Business Case and Intervention Summary
Intervention Summary
Second level land certification
Rural Land administration
Market and Policy Development
M and E
Programme Management
Inception Period
48.5
3.0
9.2
2.9
3.9
0.7
Total (£ millions)
68.2
Budget by
outcome
Budget by
input/intervention
Title: Land Investment for Transformation (LIFT) Programme
What support will the UK provide?
DFID will provide between £45 and £68.2 million to the Land Investment for Transformation (LIFT)
Programme over 6.33 years from 2013/14 to 2019/20. The intervention will be delivered by the
Government of Ethiopia (GoE) with the support of an Implementing Technical Service Provider1
(ITSP)2. The funds will be channelled through the ITSP (up to 60%), GoE (up to 12%) and the
remaining directly spent by DFID.
Sustainable Rural
Land Governance
57.1
Better Working Rural
Land sector
11.1
Total (£ millions)
68.2
Why is UK support required?
This funding will be a driver for economic growth by contributing to DFID Ethiopia’s (DFID E)
Operation Plan (OP) result of increasing income by 20% for over 500,000 households. It will also
contribute to DFID’s presently off-track global result of access to land/property rights for women, by
securing land ownership for 6.1 million households, of whom around 70% will be women (including
both joint and individual ownership).
What need are we trying to address?
Insecure land tenure, limited investment by smallholders on their land, weak land rental markets and
poor market linkages contribute to low productivity, and high levels of land degradation reinforcing
poverty traps in rural Ethiopia. With 21 million people under the poverty line, there is an evident need
to increase the productivity of land, create jobs and strengthen markets if growth is to be sustained
and poverty reduced. Women are particularly disadvantaged, both economically and socially.
What will we do to tackle this problem?
Land certification is a key driver of economic growth and particularly empowers women and the
disadvantaged through enhanced security of tenure which leads to increased income and green
economic growth. The programme will support the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) in the provision of
map based land certificates to farmers in four regions3 and assist them to fully benefit from increased
investment and productivity through the development of the rural land sector and its supporting
operations. The certification process will be made sustainable through the development of the rural
land administration system in the four regions to transparently register all rural land use rights and
transactions thereon. The process will develop a reformed fee structure for post certification land
The ITSP was procured in March 2013 on a design and build contract with a specific break clause between inception and implementation periods that is subject to
performance during the inception phase, DFID selected the HTSPE consortium made up of HTSPE Ltd -UK, Nathan Associates London Ltd - UK, NIRAS – Finland and
GIRDC - Ethiopia as the preferred supplier to implement the programme, subject to satisfactory performance and approval of the business case and inception phase
outputs.
2 There will also be an External evaluation Technical Service Provider (ETSP) procured for external evaluation.
3 Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR), and Tigray, the major highland regions where the bulk of the farmers reside and GNP is
generated.
1
1
transactions and also result in the development of a tax cadastre which will facilitate more effective
and equitable land tax collection leading to increased domestic resource mobilisation.
What specific interventions will the support provide?
The support will provide interventions in the following areas:
 Increasing land tenure security – through significant upscaling of second level certification4 in
up to 35% of the woredas (districts) in the four states of Oromia, Amhara, Tigray and the Southern
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) and support to the development of the land
administration system, to record all rural land use rights, and protect the land use rights of women
and the vulnerable in those four states. To support certification, LIFT will fund teams to go to the field
and undertake certification; to support administration, LIFT will provide technical assistance to
relevant Regional and Woreda Government institutions, as it is only these levels which have the
mandate to issue land certificates. These Regional and Local Government institutions will be
capacitated to maintain the register. We will not, however, provide land certificates where there is any
suggestion that land allocations have not been properly carried out, nor in areas covered by policies
and procedures that are not in line with international good practice or do not respect human rights
obligations, and will put in place systems to identify any impropriety during the programme life. In
addition, the programme will not work in the Developing Regional States5, due to minimal first level
certification and their overall limited institutional and policy preparedness.
 Supporting the development of the rural land sector and supporting operations – to enable
farmers to more fully utilise land investment opportunities, LIFT will use the “Making Markets Work for
the Poor” approach as a complementary component to the land certification and administration
activities. This will begin by undertaking an in-depth analysis of the rural land sector in the four
programme states in the early stages of the programme to identify constraints to enhanced
productivity and investment. It will then develop specific complementary interventions aimed at
addressing these, and improving market efficiency, for example through addressing problems such
as the lack of information on available land for renting or regulations governing the rental market.
These approaches will specifically encourage environmentally sustainable practices and improved
benefits for women, girls and the disadvantaged.
 Addressing cross-cutting policy issues – we will support the Government of Ethiopia, in cooperation with other partners’ supporting programmes, on strengthening the existing land policies
and procedures, with the aim of enhancing security of tenure for communal land holdings, pastoralists
and customary land use and improving the transparency of land allocation. Bringing Ethiopia’s wider
land governance into line with international good practice6 and human rights obligations as for all
DFID’s programmes, particularly in relation to communal, pastoral and commercial land use, should
help protect the livelihoods and rights of farmers, especially pastoralists, help attract sustainable
commercial investments and improve the extent to which such investments benefit the community
and country. This will also support the new G8 land partnership in order to minimise the risks and
maximise the opportunities presented for Ethiopia’s long term development. The selected rules and
regulations will be prioritised based on their strategic importance and the commitment of the GoE.
Our input will also be aligned to the DFID global programme on land currently under development by
Policy Division. There will be continuous dialogue both at the higher level and technical level on the
outcome of those reviews and recommendations to contribute towards a stable, inclusive, transparent
framework. We will thereafter carry out action research on a regular basis to develop evidence on the
4 The first level certification already carried out by the Government of Ethiopia in the four highland regions provided land holders with a holding document with an estimate of the
land area without specifying the boundaries. Second level will verify and improve on the land holding details and provide boundary information. See Glossary Appendix 11.
5 These are Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Somali
6 E.g. the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy of the African Union and the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure
2
application of procedures derived from the work carried out, to identify at an early stage any issues to
be taken up with GoE, including in relation to the respect of human rights.
What are the expected results?
LIFT will be implemented in a stepped approach, with 3 million parcels certified in the first 2.5 years.
Experience and evidence at that point will establish whether a further 5 million parcels will be certified
at a total cost of £45 million, or whether a scaled up trajectory of a further 11 million parcels at a cost
of £68.2 million will be pursued. Complementary interventions will be implemented to ensure that the
benefits of second level certification are maximised. The results expected of LIFT in the maximum
investment scenario, attributable to DFID, include:
 Second stage certification of up to 14 million parcels7 in approximately 140 woredas8 in the four
Highland Regional States for approximately 6.1 million households (around 70% of parcels being
jointly or individually owned by women), contributing to the DFID global result on access to
land/property rights;
 Land administration systems implemented in the same 140 woredas;
 Number of land rental agreements increased by 13%, particularly benefiting female headed
households;
 Up to 1.36 million smallholder farmers increase their income by at least 20.5% as a result of
programme activities, contributing to this headline result in DFID E’s Operation Plan;9
 Percentage of households involved in land-related disputes reduced from 21.1% to 15%;
 A total of 40 regulations, strategies, procedures and plans at different levels drafted and
approved to improve the functioning of the land sector’s productivity and investment;
 25 research and evidence-based assessments, action plans and progress assessments, action
plans produced to allow the GoE to make informed decisions on land governance and to help
bring policies and practices into line with international good practice and human rights obligations;
and
 Ethiopia’s domestic resource mobilisation enhanced through an increased rural tax base and
more effective land tax system10.
LIFT will synergise its capacity building interventions with other existing donor funded programmes so
that, while the capacity building and systems development at the federal level will be largely carried
out them, with -LIFT concentrating on on-the-job training in the regional and woreda level structures,
targeted at implementation skills.
The achievement of the expected results will be monitored through a robust Monitoring and
Evaluation system including independent annual, mid-term and end of programme reviews that will
inform decisions as to whether the programme spend size will go to the upper limit or not. The M&E
system will further evaluate the implementation and results of actions derived from the cross cutting
policy discussion on a regular basis to develop evidence on the effectiveness of application of
procedures.
The sustainability of the impact will be safeguarded through the strengthened institutions, increased
7 A parcel is a defined area of land, of no particular size, with defined boundaries, held by a landholder and bordered by others held by other
or the same landholder. A landholder may own more than one parcel. The average rural parcel size is 0.63 hectare.
8 A woreda is the main unit of local government, equivalent elsewhere to district.
9 LIFT will contribute to this pillar, with first impact in the last year of the plan – 2014/15. Other programmes such as PEPE will also contribute
to this pillar.
10
The level of the anticipated increase will be confirmed early in implementation but in Amhara, for instance, land tax more than doubled
from 2008 to 2010 as households declared and registered more land.
3
awareness of land use rights as per the laws and regulations and proactive engagement from
beneficiaries. Interventions in the land sector will be aimed at catalysing change for longer term
impact. This will be verified by the independent impact assessment planned five years after the
programme has been completed.
The Value for Money appraisal concluded that DFID’s investment of up to £68.2m will deliver benefits
that outweigh costs with an Internal Rate of Return of 24.1% and Net Present Value of over £33.1m.
Business Case
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
Despite a decade of strong economic growth, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in
the world11. The economy is more diverse than in the past, but most Ethiopians continue to be
subsistence farmers. Agriculture accounts for 46.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)i and
85% of total employmentii. But agricultural productivity remains low; Ethiopia’s average cereal
yields are less than half of the world’s average 12 and are lower than in both Kenya and
Malawi.iii Insecure land tenure, lack of improved Rural Land Administration System (RLAS),
limited investment by smallholders in their land, weak land rental markets and poor market
linkages contribute to this low productivity and ultimately to poverty. Women are particularly
disadvantaged, both economically and socially, due to patriarchal institutions among other.iv
In this context, there is an evident need to increase the productivity of land, to create jobs,
empower women (both economically and socially) and to strengthen markets if growth is to be
sustained and poverty reduced. This business case clearly sets out the reasons for DFID’s
intervention and the empirical evidence to support the theory that land certification leads to an
increase in people’s incomes, a reduction in land disputes, increased investments, better land
governance and better land management. With 85% of the population living in rural areas, land
certification is a key driver of economic growth and particularly empowers women through
enhanced security of tenure.
Ethiopia is making progress but remains poor. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
ranks Ethiopia as the 13th poorest country in the worldv in terms of GDP. The country’s per
capita GNI13 of US$370 in 2011 was lower than that of Kenya ($820), Rwanda ($570), Uganda
($510), and Tanzania ($540).vi However, the Ethiopian economy is growing rapidly; it was the
fastest growing non-oil economy in Africa from 2006-2011.vii The GoE policy of public
investment has delivered broad-based, rapid growth averaging 9.9% between 2005 and
201214, outstripping the regional average of 5.4%. These stimulus of greater public investment
coincided with good harvests, higher coffee and gold prices and the successful emergence of
new export industries, such as floriculture and oil seeds.viii Despite the commitment of the
Government there have been challenges in meeting Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP)
targets in relation to agricultural productivity, partly due to structural problems including those
relating to the land sector.
Ethiopia is making good progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, with a decline in
the poverty head count from 39% in 2005 to 30 in 2011ix. It has recently achieved the MDG on
11 As defined by the IMF and World Bank.
12 Ethiopia had an average cereal yield of 1489 kg/ha from 2006 to 2008 compared to the world average of 3402 kg/ha (and over the
same period, it had a lower cereal yield than both Kenya and Malawi).
13 Gross National Income, Atlas Method.
14 According to IMF figures – the GoE claims growth averaged 11% p.a. over the 2005/6-2009/10 period.
4
infant mortality, two years ahead of time, while net enrolment in primary education has risen to
85.4%x but over the past two years has stagnated with concern that Ethiopia might not achieve
universal primary education by 2015. Maternal mortality rates have not declined.xi Ethiopia is
relatively equal economically with low income inequalities compared to most of its
neighbours.xii Ethiopia had a Gini co-efficient of 33.615 in 2011 compared to 44.3 in Uganda,
50.8 in Rwanda, and 57.5 in Zambia.xiii Nevertheless, urban areas, are developing faster than
rural areas and poverty reduction is occurring faster in cities than in villages. xiv
Ethiopia’s private sector is small and largely informal. The informal agricultural sector
constitutes the bulk of the private sector and smallholder farming comprises 87.4% xv of
agricultural production. Excluding informal agriculture, the private sector contributed only
36.7% to GDP in 2008-09 (84.8% including agriculture).xvi Paid formal employment accounts
for less than 10% of the total number of people reported as employed. xvii The private sector is
generally small-scale and uncompetitive with low levels of entrepreneurship and private
investment (6.9 % of GDP in 2011xviii).
Secure access to land is a significant constraint to economic growth and poverty
reduction. A World Bank (WB) report identifies lack of secure access to land as a major
constraint to growth in Ethiopia.xix Land tenure insecurity, weak land administration, limited
access to land for investors, land degradation and low soil fertility all weaken Ethiopia’s
prospects for long term growth and employment generation. Given that 85% of workers are
farmers, access to land is fundamentally important. Insecure land tenure and poor land
administration weaken the incentives for these small-scale farmers to invest in land. It also
limits the effectiveness of land rental markets, leading to less efficient allocation of land and
human resources.xx Landlessness, especially among the young, is a serious and growing
problem in the rural areas.xxi The government’s limited capacity to administer land (and lack of
improved LAS) and to carry out effective land use planning constrains the state’s ability to
support private sector development and to manage land based investments.
Ethiopian women are economically disadvantaged. Ethiopia ranks poorly in terms of
inequality between women and men (118th out of 134 countries worldwide)xxii. Women are
highly represented in the informal employment sector (comprise over 60%) but earn about 86%
of the salary of men.xxiii The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia lends less than 1% of its portfolio to
womenxxiv. Among agricultural land holders in Ethiopia, women constitute only 19 percent,
whilst men constitute 81 percentxxv. As described later in the Appraisal Case, access to land
and security of tenure is crucial to unlocking the economic potential of women, which is one of
the pillars of the Government’s Growth and Transformation Plan.
Conflict and disputes undermine growth. Disputes among settled farmersxxvi and
pastoralistsxxvii over land and access to resources undermine livelihoods and weaken growth
prospects Among others lack of adequate demarcation, registration and record keeping has led
to overlapping land inheritance claims that can result in conflict. There is evidence that violence
and intimidation are used against women who attempt to use the law to establish and defend
their right to landholdingsxxviii. Addressing these land related disputes and conflicts would
contribute to economic growth.
Ethiopia is environmentally vulnerable. Ethiopia’s low level of economic development
combined with its heavy dependence on a climate sensitive agricultural sector and its high
15 Gini coefficient is commonly used as a measure of inequality of income - 0 represents perfect equality, 100 represents perfect
inequality.
5
population growth rate make the country particularly vulnerable to climate change. xxix
Deforestation, accelerated soil erosion, and land degradation are serious environmental
problems. Although the actual rate of forest destruction and soil erosion is debatable (for
example annual loss of natural forest cover is estimated in the range of 150,000 to 200,000
hectares and soil erosion believed to affect up to 82% of the country), most agree that both are
occurring on a massive scale.
Almost two million persons are added annually to the population. Given the high proportion of
the population living in rural areas, increasing pressure is put on natural resources, raising
demand for productivity and scarce arable land at the expense of greener land uses such as
pasture and forests bringing further degradation.xxx
Rainfall patterns are extremely variable and dependence on rain-fed agriculture makes
Ethiopia especially vulnerable to climatic shocks. Over the next 50 years, Ethiopia is expected
to experience increasingly erratic weather, with higher rainfall, and a temperature rise of at
least 3°C.xxxi This could result in prolonged droughts and floods, which would affect crop yields
as well as increase tension around resource use.
The overall cost of land degradation in Ethiopia is already substantial, and worth 2-3% of
agricultural GDP per year.xxxii Shorter fallow cycles further deplete soil fertility and reduce the
productive land that is available for agriculture. Sustainable land management, improved
security of land tenure and land-use planning and control, will play a pivotal role in the success
or failure of Ethiopia’s climate change response.xxxiii
To address these problems, the Ethiopian Government is committed to improved land
tenure, land management and inclusive growth. The GoE has demonstrated high-level
commitment to inclusive growth and poverty reduction in Ethiopia. Its five-year GTP aims to
transform Ethiopia into a middle income country by 2020-2023. Accordingly, one of GTP’s
outputs is the delivery of a sustainable land use planning and management system xxxiv but it is
also concerned with putting in place the transport, power and irrigation infrastructure that the
rural poor need to participate effectively in markets. GoE is also committed at policy and
implementation level to improving the tenure security of smallholders, through the Land
Administration and Land Use Development Programme (ELALUDEP, 2011) and Strategic
Road Map for National Rural Land Administration and Use System (2012-2015) (SRM).
Furthermore, in 2012, the GoE made a commitment under the G8 New Alliance on Food
Security and Nutrition to ‘strengthen land use rights to stimulate investment in agriculture’
through extending rural land certification and refining land laws xxxv. The strengthened land use
rights from second level certification will address weaknesses in the previous registration
leading to reduced land conflicts, better productivity and investment; and improved land use
planning, amongst other benefits. On 09 December 2013 the Governments of Ethiopia, the
United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Federal Republic of Germany, under
the UK’s G8 Presidency, announced a joint declaration to enter a land country partnership. The
partnership is expected to support improved rural land tenure security for all, including through
appropriate land use management in communal and pastoral areas. It will strengthen
transparency in land governance, including by promoting responsible agricultural investment
through an improved legal framework and practices for economic growth and to protect the
land use rights of local citizens in Ethiopia.
Constraints
There are a number of constraints that limit the productivity of land in Ethiopia, thereby
limiting economic growth and poverty reduction. These constraints are summarised below
and explored in more detail in the text that follows.
6
Table 1: Summary of the causes of poor land productivity
Constraint
Underlying Causes
Weak land tenure security
Restrictive land regulation and procedures


Previous land redistribution undermines confidence in tenure security
Unclear and inconsistent regional regulations and procedures for formal
land transfer (for rentals and transfer of land use rights)
 Informal land use transactions tend not to allocate land to those who
can make the most productive use of it
Weak capacity of land administration



Limited access to finance



Limited input markets


Limited output markets

Lack of knowledge and skills





Declining land quality



Poor infrastructure

Small
plot
fragmentation
size
and



Weak land administration system for registering and certifying land
Records not maintained after first-stage certification due to weak local
level capacity and systems
Weak capacity results in women and vulnerable groups disadvantaged
in obtaining and maintaining land security
Limited capacity and systems for local land use planning
Low access to credit markets and finance for smallholders (especially
women)
Limited smallholders use land certificate for loans16
Limited access to agricultural inputs including fertiliser, oxen/tractors
and seeds (especially for women)
Limited markets for agricultural produce, therefore little income to
reinvest in land or to move beyond subsistence production
Lack of market information for farmers
Lack of access to markets
Inadequate irrigation
Lack of access to roads and electricity
Lack of information on effective farming, environmental and land use
practices
Limited information on land policies and regulations
Introduction of inappropriate technologies
Loss of soil fertility due to shorter fallow periods and crop rotation
cycles
Land degradation and erosion due to impact of changing rainfall
patterns including more intense rainfall events, extended dry spells and
wider/secondary impacts of increased pressure on forests, farm,
rangeland after climate shocks
Limited land use regulations and agricultural practices
Population growth
Local inheritance practices contribute to division of land
The underlying causes of the constraints listed above are set out below:
Policy and institutional constraints
The GoE plays a strong management role in the economy, and this extends to land policy.
The Constitution states that all land is state-owned:
“…the right to ownership of rural land and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in
the state and the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the nations, nationalities and
peoples of Ethiopia”.xxxvi
16 Land certificates are being used as a guarantee of productivity in Amhara, but this is not widespread practice.
7
Citizens are entitled to obtain land without payment but are barred from buying, selling or
mortgaging land. Land use rights convey some of the benefits of ownership to landholders and
are transferable through inheritance, rental, divorce or gift to both men and women. The
Government is committed to retaining state control over land and protecting the interests of the
people.xxxvii
Restrictions in Ethiopia‘s land laws have inhibited the emergence of a functioning land
sector. Most regions limit the amount of land that can be leased, thus restricting the
development of the land rental market, with an economically viable size of parcel. The
requirement for residence on (or near) held land limits access to land for immigrants and
further restricts people from moving to areas of different opportunities for fear of losing
existing holdings. This also affects opportunities to diversify livelihoods away from
agricultureGovernment has a combination of strategies to tackle the problem of land access
including improvements in land use and productivity, voluntary land settlement and
resettlement, and introduction of model labour intensive technologies
Historically, land issues have been an important factor in Ethiopia’s political and
economic development. The pre-1974 imperial regime supported a feudal agrarian structure.
The inequitable effects of this system and eviction of tenants to make way for commercial
farming led to the 1974 revolution. The new ruling party (the Derg) subsequently implemented
a series of reforms to re-distribute land between 1976 and1991. However, frequent
redistribution had the effect of reducing secure access to land and natural resources. After
coming to power in 1991, the EPRDF maintained state land ownership and use-rights for
farmers and livestock keepers, while continuing redistribution at woreda (district) and kebele17
levels in one region. In 1996, federal law devolved greater power for land issues to regions but
attempts to redistribute land in Amhara in 1997 led to peasant grievances. In recognition of the
negative effects of land redistribution, the GoE officially ended redistribution policies in 2005.
The current land rental market in Ethiopia is uncompetitive and informal, which can leave
disadvantaged groups (e.g. women, orphans and the elderly) open to exploitation. The legal
framework governing the land rental market varies by region. Many regions have restrictions
on the rental contract period and the amount of land that can be let. For example, in Oromia,
farmers cannot lease more than half of their land nor can they lease it for more than 3 years
with more than 15 years permitted for modern agriculture. The land rental market is divided
between fixed-fee rental arrangements, where part of a holding is let for a short duration, and
share-cropping arrangements, where farmers pool resources and share harvests according to
allocation. About a quarter of all rural families in Ethiopia are engaged in land rental market
transactions, the majority of which are informal sharecropping arrangements with neighbours
or relatives.xxxviii There are significant inefficiencies in land sharecropping (i.e. realised
productivity is lower than the potential) estimated at 24%.xxxix
Those who let land are usually resource-poor households e.g. those with no oxen or ploughs,
or labour-poor households such as elderly people or female-headed households (FHH).
People who rent tend to include those who either have no access to land or are financially
better-off farmers. In a 2004 survey of 4585 households across the country 18, around 4% of
FHHs rented landxl. However, due to a fear of losing land to tenants through a lack of land
security, FHHs often sharecrop out their land to relatives or neighbours on the basis of
unfavourable arrangements. Following first level land certification 30% of FHH let or shared17 A kebele is the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia, with a population of approximately 5,000 people.
18 Excluding Gambella regional state. Letting by female headed households happened following first level certification.
8
out their land, increasing the efficient allocation of labour, productivity and returns to both the
FHH and the renter.
Certification is a pre-condition for formal transfer of land use rights but procedures are not
clear, there are deficiencies in the formats used for land registers and land users lack
awareness of their rights. This leads citizens to use customary institutions instead of land
registries, which undermines the accuracy of official land records and maintains traditional
biases against women and vulnerable groups.xli
Implementation and capacity constraints
As Regional Governments have the mandate to certify land, capacity and resource allocated to
land certification differs from region to region with the Developed/highland regions making
more headway. Since 1998 formal land registration (“first level land certification”19) has been
implemented in the four highland states (HRS) of Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray (see
Table 2), with an estimated 8 million households receiving certificates out of an estimated total
of 11 million for those four regions. First level certification commenced only recently in
Benishangul Gumuz, Afar and Gambella and the numbers of certificates issued is not
significant. The programme has not yet commenced in Somali region.
Total numbers of parcels in the four highland regions is estimated at 40 million20 with another
10 million in the other regional states. The quality of available data is, however varies and the
information in Table 2 should be treated as indicative.
Table 2: Status of first-stage certification in Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigrayxlii
Amhara
Oromia
SNNPR
Tigray
Total
170, 752
350, 000
113, 323
80, 000
714, 075
Population (mil)
17.2
28.0
16.0
4.4
65.6
Rural woredas
128
264
134
34
560
3,146
6,149
3, 586
695
13,846
Kebeles per woreda
25
24
27
20
25
Rural households (mil)
3.9
4.0
2.4
0.65
10.95
Estimated total parcels (mil)
12.0
16.0
9.6
2.6
40.2
First-level certificates issued (mil)
3.8
3.9
2.3
0.64
8.0
Completion (% of households)
98
98
98
99
98
Area (sq. km)
Kebeles
This is an excellent start, which has provided increased land security at a low cost, but there
were many flaws in the process including; up to 10% of parcels may have been omitted in
woredas that were claimed to have been completed21; the lack of clear boundaries on the
19 First level certification involves identifying occupants of land parcels and recording their rights and land use in a register. A paper
record is maintained. Second level certification involves verifying the first level certification process and physically demarcating
boundaries of land parcels using areal maps in order to build a digital cadastre that will increase accuracy further minimising boundary
disputes.
20 There are an estimated 555 rural woredas in the 4 regions (each woreda contains 23 kebeles on average). Nationally there are
671 rural woredas (though the numbers change),
21 The quantification of the extent of this is difficult but the report of the REILA project in 2013 on their first two second level
certification pilot kebeles reported finding 443 parcels missing out of a total of 4416. Informal evidence from other regions indicate
similar or larger numbers of missing parcels.
9
certificates meant that boundary disputes increased;22 the areas included in the certificates
were rough estimates using rudimentary measures; and the process did not develop a
cadastre that can facilitate more equitable tax collection, and land use, environmental and
other planning. As certification was carried out rapidly and considered a one-off campaign,
recording was inconsistent, which with the other weaknesses, undermined potential benefits of
improved valuation, expropriation and compensation processes, and rental contract protection.
These important constraints led GoE to prioritise the implementation of second level
certification, where the use of aerial photography and parcel mapping generated the spatial
data required to address these constraints. Lessons learnt from the pilots run by the World
Bank and Finland-funded Responsible and Innovative Land Administration in Ethiopia (REILA)
programme, together with studies by the ELAP and ELTAP programmes on the different
methodologies have helped shape what the second level certification would comprise,
including ensuring that wives and children – missing from first level certificates – are
incorporated in the second level land certificate.
Furthermore, land registers in these states have not been maintained following this first
level certification (despite recent attempts in Amhara). This means that records are not up to
date and are therefore of limited value in terms of long-term land use planning and land tenure
security. A coherent land administration system has not been implemented across the
country. Urban land administration is dealt with separately from rural land administration. Until
the establishment of the Rural Land Administration and Use Directorate (RLAUD) in 2010, the
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) did not have a unit that could guide the regional states and
provide federal level policy support though it had some experts. This gap contributed to the
proliferation of discrete regional arrangements with sometimes inconsistent legal provisions
and technical procedures. These organisational arrangements imply significant coordination
challenges and fragmentation of land administration capacity.xliii
The current land administration system in Ethiopia is not fully harmonised and is mainly
paper-based, although digital systems have been initiated in Amhara and Tigray. A
component of REILA programme is attempting to harmonise land administration procedures in
Ethiopia, but further work remains. Regional land administration arrangements vary across the
country. Some are organised under the Bureaux of Agriculture (e.g. Tigray and SNNPR) while
others (e.g. Amhara and Oromia) are directly accountable to the regional president. With the
exception of Amhara, states have no arrangements at the kebele level. This has put a
significant strain on record management and maintenance as well as the overall land
administration service which, in the final analysis, undermines governance. In most cases,
elected Land Administration Committees (LAC), constituting 5-7 members, are organised at
kebele and sub-kebele level, mainly to facilitate and lead the field level adjudication process.
The organisations responsible for land administration face capacity constraints such as
lack of professional staff and, at local level, the priority given to tasks other than land
administration. Another problem is the limited availability of computers and office space. The
situation is even more constrained at the woreda level. Under-staffed offices, lack of trained
professionals and high staff turnover exacerbate frustration in the sector, despite intensified
efforts by the government. The Ethiopian Mapping Agency (EMA), under the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), is the country’s repository and provider of
spatial information. However, it has neither the required spatial data nor sufficient staffing to
22 The ELAP baseline survey report of 2013 found that the number of disputes was higher for those with 1st level certificates than
others and over 58% of land disputes related to boundaries.
10
support and address the regional states’ requirements.
Corruption and rent seeking in the land sector are frequently reported in the media. In the
most recently published 2007/08 Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission report, 28 of
the 63 cases investigated that year were in the land sector, and these cases involved
approximately £26m in lost revenue from corruption. Weak enforcement of rights in rural areas,
lack of a strong policy framework and an ineffective dispute resolution process create
opportunities for possible distortion.xliv
The way large-scale land acquisitions are done affects land certification and security of
tenure. The 2003 Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation and 2005 Expropriation of
Land Holdings for Public Purpose and Payment of Compensation Proclamation gives the state
the right to expropriate land for public use, when in the public interest, and GoE has identified
large scale agricultural investments as one of the drivers of economic growth. Where
procedures to manage such activities are not robust or incorrectly applied then land holders’
perception of security of tenure will be weakened.
Market Weaknesses
Private sector credit is not widely available in Ethiopia and represented only 18% of GDP in
2010 (compared to 35% in Kenya).xlv World Bank Enterprise Surveys identified access to
finance as the second biggest constraint to investmentxlvi in Ethiopia. The country has a welldeveloped micro-finance industry made up of government affiliated and private micro-finance
institutions (MFIs)23 but these are restricted by government policies such as fixed interest rates.
Credit is a major supply side constraint to farmers for accessing inputs such as fertiliserxlvii
and finance is often provided on a short-term basis through MFIs. Banks do not currently offer
suitable financial products for smallholders and only commercial farmers can mortgage land
use rights.xlviii Medium to long-term investment finance is almost non-existent in rural areas
due to lack of loan package available and small farm size.xlix Smallholders are risk averse to
investing in cash crops at the expense of staples due to lack of insurance and lack of
alternative means of maintaining consumption.l
Numerous studiesli show that the agricultural commodity flow from rural Ethiopia to urban
markets is highly constrained despite GoE efforts to build road and irrigation
infrastructure, develop agricultural cooperatives and provide extension services. In
addition to the policy level constraints in respect to access to land, credit availability and input
supplies, weak market infrastructure expressed in terms of inadequate information on potential
buyers, price, and required quality standards act to constrain commodity flows in the country.
Under the Agricultural Growth Programme (AGP), the GoE is improving roads (40,096 km of
roads constructed throughout the country in 2011/12lii) and addressing market linkages in an
attempt to improve the whole range of production, marketing and processing of agricultural
goods through value addition, extension services and infrastructure.
Farmer incomes are restricted by lack of information and low prices for outputs. Most
farmers produce small quantities of goods and are restricted to local markets because of
transport constraints.liii Even in good crop years, local markets may be unable to absorb
surplus production and prices plummet. Producers historically sold grain shortly after harvests,
when demand was lowest, because of lack of storage facilities, but Government is addressing
through the provision of increased storage facilities and the extension of credit . Furthermore,
23 One of the affiliated MFIs, Amhara Credit and Saving Institution, was recently rated by Forbes Magazine globally as the 6th best
MFI
11
farmers have little bargaining power at markets due to their lack of market price information
(available now, however, to brokers, traders and now the public media such as radio and TV).
Apart from fertiliser and quality seeds, use of modern inputs such as farm machinery and
irrigation is not widespread. The GoE has identified small-scale irrigation as an important
component of adaptation to climate change and food security, backed by studies that
demonstrate small-scale irrigation increases agricultural productivity and households’ ability to
cope with climate variability.liv But there is scope for further expansion of irrigation since less
than 5% of arable land is irrigated at present.lv
Cooperatives and extension services are in place but are not market-orientated.
Agricultural cooperatives have been a pillar of the national agricultural strategy known as
Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI) since 1994. Cooperatives provide
smallholders with access to subsidised agricultural inputs and basic services for output
marketing. However, cooperatives and extension services were developed for food security
objectives rather than to facilitate market orientated agriculture lvi though current policy
statements require a greater focus for those activities. Female Headed Households are
reported as given low priority and often excluded from training.lvii Access to extension varies
across regions and the quality of the service is determined by a top-down approach (i.e. by
focusing on model farmers to adopt fixed technology packages, which tends to limit poor
farmers, particularly women.lviii)
Declining farm sizes
In Ethiopia, rural land holdings are small and declining; more than 85% of smallholders
operate on less than 2 hectares of land.lix Such small plot sizes decrease the potential
commercial viability of farms.24 Farms are also increasingly fragmented (each farmer holds an
average of 2.3 parcels).lx The population continues to grow and remains highly rural and this
places pressure on Ethiopia’s limited agricultural land, particularly in the densely populated
highlands. While economic inequality is relatively low in Ethiopia, a significant proportion of
citizens have no access to land. Although there are no nationwide studies on landlessness to
determine the extent of the problem in the whole country, one study claims that close to 50 per
cent of the population is landless in some parts of Oromia.lxi
Land degradation
Soil erosion and land degradation stemming from continuous cultivation lxii are serious
constraints to soil productivity and break the nutrient cycle in farm lands. Between 2000
and 2010 Ethiopia is estimated to have lost US$7 billion because of reduced agricultural output
due to land degradation. Effective soil conservation measures could double net food
production.lxiii Lack of land tenure security, however, gives farmers little incentive to invest at
household level in water or soil conservation measureslxiv and exacerbates deforestationlxv.
According to the Strategic Climate Institutions Programme Scoping Study:
“A lack of security over forest access and use leads to unsustainable exploitation, rather than use based on
stewardship; a reluctance to invest in the improvement of smallholdings including tree-planting, soil improvement
and water conservation measures; and resultant pressure on forested land, either for timber products, charcoal
and firewood, but more significantly for additional agricultural land.”lxvi
There is some evidence that land tenure security can mitigate land degradation - a study
on first level land certification in Ethiopia estimated an average 30% rise in investment in soil
24 There is a body of evidence showing correlation between farm size and productivity, Heltberg, Rasmus. 1998. Rural Market
Imperfections and the Farm Size-Productivity Relationship: Evidence from Pakistan. World Development, 26(10): 1807-1826
12
and water conservation measures among smallholders and more than double the number of
hours spent on such activities. lxvii Participants in the survey attributed the greater investment to
the security of tenure gained from land certification which encouraged better custodianship of
the land. GoE awareness raising campaigns and development partner supported programmes
have undoubtedly also contributed to this success.
Effective land use planning to conserve forests and natural resources is also undermined by
inaccurate land registers.lxviii An estimated 50% of highland resources are already extremely
degradedlxix and forest areas are threatened by the expansion of agricultural land. Between
1990 and 2010, Ethiopia lost 18.6% of its forest cover or around 2,818,000 ha. lxx However,
there is still scope to boost agricultural productivity without degrading land. Only around 20%
of potentially suitable land is currently believed to be cultivated for agriculture.lxxi
Climate change is likely to exacerbate processes of soil degradation, through more
frequent and intense rainfall and increased pressure on forests, farm and rangeland for
production following climate shocks.lxxii Land degradation heightens vulnerability to climate
change and reduces adaptive capacity at all levels through interlinked processes, such as
sustained poverty, low growth, food insecurity and deforestation.lxxiii
Constraints for women and vulnerable people
Studies show that Ethiopian women control only a very small amount of land, lxxiv despite policy
and regulatory enactments that would suggest otherwise, and despite women’s significant
contribution to agriculture.lxxv Customary law practices and patriarchal family and community
structures dictate that low status characterises virtually every aspect of girls’ and women’s
lives, and that they face systemic discrimination in accessing even the most basic resources
including land. This leaves them with few opportunities to make and act on their own
decisions.lxxvi
The Social Institutions and Gender Index reports that, despite reforms, the reality is that
women only gain access to land through marriage. It further notes that “it is generally accepted
that only the head of the household – typically the husband – can be a landowner. Women who
separate from their husbands are likely to lose their houses and property, and when a husband
dies, other family members often claim the land over his widow.” lxxvii In pastoralist areas where
poverty is higher, women do not own property without a male guardian, which increases their
marginalisation and vulnerability. A widow must marry her brother-in-law or have an adult son
in order to keep her deceased husband's land.lxxviii
Women’s limited access to resources is mirrored by the experiences of large numbers of
disadvantaged and vulnerable people who are members of minority groups and who suffer
from discrimination on the basis of their identity,lxxix e.g. race, ethnicity, religion, disability. lxxx
They tend to be amongst the poorest of the poor and have the least access to voice and
representation in society. Gender cuts across all these areas of exclusion and deepens power
imbalances in all of them.lxxxi
While being one of the fastest growing economies in the world with increasing per capita
incomes Ethiopia is one of the world’s poorest countries. Rural poverty and social inequality
are extensive and structurally ingrained, and the implementation of regulations against
discrimination is highly deficient.lxxxii Inequality and marginalisation of women and
disadvantaged groups from access to assets and services, and from decision-making
processes that influence the allocation of resources, significantly contributes to the creation
and sustenance of this poverty.lxxxiii
HIV/AIDS is another challenge that exacerbates vulnerability in Ethiopia. The current
prevalence rate is 3.5%, equating to 1.32 million people living with HIV/AIDS, of whom 55% are
13
women.lxxxiv The epidemic mostly strikes young productive adults and effects coping strategies,
thereby increasing the vulnerability of communities to hazards and shocks. Within this context,
it also has major impacts on land use rights and use, as entering into rental or sharecropping
arrangements in a situation of vulnerability weakens the negotiating power of the family. lxxxv
Why is a DFID intervention required?
The analysis above demonstrates that there is a clear need for an intervention. If agricultural
productivity is to be enhanced and sustainable private sector growth is to be achieved, GoE
must strengthen land tenure security, improve the quality of land administration, and support
smallholder market linkages. However, despite the importance and commitment made by the
Government, financial constraints have held back the implementation pace and quality. DFID’s
support in the four highland regions, as part of its wealth creation pillar that builds on its Golden
Thread strategy, climate change strategy, girls and women vision, developing a global land
programme and G8 transparency agenda, will have significant economic, social, environmental
and fiscal benefits, as well as a positive influence on conflict and transparency related issues,
which are set out below. By doing so, DFID will be meeting its commitment set out in our
operational plan to increase the income of households by 20% and improve rights to land,
particularly for women. The latter will also contribute 10.2%25 towards global DFID’s Vision for
Women and girls of providing 4.5m females with access to land/property rights by 2015.
Economically, DFID support would help to foster improved land productivity, household
income generation and ultimately economic growth. There are three potential economic
benefits:
Firstly, an effective and sustainable land certification process in the four highland
regions will reduce the insecurity of farmers and create incentives for them to increase
investments in their land. This has the potential to increase productivity and boost economic
returns. A broad body of evidence supports the link between tenure security and household
investment.lxxxvi In Vietnamlxxxvii and Thailandlxxxviii, land administration reform led to increased
household investment. Eighty-five per cent of participants in a survey on DFID Rwanda’s Land
Tenure Regularisation (LTR) Support Programme stated that land certification encouraged
them to invest more in agricultural inputs26. In Ethiopia, a 2009 studylxxxix found that farmers
increased their agricultural output by about 9% in the first year after certification.27 The
relationship however tends to be complex and dependent on the nature of the investment. xc
Secondly, a robust land certification process and effective land administration system
can contribute to smoother and more frequent land transactions. Secure certificates will
empower people to lease out and leave their land without risk of expropriation. While land
cannot be bought or sold, it can be rented. A better operating and more dynamic land rental
market can help to shift land to those that can make the most productive use of it. In
Nicaraguaxci more secure land use rights increased rental market activity and in Ethiopia,
there is evidence that certification in and of itself has led to an increased supply of land
to the rental market and that these rental markets have transferred land from relatively
resource-poor households (often FHH) to other farmers. xcii This allows FHHs and the
elderly to increase their incomes by realising land assets which they are unable to use.
Improving the rental market can also allow households that let land to diversify into non-farm
income activities, and allows those households that rent land to achieve economies of scale, to
25 See Fit with UK Priorities for more details.
26 As quoted in the LTRSP project logframe results in the draft final report.
27 This is further evidenced in the final end line survey of ELAP in April 2013.
14
apply more improved technologies and to use labour and oxen that otherwise would be underutilised.xciii
Thirdly, there is evidence that land certification can enhance farmers’ access to credit xciv
and thus their opportunity to invest in their land, though this is by no means conclusivexcv.
In Ethiopia, land cannot be sold or mortgaged, making this connection less direct than in many
contexts. A more secure and efficient certification process, however, might enable micro-credit
programmes to assess risks and potential opportunities for loans.xcvi
Overall, land titling and certification can result in profound household and macro-level gains in
productivity and growth. These gains, however, are likely to be limited xcvii unless the
certification process is accompanied by:







Adequate investment in land administration and regular updating of land records;
Effective enforcement of contracts and leases;
Adequate supporting markets for inputs (fertiliser, livestock, seeds and credit) to improve
productivity;
Adequate supporting markets to sell agricultural produce;
Available infrastructure (access to markets);
Technical and agricultural extension support; and
Capacity building at all levels of Government to sustain the above.
When new technologies become available, when credit, input, and product markets improve,
and when rural infrastructure develops, more significant relationships between tenure security
and land productivity should begin to emerge.
Fiscally, DFID support to certification and more effective land administration could help to
boost government revenues.
There has already been a positive fiscal impact for the Government as a result of first stage
land certification. This is expected to increase further with second level certification and
improved land administration. As more land is ‘claimed’ and formally registered, the volume of
land tax increases. In Amhara, for instance, land tax more than doubled from 2008 to 2010 as
households declared and registered more land.xcviii This increases domestic revenue, one of
the goals of the GTP designed to reduce aid-dependency in the long-term. A well-designed
land record, supported by DFID and Finnish Government, will ensure that tax collection records
are also up to date, minimising tax disputes.
Given limitations in GoE finances, reflecting its early stage of economic development, land
titling and administration is unlikely to be a funding priority for it. Although improved property
rights through land titling stand to deliver long-term transformational economic benefits, more
immediate requirements are likely to be prioritised by GoE.
Socially, DFID assistance would help to redress the economic exclusion of women and
disadvantaged groups.
The implications of secure land use rights for women have been widely documented. For
example, research in Kenya and elsewhere shows there is a significant link between weak
property rights and women’s HIV status.28 Security of land certification helps to remove
28 Women with HIV tend to be more vulnerable to property grabbing by relatives with the result that they may lack the property
necessary to secure any form of medical treatment. Furthermore, property practices may increase women’s vulnerability to HIV as
lack of property rights may make them (i) unwilling to leave a violent relationship where they have a higher risk of getting HIV and (ii)
force them to undergo sexual cleansing and levirate marriages to remain with the husband’s family. See Human Rights Watch,
15
women’s fear of dispossession in the event of letting land to non-relatives.xcix It may also
provide women, the elderly and orphans with greater security if faced with disputes and
inheritance claims. A survey of male conflict mediators found that joint land certification
strengthens women‘s position in cases of divorce as well as death of their husband.c Limited
land use rights also affect a woman’s standing in the community with consequent implications
for her ability to take part in community decision-making processes.
There is also evidence that more efficient rental markets improve social equity. Evidence from
Mexicoci, and East and West Africa demonstrates that land rental markets can decrease
inequality and improve productivity. As a result, “temporary land transfers through rental
markets appear to be pro-poor and particularly beneficial for women.”cii
DFID assistance would help to improve land use rights for women and disadvantaged
groups, thereby redressing economic inequalities, as demonstrated by the positive
impacts of first level land certification on women in Ethiopia. Recent pilots allocating
certificates in Ethiopia have resulted in an increase in the number of women with legally
recognised rights as land holders (more than 90% of first and second wives). ciii
Environmentally, DFID support to land certification and administration would contribute to
increased investment in soil and water conservation, tree planting and sustainable farming
practices—all of which play a part in climate change resilience and adaptation.
International evidence repeatedly demonstrates that insecure land tenure undermines
incentives for farmers to invest in soil and water conservation measures.civ The inverse is
also true and a range of studies show the positive environmental implications of secure tenure.
Analysis in Ethiopia found increased household investment in stone terracing and other soil
conservation mechanisms as well as increased tree planting in areas in which land titles have
been issued.cv cvi In addition, the improved mapping and land administration support delivered
by DFID will assist with more effective and sustainable land use planning, allowing local
government to take a more informed approach to environmental planning.
Conflicts and disputes: DFID support to effective land certification and improved land
administration is likely to reduce the scope for land disputes and the potential for these
disputes to fuel broader conflict.
Land is the most common source of local level disputes in Ethiopia. Unclear plot boundaries,
insecure title and out of date record keeping trigger and reinforce boundary, inheritance and
rental disputes. There is significant evidence that these disputes will decline with more
accurate land certification that is defined through the involvement of the landholders, their
neighbours, and the local level committees known as Land Administration Committee (LAC)
comprising community elders and woreda/district officials coupled with a more effective land
administration system. In one comprehensive Ethiopian study, 85% of certificate holders
perceived that the risk of disputes over inheritance diminished once certificates were issued. cvii
Additionally, evidence from Oromia and SNNPR found that there was a significant reduction in
disputes after land registration.cviii The programme will also contribute to addressing conflict
and fragility through the cross cutting policy discussion in collaboration with other programmes
(e.g. the US ‘LAND’ programme) to address land issues with regard to, communal land,
pastoralists and transparency in land allocations. This positive contribution to conflict reduction
Kenya: “Congressional Testimony on HIV/AIDS and Women’s Property Rights Violations in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Testimony of Janet
Walsh, Deputy Director, Women’s Rights Division, Human Rights Watch at www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/us041003-test.htm.
16
is cognisant of the ‘do no harm’ approach.
Corruption and transparency: DFID support would contribute to a more transparent land
titling and administration system in Ethiopia.
Local administrators’ control over land records can create incentives for corruption and rent
seeking, particularly if these records are imprecise and out of date. The concentration of
administrative power in these officials’ hands and the lack of accountability systems at local
levels amplify these risks in the Ethiopian context, as outlined in a recent World Bank study.cix
The participatory, public and photographic based land certification process to be implemented
by LIFT, however, makes misuse of the system more difficult. By streamlining the land registry,
the programme will also minimise opportunities for local officials to manipulate land records.
The involvement of landholders, their neighbours, and the local level committees in the
identification of parcel borders and ownership, coupled with robust dispute resolution
procedures based on widely accepted customary institutions, provides strong protection
against corrupt practices in the registration process. Local citizens, communities and
associations will also be sensitised to monitor and report any malpractice or traditional biases,
especially those that impact on women and the disadvantaged.
What will happen if DFID does not intervene?
Without DFID support, the government will continue with second stage land certification as
planned in ELALUDEP at a slower pace, with reduced quality and limited market facilitation.
This is considered in the Do Nothing Option of the appraisal case with the total funds available
in this instance from donors and GoE likely to be at most £42.4m. This is estimated in the Do
Nothing Option 4 in the appraisal case as likely to cover less than 50 woreda or 9% of the
estimated 550 rural woreda in the four Highland Regional States. Review of current limited
upscaling raises concerns about the speed and quality of the outputs which will present
problems for the future, in terms of disputes and usability of the resulting cadastres. The limited
facilitation work within the land sector will reduce the potential benefits for increased
productivity.
Policy support will continue through the interventions of the US funded LAND programme but
this will be largely concentrated on the review of existing laws and regulations and the
preparation of policy for pastoral communities, without the wider impact on transparency and
market policies.
Without DFID support, the following opportunities would be reduced or lost:



