To Beam or not to Beam?
A study in personal identity
Beaming:
Beaming:
Beaming:
Ways of Conceptualizing Beaming:
Same Matter,
“Matter Transport”
“Recruited” Matter,
“Information Transport”
Question:
• Which form(s) of transport is it rational to
assume that you will survive?
The Closest Continuer Schema
• Proposed by Robert
Nozick (1938-2002)
• Identity is a relation
that moves from one
time-slice of an object
to another time-slice of
an object based on
overall similarity.
(easy) Closest Continuer Example:
Closest to T1
Not Even Close
T1
T2
Closest Continuer Rules:
1) Objects at T2 are compared only to other
objects at T2 to determine which is the
closest continuer to the object at T1
Closest Continuer Rules:
2) “Closest” must be clear. The Closest
Continuer must be closer than any other
claimant
Closest:
No CLOSEST Continuer
T1
T2
Closest Continuer Rules
3) The Closest Continuer must be close enough
(share enough qualitative similarity).
Continuer:
No Continuer
T1
T2
Do you survive transport?
What makes the person-slice at T2
the closest continuer of the
person-slice at T1?
T1
T2
Theories:
1. Matter Matters
a) Body Matters (body includes brain)
b) Brain Matters
Theories:
1. Matter Matters
a) Body Matters (body includes brain)
b) Brain Matters
- If this is your view of personal identity, which
versions of transport would you survive?
Kinds of Transport
Matter Transport?
Information Transport?
Kinds of Transport
Matter Transport?
YES, Matter Transport preserves your original body
(including brain)
Information Transport?
NO, Information transport uses different matter to
assemble an exactly similar body (including brain)
from recruited matter.
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Body Matters:
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Body Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your body (thoroughly)
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Body Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your body (thoroughly)
– You would not survive a brain transplant into
another body (human or artificial)
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Body Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your body (thoroughly)
– You would not survive a brain transplant into
another body (human or artificial)
– You would survive gradual prosthetic replacement
of your body parts, but not a single wholesale
replacement.
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Brain Matters:
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Brain Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your brain (thoroughly)
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Brain Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your brain (thoroughly)
– You would survive the placing of your brain in a
blender, supposing that no parts were lost.
Consequences of Matter Matters Views:
• Brain Matters:
– You don’t know who you are until you examine
your brain (thoroughly)
– You would survive the placing of your brain in a
blender, supposing that no parts were lost.
– There is something important about your brain
aside from what it does. In order to endorse this
view you must have an account of what this is, or
else you don’t really have a Matter Matters view,
but instead…
Theories:
2. Mind Matters:
•
By ‘mind’ we mean psychology. A person’s
psychology survives if their personality,
memories, habits, beliefs, desires, etc. survive.
- If this is your view of personal identity, which
versions of transport would you survive?
Kinds of Transport
Matter Transport?
Information Transport?
Kinds of Transport
Matter Transport?
YES, Matter Transport preserves your original body
(including brain), and so all the stuff your body and
brain do (including sensing, remembering, desiring,
etc.) is preserved
Information Transport?
YES, presumably it doesn’t matter which carbon
atoms (e.g.) your body and brain have; they work
the same way in any case.
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
• Matter Matters views are incorrect.
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
• Matter Matters views are incorrect.
– You can survive prosthetic brain operations
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
• Matter Matters views are incorrect.
– You can survive prosthetic brain operations
– You can survive implantation into an android body,
or into no body at all (e.g. a computer).
Consequences of Mind Matters View:
• Matter Matters views are incorrect.
– You can survive prosthetic brain operations
– You can survive implantation into an android body,
or no body at all.
– You can survive information transport.
Psychological Continuers
• When we apply the closest continuer schema
to changes in a person over time, we seem to
put more weight on psychological properties
than physical properties.
Psychological Continuers
• When we apply the closest continuer schema
to changes in a person over time, we seem to
put more weight on psychological properties
than physical properties.
• If this view is correct, then we ought to have
no objection to information transport.
