
belief)
“… What is required is what Ann Hopkins showed here: direct evidence that decision
makers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their
decision.”
Note: Even though O’Conner was alone in requiring direct evidence, the
majority of lower courts used this standard in mixed-motive cases
~ Civil Rights Act of 1991 ~
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in employment practices.
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.
So, if company demonstrates that same decision would have
been made regardless of the use of the impermissible factor,
the remaining question is one of remedy not violation that is at
issue
Desert Palace Inc., v Costa
Costa was fired after getting into a fight with a male coworker
 Costa provided indirect evidence that she was treated more
harshly than her male coworker that she fought with, as well as
other coworkers
 The company said that she was terminated for being a repeat
offender (and that the male she fought with was not)
 Costa provided evidence of other men were treated less severely
for offenses (e.g., being late, cursing) and had witnesses testify that
she was targeted for intense stalking
Desert Palace Inc., v Costa (cont.)
 The District Court gave the jury the following mixed-motive instruction to
the jury:
“ You have heard evidence that the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff was
motivated by the plaintiff’s sex and also by other lawful reasons. If you find that
the plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor in the defendant’s treatment of the
plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the
defendant’s conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason…. However, if
you find that the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by both
gender and lawful reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to
damages. The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a
preponderance of evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff
similarly even if the plaintiff’s gender had played no role in the employment
decision.
 The company contended that the Costa failed to provide
“direct evidence” that sex was a motivating factor in her
dismissal
Desert Palace Inc., v Costa (cont.)
Supreme Court ruled in Costa that direct evidence is not
required for mixed-motive cases
“In order to obtain a [mixed-motive] instruction … a
plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice.”
Mixed-Motive Scenario
Phase 1: Proof by a preponderance of direct or indirect
evidence that an illegal motive was a motivating factor in
an employment decision
Phase 2: Proof by a preponderance of evidence that the
employment decision made would have been made anyway
in spite of the illegal motive
Phase 3: Proof by a preponderance of evidence that the
reasons (evidence) offered by the defence are a pretext for
discrimination
~ Pattern or Practice
Discrimination ~
~ Pattern or Practice Discrimination ~
[Subset of Disparate Treatment Discrimination]
From Title VII --- Section 707(a)
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights
secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of
such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights
herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in
the appropriate district court of the United State
~ The Pattern or Practice Scenario ~
Phase 1: Plaintiff provides statistical evidence of
underrepresentation of minorities/women in the workforce
(composition statistics) or overrepresentation of
minorities/women in less desirable jobs (cross-job
disparities)
Phase 2: Defendant can use McDonnell–Burdine defense for
pattern statistics; defense for individual claims generally
follows McDonnell–Burdine rules
Phase 3: Plaintiff ’s requirement for showing pretext is the
same as previously discussed for McDonnell–Burdine cases
for both the overall and individuals claims
Teamsters v. United States (1977)
The federal government sued a nationwide trucking company and its union for
discrimination against black and Hispanic Americans in hiring intercity truck
drivers. The government claimed that these minorities were relegated to lowerpaying driving jobs by the existence of separate units (local unions) for intercity
and local drivers. Protection from layoff and competition for vacancies were
determined by bargaining union seniority, so that intercity runs were given to the
applicant who had been an intercity driver the longest. To support its argument,
the government presented the following statistics on the company work force:
More
White
Black & Hispanic
desirable
job
__________________________________________________
Intercity drivers 1802
13
Local drivers
1117
167
_____________________________________________________
Also, the government introduced population statistics that showed further
disparities. For instance, some company terminals in areas of substantial black
population had no black intercity drivers.
Teamsters --- Representation statistics as evidence of
a prima facie
case
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only
because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in
time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired. Evidence
of long lasting and gross disparity between the composition of a work force and that
of the general population thus may be significant even though 703 (j) makes clear that
Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general population."
From Title VII ---703 (j) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor–management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any
employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor
organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted
to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in
any community, State, section, or other area.
Teamsters
[Degree of disparity between workforce & population statistics]
In cases where the differences are vast, technical issues regarding statistical
analyses/comparisons may be irrelevant
“ … fine tuning of the statistics could not have obscured the glaring absence of minority
line drivers. As the Court of Appeals remarked, the company's inability to rebut the inference
of discrimination came not from a misuse of statistics but from "the inexorable zero."
>>> Company failed to articulate a legitimate reason for the
disparities
Hazelwood v. United States (1977)
Summary of the statistics used in Hazelwood
Total teachers hired by the district .........................
Total # of teachers hired since 3/24/72 .................
% of Black teachers hired by the district ...............
% Blacks hired since 3/24/72 ..............................
% Black teachers living in metropolitan area ........
1231
405
1.8%
3.7%
15.4%
(surrounding county; % the gov't thought was appropriate)
% Black teachers in area living outside center city ..
5.7%
(local area; % that Hazelwood thought was appropriate)
% Black pupils enrolled in school district ..............