Incomes for 6.1 million small-holder farmers would remain low, missing the opportunity for
them to transition out of poverty and enhance economic growth.
Existing land registries would not be maintained resulting in increasing tenure insecurity
and land related disputes would increase with negative implications, as already evidenced
with first level certification.
Boundary disputes would continue to proliferate as significantly fewer second level
certificates would be issued29 and the overall quality of the certification process would be
weaker without DFID investment in capacity development and quality assurance, as
evidenced by the large number of errors and omissions in first level certification and high
number of boundary disputes.
29 The do nothing option in the appraisal case identifies the resources and likely outputs available in the event of DFID not supporting
land certification and estimated that approximately 4.3 million certificates would be issued by 2019 against the 14 million to be issued
through LIFT. The capacity to actually achieve this in the period is also doubtful given current speed of certification.
17





There will be weak land use planning for land productivity, income generation, the
environment and overall economic growth, because of the continuing lack of a land
cadastre on which such applications are reliant.
The position of women and girls and other vulnerable groups will continue to be
disadvantaged especially in the land rental market, as there will be continuing reluctance to
let land because of insecurity over boundaries.
Improvements in the land sector’s investment and productivity would be limited to the
marginal effects of other programmes such as AGP.
The opportunity from farmers to invest in land productivity and environmental
protection measures for up to 14 million land parcels would be reduced.
Land tax collection will be hampered by outdated and incomplete land registers.
Why DFID and not others?
DFID has comparative advantages that make it the most appropriate development partner for
this programme:Expertise in Land Reform. DFID has a strong track record of successfully supporting
land reform in similarly challenging contexts including Rwanda, Guyana and Kenya. DFID
supported the Land Tenure Regularisation (LTR) Programme in Rwanda which is considered
to be a benchmark for land certification on the continent for low cost, high quality certification
and land administration. With 10 million parcels demarcated and 8 million certificates issued
over three years it is the largest of its kind in Africa. The GoE approach to Second Level
Certification is based on the Rwanda methodology, following a number of study visits. No
other development partner is able to bring this experience, which puts DFID in the best place to
work in this sector.
DFID is a global leader in the ‘Making Markets Work for the Poor’ (M4P) approach The
M4P approach (see box) will maximise the income benefits of increased tenure security to
smallholder farmers through facilitation of
M4P (‘making markets work for the poor’) is an
investment and productivity in the land sector. approach that is characterised by:
DFID currently has a portfolio of fifteen M4P
programmes worldwide valued at £300m. 1. Addressing systemic constraints to
markets functioning well.
However, this approach has been less well tried 2. Application of a market systems
in the land sector, with current examples of DFID
framework, which requires identification of
the different rules and players involved.
working on this in Nigeria and South Africa. This
will enable the programme to look at the wider 3. Acting as a facilitator or a catalyst of
change, not a deliverer.
picture and assess where our complementary
4. An emphasis on sustainability and scale.
interventions are best placed for higher impact.
5. Ensuring that poverty reduction will result
from the change.
DFID Ethiopia’s other current programmes
align with and would benefit from LIFT. LIFT
has been developed as a Private Sector Development (PSD) programme and as such will have
many synergies with the other DFID PSD programme – Private Enterprise Programme Ethiopia
(PEPE). These two programmes will complement each other, with LIFT providing land security
to enable greater investment to unblock value chain constraints identified by PEPE in
horticulture, textiles and leather. In addition, PEPE’s work on increasing access to finance will
include investigating credit opportunities using land certificates produced under LIFT and both
programmes will work together in their land sector development components. Economies of
18
scale can be achieved in attaining these common objectives through harmonised approaches
that leverage LIFT’s extensive geographical coverage and deep understanding of the rural land
sector.30
Relationships with other programmes will be less direct but the wide regional spread of LIFT
will provide a basis from which local knowledge can be shared with other programmes and,
where appropriate, their initiatives broadened, and LIFT’s strengthened, by inclusion in LIFT
activities. These will include programmes in the areas of; climate change (Strategic Climate
Institutions Programme (SCIP), the Climate High Level Investment Programme (CHIP); food
security (Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)); gender (Girl Hub, Community Security
and Justice (CSJ) and End Child Marriage programmes).
In addition, DFID E has supported assessment of Land Administration pilots on rural and urban
image-based land administration through the World Bank in the four HRS. This will be a
valuable input for LIFT with the lessons learnt and result of the analysis feeding in to the
programme, particularly on the policy discussion on urban-rural linkages.
DFID has a strong and constructive working relationship with
Ethiopia. This has enabled DFID E to deliver significant development
results while engaging in constructive policy dialogue. Finally, DFID
financial and human resources in place to fund and oversee the
programme.
the Government of
and poverty reduction
E has the necessary
management of this
Fit with Government of Ethiopia priorities
LIFT is closely aligned to GoE priorities and policies and will work closely with the Rural Land
Administration and Use Directorate (RLAUD) at the federal level for coordination, quality
control as well as policy dialogue and work through land authorities at the regional, woreda and
kebele levels in the four programme regions. The programme has a high level of buy-in from
key government counterparts including the Ministry of Agriculture and is aligned to a range of
government policies:



The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) is GoE’s five year poverty reduction strategy
and core planning document. Its objectives include: developing irrigation schemes,
maintaining agriculture as a major source of economic growth, scaling up the productivity of
farmers and pastoralists, and moving smallholders from low to high value crops (in addition
to large scale farming). Land certification and administration are fundamental to several of
the central tenets of the plan including improved agricultural productivity, increased
cultivatable land, and conservation of natural resources. One output specified under
resource conservation is ‘improved sustainable land use planning and management
system’ with indicators referring to the number of male and female farmers with first level
and second level land certification.cx
LIFT will complement the GoE’s ambitious Agricultural Growth Programme (AGP), which
aims to improve smallholder incomes and nutritional status through investment in selected
value chains.
Under the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, the GoE is committed to
extending land certification to all rural land holders by June 2015, initially focusing on AGP
woredas, and refining the land law to encourage long-term land leasing and strengthening
contract enforcement by December 2013.
30 PEPE for example is working in urban land sectors, while LIFT is working in rural markets. PEPE will have a limited permanent
regional presence whereas LIFT will have a permanent presence in 4 regions and intermittently in 140 woredas.
19




The GoE is already committed to implementing second stage certification and improving
land administration. ELALUDEP is the framework underpinning land issues in Ethiopia and
the foundation for both state and donor land interventions.
The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has published the Strategic Road Map (SRM) for the
National Rural Land Administration and Use System (for 2012-2016). This is primarily
aimed at sequencing multiple land administration interventions in the highland parts of the
country.
Promoting women’s empowerment is one of GTP’s seven strategic pillars, and it is
working towards women’s economic empowerment and increasing the number of women
who can access credit and savings.cxi The GTP also focuses on elimination of harmful
traditional practices, such as female mutilation and child marriage. There is a link between
household food insecurity, poverty and lack of economic opportunities which partly underpin
child marriage.cxii Facilitating better land inheritance rights through LIFT could improve girls’
prospects and address concerns of land tenure encouraging early marriage.
The GoE is committed to the green growth agenda as demonstrated by its Climate
Resilient Green Economy Strategy. An assumption of LIFT is that more secure tenure
will encourage smallholder farmers to invest in more environmentally sustainable
approaches to their land, like planting trees and managing erosion. Another is that accurate
land records and registers will improve environmental management through better land use
planning. The Ethiopian Government is also addressing the problem of natural resource
degradation through promoting awareness of sustainable land management practices - e.g.
improving watersheds through the Sustainable Land Management Programme (SLMP).
Fit with UK priorities
LIFT works on UK Government’s and DFID Ethiopia’s strategic priorities including:




LIFT supports DFID Ethiopia’s objectives relating to the private sector, wealth creation, and
effective governance while protecting the most vulnerable by building the resilience of the
poorest people as set out in our Operational Plan. By tackling the root cause of poverty
through encouraging effective rural land sectors, LIFT will specifically help to deliver
private sector objectives and property rights in particular with most notably the
commitment to improve household incomes - set out in the wealth creation pillar of DFID
E’s Operational Plan.
LIFT’s impact on tenure security, transparency and good governance within the land sector
is aligned with the approach set out in the “open economies” strand of the UK’s Golden
Thread. The Golden Thread highlights the connection between secure property rights,
contract enforcement, non-corrupt public administration, transparency, and poverty
reduction that will create opportunities for more transformational impact.
LIFT will contribute around 10.2% to DFID’s strategic vision for girls and women by
helping to ‘get economic assets directly to girls and women’ through increased access to
land use rights for 4.5m by 2015. It will also support the gender objectives in DFID E’s
Business Plan to “promote economic empowerment of girls and women through jobs and
access to financial services”; and the DFID E Operational Plan objective of “putting girls
and women front and centre of all we do”. Mainstreaming gender considerations into LIFT
will encourage social change that challenges discrimination against women and improved
policy frameworks and land administration that enable women and girls to own, inherit and
control productive assets. LIFT will seek to ensure that second wives are also represented
in land certification processes, in recognition of the fact that polygamy is practiced in certain
regions of Ethiopia.
DFID’s Future Fit Climate Strategy and Operational Plan support climate resilience,
adaptation and low-carbon growth through Ethiopia’s national climate strategy, UK climate
20



investments and climate-proofing programmes to build sustainability. Adaptation measures
could involve supporting crop diversification, while climate resilience measures include
investment in the agriculture, food security, and land management sectors. LIFT will play a
role in climate resilience through improved environment management of land and effective
land administration that will also improve land use planning.
LIFT will adhere to DFID’s principles of transparency, VfM and uses of evidence-based
approach, and integrate these principles into its programming. The programme, through a
well-designed open Management Information System (MIS), a public hearing process at the
local level, evidence based action research, participatory monitoring and evaluation (M & E)
procedures will contribute to these principles.
LIFT will contribute to the Land Partnership recently agreed by DFID (and Germany and
the USA) with GoE under the G8 land country partnership and support the DFID Global
Land Programme currently under development by the Policy Division. How LIFT will fit in
will be agreed upon completion of the programme design.
LIFT will add to the domestic resource mobilisation contributing to the economic
development of the country and GoE’s ambition to become middle-income country by 20202023
Fit with other partners’ work
LIFT will coordinate its overall strategy, technical approach and geographical coverage with
other development partner initiatives. The programme will also ensure that it draws on lessons
from past programmes.
Most previous, existing and planned programmes working in the land sector have
focused on policy level research and piloting of land certification and administration.
Since 2003, for instance, numerous donor initiatives have piloted second stage certification
(including the Ethiopia Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP), Sustainable Land
Management Programme (SLMP) and SIDA Amhara Rural Development Programme
(SARDEP)). These pilots, however, have had limited geographical coverage i.e. in the highland
states and limited resources. LIFT will be able to build on this pre-existing work and
dramatically expand coverage within the four highland regions without duplicating other
programmes or overlapping geographically. Programmes presently operational in land include
the Finnish programme REILA, which will be carrying out land certification in 9 woredas, the
US-funded LAND programme will be working in capacity building and policy, SIDA is
supporting the Bahir Dar Land Institute and SLMP 2 will be covering a limited number of
woredas for land certification (project in planning stage). All of these programmes will continue
to support the upscaling of land certification in support of the ELALUDEP which aims to reach
over 650 woredas, within their limited resources and their relative strengths.
There are currently no woredas in the country that have completed second level land
certification, as the piloting approach has involved working in trial kebeles with a low key
upscaling thereafter. The LIFT approach will complete certification of all parcels in 140
woredas providing a demonstration of how a mass approach to certification can be carried out
and complete systems of land administration operation implemented and sustained. This will
completely change the picture of land administration (covering nearly 25% of the total HRS
woredas) and encourage participation in a mass system of systematic land certification within
the remaining highland regional states.
Current and planned land-related programmes:
GoE’s Land Administration and Use Programme is derived from the ELALUDEP concept
document which has six components. The following identifies how LIFT and other land related
21
programmes will contribute to these components.
Table 3 Land Sector Programme Activities
ELALUDEP
Componentcxiii
Component
1.
Improving the Policy and
Legal Framework
LIFT Component
Other programmes/Government
Rural land sector policy through
Market Facilitation at regional level.
Component
2
–
Reforming
and
Strengthening
the
Institutional Framework
Land
Admin
Development
–
rehabilitation and equipping of offices
at regional level.
LAND31 – Policy and legal development,
with special reference to pastoral
issues.
GoE – Regulations on land certification
with cabinet.
LAND – regulations development
Component 3
Registration
Certification
–
Land
and
Cross cutting policy issues at federal
level
Market Facilitation
Land Certification in 140 woredas
Component
4
–
Developing
and
implementing Land Use
Planning
Not specifically included
Component
5
–
Developing
Human
Resource and Research
Training of programme woreda and
regional staff on procedures.
Research under M4P at regional
level and cross cutting issues at
federal level.
Extensive M and E
Component
6
–
Programme
Management, Monitoring
and Evaluation
REILA32 – Piloting in BenishangulGumuz and 9 woredas in Amhara.
Aerial photography. Development of
Land Admin software.
SLMP233 – 1 or 2 kebeles in 90
woredas,
in
6
regions.
Aerial
photography.
GoE – funding being provided by
regions for upscaling. Concentration on
HRS. Aerial photography.
LAND – preparation of procedures and
piloting.
SLMP2 – capacity building in 90
woredas.
GoE – regions starting participatory land
use planning
LAND – Formal training courses,
linkages with training institutions.
Studies and research.
REILA – scholarships.
Other programme M and E systems
Activities and work plans will be synchronised through RLAUD and the Land Administration
and Use Task Team (LAUTT), to avoid duplication and to maximise synergies.
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
LIFT seeks to bring about transformative, systemic change in Ethiopia’s land certification and
rural market system, in the four programme regions34, backed up by sound evidence of
31 The WB is extending its SLMP with three components: watershed management, land administration and capacity building. It works in
the four main regional states as well as Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella.
32 The REILA aims to build federal level capacity of the RLAUD and EMA as well as developing basic land registration in BenishangulGumuz and improving land administration processes in 9 woredas in Amhara to facilitate second level certification for the Tana-Beles
Growth Corridor.
33 USAID’s successor to ELAP is the LAND Programme. This programme is focused on policy advice, development of policy and land
systems in pastoral areas and development of academic and research institutions working on land, particularly in Somali and Afar.
34Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR) and Tigray
22
success from Ethiopia and elsewhere. The primary focus of the LIFT intervention will be to
enhance economic growth in those regions35 by supporting improvements to land governance,
working through existing GoE systems, and to encourage the development of a functioning
rural land sector. This is outlined in full in the logframe in Annex 9.
Expected results
The intended beneficiaries of the intervention are the rural poor, particularly small-scale
farmers, women and the vulnerable in the four programme regions. The preferred option is
expected to deliver: issuance of second stage certificates; a functioning land administration put
in place; and, improved policies, institutions and operations for the rural land sector.
Outcome
The expected outcome is a better working rural land sector and sustainable land
governance systems. This will be achieved through:



Security of tenure from second stage certification and accurate, well maintained land
registers for up to 4.6 million households36 (around 70% certificates being jointly or
individually owned by women); 1.36 million smallholder farmers increased their income by
at least 20.5% as a result of programme activities. Of these 318,496 from accessing finance
as a result of second level certification, and 591,492 from improved land rental income;
Increased domestic revenue mobilisation in programme woredas (amount to be confirmed);
and
Areas of land covered with trees per million hectares would increase by up to 35%.
Impact
The outcomes listed above can be expected to contribute to the following overall impact:
Increased economic growth, increased incomes of the poor, without harming the
environment.
The programme will not work in the Developing Regional States of Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Somali, because of their low
level of institutional preparedness
35
36
14,000,000 land parcels second stage land certification for approximately 6.1million households will be undertaken but given existence
of 1st level certification, only 4.6 million will experience increased security of tenure
23
Appraisal Case
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic case?
Generating the right options
Approach to developing the feasible options
Options were ranked following rigorous evidence-based analysis. The options were marked
at each level, and in four stages, through a weighted scoring system, and only the highest
scoring options were moved forward to the next level of assessment until the feasible options
for appraisal were identified. The weighting of criteria is not intended to claim quantitative or
scientific status, but was an important tool by which to reflect the genuine differences in levels
of importance of the different option assessment measures.
Figure 1: The Options Development Process
3
2
1
2LC, LA
By LIFT/GoE
1-2 HRS, 0 DRS
4 HRS, 0 DRS
2 LC, 2 LA
By GoE
0 HRS, 1-2 DRS
2LC, LA, MF /P
By LIFT/GoE
0 HRS, 1-2 DRS
2LC, LA, MF/P
Other DPs/GoE
Urban
Land sectors
Rural
4
2LC, LA, MF & P
2 HRS
By ITSP/GoE
2LC, LA, MF & P
4 HRS
By LIFT/GoE
2LC, LA, MF & P
4 HRS
Other DPs/GoE
1-2 HRS, 1-2 DRS
Urban and
rural
LA, MF & P
By ITSP/GoE
1-2 HRS, 4 DRS
1 LC, MF & P
Other DPs/GoE
GoE
2 LC, MF & P
By ITSP/GoE
4 HRS, 1-2 DRS
4 HRS, 4 DRS
KEY
Option accepted
2LC, LA
4 HRS
By LIFT/GoE
2LC, LA,
2 HRS
By ITSP/GoE
2LC – 2nd level certification
1LC – 1st level certification
LA – Land Administration
MF & P Market Facilitation and Policy
HRS – Highland Regional State
DRS – Developing Regional State
Steps
Option Rejected
The first option considered urban/rural inventions, the second focused on geographic
coverage and the third on the type of intervention. The fourth combined geography and
type of intervention before a fifth stage to identify the optimum size for the programme.
Identification of the feasible options
Different criteria were used at each step to identify options that improve incomes for the poor;
specifically benefit women, the disadvantaged, and the environment; and meet the
expectations of GoE.
STEP 1 – RURAL OR URBAN FOCUS
The initial decision was whether to work in both rural and urban land administration or
concentrate on one of them. Following discussions of the implications and the evidence we
agreed to focus on one for the following reasons:

The land tenure types in the urban areas (leasehold) are different from those in rural areas
(right of use) thus requiring the development of two different land administration systems
and different land sectors.
24


The administration is divided with rural land falling under the responsibility of the MoA and
the latter under the Ministry of Urban Development and Reconstruction, thus requiring the
programme to be working with two different ministries, making for greater complexity.
This would result in the dilution of funds to establish and implement separate systems
In deciding whether to work in rural or urban land the following were considered:



The objective of the programme is to improve the incomes of the poor and the bulk of the
poor reside in rural areas. The percentage of the rural population below the poverty line
stood at 30.4% in 2010/11 against 25.7% of the urbancxiv. The WB estimates that 83% of
the 84.7 million population in 2011cxv were rural and hence the number of rural poor may
be estimated at 21.4 million against 3.7 million urban.
The same data indicates that 46.4% of 2010/11 GDP was derived from the agriculture
sector and it is elsewhere estimated that 84.7% of the workforce are engaged in
agriculture.cxvi This suggests that focusing on rural land would provide a greater economic
impact.
The focus of government policy is on ADLI, which emphasises agricultural productivity as
the driver of growth, reflected in its medium term plans including the current GTP.
It was agreed that the programme would focus on rural land but will however interact with the
urban authorities with a view to assisting the integration of the different land sector
administrations, and the resolution of issues such as the urbanisation of rural land, and the
status of peri-urban areas.
STEP 2 - IDENTIFICATION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC OPTIONS
In this step an assessment was made of the options for the types of regions, and the
combinations within which the programme interventions should take place. The geographic
options were selected to give three sets of options:



An economic set that emphasises the economic strength of the four Highland Regional
States 37(HRS) and excluded other states. These regions comprise 86%cxvii of the
population and 95.7%cxviii of the cultivated land area. Two of the possible four options were
selected for assessment (1-2 or 4 regional states), on the grounds that the omission of
only one would have been unacceptable to GoE.
A social set that recognises the social and developmental needs of the four Developing
Regional States38 (DRS). These states occupy 43% of the nation’s land area but only have
9%cxix of the population. They are characterised by pastoral (Afar and Somali) or agro
pastoral/shifting cultivation (Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella) livelihood systems. First
level land certification has not been carried out in these regions. Two of the possible four
options were similarly selected for assessment (1-2 or 4 regional states).
A set that mixed the above two sets. A further set of four groupings was selected for
assessment that mixed the economic and social selections using similar bases for
numbers in each of the options as those above.
The eight options were assessed against 15 criteria which were weighted according to their
level of importance. The criteria were designed to assess the strength of each option in
respect of their economic, social and environmental impact, their operational alignment with
37 Highland Regional States are relatively more developed regions in Ethiopia and the focus of the GoE’s Agricultural Growth
Programme. They consist of Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) Regional States.
38 Developing Regional States are less developed than HRS, positioned on the periphery of Ethiopia, consisting of Afar, Somali,
Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella Regional States.
25
GoE priorities, complementarity with other activities, and other factors.
The weighting of each criterion is based on the programme objectives through which the
income impact was the most highly rated together with GoE acceptance. Relatively low
weightings were given to impact on the poor and the environment as it was considered that
these would not change significantly whichever geographic option was chosen.
Table 4: Criterion for Assessment of Geographic Options and Rationale for Ranking of Options
Criterion
Weight39
Outcome of scoring
VH
Options in the HRS
scored more highly
than DRS
i. L
ii. L
iii. M
iv. M
Options in the DRS
scored more highly
than those in the
HRS in all criteria
1. Economic
1.1Total Income impact
2.Social
Four criteria dealing with
i. criticality of timing;
ii. impact on poor;
iii. benefiting women, and
iv. mitigating risk of conflict
3. Operational
Four criteria dealing with
i. preparedness for
support
ii. systems in place,
iii. prior donor experience
iv. cost.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
M
M
H
M
Options in the HRS
scored more highly
than those in the
DRS in the first
three criteria.
Those options with
the narrowest
geographic
coverage scored
highest against
criterion iv. for cost.
39 VH = Very High (7 marks), H= High (3), M=Medium (2), L=Low (1)
26
Rationale and evidence for outcome of
scoring
HRS scored highly because of higher
economic activity and potential for growth
(see above). Evidence from Peru shows the
probability of farmers making increased
investments and thereby increasing income
after land certification is 10%.cxx Land
certification In Amhara Region had increased
output by 9%, demonstrating impact in a
HRS.cxxi
i. HRS have some urgency to consolidate
1st level certification gains as registers
have not been maintained as evidenced
by field observationscxxii confirming
Deininger et alcxxiii.
Intervention in large scale investment
policy and procedures is time critical as
only 0.4 out of 3.5 million ha of land
allocated has been released so far,
therefore there is time to ensure it’s done
in line with international good practice
and human rights obligations.cxxiv This
large scale land for investment is largely
but not totally in DRS.
ii. Beneficiaries in all regions are poor,
though generally higher in DRSs as
confirmed by Rural Poverty Headcount
Index 2010/11 sets out relative
poverty.cxxv
iii. 1st level certification in HRS has included
women in title for first time. Impact more
likely in DRS therefore amongst
uncertified and pastoral communities.
iv. Conflict impact higher in pastoral and
other DRS with large land investment.
i. The bulk of donor support has been to
the 4 HRS as has been evidenced by
review of ELTAP, SLMP, REILA reports
and interviews with programme teams
and interviews with zonal bureaux during
field trips. Interviews with MoA.
ii. The above has led to better
preparedness in the HRS and improved
systems.
iii. The 4 HRS are generally well prepared.
iv. The costs per unit will be lower when
4. Political Will/Acceptability
to GoE
4.1 GoE acceptance
Options in the HRS
scored more highly
than those in the
DRS
H
5. Environmental
5.1 Degree to which
mitigates risk to
environment
Options in the HRS
scored more highly
than those in the
DRS
L
6. Other/Complementarities
Four criteria on:
i. how option fits with
activities of others
ii. how option fits with
activities of DFID
iii. its demonstrator effect
iv. wider learning
generated
The Options that
scored more highly
against each of
these criteria were
those with strong
presences in:
i.
M
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
L
L
M
ii.
iii.
iv.
The HRS
The DRS
The HRS
Either DRS or
HRS
working in a smaller number of regions
by reducing overheads
GoE expressed preference and policy
application is for the working in the 4 HRS to
meet its GTP targets, and provisions of
ELALUDEPcxxvi and Strategic Road Mapcxxvii.
Interviews with MoA confirm this.
Deininger et al noted that within 2 years of
certification in Rwanda twice as many
farmers had installed or rehabilitated
conservation structures as those not certified.
Effect will be higher in HRS because of ability
to start 2nd level certification earlier,
deteriorating environment due to intensive
cultivation. Lower levels of cultivation in DRS
makes the impact less strong there.
i. Activities of other development partners
will be in the HRS (REILA, SLMP) with
limited applications in the DRS (LAND,
SLMP), as demonstrated by review of
programme documents for REILA, LAND,
and SLMP, and interviews with staff,
Interview with Programme Manager of
PDP.
ii. Fits with DFID programmes in Somali
(PDP), though limited land involvement.
Other DFID programmes have no major
regional emphasis. CSJ working in HRS
and DRS
iii. HRS will provide the largest incentive for
the demonstration of results. The pilots
carried out in the HRS by GoE with
USAID, SIDA and Finnish support have
demonstrated the feasibility of 2nd level
registration and policy change that has
been taken up by regional governments.
iv. Lessons will be learnt in HRS and DRS.
The detailed geographic assessment is attached as Annex 1. When applied to the options through
the weighted scoring system the following recommendations were reached.
Table 5: Ranking of Geographic Options
Type
Options
Mark
Recommendation
1-2 Highland States; 0 developing states
65
Retain
Economic
All 4 Highland States; 0 developing states
71.5
Retain
0 Highland States; 1-2 developing states
36.5
Reject
Social
0 Highland States; All developing states
42
Reject
1-2 Highland States; 1-2 developing states
53
Reject
1-2 Highland States; All developing states
49.5
Reject
Mixed
All 4 Highland States; 1-2 developing states
63.5
Retain
All 4 Highland States; All developing states
56
Reject
In summary, geographic options were taken forward which focus especially in the highland states,
with some possibility of limited inclusion of developing states, primarily reflecting the highland states
stronger scoring on economic, operational and political will/acceptability to GoE criteria.
STEP 3 - IDENTIFICATION OF THE INTERVENTION OPTIONS
In this step the various possible interventions were identified that could deliver the programme
27
objectives and their appropriate mix, based on the initial needs assessment in the strategic case.
The key characteristics for intervention options were identified as follows:
What intervention
 Support to the GoE in the implementation of 2 nd level land certification, verifying and
demarcating the boundaries of land parcels to build a digital cadastre building on the existing
methodology of Imagery Trial which is being scaled up by the MoA and the regional
governments in the four HRS.
 Work with the Finnish programme that support GoE in the development and implementation of
an improved Land Administration System, establishing a cadastre based register that will record
2nd level certification and future transactions in land use rights (inheritance, gift, subdivision etc.).
 Support to GoE to continue with 1st level land certification. It is estimated that 86% of the 40
million parcels40 in the four HRS had been registered under 1st level certification by 2011, of
which 73% had received certificatescxxviii. This intervention would continue certification where not
previously done, verify existing data and update the registers.
 Support to GoE in the development of markets and policies, which would involve market
arrangements, policies and laws in the land sector to enhance the economic impact of land
certification in collaboration and facilitation with other partners/programmes targeting those
areas. For instance, the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) is well placed to work on
value chains, seed markets and so on. The intervention would also support national and regional
land policy including that in respect of enhanced transparency, alignment with international
voluntary guidelines, urban/rural linkages and other areas where there are opportunities that
could be gained and risks avoided for the long term development of the country.
Who the intervention will be delivered by
Options for delivery were further identified and these included GoE carrying out the interventions
without support, GoE being supported by an Implementing Technical Service Provider (ITSP) under
the LIFT programme, or funds being channelled to other development partner programmes
currently operating in the sector to support GoE.
How the intervention will be delivered
All of the options for intervention will be delivered as second level land certification and
administration. In one option, however, this will be complemented by having a Making Markets
Work for the Poor (M4P) component through which the economic benefits of land certification and
improved land administration will be maximised. The M4P component will include market facilitation
and policy development within a coherent, holistic approach that targets the poor in a sustainable
manner.
Shortlist of interventions
A long list of possible combinations of the above features was developed and assessed against
their practicality and likelihood of meeting programme objectives. A short list of 7 feasible
interventions was selected (see Table 7). These interventions were subjected to an evidence
based assessment using a set of 14 criteria, (detailed analysis attached as Annex 2), with varying
levels of importance attached, and an objective system of marking. The assessment of these
options against the criteria and the result is summarised in Table 6 below.
The weighting for each of the criteria was based on the programme objectives with the total income
40 The draft SRM of 2011provides the latest authoritative data for 1st level registration and measures progress as a percentage of
total households which has been applied above to the total parcels. Since 2011 the exercise has continued and it is generally
accepted that the total first level registration is now over 90%.
28
impact being the highest weighted being the main programme objective. Impact on women the poor
and the environment were more highly weighted than in the geographic assessment because the
type of intervention significantly influences the impacts of each.
Table 6: Criteria for Assessment of Intervention Options and Rationale for their Ranking
Criterion
Weight41
Outcome of scoring
VH
Options with market
facilitation components
scored most highly.
1. Economic
Total income impact,
potential to provide
increased incomes to
smallholder farmers.
Rationale and evidence for outcome of
scoring
Market facilitation will maximise the
inherent returns of land certification.
Research into five land programmes
showed that three which had only land
certification and administration
interventions (including Ethiopia) had
Economic Rates of Return (ERR) of 13 to
20%, whereas in the two countries
(Madagascar and Mongolia) where this
was coupled with market and policy
intervention the ERR was 31 and 38%.
cxxix
2. Social
Three criteria on the:
i. benefit to the poor
ii. benefit to women
iii. degree to which
mitigates risk of conflict.
i. M
ii. H
iii. M
The highest scoring
options against each of
the criteria were those
with:
i. M4P
ii. Land certification and
land admin
iii. Policy focus
3. Environmental
Degree to which mitigates
risk to environment
4. Operational
H
Highest scoring options
were those with strong
land certification and
administration focus.
The highest scoring
41 VH = Very High (7 marks), H= High (3), M=Medium (2), L=Low (1)
29
i. The M4P approach focuses on raising
incomes of the poor. The £12 million
DFID PropCom programme in Nigeria’s
savannah agriculture markets resulted
in over £40 million in additional net
income for 126,180 beneficiaries. The
PropCom reviewcxxx concluded that
M4P was a viable approach for the
context.
ii. Upgrading 1st level certification to 2nd
level certification will strengthen the
rights of women renting out land.
Research in Tigray foundcxxxi that 85%
of respondents believe also that the
land registration programme improves
the position of women and confidence
to rent out their land.
iii. The major interventions that will
mitigate the risks associated with
conflict are those containing policy
components especially those relating
to pastoralism and greater
transparency.
The major impacts on the environment
will come from land certification and
administration and therefore those are
ranked most highly. “Clearly defined
tenure and access arrangements over
natural resources provide a basis for
long-term stewardship and reconciliation
of competing claims by different and
interest groups. Lack of these in rural
areas can lead to environmental
degradation.”cxxxii
i. The options with both land certification
i. M
ii. L
iii. H
3 criteria on:
i. preparedness for support,
ii. Geographical coverage
possible given costs
entailed,
iii. Capacity of providers and
appropriateness of
technology.
5. Political Will/Acceptability
to GoE
Meeting expectations of
Government
H
6. Other
Five Criteria on:
i. how option fits with
activities of others,
ii. its demonstrator effect,
i. L
ii. M
iii. L
iii. cross cutting national
coverage,
iv. criticality of timing
iv. L
v. lessons learnt
v. L
options against each of
the criteria were those:
i. With strong land
certification/administrati
on focus
ii. Without market
facilitation
iii. With LIFT ITSP
support.
ii.
and administration components were
most highly ranked for preparedness
as the HRS are highly prepared for 2nd
level certification and land
administration as evidenced by
discussions in field visits and
inspections of woredas and trial sites
by LIFT.
The options with the highest numbers
of woredas covered (i.e. those without
market facilitation) within the financial
envelope scored most highly for
geographical coverage. The indicative
numbers of woredas that can be
covered under the various options was
calculated within the original financial
envelope of £30 million.
iii. Other institutions are not as well
capacitated for large scale
implementation and M4P approach.
ITSP has experience in Rwanda for
mass certification of 8 million parcels
over three years, and M4P
implementation in Vietnam and Nigeria.
Other programme experience
evidenced from discussions with
teams. Land Certification and
Administration technology shown to be
appropriate in Rwanda and trials in
Ethiopia.cxxxiii
Those options most aligned with
Government policy – ELALUDEP/GTP
etc. scored most highly (Those with land
Highest score for land
certification and administration only).
certification/ administration
Review of ELALUDEPcxxxiv indicates that
options
major concentration is land certification
and administration. GTPcxxxv sets targets
for 2nd level land certification.
i. REILA, LAND and SLMP are
specifically acting in the sector as
evidenced by review of project
documents and discussion with project
officials identify areas of overlap and
synergy.
The highest scoring
ii. Land Certification and administration
options against each of
will give more concrete evidence and
the criteria were those:
opportunities for other donors to
i. Delivered by other
support to complete the national
donors
coverage.
iii. The national coverage will be for
ii. With strong Land
interventions with regard to greater
Certification and
transparency, rural/urban land
Administration focus
linkages, and pastoralism. The M4P
iii. With high policy
approach emphasises policy
components
development and other options also
iv. With high policy
include significant policy development.
component
iv. The major criticality of timing is in
v. With M4P approach
respect of land transparency as only
416,000 of the 3.5 million has
earmarked for large scale investment
30
has been allocatedcxxxvi .
v. There is a substantial amount of
literature on land certification but there
has not been previous M4P work on
rural land sectors
The detailed analysis is included in Annex 2 and resulted in the following rankings
Table 7: Ranking of Intervention Options:
Intervention
1. 2nd Level Certification and Land Administration
2. 2nd Level Certification and Land Administration
3. M4P approach to Second Level Certification, Land
Administration, Market Facilitation/Policy
4. Second Level Certification, Land Administration,
markets, regional/federal policy
5. M4P approach to Land Administration, Market
Facilitation and Policy
6. M4P approach to 2nd Level Certification, Market
Facilitation and Policy
7. Complete and update 1st Level Certification with
markets, regional and federal policy
Delivered by
Service Provider/GoE
GoE
Service Provider/GoE
Existing DP Projects
/GoE
Service Provider/GoE
Service Provider/GoE
Existing DP Projects
/GoE
Mark
68
65
Recommendation
Retain
Reject
99
Retain
76
Retain
64
Reject
64
Reject
49
Reject
In summary, intervention options which were taken forward include second level certification
(reflecting especially its greater economic benefits than 1st level certification – and Government
preference), M4P (reflecting especially its potential to leverage greater economic and social
benefits) and land administration (given its importance to sustainability of benefits). Delivery
options including a service provider and other donor projects were prioritised (reflecting the
importance of supplementing GoE capacity in this area).
STEP 4 – IDENTIFICATION OF THE OPTIONS FOR APPRAISAL
In this steps the retained geographic and intervention options were reviewed and appropriate
combinations defined to provide a final set of options for appraisal.
Final option selection was guided by the strategic understanding that:
 They should all target the programme objective of improving the incomes of the poor and
economic growth (overriding criterion).
 The main concentration should be at the regional level, particularly in the HRS, given the greater
economic potential.
 Consideration given to inclusion of one DRS, given high poverty levels and DFID’s-institutional
preference to address problems faced in more challenging environments.
 Cross cutting national policy development should be included, given its potential to enable
engagement with more broader topics and to help align Government policy with international good
practice and to respect human rights obligations.
 Different delivery options be included, given the need to assess substantively different options
through the business case process.
This analysis identified the following five feasible options:
Option 1: All interventions; 2 HRS regions; M4P approach; GoE+ ITSP
Where: in the regions of Amhara and Oromia. These 2 regions were selected from the 4 HRS through
a transparent, evidence based assessment that compared the potential impact of each of the four in
respect of increased investment, improved land rental markets, environment, poverty, and land tenure
security, as well the potential for replication in the region by GoE. The detailed analysis supporting
31
this decision is attached as Annex 3.
What: This option would carry out Land Certification, Land Administration, Rural land sector and
policies facilitation using the M4P approach and support to government in policy and legislation.
National policy support would also be provided to GoE in respect of enhanced land transparency,
alignment with international good practice and human rights obligations, urban/rural linkages and
other areas as they arise. The option makes allowance for possible support to GoE in respect of
pastoral policy development either in Somali Region or in Oromia where there are significant pastoral
areas. The selection of Somali as a possible DRS for intervention was considered on the basis of an
analysis (see Annex 3) of the benefits of that region against others42, but was rejected because of the
lack of preparedness or appropriate land use mechanisms.
Delivery: This option would be delivered by GoE with the support of a DFID-contracted ITSP.
Option 2: All interventions; 4 HRS; M4P approach; GoE+ ITSP
Where: in the 4 HRS of Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray.
What: As for Option 1 but in 4 regions.
Delivery: As for Option 1 (GoE with the support of a DFID-contracted ITSP).
Option 3 – Second level certification, land administration, markets, federal and regional policy;
4 HRS; delivered by GoE & existing projects
Where: in the 4 HRS of Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray.
What: This option would use the existing donor-funded projects in the sector to carry out Land
Certification, Land Administration, and Policies facilitation with a limited M4P approach. Land
Certification and Land Administration would be carried out by the scaling up of the activities of the
REILA project. LAND will continue to work in pastoral policy development in Somali and Afar regions,
capacity building, policy and legal review, land transparency and voluntary guideline compliance.
Delivery: GoE with the support of the above projects, using LIFT funds to scale up existing activities.
Option 4 – All interventions except M4P, 4 HRS; GoE+ ITSP.
Where: in the 4 HRS of Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray.
What: This option would carry out 2nd level land certification and land administration. There would,
however be no rural land sector interventions, relying on the inherent attributes of land certification as
a driver of improved investment and land rental markets to generate higher incomes for the poor, nor
will there be support to pastoral policy development. National policy support would however be
provided to GoE in respect of enhanced land transparency, alignment with international good practice
and human rights obligations, urban/rural linkages and in areas directly related to 2nd level certification
and land administration.
Delivery: GoE with the support of a DFID-contracted ITSP.
Option 5 – Second level certification and land administration, 2 HRS, GoE + ITSP
Where: in the regions of Amhara and Oromia
What: As for Option 4
Delivery: As for Option 4 (GoE with the support of a DFID-contracted ITSP).
Having arrived at 5 feasible options, these were then assessed against a final set of criteria, intended
to assess the suitability of the options in combined form, to reach a final shortlist of 3 (in addition to
“do nothing”). Table 8 shows this assessment the explanation of each criteria, the weight given to
each criteria, the rationale for the ranking and the evidence for the rationale.
The weighting for each criterion was based on the programme objectives. The highest weighting was
42 Comparative advantage in the region, other Development Partner projects, opportunities for transformational impact, impact on the
poor and disadvantaged, impact on women, and the presence of large scale investment.
32
given for the criteria relating to previous assessments with the multiplicity of different criteria behind
those markings. The lowest weighted were those where the ability to measure the criteria was least
certain and therefore should not outweigh the more readily quantifiable ones.
Table 8: Criteria for the Assessment of Final Options for Appraisal and Rationale for their Application
Criterion
Interventions:
Score
from
initial
intervention assessment
Geography
Score from initial geography
assessment
Capacity to implement Preparedness and ability of
the implementing partner to
deliver
Weight43
High
Outcome of scoring
Options with market
facilitation scored
highest
Options in HRS
scored highest.
Rationale and evidence for outcome of scoring
Rankings derived from the initial intervention
assessment. See Table 7
Medium
Those
being
delivered by the
LIFT ITSP scored
highest.
Are costs of spreading
widely
mitigated?
Complexity of delivery
Low
What is the transformation
potential
Low
Options with lower
administrative
overheads scored
highest.
Those with M4P
approach
scored
highest.
What is the likely effect of
inspiring
regions
and
woredas
to
extend
application further
Low
Those with widest
coverage and M4P
approach
scored
highest.
Implementation through the LIFT ITSP scored
highly under this criterion due to their experience
with delivering M4P projects and scaling-up land
certification projects as evidenced by Reports from
LTRSP Rwanda and M4P programmes in Nigeria
and Vietnam
Discussions and review of other programme
documents do not reflect scaleable approach or
M4P.
Use of indicative costings to identify those options
that provided greater output in terms of land
registration. Scored on the basis of the relative
costs of implementation.
The M4P approach will provide transformational
impact for the poor through interventions that will
make structural change in rural land sector, and
policy change facilitation.
The interventions will gain momentum as the
benefits become evident to the beneficiaries. Field
visits indicated there is already demand from
woredas for inclusion in 2nd level certification up
scaling.
Similar result expected from M4P market
interventions, evidence of whose impact on the
market and incomes will lead to demand.
Political Will/Acceptability to
GoE
Medium
Options involving
four HRS and 2nd
level
certification
scored highly
High
Rankings derived from the initial geographic
assessment. See Table 5
Reflecting GoE priorities in ELALUDEP and SRM.
The detailed analysis is included in Annex 3 attached and resulted in the following rankings.
Table 9: Ranking of Feasible Options for Appraisal
Where
What
Who
Mark
Rank Recommendation
1
2
highland M4P approach and Land
GoE/LIFT SP
regions
Certification and Administration
28
4
Reject
2
4
highland M4P approach and Land
GoE/LIFT SP
regions
Certification and Administration
36
1
Retain
3
4
highland Market Activities (not M4P GoE/Other
Regions
methodology)
and
Land Programmes
32
2
Retain
43 H= High (3 marks), M=Medium (2), L=Low (1)
33
Certification and Administration
4
4
highland Land
Certification
regions
Administration
and
5
2
highland Land
Certification
regions
Administration
and
GoE/LIFT SP
29
3
Retain
GoE/LIFT SP
22
5
Reject
In summary, the combined options (merging choices of intervention geography, intervention type
and delivery mechanism) taken forward include: geographical coverage of all 4 highland states
(reflecting especially GoE preference); a range of intervention types (both including and excluding
M4P) but with all including land certification and administration (reflecting their centrality to
sustainable property right improvements) and; a choice of delivery vehicles between a DFID
appointed ITSP and delivery via other existing donor projects. The resulting selection provides a
mix of 3 credible and substantially different options for appraisal. There will be no interventions in
any of the Developing Regional States.
STEP 5 – IDENTIFICATION OF THE OPTIMUM PROGRAMME SIZE
The objective of this step is to identify the optimum size for the programme. Scenarios assessed
range from a programme big enough to cover 4 million parcels of land (including costs of titling,
administration and related market systems work, if included) up to 40 million parcels, which would
provide complete coverage for the 4 HRS.
Economies of Scales and Cost Benefit Analysis
Cost Benefit Analysis was also applied to the various scenarios resulting in the following table:
Table 10: Summary of Options for Programme Size
Parcels Certified (million)44
Number of households (million)
Programme
cost
Land Certification
Land Admin
M4P
Programme Management45
M and E
Total (£ millions)
LIFT costs as a % of DFID-E’s
overall current OP budget46
Total Cost per parcel (£)
Cost of SLLC47 per parcel (£)
Discounted BCR48
Number of households with
higher income (000’s)
4m
8m
12 m
14 m
16
18 m
24 m
40 m
1.7 m
3.5m
5.1 m
6.1 m
7m
7.8 m
10.4 m
17.4 m
17.2
1.3
5.8
3.7
2.0
30
1%
29.7
2
7
4.1
2.2
45
1.5%
42.4
2.6
8.5
4.6
2.4
60.5
2%
48.4
3.0
9.1
4.8
2.8
68.2
2.3%
55.3
3.3
10.3
5.2
2.7
76.7
2.6%
61.3
3.7
11.3
5.5
2.8
84.6
2.8%
81.6
4.7
15.0
6.5
3.3
111.1
3.8%
137.2
7.6
32.2
11.2
4.8
192.8
6.6%
7.50
4.47
4.09
5.63
3.81
5.61
5.05
3.60
6.36
4.87
3.52
6.63
4.80
3.51
6.76
4.70
3.46
6.92
4.63
3.45
7.07
4.83
3.47
6.86
389
778
1,166
1,360
1,554
1,749
2,332
3,886
The costs per parcel reduce significantly between 4 million and 18 million parcels after which they
flatten out and only reduce gradually towards the 40 million scenario49, when the effects of lower
44 Assumes certification evenly spread across the 5.5 years without staged scaling up
45 Includes inception costs of £631,000.
46 Assuming 24% of the budget will be spent during the current OP period based on our current BC draft estimate on the 30m and
using our budget forecast in our OP i.e. ((LIFT cost*24%)*100)/OP budget
47 Second Level Land Certification
48 Benefit Cost Ratio
34
proportions of management, M4P and Programme Management become less evident. These costs
do not however take account of the effects of the potential inefficiencies that might arise from a
very large programme, which may reduce the cost benefits, though cannot be simply quantified.
For example, covering 18 million parcels would mean that the total number of people working at the
woreda level under LIFT would reach 3,372 (as compared to 770 people for £30m).
The Cost Benefit Analysis model assumes constant returns. This is because the assumptions
remain the same regardless of the value of LIFT and there is no intended change in the intensity of
inputs (access to finance, technology, rental markets). The model confirms that there are
economies of scale of increasing outreach as set out above, but with increasing resources, it might
be appropriate to develop larger M4P interventions that could generate larger scale change
This therefore should be regarded as a conservative model, which indicates that the % increase in
incomes by household will reach 20.5% p.a. but the number of households affected rises as shown.
The Discounted BCR shows a fairly instant increase across the scenarios which flattens out and
falls with a similar trajectory as the costs per unit.
Non quantifiable benefits of LIFT
The benefits accruing from LIFT are well documented elsewhere in the Business Case, but some of
the increased impact of quantifiable benefits from a larger programme are:
 Availability of aerial survey – as a result of LIFT, high resolution aerial survey photographs
covering up to half the four programme regions and, together with those available or being
prepared from other sources, will cover most of these regions. These will be available for
other applications including land use and environmental planning, social mapping,
infrastructure design.
 Greater security of tenure especially for women, girls and the disadvantaged.
 Conflict and disputes will be reduced by improved land administration systems encouraging
the respect for the law. Improved tax revenues will accrue from the development of inclusive
tax cadastres which will ensure that all landholders are included, thus improving equity and
the resources available to local governments to provide community-accountable services.
Burden sharing /catalytic
There are a number of other programmes and partners active in the Land sector who are
contributing towards the LIFT objectives. These include REILA (Finland), LAND (USAID), SLMPII
(World Bank and Norway), though their total current budgets are approximately £20 million over
four to five years (not all of which is targeted at the regions targeted within LIFT).
In Rwanda the success of the DFID led programme and the clear Government commitment brought
in donors, or increased the contributions from those already supporting the land programme, and it
is reasonable to assume that a similar catalytic effect will result from a clearly demonstrated
effectively operating system in Ethiopia. The current REILA programme is for instance the first part
of an anticipated 15 year intervention in the land sector, which has yet to be fully defined, and
therefore is a potential future contributor. While there is currently no commitment from Finland or
others to contribute to further SLLC, the precedent from Rwanda shows where other donors
brought in additional funds that equalled the original DFID commitment once the results were
established.
It is reasonable to assume that the catalytic effect of the LIFT intervention could result in up to an
49 The increase in cost per parcel at 40 million arises from the need for additional aerial survey which is costed for procurement on
a stepped basis.
35
additional £60 million being contributed by other donors. Regional governments have been
encouraged to make budgets for land certification purposes, and while the amounts are uncertain it
is reasonable to assume from discussions with them that a further £20 million will come from that
source. Since LIFT’s value for money would be enhanced significantly by leveraging others’
resources, which would not otherwise flow to land in Ethiopia (especially that provided by donors),
there is benefit in leaving space for them to do so.
This will leave a funding gap of approximately £113 million required to complete the process of land
titling and administration in the four HRS (covering the remaining 24 million parcels), which DFID
could consider filling through LIFT and the following sections review considerations to take into
account DFID’s approach.
Other Considerations as to Programme Size
The following review highlights various considerations that should be taken into account when
fixing the programme size.
Operational risk
The technical risks with regard to second level land certification are relatively small given that the
approach is tried and tested both in Ethiopia, through field trials, and in Rwanda, through a recently
completed nationwide programme. Experience of both is included in the contracted ITSP.
The logistical risks of operating on a larger scale than attempted before are likely to be great and
will need continuous monitoring. These risks will include those in respect to the management of
large numbers of staff, vehicles, equipment and resources, together with the planning of their
activities to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. This risk will be mitigated by ensuring that the
ITSP team is appropriately staffed with the necessary managerial and planning skills to administer
a programme of this size and nature. The experience within the team of a similar sized programme
(10 million parcels) in Rwanda will be invaluable. The proposed staging of the scaling up will also
mitigate against this risk by ensuring that processes are working at a smaller size before mobilising
for greater numbers of parcel certification.
There are greater operational risks with M4P as the approach is less well-tried in the land sector50
but the bigger the programme the lower its proportional cost. If the market facilitation component is
not bearing fruit it can be relatively easily pruned back or discontinued, as it involves little major
capital investment. The M & E component includes continual monitoring that will give early warning
of where the M4P component is succeeding or failing.
Impact risk
There is some uncertainty surrounding the scale of the programme impacts given the sometimes
contradictory literature on land certification’s impact on productivity and livelihoods, the fact that it
only partially tested in Ethiopia, and given the novelty of the M4P approach on land.
As it will take some time for the impact to take place, conclusive evidence of these impacts may not
be available until after the programme is over. The effects of interventions in years 5 and 6 will not
be felt until year 7 and 8, for example. There will however be intermediate evidence with proxy
indicators that will give indications and perceptions of project impacts that can be gathered in the
short term. A strong emphasis on M&E will support us in gaining this understanding throughout the
programme. Nonetheless, uncertainties surrounding impact imply some caution in determining the
programme’s scale.
50
DFID is applying this in Nigeria and South Africa, but these are relatively new programmes, with
results yet to be proven.
36
Capacity and resource of Government to support the programme.
The evaluation of size has to consider whether GoE has the resources required to undertake the
programme as well as the capacity to supervise and manage the larger programme at federal and
regional level. The strategic section (what will happen if DFID does not intervene) covers the first
part whereby we have highlighted the limited finance the Government has to undertake this
programme despite its commitment under their five year plan. This may require investment in
providing technical assistance to the MoA and regions, to provide the necessary short term
capacity to coordinate and quality control such a large programme, though the amounts involved, if
required, will not be significant to the overall budget (less than £500,000).
Sequencing
It would appear natural that economies of scale would be greater if one started off with a large
programme as the costs would be spread across immediately larger numbers of parcels. However
there is a case to be made for starting the programme with lower targets. In this way the first 2.5 of
the 5.5 year implementation period would be used to gear up and to test that the technical and
logistical complications are resolved in a way that will provide confidence in the programme’s
capability to upscale to a higher level of activity. It would also allow early indicators of impact to be
measured and programme expectations and procedures amended accordingly allowing greater
benefit in the latter half of the programme.
Covering a minimum of about two million parcels within the first 2.5 years would enable operational
risks associated with large scale implementation to be tested and resolved while a minimum of
perhaps three million parcels during that period would be required to generate sufficient
engagement and prioritisation with the regions to pave the way for a scale-up during LIFT’s second
half. The three million parcels would be approximately 750,000 per region which is nearly triple the
number of parcels that have received 2nd level certification nationally under REILA, USAID, SLMP,
or GoE initiatives combined. It is considered from experience in Rwanda and elsewhere that an
initial intervention at this level would allow systems to be introduced and be stress tested, and
generate GoE engagement and commitment.
The maximum extent to which the programme could scale up in the second half would be by a
factor of about 4, to an upper limit of about 14m parcels during that period.
Capacity of DFID E to support the programme.
In assessing the programme size, consideration has been given to whether DFID has the technical
capacity and financial resource required. On the capacity side, a larger programme will require
more human resource to supervise and manage the programme as this would entail greater
strategic oversight and monitoring, management of the greater internal and external interest and
scrutiny it will generate, as well as additional financial management due to the larger number and
value of procurements and so on. Nonetheless, if required, additional DFID human resources could
likely be found to manage a larger programme, at low cost relative to total programme size.
In terms of financial resource, £15m has already been allocated to LIFT within the current
Operational Plan period (a figure developed at a time when the nature and potential of this
programme had not been fully assessed). Reflecting the point on sequencing above, which makes
the case for a slower start up to the programme, the majority of costs would be expected to lie
outside of the OP period (which has been acknowledged by HMT). For example, covering 14
million parcels would result in costs of around £11m during the current OP, around £4 million less
than the current allocation. Thus, it is expected that a larger programme would be affordable, at
least within this OP, except perhaps in the largest option.
An additional consideration is the concentration within DFID-E of financial risk associated with a
much larger programme. Mitigating measures will be set up according to the current planned size.
37
The above analysis suggests the following conclusions for the optimal size of the programme:
 There is a good case for a larger LIFT project because of the scale efficiencies that are
immediately visible together with the additional non quantifiable benefits which will also be
increased in line with any scale-up
 There is a likelihood that other donors may be encouraged to assist in meeting the funding
gap, thus suggesting it would not be desirable for the full programme to be addressed from
DFID resources, and allowing the burden and risk to be shared.
 There is a strong M & E system built into LIFT that will closely monitor the programme with
quick feedback loops to ensure the programme is on the right track.
 There is some uncertainty on the scale of programme impact; equally there are operational
risks since a land programme has not been implemented at scale in Ethiopia. This is not
only a new programme for Ethiopia but also DFID Ethiopia. Together these factors suggest
that the programme design should be cautious but ambitious and be able to react quickly to
evidence from assessments.
This analysis supports a conclusion that LIFT:
 has a budget between £45 and £68.2 million.
 is designed to include a stepped trajectory that will allow lesson learning with 3 million
parcels being certified in the first 2.5 years before scaling up, if justified by the experience
and evidence generated to that date. Although this approach will partially reduce economies
of scale achievable, such economies will still be significant if the programme is ramped up,
and the trade-off is justified given the uncertainties faced at the outset.
The feasible options
Summary of options
Based on the strategic considerations identified above, the following specific programme options,
with a programme budget of between £45 and £68.2 million were identified for appraisal.
Table 11: Options for consideration
Option
Option 1
Title
Land Registration and Administration Programme in four regions
(new-DFID led intervention)
Option 2
Land Registration and Administration with Making Markets Work for
the Poor Programme in four regions (new-DFID led intervention)
Option 3
Option 4
Increasing coverage and uptake of REILA and LAND
Do nothing
Option 1: Land Registration and Administration Programme in four regions
Under option 1 the programme would focus on upgrading the existing land register through second
level certification and strengthening the land administration system in the four HRS, building from
existing pilot interventions. The three interventions of the programme would be:
38
 Providing second level certification in the four
programme regions: verifying, confirming and
correcting the information from the first level
certification processes and demarcating the boundaries
of land parcels to build a spatial register. (See strategic
case pages 9-10 on why the proposed focus is on
second level and not first level certification). The
process of undertaking second level certification builds
on existing methodologies gained from the first level
and on-going pilot programmes. Federal and regional
regulations and procedures have been prepared to
support the proposed methodology. These procedures
will particularly focus on ensuring that laws and
procedures with respect to compensation have been
followed where compulsory purchase of land for large
scale investment, or for public projects, has taken
place. The programme will not work in the Developing
Regional States, due to their lack of institutional and
policy preparedness.
Figure 2: Second level land certification process
Production of Field Materials
Demarcation & Adjudication of Land
Parcels
Data Entry and Parcel Digitisation
Verification and Corrections
Production of Certificates
Issuance of Certificates
Maintenance of Data in the Land
Administration Information System
First level certification while providing formal land use
rights for the first time was carried out without a spatial
context that is without boundaries or measurement.
The area of the parcel was estimated by eye or using a
piece of rope. The weaknesses of the 1st level certification51 have been recognised by GoE and a
second level programme initiated under the ELALUDEP. Various other low cost methods of
measurement have been assessed by GoE to identify the parcel boundaries including the use of
handheld GPS equipment, formal surveying through total stations, and orthophotos (aerial or
satellite mapping), as used in Rwanda.
Following use in the field and successful piloting, the MoA has established in its draft Purpose and
Options for Cadastral Survey of Rural Lands in Ethiopia (2011) that the use of aerial photos best
met the criteria of speed, cost, and accuracy, as well being the most participatory with farmers
identifying their boundaries on maps with their neighbours. This methodology has therefore been
determined in the SRM as the default, though other tools can be used where circumstances dictate.
The certification process is highly participatory, with farmers identifying their own parcels on maps
with the agreement of neighbours and farmer representatives, which assists in reducing disputes
being raised and encourages local level resolution of those that occur. The establishment of
appropriate disputes processes is essential to the success of the programme and these will be
clearly defined, based on existing processes such as Land Administration Committee (LAC) and
will be widely publicised in the woredas and kebeles. The dispute resolution processes envisaged
are participatory, involving neighbours, local leaders and customary channels to settle disputes
before they enter the legal system. The ELAP baseline report quoted elsewhere in this document
found that of the disputes in its survey, only 14% were resolved by formal courts, and the majority
through elders and family (57%) or the intervention of the local administration (29%).
Up to 10% of parcels may have been omitted in woredas that were claimed to have been completed, the lack of boundaries meant that
boundary disputes increased; the process did not develop a cadastre that can facilitate more equitable tax collection, and land use, environmental
and other planning.
51
39
The numbers of disputes, their causes and resolution processes will be monitored and reported
through the programme M&E systems. This will be augmented by the inclusion of local CSOs,
where applicable, so that they can be mobilised to report on programme failures and procedural
abuses, especially those relating to women and disadvantaged groups. If substantiated abuses are
found to be systematic or widespread, DFID will take view on the extent to which LIFT may be
contributing to it and review UK support accordingly. The programme will also work with Institution
of the Ombudsmancxxxvii in Ethiopia to ensure any grievance on rural land are addressed
accordingly.
In carrying out the second level land certification the processes will ensure that the rights of
women and girls and the disadvantaged are addressed. Community land will be identified at the
beginning of the process and demarcated. Certificates will only be awarded to those farmers with
evidence of how they received the land. If they have received through customary or informal
procedures this will be regularised, unless another farmer is able to show rights predating the
informal or customary rights.
Certification under this option would capture a maximum of 17 million parcels52 in approximately
170 woredas.
Scheduling of activities would allow for staged scaling up whereby 4 million parcels would be
certified in the first 2.5 years of the implementation period and 13 million in the following 3 years.
This would provide the opportunity to demonstrate and measure how effective the processes are
and adapt them accordingly (See step five above). Should evidence and experience prove
otherwise, a slower trajectory would be implemented in the following three years.
Awareness raising would also be key to gain citizen buy-in to the certification, and to ensure that all
land holders (in particular women, second wives etc.) are registered.
 Strengthening the Land Administration System in the Four Programme Regions: to ensure
that the land certification process is effective, this option would support the upgrading and
strengthening of the land administration system. The main activities would be:
o Support the harmonisation of the legal framework: the programme will work with LAND in
supporting the harmonisation of the proclamations and regulations, where they are seen to
be inconsistent with the design and application of the Land Administration System.
o Assist in developing RLAS: the programme would help develop procedures and manuals
for the programme regions for the maintenance of the land registers. This has been
commenced, and REILA will continue this at the federal level by RLAUD, but LIFT will
provide technical inputs into this process to ensure that they are appropriate for
implementation.
o Strengthen LAU institutions: the programme would support the strengthening of land
administrations in the programme areas, from kebele, woreda and regional level through
development of systems, equipping of land offices and preparing revenue models to ensure
the financial sustainability of the system.
o Enhance domestic revenue mobilisation: By providing a strengthened land administration
system based on cadastral land register the programme will assist in the development of a
more extensive and accurate tax cadastre which will enhance collection of land tax, in
52 REILA trials, per presentation to World Bank 2013 conference estimated cost for country at $8.5 (£5.48) per parcel. Rwanda outturn on
certification, per draft final report, indicated $7.69 per parcel. $6.70 per parcel used to reflect exclusion of management costs, and lack of some
adjudication activities. 5.5. million Parcels @ $6.70 @ 1.55 = approximately £23.6 million, which is within LIFT resources. Number of parcels per
woreda set at 100,000 (SRM).
40
addition to the improved fee revenue referred to above.
o Provide capacity building in land administration within LAU institutions at regional level: The
capacity building will mainly be on the job training in the programme woredas, as well as at
the regional level, on the practical application of the systems. This will complement the
higher level cascaded training of trainers and formal courses that will be introduced by
LAND.
o Implement at regional and woreda level the existing GoE initiative to develop a National
Rural Land Administration Information System (NRLAIS)53: the programme would
implement sub-systems for data entry, data maintenance and management and provision
of land information services.
o Raise awareness on LAU rights and obligations: this would allow citizens in the programme
woredas to appreciate their rights and responsibilities, and to be aware of the importance
and benefits of using the land administration system.
The work in the Land Administration component is critical to the sustainability of the programme
and lessons have been learnt from DFID’s involvement in the Rwandan programme as follows:
o
o
o