Objections to Information Transport
• There are at least five major objections to the
mind-over-matter closest continuer view:
Objections to Information Transport
There are at least five major objections to the mindover-matter closest continuer view. Three of them
are addressed by Hanley:
1. The Argument from The Principle of Independence
2. The Argument from Phenomenology
3. The Argument from The Exclusion Principle
Two of them are not (at lest not in this chapter):
4. The Duplication Argument
5. The Delay Argument
Objection 1, The Argument from the
Principle of Independence
• The reasoning here is the same as in many
other metaphysical disputes:
– The Principle of Independence is obvious and
clear
– Some element of Hanley’s mind-over-matterclosest-continuer view is at odds with the
Principle of Independence
– Therefore, there is something wrong with Hanley’s
view.
Objection 1, The Argument from the
Principle of Independence
• To evaluate this reasoning, we will need to
look at the Principle of Independence and see:
– if it is as clear and obvious as the proponent of
this objection says it is, and
– if Hanley’s view is really at odds with it.
The Principle of Independence
• The Principle of Independence states that the
question of whether identity has been
preserved over time or through change should
be independent of the presence or absence of
some third entity.
• For illustration, consider an example pulled
from the TOS episode “What Are Little Girls
Made Of?”
The Principle of Independence
On Hanley’s view, A is Kirk’s
closest continuer because it
combines Kirk’s psychological
AND physical properties, but if A
did not survive, then B would be
the closest continuer.
Kirk body
Kirk mind
T1
T2
Kirk body
Android body
Kirk mind
Kirk mind
A
B
The Principle of Independence
In this case, A is Kirk’s closest
continuer because it combines
Kirk’s psychological AND physical
properties, but if A did not
survive, then B would be the
closest continuer.
Kirk body
Kirk mind
T1
T2
Kirk body
Android body
Kirk mind
Kirk mind
A
B
However, the principle of
independence states that
either A or B should either be
Kirk or not be Kirk regardless
of the existence of the other
entity.
The Principle of Independence
The force of the
objection is that B
should either be or not
be Kirk regardless of the
existence or nonexistence of A, but that’s
not how it comes out on
Hanley’s view.
Kirk body
Kirk mind
T1
T2
Kirk body
Android body
Kirk mind
Kirk mind
A
B
The Principle of Independence
The force of the
objection is that B
should either be or not
be Kirk regardless of the
existence or nonexistence of A, but that’s
not how it comes out on
Hanley’s view.
Kirk body
Kirk mind
T1
T2
Kirk body
Android body
Kirk mind
Kirk mind
A
B
IS KIRK
The Principle of Independence
The force of the
objection is that B
should either be or not
be Kirk regardless of the
existence or nonexistence of A, but that’s
not how it comes out on
Hanley’s view.
Kirk body
Kirk mind
T1
T2
Kirk body
Android body
Kirk mind
Kirk mind
A
B
IS NOT KIRK
The Principle of Independence
• It is clear that this argument doesn’t have
trouble with the mind-over-matter part of
Hanley’s view, but rather with the closest
continuer part of the view.
The Principle of Independence
• It is clear that this argument doesn’t have
trouble with the mind-over-matter part of
Hanley’s view, but rather with the closest
continuer part of the view.
• It is clear that this part of Hanley’s view is
indeed at odds with the Principle of
Independence.
The Principle of Independence
• It is clear that this argument doesn’t have
trouble with the mind-over-matter part of
Hanley’s view, but rather with the closest
continuer part of the view.
• It is clear that this part of Hanley’s view is
indeed at odds with the Principle of
Independence.
• But is the PoI that clear and obvious?
The Principle of Independence
• Hanley’s replies to this point are honestly not
very good. Briefly:
1. Hanley asserts that the PoI isn’t very plausible
(without argument)
2. Hanley asserts that accepting the PoI means
adopting a version of a matter-matters view (it
doesn’t).
3. Hanley implies that giving up the closest
continuer view means having to accept a soul
view (also incorrect).
The Principle of Independence
A better response would be to point out that
sometimes we must look around at other
objects at some given T2 to fully make sense of
continuation (or not) of identity, contrary to the
PoI.
The Principle of Independence
Consider a case of cell division. If we only look
at one cell at a time, we might say that each
daughter cell preserves the identity of its parent
cell. Instead, we see that there are two of them
at T2, and conclude that identity has not been
preserved at all and that there are two new
cells.
Objection 2, The Argument from
Phenomenology
• Recall that one consequence of the mindmatters view is that there is no difference
between information transport and
androidization or computerization (at least as
far as personal identity is concerned).
