The multifactorial nature of theory of mind:
A structural modelling study
Larry Cashion
Rachel Dryer
Michael Kiernan
School of Social Sciences & Liberal Studies
Charles Sturt University
Bathurst NSW Australia
Presented at the 14th Australasian Human Development Association Biennial
Conference
Perth Western Australia
July 2005
Presentation Plan
 Theory of Mind and Classification
 Current research study method
 Age, gender, and the multifactorial nature of
theory of mind
 Conclusions and implications
Theory of Mind
 The ability to attribute mental states, such as
thoughts, beliefs, intentions, desires, and
feelings, to others and oneself
 The ability to perform social and laboratory tasks
requiring theory of mind has also been called
mentalising and mindreading
Classification in Theory of
Mind
First-order theory of mind
Second-order theory of mind
Higher-order or advanced theory of mind
First-Order Theory of Mind
Unexpected locations
“Where will X look for the object?”
Unexpected contents
“What does X think is in the box?”
Appearance-reality
“What is this object really?”
Second-Order Theory of Mind
Ice-Cream Van
“Where will X look for Y?”
Unexpected locations
“Where does Y think X will look for the
object?”
Higher-Order Theory of Mind
Understanding mental states in
motivating actions
“Does X mean what she says?”
“Why did Y do that?”
Reading complex mental states
“What is X thinking or feeling?”
Theory of Mind Modularity
Theory of Mind Module (ToMM)
Leslie (1987; Leslie & Roth, 1993)
ToMM neurologically separate from other cognitive
and brain systems
Minimalist modularity
Baron-Cohen (1999)
Sub-modules of eye direction detection,
intentionality detector, shared attention mechanism
False belief & Theory of Mind
False belief unrepresentative of
theory of mind in general
Bloom & German (2000)
False belief as a highly complex
cognitive function
Bloom & German (2000)
Competing Theory of Mind
Models
3-factors
1st-, 2nd- & higher-order ToM
Common use in literature
2-factors
False belief tasks & other tasks
Bloom & German
1-factor
Theory of mind module
Leslie
Method I
Participants
216 school-aged children
Recruited from State Schools in NSW & Victoria
Years 1, 3, and 5
Screened using a modified version of the Social
Communication Profile (Coggins & Olswang, 2001)
2 children eliminated from sample prior to testing
No adverse incidents
Ethics approval from CSU, and NSW & Victorian
Departments of Education
Method II
 First-order tests
 Sally-Anne Task (unexpected locations)
 Smarties Task (unexpected contents)
 Second-order tests
 Ice-Cream Van Task
 Second-Order Sally-Anne Task
 Higher-order tests
 Strange Stories Test
 Faux Pas Test
 Eyes Test – Children’s Version
Methodological Issues
Memory prompts
No memory prompts or hints were
provided to participants
Justification questions
Often absent from previous first- and
second-order ToM research
Makes lower-order tasks more
consistent with higher-order tasks
Ensures understanding, not just
recognition
Hypotheses
Significant group differences
Older children will perform better than
younger children
Significant gender differences
Females superior to males
3-factor model superior
Better fit than 1- and 2-factor models
Data Analysis
Categorical data
Chi-square (χ2)
Continuous data
ANOVA + Tukey HSD
Structural Modelling
Mplus confirmatory factor
analysis
Results I
Task
Year 1
Year 3
Year 5
Interpretation
72.9
90.1
89.3
Justification
65.7
83.1
89.3
Interpretation
87.1
94.4
100.0
Justification
71.4
87.3
98.7
Interpretation
27.9
42.3
52.0
Justification
17.6
38.0
50.7
Interpretation
69.6
81.7
96.0
Justification
31.9
57.7
85.3
Sally-Anne
Smarties
Ice-Cream Van
Sally-Anne 2nd-Order
Results II
Task
Year 1
Year 3
Year 5
Interpretation
4.70
5.25
6.05
Justification
2.29
3.25
4.09
5.55
7.11
8.29
15.02
16.90
18.77
Strange Stories (/8)
Faux Pas (/10)
Total
Eyes Test (/28)
Total
Results III
No gender
differences
for any task
Results IV
Model
χ2
p
df
CFI
TLI
WRMR
No correlated terms
3-factor
18.60
.069
11
0.975
0.951
.546
2-factor
23.42
.037
13
0.965
0.944
.634
1-factor
24.67
.038
14
0.946
0.946
.655
Sally-Anne Tasks correlated
3-factor
6.56
.766
10
1.000
1.024
.328
2-factor
20.60
.057
13
0.971
0.950
.593
1-factor
20.36
.087
13
0.975
0.960
.596
N = 216; all models use WLSM estimation & Santorra-Bentler scaled χ2
Smarties
e1
.23
e2
.65
Sally-Anne
(1st-order)
.88
1st
Order
ToM
.59
.34
.37
e3
.32
e4
.77
Sally-Anne
(2nd-order)
Ice-Cream
Van
.83
2nd
Order
ToM
.76
.48
.81
e5
e6
.56
.58
Strange
Stories
.66
Faux Pas
.65
e7
.71
Eyes
.54
Higher
Order
ToM
Summary of Results
Hypothesis 1 – age group
differences supported
For all theory of mind tasks
Hypothesis 2 – gender differences
not supported
For all theory of mind tasks
Hypothesis 3 – 3-factor model
significant superiority supported
Implications I
Support for the multifactorial nature of
theory of mind
Fits with current theory and use of ToM
Challenge to ‘male brain’ theory of
Baron-Cohen
No gender differences detected
No interaction effects
Possible that gender effects were not evident because
of prepubescent sample – but still fails to fit theory
Implications II
Challenge to current orthodoxy in
theory of mind research
Assumptions of age – ability development of theory of
mind were not supported
Knowledge that ‘something’ is going on is different from
understanding what that ‘something’ is
Instruction sets and ‘memory prompts’ affect the
ecological validity of ToM tasks and artificially inflate
passing rates
Where Now?
Further examination of ‘memory
prompts’ and instruction sets
Further research into the
multifactorial nature of theory of
mind using a larger array of tasks
Using the 3-factor model to
examine the relationship with
executive functioning
Contact Details
Larry Cashion
larry@cashion.net