The Rwandan programme suffered from affordability issues arising from registration fees
constraining the collection of leases. In LIFT there is no such fee to participate in the
certification exercise so this issue is not expected to arise.
High levels of transaction fees were also perceived to be a constraint on the registration of
changes to title after certification. As part of the LIFT’s land administration system
implementation, woredas’ land revenue structures will be reviewed to maximise income
whilst still encouraging registration of changes of title.
The capacity building element of the Rwanda programme suffered from the emphasis of
the Government on certification, leaving the development of the land administration system
to the end of the programme. In LIFT, through the land administration component, capacity
building such as on-the-job training will be carried out simultaneously with certification so
as to ensure that when the certification is complete in a particular woreda, there is a
functioning land administration system with trained staff operating it. This will be coordinated with USAID’s LAND programme that has a large capacity building component
with more formal training envisaged in it. LIFT has an agreement with LAND to share
training modules to ensure consistent messages and best practices are communicated.
Cross-cutting Policy and Law: we will work with the Government of Ethiopia and other
partners (including the US) on wider land policy issues such as improving security of tenure for
communal land holdings, pastoralists and customary land use and improving transparency of
land allocation in line with international good practice and human rights obligations54. Strategic
priority will be given towards those policies and procedures the GoE has demonstrated a
commitment to reviewing and reforming, including those in respect of:
o Urban-rural linkages, whereby issues relating to the effect of urban expansion will be
reviewed, actions required agreed with GoE and supported as appropriate. GoE has already
commenced a review of the compensation systems but further assurances of commitment
will be sought before commencement.
o Communal land holding, through which the differing approaches to certification of common
grazing, forest and other land in sedentary areas used in the programme regions will be
53 The development of the NRLAIS is being supported by Finland through the REILA Programme
54 E.g. the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy of the African Union and the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Voluntary Guidelines
on Land Tenure
41
reviewed and harmonised through MoA/RLAUD. Commitment of GoE to clarifying these
issues is demonstrated by their inclusion in the land certification manual under preparation.
o Pastoralists and customary land use, whereby the land tenure and use arrangements for
pastoral and agro pastoral communities in programme regions55 which are generally held
under customary arrangements and not covered by current federal or regional proclamations
will be reviewed and a programme prepared for the development of specific policy and
procedures.56 This will be aligned with the work being carried out on a national basis by the
USAID funded LAND programme, who will lead in this area, and whose work is supported by
GoE.
o Transparency of land allocation and compensation, whereby the programme will work with
GoE to help it to develop procedures and policies that are in line with international good
practice and human rights obligations and the G8 commitments that will minimise the risks
and maximise the opportunities presented for Ethiopia’s long term development. There will
be continuous policy dialogue both at the higher and technical levels on the outcome of
those reviews and recommendations to contribute towards a stable, inclusive, transparent
framework. We will thereafter carry out action research on a regular basis to develop
evidence on the application of procedures derived from the work carried out to identify at an
early stage any issues to be taken up with GoE and to help ensure that human rights are
respected. The commitment of GoE to this area of work has been demonstrated by its recent
agreement to the setting up of a Land Partnership with the UK, Germany and USA, and the
accompanying Declaration.
o The G8 land initiative components will be addressed as follows:
-
-
Fit with voluntary guidelines: through the review of the procedures of GoE land
allocation, compensation and tenure policies and procedures as described above with a
view to engagement of GoE in identifying where greater alignment is required and
supporting the change.
Increased transparency on transactions made: through the same process outlined
above.
Partnership arrangements: DFID E has recently concluded (with USAID and Germany)
a partnership arrangement with GoE to improve land transparency. The implementation
of that partnership will be through LIFT and other land programmes.
Cross cutting policy interventions will also be aligned to those currently being prepared DFID
Global Land Programme once the design has been finalised.
The guidelines with which compliance will be measured are:
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and
Forests in the Context of National Food Security, as published by the Food and Agriculture
Organisation in 2012
The objectives of these guidelines are to:
 improve tenure governance by providing guidance and information on internationally
accepted practices for systems that deal with the rights to use, manage and control land,
fisheries and forests.
55
56
Mainly in Oromia and SNNPR
Implementation of any policies developed in this area is not anticipated under the current programme.
42



contribute to the improvement and development of the policy, legal and organisational
frameworks regulating the range of tenure rights that exist over these resources
enhance the transparency and improve the functioning of tenure systems
strengthen the capacities and operations of implementing agencies
The Guidelines set out best practice on land tenure governance and the areas covered are set
out in Annex 11.
Land Policy in Africa: A Framework to Strengthen Land use rights, Enhance Productivity
and Secure Livelihoods as published by the African Union/Economic Commission for Africa
in 2009.
The framework sets out the key operational processes which African countries will need to follow in
order to develop comprehensive policies that would enable the land sector to fully perform that role.
It analyses the difficulties likely to be met and conditions necessary for the effective implementation
of such policies and discusses the measures which African countries may wish to put in place to
track progress in the development and implementation of those policies. The key content is set out
Annex 11.
A series of studies will be commissioned from land administration professionals to carry out the
above, recommending improved processes, which will then be followed up by the GoE and ITSP.
This would also ensure equity within the market, and allow pastoralists and other marginalised
communities to fully participate. It is recognised that the LAND programme will also be working in
these areas, though as part of a wider brief, and LIFT interventions will complement and work in
consultation with the LAND team, making recommendations where appropriate, for LAND to carry
forward, and synchronising work plans.
Selection of Woredas
The option will work in 170 woredas and these will be selected in consultation with the federal and
regional Governments, subject to DFID approval. The selection will be made through a transparent
and objective process with the initial field being those that are included in the Agricultural Growth
Programme (AGP) and Sustainable Land Management Programme (SLMP) as priority, high return
woredas. Criteria such as duplication of other programmes or an absence of a solid policy
framework that is in line with international good practice and human rights obligations will be
applied to remove certain woredas and narrow the field. Finally the woredas will be clustered to
improve efficiency of implementation and economy of aerial photography.
Outputs
The following outputs are anticipated from Option1:





Second level certification in the programme woredas through use of high resolution imagery of
up to a maximum of 17 million land parcels (out of a total of 40 million) in approximately 170
woredas (out of 550). In excess of 70% of the certificates issued will be in the names of women
individually, or collectively with a husband.
Computerised land administration systems operational in 170 woredas where second level
certification has taken place.
Up to 1.65 million smallholder farmers (households) that increase income by at least 11.6% as a
result of programme activities.
Staff in the 170 woreda and the 4 regions level fully capacitated to carry out their roles in the
land administration.
The further 4.3 million parcels are assumed to be certified by the regions and other programmes
43

as described in Option 4. The ITSP will co-ordinate with the implementers on introduction of an
enhanced land administration system, capacity building and legal advice on land issues and
policy support in respect of pastoral communities.
Improved domestic revenue mobilisation in the programme woredas.57
Stakeholders in the delivery of Option 1
The delivery of second stage certification and strengthening of land administration system would be
done in collaboration with LAU institutions at federal, regional, woreda, and kebele levels. Of these,
regional and woreda level institutions would be the most relevant for the implementation of the
programme. The role of RLAUD will be advisory and co-ordinating the work being carried out by
LIFT at the regional and woreda level, and to monitor overall project progress.
REILA will assist RLAUD to develop operational manuals based on the pilots and a computerised
land administration system, which will be used as the basis for LIFT implementation in the four
programme regions and be adapted and agreed to meet regional needs. REILA will also be
introducing 2nd level certification in 3 woredas in Benishangul-Gumuz and 9 woredas in Amhara.
LAND will continue the work of predecessor projects in policy and legal review, including work on
enhanced land transparency, and alignment with international voluntary guidelines. It will finance
research, and capacity building through formal courses and cascaded training. LIFT will
concentrate capacity building in the programme regions and woredas and generally be confined to
activities that directly impact on the implementation of programme activities.
The second phase of SLMP will, if agreed, commence operations in October 2013. It is anticipated
that it will, as part of its watershed management primary objective, have a component that will fund
rural land administration, certification and land use, though the funding split of the US$ 9 million for
this component has not been specified, nor the numbers of woredas covered. cxxxviii
The Land Administration and Use Task Team (LAUTT) will provide oversight and co-ordination.
RED&FS, the overall donor/GoE co-ordinating body for the sector will have specifically interested in
the contribution of LIFT to the AGP.
Other stakeholders would include the Ethiopian Mapping Agency (EMA) and the Information
Network Security Agency (INSA).
How Option 1 will be delivered
Option 1 would be delivered by the ITSP in partnership with the GoE. While the lead government
agency, responsible for co-ordination and policy setting would be the RLAUD the programme would
be implemented by the land administration bureaux/offices/desks at the regional and woreda levels.
Cost breakdown
Based on experience of DFID’s land programmes, an indicative budget for implementing Option 1
would be as follows:
Table 12: Budget for Implementing option 1
Indicative budget for Option 1 (in £ million)
Land certification
58.358
The amount of the likely increase remains to be confirmed but In Amhara, for instance, land tax more than doubled from 2008 to
2010 as households declared and registered more land under 1st Level Certification.
58 REILA trials, per presentation to World Bank 2013 conference estimated cost for country at $8.5 (£5.48) per parcel. Rwanda
outturn on certification, per draft final report, indicated $7.69 per parcel. $6.70 per parcel used to reflect exclusion of management
costs, and lack of some adjudication activities, Extrapolated across 17 million parcels, reduced to $5.36 with economies of scale. 17
57
44
Land administration
M&E
Programme management61
Inception period
3.659
2.660
3.062
0.763
Total DFID support
68.2
GoE contribution64
Total resources
6.0
74.2
Option 2: Land Registration and Administration with Making Markets Work for the Poor
Programme
This option would cover the same interventions as Option 1 above (second stage certification and
support to the development of the land administration system in the four programme regions and
cross-cutting policy and law support at the national level), but at the same time, addressing the
constraints that are present in the rural land sector in the four programme regions, that prevent
farmers from fully capturing the benefits of second stage certification. This option will include
complementary interventions in the rural land sector and closely related markets (e.g. finance) that
will allow LIFT to maximise the benefits of second level certification.
To achieve this, this option would use the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) approach (see
annex 4) to assess the constraints in the market and identify the most relevant complementary
interventions. The M4P approach would allow the programme to have a holistic view of the rural
land sector and understand how smallholder farmers operate within it; what are the links between it
and the related markets (inputs, technological transfer, skills, finance); what are the constraints
faced by smallholder farmers in the related markets; and how the proclamations, regulations and
policies shape the incentives in the market and effect smallholder farmers. This deep
understanding of how the rural land system works and how it affects smallholder farmers will be
required to identify what interventions are needed to maximise the impact of land certification and
administration.
In Ethiopia, a better operating rural land sector would help maximise the gains obtained by
smallholder farmers from second level certification and the development of the land administration
system by further increasing their productivity levels and raising their incomes. As a result, the
focus of the programme would be on achieving longer-term development of an effective rural land
sector through a systems approach coupled with a focus on the key drivers.
In using the M4P approach to maximise the impact of second stage certification, we will ensure that
the programme is characterised by certain features:
million parcels @ $5.36@ 1.55 = approximately £58.7 million, which is within LIFT resources. Number of parcels per woreda set at
100,000 (SRM).
59 Calculated by ITSP for development and implementation of improved LA system in170 woredas. Local and International TA £700,000, training costs £500000, Rehabilitation of 170 woreda offices @ £5000, £850,000, Equipment 170 woredas @£8,500,
£1,450,000= Approx. £4.7 Million.
60 Extrapolated from G4G scoping report allocation, confirmed by calculations of ITSP - £1.6 million for monitoring, £1million for
external evaluation.
61 Programme Management under this option represents 4.4% of total costs, and a similar %age of Land Certification and Land
Administration.
62 Analysed from HTSPE indicative budget for implementation phase and extrapolated for 17 million parcels.
63 £434,000 ITSP contracted costs. £197,000 DFID preparation costs.
64 This represents the estimated contribution of GoE to the implementation of the option through satellite imagery, use of existing
officers and making available office space. This should not be confused with total costs in the Cost Benefit Analysis which include the
incremental costs to Government for managing the improved land administration system for 15 years
45
 A focus on the poor, underpinned by a thorough analysis to establish the underlying causes/
systemic constraints rather than the symptoms of sub-optimal market performance for
smallholder farmers. This detailed analysis of the rural land sector would take place during the
early stages of the programme and would help identify the list of interventions to be
implemented by the programme.
 An iterative methodology, with continuous M&E, in which analysis and research constantly
inform the programme’s interventions. As a result, the interventions need to be flexible in nature
as they might need to be adjusted depending on what are the findings of the programme as it is
being implemented. This flexibility also allows the programme to be sensitive to local market
conditions, and to adapt and respond to emerging opportunities.
 LIFT will act as a ‘facilitator’ – analysing and establishing the incentive structures of key players
in the rural land system and getting them to work together more effectively. The approach
makes room for direct provision in the short-term when it is clear that others cannot provide the
service, but such interventions will be temporary and have a clear exit strategy as per
established M4P practice. The approach explicitly avoids introducing any distortions into the
market.
 An emphasis on developing a sustainable system that is scalable, so that by the end of the
programme, it will be demand-driven and self-financing.
Main activities
As mentioned above, the ITSP would undertake an in-depth analysis of the rural land sector in the
four programme regions during the inception and early stages of the programme that would help
identify a focused set of complementary interventions in the rural land sector and those markets
directly linked to it (e.g. finance). Care will be taken to strike a balance between a) including too
many interventions, including ones targeted at problems potentially far “upstream” (i.e. in distant
parts of the value chain, or in distinct but related value chains) and b) taking a portfolio approach
which allows different interventions to be tried and tested, and in areas which – although upstream
– may yield greatest developmental benefits. The analysis would include: a) identification and
mapping of relevant stakeholders in the rural land sector (including smallholder farmers); b) an
understanding of how participating in the rural land sector fits smallholder farmers’ livelihood
strategies and what are the constraints that they face; c) assessment of the support functions (such
as the availability of inputs, access to markets, access to finance); d) assessment of which policies
and institutions (including informal and traditional ones) affect the rural land sector; e) detailed
gender, social development, climate change and environmental analysis; g) identification of the
other programmes that are working in the land and adjacent markets and how the LIFT programme
can integrate with their initiatives; and h) detailed political economy analysis to understand the real
incentives and barriers to developing the land sector for smallholder farmers.
Studies of first level land certification and initial market analysis undertaken during the design
phase of LIFT have already identified land rental markets as one of the key constraints hindering
the farmer from utilising his/her land. This is one area where the M4P approach will focus. In
addition, LIFT is also looking to improve the functioning of a series of related markets such as
elements of the financial market, as they directly impact the ability of smallholder farmers to invest
in their land. Also, if the in-depth market analysis identifies key constraints in related markets such
as agriculture, LIFT will facilitate action from other government programmes working in this sphere,
such as Agricultural Growth Programme (AGP), initiatives run by the Agricultural Transformation
Agency (ATA) and within DFID’s PEPE programme (which focuses on three value chains), to
improve the functioning of agricultural markets. If no action is taken by these other programmes,
and where the resolution of the constraint is critical to the achievement of programme activities,
LIFT might get involved in implementing catalytic interventions in these related markets. But LIFT’s
scope will be closely monitored to ensure complementary interventions are closely and directly
46
related to the land certification component.
In line with the M4P approach, elements of flexibility would be built strongly into this option.
Although there is limited flexibility in the land titling and administration component, there is ample
flexibility in the M4P component given that its aim is to facilitate wider market development. The
possibility of adapting existing interventions and developing new ones as there is a better
understanding of how the rural land sector operates is inherent to the characteristics of the M4P
approach.
The specific programme activities will only be determined after the in-depth market analysis is
finalised in the early stages of programme implementation, but an indicative list of some the
possible types of interventions that could be undertaken is the following:



Address key land policy and institutional issues. Within this intervention, the programme
could also focus on ensuring that policy, regulatory and enforcement mechanisms and
institutions are working – for example: supporting the adaptation of proclamations, regulations,
strategies and plans to allow for development of the land rental market; supporting the land
dispute resolution system to become more efficient and cognisant of gender issues. These
interventions would be undertaken in close coordination with the LAND project to avoid any
duplication of activities.
Support the development of the (core) land sector. In line with the constitutional framework,
the programme could specifically promote the development of the land sector through capacity
building of stakeholders to understand their rights and obligations (particularly with a gender
focus); improving market information by using media and technology (e.g. mobile phone
systems) to disseminate information on the availability of land for rent and the price.
Improve key support operations of the land sector. These types of interventions could look
at improving the support functions of the land sector that are also related to the wider
agricultural market system. Examples of interventions could include: facilitating the introduction
of innovative loan systems for MFIs to increase access to credit in rural areas (in close
collaboration with PEPE, which includes an access to finance pillar); and collaborating with
research institutions to develop evidence that can inform the policy process related to the
markets. In many of these cases the other programmes will take the lead, reflecting their greater
expertise and capacity in the particular area. LIFT would collaborate with them to influence the
activities and to integrate the results into the holistic approach.
As mentioned above, the in-depth market analysis that will be undertaken in the early stages of
implementation would allow LIFT to identify the underlying causes that limit the ability of farmers in
the four programme regions to benefit fully from second stage certification and develop an effective
and focused list of complementary interventions.
In designing the M4P components of LIFT, account will also be taken of experience of market
stimulation activities in other DFID land programmes, such as the Community Land Use Fund
(Iniciativa para Terras Comuntárias) (ITC) programme in Mozambique65.
Main instruments
A key instrument for the delivery of complementary interventions using the M4P approach is
The ITC was not conceived of as an M4P programme, nor did it put strong emphasis on activities to stimulate market development
connected with land titling. However, evidence set out in the draft programme evaluation suggests that work undertaken to stimulate
economic activity has not been as strong as expected. That evaluation recommended that the programme place much more effort
into facilitating such measures, such as actively linking communities whose land has been titled, to potential investors.
65
47
facilitation, which includes developing a vision of what the market would look like and using
evidence, influence, networking and communications to achieve the desired systemic change in the
market. This will be the key role of the ITSP as facilitator, who will also seek to identify opinion
formers from within the system (also called champions of change) to help generate change. In
doing so the ITSP will identify where activities in land related markets are being carried out by other
programmes, such as those under AGP and ATA, who have appropriate expertise and capacity.
The ITSP will seek to influence or supplement their activities rather than carry out parallel
processes.
Besides facilitation, other more direct instruments that could be used in implementing Option 2,
subject to the completion of the market analysis, are the following:

Technical assistance. Technical assistance would be the main instrument for the delivery of
the programme. The main technical assistance provided by the programme would be supporting
the regions to undertake second stage certification and supporting the establishment of a
sustainable land administration system. Other examples of technical assistance that the
programme could provide are to support the legal departments of RLAUD and Bureaux to
develop new land policies; support MFIs to develop new systems that would allow them to
provide credit based on the “right of use” certificate; undertake a scoping study on the potential
for an emergent spatial data infrastructure; or working with Google Maps or other potential
suppliers to provide imagery that is adequate for cadastral purposes.

Performance grants. The programme will use performance grants66 to incentivise private
businesses, farmers’ associations and CSOs in the rural agricultural market to invest in
innovative business models and technologies that are directly linked with land certification and
administration and can deliver wider public benefits. This could include, for example, working
with credit and savings institutions to provide credit to smallholder farmers with second stage
certificates. Performance grants, however, will only be used when this is justified on economic
and social grounds and does not create any market distortion, limited to the core land
certification and administration activities, ensuring that assistance is finite, sustainability of
results does not depend on continued support from the programme, and there is a clear exit
strategy.

Training and capacity building. The programme would provide training and capacity building
to key stakeholders identified through the initial market analysis and who have the right
incentive structures that will strengthen the operations of the land sector. This could include, for
example, training the Elders Committees and Woreda Judicial Courts to improve the resolution
of land-related disputes and overcome gender biases; providing training to land-related
institutions (e.g. the Agricultural Investment Support Directorate on international voluntary
guidelines on allocation of land for commercial purposes); and building the capacity of the
extension and use departments of LAU bureaux. Any training interventions to LAU bureaux,
however, would be closely coordinated with LAND as this programme is largely responsible for
higher level training to LAU institutions through formal courses. On the other hand, the bulk of
the programme’s training to LAU bureaux would take place in the woredas in which the
programme is working and would be on the job training.
66 A performance grant is a grant to private sector or NGOs to deliver specified public goods against milestones being achieved (e.g.
a company develops a business model for contract growing which includes providing inputs and training farmers on soil fertility
management). Milestones and outputs against which you will pay are then agreed, ensuring that there is investment from the grantee
to avoid moral hazard.
48

Research and communication. The programme would aim to generate research that would be
used to influence public private dialogue and policy making processes. Research would be
implemented through institutions such as Ethiopian universities or the Ethiopian Development
Research Institute 67. Research would focus on land governance issues such as: the impact of
the different duration and types of rental agreements in the four HRS; the impact of land
certification on women’s empowerment; the impact of land certification on levels of violence
against women or conflict more broadly; the impact of land certification on environmental
management practices and on agricultural productivity, identification of scalable solutions for
effective land administration reform in contexts of rural-urban interface and pastoralist/
communal farming areas (in collaboration with LAND); and the use of emergent spatial data
infrastructure. Communications would include facilitating public-private dialogue; developing
awareness campaigns on user rights on land, particularly aimed at FHH and women land users;
and dissemination of innovative research/successful innovations/international best practices.
Selection of Woredas
The 140 woredas in which the option will operate will be selected according to the same process as
that outlined in Option 1. Likewise scheduling of activities would allow for staged scaling up of the
programme. Under Option 2, 3 million parcels would be certified in the first 2.5 years of the
implementation period and following a review of the evidence and experience to date, a minimum
of 5 and a maximum of 11 million parcels would be certified in the following 3 years.
Outputs
The following outputs are anticipated from Option 2:









Second level certification of a maximum of 14 million parcels (out of a total of 40 million) in
approximately 140 (out of 550) woredas in the four programme regions. In excess of 70% of the
certificates issued will be in the names of women, individually or collectively with a husband.
Land administration systems implemented in the 140 woredas where land certification has
taken place.
Land administration systems and procedures training carried out for additional regional and
woreda staff.
Land rental agreements increase by 13%.
Up to 1.36 million smallholder farmers (households) in the programme regions increase their
income by at least 20.5% as a result of increased investment due to second stage certification,
improved access to finance, and increased land rental opportunities. Of these, 318,495
smallholder farmers (households) will benefit from increased access to finance as a result of
second level certification, and 591,492 from improved land rental income.
Percentage of households in the programme regions involved in land-related disputes reduces
from 21.1% to 15%.
40 regulations, strategies and plans drafted and approved to improve the functioning of the rural
land sector.
25 research and evidence land policy reports produced that allow the GoE to make informed
decisions on land governance.
The further 4.3 million parcels are assumed to be certified by the regions and other programmes
as described in Option 4. The ITSP will co-ordinate with the implementers on introduction of an
enhanced land administration system, capacity building and legal advice on land issues and
67 DFID is currently funding the Ethiopian Strategic Support Programme, which undertakes research to feed into policy development.
The project will ensure that its research Programme does not duplicate that of ESSP.
49

policy support in respect of pastoral communities.
Enhanced domestic revenue mobilisation in the programme woredas as in Option 1.
Stakeholders in the delivery of Option 2
The delivery of second stage certification and strengthening of the land administration system
would be the same as Option 1. Additional stakeholders would include regional and woreda justice
bureaux, as well as woreda local administrations.
Delivery of other interventions would be done by the ITSP in collaboration with other stakeholders
such as universities and technical institutes (e.g. research, awareness campaigns, training);
relevant development partners and programmes (PEPE, AGP etc.); BDS providers (e.g. training,
capacity building); relevant departments of MoA (e.g. extension services) and MoFED and their
regional bureaux; MFIs; NGOs and private sector firms (e.g. performance grants, technical
assistance). Once the list of programme interventions is finalised (at the end of the inception
phase), stakeholders for the delivery of interventions will be selected and engaged based on their
relevance for the successful implementation of the intervention and their capacity.
How Option 2 will be delivered
The programme would be implemented through an ITSP in partnership with the GoE. While the
lead government agency, responsible for co-ordination and policy setting would be the RLAUD the
programme would be implemented by the land administration bureaux/offices/desks at the regional
and woreda levels.
Cost breakdown
Based on experience of DFID’s M4P and land projects, an indicative budget for implementing
Option 2 would be as follows:
Table 13: Indicative Budget for implementing option 2 (in £ million)
Land certification
Land administration
M4P Interventions – technical assistance
Performance grants
Training and capacity building
Research and communication
M&E
Programme management75
48.568
3.069
3.270
3.071
1.672
1.473
2.974
3.976
68 As for Option 1 estimated that at a cost per parcel of $6.70 => 14 million parcels @ $6.705.36 @ £/$1.55 = approximately
£17.248.4 million.
69 Land administration costs for 140 woredas: local and International TA - £660,000; training costs £450,000; rehabilitation of 140
woreda offices @ £5,000 = £700,000; equipment 140 woredas @ £8,500 = £1,190,000 => Approx. £3 million.
70 This will include 25 30 technical assistance interventions @ with an average size of £52,000. This is consistent with the average
size of similar technical assistance interventions - £50,000 (average size of DFID’s BIF Programme) and £100,000 (average size of
DFID’s FRICH Programme). It also includes four regional facilitators for M4P interventions.
71 This will include 30 grants @ £100,000 per grant. The average grant size in the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund is £400,000; the
average grant size in DFID/ADB’s M4P2 Programme in Vietnam was £80,000.
72 This will include training for 12,800 farmers @ a cost of £125 per training. The WB MSME Project in Nigeria trained 20,000 farmers
at a cost per farmer of £115. .
73 This will include 25 research studies @ £25,000; communications budget @ £0.8 million (approx. £145,000 per year).
74 The M&E costs for an M4P Programme are larger than for conventional programmes given the need to individually monitor and
evaluate each of the Programme interventions.
75 Programme Management under this option represents 5.7% of total costs, 4.7% of Land Certification and Land Admin Costs, and
11.5% of M4P Costs
50
Inception
0.7
Total DFID support
68.2
GoE contribution77
Total resources
5.3
73.5
Option 3: Increasing coverage and uptake of REILA and LAND
This option would focus on supporting the GoE in second level certification, land administration and
policy development in the land sector through two projects that currently operate in Ethiopia. The
two projects are:

REILA - Responsible and Innovative Land Administration in Ethiopia, a £10.6 million (€12.5
million) project funded by the Government of Finland. The project has four main
componentscxxxix:
1. Public information and awareness.
2. Capacity building and harmonisation.
3. Developing basic land registration in Benishangul-Gumuz.
4. Land administration and certification in Tana-Beles Growth corridor, Amhara Region.
 LAND - Land Administration to Nurture Development, a £7.1 million ($11 million) project funded
by USAID. This project has four main componentscxl:
1. Legal and policy frameworks at the national and regional levels.
2. Capacity in national, regional and local LAU planning.
3. Capacity of Ethiopian universities to engage in policy analysis and research related to land
tenure and train LAU professionals.
4. Community land use rights in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas to facilitate market linkages
and economic growth (focused on Somali and Afar regions).
DFID funds would allow a significant increased coverage of their existing project components. The
three main interventions under Option 3 would be:
 Providing second level land certification and supporting land administration system:
Funds would be channelled to funding component four of the REILA Project. In order to achieve
DFID’s objectives for the project, REILA would expand its coverage to cover all 4 HRS. cxli The
project would upscale from its currently relatively small scale implementation to mass
implementation with investments in additional management and logistical requirements. The
methodology for land certification and administration would be the same as that envisaged for
options 1 and 2.
Support for the land administration system would mainly focus on updating the Land Register.
The option has been explored with REILA and the Embassy of Finland and a tentative
agreement in principle to consider this option was reached.