Objection 2, The Argument from
Phenomenology
• The argument from phenomenology proceeds
as follows:
– It is clear and obvious that androidization and
computerization could not preserve
phenomenology.
– Phenomenology is essential to identity.
– Therefore, Hanley’s view (or any other that allows
identity to be preserved by androidization or
computerization) is not a correct view of identity.
Objection 2, The Argument from
Phenomenology
• Phenomenology refers to what it is like to
have your mental states.
Objection 2, The Argument from
Phenomenology
• Phenomenology refers to what it is like to
have your mental states.
• People commonly think that if they were
turned into a functionally identical android,
their mental states would feel different to
them. (This is what motivates the first premise
of this argument
Objection 2, The Argument from
Phenomenology
• This objection sounds plausible to many, but it
never actually gets off the ground (it is
internally inconsistent).
Objection 2, The Argument from
Phenomenology
• This objection sounds plausible to many, but it
never actually gets off the ground (it is
internally inconsistent).
• Consider describing what it would be like to
have your mental states, but have them feel
different than your mental states.
Objection 2, The Argument from
Phenomenology
• This objection sounds plausible to many, but it
never actually gets off the ground (it is
internally inconsistent).
• The problem is that if all of your mental states
felt different, they wouldn’t BE your old
mental states.
Objection 2, The Argument from
Phenomenology
• Further, this argument must outright deny
functionalism and explain how the brain
creates mental states that feel a certain way
and cannot be replicated.
• It must do this without appealing to any
“special physics” (i.e. magic) that happens in
brains.
Objection 3, The Argument from the
Exclusion Principle
• Hanley includes this objection, not because it
is very good, but because he runs into it often.
Objection 3, The Argument from the
Exclusion Principle
• Here’s how it goes:
– It just seems obvious that androidization and
beaming are different processes
– Hanley’s view treats them as the same
– Therefore, Hanley’s view is mistaken
Objection 3, The Argument from the
Exclusion Principle
• To respond to this position, Hanley needs to
explore the first premise to figure out what it
is that makes people thing that it is so clear
that androidization and information transport
are different.
Objection 3, The Argument from the
Exclusion Principle
• Hanley thinks this premise is motivated by the
Exclusion Principle
Objection 3, The Argument from the
Exclusion Principle
• Hanley thinks this premise is motivated by the
Exclusion Principle
• The Exclusion Principle is a psychological
tendency that people have to be fooled by the
way that processes are described.
Objection 3, The Argument from the
Exclusion Principle
• Hanley thinks this premise is motivated by the
Exclusion Principle
• The Exclusion Principle is a psychological
tendency that people have to be fooled by the
way that processes are described.
• Specifically, processes that are described as
detailed and scientific are less intuitive than
processes that are undescribed, or described
as magic.
Objection 3, The Argument from the
Exclusion Principle
• Since beaming looks like magic, we can accept
that the same person that disappears,
reappears.
• Since androidization looks like science, we
cannot accept that the same person that has
their parts replaced, persists.
Objection 3, The Argument from the
Exclusion Principle
• Since beaming looks like magic, we can accept
that the same person that disappears,
reappears.
• Since androidization looks like science, we
cannot accept that the same person that has
their parts replaced, persists.
• The Exclusion Principle states that we can
believe in the results of magical, but not of
man-made processes.
Objection 3, The Argument from the
Exclusion Principle
• Obviously, Hanley doesn’t think much of the
Exclusion Principle.
• There seems to be no rational basis for
accepting the Exclusion Principle.
Hanley’s conclusion
• Since psychological properties are evidently
preserved in matter transport, information
transport, and androidization, it is rational to
accept each procedure, and superstitious to
refuse.
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• Recall that no two objects can share an
identity on pain of contradiction. If there are
two people, they have different identities, and
if they share an identity, there can be only one
of them.
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• Recall the standard description of the
information transporter:
– Your “pattern” is digitized, and then you are
assembled at a new location, with the same
physical pattern (and so the same psychological
pattern) from matter that was already at the new
location.
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• The process has one person disappearing in
one place while one person appears in
another place.
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• The process has one person disappearing in
one place while one person appears in
another place.