2.3%
>>> Hazelwood won since the S.C. decided that they had
articulated a legitimate reason for the imbalance (e.g.,
competition from the City of St. Louis, its AA plan raised hiring
rates for minorities after 1972) when the “proper” relevant labor
market was used
Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011)
>>> Plaintiffs alleged system-wide sex discrimination regarding pay and
promotion decisions at Wal-Mart
Plaintiff’s Evidence:
1) Study on the culture at Wal-Mart (ripe for gender discrimination)
•
•
•
•
Senior management often refer to female associates as “little Janie Qs.
One manager told an employee that “men are here to make a career
and women arent.”
A committee of female Wal-Mart executives concluded that
“stereotypes limit the opportunities offered to women.”
Wal-Mart permits those prejudices to infect personnel decisions, by
leaving pay and promotions in the hands of “a nearly all male
managerial workforce” using “arbitrary and subjective criteria.”
Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011)
2) Statistics:
•
Women fill 70 percent of the hourly jobs in the retailer’s stores
but make up only “33 percent of management employees
•
The higher the organizational level, the lower the percentage of
women
•
Women working in the company’s stores “are paid less than men in every
region” and “that the salary gap widens over time even for men and
women hired into the same jobs at the same time.
Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011)
All 4 of the following must be met ---
Rule 23. Class Actions (a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(1) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
In addition to Rule 23(a), one of the following must be met --(b) Types of Class Actions.
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that
would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would
be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
*(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the
class as a whole; or [Note: This pertains to claims for injunctive or declarative relief; permits a
purely statistical analysis for the merits of plaintiff’s class action claims and doesn’t allow the
defendant to answer individual claims]
*(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings
include: [Note: More difficult to meet; pertains to claims for monetary relief]
(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or
against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Definitions
Injunctive Relief: A court-ordered act or prohibition against an
act or condition which has been requested; not a judgment for
money
Declaratory Relief: A judgment of a court which determines the
rights of parties without ordering anything be done or awarding
damages. The party making the request seeks an official
declaration of the status of a matter in controversy.
Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011)
District Court: Approved class certification based on Rule 23 (a) and on Rule
23 (b) (2)
On appeal (to CA 9), Wal-Mart argued that the district court made 3 errors:
1) No proof of commonality and typicality – Rule 23(a)
2) Using 23(b) (2) eliminated their opportunity to respond to
individual claims
3) Rule 23 (b) (2) should not have been used since claims for monetary
relief predominated over injunctive and declarative relief
Court of Appeals (CA 9):
Three judge panel denied the appeal as did an en banc ruling (6-5)
Majority upheld claims for injunctive, declarative relief, and back pay under
Rule 23(b) (2) but sent back to the lower court to determine whether punitive
damages should be certified under 23(b) (2) or 23(b) (3)
Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011)
Supreme Court Decision:
• Majority failed to certify plaintiffs as a class. Commonality was not satisfied
– Rule 23(a)(2)
• Unanimous that Rule 23(b) (2) was inappropriate to use; monetary claims far
predominated over injunctive and declarative relief
Dissent: “Rule 23(a)(2) establishes a preliminary requirement for maintaining a
class action: “[T]here are questions of law or fact common to the class.” The Rule
“does not require that ALL questions of law or fact raised in the
litigation be common,” indeed, “[e]ven a single question of law or fact common
to the members of the class will satisfy the commonality requirement,”
Believed the case should be sent back to lower court to determine if class
certification is possible using rule Rule 23(b) (3)
Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011)
General Implications:
1) Class certification claims for large monetary awards that fail to
offer defendant opportunity to evaluate/address individual claims
are “losers” (DOA)
2) For suits of this nature, Plaintiffs need to present some
identifiable employment practice or policy that affects the class
in the same or similar manner (e.g., commonality requirement)
Wal-Mart v. Dukes --- Update
• News on Wal-Mart v. Dukes (deadlines for suits)
• Role of the OFCCP on pay discrimination?
Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis in her address to the 22nd convention of the National
Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) on July 1, 2011:
Here's an important point: The Supreme Court's Wal-Mart ruling was limited to class
actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But my department's efforts
to eliminate workplace discrimination in America don't depend on this rule. …. We
enforce an executive order that says federal contractors can't discriminate. We have
oversight over any company doing at least $10,000 of government business a year. This
means that Pat's office can obtain class-wide relief for victims of pay discrimination
without having to file a class action lawsuit. … The Wal-Mart decision won't affect our
ability to address pay disparities on a broad scale — even if our lawyers have to tweak some
of their legal arguments based on the reasoning used in that case.
• Also, emphasized DOL’s commitment to seek remedies for pay discrimination against
women and minorities and promised to increase the percentage of pay investigation from
14% in the preceding year to 20 to 40% going forward.
Other comments by the Secretary of Labor:
• Obama administration remains committed to the Paycheck Fairness Act (failed by
two votes in Congress last year.)
Promised to:
• Close loopholes that give employers unjustified defenses to discrimination
• Strengthen the ban on retaliation against those who complain about unequal pay
• Rescind Bush-era guidelines preventing effective enforcement of equal pay laws
• Create more flexible workplaces so women don't have to choose between
motherhood and a fulfilling care
• Enforce a new provision in the Affordable Care Act that guarantees break time for
nursing mothers.