Supporting policy and capacity development: Funds would be channelled to funding
components 2 and 3 of the LAND Project and would also involve a significant upscaling of the
scope of this component and capacity to implement. The LAND project is currently finalising its
work programme, and a willingness in principle was expressed to accommodate the increase in
funds.

Market Support: Though these interventions do not directly deal with the market aspect of
land78, the five year donor-funded Agricultural Growth Programme (AGP), which aims to
76 Derived from HTSPE indicative implementation budget. Increased management costs due to M4P activities.
77 See explanation on option 1
51
increase agricultural productivity and market access for key crop and livestock products in 83
targeted woredas in the HRS, will be operating in parallel to these two interventions. The AGP
does not directly address the improvement of the rural land sector but through its first
component it addresses Agricultural Production and Commercialisation.cxlii More specifically,
sub component 1.3 relates to market and agribusiness development activities under which the
programme will support farmers in selected value chains in improving their productivity and
hence their incomes. It is therefore possible that some of its interventions have a positive impact
on certified smallholder farmers but this will be peripheral to its main thrust of activities. As a
result supporting this programme is not considered as part of this option.
Selection of woredas and stepped approach – this would be the same as for options 1 and 2.
Outputs
The following are the anticipated outputs:
 Second level certification by LIFT of up to a maximum of 15 million parcels in approximately 150
woredas (out of a total of 40 million) in approximately 150 (out of 550) woredas. In excess of
70% of the certificates issued will be in the names of women, individually or collectively with a
husband.
 Updated Land Register in 150 LIFT woredas.
 Up to 1.45 million smallholder farmers (households) increase their income by at least 12.4% as
a result of programme activities.
 Training and capacity building on land administration systems and procedures undertaken for
federal, regional, woreda and kebele staff.
 Reduced time to resolve land disputes.
 Improved land policy framework.
 The further 4.3 million parcels are assumed to be certified by the regions and other programmes
as described in Option 4. The ITSP will co-ordinate with the implementers on introduction of an
enhanced land administration system, capacity building and legal advice on land issues and
policy support in respect of pastoral communities.
Stakeholders in the delivery of Option 3
The main stakeholders involved in the delivery of this option are:






RLAUD would be responsible for the overall supervision and implementation of the option,
Regional Government Land Bureaux in the 4 HRS would be responsible for the co-ordination
and supervision of implementation of the option at regional level
The 150 selected woredas would carry out the implementation of the land certification through
the kebele structures, and implementation of the land administration systems in the woreda
offices.
The REILA service providers would support the development and implementation of the second
level land certification and land administration procedures. The project is due to finish in June
2016 but is considered to be part of a longer term engagement.
The LAND service providers would support policy and regulation development and capacity
building. The project is due to finish in 2017.
AGP will carry out market improvement activities within its current programme.
78 LAND’s legal and policy activities will include review of the land rental provisions of federal and regional proclamations.
52
How Option 3 will be delivered
The option will be implemented by the RLAUD, through the REILA and LAND projects, which will
receive funding from LIFT to upscale their activities. There are precedents for such co-financingcxliii
and options that could be used include:


Delegated agreement whereby the funds are channelled to the other development partner and
used as part of the existing project resources, under revised terms of reference. As in the
cases of both LAND and REILA the increases in resources would be very significant. This might
require re- tendering the service providers.
Channelling the funds through the same service providers as currently in place using revised
terms of reference, though this would almost certainly require tendering under DFID
procedures.
The arrangements will be accompanied by detailed project agreements, terms of reference and a
logical framework that will guide the LAND and REILA project teams.
Cost breakdown
REILA’s management has indicated that in scaling up the cost per parcel for 2 nd level certification
and land administration would be £6.4579 per parcel, including increased management costscxliv, for
an increase of 4 million parcels. We have applied the same economies of scale to this rate as
calculated for options 1 and 2 to come to a rate per parcel of £4.20. For 15 million parcels this
would equate to £63 million, of which £6 million will be in respect of management costs.
LAND’s management has indicated that the increased capacity building activities envisaged would
cost approximately £2.5 million ($4 million).cxlv
Table 14: Budget for implementing option 3 (£ million):
Land certification and administration (GoE
supported by REILA)
Management costs (REILA)
Training and capacity building (LAND)
Land Administration and Land Use Planning legal
framework, pastoral policy
M and E
Inception
57.1
2.081
0.6
Total DFID Support
68.2
GoE
Total
5.6
73.8
6.0
2.5
080
Option 4: Do nothing
Under Option 4 no resources would be allocated by DFID to support land in Ethiopia, as other DFID
on-going interventions do not directly address the land issues specifically. There are, however,
some DFID programmes that will peripherally impact on the rural land sector as a by-product in the
79 $10 (£6.45) per parcel was an estimation provided by the REILA Team Leader that included Land Certification and Land Admin.
The estimate included Land Administration (assumed to be the same as for Option 1). The TL’s view, expressed in a paper for the
2013 World Bank conference was that a high level of administration is required (up to 20% of total cost), hence the relatively high
level of such costs. With the economies of scale calculation this has been reduced to 10%.
80 There is no cost here as the LIFT project will not be providing funds to the implementing programmes for this purpose.
81 M and E will be carried out by the individual projects but the additional cost from scaling up is assumed to be the similar to Option1
53
absence of a LIFT intervention. These are the following:




PEPE includes work on Access to Finance that will address to an extent the issue of land
certificates being used to provide some form of guarantee for borrowing by smallholders from
microfinance institutions.
PEPE also includes work on value chains that may have a limited effect on the rural land sector.
Smallholder farmers and the rural land sector are, however, not priority areas under PEPE and
so any impact on the land sector is likely to be a by-product of other interventions.
The CSJ Programme will operate in 5 zones in 3 regions and will influence disputes procedures
and community empowerment, especially in relation to women. This may influence the land
administration processes.
PDP will continue to work in Somali Region and while its activities are not related directly to land
it will be able to influence land policy through its livelihoods component.
GoE will continue to implement the ELALUDEP with the support of the on-going REILA and LAND
projects as well as the SLMP 2.
Therefore, if LIFT does not become operational, the impact on the land sector in Ethiopia will:






Significantly reduce land registration and land administration interventions. LIFT would have
completed land registration in either 170 (option 1), 140 (option 2) or 150 (option 3) woredas.
As it stands, REILA will work in selected kebeles in 9 woredas in Amhara (i.e. not full coverage),
and an undisclosed number of kebeles in 3 woredas in Benishangul. While funds are being
budgeted by the regions it is not clear how they will be applied over the project period but the
number of woredas covered by the funding will not exceed 40.82
It is unclear what other funds will be available for mass scale second level land certification in
Ethiopia. A second phase of SLMP is being designed, but as per the draft PAD only US$9
million has been allocated for land administration, certification and land use.
It would exacerbate the deterioration of the achievements of first level certification for woredas
LIFT would have operated in.
Neither SLMP, REILA nor GoE have any experience of mass second level certification, which is
very much more complex than the simple first level, and the implementation in pilot woredas.
Using current practices 2nd level registration will be slow, taking perhaps an additional 5 years to
cover 40 woredas, 83
Support to policy development will continue with LAND support but this will be restricted to land
tenure and rental and pastoral legislation and policies.
Market interventions will be lost and the holistic M4P approach will not be applied thus
restricting the likelihood of significant impact being made on the livelihoods of the poor to AGP
and ATA market and value chain development programmes.
82 In a meeting with regions on 29/6/13 they intimated that the total capital land budget for regions for 2013/14 would be no more than ETB 100
million which can be extrapolated to approximately £21.4 million over the 6 year project period. Significant amounts of this have been reserved for
aerial photography.
83 Interviews in the regions suggest that it takes 4 months to complete certification of a kebele. A sample woreda visited has 4 kebeles currently in
progress. If an average of 22 kebeles is assumed per woreda, then each woreda will take over 20 months to complete. Assuming that 8 woredas are
ongoing at the same time it will take 160 months or 15 years to complete the 40 LIFT woredas. If greater urgency is assumed then this may be
reduced to 10 years.
54
Table 15: Budget for implementing option 4 (in £ million)
Land certification and
administration
Management and M &
E costs88
Training and capacity
building
Land
Administration
and Land Use Planning
legal
framework,
pastoral policy
Total
LAND84
REILA85
SLMP286
GoE87
GoE
Regions
Total
0
4.9
2.4
0.4
17.2
24.9
1.4
1.7
0.6
0.2
4.2
8.1
2.9
3.3
0
0.2
0
6.4
3.0
0
0
0
0
3
7.3
9.9
3
0.8
21.4
42.4
Outputs of the Option
Because of the lack of certainty over the budgets of the regions and the lack of information on
numbers of parcels to be covered it is difficult to assess the outputs of this option. The REILA land
administration budget is based on working in 9 woredas in Amhara of which 6 will receive training
and equipment support and 2 will be fully supported in 2 nd level registration. On this basis it would
suggest costs per parcel in excess of US$ 10 quoted. On the grounds that there will be less
technical assistance in other projects in this option but significantly lower efficiency, then a cost per
parcel overall has been assumed at $9 per parcel including the implementation of land
administration systems or £5.81 giving an assumed total of 4,300,000 parcels.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option including delivery
routes
Option 1: Land Certification and Administration Programme.
Option 1 is built on the premise that improved land governance through second level certification
and land administration systems in the four programme regions will lead to greater security of
tenure, which will in turn lead to improved incomes for the poor. The strength of the evidence in this
option is set out as follows:
Evidence of land tenure security to improve investment in land
Rwanda commenced mass land certification in mid-2009 after piloting in 2007. All 10 million
parcels in the country were demarcated and adjudicated by the end of 2012 and by May 2013 8
million certificates had been issued to those who had full title, of which 70% had been collected by
the land holders. At the same time 27 of the 30 districts in the country had implemented a new
project-developed land administration, establishing a land register that will record future
transactions. Rwanda differs from Ethiopia in that land title is on leasehold or freehold terms, with a
market in the purchase and sale of land. Land certification also, as in most such exercises,
included both first and second level registration.
Deiningercxlvi et al published an initial impact study in 2010 and identified that, despite the short
period since the pilot, there was a significantly higher propensity to invest in or maintain soil
84 Information provided by Chief of Party of LAND (still under discussion) $1.50=£1.
85 Extracted from REILA project document. Converted at £1 = Euro 1.29. Capacity Building includes funding of development of Land Administration
Information System.
86 $9,000,000 of which 50% assumed to be land registration and administration @$1.50
87 GoE contribution to REILA.
88 As management costs are not itemised in a project document other than REILA, a similar proportion has been allocated to these expenses in
each.
55
conservation structures in treatment as compared to control areas. The Process Monitoring Midline
Report for the programmecxlvii carried out in 2012 identified the following early impacts of the
certification process:





Resolution of numerous boundary and inheritance disputes.
Significant strengthening of the role of women in land ownership, with positive impacts beyond
the land sector.
Possible emergence of a working rural land sector, and an expanded and stabilising rental
market.
Some improvements in terms of access to credit and other financial services, expanded
intermediary services that could help reach poorer households, land use consolidation, and
market expansion.
Those in areas where other supportive interventions were underway were optimistic that the
combination of LTR and these other means of support was helping to transform the rural
economy.
The above results while based on statistically valid sampling are considered too early to be
conclusive evidence of the impacts but provide strong indications of the likely impact of LTR in
Rwanda.
There is also significant international and Ethiopian evidence that increased security of tenure
arising from land registration encourages greater investment by land holders 89, and an improved
land rental market, thereby driving greater economic returns for the smallholder farmers. Klaus
Deininger estimates that in Amhara Region land certification had increased output by 9% and UN
Habitat finds that “tenure security creates incentives for land users to invest labour and other
resources to improve and maintain the productivity of farms, the quality of dwellings and the value
of land and property”.cxlviii
While land remains the property of the State in Vietnam (as is the case in Ethiopia), rights to use
the land were assigned in 1993 to individuals and land-use rights could now be inherited,
transferred, exchanged, leased and mortgaged, thus providing increased security of tenure. Study
results showed a statistically significant increase in the proportion of total cultivated area devoted to
multi-year crops, thus showing an increased willingness to undertake longer term investments. cxlix
Evidence of land tenure security to improve land rental markets
A 2011 study in Tigray demonstrates “a significant and positive effect of the low cost land
certification that took place in the late 1990s on the amount of activity that took place in the land
rental market. The reform appears to have reduced land rental costs in the land rental market by
making poor female (potential) landlord households more willing to let out their land.”cl A survey
conducted in Amhara confirmed that 50% of the land holders are involved in one or another form of
land rental market against 5% before certification. This was accompanied by an increase in the
share to the landholder from 30 to 50% of the crop income.cli
The ELAP Baseline report identified that a relatively high degree of participation was found among
holders of 1st and 2nd level certificates as compared to non-holders.clii
Evidence of additional impact of second level certification
In most countries the land certification is carried out in one stage, unlike in Ethiopia where it has
89 Though there is contrary evidence quoted in the DFID EPS-PEAKS, Rapid review of the literature on Property Rights, October 2012, though the
bulk of the evidence for land registration in Ethiopia and Rwanda points to a significant correlation, especially in conjunction with other initiatives.
56
been carried out in two stages. The first level provided a security of tenure which the various
reports have suggested as giving rise to economic impact. The second level provides greater
security by providing a spatial assurance as to the physical boundaries as well as verifying and
correcting errors in the first stage.
There is strong evidence from interviews in the woredas and regions during field visits that the
original first level registration information has become degraded through errors made in the original
registration, and the failure to maintain the registers for any transactions that have occurred since
then, noted by Deiningercliii. The pilots currently being implemented by the Government have
revealed unregistered land that amounting to more than 10% of the parcels surveyed cliv. The
second level registration will address these inaccuracies, together with the work in the
implementation of the Land Administration System in this option, and restore the security of tenure
eroded since first registration.
The ELTAP baseline report referred to above indicates that 27% more second level than first level
certificate holders rent to non-family or friends, providing additional strong evidence as to the
incremental impact of 2nd level registration.
Evidence of impact of a Land Administration System
Land Certification is a one-time event which will quickly become obsolete unless the register
created is kept current, through a working land administration system that “will guarantee
ownership and security of tenure; support land and property taxation; provide security for credit;
develop and monitor the rural land sector; protect land resources and support environmental
monitoring; facilitate the management of State-owned land; reduce land disputes; facilitate rural
land reform; and provide statistical data in support of good governance. It should be affordable and
open to everyone, meeting the needs of all its users, and must be sustainable.”clv
This sustained security of tenure is “a prerequisite for productive investment. Difficult access
discourages enterprises of all sizes in both urban and rural areas. Easier access depends on
effective, accessible land administration systems.”clvi
Summary of strength of evidence for Option 1
There is strong evidence of the impact of Land registration and administration systems on security
of tenure, investment in land, and land rental market development. The direct evidence rather than
imputed evidence of impact on the incomes of the poor is less strong, thus giving a rating of
moderate.
Option 2: Land Registration and Administration with Making Markets Work for the Poor
Programme in the four programme States
DFID has a strong track record from work on land reform programmes such as in Rwanda and
Guyana. However using the M4P approach on a full-fledged land programme is a novel approach
for DFID and it has only aimed to apply the M4P approach in two land-related programmes:


As part of DFID Nigeria’s Growth Employment and Markets in States – Support Improved
Business Environment (GEMS 3) programme (2010-2016), which addresses land administration
and tax reform as well as investment promotion. However, land activities were mostly related to
the political economy of land reform and did not involve any support to land certification and
land administration.
In South Africa, DFID’s Urban LandMark (2006-2011) worked to make the urban land sector
work for the poor through research activities, dissemination of findings, networking and
advocacy, and communications and knowledge management. It did not involve any land
registration and administration activities.
Therefore, evidence on the potential impact of an M4P approach on the rural land sector is low.
57
There is evidence, however, on the impact of the M4P approach in respect of effectively working
with and facilitating between interconnected markets on land, finance, credit, the rules (policies and
institutions) that govern them and the functions that support them – these specific market systems
are all part of LIFT.
Evidence that M4P programmes increase incomes of poor
The M4P approach that LIFT would use to ensure that farmers are able to maximise the benefits
from second stage certification seeks to tackle systemic constraints that hinder the performance of
the rural land sector in Ethiopia. The evidence base supporting the efficacy of the M4P approach is
fairly new, but growing. There are an increasing number of growth programmes explicitly following
an M4P approach and which are recognised to be successful in terms of sustainability, scale and
poverty reduction. These include FinMark in Southern Africa (in financial services), PrOpCom in
Nigeria (in agriculture), ENABLE in Nigeria (in business environment reform), and Katalyst in
Bangladesh (in a range of sectors). The impact of two of these programmes is summarised as
follows:

The £12 million DFID PrOpCom programme in Nigeria’s savannah agriculture markets resulted
in over £40 million in additional net income for 126,180 direct and indirect beneficiaries between
2005 and 2011. The programme created 17,633 new jobs, and agricultural productivity
increases averaging 31% were seen among poor farmers in 12 states across northern Nigeria.

The Katalyst M4P programme in Bangladesh has demonstrated significant results in boosting
agri-business markets through working to improve the outreach of private sector business
services to the poor. At its mid-term review, 3,560 service providers had improved service
provision, or service and product quality, while an estimated 1.15 million farmers and small
businesses had accessed better and more affordable business services. To achieve pro-poor
impact, the programme worked with business service providers to adopt innovations that
resulted in better outreach to poor producers, which in turn attracted additional stakeholders into
the market.
It is important to note, however, that the evidence of the impact available so far is largely based on
project monitoring data and not independent evaluations. There is, in fact, a need for reliable
evaluations of M4P programmes as stated in a recent DFID reportclvii to which LIFT would
contribute significantly.
Evidence on the need for complementary interventions to ensure that land certification
leads to increased growth and improved incomes of the poor
Several more DFID M4P-oriented programmes are at a design or early implementation stage.
Although a large body of evidence from independent evaluations has not yet been developed, there
are quite strong emerging indications of the success of the approach.
Evidence that supporting land-related policies and market systems (with land administration
and certification) leads to increased growth and improved incomes of the poor
As shown earlier in this business case, there is strong and significant evidence that points at the
positive impact that second level certification and land administration reform have on growth. There
is also evidence that the impact of land certification and administration interventions is enhanced
when it comes together with a package of complementary interventions that address the policy and
support services. The reason is that in developing countries the benefits that land certification and
administration may provide may not be achieved due to existing bottlenecks and to the fact that
related markets do not operate properly.
In a recent paperclviii the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of several land registration projects
undertaken by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the World Bank were analysed.
Table 16 shows how those programmes where land registration and administration interventions
58
were coupled with market and policy interventions obtained a significantly higher economic rate of
return.
Table 16: Estimation of the Economic Rate of Return of land programmes
Country
Inst.
ERR
Positive externalities modelled
Lower transaction costs; Land value
increase;
Increase
in
agricultural
productivity
Land value increase; Lower transaction
Mozambique
MCC
13%
costs; Improved access to land
Increase in agricultural productivity;
Ethiopia
WB
17%
Improvement in soil conservation; Land
use efficiencies
Leveraging land to raise capital; Financial
Sector
improvements;
Increased
Madagascar
MCC
31%
investment in land; Improvements in land
management
Improved access to land financing; Land
Mongolia
MCC
38.5% value and rental price increase; Increase
in return on land investment
Source: Adapted from Whitehead et al (2012)
Benin
MCC
20%
Comparison with LIFT intervention
Interventions in
Administration
Registration
and
Interventions in
Administration
Registration
and
Interventions in
Administration
Registration
and
Interventions in Registration and
Administration coupled with market
and policy interventions
Interventions in Registration and
Administration coupled with market
and policy interventions
Similarly a 1999 ODI paper clix on the economic benefits of land tenure reform in South Africa,
estimated that up to a 20% increase in economic benefit would have accrued from land reform if
carried out in conjunction with extension and other support services.
Evidence on the need for complementary interventions to ensure that land certification
leads to increased investment and more efficient land and land-related markets
There is significant evidence on the need for complementary interventions to ensure that land
certification leads to increased efficiency in the land rental market. Studies analysing the impact of
land certification on the efficiency of the land rental market show a disparity of results. For example,
even though Deininger et al.clx found that land certification increased the propensity to rent out land
and the amount of land rented, the ELAP baseline studyclxi found that the practice of renting was
not affected by land certification, particularly because women fear that renters would claim the land
as their own after several years of renting. Another study in Oromia and SNNP regions of Ethiopia
shows that land rental transactions diminished after first stage certification because of the need to
have the consent of the whole family to formally report any changes in the ownership of the land.clxii
These disparities on the impact of land titling programmes on land rental market indicate the fact
that the land certification program alone is not sufficient in farmers’ decision to engage in both
formal and informal land transactions. Other studies reveal that individual titling does not seem to
be a sufficient condition for these markets to develop or work properly and that markets that are
sufficiently developed - and well-functioning institutions that hear disputes and enforce agreements
- are crucial complements to land tenure interventions to make sure that they promote land
transfers via sales or leaseholds. clxiii
There is also evidence that land tenure reform per se did not necessarily lead to increased
investment and productivity. A review by Braselle et al.clxiv shows that land titling had a very little
effect on investment in a number of African countries. More specifically, a detailed study on the
impacts of land certification on investment in Niger found that tenure security had little effect on
long-term investment because there were simply no opportunities for such investment, although it
had a positive effect on manure application.clxv Another study in Kenya also revealed that land
titling by in Ghana did not lead to increased investment and productivity due to an institutionally
weak environment.clxvi Looking specifically at rural areas in Uganda, a study concluded that secure
59
tenure rights increased the likelihood that farmers make investments but that returns to these
investments were significantly higher where well-functioning markets ensured farmers were able to
obtain agricultural inputs and technology as well as sell surplus production at favourable prices. clxvii
Similarly, there is evidence that land tenure reform by itself will not improve the efficiency of
enabling markets such as the financial market. Fleisig and de la Peñaclxviii argue that land titling per
se will do little to expand credit, and provide a good review of what comprises an enabling
environment for property to successfully leverage credit. Several other studies point out that land
titling addresses only a piece of the broader reforms to property rights necessary to create a good
environment for credit and that there is need to look at other failures in credit markets beyond the
lack of formal land titles.clxix For example, a study in Andhra Pradesh, India found that land use
rights had scant effect on credit because of the scarcity of formal credit sources in the survey
areas.clxx
Summary of strength of evidence for Option 2
As mentioned in Option 1, the evidence of the impact of land registration and administration
systems is rated as moderate. The evidence on the potential impact of an M4P programme on the
rural land sector is low, though evidence on the impact of an M4P approach is moderate in respect
of effectively working with and facilitating between interconnected markets on land, finance, credit,
and the policies and institutions that govern them. However, evidence that complementary
interventions are needed in conjunction with land administration certification and reform to ensure
that the benefits of land tenure reform are realised is strong.
The overall strength of evidence for this option is therefore rated as moderate
Option 3: Increasing coverage and uptake by existing projects REILA and LAND
The evidence in this option with regard to the impact of 2 nd level certification and land
administration on the incomes of the poor is as for option 1.
There is little evidence of the impact of the pilots supported by REILA because they are only
recently competed or still in progress.
There is rather more evidence arising from LAND’s two predecessor projects (ELAP and ELTAP),
which confirm the impact of rural land certification on investments in land and the rural land sector
without quantifying the improvements in income for the poor.clxxi
ELAP and ELTAP reportedly assisted the government in the provision of over 200,000 second level
certificatesclxxii, using the hand held GPS methodology, which has now been replaced as the
methodology for second level certificationclxxiii. While these certificates will remain valid they will
require significant corrections to fit with the more accurate processes to be carried out. There is
strong evidence that ELAP has assisted the Governments of Afar and Somali to produce land
proclamations.clxxiv
There is no evidence of any success in these projects in the establishment of a working land
administration system that will be sustained over time and that outcomes will be able to persist in
the long run beyond the life of the donor programme.
Summary of Evidence for Option 3
From the above the evidence level for this option is considered somewhat weak.
Option 4: Do nothing – the counterfactual
The evidence from the various Government policy documents (ELALUDEP, GTP, and SRM)
indicates that GoE will continue to implement land certification and land administration though with
much reduced resources and without the mass certification capacity support that LIFT would bring.
While there is a GoE intention that significant numbers of certificates will be issued the evidence
60
base for this is very weak and there is no evidence that this will provide significant market driven
gains for the poor to maximise the gains of certification.
The corollary of the evidence in Options 1 to 3 is that if DFID does not intervene in land and related
market issues, which strongly affect the livelihoods of many Ethiopians, insecurity of land tenure
and subsistence agriculture will continue to prevail, leading to lost opportunities for growth, which
otherwise can be achieved through increased access to finance and investment leading to raised
productivity, but also to better environmental management of land, a more equitable distribution of
land and estimated reduced potential for conflict over contested land in its various forms.
Summary of the Evidence for Option 4
The evidence for the counterfactual option is considered weak.
Summary of the quality of evidence underpinning proposed options
Table 17: Summary of options and evidence rating
Option
Evidence rating
1
Moderate
2
Moderate
3
Weak
4
Weak
C. For each feasible option, what is the assessment of local capacity? Is the intervention
likely to strengthen capacity in a durable manner?
The federal and regional level LAU staff have recently become familiar with second level
certification through the recent pilots undertaken by GoE, and through familiarisation visits to the
Rwanda LTR Programme supported by DFID. In the woredas where trials have taken place, staff
have been shown to be able to operate the systems and supervise field data collection after
minimal training. However, none of the implementing agencies, including the REILA or SLMP, have
any experience of designing and managing the mass second level land certification procedures.
Because of the spatial and digital contexts, these are far more complex than those for first level
certification, or for pilots.
Land administration capacity at the region, woreda and kebele levels is low, evidenced by the outof-date paper registers and low staffing levels. The programme would seek to address the key
capacity constraints at each of these administrative levels. The bulk of the capacity building at the
central level will be carried out through REILA and LAND. The programme will also not carry out
capacity strengthening in the DRS regions or woredas.
The technology envisaged for use in land certification and land administration will be similar to that
successfully used in Rwanda, where mostly inexperienced staff were able to quickly implement the
processes following a short period of training.
The identified capacity weaknesses will effect all four options as they all cover land certification and
administration. The ITSP would provide technical assistance to mitigate the weaknesses in Options
1 and 2, but not in 3 and 4, where they would seriously constrain the effectiveness of the options.
The ITSP has strengths in mass land certification and market facilitation that are not available in
REILA or LAND.
RLAUD is a new department and is building capacity in respect of legislative issues. LAND, has
significant experience in policy advice and capacity building through the two predecessor USAID
projects, ELTAP and ELAP.
The ITSP will undertake a detailed assessment during the inception and implementation periods of
the capability of the relevant stakeholders for market interventions and select those that are most
able to carry out the required tasks, though they will receive capacity building to address the
identified skills and experience gaps in option 2. As Options 1, 3 and 4 do not directly address
61
markets, this skill gap is not relevant to them.
D. What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for
each feasible option?
Ethiopia is heavily vulnerable to climate and environmental shocks. Despite improvements in
tackling the challenge, climatic and environmental shocks are still considered to pose major risks to
any development endeavour in the country. LIFT is at some risk, but also provides significant
opportunities to help farmers in the programme regions and woredas tackle and reduce some of
these environmental and climatic risks.
Risks from Climate change and environment to the Programme
The following four risks to the programme from climate change and the environment have been
identified, and are judged to put the programme at medium risk (‘B’). These have been included in
the risk matrix with their mitigating actions.
1. Risk to increasing incomes of farmers: Environmental degradation reduces the ability of
farmers to maximise productivity, and hence their incomes, from increased land tenure
security. This could affect the project impact. Climate change is likely to exacerbate current
processes of soil degradation and challenges in water management, through primary effects
of more frequent and intense rainfall events and less average rainfall in some areas,
resulting in increased pressure on forests, farm and rangeland for production and coping
during and after climate shocks.clxxv
2. Adverse climatic conditions, such as extended droughts or intense rainfall may force GoE to
divert financial and administrative resources to managing them, reducing the federal and
local support available for the LIFT programme.
3. Climate change may, through a decline in rainfall and water resources, exacerbate existing
tensions over land and associated resourcesclxxvi, which will put at risk effective
implementation of the programme in affected woredas, through disputes over land
boundaries and inability to cultivate disputed lands.
4. Atypically intense rainfall events are likely to make land certification difficult with the fields
becoming inaccessible, flooding masking boundaries, and farmer displacement as a result of
spoilt crops. Conversely a multi-year drought would also impede the certification process
with farmer displacement and resettlement.
Negative Impacts of the Programme
The programme is not expected to have significant negative environmental or climate change
impacts. It will, however, help to tackle and decrease the risks of climate change and environmental
problems in the programme woredas, as described in the following paragraphs.
Climate and Environment Opportunities: Positive Impacts of the Programme
The main project activities are related to the issuance of second level land certification,
development of land administration procedures, conducting research, facilitating access to
credit and product loan, as well as capacity building and development. These can all
contribute to strengthening the adaptive capacity and resilience of farmers in the
programme woredas to climate change impacts. Evidence to support the potential of the
programme in addressing environmental and climate change risks is set out in section G of
the ’Assumptions Assessment’ of the Appraisal Case.
The specific positive impacts of the feasible options are as follows:
Option 1: The option presents opportunities because it would improve land tenure security
for smallholder farmers. Land tenure security encourages long-term investment in land, at
household and community level, and results in more sustainable management of scarce
resources including water and soilclxxvii. It has been estimated that first level land certification
62
in Ethiopia gave rise to an average 30% rise in investment in soil and water conservation
measures by smallholders and more than double the number of hours spent on such
activities.clxxviii Increases in land productivity and income also create opportunities for future
adaptation to the changing risks of climate change in terms of income diversification and
even migration (security of land in particular can facilitate migration).
As in the other options, the land administration and second level certification components will
focus on elaborating and recognizing the rights, responsibilities and restrictions of land users
and other actors, including environmental obligations that need to be implemented while
protecting the livelihood of the poor. The spatial data derived under second level certification
will enhance capacities of the federal, regional and local level responsible government bodies
for land use and environmental planning, which would help to tackle climate change
vulnerability and unsustainable growth.
Land certificates and the land register will recognise the existing, formal or customary, rights
of others to access water either on or through a property. Water courses will not normally
form part of a parcel, being public land. Water rights in respect of irrigation schemes are
recorded in the initial allocation document which will be referred to in the certification process,
as the source of the land title. Later amendments, after certification, to water rights of specific
parcel holders, arising from environment plans, will be recorded in the register to provide a
public record.
Based on the above this option has been judged to have medium climate change and
environment risks and medium opportunities. The opportunities are not considered high
because the option does not actively address wider constraints on sustainability of land
productivity and resilience to climate change.
Option 2: extends the opportunities in option 1 and 3 because it will follow the M4P
approach. This include examining and addressing the constraints on the farmers in
maximising the sustainable income benefits of the security of tenure received under land
certification. This will include working with woreda environmental protection officers to carry
out assessments of environmental and climatic risks (to crops, water supplies, to supply
chains etc.) in the programme woredas and identifying specific actions relevant to reduce
these risks. The reach of the LIFT expert in environmental protection and climate change will
be greater under this option as they will ensure that issues of sustainability are considered in
all M4P interventions.
This expert will also familiarise LIFT field staff with environmental and climate change issues,
for inclusion in awareness raising with farmers under the Second Level Land Certification.
The programme will complement existing efforts by the local, regional and federal
Government and other partners and will, where appropriate, coordinate closely with the
existing DFID supported SCIP and CHIP programmes. This option therefore provides the
greatest positive impact on climate change resilience and environmental sustainability.
Indeed it represents a very significant opportunity to improve land and water management
and reducing environmental degradation in ways that directly improve the productivity and
incomes of poor farmers.
Based on the above this option has been judged to have medium climate change and
environment risks, and high opportunities. The latter rating has been made because this
option actively pursues additional initiatives to build on the inherent opportunities of greater
tenure security.
Option 3: has similar opportunities and impacts as option 1, and been rated accordingly.
63
Option 4: will provide fewer farmers with additional security of tenure, without the focus on
land administration of LIFT, thereby making benefits of tenure security unsustainable and
losing the early positive environmental and climate change impact. The option has therefore
been graded as high risk and medium opportunity.
Table 18: Assessment of options against climate change risks and opportunities
Climate
change
environment risks
impactsclxxix
and
and
Climate
change
and
environment opportunities
Option 1
B
B
Option 2
B
A
Option 3
B
B
Option 4
A
C
The programme is considered a medium risk intervention and a high opportunity with option 2 from
the climate change and environment perspective
E. If any, what are the likely major impacts on social development?
Access to land and property is central to the empowerment of women, girls and disadvantaged
groups90. Land can serve as a basis for food production and income generation, and as a means
of holding savings for the future. Land is also a social asset crucial for cultural identity, political
power and participation in decision making.
General Overview of the Programme Impact on Women and Girls, Youth, and Marginalised
Communities
Evidence shows that agricultural production and food security increase when women are granted
tenure security,clxxx that women’s land use rights reduce domestic violence,clxxxi and that women
who own land are more capable of exiting violent relationships.clxxxii It has also been shown that
increases in the relative resources controlled by women generally translate into a larger share of
household resources going to family welfare. Women with land are able to influence household
decision-making and make better choices for their children.clxxxiii
LIFT’s core deliverable is a properly working and sustainable land registration and administration
system in the programme woredas. This is crucial to closing the gap between policy commitment to
women’s access to land use rights and tenure security, and practice. Several studies conducted on
the land certification process in Ethiopia highlight a positive outcome of land certification on (i)
women’s (including those in polygamous marriages)clxxxiv tenure security,clxxxv (ii) women’s
participation in land rental marketsclxxxvi (iii) women’s capability to negotiate with rental
partners,clxxxvii and (iv) perceptions of enhanced levels of bargaining power within the household 91
and increased economic independence.clxxxviii
90 Disadvantaged groups include the elderly, the handicapped, orphans, youth and the minorities. The rights of these groups are embedded in laws
and regulations, as are those generally of women and girls, but often not applied in practice.
91 The impact on women’s empowerment should not be overstated however as a number of other factors will
influence their true empowerment. We understand that in India for example, despite widespread involvement
of women (over 90%) in microfinance institutions true empowerment has not been achieved. However, a
recent review of 15 empirical studies from different regions found that granting women land rights is strongly
associated with increases in the productivity of women farmers and their economic security and autonomy
(UN Foundation 2013).
64
Findings also confirm that effective land reforms improve the welfare, in terms of productivity, of
rural households in general and of female headed households in particular. clxxxix The link between
certification, women’s participation in land rental markets and improved productivity is especially
important in the context of Ethiopia where the taboo against women undertaking major farming
activities means they are heavily dependent on renting out land.cxc
There are deep-rooted socio-cultural attitudes and perceptions about the role, status and rights of
girls and women within households, on farms and in the community, and customary laws on marital
and inheritance rights that impact heavily on women’s ability to access and benefit from access to
land, are difficult to change. This is especially so where there are costs attached to participating in
formal marketscxci and where circumstances are such that women’s land use rights are not well
known, women’s participation in land related institutions is low,cxcii as are their literacy levels are
low,cxciii engendered land administration practices are inconsistent,cxciv and where systems of
dispute resolution often reinforce male power. cxcv
Indeed there is anecdotal evidence that land reforms have the potential to reinforce traditional
practices that are particularly harmful to women and girls; increased tenure security for women has
enhanced the attraction to poor families of marrying off their daughters early. There is also a
perceived risk that where women have equal rights over land with their spouse this may increase
the potential for domestic tensions and violence against the wives. These potential issues will be
researched and examined further in the implementation phase to define and reduce this risk.
Secondly, governing laws and policies are often based on a lack of evidence. For example, gender
guidelines to support policy implementation are absent;cxcvi restrictions on land sizes to be rented
out and periods of renting out encourage unofficial transactions, which may negatively affect
women, girls and the disadvantaged who are vulnerable to inappropriate land allocation;cxcvii recent
changes that provide that land acquired through marriage may be controlled by the person who
brought it into marriage, may weaken the position of women under the prevailing residence
system.cxcviii
Thirdly, poor people are constrained from leveraging land use rights into improved livelihoods –by
lack of market and legal information, inefficient dispute resolution procedures, inadequate skills and
capacity, poor access to markets and to credit.
Ethiopia faces growing youth landlessness in rural areas and inadequate rural job creation,
leading to an increase in migration to urban areascxcix. There is little surplus land to allocate to new
users, who are mostly the youth (male, female). In addition, in most regions, redistribution is not
encouraged and has been halted due to its potential to increase insecurity while undermining
investment on land.
Another impediment is the size of land that any youth can get through inheritance, which is
sometimes lower than the legally allowed minimum size. Hence, the legal recognition of user rights
through certification processes will allow access for the youth to land through rental arrangements cc
There are several vulnerable groups in Ethiopia and the largest of these in respect to land is the
pastoralist community. Pastoralists are estimated to be 13.7% of the total population of the country.
They inhabit the arid and semi-arid parts of the country and they are economically less served,
though they are increasingly the focus of current Government actions cci
Issues in these pastoral areas relate to the expansion of sedentary agriculture, large scale
agricultural projects, wildlife parks and sanctuaries, conflict over key rangeland resources,
weakening of the indigenous pastoral institutions all of which have the potential to aggravate
vulnerability of pastoral communities.ccii If Government policy for land administration does not
adequately adapt to the needs of pastoralists, then the policy can in itself cause conflict cciii.
65
Pastoral communities currently do not enjoy the same formal security of tenure as sedentary
farmers, as the land use rights suitable for pastoralists has not been identified, though there are
current efforts to address this.
LIFT’s approach to managing the social impact of the programme
To maximise returns to women and disadvantaged groups in the programme, LIFT will focus on
four core themes in the programme woredas in the four highland regions:

Participation: working with other programmes (Girl Hub, CSJ etc.), local associations,
CSOs, and women’s groups to improve the participation of women and marginalised groups
in land administration activities (including monitoring the disaggregated impacts thereof) and
institutions. The programme approach will encourage participation of women in the
development of land certification and administration procedures as well as programme
strategies.

Targeted planning: Paying primary focus and attention to the needs and concerns of
women, youth and marginalized communities in relevant areas of economic empowerment
and market facilitation through specific targeting, planning and affirmative action so it
ensures they benefit most from the interventions.

Focused application of the existing legal provisions: The programme will ensure that the
laws with respect to orphans, the elderly, the disabled and minorities, as well as women and
girls, are properly applied in the certification process and embedded in the land
administration system so that these groups are protected by the system.