• The argument from duplication starts by
pointing out that these parts of the
technology are incidental to how it operates,
not essential to how it operates.
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• Specifically:
– The original NEED NOT DISAPPEAR for the process
to work.
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• Specifically:
– The original NEED NOT DISAPPEAR for the process
to work.
– The number of appearing at the new location
NEED NOT BE RESTRICTED TO ONE
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• Wait a moment, this talk of ‘disappearing’
sounds an awful lot like magic…
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• Wait a moment, this talk of ‘disappearing’
sounds an awful lot like magic…lets use the
term ‘disintegrating’ instead and see if our
willingness to go through the process changes.
Info Transport + Phaser Case:
• Step One: Scan the pattern at location 1
• Step Two: Integrate from recruited matter at
location 2
• Step Three: Shoot the person at location 1
with phaser, to disintegrate them
Info Transport + Phaser Case:
• Any Takers?
Info Transport + Phaser Case:
• Any Takers? No?
• If you’re not convinced that you would survive
this process, then you should not be
convinced that the person emerging at the
end of more conventionally described info
transport IS YOU.
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• Hanley could simply bite the bullet at this
point and maintain that in spite of how we
feel about the info transporter plus phaser
case, we are just being superstitious.
• Since our psychological properties really do
survive this process, and since our identity
really is identity of psychological properties,
we really survive, so opposition is misguided.
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• If we follow Hanley, and allow that you really
survive info transport + phaser, then the mind
matters view has more serious trouble:
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• Consider what happens when the info
transporter makes more than one person on
the same pattern, both with recruited matter,
then (as before) the original is phasered.
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• Consider what happens when the info
transporter makes more than one person on
the same pattern, both with recruited matter,
then (as before) the original is phasered.
• It is logically impossible for both to have the
identity of the original, and the closest
continuer schema is unable to tell the
difference.
Objection 4: The Duplication Argument
• Consider what happens when the info
transporter makes more than one person on the
same pattern, both with recruited matter, then
(as before) the original is phasered.
• If identity is carried by psychological properties,
then identity could be duplicated (because
psychological states can be duplicated). Since
identity cannot be duplicated, identity cannot be
carried by psychological properties.
Objection 5, The Delay Argument
• The Duplication argument is an argument
against surviving information transport. The
Delay argument argues against the closest
continuer view as it applies to either matter or
information transport.
• The Delay argument introduces a new aspect
of transport to think about:
More Ways of Conceptualizing Beaming:
Delay
Instantaneous
Objection 5, The Delay Argument
• While these cases may both seem reasonable,
there is a limit to how instantaneous the
instantaneous version can be. There must be
either:
– Some time between T1 when you are in one place
and T2 when you are in another place (even if that
time is very small).
– Some time during which you are neither
completely in one place nor completely in
another.
Objection 5, The Delay Argument
• Recall that the closest continuer schema
requires a continuer.
• Since any concept of transport contains a
period of discontinuity, even the closest
continuer schema indicates that you would
not survive transport (of any kind).
• Consider the following example
Objection 5, The Delay Argument
Objection 5, The Delay Argument
• Any takers?
Objection 5, The Delay Argument
• Any takers?
• No? Why not?
Objection 5, The Delay Argument
• So if a break in continuity means a loss of
identity (otherwise known as dying), then any
form of transport kills you (at least according
to the closest continuer schema) and at best
creates a copy that thinks it’s the original.
Life after Beaming
• So if we do indeed survive matter or
information transport, delayed or
instantaneous, then it is for reasons other
than psychological closest-continuation.
Life after Beaming
• So if we do indeed survive matter or
information transport, delayed or
instantaneous, then it is for reasons other
than psychological closest-continuation.
• What could those reasons be?
Wrap-up on metaphysics
• Not all metaphysical assumptions are equally
good.
Wrap-up on metaphysics
• Not all metaphysical assumptions are equally
good.
• There are many things we can’t be sure of, so
we must do the best we can to be creative and
critical so as to at least do the best we can.
Wrap-up on metaphysics
• The things we say, think, and base decisions
on in everyday life require metaphysical
assumptions.
Wrap-up on metaphysics
• The things we say, think, and base decisions
on in everyday life require metaphysical
assumptions.
• Metaphysical problems are not isolated to
philosophy class.