Awareness and communication: on women’s and vulnerable groups’ rights to land, the
processes involved, their challenges in terms of effecting their rights, the potential for
conflicts and tensions that can arise from changes in tenure arrangements, and the links
between improved access to land use rights for women and improved living standards for
Ethiopian men, women and children. Documenting and disseminating lessons learned and
‘best practices’ is crucial as is working with other programmes such as the DFID funded Girl
Hub Ethiopia, to build the evidence in land issues with respect to girls, to advise on best
practice, and to communicate the findings.
An M4P methodology requires LIFT to understand and address weaknesses in the rural land sector
as well as weaknesses in supporting markets that influence it’s functioning in Ethiopia. This
includes relevant informal and deep-rooted social norms and institutions that perpetuate exclusion
and poverty, and such issues as credit access, market information and access to agricultural inputs
etc. An M4P approach offers LIFT the opportunity to support interventions that empower girls and
women, and the disadvantaged to make informed choices with regard to land, and to control
decisions that affect them.
Cross-cutting policy issues will include work on policy areas such as communal and pastoralist land
where there is potential to improve the protection of land use rights for vulnerable groups.
Assessing how each option would specifically impact on gender and social development
issues
Option 1:
Option 1 will address a number of the risks identified above in the programme regions as follows:
 Second stage certification and the implementation of mechanisms for ongoing updating of
registry information will help secure women’s tenure and help prevent disentitlement of women’s
rights in cases of inheritance and divorce. It will similarly ensure that the rights of orphans, the
and other vulnerable groups are similarly secured and make them less vulnerable to abuse and
loss of land from family members or others;
 The increased security of tenure will result in increased income through letting out of land by
66



women, the elderly and the handicapped, for whom farming is not a practical occupation to the
young and landless who suffer from lack of access to land for cultivation;
The provision of policy support and regulatory harmonisation will present an opportunity to
develop policy implementation guidelines on gender and inclusiveness and will help to address
regulatory uncertainties that can leave room for biases and traditional patriarchal interpretations.
It can also address anomalies such as the need for sharecropping arrangements to be
formalised in the same way as fixed rent contracts so that sufficient land is preserved for food
production, the poor receive fair contracts, and the benefits of share cropping are shared
fairly.cciv
Institutional strengthening and capacity building within LAU institutions presents an opportunity
to encourage the increased involvement of women and other vulnerable groups in land
administration institutions, improved results for women from those institutions through manuals,
training, practices, targets and disaggregated data collection that reflect gender awareness
including the implementation of special programmes for women, and other groups e.g.
promoting their involvement as local arbitrators.
Raising awareness on LAU rights and obligations presents an opportunity to focus efforts on
raising the awareness of women and vulnerable groups to understand their rights and
responsibilities, and the benefits of using the land administration system. .
Option 2: Apart from the advantages of enhancing security of tenure outlined in option 1, this
option would focus on analysing and improving women, disadvantaged and poor people’s returns
from the existing land renting system, including exploring options for improving access to microfinance (augmenting credit provision with the provision of training, business development services
and financial innovation) through use of land certificates.
Option 2 will focus on interventions that will increase the productivity levels of small-scale farmers
in the programme woredas, such as enhancing their access to both inputs and credit to fund inputs,
the lack of which is a serious constraint on small holders’ productivity yields in Ethiopia.ccv
It would specifically promote the development of the land rental market in the programme woredas
through capacity building of stakeholders to understand their rights and obligations (particularly with
a gender and inclusion focus), and strengthen gender informed dispute resolution including
women’s and minorities’ participation in formal dispute mechanisms, thereby ensuring fairer
outcomes for them. Option 2 provides opportunities to influence the market through a thorough
understanding of constraints experienced by women, the elderly, youth and the poor, and by
making specifically targeted market interventions.
Option 2 will also through its cross cutting policy component work with other programmes on the
issues in pastoral communities, in which the position of women and inheritance is very sensitive.
The approach has been described in the Option 2 description section but will concentrate on the
pastoral communities in Oromia and SNNPR to assist the government in development of policies to
meet their needs, which work will be synchronised with that of the LAND programme.
This will allow LIFT to positively impact pastoralists who, in conditions of high vulnerability, present
an opportunity for significant programme impact in terms of improving livelihoods of the poorest of
the poor. ccvi This is especially so in relation to those pastoralists who cannot afford to engage in
livestock rearing activities due to poverty, and who are left without alternative livelihood options; as
communal land owners, they are not able to let out land use rights.
The policy development will include research into communal land leasing, thus facilitating poor
pastoralists to generate an income from their use rights that would allow them to buy livestock or
engage in alternative activities. LIFT will also focus on assessing customary laws with regard to
women’s access to land, and their alignment with formal policy and legislation.
67
As well as the advantages gained in Option 1, women and girls, pastoralists and other vulnerable
groups will further benefit from an increase in access to markets and the more focused
concentration which the programme will give to their specific needs.
Option 3 will limit the overall coverage of the programme, but would extend the geographical
coverage to the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in the Developing Regions. Under this
option, the pastoralists will still benefit from the same initiatives as Option 2, but women and girls
and other vulnerable groups will not receive the specific and targeted market based interventions
which they will receive under Option 2.
Option 4 will have a reduced coverage leading to fewer benefits for women and girls and other
vulnerable groups.
Under this analysis, Option 2 has the most positive social development benefits.
F. For fragile and conflict affected countries, what are the likely major impacts on conflict
and fragility, if any?
A robust and updated land certification and administration system can help to reduce the number
and intensity of both boundary and ownership disputes and provides an easy means of verification
in the event of a dispute in the four HRS. In one comprehensive study in Ethiopia, 85 percent of
certificate recipients believed that certification reduced the risk of inheritance disputes. ccvii The
participatory and photographic based certification process proposed in Options 1 and 2 would
provide accurate, clearly demarcated and agreed boundaries between plots, thereby reducing the
likelihood of boundary disputes. Research in southern Ethiopia indicates that land registration and
certification has reduced the number of disputes arising from border encroachments and land
inheritances.ccviii Support to land administration in both Options 1 and 2 would also strengthen the
ability of local level administrators to maintain and update land records–a significant source of
ownership and inheritance disputes.
Poorly designed and poorly executed land registration and certification programmes can
exacerbate rather than mitigate disputes and conflict. This is particularly the case when land is
being registered for the first time and in contexts in which there is already a high degree of land
insecurity or existing land- or resource-related conflict.ccix Both options 1 and 2 entail certification of
land that is already registered. This makes the sort of conflict entailed in formalising land tenure for
the first time less likely.
There are intermittent border and localised conflicts in Ethiopia. Most of these are in the Developing
Regional States (where LIFT does not propose to operate for reasons given in the options analysis)
and along Ethiopia’s borderlands, but there are also live or latent conflicts on the borders of each of
the four central states. Many conflicts in Ethiopia centre on land and access to resources, often
between pastoralists and settled farmers and between different groups of pastoralists.
Disputes and conflicts can have an impact on land productivity. Land is often taken out of
production until disputes are settled or land use rights change hands. In conflict affected areas,
farmers may be more wary of investing in fixed assets on their land or may leave it fallow.
Options 1 and 2 take a conflict sensitive approach to their programming. The criteria for selection
of the target woredas prioritise areas already covered by the AGP and SLMP and where existing
mapping exercises have been completed. Until the necessary polices and preparedness are in
place, we have taken the decision not to work in areas of the four DRS. We will also avoid working
in any areas of the HRS where large-scale commercial investment is ongoing or planned, or deal
with pastoralist or communal land unless DFID is assured that policies are in place that are in line
with international good practice and human rights obligations. In the selected woredas, every
community will benefit from the programme which should ensure that there are no perceptions of
68
exclusion within those specific woredas. However, it is possible that people in other woredas will
feel excluded, particularly if the population in those areas already feels it has been subjected to
abuse or exclusion. The fact that LIFT will also focus on bringing federal and regional land policy
into line with international norms and standards should have an indirect impact on improving
management of land resources even in areas not covered by the programme. LIFT will coordinate
with other partners and stakeholders for early identification of occurrences of any abuse or
mismanagement. In addition, if any allegation were to be reported within the HRS, LIFT would
monitor and assess the situation, and if abuse was considered to have taken place, press for action
to address the situation. If we were to judge that substantiated allegations amounted to systematic
or widespread abuse, DFID would consider whether LIFT itself was contributing to instances of
poor implementation and/or abuse, and take steps accordingly.
We will manage the risks arising from land acquisition exercises in the four HRS by reviewing the
status of each woreda before we select it for inclusion in the programme and again before
commencing work in order to ensure that there are policies and procedures in place that are in line
with international good practice and human rights obligations.
On a wider level, work on cross cutting national policies will specifically target the transparency of
policies and their application with a view to assisting GoE to bring them into line with international
good practice and human rights obligations.
The process around the demarcation of land has been developed to be participatory, involving
those who have possession of and/or farm the land, government officials and traditional leaders.
Farmers will be asked to identify their land on an existing map in a forum that enables them to be
challenged. The agreed plot is then mapped again and the final demarcation will be publicly
displayed. Anyone disputing the demarcation will have a period of 20 days to appeal to the Land
Administration Committee, with the possibility of appeal to a higher authority. The certification
process itself will take place over a nine month period in a set of selected woredas, allowing for the
process to take account of busy periods such as harvests, which will ensure time for public
participation is not put under undue pressure.
Neither option entails working in the more conflict prone Developing Regional States where land
and resource disputes have been most virulent. Both options are working in the mainly settled
farming areas of the country where larger scale conflicts are less prevalent and land certification is
likely to reduce rather than exacerbate conflict, though there are conflict sensitive woredas in
Oromia and SNNPR. Option 1 will not directly work in such woredas, though it will carry out
national and regional level work in reviewing government procedures for land allocation and
compensation, and recommending improved procedures and processes.
In option 2 the approach will be as in option 1, though using the holistic M4P approach and will also
include working at the regional level in identifying land policy issues with regard to pastoralists and
agro-pastoralists in Oromia and SNNPR, and assisting the regional governments in development
and implementation of responses. These and the policy interventions in option 1 will be carried out
in consultation with the LAND programme which is working on general land policy issues at the
federal level and those in respect of pastoralists mainly in Afar and Somali regions, using
harmonised work plans.
Option 3 entails working in the more conflict affected emerging states of Somali, Afar and
Benishangul Gumuz. Much of this work will involve supporting regional governments on policy and
land use planning and will therefore have a limited conflict dimension. The planned support to land
registration and certification in Benishangul Gumuz through the REILA programme will entail
greater risk. Benishangul Gumuz is sparsely populated. Most of the population are shifting
cultivators. Access to land and resources is a key cause of conflict in Afar and Somali regions,
69
where customary values related to ownership and use of land, coupled with predominantly mobile
forms of livelihood, make identification of fixed land highly complicated. The risks of exacerbating
tension under this option, particularly in these two regions, might be very high.
Under Option 4 all the benefits that would have been gained on reduced conflict over contested
land in various forms would be lost. Furthermore, there will be limited support to address the crosscutting policy issues, in particularly around transparency, alignment with international good practice
and human rights obligations and compensation as this will be left to the LAND programme only
with less than £3m allocated for these purposes. With the Government’s ambitious plan to
undertake land certification covering the whole nation within the GTP period, and with limited
funding available, there is a risk that working at a minimum cost could compromise quality of the
work with the potential to exacerbate dispute and possible conflict.
G. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option? Identify the preferred option.
The cost-benefit analysis
While the costs of each option are fairly easy to establish, it is very difficult to be precise about the
benefits which will accrue. The benefits are difficult to establish in advance given a lack of evidence
on the precise impacts of these type of interventions both in Ethiopia and globally. They are also
somewhat difficult to establish after implementation and careful thought will be needed in the
monitoring and evaluation component to ensure that we can measure them accurately. This
programme presents a good opportunity to document the effects in the Ethiopian context.
We have used the evidence which does exist to construct a cost-benefit calculation for each option.
This evidence is of varying quality and relevance to this programme. The best evidence is that
collected within Ethiopia on earlier land programmes. The global evidence while giving us some
guide as to the magnitude of effects, is more difficult to apply confidently within an Ethiopian
context. The details of each cost benefit calculation are set out in Annex 7 with clear description of
the assumptions made in Annex 6.
The key part of the option appraisal presented here is whether Option 2 shows greater returns than
Option 1. The available evidence suggests that returns are likely to be higher when land
registration and administration interventions are accompanied by other interventions which
increase land productivity. At this point we do not know exactly what these interventions will look
like but have in the CBA calculation set out indicative returns for improvements in rental market
efficiencies and improvements from access to finance. These represent our best estimate of the
improvements which the M4P approach will bring to the programme. Careful analysis of the returns
to M4P approaches will be made by the programme team prior to commencing with these activities
based on greater knowledge of the markets concerned.
Full details of the calculation and assumptions behind each CBA calculation are set out in Annexes
6 and 7.
Option 1: Land Registration and Administration Programme in four regions
A1. Incremental costs for option 1
Based on DFID’s experience implementing Land Registration and Administration programmes in
Sub-Saharan Africa, in general, and Rwanda in particular, the estimated incremental costs of the
intervention under option 1 are shown in Table19 below, which includes DFID costs as well as the
GoE contribution to maintaining the land administration system.
Table 19: Incremental costs for implementing option 1 (in millions)
70
OPTION 1
Year
DFID Costs
Land certification
Land administration
M&E
Programme Management
Inception period
Total DFID costs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
£1.20
£0.23
£0.10
£0.36
£0.70
£2.59
£6.50
£0.35
£0.56
£0.52
£12.80
£0.65
£0.25
£0.56
£11.55
£0.80
£0.60
£0.51
£11.55
£0.87
£0.25
£0.45
£14.44
£0.65
£0.40
£0.43
£0.25
£0.05
£0.44
£0.18
£7.92
£14.26
£13.46
£13.13
£15.92
£0.92
GoE Costs
Maintenance of land adm system
Total GoE costs
£0.00
£0.00
£0.21
£0.21
£0.41
£0.41
£0.62
£0.62
£0.84
£0.84
£1.00
£1.00
£2.55
£2.55
£1.11
£1.11
£1.15
£1.15
£1.18
£1.18
£2.70
£2.70
£1.27
£1.27
£1.32
£1.32
£1.37
£1.37
£2.89
£2.89
£18.62
£18.62
Total costs
£2.59
£8.14
£14.67
£14.07
£13.97
£16.92
£3.47
£1.11
£1.15
£1.18
£2.70
£1.27
£1.32
£1.37
£2.89
£86.82
£58.30
£3.60
£2.60
£3.00
£0.70
£68.20
This option would register approximately 17 million parcels at an estimated cost per parcel of
£4.0192 (US$6.22) and allow for the upgrading and strengthening of the land administration system.
This would allow us to sustain the benefits of registration over time.
B1. Incremental benefits for option 1
We anticipate that the following incremental benefits will be produced if the interventions of option 1
would be implemented:
 Benefit 1: Increased agricultural investment and resulting productivity increases: As evidenced
by Deininger et alccx in Ethiopia, land certification systems can be assumed to increase investment
activities significantly due to the respective increased security of tenure on 17,000,000 certified
parcels. This effect has been noted for first level certification, and can be expected to occur,
possibly to an even larger extent, as a result of second level certification. Increased investment is
likely to have a positive impact on the environment as a 2007 study by Deininger in Ethiopia
(sourced already in other parts of business case) shows that this investment is like to be in the form
of trees (88%), soil and water conservation structures (86%), and sustainable management of
CPRs (66%).
 Benefit 2: Reduction of land-related disputes: A baseline study done in Ethiopia in 2013 has
established, that households with first level certification have experienced much higher occurrences
of land-related disputes (21.1%), compared to those with second level certification (15.1%). This is
strong evidence that the increased quality of second level certificates (mapping) will help to
significantly reduce the extent of land-related disputes in Ethiopia.
 Benefit 3: Improved resolution of land-related disputes: The same studyccxi furthermore found
that existing disputes were much more easily resolved with the help of second level certificates
compared to first level certificates. Study participants stated that disputes were resolved much
more often in cases with second level certification (43.5%) to their satisfaction (only 15.2% with 1 st
level certification).
 Benefit 4: Sustainability effects of land administration: The introduction of a systematic land
administration system parallel to the certification process has important effects on the sustainability
of certification-induced benefits. The failure to introduce such a system during first level certification
in Ethiopia (from 1998) has resulted in considerable attrition of its benefits over time. This will be
avoided with the enforcement of an effective land administration system together with second level
certification. This effect will be further enhanced as a result of activities related to extensive training
and capacity development on land administration systems.
 Benefit 5: Increased tax revenue: Establishing systematic land certification systems will also
create a better basis for land taxation.ccxii Second level certification provides the government with
the necessary information for an even more accurate collection of land taxes. These ultimately lead
to higher fiscal revenue, producing a fairer tax system because land areas and boundaries are
92
All option costs including management, M&E
71
defined clearly and providing information to identify and punish tax evaders. ccxiii On the other hand,
land taxation may constitute an important tool for land policy, as it may create incentives for putting
land to productive use.ccxiv
 Benefit 6: Increased farm productivity due to improved rental market efficiency: One studyccxv
that examines the effects of community development programmes on agrarian production systems
in India, finds that more efficient tenancy systems can reduce sharecropping arrangements by a
margin of up to 34%. In an effort to attempt a very conservative estimate due to the institutional
differences of the African region, we have assumed that we will be able to yield a reduction of
conventional sharecropping contracts (in favour of fixed-rate renting or input-sharing) by 6%. On
these plots, we also assume that productivity will be increased by 10%, a considerably lower
estimate compared to that of Deininger et al. Given the constraints that currently exist in the rural
land rental market, we assume that only 25% of these benefits will be captured.
 Benefit 7: Increased farm productivity due to better access to finance: Use of second level
certification as a guarantee of productivity will allow farmers to gain easier access to credit.
Additionally, even if financial institutions did not directly accept the certificate as collateral, it could
still have an impact on perceived wealth or trustworthiness in their loan-risk assessment.93 For
those households that are able to access finance due to LIFT interventions, they are assumed to
take loans for investment which boosts farm productivity and hence output. Given the constraints
that currently exist in the rural land rental market, we assume that only 25% of these benefits will
be captured.
C1. Estimates of cost benefit analysis for option 1
Table 20: CBA for option1
Economic indicators
Total costs (15 years)
£86,817,213
£49,710,257
Total costs (discounted)
Total benefits (15 years)
£196,403,259
Total benefits (discounted)
£62,426,851
Net Present Value (NPV)
£12,716,594
Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) (discounted)
1.26
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
17.2%
Achieve commercial viability?
Yes
Direct beneficiary numbers
Total number of farming households that receive second level
certification
7,391,30494
Total number of farming households that benefit from increased
security of tenure due to second level certification
5,514,24795
Total number of farming households that benefit from productivity
1,654,27496
While in Amhara the Proclamation allows the use of the certificate as a guarantee of productivity, this is not the case in Tigray,
Oromia and SNNPR. In all regions, however, MFIs are starting to request the certificate as a requirement to allow farmers’ access to
group based lending.
94 17 million parcels at an average of 2.3 parcels per household = 7,391,304 households (see annex 6).
95 Out of the 7,391,304 households, only 70% of households (+10% attrition rate) experience a positive impact of second level certification through
increased security of tenure (see annex 6).
93
72
increases due to second level certification
Cost per farming household97
£15.74
Option 2: Land Registration and Administration with Making Markets Work for the Poor
Programme
A2. Incremental costs for option 2
Based on DFID’s experience, the estimated incremental costs of the intervention under option 2 are
shown in Table 21 below which includes DFID costs as well as the GoE contribution to maintaining
the land administration system. These costs are used in the economic analysis reported in section
C2 below.
Table 21: Incremental costs for implementing option 2 (in millions)
OPTION 2
Year
DFID Costs
Land certification
Land administration
TA for M4P interventions
Performance grants
Training and capacity building
Research and Communications
M&E
Programme Management
Inception period
Total DFID costs
1
2
3
4
£1.92
£0.05
£0.07
£0.00
£0.00
£0.00
£0.15
£0.23
£0.69
£3.12
£7.72
£0.42
£0.69
£0.50
£0.20
£0.20
£0.55
£0.66
£8.49
£0.64
£0.63
£0.63
£0.35
£0.30
£0.23
£0.74
£10.43
£0.62
£0.61
£0.63
£0.35
£0.30
£0.22
£0.70
£10.93
£12.00
GoE Costs
Maintenance of land adm system
Total GoE costs
£0.00
£0.00
£0.16
£0.16
Total costs
£3.12
£11.09
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
£10.01
£0.62
£0.60
£0.63
£0.35
£0.30
£0.52
£0.74
£9.87
£0.63
£0.60
£0.63
£0.35
£0.30
£0.58
£0.69
£0.06
£0.01
£0.01
£0.00
£0.00
£0.00
£0.65
£0.16
£13.86
£13.76
£13.65
£0.89
£0.29
£0.29
£0.45
£0.45
£0.62
£0.62
£0.83
£0.83
£2.17
£2.17
£0.95
£0.95
£0.98
£0.98
£1.01
£1.01
£2.30
£2.30
£1.09
£1.09
£1.13
£1.13
£1.17
£1.17
£2.46
£2.46
£15.60
£15.60
£12.29
£14.30
£14.39
£14.47
£3.06
£0.95
£0.98
£1.01
£2.30
£1.09
£1.13
£1.17
£2.46
£83.80
£48.51
£2.99
£3.20
£3.00
£1.60
£1.40
£2.90
£3.91
£0.69
£68.20
This option would register approximately 14 million parcels at an estimated cost per parcel of £4.87
(US$7.55)98 and allow to upgrade and strengthen the land administration system. Additionally,
there would be a number of market interventions (linked to line items TA for M4P interventions;
performance grants; training and capacity building; and research and communications) that would
allow smallholder farmers to maximise the benefits of second level certification.
B2. Incremental benefits for option 2
We anticipate that the following incremental benefits will be produced if the interventions of option 2
would be implemented:
 Benefit 1: Increased agricultural investment and resulting productivity increases: As evidenced
by Deininger et alccxvi for the case of Ethiopia, land certification systems can be assumed to
increase investment activities significantly, due to the respective increased security of tenure on 14
million certified parcels. This effect has been noted for first level certification, and can be expected
to occur, possibly to an even larger extent, as a result of second level certification.
 Benefit 2: Reduction of land-related disputes: as described in option1.
 Benefit 3: Improved resolution of land-related disputes: as described in option1.
 Benefit 4: Sustainability effects of land administration: as described in option1.
 Benefit 5: Increased tax revenue: as described in option1.
 Benefit 6: Increased farm productivity due to improved rental market efficiency: One studyccxvii
that examines the effects of community development programmes on agrarian production systems
Out of the 5,514,247 households that experience increased security of tenure, only 30% have a propensity to invest (=1,654,274) (see annex 6).
This number is obtained by dividing the total costs of the intervention (undiscounted) by the total number of farming households that
benefit from increased security of tenure due to second level certification.
98 Full option costs including M4P, management and M&E
96
97
73
in India, finds that more efficient tenancy systems can reduce sharecropping arrangements by a
margin of up to 34%. In an effort to attempt a very conservative estimate due to the institutional
differences of the African region, we have assumed that a focussed facilitation based on the M4P
approach will be able to yield a reduction of conventional sharecropping contracts (in favour of
fixed-rate renting or input-sharing) by 6%. On these plots, we also assume that productivity will be
increased by 10%, a considerably lower estimate compared to that of Deininger et al.ccxviii
 Benefit 7: Increased farm productivity due to better access to finance: Use of second level
certification as a guarantee of productivity will allow farmers to gain easier access to credit.
Additionally, even if financial institutions did not directly accept the certificate as collateral, it could
still have an impact on perceived wealth or trustworthiness in their loan-risk assessment..99 Also,
interventions at the macro and meso levels (which are likely to be undertaken by PEPE) may help
to develop the financial system leading to a further impact on access to finance. For those
households that are able to access finance due to LIFT interventions, they are assumed to take
loans for investment which boosts farm productivity and hence output.
 Benefit 8: Improved policy-making decisions results in a better performing land sector: A better
functioning rental land market will allow a more efficient allocation of labour (particularly for women)
that will lead to increases in investment and productivity. In China, improved land rental markets
contributed to occupational diversification and had a significant increase in productivity ccxix. There
are several studies that find the positive impact of policy-making decisions on better performing
land sector. In Ethiopia, a study by Holden et al.ccxx shows that policy interventions that affect rental
market participation will have effects on households’ movements, in the long term.
C2. Results of cost benefit analysis for option 2
Table 22: CBA for option 2
Economic indicators
Total costs (15 years)
£83,804,378
£49,290,629
Total costs (discounted)
Total benefits (15 years)
£255,091,741
Total benefits (discounted)
£82,362,137
Net Present Value (NPV)
£33,071,509
BCR (discounted)
1.67
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
24.1%
Achieve commercial viability?
Yes
Direct beneficiary numbers
Total number of farming households that receive second level certification
6,086,957100
Total number of farming households that benefit from increased security of
tenure due to second level certification
4,549,942101
99 While in Amhara the Proclamation allows the use of the certificate as a guarantee of productivity, this is not the case in Tigray,
Oromia and SNNPR. In all regions, however, MFIs are starting to request the certificate as a requirement to allow farmers’ access to
group based lending.
100 14 million parcels at an average of 2.3 parcels per household = 6,086,956 households
101 Out of the 6,086,956 households, only 70% of households (+10% attrition rate) experience a positive impact of second level
certification through improved security of tenure (see annex 6).
74
Total number of farming households that benefit from productivity
increases due to second stage certification
1,364,983
Total number of farming households that benefit from increased farm
productivity due to improved rental market efficiency
591,492
Total number of farming households that benefit increased farm
productivity due to better access to finance
318,495
Cost per farming household102
£18.42
Option 3: Increasing coverage and uptake of REILA and LAND
A3. Incremental costs for Option 3
The estimated incremental costs of the intervention under option 3 are shown in Table 23 below
which includes DFID costs as well as the GoE contribution to maintaining the land administration
system. These costs are used in the economic analysis reported in section C3 below.
Table 23: Incremental costs for implementing option 3 (in millions)
OPTION 3
Year
DFID Costs
Land certification
Land administration
Training and capacity building
M&E
Programme Management
Inception period
Total DFID costs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
£1.57
£0.16
£0.00
£0.10
£0.34
£0.63
£2.79
£7.17
£0.46
£0.40
£0.40
£1.02
£11.30
£0.72
£0.70
£0.20
£1.21
£10.43
£0.91
£0.60
£0.40
£1.21
£10.43
£0.95
£0.50
£0.20
£1.00
£11.92
£0.76
£0.25
£0.30
£0.90
£0.25
£0.05
£0.05
£0.40
£0.33
£9.45
£14.13
£13.55
£13.08
£14.13
£1.08
GoE Costs
Maintenance of land adm system
Total GoE costs
£0.00
£0.00
£0.19
£0.19
£0.36
£0.36
£0.53
£0.53
£0.71
£0.71
£0.88
£0.88
£2.30
£2.30
£1.01
£1.01
£1.04
£1.04
£1.08
£1.08
£2.44
£2.44
£1.15
£1.15
£1.19
£1.19
£1.24
£1.24
£2.61
£2.61
£16.73
£16.73
Total costs
£2.79
£9.64
£14.48
£14.08
£13.79
£15.01
£3.38
£1.01
£1.04
£1.08
£2.44
£1.15
£1.19
£1.24
£2.61
£84.93
£53.07
£4.00
£2.50
£2.00
£6.00
£0.63
£68.20
This option would register approximately 15 million parcels at an estimated cost for parcel of £4.55
(USD 7.05) as well as support to upgrade and strengthen the land administration system. The cost
of per parcel certification is higher in this option because REILA anticipates higher levels of
management costs and lower levels of performance in processing demarcation and certification
than those presented in options 1 and 2, reflecting their lack of experience in mass certification
processes. This option would also include support for training and capacity building activities
through the LAND project.
B3. Incremental benefits for option 3
We anticipate that the following benefits will be produced if the interventions of option 2 would be
implemented:
 Benefit 1: Increased agricultural investment and resulting productivity increases: As evidenced
by Deininger et alccxxi for the case of Ethiopia, land certification systems can be assumed to
increase investment activities significantly, due to the respective increased security of tenure on
15,000,000 certified parcels. This effect has been noted for first level certification, and can be
expected to occur to an even larger extent as a result of second level certification.
 Benefit 2: Reduction of land-related disputes: as described in option1.
 Benefit 3: Improved resolution of land-related disputes: as described in option1.
 Benefit 4: Sustainability effects of land administration: as described in option1.
 Benefit 5: Increased tax revenue: as described in option1.
 Benefit 6: Improved land rental market: as described in option 1.
102 This
number is obtained by dividing the total costs of the intervention (undiscounted) by the total number of farming households that
benefit from increased security of tenure due to second level certification.
75
 Benefit 7: Improved access to finance: as described in option 1.
 Benefit 8: Improved policy-making decisions results in better performing rural land sector: as
described in option 2.
It is important to note that given the nature of LAND related interventions (focused in the area of
policy), it is likely that the number of beneficiaries is higher. Any intervention of the programme that
addresses some policy constraints will benefit more farmers than just those who receive a
certificate.
C3. Results of cost benefit analysis for option 3
Table 24: CBA for option 3
Economic indicators
Total costs (15 years)
£84,926,228
£49,519,815
Total costs (discounted)
Total benefits (15 years)
£175,364,195
Total benefits (discounted)
£56,244,512
Net Present Value (NPV)
£6,724,697
BCR (discounted)
1.14
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
14.8%
Achieve commercial viability?
Yes
Direct beneficiary numbers
Total number of farming households that receive second level certification
6,521,739103
Total number of farming households that benefit from increased security of tenure
due to second level certification
4,863,861104
Total number of farming households that benefit from productivity increases
1,459,158105
Cost per farming household106
£17.46
Option 4: Do nothing
Under a do nothing option, the situation around land administration in the woredas where LIFT
would be operating will continue to deteriorate. The effects of first level certification will continue to
be eroded by a rate of 10% per annum (GoE figures, see annex 6). This means that further work
will still be required to stop the attrition of the system and to re-certify those plots where the benefits
of first level certification are completely gone. In the woredas where LIFT would be operating,
subsistence agriculture will continue to prevail and there will be no productivity gains from land
registration and a functioning land administration system. In addition, the possible gains in
productivity that could be achieved from improving the efficiency of rental markets, agricultural
management practices, and increasing access to finance for smallholder farmers will be lost.
In woredas different from the ones where LIFT would be operating, it is estimated that 4.3 million
15 million parcels at an average of 2.3 parcels per household = 6,521,739 households (see annex 6).
Out of the 6,521,739 households, only 50% of households (+10% attrition rate) experience a positive impact of second level
certification through improved security of tenure (see annex 6).
105 Out of the 3,758,500 households that benefit from improved security of tenure, only 30% have a propensity to invest (=1,127,550)
(see annex 6).
106 This number is obtained by dividing the total costs of the intervention by the total number of farming households that benefit from
increased security of tenure due to second level certification.
103
104
76
parcels would be certified with funding from the regional governments and two donor programmes
(REILA, SLMP2). Additionally, another donor programme would be undertaking interventions to
build capacity and provide legal advice on land issues and support policy development on pastoral
communities (LAND). These interventions, however, would occur in different woredas from those
where LIFT would be taking place and have therefore not been incorporated into the CBA.
As options 1, 2 and 3 are assessed against a do nothing option and therefore only measure the
incremental costs and benefits, the NPV of option 4 is necessarily zero. The gains that are
quantified in the other options are incremental to the do nothing option.
Balance of incremental costs and benefits
A summary of the costs and benefits of all three options is presented below.
Table 25: Summary of CBA across the three options
Total costs (15 years)
Total costs (discounted)
Total benefits (15 years)
Total benefits (discounted)
NPV
BCR (discounted)
IRR
Total number of farming households
that receive 2nd level certificates
Total number of farming households
that benefit from increased security
of tenure due to 2nd level certificates
Total number of households that
benefit from productivity increases
Cost per farming household109
Benefit per farming household110
Option 1
£86,817,213
£49,710,257
Option 2107
£83,804,735
£49,290,629
Option 3
£84,926,228
£49,519,815
£196,403,259
£62,426,851
£255,091,741
£82,362,137
£175,364,195
£56,244,512
£12,716,594
1.26
17.2%
7,391,304
£33,071,509
1.67
24.1%
6,086,957
£6,724,697
1.14
14.8%
6,521,739
5,514,247
4,549,942
4,863,861
1,654,274
1,364,983108
1,459,158
£15.7
£35.6
£18.4
£56.0
£17.5
£36.05
The table above shows that option 2 is the option that presents a higher IRR (24.1%) as well as the
highest NPV (£33,071,509). It also presents the highest (discounted) BCR of the three (1.67).
These results differ from those in Step 5 of the options assessment which was carried out assuming that the certification would be
evenly spread over the programme period
108 Of these, 591,492 households will experience increased farm productivity due to improved land rental efficiency and 318,495
households due to better access to finance. It is important to note that the number of beneficiaries does not include the people who
would benefit by being able to rent the land. This calculation has not been undertaken as there is no reliable information on the number
of tenants that will be in the market.
109 This number is obtained from dividing the total costs of the intervention (undiscounted) by the total number of farming households
that benefit from increased security of tenure due to second level certification.
110 This number is obtained from dividing the total benefits of the intervention (undiscounted) by the total number of farming
households that benefit from increased security of tenure due to second level certification.
107
77
Sensitivity analysis
In order to test the robustness of the key assumptions, we tested them against two alternative (and
in most cases more conservative) estimates. All sensitivity analyses are compared to the headline
results from the CBA. The following assumptions were tested:
Value
added
in
Ethiopian agriculture
Average plot size
Propensity to invest due
to 1st/2nd certification
Productivity impact of
1st/2nd certification
Original
value
Alternative
estimate 1
Alternative
estimate 2
65%
55%
45%
If value added is reduced to 55%, only options 1 and 2
remain commercially viable. If value added is reduced to
45%, the only option 2 remains commercially viable.
1.17 ha
Reducing the average plot size to 0.32 ha makes the
NPV of all options negative. It is important to note,
however, that a very modest change in some of the
assumptions for option 2 (e.g. increase the reduction of
inefficient sharecropping from 6 to 8%) is sufficient to
generate a positive NPV in option 2. Increasing average
plot size to 1.17ha makes all three options commercially
viable.
10%
Reducing propensity to invest makes the NPV of options
1 and 3 negative and, therefore, commercially nonviable. Option 2 remains with a positive NPV, albeit with
a lower value.
3%
Reducing productivity impact makes the NPV of options
1 and 3 negative and, therefore, commercially nonviable. Option 2 remains with a positive NPV, albeit with
a lower value.
0.62 ha
30%
9%
0.32 ha
20%
6%
Remaining effects of 1st
level certification
Annual attrition rate of
1st level certification
30%
40%
50%
Increasing remaining effects to 40% reduces the NPV of
all three options, but they all remain commercially viable.
However, increasing remaining effects to 50% makes the
NPV of options 1 and 3 negative, and therefore, nonviable commercial options.
10%
5%
0%
Reducing the attrition rate has no impact on the
commercial viability of the three options.
Average output per ha
Increased productivity
due to access to
finance
Impact on NPV/IRR
ETB3,476
ETB 2,500
ETB 2,000
Reducing average output to ETB 2,500 per ha makes
options 1 and 3 commercially non-viable, but option 2
remains with a positive NPV. However, reducing average
output to ETB2, 000 makes all three options
commercially non-viable.
9%
5%
0%
Reducing the productivity due to increased access to
finance reduces only slightly the NPV of the three
options. They all remain commercially viable.
Additional analysis has been undertaken to test the robustness of the model if there is an erosion of
benefits over time. Two alternative scenarios were assessed:
 A 5% erosion of benefits after year 4 of the programme: in this scenario, the NPV of options 1
and 3 becomes negative and therefore commercially non-viable. Option 2 presents a lower NPV
but remains commercially viable.
 A 5% erosion of benefits after year 7 of the programme: in this scenario, the NPV of option 3
becomes negative, but options 1 and 2 remain with positive NPVs and commercially viable.
Details of the sensitivity analyses undertaken are included in Annex 7. The sensitivity analysis
indicates that option 2 is the only option that remains commercially viable in all alternative
scenarios except option one under some scenarios. It is also the option that most consistently
delivers the highest NPV and IRR.
78
Selecting the preferred option
The analysis undertaken so far suggests that all three options present positive returns to DFID and
are therefore worth undertaking. The cost benefit analysis, however, points towards a positive and
higher impact of option 2 as it is the option that delivers the highest NPV and IRR. It is also the only
option that runs positively through most sensitivity scenarios.
It is important to note, however, that the results of the cost benefit analysis are derived from a set of
assumptions on the potential benefits of each option. These assumptions, which are clearly
presented earlier and detailed in annex 6, are based on literature (from Ethiopia and elsewhere)
that needs to be considered as “moderate evidence”. It is also the case that there are a number of
non-quantifiable benefits that could significantly increase the positive impact of these options,
particularly in the case of option 2. As a result of these constraints, the actual impact of the different
options is hard to establish in advance. This also implies that the results of this CBA should be
taken as indicative, and that the suggested potential benefits and the assumptions made should be
tracked over the programme’s life. This will be done through the VFM indicators developed in the
following VfM section.
H. Theory of Change for the Preferred Option
The strategic case highlighted the existing constraints faced in the land sector and the importance
of taking a systemic and transformational approach in tackling the problems of land in Ethiopia. The
appraisal case has identified the preferred option as Option 2, with support to improved land
governance and development of rural land sector. These elements are set within a Theory of
Change (ToC) below, including underlying assumptions of the model.
The theory of change is set out in the diagram below:
79
Figure 2 Theory of Change
LIFT Programme Theory of Change
Weak Land Governance
1
Undertake second stage
certification
Support Improved
Land Governance
• Poor capacity of staff (and
limited in number) in LA
instituitions
• Lack of maintentance of land
records
• Limited information,
transparency and
unpredictable land
administration policies
• Lack of administrative
resources and infrastructure
• Limited research & innovation
on land issues
• Land holdings not accurately
mapped
Develop LA procedures
Develop LA organisation
capacity
2
3
Support Development
of Rural Land Markets
4
• Inadequate and unclear policy
framework
• Limited access to finance
• Limited understanding and
knowledge of user's rights
• Limited transparency in
Government's allocation of
land
• Weak enforcement of land
rental contracts
• Lack of soil conservation
measures
• Insecurity of tenure restricts
women's participation in land
rental markets
2nd level certificates
issued recognising rights
of joint, polygamous and
FHH land holders
8
9
Develop information &
communication
Weak Rural Land Markets
6
IMPACT
OUTCOMES
OUTPUTS
INTERVENTIONS
CONSTRAINTS
Review policies and
regulations
Undertake research to
provide evidence
Facilitate use of security
of tenure to access
finance
5
7
10
Functioning land
administration system
Improved gender
sensitive and pro-poor
policies and institutions
for the rural land market
To all outputs
Improved supporting
functions for the rural
land market for women
and poor farmers
Sustainable land
governance
Security of tenure from second level
certification and accurate well
maintained land register leads to more
productive use of land and improved
environmental management from
effective land use planning ,land use
consolidation, reduction in land
disputes, and investment in
environmental improvements
11
12
13
Better working rural land
market system
A better working rural land market
leads to a more efficient allocation of
land (particularly for the benefit of
women), increased investment and
higher productivty by smallholder
farmers, who are able to participate in
commercial agriculture.
Support Public Private
Partnership policy on land
development
Cross-cutting issues: M&E, gender, climate change
80
14
15
Increased economic
growth, increased
incomes of the poor,
without harming the
environment
Assumptions assessment
The fifteen assumptions indicated in the ToC have been grouped into seven (A-G), which have
been assessed as follows:
A. Evidence that strengthening land governance leads to improved security of tenure
 Assumption 1 – Strengthened land governance leads to increased land security
 Assumption 8 – Land holders accept second level registration as legitimate
B. Evidence that supporting land-market related policies and functions leads to increased investment and
productivity
 Assumption 2 – Supporting the rural land sector will lead to increased access to finance, increased renting,
and improved productivity
 Assumption 3 - Weak rural land sector leads to a low level of investment
 Assumption 5 - Farmers would be willing to use certificate for accessing finance
C. Evidence that GoE has political will to undertake land-related interventions
 Assumption 4 – GoE's policy aims to support the growth of smallholder farmers
 Assumption 6 – Government open to improving the land regulatory environment, including cross-cutting
aspect such as transparency and large-scale land investment
 Assumption 7 – Government open to Public Private Partnership (PPP) engagement in private sector
development and growth and to reforms recommended by LIFT
 Assumption 9 – GoE continues to allocate resources to maintain the Land Admin system (until it can
become self-financing)
D. Evidence that security of land tenure leads to increased investment and productivity
 Assumption 10 - Increased security of tenure through second level certification leads to increased
investment in land
E. Evidence that investment links to growth/increased incomes
 Assumption 12 - Increased investment leads to increased incomes of the poor
F. Evidence that focus on women will support growth/increase incomes
 Assumption 14 - Greater economic growth and improved incomes will be achieved by specifically
empowering girls and women.
G. Evidence that focus on climate change will support growth/increase incomes
 Assumption 11 – Increased security of tenure leads to improved land usage/green performance
 Assumption 13 – Additional investment generated will be put to economically productive and environmentally
beneficial use
 Assumption 15 - Better land husbandry will lead to improved carbon fixation through more stable soils.
Assumption A - Evidence that strengthening land governance leads to improved security
of tenure
Weak governance tends to flourish where the law is complex, inconsistent or obsolete.
Fragmented institutional arrangements, weak institutions, ambiguous laws and a weak judiciary
aggravate the situation. Weak governance is often associated with two principal types of
corruption: “state capture” and “administrative corruption”, each with its own characteristic set of
behaviours.ccxxii It reduces security of tenure as illegal transfers may cause legitimate owners or
occupiers to lose their rights, informal transfers and informal ownership are not protected by law,
and the protection offered by customary tenures may be weakened. Those who capture the state
may attempt to use land registration systems to reinforce their claims to land, even when the land
has been acquired inappropriately. LIFT will help address this by making sure that smallholders
have evidence of their land title and are better placed to challenge any such abuses.
Marginalized groups may have the evidence of their land use rights suppressed by officials.ccxxiii
International evidence from the WB and FAO studies supports the claim that good governance in
land administration and state land management increases land tenure security. ccxxiv It also
reduces conflicts, decreases transaction costs and therefore provides incentives for private
sector investment. Because good governance increases tenure security and reduces land
conflicts, citizens feel more secure. They also gain more confidence in each other, the state and
institutions. This is fundamental to sustaining social and political stability. In Ethiopia, for
example, 99% of respondents to the ELAP baseline study with second level certificates (an
81
important contributor to land governance) felt that their tenure security was enhanced by
certification.ccxxv
There is clear evidence that land holders recognise the validity of the second level certificates
and are ready to use the land administration system. In Rwanda, over 70% of the 8 million
certificates made available have been collected so far by the land holder despite there being
issues over fees required to be paid, and absenteeism.ccxxvi In Ethiopia, field visits to the
ELAP/ELTAP supported second level certification sites indicated that the level of collection by
farmers was lower in Asela woreda due to the large number of errors arising from the process
used (although 75% still collected their certificates). In other woredas, collection was closer to
100%.ccxxvii Interviews with farmers confirmed their appreciation of the spatial evidence in the
second level certificates as a means of reducing disputes, and the validity of the certificates.
Assumption B - Evidence that supporting land-market related policies and
functions leads to increased investment and productivity
Impact of land-related policies on investment and productivity
Land related policies may either positively or negatively impact investment and productivity of
smallholder farmers. For example, policy changes implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa in the
mid-1980s and the second half of the 1990s, combined with technological innovations available
at that time, appear to have played an important role in improving agricultural performance. ccxxviii
Particularly relevant for Ethiopia is the impact of land rental policies on investment and
productivity. The specific assumption is that improved rental markets will allow for a more
efficient allocation of labour (particularly women’s) that will lead to increases in investment and
productivity. This was the case in China, where improved land rental markets contributed to
occupational diversification and was estimated to have increased productivity by about 60% ccxxix.
In Vietnam, the impact of the 1993 Land Law of Vietnam which gave households the power to
exchange, transfer, lease, inherit and mortgage their land-use rights was not only to have
prompted investment (by 7.5% compared to no certificates) but also saved 11-12 weeks per
annum for non-agricultural activity, an effect that was particularly pronounced for the poor.
In Ethiopia, there is evidenceccxxx that policy interventions that affect rental market participation
will have effects on households’ trajectories in the long term. Estimated marginal effects suggest
that certification increases the propensity to let out by 13 percentage points and the magnitude of
land rented out by about 9 points or 1/10 of a hectare for the average farm in the sample. Sociocultural norms and factor market imperfections make self-cultivation by female heads extremely
rare, implying that they can either let out their land or—often because of insecure tenure— leave
it fallow. To the extent that they allow productive use of plots that had been left uncultivated,
certification-induced rental market effects would enhance productivity as well as equity.
Impact of land-related functions on investment and productivity
One key supporting function in the land sector is the use of certificates for increasing access to
credit.
In Ethiopia, however, the use of certificates as collateral has generally not occurred so far.
Amhara is the only regional state where the regulations allow for the use of the certificate as a
guarantee of productivity, and farmers interviewed confirmed having used it. However, a lack of
understanding on the mechanisms of how the process works by stakeholders prevents this from
being widespread. If financial institutions do not directly accept the certificate as collateral, they
do accept it as “collateral substitute” as proof of trustworthiness to access group based lending.
Proper studies have not yet been carried out on the extent and impact of this practice.
The empirical literature, however, presents mixed results. Many studies clearly point to particular
82
contextual factors that affect the impact that certification has on access to credit. Some examples
from various countries are:




Paraguay -ccxxxi credit impact only for medium and large farms.
Indonesia -ccxxxii a title does not in and of itself unleash access to credit, but rather provide one
signal among many regarding the borrower's creditworthiness.
Indiaccxxxiii - computerizing the land registry (not titling) had an effect on borrowing in urban
areas, but not in rural areas.
Guatemalaccxxxiv - the effect of land titles on plot use and credit access varies with the
prevalence of conflicts and different types of conflict resolution mechanisms.
There is evidence that with more private sector involvement in input markets, new channels for
advice open up leading to adoption of new technologies and improved practices and increased
farm productivity. For example, this was achieved with Syngenta (a private project partner) within
the Bangladesh Katalyst programmeccxxxv.
In Ethiopia, a 2008 paperccxxxvi shows that farmers with certificates were more productive than
farmers without certified plots as a result of the use of improved technologies such as chemical
fertilizers and improved seeds.
Assumption C - Evidence that the GoE will support land-related interventions
The government is committed to the second stage certification process and to improving its
capacity to administer land at national, regional and local levels.
The Government’s policies on land and the private sector growth
The government’s overarching strategies, policies and spending priorities are centred on rural
economic growth (and especially agricultural growth) as a driver for economic development and
industrialisation. This strategy is encapsulated in the Agricultural Development Led
Industrialisation strategy (ADLI), which has guided government engagement since the 1990s.
These priorities are highlighted in the Rural and Agricultural Development Policies and Strategies
(2003). Ethiopia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes, the SDPRP-2002/03-2004/05,
PASDEP-2005/06-2009/10 as well as the more recent Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15 reinforce the government’s focus on rural-led growth.
The GTP emphasises private sector involvement in (primary) agriculture, in particular through
attracting commercial (larger) investors. More specifically, the GTP indicates that (i) private
investments are also very important for smallholder agriculture and need to be promoted through
an enabling environment including transparent input and output markets, land tenure security
and effective land transactions, and also access to financial services, and (ii) the focus on private
sector involvement in primary agriculture should be matched with the same focus for the sectors
supporting the inputs to and outputs from agriculture.ccxxxvii
Ideology and pragmatism
The Government supports the private sector and its views on land tenure are framed by both
pragmatism and the governing party’s ideology. The Government nurtures fledgling businesses
as well as recognising the market’s ability to allocate resources fairly and efficiently —
particularly in strategic sectors such as land, agricultural inputs and banking 111. It sees the rural
poor as its primary political constituency and ensuring equity, equality and inclusion are abiding
political and policy concerns. Overall, the government seeks its state building and development
lessons from East and Southeast Asiaccxxxviii. This model sees an important role for the private
111 While GoE uses markets and recognises the need for private investment, it continues to guide strategic sectors.
83
sector, but one that is more managed than in many other countries.
This ideological drive is tempered by pragmatism and government policies toward rural land are
framed by the need to: improve the competitiveness of small holder agriculture and the
productivity of land; improve sustainable land use planning; realise gender equality in land; and
reduce the scope for disputes and conflict involving land.
Policy and administrative commitment
The GoE has formally requested that DFID support its land registration and administration
processes. The LIFT programme and the options presented have emerged from this initial
request and subsequent discussions. At policy, practical and administrative levels, the GoE is
committed to improving the tenure security of smallholders through second stage land
certification and improved land administration. This commitment is reflected in the government’s
ELALUDEP and SRM. In 2010 a new RLAUD was established within MoA to oversee these
commitments. This Directorate has strong political and administrative support, which is echoed at
the regional level, where land administration bureaux have been established.
GoE is already rolling out its own low-cost, low-scale second stage certification process across
the four HRS. LIFT would help to significantly scale up, speed up and improve the quality of this
process.
The GoE has shown a willingness to review and revise its land-related regulations and strategies
within the broader framework of the overall policy. Development partners have been involved in
these processes through the various joint consultative bodies and more directly through projects
such as the ELTAP and successors. Regional level proclamations and regulations have been
modified in the past several years. Amhara, for instance, has revised its land proclamation twice
to bring it in line with federal regulations and to improve dispute resolution mechanisms. The
Government is also engaging the private sector in seed production and distribution.ccxxxix In
2010/11 the government began publishing information about large-scale lands leased to
agricultural investors through its land bank.ccxl
In summary, the above evidence confirms the GoE commitment to second stage certification,
land administration and to engaging the private sector in rural markets in attempt to reduce
poverty and encourage women to become more active in the sector. Their recent agreement to
enter into a G8 land partnership also shows their willingness to improve transparency on land
issues.
Assumption D - Evidence that security of land tenure leads to increased
investment and productivity
The various studies present mixed findings on the impact of formal land titles on investment. UN
Habitatccxli strongly supports the assumption above but the World Bank, ccxlii however,
summarising the evidence from Africa, notes that some studies show that formal land title had
little or no impact on investment or farm income, as land tenure is secure under most customary
land use rights and formal land titles do not necessarily equal to higher tenure security.
While land titling does not yield impacts on investment and productivity in every context, there is
increasingly robust evidence supporting this association, including that from Cambodia ccxliii,
Vietnamccxliv, Kenyaccxlv and Ugandaccxlvi. Furthermore, a study of land tenure and investment in
Zambia found evidence that documentation of land title is positively associated with fixed
investments and agricultural productivity. ccxlvii In northern Ethiopia, long-term investments in
stone terraces were associated with secure land tenure.ccxlviii Households that had more security
of tenure were more likely to demand and receive credit for agricultural investment financing and
complementary inputs in South Africa.ccxlix
84
Recent empirical resultsccl in Ethiopia also reported that a majority of beneficiaries perceive
certification to increase incentives for investment. Some 75% of the farmers interviewed
indicated that they intended to increase investment in their land following registration and to
increase its sustainability. The first level certification programme that covered around 20 million
parcels in the Amhara Region,ccli found significant economic benefits, including an increase in
agricultural outputs of about 9 percentage points and increased plot sizes.
Assumption E - Evidence that investment leads to growth/increased incomes
There is strong evidence to support the view that private investment is a driver of growth in Africa
and that it is a key determinant to variations in growth rates across Africa cclii. The ratio of private
investment to GDP partially explains differences in real GDP growth in Sub-Saharan Africaccliii.
The DFID PSD Strategyccliv shows that a higher share of private investment in total investment is
correlated with faster growth. This is supported by several cross country studies of developing
countriescclv worldwide and the G20 Multi-Year Action Plan on Developmentcclvi.
Evidence on the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty is strong cclvii. Growth has been
historically shown to account for between two thirds and 90% of the variations in poverty rates of
changecclviii. However, how poverty reduction responds to economic growth differs significantly from over 4% to less than 1% change in poverty levels for every percent of economic growth cclix.
One example of a weak response of poverty to growth is Ethiopia where between 2004 and
2011, per capita GDP rose an average of 8.1% p.a. and poverty fell an average of 3.8% p.a. cclx
The literature points to poor human development and a limited number of growth sectors as the
main causes of the poor responsiveness of poverty to growth cclxi which basically boils down to
inadequate political decisions and availability of transmission mechanisms between growth and
poverty reduction such as an effective and progressive tax collection and redistribution policy,
robust social security systems, and education levels. Some of those challenges will/are being
addressed through other DFID Ethiopia programmes such as Public Sector Capacity Building
Programme (PSCAP); Tax, Audit and Transparency Programme (TAUT); and General Education
Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP I and II).
Assumption F - Evidence that a focus on women will support growth/increase
incomes
The economic empowerment of women is a prerequisite for sustainable development, pro-poor
growth and the achievement of all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).cclxii Empowerment
implies and requires among other things, effective access to and control over economically
productive resources, such as land and finance. The various literaturescclxiii powerfully
demonstrate that the marginalization of women from access to productive assets such as land,
and from decision-making processes that influence the allocation of resources, has a negative
impact on growth and poverty reduction. As ‘women’s activities’ are under-resourced and
undercapitalised while ‘male activities’ are (comparatively) over-resourced and over-capitalised,
there are declining marginal returns and/or loss associated with talented women being starved of
economic resources, reducing aggregate outputcclxiv.
But increased economic empowerment of women also contributes to economic growth through
other channels. For example, as women become more educated, their contribution to economic
growth will increase through reduced fertility levels cclxv, reduced child mortality levelscclxvi, and
increased education of the next generation.cclxvii Also, as gender gaps in employment are
85
reduced, the pool of talent from which employers can draw upon will increase, thereby increasing
the average ability of the workforce and increasing economic growth. cclxviii 112
Ethiopia-specific datacclxix show that improving female education positively affects a number of
MDG indicators. They also show that labour market reform that allows women to devote more
time to market work complements the improvements associated with better education. By
simulating a range of policies focussing on post-primary education investment, barriers to
employment for women, wage discrimination and productivity in home service production, it is
estimated that the correct policy mix could add 1.9% to Ethiopian GDP.
Land use rights improve tenure security and reduce land fragmentation by encouraging
consolidation. Land use rights also support engagement in non-agricultural activity, especially
benefitting women and the disadvantaged by allowing them to engage in off farm activities by
renting their landcclxx.
Assumption G - Evidence that focus on adaption and mitigation /green growth will
support growth/increasing incomes
Globally, “even with conservative assumptions, a green investment scenario achieves higher
annual growth rates within 5-10 years and an increase in renewable resource stocks that
contribute to global wealth” compared to a business as usual investment scenario cclxxi. Separate
UNEP research indicates that far more green jobs will be created in the move toward a
sustainable economy than jobs lost.cclxxii Evidence is also building that developing countries are
actively seeking “green” growth pathways. Uganda increased its exports of organically farmed
products from US $4m in 2003/4 to $23m in 2007/8, while achieving a 36% reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions per hectarecclxxiii. Countries such as Ethiopia, with relatively little
investment in infrastructure to date, are less fixed on a high-carbon trajectory compared to more
developed countries. Analysis from the Ethiopian Government Climate Resilient Green Economy
(2011) paper shows that Ethiopia has a number of green growth opportunities. Ethiopia can
increase agricultural output through improved farm productivity rather than area of land cultivated
by use of resource efficient approaches. These measures could achieve emissions reductions
equal to 50% of its total current level, versus a business as usual approach. The improved
productivity arising from SLLC and NLAS will contribute to the implementation of this strategy. It
will not in itself, however, reduce the increase in areas of land under cultivation as other political,
economic and social factors will influence the achievement of the strategy objectives.
Land registration and administration also contributes to the environmental integrity of farmland as
farmers’ propensity to invest in their land improves (FAO, 2008). The experience in Rwanda has
shown that within two years of the registration, twice as many farmers in the trial areas (where
registration had taken place) had installed or rehabilitated soil conservation structures as those in
the control areas.cclxxiv Other studies in developing countries also show positive impacts of land
certification on productive, green investment through increased tenure security. cclxxv
There is also empirical evidence in Ethiopia that rural land certification has led to improved land
management and increased environmentally beneficial investment both at individual and
community level.cclxxvi. Holden et al.cclxxvii concluded that land certification has increased the
incentives for investment in trees (88%), soil and water conservation structures (86%), and
sustainable management of common property resources (66%). Similarly, the experience from
the dry land areas of eastern Amhara region confirmed that the participation of households in
112 There is also evidence that more female economic power might help reduce corruption, conflict and violence in their nations,
while promoting greater environmental sustainability and, perhaps, reduced rates of HIV/AIDS.
86
land management practices increased by 15.4% after land certification cclxxviii. Research findings in
the upper Blue Nile Highlands show insecurity of land tenure as a major factor in the reluctance
of farmers to adopt and maintain soil and water conservation measures.cclxxix The land
administration process will set a strong bio-physical options that include local level land use
planning which accordingly will guide the application of enhanced farm level water resource, farm
operation and environmental management that comprehensively will help tackling biophysical
drivers of vulnerability (poor land management, deforestation, slash and burn agriculture, monoculture cropping, slope instability, etc.). The land certification process, on the other hand, will
help to strengthen the adaptive capacity of communities to vulnerability through recognition of
rights of land use as an asset, support to productivity enhancement, facilitation of access to
credit as well as input and output market which altogether will contribute for the income
stabilization and product diversification that may be associated with local level potential income
loss associated with extreme events. Hence, the land administration and certification processes
through no-regret adaptation options will improve the resilience of farmers to climate change and
strengthen their adaptive capacity to any future of extreme climate change impacts.
I. What measures can be used to monitor Value for Money for the intervention?
Value for money (VfM) will be measured on an on-going basis throughout the duration of the
LIFT programme, drawing on the log-frame, annual reviews, mid-term and final evaluations, as
well as the programme completion report. LIFT-specific VfM indicators will be developed to
measure economy, efficiency, and effectiveness at the overall programme level and at the
intervention level. The final VfM indicators were developed in collaboration with the ITSP
appointed during the inception phase of the programme. VfM data will be reviewed by
independent evaluators in the first half of the implementation year.
The measures recommended to track VfM are suggested below. They are in accordance with
DFID’s ‘3Es’ framework.cclxxx
Economy
In driving for economy, LIFT will focus on minimising costs and inputs, while ensuring that high
quality outputs are delivered. There are two dimensions of costs that will be closely monitored
during implementation to help ensure value for money: 1) unit costs of inputs; and 2) cost ratios.
1. Unit costs of inputs that are used to deliver the different components of the programme.
These indicators will be monitored for every component of the programme.
The input cost targets are based on market rates and have been benchmarked against those of
similar programmes in Ethiopia and comparable countries to ensure they are reasonable.
The following economy indicators will be used to assess VfM on programme management and
M&E components of the programme:
 Average daily cost of international consultants: to ensure that the fee rates of international
consultants remain competitive and deliver savings to DFID, we will target an average cost for
international consultant of £476/day.
 Average daily cost of national consultants: the use of local consultants will enable savings on
fees, traveling costs and per diems as these are significantly lower than for internationals.
The target average cost for national consultants will be £251/day.
 Cost per unit of travel: economy of cost of travel will be ensured by charging DFID based on
actual costs of travel. Travel class will be economy and the target cost will be £900 for
international flights and £100 for domestic flights.
 Cost per unit of accommodation (per diem): there will be substantial accommodation costs
during the life of the programme, but agreeing preferential rates with hotels and differentiating
for per diems within Addis and outside will enable economy of this indicator. The target cost
87
for per diems will be £120 in Addis and £65 outside.
The following economy indicators will be used to assess VfM on the land registration and
administration components of the programme:
 Cost per parcel registered: this will be one of the key indicators to measure the cost
effectiveness of the programme. The estimated cost per registered parcel in LIFT will be
$5.88.113 This figure is below the cost of second level certification achieved in the REILA trials
in Ethiopia ($8.50) and lower than the cost of production of second level certification in
Rwanda ($7.56).cclxxxi This level of cost effectiveness is mainly achieved thanks to the use of
locally recruited semi-skilled labour rather than professional surveyors, an innovative
approach in land certification programmes.
The estimated cost per parcel for LIFT is significantly lower to that achieved in several other
land tenure regularisation programmes. Their costs are shown in table 26 and range between
$10.55 per parcel in Kyrgyzstan to $69 in Lesotho.
Table 26: LTR costs (second level certification) in other countries
Country
Estimated Cost Per Parcel (US$)
Rwanda
7.56
cclxxxii
6.51114
cclxxxiii
33
cclxxxiv
Lesotho
69.00
cclxxxv
Armenia
13.35
Kyrgyzstan
10.55
Moldova
46.41
Indonesia
16.3
Thailand
21.66
El Salvador
29.74
Peru (urban)
12.68
Peru (rural)
55.69
Ethiopia (REILA)
Mozambique


Source
cclxxxvi
Cost of equipment per woreda: a target cost of £8,500 will be set to equip the woredas where
the programme will be working. This will be ensured by applying DFID-approved procurement
internal processes for procuring equipment under £5,000115 and by using DFID-E’s
procurement agent for procuring equipment over that amount.
Cost of training per woreda: the target cost per woreda for training staff on the use of
maintaining the land administration system is £7,500. We will ensure that these input costs do
not exceed market rates by comparing them to those of REILA and similar programmes
undertaken in comparable countries, such as Rwanda.
113
Land certification plus related management and M&E costs.
Estimate given by REILA of $10 per parcel for 40 woredas discounted for economies of scale for 140
woredas to $6.51
114
115
Per DFID Procurement Regulations.
88
The following economy indicators will be used to assess VfM on the market-related components
of the programme. In all cases, we will ensure that these input costs do not exceed market rates
by comparing them to those of other programmes in Ethiopia or comparable countries.


Average cost of research study: the target cost per research study will be £25,000. This will
be ensured by setting up a DFID- approved selection process for the selection of service
providers (i.e. researchers) and compare the resulting costs against those of similar research
studies undertaken by LAND in Ethiopia and other donor programmes in comparable
countries.
Average cost of technical assistance interventions: the target average cost of technical
assistance in respect of M4P interventions is £52,000.
Unit costs of inputs will also be assessed at the specific interventions that are financed by LIFT
and undertaken by service providers. We will ensure that these input costs do not exceed
market rates by undertaking competitive tenders and comparing these costs to those of similar
programmes in Ethiopia or comparable countries, especially those run by donors.
2. The cost ratios of programme costs also need to be assessed to ensure that there is a
balance between the costs of the different components of the programme.
The following key cost ratios will be assessed:



Administration to overall programme cost ratio: the lower the ratio of total programme
management costs to total programme cost, the greater the economy of resource use in
establishing and effectively managing the programme. The target ratio is 5.7%.
Administration to land certification and administration component cost ratio: the target ratio is
4.7%
Administration to M4P component cost ratio: the target ratio for this indicator is 11.4%. In
assessing this ratio, it will be important to take into consideration that LIFT is a M4P
programme, so management costs need to be benchmarked against other M4P-type
programmes where management costs typically amount to over 20%. The M4P requires a
high level of facilitation, hence the high percentage of management costs.
These cost ratios will also be assessed at the level of specific interventions, where we will make
sure that the ratios remain within those of other comparable programmes in Ethiopia and
elsewhere.
Efficiency
Efficiency indicators that link inputs to outputs are critical for the success of the programme and
are based on the assumptions taken for the elaboration of the appraisal case.
The following indicators will be used to assess the efficiency of the programme:



Number of plots that are second level certified: a key factor for the success of the programme
is to provide second level certificates in all four HRS. The target value for this indicator is that
14 million parcels are second level certified.
Number of smallholder farmers that have increased security of tenure: this will be a key
indicator to assess the efficiency of the programme as this is the main objective of providing
second level certificates. The target for this indicator is that 4.55 million smallholder farmers
experience increased security of tenure.
Percentage of smallholder farmers with LIFT certified plots that are able to increase
productivity: by providing second level certificates, smallholder farmers will increase the level
of investment (and hence productivity) of their land. However, only a percentage of farmers
will be able to do so. The target value for this indicator is 30% of smallholder farmers that
have increased security of tenure due to second level certificates experience productivity
89




increases.
Number of land transactions recorded in the improved land registers: increasing the number
of transactions recorded in the land register is key to ensure that the system is operational
and therefore the benefits of certification can be maintained. The target value for this indicator
is that 1,400,000 new transactions are registered over the life of the programme.
Percentage of smallholder farmers with LIFT certified plots that are able to rent their land:
having a second level certificate should provide incentives to smallholder farmers to let out
their plots. Increased renting out of land will lead to increased productivity of the land. The
target value for this indicator is that 13% of smallholder farmers that have increased security
of tenure due to second level certificates let out their land.
Percentage of smallholder women with LIFT certified parcels that let their land: certification
will allow female headed households (FHH) to increase land rentals. The target value for this
indicator is that 30% of smallholder women in FHHs, who have increased security of tenure
due to second level certificates, let out their land.
Percentage of smallholder farmers that are able to access finance by using second level
certificates: finance is a key element to allow smallholder farmers increase the investment in
their lands. The target value for this indicator is that 7% of the smallholder farmers that have
increased security of tenure due to second level certificates are able to access finance.
Additionally, we will make sure that when the programme implements specific interventions
through third parties, contract payments are linked to results. This will allow the programme to
control the efficiency of resource use.
Effectiveness
Measuring VfM at the outcome level is about judging the effectiveness in delivering the expected
results of the programme. Effectiveness will be achieved by obtaining positive rates of return
arising from the improved efficiency. The economic appraisal shows that the programme benefits
exceed its costs.
The following indicators will be used to assess the effectiveness of the programme:
• Percentage increase in average incomes of smallholder farmers that have second level
certificates and benefit from market led interventions: this is the critical effectiveness indicator for
the success of the programme. Target: at least 20.5% per farmer.
• Increase in incomes of smallholder farmers with second level certificates due to improved
access to finance. Target: by £5.16/farmer.
• Increase in incomes of smallholder farmers with second level certificates due to improved
functioning of land rental market. Target: by £45.06/farmer.
Conclusion
Further indicators focussed on DFID’s 3E’s approach will be collected during the inception phase
of the programme to complement the ones highlighted above. An important source of information
for these will be the baseline study that will be further developed as part of the approach to
monitoring and evaluation during the inception phase (see management case), disaggregating by
gender.
Overall the benchmark for poor VfM for the programme taken as a whole will be if two or more
outcome purpose level indicators fall short of targets by more than 30% at the Mid Term. In this
case, DFID will consider significant modification to the programme course, strategies and
partnerships, including the option of stopping funding for the relevant initiatives.
90
J. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
The preferred option is Option 2, the Land Registration and Administration with Making
Markets Work for the Poor Programme with an NPV of £33,071,509 and an IRR of 24.1%.
This option has the benefit of aiming to address the policy, institutional and supporting functions
factors constraining the land sector in Ethiopia. 1.36 million farming households would see
significant changes through improved productivity. Including farmers’ dependents, the combined
number of beneficiaries will be 6.8 million people.
The conclusion of this appraisal is that DFID’s investment of up to £68.2 million in a programme
using the preferred option will deliver benefits that substantially outweigh costs and deliver value
for money. This conclusion is not solely based on the positive returns estimated through the cost
benefit analysis, but is also based on the appraisal of the way the programme will manage risk
and develop a portfolio approach. This will allow it to focus on interventions with a high chance of
success, yield high returns and produce good value for money.
Commercial Case
Direct procurement through a contracted supplier
The LIFT programme will comprise the following portfolio of activities116:
1
2
3.
4.
5.
6.
7
Activity
Supporting the government in land certification and
strengthening the land administration system with
related technical assistance
Technical Assistance for M4P interventions
Performance grants to incentivise the private sector
Training and capacity building
Research and communication
M&E and programme management
Inception Activities
Total
£ Million
51.5
3.2
3.0
1.6
1.4
6.8
0.7
68.2
Supplier (£ million)
 ITSP117 (28.2)
 DFID
Procurement
(17.9)
 GoE through Financial
Aid (8.6)
 ITSP (incl. contracted
suppliers (4.8)
 ITSP and EETSP
 ITSP, DFID (0.2)
An Implementing Technical Service Provider (ITSP) is responsible for delivering the overall
programme and will work in partnership with GoE. The lead government agency will be
MoA/RLAUD. Working through GoE structures will involve a level of financial disbursement to
regional offices, (through Ministry of Finance and Economic Development as they have the
responsibility for public financial management) responsible for rural land issues.
It is envisaged that the ITSP will lead, in collaboration with other stakeholders, on activities 3) to
5). These will include universities and technical institutes (e.g. for research, awareness
campaigns, training); Business Development Service providers (e.g. for training and capacity
building); and NGOs working in water and soil conservation, agriculture and other related fields
and private sector firms (e.g. for performance grants, technical assistance). The ITSP would
undertake a detailed assessment of the capability of these stakeholders and select those that are
more relevant for the delivery of the selected interventions. This assessment will commence
during the inception phase, when requirements will be outlined in greater detail.
116 As described in detail in the Appraisal Case Assessment of the Feasible Options – Option 2.
117 Total through ITSP over all the activities is £41.1– Finance Case.
91
An External Evaluation technical service provider (EETSP) will also be procured by DFID to
undertake the external evaluation of the programme as set out in section D of the Management
Case.
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
DFID undertook a competitive tender to recruit an ITSP under a design and implement contract.
GoE participated in the bid evaluation process. As a result of the competition, DFID selected the
HTSPE consortium as the preferred supplier to implement the programme, subject to satisfactory
performance and approval of inception phase outputs (the Forward Implementation Plan, the
draft LIFT Business Case and the Inception Report). A contract with a break clause (before the
implementation phase) is already in place.
The HTSPE consortium includes the necessary broad range of skills and experience for the LIFT
programme as follows:
HTSPE Ltd - UK





Mass Land Registration and administration in Rwanda and
elsewhere
Programme Management
M&E
Social Development
Climate Change and Environment
Nathan Associates
London Ltd. - UK

M4P
NIRAS - Finland

Land sector in Ethiopia
GIRDC - Ethiopia

Local knowledge and experience, identification of potential staff,
administrative support
The EETSP will be recruited immediately on commencement of the implementation phase.
Consideration would be given to selecting the best method for the procurement i.e. through a
tender process, conducted through DFID PrG and openly published in the OJEU or through calldown contract using Global Evaluation Framework Agreement (GEFA) put in place by DFID
central using clear and inclusive terms of reference for either of the proposed options.
Indirect procurement
During the implementation of the programme other commercial opportunities will arise whereby
the ITSP will contract local institutions and organisations, for the purposes set out above in
respect of interventions 3 to 5. The detailed requirements will be identified in the inception phase
and approved by DFID E, who will also approve the ToR, procurement processes and the award
during the implementation phase. It is not currently anticipated that any such sub-contracting to
local institutions will be required under interventions 1, 2 & 6.
B. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
DFID undertook a competitive tender to recruit a TSP under a design and implement contract
through the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) that was carried out in collaboration
with DFID’s Procurement Group (PrG). For that contract, sufficient interest was shown with
numerous companies signalling appetite and requesting information from DFID E with express
interest to bid for work.
For the remaining procurement work on overall programme evaluation, based on our use of a
mix of different consultants, sourced both from the resource centres and competitive
procurement, we expect a wide availability of suitable expertise. The adjudication of bids and
92
proposals will primarily be on the basis of ability to deliver a specified set of services to an
adequate standard at a reduced budget. It will be important though to manage the contracting
processes to ensure the maximum number of potential competitors. DFID-E will work closely with
DFID’s procurement group to determine the most appropriate route to market and which enables
DFID-E to provide responsive support. It is anticipated that there will be a sufficiently number of
competitors to ensure cost competition and innovation - recent DFID tenders for M & E have
elicited strong interest from TSPs, e.g. PEPE M & E contract.
The additional contracting for interventions 3, 4 and 5 will be through local contracting by tender
from suppliers with the necessary capacity and skills (training institutions, NGOs, private sector
etc.). Review of the reports produced under the USAID funded projects (ELAP, ELTAP), and
field interviews carried out by the ITSP indicate a wide interest from Addis Ababa, Bahir Dar, and
Haramaya Universities as well as MFIs and others working in research, training and market
facilitation. These assessments will be refined through the market assessment process in the
inception and immediately on commencement of the implementation, through which the
engagement with the market will commence immediately.
C. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial advantage for
DFID?
LIFT is a design and implement programme with a contract in place through OJEU. This decision
was undertaken for two reasons. First, it allowed DFID to keep pace with the Government’s
established schedule for second-stage certification; and second, the faster pace enabled us to
better deliver on our anticipated results within the Operational Plan period.
As outlined above, a tender process involving open competition between several technical
service providers has been completed. Scrutiny of fee rates has ensured that the winning bid
represented VfM and was the most commercially advantageous design for DFID. Additional
consultancy time was negotiated at no extra cost to DFID during inception. Before proceeding to
implementation, further scrutiny will be applied to any revision in the costs set out by the bidder
for that phase and in line with the economy VfM indicators. Break-points will be included in the
implementation phase, and DFID will consider the option of retendering if VfM is not being
achieved.
Downstream procurement will be managed largely by DFID’s Procurement Agent and will be
subject to DFID rules and monitoring.
At implementation phase, the most suitable staff will be recruited from a wide pool of available
experts at both international and national level, though continuity of some of the staff will be
maintained from the inception phase. The level of Ethiopian staff used to deliver LIFT will steadily
increase throughout the programme and this will not only deliver efficiency and sustainability but
reduce the fee and travel costs associated with international consultants and ensure transfer of
knowledge and skills.
As stated above, the additional contracting for interventions 3 to 5 will be through local tenders
from identified suppliers with the necessary capacity and skills (training institutions, NGOs,
private sector etc.). The use of local suppliers will reduce international cost and the close vetting
of suppliers’ capacity will ensure value for money.
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value added and how
will we measure and improve this?
The key cost drivers by intervention are as follows:
93
Table 27: Key cost drivers of the different interventions
Intervention
Key cost drivers
Second
Level
Certification
Land
Land Administration
Technical Assistance for
M4P Interventions
Performance Grants
Training
building
and
capacity
Research
communication
and
M&E
Programme Management
Challenges and Mitigation
Local and international consultants
Local field staff through woredas
Field materials
Aerial survey costs
Purchase of vehicles
Vehicle running costs
Purchase of computers and equipment
Local and international consultants
Purchase of computers and equipment
Rehabilitation of offices.
Local and international consultants.
Local and international consultants
Grants to NGOs, companies etc.
Communication of results
Local and international consultants
Training institutions
Individuals
research
and
institutions
Local and international consultants
Survey teams
Local and international consultants
Office costs
1. Consultants’ costs – indicative
costs have been agreed following
completion
of
open
tender
procedure
and
negotiation.
Implementation budget will be
scrutinised by DFID against local
and international market.
2. Local field and survey staff – the
challenge is to avoid paying more
than market and increases through
inflation. Former will be addressed
through comparison with what GoE
pays. Inflation built into budget.
3. Purchase of equipment and
materials. Challenge: Poor/corrupt
purchasing. Mitigation: Equipment
and bulk materials will be procured
by DFID, through our prescribed
procedures.
for
4. Aerial survey costs are likely to
take up a considerable amount of
the budget.
This might be
mitigated through arrangements
with a supplier such as Google.
The anticipated staff resources (international and local consultants contracted by the ITSP) over
the programme are 800,000 person days costing £24.4 million (£30 per day)118. Additionally, the
cost of employing local staff through the woredas to undertake land registration will be some
1,750,000 days costing £7 million (£4 per day).
DFID staff resources comprising PSD staff (50% of PSD A2L lead adviser and part of the time of
another PSD A2 adviser) and input from the A1 team leader and support staff will be dedicated to
oversee programme implementation and ensure delivery of results and VfM.
Value will be added by:



Using an appropriate mix of national and international consultants. Locally contracted staff
will comprise the bulk of the field staff for the land component of LIFT. International
consultants will only be used for senior technical assistance if no suitably skilled Ethiopian
experts are available. It is expected that international consultants will be gradually phased out
and replaced by local ones.
Proactively sharing knowledge with other donors and GoE stakeholders via the Land
Administration and Use Task Team (LAUTT).
Establishing links and partnerships to identify synergies and areas for rationalisation or
efficiency savings, such as LAND (legislation and capacity building), REILA (development of
land certification systems) and PEPE (working together to improve access to credit).
118 Indicative budget for implementation in ITSP contract.
94








Drawing on field trials already conducted by other donors to inform the implementation phase.
Using dynamic and flexible approaches to second stage land certification and ‘learning by
doing’. Lessons learnt from one woreda or regional state will be applied to others. The ITSP
will seek to improve their processes accordingly to make them more efficient and more costeffective as the implementation progresses.
Using appropriate and innovative technology to ensure that administrative costs are efficient
and that LIFT is aligned to GoE’s proposed nationwide Rural Land Administration Information
System (the GoE is currently tendering the RLAIS development work).
Using project management processes that maximise VfM, such as decentralisation of
operations to woredas and results-based management.
Ensuring that market trials are promptly terminated where they show that they are not
achieving the required aims.
Keeping overhead costs within maximum limits, as advised by DFID’s Procurement Group.
Travel and expenses will be aligned with best practice within DFID.
Making use of good relationships with key local suppliers through the ITSP consortium’s local
partner. This means that small items can be procured locally at a fair cost.
Use of output based payment measures in the ITSP contract.
Efficiency savings (and/or cost increases) will be reported in the programme quarterly and annual
reports. These will be linked with comparisons of budgeted costs per output in order to measure
additional value added.
E. How will the contract be structured and how will contract & supplier performance be
managed through the life of the intervention?
The ITSP and EETSP contracts will be supported by clear ToR with tangible, quantifiable
deliverables for which the service provider can be held accountable. The ToR will be deepened
by the TSPs through the inception report and the annual implementation work plans which will be
the mechanisms to drive and monitor progress towards outputs.
In addition, the following supplier performance monitoring measures will be included (as
appropriate):
 Key performance indicators (KPI) and targets to measure performance against agreed
outputs will be developed. These KPIs will be directly related to the log frame.
 There will be a formal contract management process to address off-track or unsatisfactory
performance, to verify that an acceptable standard of work has been completed and as a
mechanism for agreeing revised outputs and timelines. This will entail formal meetings per
quarter with DFID Ethiopia and PrG for contract management. Both parties will agree
minutes and actions from these meetings in writing.
 Output-based payments will be used where congruent with log frame deliverables and
timescales, otherwise milestone-based payments will be used as appropriate. The specific
arrangements will be agreed prior to the implementation phase.
 There is a break clause in the contract after the six month inception phase and at the midpoint (i.e. after 3 years); DFID will additionally review the contract on an annual basis.
 The contract will include flexibility to enable the service provider to manage risk and cope with
future changes to the programme. DFID will reserve the right to scale the programme up or
down based on performance, and to terminate the contract if performance is unsatisfactory.
Delivery through a third party entity (multilateral organisation; civil society organisation or
support to government)
A. Delivery through an external service provider
95
The main delivery channel will be through the already contracted ITSP, who will however work
through other organisations to obtain delivery of results. The most important of these is working
through the regions and woredas to deliver second level certification. Currently it is
anticipated that some funds will be directed to the regions for onward transmission to the
woredas for utilisation in the field work (see C below).
Financial Aid to Government
As the relevant political and administrative authority at the local level, the woreda must have
ownership of the certification process and therefore will be the main implementer of 2 nd level
certification LIFT. Consideration has been given to the advantages and disadvantages of using
financial aid to channel some funds through the regions and woredas and this is summarised
below. The amount under consideration would entail up to 12% of the total programme budget.
Financial aid will increase ownership and accountabilityaccountability, and ultimately
sustainability of the land administration system, particularly at the regional and woreda level, as
it will ensure that activities under LIFT will be formally incorporated in government work plans
and budget and therefore their delivery agreement. This will help increase their commitment in
the land registration process as they will become implementers themselves with a higher stake in
delivering results to schedule.
Currently the land administration system is not being maintained and this is likely to continue
where LIFT will not operate. A core component of the LIFT programme is the development and
implementation of a sustainable land administration system that will institutionalise the results of
the certification process. The use of financial aid will encourage the inclusion of certification into
work programmes which will prioritise the work against other tasks in the land sector, and
promote the recognition of the importance of sustaining the system.
This modality is supported by the experience of the DFID land certification programme in
Rwanda, where the Districts were not consistently involved in the process, partly because of lack
of financial aid, and ownership levels were in many cases low. This has resulted in concerns over
sustainability of the administration system which has had to be separately addressed by
Government of Rwanda.
Under the FA option, GoE officials involved in implementation, management and financial
management will build their managerial/administrative and financial capacity. Under a nonFA option, these skills may be partially lost, both when LIFT stops operating in a given area, and
at programme end. Also, this option will allow funds to go through government to enable the right
systems, including financial ones, to be strengthened. This will contribute to the sustainability of
programme results.
DFID is committed to working with both the federal and regional Governments to deliver shared
goals. LIFT would be covering up to 25% of the targeted Woredas, assisting GoE to meet its
target of completing land certification in all of them.
Under the FA option, value for money will be higher than under the non-financial aid option; as
additional cost will be incurred through non FA (additional administrators will be required to
manage the funds that would have been absorbed by the existing staff and system within the
GoE at no cost as well as additional management fee charged by ITSP) 119. Furthermore,
evidence from similar arrangements would suggest that the ITSP will end up paying higher than
119 Under non FA each of the 28 technical support teams will require an accounts assistant with additional capacity at regional and
central level, perhaps a total of 34 at that level plus an additional accountant, at an additional cost of up to £500,000 over the project
life. A management fee of (say) 2% for transfers of non FA of £10 million (say) would cost a further £200,000.
96
GoE salaries, making it difficult for the recruits to easily be absorbed into the GoE post LIFT
(although potentially making them more efficient).
Using the FA entails a higher financial risk, including possible corruption associated with
government officersinvolved in land. However, Ethiopia has relatively good and improving
financial systems for its level of development, has an expanding audit coverage and has
demonstrated action on corruption charges. Fiduciary assessments have enabled this to be the
channel used for the majority of DFID’s present funding for some of its main programmes such
as Protection of Basic Services and Productive Safety Nets Programme. The financial risk will be
mitigated by the measures set out in section G below.
Under non-FA the financial risk will be lower as all funds will go through the ITSP though this will
be at the expense of VfM as noted above.
However, if at any point FA is considered less suitable in Ethiopia (e.g. following judgments
arising from the Partnership Principle assessment), LIFT could shift to the non-FA option (albeit
with the caveats on effectiveness and sustainability outlined above.)
Administratively, FA will require DFID to update to the annual partnership principles
assessment as necessary, review its overall fiduciary risk assessment (next one due in 2014)
and determine if specific assessment is required for the MoA (which could be jointly undertaken
with the Productive Safety Nets Programme) and management by DFID of the two payments
(GoE, ITSP) rather than one.
Having considered the above and, given the risk mitigation and the positive developmental
benefits of using the FA option, - especially ownership, sustainability, value for money and
capacity building, which significantly outweigh the negatives the FA approach, which is also
the GoE preferred option, has been adopted, recognising that we could revert to non-financial
aid at a future date if circumstances so require. Disbursement under the FA will be made based
on performance against agreed annual work plan. See section D of the financial case and
section A of the management section for more detail. This will be clearly articulated in the
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the budget beyond the 2.5 year break point put in as
indicative pending the mid-term review.
The regions have experience in second stage certification through field trials but not in mass
registration. The capacity of the woredas to implement a mass certification system is also low as
stated in the appraisal case, the financial case and below in the review of financial management.
The programme design includes substantial support to the woredas and regions to ensure that
programme objectives are met and to mitigate the risk of using this delivery channel.
Procurement risk will be eliminated as neither the woreda or the region will procure under LIFT
funding.
The implementation progress will be governed by agreed action plans against which progress will
be monitored and VfM identified. Lessons learnt in one woreda will be applied in others to drive
lower costs and greater efficiency. Cost estimates from woredas and regions will be scrutinised
and reduced as appropriate to ensure costs are reasonable.
Other Channels
Other channels to be used are NGOs, private companies, and training institutions to deliver
services for interventions 3 to 5 as identified in the introduction to this case. By using these
channels for delivery, local knowledge is leveraged, while at the same time transferring skills
where appropriate. In the case of market interventions, the providers will be those who are
active in the market and likely to be users of the methodologies in the future, and therefore bring
sustainability to the results.
97
These service providers will be shortlisted for tendering on the basis of their proven track record
in producing quality results to mitigate capacity risks, due diligence having been carried out by
the ITSP in all cases. Where the work required is highly innovative and providers with all the
relevant experience are not available, then the ITSP will work closely with them to ensure the
timely delivery of quality results, and to transfer skills. Providers will be recruited by the ITSP
through competitive tender procedures in line with DFID regulations and the ITSP will obtain
DFID approval to the procurement and award processes, including the negotiation of tendered
costs.
There will be no goods-procurement risk as it is not anticipated that the service providers will be
required to procure.
B. Is there an opportunity to negotiate on anticipated costs?
Fee rates for the ITSP consultants have already been subject to negotiation under the tender
process for the design stage with further negotiation to take place at the end of the inception
period when the needs have been clearly defined, including the mix of experts. The team of
consultants and their fee rates will also be subject to on-going review over the lifetime of the
programme (see section D above). Other costs will be similarly scrutinised during preparation of
the implementation contract amendment and agreement of annual budgets thereafter.
DFID may be able to achieve synergies between LIFT and other programmes that DFID is
supporting through the MoA, such as the multi-donor PSNP as well as other DFID programmes
in Ethiopia, to achieve cost savings.
C. Financial Aid to Governments
Programme support to government will include provision of funds to the regional land
bureaux (through regional and woreda finance bureaux who have the financial management
mandate) to be distributed to the woredas, for employment of local field staff to implement land
registration as described in A above, amounting to up to 12% of the programme budget. The
viability of financial aid will be assessed by DFID through its annual Partnership Principles
assessments, with the requirement that we assess that GoE remains committed to the underlying
principles of our engagement before financial aid can be disbursed.
These funds will then be disbursed according to agreed annual operational plans and will be
transferred directly to regional offices for specific objectives, on a quarterly basis, requiring
accountability for use of funds before the next advance. It is not anticipated that these funds will
be used for procurement. A more detailed description of the financial transfer arrangements is
set out in the financial case.
In the event of any concerns over expenditure, the ITSP will seek to address and resolve these
quickly, through dialogue with regional offices. If necessary, DFID, in consultation with the GoE,
will step in to put in place further safeguards for future disbursements.
Regions and woredas have shown technical capacity to deliver in the small scale 2nd
certification exercises carried out to date with the support of SLMP and REILA. However none
have experience of doing so in a mass certification circumstance. As discussed in F above, they
will be supported by programme technical assistance, capacity building and quality control.
98
Financial
management
capacity
assessments have been conducted by
SLMP (2007) and PSNP (2013), which
found that Woreda accounting personnel
had already received training on how to
maintain accurate programme accounts,
and that the GoE had put in place a
double entry cash accounting system at
federal and regional level in the HRSs.
Several shortcomings have, however,
been reported in various review missions
and audits. These and other financial
risks are described in the Financial Case
together with their mitigation measures.
An Assessment of the UK’s Partnership Principles in Ethiopia
was undertaken in November 2013. The partnership principles
are:
i. Commitment to poverty reduction and the Millennium
Development Goals
ii. Respecting human rights and other international
obligations
iii. Improving public financial management, promoting good
governance and transparency and fighting corruption; and
iv. Strengthening domestic accountability
The Secretary of State approved DFID Ethiopia’s Partnership
Principles Assessment (PPA) on 15th November 2013. The
PPA headline was that: “We assess the Government of
Ethiopia remains committed to the underlying principles of our
engagement. However, we continue to have concerns with
regard to civil and political human rights. We will continue to
monitor human rights closely, with regular FCO-DFID
meetings to assess progress, reporting to DFID and FCO
ministers. We will also continue to raise concerns with the
Government of Ethiopia, including through Ministerial
engagement, our bilateral UK-Ethiopia human rights dialogue
and together with international partners. We continue to look
for ways to support improvements in civil and political rights;
will assess and seek to mitigate human rights risks to
successful implementation of our programmes, and take a ‘do
no harm’ approach in our programmes
We regularly update our PP assessments and any
disbursement of financial aid will be made after consideration
of an updated PPA.
99
Financial Case
A. Who are the recipients of all proposed payments?
HTSPE, as the ITSP is the main recipients of payments (£36.2million). DFID will also however
channel payments with arrangements outlined in section D:
 On the recommendation of the ITSP, and with the agreement of MoA, to the regional land
bureaux via MOFED for onward transmission to regions and woredas to carry out programme
activities (£8.6 million).
 To other service providers as described in the commercial case (£4.8 million).
 To DFID procurement agent for major purchases under direct procurement including the
EETSP (£17.9 million)
The funds process is outlined below:
Figure 3: Flow of payments from DFID
DFID Procurement
Agent
DFID
MOFED
HTSPE
Amhara Bureau of
Environmental Protection,
Land Administration & Use
Woreda
Oromia Bureau of Rural
Lands &
Environmental Protection
Woreda
Tigray Environmental
Protection, Land
Administration & Use Agency
Payments for
Performance Grants,
research etc.
SNNPR Natural Resources &
Environmental Protection
Agency
Woreda
Woreda
B. What are the costs to be incurred directly by DFID?
DFID will incur the bulk of the programme costs with a contribution of £68.2m; £67.51m for the
implementation phase and £0.69m for inception phase.
DFID E had indicatively allocated £15m within the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR)
period during the Bilateral Aid Review for this programme. It is now intended to extend the period
of the programme to 6.33 years and budget size allowing for the preparation and testing of the
design before scaling up to deliver the impact intended. The rationale for the funding level is
included in Step 5 of the options identification section of the Appraisal Case.
However, the profiling has changed due to delays in procuring and setting up the ITSP.
Consequently, costs during the CSR period are likely to be £11.2 million with the remainder of the
costs – up to £57 million – being incurred subsequently.
The main costs to be incurred by DFID during implementation phase are set out in the table in
section F following. The breakdown of the costs are estimates which will be refined during the
finalisation of the inception phase report of the programme and contract negotiation.
100
C. What are the costs to be incurred by third party organisations?
The major third party costs that will contribute to the programme are the contributions of the
federal, regional and woreda governments. These costs will be in the form of:
1.Incremental costs to be provided specifically for programme implementation and sustainability
in the form of additional staff, allowances and other supervisory expenses estimated by the ITSP
as being approximately £2.3 million over the programme period.
2. Non-monetary contributions in the form of office space, already employed staff, and access to
previously procured aerial photography120. This has been estimated at a cost of approximately
£2.9 million.
LAND, REILA and SLMP 2 will also provide a total of £20.2m to support land activities in Ethiopia.
Other costs may be incurred by 3rd party organisations under LIFT such as MFIs during the
market facilitation work but this is not possible to quantify at present. The regional governments
will contribute up to £22.2 million to the wider land programme as detailed in section A of the
Appraisal case and below.
D. Does the programme involve financial aid to governments? If so, please define the
arrangements in detail.
As described in the Commercial Case, DFID will transfer funds to the regional land bureaux,
through MOFED (without passing through the ITSP), for onward transmission to the woredas to
fund the employment of local field staff to implement land registration. Disbursements will be
made following consideration of an updated assessment of GoE’s commitment to the UK’s
Partnership Principles (see the Commercial Case). It is not anticipated that these funds will be
used for procurement.
While transfers will be made directly to MoFED by DFID on receipt of assurances that the
previous funds have been appropriately used the transfer to the Regions/woredas by MoFED will
be authorised by MoA in line with the agreed woreda and regional budgets and work plans.
The regions will open dedicated accounts for the LIFT funds as will the woredas. No transfers will
be made until such accounts are open and the funds will be disbursed according to agreed
annual operational plans for specific objectives, on a quarterly basis. The transfers will be made
on the assurance of the ITSP that any previous advance has been accounted for, the funds have
been appropriately used, and work plan targets have been met. GoE will be responsible to DFID
for the accountability for these funds but the ITSP will be responsible for advising DFID on the
accountability and developing mechanisms to mitigate risk. It will be the responsibility of the
regions to ensure that the full accountability from the woredas is received and further transfers will
not be made if one woreda has not satisfactorily accounted. In case of inappropriate use of funds,
DFID will seek to return of funds in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development, who has the overall mandate and responsibility of public financial management.
At woreda level there are existing accounting systems in place that have been used on both the
SLMP and PSNP. In order to ensure adequacy of these systems, the ITSP will, however, provide
capacity building for regional and woreda staff on the use and accounting for the funds and an
internal auditor will be employed by the ITSP to monitor procedural compliance. The ITSP will
report spending by woredas in quarterly reports to DFID.
120 It is anticipated that LIFT will initially make use of GoE aerial photography while procuring additional imagery to ensure all 140
woredas will be covered.
101
E. Is the required funding available through current resource allocation or via a bid from
contingency? Will it be funded through capital/programme/admin?
The funding for LIFT to March 2015 is available through DFID Ethiopia’s current programme
allocation. It is expected that funding will be available beyond 2015 as part of future budget
allocations. DFID has allocated a maximum of £68.2m over 6.33 years from April 2013 to July
2019, this is split between a 10-month inception phase (£0.69m) and a 66-month implementation
phase (up to £67.51m). This has already been flagged to Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) and
DFID’s Finance and Corporate Performance Division (FCPD) and both are content with it pending
approval.
Table 28 following sets out the funding from CDEL and RDEL resources.
F. What is the profile of estimated costs? How will you work to ensure accurate
forecasting?
As stated, the total estimated budget of the programme is up to a maximum of £68.2m over 6.33
years. The level of certainty associated with these costs is medium as, while the total amounts
for each intervention are relatively well established, their incidence over the project life requires
further analysis.
The figures in the table overleaf will be refined during the inception period when detailed work
plans will be prepared by the ITSP which will be a basis for accurate forecasts. These forecasts
will be reviewed quarterly during the implementation phase, and updated as appropriate.
The costs are derived from the appraisal case and significant items in the cost structure are:

Capital costs are envisaged to total £12.0 million of which major items are:
 Aerial photography121
 124 vehicles122
 Computers and other equipment for Regions, woredas, land certification
 Minor rehabilitation of 140 woreda land Offices.
 Cost per parcel demarcated is in line with that incurred in similar work in
lower than that reported by the REILA project in trials.
 Programme management costs are 6% of the budget.
£5.1 million
£4.2 million
£2.0 million
£700,000
Rwanda and
The following table sets out the estimated costs of the programme to FY 2018/19. The costs for
the first and second years of the programme and the relevant input sector codes are contained
below in Annex 8.
Financial forecasts will be based on agreed work plans. A detailed programme budget with, for
example, expected unit costs, will be used to calculate the expected expenditure and forecasts
over six month periods.
In collaboration with the Government/Information Network Security Agency.
122 It is anticipated that there will be certification going on in 28 woredas at any one time, with four vehicles being provided to each
field teams demarcating parcels in each woreda (112 vehicles). A further 8 vehicles will be used by the ITSP regional coordinators’
team and 4 will be for head office/back up use. Each batch of procurement of the vehicles will be subjected to approval from MOFEF
121
102
Table 28: Estimated costs of the programme per year (£)
Year to 31st March
Compone
nt
2nd level
land cert’n
Land
administra
tion
TA
for
Markets
and Policy
Performan
ce grants
Training &
capacity
building
Research
& Comm’n
M and E
Prog.
Manag’nt
Inception
Period
Total
2014
2015
2016
4 months
2017
2018
2019
to 07/19
Total
% of
total
CDEL
RDEL
57,000
208,774
4,872,000
4,028,499
3,062,001
5,418,629
13,875
8,153,251
2,022,500
9,934,691
6,600
9,917,655
0
805,432
10,033,976
38,466,931
Total
265,774
8,900,499
8,480,630
8,167,126
11,957,191
9,924,255
805,432
48,500,907
CDEL
RDEL
0
22,305
192,000
247,015
288,000
229,041
407,040
197,977
419,760
201,097
432,480
201,564
114,480
38,513
1,853,760
1,137,512
Total
22,305
439,015
517,041
605,017
620,857
634,044
152,993
2,991,272
0.04
RDEL
48,890
653,386
623,690
606,201
605,767
602,388
59,678
3,200,000
0.05
RDEL
0
458,333
614,583
625,000
625,000
625,000
52,083
3,000,000
0.04
RDEL
0
183,333
337,500
350,000
350,000
350,000
29,167
1,600,000
0.02
RDEL
0
187,881
290,612
297,649
300,000
298,834
25,023
1,400,000
0.02
RDEL
139,400
546,000
240,084
208,006
517,105
582,807
669,234
2,902,636
0.04
CDEL
RDEL
0
98,389
100,000
642,217
1,000
731,361
1,000
697,327
1,000
732,194
1,000
688,892
0
218,178
104,000
3,808,559
Total
98,389
742,217
732,361
698,327
733,194
689,892
218,178
3,912,559
CDEL
RDEL
2,000
690,269
Total
692,269
0
0
0
0
0
0
692,269
0.01
CDEL
RDEL
59,000
1,208,027
5,164,000
6,946,665
3,351,001
8,485,500
421,915
11,135,411
2,443,260
13,265,854
440,080
13,267,140
114,480
1,897,309
11,993,736
56,205,907
0.18
0.82
Total
1,267,027
12,110,665
11,836,501
11,557,326
15,709,114
13,707,220
2,011,789
68,199,643
1.00
0.71
0.06
2,000
690,269
It should be noted that included in 2019/20 is £650,000 in respect of the impact assessment to be
carried out 5 years after the end of the programme (20124/25).
G. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
Procurement
The risk of fraud or inefficiency in procurement processes is low. DFID’s Procurement Agent will
be responsible for all large and international procurement and is mandated to work within DFID’s
standard procurement guidelines. The ITSP will undertake, manage and monitor small-scale
procurement in-country (not exceeding £113,057, as stipulated by DFID), in accordance with best
international practice.
Corruption and financial mismanagement
The risk of corruption and financial mismanagement must be managed at the overarching service
provider’s level, when working through regional and woreda offices as well as other parties.
1. Risk at service provider level
The risk of corruption and financial mismanagement by the ITSP consortium is low. The ITSP
provided audited accounts under the tender process, is accredited to ISO 9001:2008, and will
provide evidence that all necessary insurances, code of ethics, anti-corruption and anti-bribery
103
policies are in place.
The ITSP will draft a financial management manual (FMM) before the implementation phase to
mitigate and monitor financial risk throughout the programme life. The FMM will bring together all
aspects of the processes required to manage the programme finances effectively, including those
passed through sub-contractors. The purpose of the FMM is to ensure that:



Accurate financial information to implement and supervise the programme is available and
reported to the relevant stakeholders in line with the programme requirements.
Stakeholders can check that funds have been used efficiently and for approved purposes,
showing transparency at all times.
Robust systems are in place that will deter corruption, bribery and fraud, as well as providing
internal financial controls that allow the team to quickly identify anomalies.
2. Risk at the level of GoE regional and woreda offices
DFID Ethiopia’s general assessment is “Overall, DFID’s Fiduciary Risk Assessment determines
that the level of fiduciary and corruption risk in Ethiopia remains moderate. Recent analysis
suggests that the public finance management (PFM) system is stronger than in any African
country of comparable size and complexity, bar South Africa – and that PFM improvements in
Ethiopia are moving at a faster than average pace when compared with the 41 countries for which
data is available.”cclxxxvii
The MoA has assumed overall responsibility for financial management on the SLMP. A financial
management assessment was conducted in October 2007, in accordance with WB
guidelines.cclxxxviii It found that woreda accounting personnel had already received training on how
to maintain accurate programme accounts. GoE had put in place a cash accounting system at
federal level and also at regional level in Amhara, Tigray, SNNPR and Oromia.
The independent audit of the PSNP in 2012 also found that all external financing had been used
for intended purposes and “with due attention to economy and efficiency”. There were, however,
major concerns over weaknesses at woreda level (e.g. in some woredas no bank reconciliations
had been prepared) and MoA levels as a result of inadequate supervision and control. [ii]
Based on the above, the financial risk is considered to be medium at this level.
These risks will be mitigated through capacity building of woreda and regions, whereby the
programme will provide training to management and accounting staff on the procedures to be
followed, the allowable use of funds, and conditions for completion of returns and reimbursement.
This will be linked to a robust internal audit function of the ITSP that will follow up processes in
the woredas and regions to ensure controls are maintained, provide early identification of misuse,
and repeat training to address weaknesses identified. This training, checks and internal audit will
supplement, but not replace, existing GoE external and internal functions. Training will also be
given to MoA to ensure that they are aware of the accounting requirements to facilitate their
monitoring of the regions. Failures to maintain records and provide appropriate evidence will
result in funds not being released to woredas. In addition, due to the rating, funds will be
disbursed on quarterly bases to minimise the risk.
3. Risk from third parties
It is anticipated that the programme will make performance grants to third parties to stimulate
rural land sector activities. The risk of misuse or mismanagement of funds will be addressed by;
due diligence of the recipients; ensuring all funds are accounted for before releasing more;
minimising the amounts of funds released to reduce risk levels.
104
Due diligence on LIFT
Third parties receiving funding through the market facilitation component, such as NGOs, training
institutions and other organisations will be subject to due diligence where appropriate.
H. How will expenditure be monitored, reported and accounted for?
Accounting, recording, reporting and audit functions will use systems and procedures, agreed
with the ITSP, in line with DFID best practice. DFID will carry out rigorous forecasting, monitoring
and accounting of expenditure and assets using the ARIES system and standard DFID E
procedures.
Financial reporting
The ITSP will submit reports on financial performance on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis to
DFID. These reports will include details of activities implemented and expenditure since the
previous reporting period. The ITSP will also submit the activity plan for the next reporting period,
with accurate financial forecasts in line with DFID best practice. The ITSP contract will specify
that release of funds will be contingent on receipt of timely and quality reports. Financial reporting
and forecasting will be a standing agenda item at regular management meetings of DFID and the
ITSP.
Transparency and accessibility of information
The ITSP will require DFID approval for all strategic decisions, in particular changes to budget
and deviations from work plans. Full financial records will be kept and payment claims will be
verified against receipts. To increase transparency and allow DFID to monitor and analyse the
LIFT programme independently of formal reporting, DFID will be able to log in to the ITSP’s
dedicated MIS to view financial reports relating to the programme.
Accounting and auditing
Accounting and auditing will be the responsibility of ITSP using financial management systems,
policies and procedures agreed with DFID in line with best practice. Further, DFID will make sure
that the ITSP has in place for the programme an appropriate accounting system, strong internal
control measures, a cash flow management system, and financial and budget management
systems. Operation of the financial systems will be through a programme administration and
finance unit.
The ITSP will carry out regular internal audit checks at its own expense and will make available to
DFID reports from these exercises together with the reports of the statutory audit of the
company’s accounts. The programme internal auditor will scrutinise systems in operation in third
party contractors to ensure being appropriately designed and operated. The Government/Ministry
of Finance and Economic Development will provide internal audit report on DFID’s financial
assistance while the Office of Federal Auditor General (OFAG) would carry out the external audit.
In addition, there will be DFID funded external audit of the overall programme that assesses both
the ITSP and Government’s financial performance.
Asset management
Assets procured through the funds released to this programme are attributable to DFID and will
be tracked and monitored. An asset register will be created by the ITSP, updated regularly and
audited as part of the external audit. This will include IT equipment, vehicles and equipment.
Computers and other such assets to maintain the land administration system will be used by
woreda offices during the programme life, and then will be disposed of at the end of the
programme as directed by DFID’s rules and regulations. The decision as to whether to retain or
dispose of the remaining assets (and how) at the programme end will be subject to the approval
of DFID.
105
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
Following an open tender process, the HTSPE consortium has been contracted as the ITSP to
deliver the LIFT programme and will report to DFID E, which is ultimately responsible for the
programme.
MoA is responsible for programme leadership, technical oversight and quality control, while
overall oversight is the responsibility of DFID E, who will have final approval of all work plans
and budgets for the regional and woreda governments’ use of financial aid funding.
The Project Steering Committee (PSC), co-chaired by MoA and DFID will approve overall work
plans and review quarterly and annual progress reports. Membership will include the Director
RLAUD, heads of regional bureaux and agencies responsible for rural land, representatives
from the Ministry of Women, Youth and Children and MoFED, the LIFT management, and
other relevant agencies as required from time to time.
Regional Programme Co-ordinating Committees (RPCC) and Woreda Implementation
Committees (WIC) will provide further instruments to ensure Government leadership and
technical oversight of the programme.
The ITSP will prepare monthly, quarterly and annual reports, which will be reviewed by
MoA/RLAUD before presentation to DFID E. Quarterly and annual reports will be presented to
the PSC. They will also be shared with the Land Administration and Use Technical Team, a
stakeholder forum, which will provide a wider advisory governance structure.
LIFT will work through existing GoE structures to implement LIFT and achieve its objectives: at
federal level, LIFT will work with MoA/RLAUD; with the regional land bureaux; and at woreda
and kebele level with and through woreda offices.
While the lead government agency,
responsible for co-ordination and policy setting would be the MoA/RLAUD, the programme
would be implemented by the land administration bureaux/offices/desks at the regional and
woreda levels.
A second TSP (EETSP) will be contracted immediately on programme commencement by
DFID to carry out external reviews and evaluations, reporting to DFID but assisted by the
ITSP.
RLAUD will represent MoA on land technical policy issues, guiding the overall programme
implementation, co-ordinating the regional and woreda involvement in the programme, and
guiding the LIFT programme activities to ensure that the programme is effective and
economical in meeting MoA’s needs within the programme objectives. In doing so it will
develop with the ITSP operational plans, and agree the monthly, quarterly and annual reports
before they are formally submitted to DFID and/or the PSC. RLAUD will provide technical staff
to quality control, participate in, and advise on LIFT processes.
The management structure will be elaborated at inception phase, but is envisaged as follows:
106
Figure 4: LIFT Management Structure
The woreda implementation teams will work at kebele level to involve farmers and
smallholders in land certification processes. The number of woredas that LIFT will cover within
each of the four states will be decided at inception phase, and the selection process will be
based on transparent criteria that will be acceptable to both DFID and GoE.
Roles and responsibilities
During the implementation phase, activities have to be carried out at federal level and in four
regional states under different regulatory, institutional and cultural settings. Given these
differences, the capacity development, communications strategy and market interventions will
need to be tailored to each state. This requires a decentralised and, over time, increasingly
devolved management structure. Envisaged roles and responsibilities at each level are listed
below, but are indicative at this stage.
Core ITSP Management Team & Technical Advisory & Capacity Development Team
Working with RLAUD on






Overall programme management, budgeting, forecasting, and monitoring activities to
deliver programme outputs.
Reporting to DFID and PSC.
Monitoring, coordinating and analysing regional activities, budgets and expenditure
Support development of strategies for certification and administration in the regional states
Aligning federal and regional land administration information systems
Design of market systems activities and monitoring their implementation by the regions
107






Development of training and capacity building activities
Knowledge management and liaison with other land stakeholders (through LAUTT)
Management of research activities
Design of overarching communications strategy
Carrying out of cross cutting policy initiatives
Support development and implementation of strategies on gender and disadvantaged
groups, environment and climate risks and conflict management
ITSP Regional Coordinator & Technical Support Team
Working with the Regional bureaux in:
 Management of certification and land administration related activities in the woredas
 Management of enhanced market systems activities
 Reporting to the RPCC.
 Stakeholder management at regional state level
 Development and implementation of training and capacity building activities
 Co-ordinate research activities at regional level
 Oversight the proper consideration and implementation of cross cutting issues (Gender,
Environment and Climate Change, Conflict, etc. ) in implementation
 Regular programme monitoring
ITSP Woreda Implementation Teams
Working with the Woreda officials on
 Stakeholder management at woreda and kebele level
 Support to Implementation of certification and land administration related activities
 Reporting to the WIC
 Implementation of activities to enhance markets
 Implementation of training and capacity building activities
ITSP will work closely with the EETSP to ensure that the latter’s roles and responsibilities set
out in section D below are achieved.
Oversight
General
As mentioned above MoA is responsible for programme leadership, technical oversight and
quality control, while overall oversight is the responsibility of DFID E, who will have final
approval of all work plans and budgets for the regional and woreda governments’ use of
financial aid funding.
DFID’s resources specifically deployed to manage and oversee ITSP implementation of the
programme will include 50% of PSD A2L adviser, part of the time of another PSD A2 adviser,
A1 team leader and Programme Management support staff.123 The ITSP team will provide
monthly reports on activities and formal quarterly and annual reports through RLAUD to DFID
E. Operational plans will be similarly developed with RLAUD for DFID E review. All plans and
reports will be presented to the PSC for approval.
The LAUTT will be the advisory committee to LIFT. LAUTT is an advisory group which brings
together donors and GoE stakeholders in land, in order to share experiences and ensure
effective coordination of interventions. The LAUTT but will be an instrument for wider
123
DFID staff costs in respect of programme supervision sit outside the programme as non-attributable.
108
stakeholder engagement.
Backstopping
Staff from the ITSP’s headquarters will provide a backstopping / quality assurance role and will
ensure continuity between inception and implementation phase. While the programme will
involve a degree of flexibility during implementation, the ITSP will seek DFID E approval
accordingly for any changes to the agreed work plan and all high-level strategic decisions.
Monitoring and assessing performance
DFID will conduct on-going monitoring throughout the lifetime of the programme in terms of
contract management, supplier performance and progress against log frame outputs. This will
include formal quarterly meetings, ad-hoc reviews and annual reviews. (Arrangements for
monitoring, measuring and evaluating results are set out in section D.) As previously stated,
the ITSP will report to DFID and communicate progress to RLAUD. The woreda offices will
manage the performance of the woreda and kebele implementation staff.
In addition to team performance, MIS design and LIFT programme monitoring, the ITSP team
will also conduct results monitoring, which will build on LIFT programme monitoring of inputs,
activities and outputs by measuring the various ways in which outputs are used and what
outcomes result. Outcomes include consideration of measures more sensitive to change,
specifically relevant LIFT programme direction and evidence of needed reorientation/strengthening, directly contributing to programme strategy, and also relevant to
‘early wins’. These will be considered at relevant junctures, while those outcomes that are
expected to take longer to manifest will be assessed at later junctures in implementation, and
triangulated by the EETSP.
Measures will be twofold: 1) measuring institutional impacts associated with systems
strengthening and human resource development; and 2) measuring impacts on land tenure
regularisation intended outcomes and results. For the latter, DFID’s commitment to M4P, and
the LIFT Programme’s alignment with this commitment, requires that monitoring and
evaluation systems provide intelligence to act as a quick feedback loop for programme
implementation in this regard, and programme impacts.
Break points
DFID has incorporated a break point into the contract following the six-month inception phase,
and at the mid-programme point (after 3 years) which enables it to terminate the contract if
evaluated performance is below agreed levels. DFID will ensure that contract continuation is
based on the outcome of the inception period as well as development of a clear strategy that
sets out how DFID’s objectives will be met.
Procurement
The ITSP will use DFID’s Procurement Agent, except for small-scale in-country procurement.
The ITSP will supply the Procurement Agent with detailed technical specifications of the goods
required and provide guidance on considerations of price, quality and expected delivery time.
DFID will manage the performance of the Procurement Agent. For local procurement, ITSP
will use defined procurement processes already in place to ensure compliance with DFID and
international standards (the existing quality management system is certified to ISO
9001:2008). These procurement processes will be formalised in a procurement manual.
Exit Strategy
Sustainability
DFID seeks to build sustainability during the 6.33 years of LIFT to achieve lasting impact. The
M4P approach adopted by LIFT aims to address the causes of market weaknesses, and not
just the symptoms. LIFT will act as a market facilitator, getting market players to work more
109
effectively and will not become part of the system. This means that LIFT interventions will be
relatively short term in nature and aimed at catalysing change within the rural land sector,
delivering lasting behavioural transformation.
As LIFT will strengthen the processes of the land administration system for the four
programme regions, it is expected that, in areas covered, the system will be fully functioning
when DFID support has ended, so that the benefits of land tenure security can be maintained.
The second level registration and implementation of improved land administration systems will
not, however, cover all the woredas in the HRS leaving a further 400 to be covered through
GoE and other funding sources. It is anticipated, however, that by being able to demonstrate
working processes that are delivering economically and efficiently land tenure services at the
regional level, LIFT will attract other development partners to support these interventions, both
during the life of LIFT and thereafter.
The sustaining and extending of the LIFT land governance successes will mainly be achieved
by training and capacity building of staff within the RLAUD, and the regional and woreda
offices. To this end care will also be taken not to undermine the staffing of GoE systems by
setting salaries at an appropriate level that can be sustained after programme closure.
Transaction costs of land certification will also be affordable for Ethiopian smallholders.
In addition the programme will work with the woredas to establish appropriate transaction fees
that will provide revenue to at least contribute to the costs of maintaining the land
administration system to ensure sustainability without setting them so highly that they
discourage land holders from registering their transactions.
For all M4P-specific interventions, it will be important to have a clear exit strategy so that, once
the programme comes to an end, local capability will have reached a stage whereby market
development can continue to be driven by local players. Any intervention that LIFT implements
will have to look at how the capacity of market players, or implementers, needs to improve or
change so that they are capable of continuing activities after support has been withdrawn. A
specific exit strategy will be individually tailored for each of the interventions, in order to bring
these to a close efficiently and cost-effectively. For example, if an intervention is aimed at
policy reform, then there will be no need for an exit strategy if the reform is achieved. In
contrast, an intervention to build a network of input suppliers and dealers will require an exit
strategy whereby leadership and tasks are handed over to a local stakeholder.
Where the Programme no longer provides value for money or fails to deliver
The value for money assessment in the appraisal case provides trigger points that will indicate
that the programme is not achieving the required value for money or is failing to deliver the
expected results. If one of these trigger points is reached, DFID-E with the ITSP and GoE will
attempt to identify measures through which the situation can be rectified. Where these efforts
are unsuccessful, DFID-E will inform GoE of the closure of the programme and give the
required contractual notice to the ITSP, though at the same time preparing a work plan for the
orderly closure of the programme and disposal of programme assets, in such a way that the
loss to DFID is minimised.
Where the Financial Aid mechanism fails to deliver
Where the Financial Aid mechanism is considered no longer appropriate, for reasons of failure
to account properly, or slowness in funds transfers, assessment of the partnership principles,
or other reasons, it can be suspended or amended quickly as:
 The financial aid will only be transferred to GoE on receipt of approved work plans, and
proper accounting for funds advanced. In the event of process slowing or speeding up
this will be reflected in work plans and therefore the level of transfer. There will
110
therefore be no commitment to fixed quarterly transfers by DFID.
 The MoU will include provisions for the end of financial aid in the event of the
mechanism being shown to be ineffective, the programme stopped or due to
assessment of the partnership principles.
 The certification approach entails tackling woreda by woreda – this will make it easier to
discontinue a financial aid led approach since we will not be changing the approach
within a given area half way through; rather we would initiate new woreda certification
via the non-financial aid approach.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
LIFT is judged to be medium risk with certain risks potentially having a high impact on
programme’s objectives. Risks have been identified in relation to the macro, policy, and
operational levels, including those concerning corruption, the environment and climate change,
conflict, women and the disadvantaged. They are set out in Annex 10 together with their
triggers and associated mitigation strategies. The paragraphs below highlight key potential
risks and mitigation.
Partnership Principles/Financial aid
Our current assessment of the Partnership Principles allows us to provide financial aid. The
annual assessment will be reviewed before any disbursement of financial aid to the
government under this programme. Should difficulties arise in relation to financial aid,
measures are in place to alter the aid channel with minimum disruption to programme
implementation.
Land use rights
The Government is committed to supporting small-holder and large scale commercial land in
support of more productive agriculture. Some human rights NGOs have alleged that forced
resettlement is being carried out, including to clear the way for commercial land deals (e.g. in
the case of the Commune Development Programme in the Developing Regional States or
resettlement in South Omo) and/or that commercial land deals involve inappropriate land
allocation, without adequate compensation.
LIFT will not certify land or work on land administration in the Developing Regional States or
South Omo given the lack of policy readiness for certification in those states. We have sought
to minimise the human rights risks to and from LIFT through the following measures:
 LIFT will not certify any communal, pastoral or commercial land until policies are in
place which are line with international good practice and human rights obligations;
 LIFT will not carry out land certification in districts (woredas) where land allocation is
judged to not have been properly carried out in the past, and
 LIFT will not support any large scale land acquisition.
In addition, the third component of the programme will seek to address some of the root
causes of some key human rights risks and concerns. This is likely to include work on advising
the Government of Ethiopia on how to bring policies on communal and pastoral land and
commercial land acquisition in line with international good practice and human rights
obligations. Whilst we cannot guarantee that the Government of Ethiopia would choose to
follow our recommendations, or that the resulting policies and procedures (or their
implementation) would be in accordance with such obligations, we will be able to demonstrate
that our inputs were in line with these principles and would monitor Government of Ethiopia
outputs and implementation. We would take any concerns about the final policies into account
in terms of our programme (i.e. not certifying under policies which we thought were not in line
111
with international good practice and human rights obligations) as well as broader dialogue
(including pressing for improvements and taking this into account in our review of Partnership
Principle 2).
If allegations of human rights abuses are raised in relation to the programme we would monitor
and assess these. We would ask for Government officials to assess the allegations and take
action as appropriate. If we judged that human rights abuses in relation to the programme
were systematic or widespread, we would take a view on the extent to which LIFT may be
contributing to those abuses and review our support accordingly.
Under the Ethiopian constitution and law, the State owns all land and it can be expropriated in
the interest of the country’s development. In these instances, landholders must be adequately
compensated. Greater certification of land and land transparency should mean that there
would be a good, transparent process for acquisition and affected farmers should be able to
better claim the compensation to which they are entitled. Any concerns as to whether this is
occurring in line with Ethiopian law, international good practice and human rights obligations.
The design process for LIFT assessed equity and inclusion gaps affecting vulnerable groups particularly pastoralist communities and women and girls and sought to consider and address
these as far as possible through the programme design. The impact of the programme on
these groups will be tracked throughout the programme’s lifetime.
Conflict
Land is a major source of conflict in Ethiopia. Whilst the programme itself seeks to make land
boundaries clearer with the aim of reducing conflict, there is a risk that conflict may erupt
between small-holder farmers and/or with large scale farming. To mitigate this risk the
programme will strengthen traditional and formal dispute mechanisms, conduct a conflict
assessment and support more transparent Federal and Regional land administration.
Political distortion of aid management
There is a risk that resources mobilised as part of the LIFT programme could be used to
favour individuals/groups/communities with political affiliation (e.g. the selection of districts or
individual farmers to benefit from land certification based on party membership). This risk is
increased despite Government of Ethiopia commitment to increasing land tenure security for
all, as the available finance falls short of total requirements, so prioritisation will be required.
LIFT guards against this political distortion of aid by setting out clear and transparent rules for
the allocation of funds and selection of districts (woredas) on the basis of a transparent
planning process using clear criteria that are approved by DFID. Once selected, the
programme will cover all sub-districts/communities/farmers in that district, so that all will
benefit. The programme will be monitored through semi-annual supervision missions, tracking
allocation and use of programme funds through the quarterly interim financial reports, audit
reports and independent evaluation of the programme.
Corruption
Corruption in Ethiopia is considered to be low in relation to countries at a similar stage of
development. However, risks still remain and land is an area where vested interests may be
used to obtain, withhold or delay land certification. To mitigate this risk, the programme will be
designed and implemented with high transparency and internal controls, with a complaints
procedure and monitoring system in place to identify citizen concerns.
112
In order to enable the programme to effectively monitor and mitigate the risks and maximise
the leveraging of opportunities, experts will be included in the team to develop, guide the
implementation of, and monitor strategies on cross cutting sectors, such as gender and
disadvantaged groups, environment and climate change, and conflict.
The programme will develop a live, periodically updated risk matrix that can be used to track
conflict-related and other risks for the programme.
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
It is anticipated that funds will be provided by DFID to regional governments for onward
distribution to woredas for the implementation of land certification and implementation of land
administration systems through financial aid. These funds will be disbursed according to
agreed annual operational plans and will be transferred from DFID through MoFED to
dedicated accounts in the regional offices for specific objectives, on a quarterly basis.
Further funds will be disbursed on the recommendation of the ITSP that the funds have been
properly accounted for and that the performance targets in the related plan have been met.
The ITSP will ensure on behalf of DFID that robust accounting systems are in place in regional
and woreda offices to monitor and account for spending. In the event of any concerns over
expenditure, the ITSP will seek to address and resolve these quickly through dialogue with
regional offices. If necessary, DFID will put in place further safeguards for future
disbursements or make alternative arrangements.
All disbursements through GoE structures are subject to the four, agreed partnership
commitments governing UK financial aid. Thus, DFID will assess commitment to the UK’s four
partnership principles (necessary for the continuation of financial aid). These are (as set out in
HMG’s Conditionality Policy and Guidance):




Reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Ethiopia.
Respecting human rights and other international obligations.
Strengthening financial management and accountability and reducing the risk of funds
being misused through weak administration or corruption.
Strengthening domestic accountability.
Every year we will assess whether the Government remains committed to the underlying
principles of our engagement. The outcome of the review will be approved by the Secretary of
State and GoE’s continued commitment to the Partnership Principles will be necessary for
DFID’s disbursement of Financial Aid to the GoE.
At programme level, the ITSP are responsible for fiduciary oversight of the project and to
closely monitor GoE’s compliance with agreed implementation and financial management
arrangements. All arrangements will be jointly developed and agreed between GoE and DFID
and will be published as part of our Business Case. In the event that M & E, audit reports, or
other evidence that leads DFID to believe that GoE structures are not fulfilling these
commitments, DFID will commence an assessment and discussion with the GoE to: enable
DFID to explain their concerns; better understand the GoE’s position; explain possible
implications for the provision of further aid that DFID may deliver or the way it is delivered; and
seek solutions where possible.
Disbursement from DFID to GoE’s designated account is based on satisfactory assessment of
compliance and progress by the ITSP and DFID through review of quarterly financial and
technical reports, supervisory visits, continuous internal audit undertaken by the ITSP, DFID
funded external audit of the programme, and internal and external audit undertaken by the
GoE. Non-compliance will be dealt with in accordance with the Programme MoU to be
113
concluded with GoE.
DFID’s Business case and bilateral MoU with the GoE, the inception report, financing and
grant agreement with GoE, annual reports, evaluation reports and the supervision missions
outcome will all be published.
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
The overall strength of the evidence base for the proposed option is moderate, with some
areas noted as weak. Given this, the overall size and strategic importance of the investment,
together with the need for on-going lesson learning there is a need for a rigorous approach to
monitoring and evaluation. It is inherent to the nature of the M4P process that continual
monitoring is at the heart of the intervention. Information and analysis gathered through
interventions is fed back into the decision-making process, enabling the programme
implementer to adapt and revise inputs in a dynamic way. This continues in an iterative
fashion for the length of the project – this is a feature that distinguishes M4P programming
from a more traditional programme. The ITSP will establish its own M&E team, under the LIFT
M & E framework, including statistics and econometric expertise and invest significantly in
developing robust supporting data systems as well as developing its own supporting research
and evaluation activities.
M&E activities undertaken by the ITSP will be complemented by an external independent
evaluation of the programme through an External Evaluation Technical Service Provider
(EETSP). The EETSP will be contracted and managed by DFID to provide an additional layer
of safe-guard as well as specifically assessing the impact of the programme.
The M&E Framework
A robust monitoring framework for the programme will be designed during the inception phase
and implemented at the beginning of the implementation phase. This will consolidate all of the
indicators and assumptions of the ToC, logframe and VfM Matrix into one framework which will
form the scope of the M&E work. It will also allow an attribution gap 124 so that results and
information from M4P can also be considered. The M&E Framework will be based on the DFID
Results Chain model but because of the nature of the M4P approach, where learning is
paramount and programme adaptability is highly valued, the Programme has elaborated this
model for operational purposes as follows:
Inputs
Process
Outputs
•Use of Outputs
Outcomes
•Intermediate Outcomes
•Ultimate Outcomes
Attribution Gap
Impacts
This elaboration aims at ensuring that the information needs of the M4P approach are met by
the M&E system and the research agenda. This includes Use of Outputs under Outputs, the
consideration of both Intermediate Outcomes and Ultimate Outcomes, and paying due
attention to the Attribution Gap between Outcomes and Impacts.
A summary log-frame in the DFID format is attached as Annex 9. Although the logframe is
reporting quantitative data only, the M&E framework will add further qualitative (including
beneficiary feedback) and quantitative data to the indicators through an Indicator Tracking
Report which will provide a fuller picture of progress under each indicator in the logframe. The
logframe is drawn directly from the theory of change which will also form the basis of the full
124 Represents the extent to which observed development effects can be attributed to a specific intervention
114
programme results framework that will also monitor milestones and targets at each additional
layer of the results chain as well as testing the underpinning assumptions. Some ToC
assumptions can be measured in the lifetime of the programme, and these will be identified
clearly in the M&E Framework. Assumption A, for example, states that through strengthened
land governance land holders will accept second level registration as legitimate. There are
numerous aspects of this that can be considered during implementation, coming both from the
Management Information System (MIS) (e.g., levels of registration, complaints) and from
programme monitoring (e.g., satisfaction, risk taking, etc.).
However, most of the key assumptions relate to the outcome to impact level and the final
measurement of these assumptions will have to wait until some considerable time after project
has started (e.g. Assumption D that investment and productivity will increase due to land
tenure security.) For this reason the EETSP will carry out a full impact assessment five years
after completion (see below). The ITSP will also test progress towards these assumptions as
the programme develops in collaboration with the EETSP.
The quality and availability of data necessary for programme monitoring is weak. It is generally
held and reported in manual formats in the various regions with little routine aggregation at the
centre. The ITSP will rectify this by putting in place an MIS system based on the computerised
land administration system currently under development, thereby providing accurate and
timely data for activities, inputs and outputs. This will support measurement of progress
towards quantitative deliverables as per the log-frame. The MIS will be designed and
developed to a basic standard in the first three months of implementation. The MIS will
continue to develop as user needs and data sources are better understood. What is crucial in
the first three months is to ensure that all necessary data is there so that if a new query comes
up in the future, the MIS can be developed and can run that query on historical data. After
three months a basic MIS will be present to meet the most important needs but this will be
developed as the programme goes on. When programming bugs arise, they will be resolved
by the team ICT experts. However these risks have been noted in the risk matrix. What is
important is to ensure that the data is still being stored so that once the delays have been
addressed the data can be queried. The design will be guided by the M&E Framework in
consultation with GoE, DFID and other key stakeholders. The design and running of the MIS
will be managed by the ITSP with the EESTP providing oversight. One of the key sources for
the MIS is the National Rural Land Administration Information System (NRLAIS). Given that
NRLAIS is unlikely to be completed until the end of Year 1, the MIS will initially query data
from the interim land information system until NRLAIS is ready.
The MIS will be operated with the woredas and the regional and federal governments and
capacities will be built at all levels to ensure sustainability at the end of the programme By
gradual handover and inclusion of government staff the system will be institutionalised by the
end of Year 3, enhancing prospects for sustainability. This process will be monitored in
relation to the additional ownership and sustainability of using financial aid so that these
assumptions can be tested and assessed.
115
For indicators where the source is not the MIS, ITSP will use other sources including the GoE
Growth and Transformation Plan’s, which are monitored on an annual basis to measure the
development of the country and are thus considered to be of a high rating of robustness. Other
likely indicator sources will include World Bank data, data from other programmes in Ethiopia
and other relevant documentation from academia. Finalisation of the logframe, including
identification of all sources will be presented to and approved by DFID and the EETSP by
month seven from the start of the
implementation period. This will
Why ensure compliance with the DCED Results
include
consideration
of
Measurement Standard?
beneficiary feedback as a source
The DCED Standard has emerged over the past three to
information
to
monitor
the
four years in response to the increasing need for private
programme’s progress.
sector development programmes to improve their
To support the regular data
collection of monitoring data from
the MIS the ITSP will also
develop a range of sources and
undertake a programme of
studies to support results based
monitoring through measuring
progress
towards
outcomes
through “use of outputs” and
“intermediate
outcomes”
at
activity level. The results based
monitoring will always consider
the OECD standard.
performance and report credible results that can be used to
inform resource allocation decisions. It is a process
management standard and designed in much the same
way as standards approved by the International Standards
Organisation (ISO). The standard is built around control
points and compliance criteria, which will be mirrored in
LIFT’s results measurement system. By documenting that
the control points and compliance criteria have been met
we can take a much greater degree of confidence in the
reliability and credibility of results emerging from the
programmes. Another advantage of the Standard is that is
has developed universal impact indicators (around income
growth and outreach), which are designed to enable
comparison across programmes and geographies with
other private sector development initiatives.
The ITSP will collect primary data
at baseline, midline and endline points in LIFT Programme implementation, using both
quantitative and qualitative means. Results from these studies will be combined with data
from the regular MIS to provide a comprehensive review of progress against milestones and
targets and the testing of relevant assumptions. Where possible the team will aim to establish
experimental design into the surveys creating treatment and control groups to better measure
the relevant effect of different combinations of interventions
The M&E framework will also consider cross cutting themes such as gender, climate change
and poverty reduction. Through a stakeholder analysis, the M&E framework will ensure that
the surveys will be with groups and individuals who are well placed to provide opinion on
qualitative benefits and risks. For example, the M&E framework will need to ensure that data is
appropriately collected on women’s rights and how LIFT is either supporting or hindering their
position in society. To accomplish this, the baseline, midline, endline and annual reviews will
ensure that the qualitative views of female headed households, women’s groups and CSO’s,
Ministry of Women’s, Children and Youth’s Affairs, DFID Gender Advisor and other individuals
and groups who do or do not have a gender focus are consulted on the benefits and risks that
LIFT has on women’s rights, their participation in the process and their place in society
throughout the programme. The M&E Framework will also consult marginalised groups and
parties who are supporting such groups to consider how LIFT is affecting their lives. Climate
change issues will also be considered and discussed during the formulation of the M&E
Framework.
The team will also take more detailed analysis to determine the combined effect of LIFT with
other programme interventions such as PEPE and RLAUD. The team will also investigate the
116
potential to draw together M&E work from other land programmes in Ethiopia to further
understand the key drivers and barriers to progress within the LIFT programme itself as well
as to identify opportunities for further synergy
Because the M4P approach includes an adaptive response to specific situations as roadblocks
are identified and options considered, the overall M&E approach proposes an additional
adaptive results-monitoring for market facilitation component. This approach will aim to
incorporate a constant review of the activities to ensure it is meeting the needs of the
recipients. This component will look to test the effectiveness of a range of M4P activities as
part of the broader research agenda of the ITSP in order to provide information on whether to
scale up or scale back activities. M4P and results based monitoring will combine through the
arbitration gap in the results chain. For example the assumption that productivity on rented
land that moves from sharecropping will increased by 10%, and that this entire increase in
productivity will be attributable to the M4P intervention, will be measured by results monitoring
through the baseline, midline, endline and indicator tracking reports. The market facilitation
team will at the same time consider the impacts of market facilitation interventions which affect
the rental market.
We did consider introducing a formal experimental design to aid this analysis through the
creation of treatment (M4P plus land certification and administration) and non-treatment (land
certification and administration only) woredas. This was rejected on the grounds that all the
M4P interventions will be tailored by region (or cluster of woredas), depending on the local
context making sample design complex to the extent of being impractical and too expensive.
Instead we have opted to build quick feedback loops into the M4P component to facilitate
regular and frequent review to adjust activities as appropriate. The frequency of these reviews,
benchmarks for success as well of cut-off points will be worked out in the inception report and
implementation manual and the progress of M4P will be measured against its own targets as
set out in the log-frame. ITAD have also provided a recent study into how to evaluate M4P
which will be drawn on through this process.
The ITSP will conduct regular (monthly, quarterly and annual appropriate to indicators)
operational monitoring through the MIS and report directly to key stakeholders such as LIFT
Programme Management, DFID and the GoE. This will be supplemented by regular reporting
through the EETSP (see below).
In addition to supporting real-time programme evaluation and re-design where appropriate, the
project M&E activities will have a key role in determining the value of any additional planned
investment from the baseline figure of £45m up to the proposed maximum of £68.2m. As
highlighted on step five of the options identification process, the programme would follow a
stepped trajectory that will allow lesson learning with 3 million parcels being certified in the first
2.5 years costing up to £35m before scaling up to 5 to 11 million parcels over the next three
years based on the findings of the M & E in the operational (such as logistics including human
resource, VfM, commitment and collaboration by relevant partners) and programme (for
instance our assumption on the M4P activities realised) performance. Both monitoring and
research done by the ITSP and the EETSP, two annual reviews and mid-term review will
recommend on the pace of implementation and activities to take forward. The increased size
of the programme was based on a cost-benefit analysis that showed increasing returns to
scale that will need to be closely monitored to ensure our assumptions are right and on track.
VfM will be one of the areas where the ITSP will focus mainly on economy indicators such as
cost per parcel, cost per staff, cost of training per woreda, and so on as well as number of
plots that are certified on the efficiency side. EETSP will focus on all aspects of VfM including
effectiveness i.e. percentage increase in income. See section I in the appraisal section for full
117
coverage on VfM.
A total of £2 million has been set aside for M&E activities within the ITSP. The M&E work will
have close ties with those of the PEPE team, ensuring homogeny between DFID E’s main
activities in the Wealth Creation Programme. It will also interact, specifically on M & E as well,
with other DFID programmes, especially those relating to gender and climate change, as well
as other land sector programmes such as REILA, LAND, and SLMP, sharing approaches, to
obtain synergy, and results to enrich the evidence base. This will be particularly the case with
USAID, as they are in the process of undertaking an impact assessment for their previous land
programme that ran from 2005 to 2011 as well as commissioned a baseline survey for the
third phase/LAND programme that will be undertaken in the next couple of month. We will use
this golden opportunity to collaborate and synergise our respective approaches for an effective
and efficient outcome.
Evaluation
The overall value, innovative nature and strategic importance of the LIFT programme has
identified it as a priority programme for independent evaluation under the DFID Ethiopia
Evaluation Strategy addressing both impact and assessing the Theory of Change approach
taken at overarching programme level and at market level for each market system. As such
the internal ITSP activities will be supplemented by an independent programme of review and
evaluation through the EETSP identified above.
The role of the EESTP will be two-fold. First the EESTP will provide a regular independent
review of progress of the programme, working with the ITSP to adapt monitoring systems and
supporting study and research methods to enhance overall transparency and accountability as
well as lesson learning. The EESTP will also be responsible for conducting Annual Reviews in
line with DFID mandatory procedures.
Second, the EESTP will conduct a full impact evaluation at mid-term, end-term and 5 years
post-completion of the programme to assess the programme’s contribution as a driver for
economic growth in Ethiopia. A synthesis paper on evaluating the impact of M4P
programmescclxxxix highlights a number of challenges in evaluating impact accurately. M4P
aims to catalyse change, inducing spill-over effects to indirectly scale up change. This poses a
challenge as external factors have an increasing influence on scale and nature of change
further up the results chain. There are also challenges with attribution and establishment of a
counterfactual. M4P programmes facilitate the behaviour of market players who in turn
incentivise ‘others’ to behave differently. With this approach, the distinction between groups
that are “treated” and “untreated” is not always clear, and it is difficult to distinguish which
target groups are actually driving change across the results chains. This makes it difficult to
find a robust control for comparison. Further, the iterative nature of M4P, with its
entrepreneurial approach to pursuing (and discarding) avenues of intervention, mean that too
rigid an assessment of results against targets set at the beginning may not provide a
meaningful idea of what has been achieved.
It is therefore not considered appropriate, as stated in the M & E framework and above, to
carry out a classic impact evaluation (experimental or quasi-experimental design), with
selection of controls, and an emphasis on the comparison of results against the control and
baseline. But there will be treatment locations and control locations. We will be using a
simple ‘matching’ approach that is commonly used (which makes things quasi, rather than
experimental) where we have a non-equivalent control that is as equivalent as possible. In
order to assess the success of the programme most effectively, the evaluation will look at two
areas:
118
1. The first purpose will be to identify the overall impact of the market system changes
facilitated by the programme, and in doing so to report on the value for money of the
interventions within the strategy, particularly in terms of the economy of inputs used to
deliver each intervention, the efficiency with which it was implemented and the effectiveness
of the final changes that have emerged in terms of impact on the target groups. This will be
at the level of the impact and outcome set out in the logframe, against an established
baseline. As a control group will not be used, contribution analysis will be applied to
determine the extent to which the impacts and outcomes can be attributed to the
programme. Thus the question for the evaluation to answer in this area will be: Were impact
and outcome indicators in the logframe met? What evidence exists to support this?
2. The evaluation will assess how appropriate the Theory of Change was in articulating the
problem and the solution. This will include analysis of whether the assumptions and logical
links in the results chains that will be developed during the inception phase hold true, and
how the intervention strategies in each of the six sectors succeeded in contributing to the
outcome and impact. Thus the two questions for the evaluation to answer in this area will
be: Did the interventions work as identified in the Theory of Change or through other causal
pathways? and Did the assumptions at every level of the results chains hold?
The approach will aim to address the standard OECD evaluation criteria as well as addressing
cross-cutting issues such as gender, inclusiveness, engagement and climate change.
In broad terms, a comprehensive list of evaluation and research questions will be developed
by the TSPs by the end of the inception phase, tested during implementation and quality
assured / verified through independent assessment. They will be time appropriate i.e. (midterm, end of programme and five-year post programme) that will enable DFID assess how the
programme had performed as per the TOC.
Examples will include:
 Output achievement: have outputs set out at the beginning of each intervention been
delivered? Has the envisaged focus on gender and green growth been achieved (e.g. has
the land certification successfully targeted girls and women rights to land or economically
empowered high numbers of women)? Has the innovative M4P approach achieved
intended outputs? Has M4P had any unintended consequences (positive or negative)?
 Effectiveness of approaches: which components and/or combination of components of the
programme deliver the most effective results (e.g. has the anticipated targeting of access
to finance led to greater wealth creation, and have different institutions been more/less
effective at doing so)? This will be based on rigorous testing, including where possible
randomized control testing or market tests.
 Key success factors: what factors were key in the success or failure of each intervention
(e.g. has political economy incentives facilitated or hindered wealth creation)? Have the
results been sustained over several years (e.g. have performance grant or technical
assistance been more effective at market failures in the short, medium and longer term)?
While the EESTP is expected to draw heavily from the evidence base created from the ITSP
M&E system we envisage that there may be a need for verification of the MIS data via their
own qualitative fieldwork, and following points of relevance for evaluation criteria (the
efficiency effectiveness etc.).
We envisage the mid- term evaluation in year 2.5 being critical in determining the overall value
for money of the programme to inform further investment decisions. In addition to testing the
key evaluation questions we will be looking in particular to identify ‘early wins’ at outcome level
to shape the nature of any further investment. The end-line evaluation in Year 6 will build on
119
the findings of the mid-term evaluation and include an initial consideration of the impact of the
programme.
As part of a broader research agenda we also plan for the EETSP to conduct a further impact
assessment up to 5 years following the formal end of the programme.
The EETSP will be contracted centrally through DFID systems as outlined in the commercial
case. The budget for the EETSP is within the M&E budget in the Financial Case. Governance
arrangements are summarised earlier in the management case but we plan to ensure close
collaboration between the ITSP and EETSP balancing the need for an independent
assessment with optimal value for money in monitoring system design through avoiding the
development of parallel systems.
The DFID E Results Adviser and other DFID evaluation expertise will be involved throughout
the design of the evaluation and the LAUTT will be consulted before the work is commenced.
The results of the evaluation will be distributed to all stakeholders through the LAUTT and
large scale events. The ITSP communications staff will absorb the results and
recommendations into the wider awareness raising process and the reports will be available
through the DFID and MoA websites and summarised through social media channels. The
ITSP will feed into national poverty, MDG, gender, environment and climate, and other
reporting, to strengthen such reporting, ensure information utility, and the development of an
evidence database.
Logframe
Quest No of logframe for this intervention: 4327612
120
Annex 1 - LIFT Business Case- Geographical Location Option Assessment
1.1 Total
Income
impact
2.1
Criticality
of timing
2.2
Equality/
Distributi
on:
relative
poverty
of those
benefitin
g
2.3
Likely to
benefit
women
specifica
lly
2.4
Degree
to which
mitigates
risk of a)
conflict,
b)
misalloca
tion
of
land
3.1
Risk
mitigat
ed due
to
Prior
donor
experi
ence
3.2
Degree
of
prepare
dness
for
support
3.3
Degree
of
system
s
in
places
to
address
M4P
principl
es
3.4 Cost
mitigated
by
not
spreading
activities
thinly
4.1
GoE
acceptanc
e of: a)
benefit
concentrat
ion, b) any
activity in
area
Very
High
Low 125
Low126
Med
Med
Med
Med
High
Med
High
3. Operational
5.
Environme
ntal
6. Activity Complementarities
7. Other
5.1
Degree to
which
mitigates
risk
to
environme
nt
6.1
Degree
to which
fits with
activities
of others
6.2
Degree
to which
fits with
other
DFID
activities
PDP
6.3
Demonst
rator
effect
likely to
attract
other
donors
Wider
learning
generat
ed
Low127
Med
Low128
Low129
Med
Very
High
Med
Low
Med
Low
High
High
High
High
Med
High
High
Low
Med
Low
All 4 HRS;
0 DRS
Very high
Med
Med/
Low
Med
Low
High
High
High
Med
High
High
High
Low
High
High
Med/
Med/
Med/
Med/
Med/
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Retain Retain
Economic
1-2
HRS130; 0
DRS131
Conclusion (reject vs. retain)
2. Social
Criterion
Indicator
Criterion
Importance
4. Political
Will/Accep
tability to
GoE
1.
Economic
Low
Med/
Low
Low
Med
High
Med
High
125 Numbers threatened are relatively small.
126 Comparing v. poor with vv. poor.
127 Likely to help in all areas, so not a key determinant.
128 Cross-programme learning possible.
129 Failure may deter others.
130
Highland Regional States
131
Developing Regional States
121
Low
Med/
Med
Low
Reject
Social
0 HRS; 12 DRS
2.2
Equality/
Distributi
on:
relative
poverty
of those
benefitin
g
2.3
Likely to
benefit
women
specifica
lly
2.4
Degree
to which
mitigates
risk of a)
conflict,
b)
misalloca
tion
of
land
3.1
Risk
mitigat
ed due
to
Prior
donor
experi
ence
3.2
Degree
of
prepare
dness
for
support
3.3
Degree
of
system
s
in
places
to
address
M4P
principl
es
3.4 Cost
mitigated
by
not
spreading
activities
thinly
4.1
GoE
acceptanc
e of: a)
benefit
concentrat
ion, b) any
activity in
area
0 HRS; All
DRS
Low
Low
High
High
Med
Low
Low
Low
Med
Low
1-2 HRS;
1-2 DRS
Med/
Med/
Med
Med
Med
Med
Med
Med
Med
1-2 HRS;
All DRS
Med
All 4 HRS;
1-2 DRS
High
Criterion
Indicator
Mixed
All 4 HRS;
All DRS
Weight score
Med/
Low
High
High
Low
Low
Low
Med
Med
6. Activity Complementarities
7. Other
5.1
Degree to
which
mitigates
risk
to
environme
nt
6.1
Degree
to which
fits with
activities
of others
6.2
Degree
to which
fits with
other
DFID
activities
PDP
6.3
Demonst
rator
effect
likely to
attract
other
donors
Wider
learning
generat
ed
Low
Low
High
Low
Med
Med/
Med/
Med/
Med
Med
High
High
High
Med
Low
Low
Med
Med
High
Med
High
Med
Med
Med
High
High
Med/
Med
High
High
Low
Med/
Low
Med
Med
Med
Med
Med
Med
Med
High
Med
Med
Low
Low
Med
Low
Med
High
High
High
4
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
1
2
1
1
2
Low
Med/
High
16
2
1
4
2
6
6
9
All 4 HRS;
0 DRS
16
2
1.5
4
2
6
6
9
Social
0 HRS; 12 DRS
4
1
2.5
4
4
3
3
0 HRS; All
DRS
4
1
3
6
4
2
1-2 HRS;
1-2 DRS
8
1.5
2
4
4
4
Mixed
Economic
1-2 HRS;
0 DRS
Retain Reject
2.1
Criticality
of timing
5.
Environme
ntal
Reject
1.1 Total
Income
impact
3. Operational
Reject Reject
2. Social
Conclusion (reject vs. retain)
4. Political
Will/Accep
tability to
GoE
1.
Economic
6
3
6
1
2
2
72
4
9
3
6
1
3
6
78.5
4.5
6
3
1.5
3
2
1.5
2
45
2
3
4
3
1
2
3
1
4
43
5
7.5
4
6
2.5
5
2
2.5
4
62
122
2. Social
1.1 Total
Income
impact
2.1
Criticality
of timing
2.2
Equality/
Distributi
on:
relative
poverty
of those
benefitin
g
2.3
Likely to
benefit
women
specifica
lly
2.4
Degree
to which
mitigates
risk of a)
conflict,
b)
misalloca
tion
of
land
3.1
Risk
mitigat
ed due
to
Prior
donor
experi
ence
3.2
Degree
of
prepare
dness
for
support
3.3
Degree
of
system
s
in
places
to
address
M4P
principl
es
3.4 Cost
mitigated
by
not
spreading
activities
thinly
4.1
GoE
acceptanc
e of: a)
benefit
concentrat
ion, b) any
activity in
area
1-2 HRS;
All DRS
8
1.5
2
6
6
2
2
3
2
All 4 HRS;
1-2 DRS
12
1.5
2
4
4
5
4
6
All 4 HRS;
All DRS
8
2
2
4
6
4
4
3
Criterion
Indicator
3. Operational
123
5.
Environme
ntal
Conclusion (reject vs. retain)
4. Political
Will/Accep
tability to
GoE
1.
Economic
6. Activity Complementarities
7. Other
5.1
Degree to
which
mitigates
risk
to
environme
nt
6.1
Degree
to which
fits with
activities
of others
6.2
Degree
to which
fits with
other
DFID
activities
PDP
6.3
Demonst
rator
effect
likely to
attract
other
donors
Wider
learning
generat
ed
6
1
2
2
2
6
51.5
4
9
2
4
2
3
6
68.5
2
6
1
4
3
3
6
58
The following section sets out the reasoning for the scoring of each geographic
option against each of the criteria set out above (Economic, Social, Operational,
Political, Environmental, Complementarity and Other).
ECONOMIC
Ethiopia covers an area of 1,127,127 square kilometres, of which an estimated 34%
is agricultural, 9.6% is arable, an estimated 3.6 is forested, and 48.9% is covered by
woodlands and shrubs. Only 4.5% of arable land is irrigated. Protected areas
encompass 14% of Ethiopia‘s land area.
Ethiopia‘s economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, with more than 80% of the
population working partially or solely as smallholder farmers on the production of
crops and livestock. Agriculture accounts for about 45% of GDP, almost 90% of
exports, and 85% of employment. Crop production contributes to 35% of GDP and
90% of crop production is carried out in the four main states and 3% in the four
Developing Regional States (DRS). Cereals account for 80% of crop production in
both area and value, while oilseeds and pulses contribute nearly 15% of the value.
Livestock accounts for nearly 10% of GDP and 30% of the employment of the
agricultural labour force. We were unable to find direct GDP figures disaggregated
by region which would give a clear indication of the potential impact in the different
regions.
Pastoral communities represent nearly 14% of the Ethiopian population and occupy
approximately 60% of the land mass. Somali, Afar and Oromia regional states have
the largest share constituting 87% (57%, 26% and 10% respectively). The pastoral
production system contributes 6% of the agricultural GDP per annum.
The international and local evidence on the economic impact of land registration is
mixed, though there is general agreement that land registration has the potential to
increase investment in land and its productivity, to improve the rural land sector and
thereby to catalyse economic growth.





Adams et al., in a 1999 ODI paper on the benefits of land tenure reform in South
Africa, estimated that land reform could lead to a 20% increase in economic
benefits, if carried out in conjunction with extension and other support services.
Deininger et al. (2009) estimated that in Amhara Region land registration had
increased output by 9%.ccxc
In a previous paper, Deininger deduced that landless and near landless
households could gain access to land through the land rental market as the
market had been enhanced by land registration. The main benefits recorded in
the four main regions, largely due to the formal mechanisms to enforce property
rights, included incentives for land-related investment, and lower transaction
costs for productivity-enhancing land transfers through rental arrangements.
Research by Fort (2007) in rural Peru suggests that - although individual titling
and registration can increase the level of farmer tenure security and as such
contribute to the enhancement of land-related investments in their parcels - the
strength of this relationship is very much related to the density of formal land use
rights in the area where parcels are located. Fort deduces that the probability of
increased investments arising from land tenure is some 10%, which is likely to be
increased by another 3% in areas where land titling has been densely carried out.
Stein Holden (2009) estimated that land certification has enhanced land
productivity by about 45% on owner-operated land in Tigray.
124



Deininger et al. (2011), in research on the initial impact of the Land Tenure
Regularisation Programme in Rwanda, observed that farmers were twice as likely
to make investments in their property if they had received certificates.
Based on a survey conducted in Amhara, Gebeyehu (2013) showed that 80% of
land holders were involved in some form of land rental market (fixed term or
sharecropping), compared to only 5% before land certification. The current
situation represents a 30-50% increase in rental income share to the landholder.
Other perception surveys confirm that the programme has created incentives to
invest in land, specifically an increase of 88% in tree planting, 86% in water and
soil conservation, and 66% in common property resources.
The DFID Ethiopia Government for Growth (G4G) Second-stage Scoping Report
refers to a 2004 DFID Working Paper (‘Land reform, agriculture and poverty
reduction’), arguing that "in several contexts land titling did not generate any
significant economic impact". However, the same working paper also claims that
where reliable registration systems are in place, "landholders are more willing to
invest in land improvements and sharecrop, rent or lease their land".
Unfortunately none of this research was carried out in nomadic pastoral (henceforth
referred to as pastoral) areas, and we are not aware of a successful land tenure
system internationally for such areas, which explains the lack of data on impact.
Nevertheless, a review of existing literature suggests that caution should be taken in
registration of pastoral land:





There is a misconception that pastoral lands are poorly managed and overstocked beyond carrying capacity. There is increasing evidence to suggest that
the carrying capacity concept is irrelevant to dynamic, constantly changing
environments. Pastoralist livelihoods demonstrate a flexible approach which is
determined by external forces rather than internal forces such as land tenure.
Studies have shown that the Ethiopian Borana pastoral system had higher
returns of both energy and protein per hectare than industrialised ranching
systems in Australia. Australian Northern Territory ranches realised just 16% of
the energy and 30% of the protein per hectare produced by the Borana system.
Similar results for collective use of pasture in countries such as Zimbabwe, and
Kenya have shown similar results (UN OCHA, 2007).
In Ethiopia, some state-controlled grazing schemes or ranches have been based
on Western models of carrying capacity. In Borana, for example, the Southern
Rangelands Development Unit established ranches on 54,000 ha of rangeland
and pastoralists were required to provide breeding stock on an animal quota
basis and at fixed prices. However, this ranching approach proved ineffective and
inappropriate, as it did not provide the flexibility to respond to the constantly
changing environment (Elias, 2008).
No evidence of a successful, functioning programme of land registration and
administration in pastoralist areas can be found, even in wealthy land-rich
countries such as Brazil. Indeed the evidence above suggests that to introduce
such reforms would have a negative impact on production and livelihoods.
‘The Future of Pastoralism in Ethiopia’ argues that improved access to livestock
markets would have a big impact on nomadic pastoralist livelihoods (UN OCHA,
2007). The Ethiopia Agricultural Growth Programme supports this argument.
On the above basis, the four Highland Regional States (HRS) would see the highest
economic impact, with an immediate effect. The four big states have much in
125
common (level of engagement, experience in titling, institutional set-up in the land
sector, legal tools, and financial commitment to improve titling in future) that provide
a relatively solid foundation for yielding prompt economic returns from land
registration. Despite their similarities, they also have minor differences in contexts
that may require further analysis to identify possible narrow preferences, if it was
decided that the programme should work in less than four of them.
Long-term transformation from land registration will be higher in the DRS of
Gambella and Benishangul, where no first-stage registration has taken place, though
the low population and parcel numbers make this likely to have a lower overall
impact than in the four HRS.
The complexities of the customary land tenure system on one hand and the
government policy of encouraging moving from pastoral to sedentary practices, on
the other, are likely to make land certification in Somali and Afar a long-term process
with little economic gain given the economic output of the two regions.
SOCIAL
Criticality of Timing
This criterion ranks the urgency of the intervention in a particular region based on:

The need to meet farmers’ needs to increase productivity; and to counter the
possibility of land being lost to large-scale commercial investment without
appropriate compensation being paid.
With varying magnitude, both issues will apply in all of the regions (big four and
emerging). In the big four, because the first level certification was rushed and done
on a one-off basis, the need for large-scale verification and record maintenance has
threatened to reverse the gains made so far. Prompt intervention is required to
rescue the gains which can be considered as medium impact.
High levels of communal land, pastoralists and potential commercial land use means
that ensuring land is allocated and secured in line with international good practice
and human rights and other international obligations is particularly important and
time critical in the DRS
Equality / Relative poverty distribution of beneficiaries
The Household Income Survey of 2010/11 established the following Rural Poverty
Headcount Index in relation to the regions under consideration, with the variance
against the simple average:
Region
Afar
Tigray
Somali
Gambella
Amhara
Benishangul
SNNPR
Oromia
Index
0.411
0.365
0.351
0.325
0.307
0.301
0.300
0.293
Variance
1.24
1.10
1.06
0.98
0.93
0.91
0.90
0.88
While the indices show Afar to be the poorest region followed by Tigray and Somali,
the subsequent regions are relatively similar with a small spread against the highest
poverty count. It is also apparent that the HRS are poor with Tigray ranking higher
than Somali.
126
Likely to benefit women specifically
Ethiopian and international experience on land registration generally indicates a
positive impact for women with enhanced security and rights to land.
In visits to the four HRS during the LIFT preparation it was noted that all regions
other than Tigray give a joint title (husband and wife) on the first registration
certificates. In Amhara, for example, study data showed that over 80% of titles
issued bear the names of women, either jointly with their husband or alone.
Procedures are also in place for protection of women in polygamous marriages.
Stein Holden et al. (2011) note that 85% of respondents also believe that the
programme improves the position of women and confidence to lease out their land.
The land productivity on rented-out plots of female-headed households is no longer
lower than that of male-headed households and female-headed households have
become more willing to lease out land after land certification.
There is, however, evidence that women receive lower rental income than men do
because of lower bargaining powers, and the on-going 2nd stage registration is
expected to have significant gender impact, reinforcing the gains of first stage
registration, and addressing the gaps identified.
There is limited evidence on the impact of registration in pastoral areas but work
carried out by Flintan (2010) and others highlights the complexity of the situation in
customary societies where norms of behaviour are breaking down under the impact
of sedentarisation in those areas. She suggests that in traditional customary
societies women had, in practice, equal access to resources as men but the effect of
sedentarisation has reduced this, because of lower bargaining power to obtain equal
allocations of land. Women’s land inheritance is through the family or husband.
This situation requires an innovative and nuanced approach that will take some time
to develop with the USAID LAND programme that will be holistic in addressing all the
cultural lands and avoiding causing conflict. In pastoral areas where the customary
institutions are relatively strong, state intervention in land management is generally
not welcome. Any titling effort also has the potential to ignite competition among
clan and sub-clan, between strong and weak, etc.
This is further complicated by the fact that most of the clan boundaries were
abolished during the Derg kebele formation and land nationalisation that denied any
role to the customary authorities. The government is also currently attempting to
recognise the role of customary institutions/clan leaders in the land administration
sector which reduces the potential impact and will take time to resolve.
The criterion will be applied to the regions on the basis that there could be a high
long-term impact in the pastoral regions, though results in terms of programme
outputs will be low.
Degree to which mitigates risk of conflict and inappropriate allocation of land
The impact of the LIFT programme would be to ensure that the law is properly
applied in terms of eminent domain, compensation and allocation of land without
duress. LIFT will not certify land in a particular area until land administration policies
and practices are in place that are in line with international good practice and human
rights obligations. .
The Ministry of Agriculture’s database of large scale agricultural leases indicates the
following geographic spread:
127
Region
Benishangul
Gambella
SNNPR
Somali
Total
Number of investments
12
9
12
1
34
Hectares
125,431
210,012
79,360
2,000
416,803
Disputes related to land in the four main regions, Benishangul and Gambella are
generally between individuals and settled through the judicial system. In Somali,
Afar and the pastoral areas of SNNPR and Oromia, they are more often between or
within customary groups and lead to serious conflicts.
In these areas the impact of LIFT will not be immediately felt as the procedures for
the pastoral areas remain to be developed and need to address complex issues
relating to customary authorities and cultural practices. The ranking of the regions
therefore will show a high impact in the DRS.
OPERATIONAL
Risk mitigated due to lessons from prior donor experience
There has been substantial donor involvement in land registration in recent years in
the various regions, the major examples of which are:





SIDA – SARDP (Sida Amhara Rural Development Programme)
USAID – ELTAP (Ethiopia Strengthening Land Tenure Administration Program)
USAID – ELAP (Ethiopia Strengthening Land Administration Program)
Finland – REILA (Responsible and Innovative Land Administration Project)
World Bank – SLMP (Sustainable Land Management Programme)
Their activities can be summarised by region as follows:
Region
Afar
Amhara
Benishangul
Gambella
Oromia
Somali
SNNPR
Tigray
Programme
ELTAP/ELAP
SARDP
SLMP
ELAP/ELTAP
REILA
SLMP
REILA
SLMP
SLMP
ELAP/ELTAP
REILA
ELAP/ELTAP
SLMP
ELAP/ELTAP
REILA
SLMP
ELAP/ELTAP
REILA
Years
On-going
2002-04
2008-13
2005-13
2013
2008-13
On-going
2008-13
2008-13
2005-13
2012-13
On-going
2008-13
2005-13
2012-13
2008-13
2005-13
On-going
Activities
Policy development
Policy, 1st Registration
2nd Registration
Policy, 2nd Registration
Piloting second registration
Piloting second registration
Piloting second registration
Piloting second registration
Second registration
Policy, 2nd Registration
Piloting second registration
Policy development
Second registration
Policy, 2nd Registration
Piloting second registration
Second registration
Policy, 2nd Registration
Piloting second registration
The four HRS clearly have a very significant experience of donor supported
implementation of second level registration. In the other regions, donor support is
limited to policy development or very limited implementation.
Degree of Preparedness for Support/Cultural Awareness
All regions other than Somali have the necessary legal documents in place and
Somali has recently passed a proclamation, though the quality of this is questionable
(Finlan, Menberu), as it gives limited role to the customary institutions and clan
leaders.
128
While Gambella, Afar and Benishangul have the legal instruments in place they
remain institutionally weak with limited experience of registration, none of them
having undertaken 1st level registration. Indeed the Ethiopia: Land Administration
and Use Development Project (ELALUDEP) concept document notes that the 1 st
level registration in Benishangul and Gambella stalled because of lack of institutional
capacity and did not begin at all in Afar and Somali (sub component 3.1).
The experience in the four HRS in land registration has led to significant institutional
capacity and preparedness to carry out land registration, though capacity and
resource levels will need building for a scaled-up approach.
While cultural awareness is not an issue in the highland sedentary agriculturist
regions, where there is regularisation experience and less customary influence, the
need for cultural awareness raising (or change) will be highly important in the
pastoral and semi-pastoral areas, and little has been done to address this.
As reported elsewhere, the LAND project is working on resolving cultural issues in
the pastoral areas and expects to expend a significant portion of its project lifespan
in doing so and piloting the outcomes.
Degree of systems in place to address M4P principles
The four HRS have flourishing land rental markets which have grown under
registration, the bulk of the activity being share cropping. The Amhara region land
authorities, for example, informed the ITSP that some 50% of parcels are currently
being rented out in some form (fixed rent and share cropping).
There are, however, significant variations in legal provisions for land rentals, with
Amhara allowing renewable leases up to 25 years without use restrictions. But other
regions have restrictions in terms of lease length, usage, and proportion of land
holding that can be used. In the pastoral regions, there is little experience of land
rental, and if any, it is the clan leader that negotiates and rents out common land.
Cost mitigated by not spreading thinly
Clearly the highest impact would be achieved by working in one region, thus keeping
supervisory costs and overheads to a minimum, and covering the most land parcels.
This is likely to be unacceptable to the Government and there are other benefits that
will arise from the contextual differences (in legal and policy instruments, technical
experience, institutional arrangements, regional readiness, etc.) of operating in more
than one region. Indeed, by concentrating on one emerging region, the cost
expended would not achieve significant, tangible results; and the funds would
probably not be spent.
Political Will/Acceptability to GoE
Acceptance of National Benefit Concentration
Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has expressed its intention through the ELALUDEP
(Component 3), the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) and the SRM, to
prioritise the implementation of second level registration through a phased approach
across the four HRS of Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray. The SRM intends to
register and title about 49.98 million parcels covering a total of 12,288 kebeles and
496 woredas situated in Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray regional states. While
this is clearly unlikely to be achieved, the intentions of Government are clear.
The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition Initiative by the G8 supports the
accelerated implementation of the African-led agricultural plans (known as CAADP)
which the Ethiopian government also endorsed. In line with this, the government
129
announced that priority would be given to the Agricultural Growth Programme
woredas which are all within the four main regions.
GoE’s commitment is further evidenced by the commissioning of aerial photography
for 4,500 km2 in each of these regions through the Sustainable Land Management
Programme. The Ministry of Agriculture has reportedly requested budget provision
for 2013/14 to procure further aerial photography across these regions.
The federal level is clearly comfortable with spreading the benefits relatively widely
amongst the four main states. This will ensure that the initial benefits of first
registration are leveraged while the four DRS are prepared for an up-scaling.
There have been continuing activities in the area of land registration and the RLAUD
continues to be very involved in the pilots of the ortho-photo second certification
process supported by REILA and SLMP, in the four regions, which are its major
focus for land registration. RLAUD also supports the regions, largely through SLMP,
in on-going scaling up of second registration using other methodologies.
RLAUD continues to work with the regions of Somali and Afar in developing legal
mechanisms for land registration in the pastoral communities.
Acceptance of Regional Benefit Concentration
The four HRS are currently all engaged in carrying out second stage certification to
the extent that internal funds allow. The focus is on scaling up the ortho-photo trials,
though Amhara continues with the total station and RTK GPS methods as it
evaluates the REILA trials. These regions would be unhappy, therefore, if they were
to miss out on the benefits of LIFT.
The four DRS would naturally all wish to be covered in LIFT but Somali and Afar will
have significant input from USAID and Benishangul from REILA.
ENVIRONMENTAL
Degree to which mitigates risk to environment
Experience from Rwanda under the DFID Land Tenure Regularisation Programme
demonstrated that where farmers have greater security over their land title they will
take greater care of it and employ practices that will reduce soil erosion and land
degradation.
Other studies also show that the certified households that voluntarily constructed
conservation structures increased in a single year from 12% to 25% while structures
in the non-certified ones declined from 36% to 24%. We observed similar reversals
in the share of plots with any type of conservation structure (from 44% to 34% in
control villages, and from 22% to 32% in treated villages), and in the share of
households which constructed new conservation structures during a single year of
the survey period (from 10% to 8% and from 7% to 10% in control and treated
villages, respectively).
On-going research by Addis Ababa University in Amhara, which commenced in
2012, also revealed that some 75% of the farmers interviewed indicated that they
intended to increase investment in their land following registration and to increase its
sustainability through better land management.
A study in 2007 by Klaus Deininger et al. on the impact of registration in the four
HRS in Ethiopia reported that large majorities of beneficiaries perceive certification to
increase incentives for investment in trees (88%), soil and water conservation
130
structures (86%), and sustainable management of CPRs (66%). While these are
perceptions and need to be supported by actual investment data, they are indicative
of the benefits of land registration on the environment.
This is confirmed by a report on Rwanda by the same author who noted that within 2
years of the registration twice as many farmers in the trial cells had installed or
rehabilitated conservation structures as those in the control cells.
Because of lack of registration and limited international experience there is limited
evidence of the environmental effect of registration in the pastoral regions. It is
considered likely, from discussions with the Environment and Climate Change Expert
in the team that land registration would have a beneficial effect on the environment in
pastoral communities, though it is likely to require greater cultural change and
education, as the ownership will be in the name of the community and so any
commitment to more sustainable herd sizes must be collective as well as individual.
Benishangul and Gambella also have limited data because of the late engagement
and different context to the four HRS. It is again likely that registration would have
beneficial environmental impact but this would be less immediate and also require
cultural change (from agro-pastoral) and extensive awareness raising.
The above section demonstrates that land registration has a positive effect on the
environment in the agricultural areas that predominate in the four HRS and lower
effects in the agro-pastoral regions of Benishangul and Gambella, and the pastoral
regions of Somali and Afar.
Activity Complementarities - degree to which fits with activities of others.
The other complementary programmes are detailed below.
Land Administration to Nurture Development (LAND) is a USAID funded project
building on the two predecessor programmes. It is anticipated to operate from 2013
to 2017 with a total budget of US$11 million concentrating on:




Legal and policy development
Pastoral communities
Capacity building at national, regional and Woreda levels
Development of capacity building institutions
Geographically the LAND input is at national and regional level, specifically in Afar
and Somali. It would be a duplication of effort for LIFT to work in LAND project areas,
as the focus would still be on the policy front which LAND will cover.
The current phase of the €12.8 million Finnish-funded project, Responsible and
Innovative Land Administration Project (REILA) began in 2011 and will end in
June 2016. This phase is regarded as the first part of a longer programme of
support. Its major components are:




Public information and awareness raising
Capacity building and harmonisation
Developing basic land registration in Benishangul
Land administration in the Tana-Beles Growth Corridor in Amhara (9
woredas)
The third major project that will be going on during the implementation of LIFT is
Phase 2 of the Sustainable Land Management Programme (SLMP 2). SLMP 2 will
continue to support land registration within an overall framework of watershed
131
management. The programme has not yet been finalised but it is likely to be
US$100 million over 5 years, co-funded by Norway and the World Bank. While funds
are not being earmarked for specific activities, MoA have written to the World Bank
proposing that US$30 million of the available funds be used to support 2 nd level land
registration activities by regions in woredas in the watersheds being covered by the
programme. It is anticipated that these will be in the six regions that were covered
under SLMP 1 (all excluding Somali and Afar). As the SLMP is entirely implemented
by GoE in limited geography (woredas) and is a watershed-focused technical
engagement, any addition will not have a duplication effect but will rather have a
large leveraging potential.
In conclusion, there will be support to land registration from other programmes in the
four HRS and the western DRS. Afar and Somali will only receive support for policy
and systems development from LAND.
Degree to which fits with other DFID activities
The key DFID activities that relate to LIFT are as follows:



Private Enterprise Programme Ethiopia (PEPE), a national programme with
linkages to the market-orientated initiatives of LIFT.
Ethiopia Peace and Development Programme (PDP), which provides £75
million over five years to support improved basic social service delivery,
generate livelihood opportunities and improve access to justice. There will be
clear synergies with this programme in Somali as PDP has developed
capacities, work practices and relationships with regional and local
governments, and stakeholders.
Community Security and Justice in Ethiopia (CSJ), which is working in 5
zones in Gambella, Oromia and SNNPR with the following outputs;
o More capable and accountable local-level security and justice providers
in five selected zones of Ethiopia132
o Local communities more active in addressing their own security and
justice needs in five selected zones of Ethiopia
o Development of federal, regional and zonal GoE capacity,
accountability and coordination to improve gender-sensitive community
security and justice at local levels
o Support to the development of locally-owned indicators to drive
performance improvement within state criminal justice institutions
o Increased use of systems to enable monitoring and evaluation (M&E),
lesson-learning and dissemination of good practices at woreda, zone,
regional and federal levels.
There will be clear synergies between CSJ and LIFT in the three regions in the areas
of dispute mechanisms and the justice system, and gender issues in land tenure.
Many of these lessons can be extended across other LIFT programme regions.
Demonstrator effect likely to attract other donors
132
In areas including community policing; crime prevention, crime investigation and response;
improved local accountability; performance of, and access to, local state and non-state courts;
improved linkages between neighbouring districts or zones; and improved links between state and
non-state security and justice providers at local levels.
132
This indicator identifies whether working in a particular region or set of regions will
provide confidence to other development partners and government institutions to
start land-related activities in those regions.
The ITSP believes that successful implementation of a scaled-up approach to land
tenure regularisation will attract other development partners as there will be a
demonstrable system providing significant results with federal and regional
commitment. In options that include Somali and Afar, there will be less attraction for
risk-averse partners, since if certification has started in the programme period, it will
be too early to draw conclusions on its success. The case for Gambella and
Benishangul falls between these two options.
Wider Learning Generated
It is the view of the ITSP that all the regions will give rise to wider learning from the
market initiatives, land registration procedures, land administration systems in the
HRS and the development of policies and processes in the pastoral areas. It is likely
that the most innovative ideas may come out of the pastoral areas though these will
be largely developed in support of the LAND initiatives. The gradings are therefore
based on “low” for a small number of regions with few lessons to “high” for those with
many regions. Those in between have been marked as “medium”.
133
Annex 2 - Intervention Options Assessment
1.
Economic
Criterion Importance
2nd
Level
Certification
and
Land
Administration delivered by ITSP/GoE
2nd
Level
Certification
and
Land
Administration delivered by Govt
Second
Level
Certification,
Land
Administration, markets, regional and federal
policy Delivered by ITSP/GoE
Second
Level
Certification,
Land
Administration, markets, regional and federal
policy Delivered existing programmes and
AGP for markets
Land Administration, markets and policy
delivered by ITSP/GoE
2nd Level Certification, markets and policy
delivered by ITSP/GoE
Complete and update 1st Level Certification
with
markets
and
policy,
through
Government and AGP
Weighted
Score
2nd
Level
Certification
and
Land
Total
Income
impact
(accounting
for
difference
between
longterm/transfor
mational vs.
quick win)
2.1
Equalit
y/
Distrib
ution:
relativ
e
povert
y
of
those
benefit
ing
2.2
Likely
to
benef
it
wome
n
specif
ically
Very High
Med
Med
Low
Med
4. Operational
6. Other
3.1
Degree
to
which
mitigat
es risk
to
environ
ment
4.1
Degree
of
prepar
edness
for
support
4.2
Geogr
aphical
covera
ge
possibl
e given
costs
entaile
d
4.3
Capacit
y
of
implem
enting
agenci
es
&
appropr
iate
level of
technol
ogy.
5.1
Meeting
expectati
ons
of
federal
and local
governm
ents
6.1
Degr
ee
to
whic
h fits
with
activ
ities
of
othe
rs
High
2.3
Degre
e
to
which
mitigat
es
risks
conflic
t, large
scale
land
acquis
ition
Med
High
Med
Low
High
High
Med
Low
High
Med
Med
High
High
Low
High
Low
High
Med
Med
Low
Very High
High
High
High
High
Med
Med
High
Med
Med
Med
High
Low
Med
Med
Med
High
Med
Med
Med
Med
High
Low
Med
Med
7
14
2
2
3
6
Conclusion (reject vs. retain)
Criterion Indicator
3.
Enviro
nment
2. Social
5.
Political
Will/Acce
ptability
to GoE
6.2
Demon
strator
effect
likely to
attract
other
donors
6.3
Cross
cuttin
g
Geogr
aphic
Cover
age
6.4
Critic
ality
of
timin
g
6.5
Wide
r
learni
ng
gener
ated
Low
Med
Low
Low
Low
Med
High
Low
Low
Low
Retain
High
Med
High
Low
Low
Low
Reject
High
High
High
High
High
Med
High
Retain
Low
Low
High
High
High
High
Med
High
Retain
Low
High
High
Low
Med
Low
High
Med
Med
Reject
Med
Med
Med
High
Low
Med
Low
Med
Med
Med
Reject
Med
Low
Med
High
Med
Low
Low
Low
Med
Med
Med
Reject
2
2
3
9
2
4
1
2
3
9
3
9
1
2
2
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
68
134
1.
Economic
Criterion Importance
Administration delivered by ITSP/GoE
2nd
Level
Certification
and
Land
Administration delivered by ITSP/GoE
Second
Level
Certification,
Land
Administration, markets, regional and federal
policy Delivered by ITSP/GoE LIFT
Second
Level
Certification,
Land
Administration, markets, regional and federal
policy Delivered existing programmes and
AGP for markets
Land Administration, markets and policy
delivered by ITSP/GoE
2nd Level Certification, markets and policy
delivered by ITSP/GoE
Complete and update 1st Level Certification
with
markets
and
policy,
through
Government and AGP
Total
Income
impact
(accounting
for
difference
between
longterm/transfor
mational vs.
quick win)
2.1
Equalit
y/
Distrib
ution:
relativ
e
povert
y
of
those
benefit
ing
2.2
Likely
to
benef
it
wome
n
specif
ically
Very High
Med
14
4. Operational
6. Other
Conclusion (reject vs. retain)
Criterion Indicator
3.
Enviro
nment
2. Social
5.
Political
Will/Acce
ptability
to GoE
3.1
Degree
to
which
mitigat
es risk
to
environ
ment
4.1
Degree
of
prepar
edness
for
support
4.2
Geogr
aphical
covera
ge
possibl
e given
costs
entaile
d
4.3
Capacit
y
of
implem
enting
agenci
es
&
appropr
iate
level of
technol
ogy.
5.1
Meeting
expectati
ons
of
federal
and local
governm
ents
6.1
Degr
ee
to
whic
h fits
with
activ
ities
of
othe
rs
6.2
Demon
strator
effect
likely to
attract
other
donors
6.3
Cross
cuttin
g
Geogr
aphic
Cover
age
6.4
Critic
ality
of
timin
g
6.5
Wide
r
learni
ng
gener
ated
High
2.3
Degre
e
to
which
mitigat
es
risks
conflic
t, large
scale
land
acquis
ition
Med
High
Med
Low
High
High
Low
Med
Low
Low
Low
2
9
2
9
4
2
3
9
2
6
1
1
1
65
28
6
9
6
9
4
2
9
9
3
6
3
2
3
99
21
4
6
4
9
2
1
3
9
3
6
3
2
3
76
14
4
6
6
6
2
3
9
3
2
2
3
2
2
64
14
4
6
6
6
4
2
9
3
2
2
2
2
2
64
7
4
6
4
3
4
3
6
3
1
2
2
2
2
49
135
The following section sets out the reasoning for the scoring of each intervention
option against each of the criteria set out above (Economic, Social, Environmental,
Operational, Political, and Other).
1 Economic
1.1 Land Registration
The economic impact of the land registration was discussed in some detail during
the geographic assessment where the varying evidence of a number of sources was
cited. While the sources gave varying estimates of economic impact, it is clear that:



Increased security of tenure arising from land registration encourages greater
investment by land holders, driving greater economic returns. Klaus Deininger et
al., for example, in a 2009 paper on Impacts of Land Certification estimated that
in Amhara Region land registration had increased output by 9%. The land rental
market and access to finance is similarly enhanced by land registration.
Gebeyehu, in 2013, from a survey conducted in Amhara showed that 80% of land
holders were involved in some form of land rental market (fixed term or
sharecropping), compared to only 5% before land certification. The current
situation represents a 30-50% increase in rental income share to the landholder.
Impact is enhanced when the land registration is included in a package of
initiatives. Martin Adams et al. in a 1999 ODI paper on the economic benefits of
land tenure reform in South Africa, estimated that land reform could lead to a
20% increase in economic benefits, if carried out in conjunction with extension
and other support services.
Tenure security creates incentives for land users to invest labour and other
resources to improve and maintain the productivity of farms, the quality of
dwellings and the value of land and property.ccxci
In other countries, land registration is carried out in one stage, unlike in Ethiopia
where it has been carried out in two stages. The first level provided security of
tenure which gave rise to economic impact, according to various reports. The
second level provides greater security by providing a spatial assurance as to the
physical boundaries as well as verifying and correcting error in the first stage.
Upgrading land certification in Ethiopia from 1st to 2nd level involves more than just
the computerisation of land records. Of principal importance is the creation of a
spatial record – known as the cadastre. Cadastre is defined by the International
Federation of Surveyors as: “parcel based and up-to-date land information system
containing a record of interests in land. It usually includes a geometric description of
land parcels linked to other records describing the nature of the interests, ownership
or control of those interests, and often the value of the parcel and its improvements.
It may be established for fiscal purposes, legal purposes, to assist in the
management of land and land-use control, and enables sustainable development
and environmental improvement”.
While cadastral systems throughout the world differ in terms of processes and
structure, they are increasingly converging on a unified global model: the multipurpose cadastre. This provides spatially referenced information on tenure,
occupancy and land use, which is the foundation of a land information system. The
emergence of the multi-purpose cadastre is driven not only by advances in
information technology, but increasingly by the recognition that land is a community
scarce resource, and by the shift towards the sustainable development paradigm. ccxcii
136
The land information system functions as a core component of a comprehensive
land governance system which includes land administration systems, and land
management policies. These form the basis for sound land management towards
social, economic and environmental sustainability.
The main beneficiaries of such a multi-purpose cadastre are the stakeholders using
land data to plan for improved infrastructure, utilities, investments and environmental
protectionccxciii. These stakeholders may include investors whose investment
decisions can be hindered by a lack of clarity over land use rights.ccxciv
It is difficult to quantify the economic impacts of 2nd level registration over 1st level
registration since the principal impacts stem not from the act of 2 nd level registration,
but from building upon the land information generated to improve land management
through land administration and land use planning. Findings from Australia and New
Zealand suggest that economic benefits derived from such investments to land
information are in the region of $4 for every $1 spent. ccxcv Additionally, given the
unrecorded changes to de facto land ownership since 1st level certification occurred,
the benefits it afforded have largely eroded; therefore 2 nd level registration benefits in
Ethiopia can readily be compared to countries with single registration processes.
1.2 Land Administration Systems
The importance of the maintenance of a land administration, with a secure legal
basis, is highlighted in the following quotations from UN documents:
“A good land administration system will guarantee ownership and security of tenure;
support land and property taxation; provide security for credit; develop and monitor
land markets; protect land resources and support environmental monitoring; facilitate
the management of State-owned land; reduce land disputes; facilitate rural land
reform; and provide statistical data in support of good governance. It should be
affordable and open to everyone, meeting the needs of all its users, and must be
sustainable.” UNECEccxcvi
“Secure rights of access to land are a prerequisite for productive investment. Difficult
access discourages enterprises of all sizes in both urban and rural areas. Easier
access depends on effective, accessible land administration systems.”ccxcvii
It is clear from field inspections by the ITSP, interviews with regional and federal staff
and studies, that the registers that form the core of the land administration system
are not being undertaken thus undermining the gains from the land registration
exercise, leading to the reversion of the tenure to informal transactions, and the
obsolescence of the system:
 “An important lesson to be drawn from the experience in Ethiopia, where a failure
to keep records up-to-date is quickly undermining the reliability of the low cost
registration system (Deininger et al., 2008). Data from the 2010 Ethiopia survey
show that there is a high level of land transactions in the sampled areas.”ccxcviii
“Preliminary findings of the study have revealed that very few cases of permanent
transactions in land use rights are reported to the local registry offices. The
factors which have led land users not to “officially” report permanent transactions
in land use right relate to cultural norms and a low level of awareness on the
demand side. On the supply side, limiting factors include poor service delivery in
the local registry offices, combined with lack of a detailed legislative
framework.ccxcix”
137
If the LIFT programme is to register holding rights for 4 million parcels over a 5-year
period (approx. 800,000 parcels/year) and we use the 5% per annum transaction
estimated by the World Bank and quoted by the GoE in its Strategic Road Map, this
means that by the end of the programme, 1 million (a quarter) of the registered
parcel rights will be outdated (having changed hands in reality, but not in the
register) if there is not a functioning Land Administration system.
In short, the maintenance of an effective land administration system will therefore
sustain the gains of registration and ensure continuing security of tenure to land
holders. It will further stimulate economic growth through improved land use
planning based on an up-to-date cadastre. The impact will not be as immediate as
that of registration but will provide the platform for growth over the long term.
1.3 Market Facilitation interventions
The economic impact of first registration was driven totally by the registration
process without specific initiatives to facilitate economic impact. The use of the M4P
methodology to analyse the land and associated market facilitation, and to develop
interventions, will facilitate maximum economic impact beyond the inherent
advantages of land registration.
The M4P approach seeks to tackle systemic constraints that hinder the performance
of markets. The evidence base supporting the efficacy of the M4P approach is fairly
new, but growing. While there are presently no land interventions designed with an
M4P approach, the general success of this approach can be gauged by other private
sector programmes deploying it. There is an increasing number of programmes
explicitly following an M4P approach and which are recognised to be relatively
successful. These include FinMark in Southern Africa (in financial services),
PrOpCom in Nigeria (in agriculture), ENABLE in Nigeria (in business environment
reform), and Katalyst in Bangladesh (in a range of sectors). Several more
programmes are at a design or early implementation stage. Other donors such as
SDC, Sida and AusAID, are also devoting more resources to M4P programmes and
there is increasing interest in its application to ‘non-economic’ spheres such as
education and health. Although a large body of evidence from independent
evaluations does not yet exist, some positive indications of success are emerging:


The £12 million DFID PropCom programme resulted in over £40 million in
additional net income for 126,180 direct and indirect beneficiaries between 2005
and 2011. The programme created 17,633 new jobs, and agricultural productivity
increases averaging 31% were seen among poor farmers. The reviewccc
concluded that M4P was a viable approach for the context.
Katalyst has demonstrated significant results in boosting agri-business markets.
At its mid-term reviewccci, 3,560 service providers had improved service provision,
while an estimated 1.15 million farmers and small businesses had accessed
better and more affordable business services.
In terms of using the M4P approach to tackle deficiencies in the Ethiopian landmarket, there is evidence that these have been successfully addressed elsewhere
(albeit not through an explicitly labelled M4P programme). For example:

Rental markets and sharecropping – these often provide an opportunity to adjust
to credit imperfections in a flexible way with moderate productivity losses. Recent
research in Chinacccii found not only that rental markets have become more
important than administrative reallocation in terms of quantity, but also that
138

markets tended to transfer land to more productive and poorer households. In
other words, land markets were better than bureaucrats in transferring land to
poor and more efficient producers – those with small land endowments and high
levels of agricultural ability. The implication is that land sectors can – and do –
contribute to higher productivity and greater equity.
Access to finance – in the case of LIFT, activities under the market facilitation
approach will primarily make use of the additional security of tenure under a land
certificate as a guarantee of small credit facilities.
It should also be noted throughout this assessment that the M4P approach to market
facilitation has not been previously applied in rural land situations and therefore there
is a risk that the M4P initiatives may fail.
1.4 Application to the Options
2nd level registration – this intervention alone would have a low economic impact in
the medium term, since 1st level registration benefits have largely eroded as records
were not updated and the register is weakly upheld. In the longer term, the
economic gains would be little or none, due to accuracy erosion.
Land administration – this intervention alone would have little/no economic gains;
original accuracy limitations / erosion of 1st level register accuracy means it would
yield few benefits without 2nd level registration. Combined with 2nd level registration
there would be additional low long-term economic gains as registers would be
upheld and accuracy maintained.
Market facilitation – reasonable economic gains in the long term, since basic benefits
of holding an accurate certificate are significantly leveraged; limited benefits without
2nd level registration (to provide accurate register as a basis), and diminishing
benefits over time without land administration (to retain accurate register).
2
Social
2.1 Equality/Relative poverty distribution of beneficiaries
The target beneficiaries for the programme are smallholder farmers though there is a
relativity of poverty and landholding sizes. In addition, work could be carried out at
the policy level with pastoral communities. The impact of the various intervention
components is described below.
2.1.1 Second Level Registration
Studies by Deininger et al. (2008)ccciii point to a positive and highly significant
investment effect of land certification. This work in Ethiopia showed that certified
plots were 5% more likely to have received new investment and that this new
investment would be 4.4% higher than on non-certified parcels.
Evidence to date suggests that land registration in Ethiopia has been ‘wealth neutral’
in that it has benefitted land holders regardless of income status.ccciv With this in
mind, systematically upgrading 1st level registered land to 2nd level registration would
ensure that it is not only wealthier land holders, who can afford to have their land
surveyed on a sporadic basis that benefit from spatial records.
Holden et al. (2011)cccv found that boundary disputes in Tigray constituted over 37%
of all land disputes, and that local mediators felt that these types of dispute were the
most difficult to resolve. Defining spatial parcel boundaries helps to protect farmers
from land disputescccvi by providing verifiable evidence in the event of an appeal.
2.1.2 Land Administration
139
The sources quoted in the ranking against the 1st criterion of economic impact
provide evidence of the importance of the land administration system to sustain the
tenure security provided to the poor through land registration. Where land
administration is founded on a strong and equitable legal base, and includes
effective dispute resolution mechanisms, it will further protect the poor from
exploitation and loss of their land use rights without compensation or right of appeal.
2.1.3 Market Facilitation interventions
The examples quoted of the effect of the M4P approach in Nigeria and Bangladesh
in section 1.3 demonstrate how pro-poor results can be achieved by explicitly
focusing on the needs of the poor; this would also be the focus of LIFT. Section 1.3
also refers to the effect of land rental market reform in China as increasing access of
the poor to land. This is reinforced by evidence from Mexico, where abandonment of
rental restrictions in the constitutional reform of 1992 had a positive impact on
productivity, land sector activity, and equity rather than the predicted wave of land
sales and destitution.cccvii A prime area of focus within LIFT will be to seek to
enhance land sectors for the benefit of the poor.
In Ethiopia, there are restrictions on land rental markets that limit the ability of less
productive or resource-poor land users to lease out their land to more productive or
resource-rich users and thereby to gain an income that they would not otherwise
have. Research carried out in Amhara by the regional bureau which has liberalised
rental laws showed that one of the biggest land renting out groups is the poor.
The cross-cutting policy interventions in the Market Facilitation Interventions will
include assisting GoE in developing policy and procedures in respect of the
allocation of land for large scale land investments, communal land, and pastoralism
that will protect the poor and emphasise equity.
Interventions in this area could offset potential risks associated with less pro-poor
growth from land registration; however, there is a strong risk that the GoE may not
accept the most promising pro-poor policy changes.
2.1.4 Application to the Options
The above analysis indicates that improved and sustainable security of tenure will
benefit the poor, building on the gains from 1st registration and correcting the
imperfections of that exercise. The largest impacts will come from work on market
laws, policies and interventions, which will focus on improving the incomes of the
poor together with the cross-cutting activities which seek to provide greater equity
and protection for the rights of the poor.
Taking the above into account, the highest rankings have therefore been given to
strong market interventions with a holistic approach to enhancing the market through
supporting functions, the institutional and legal framework, and cross-cutting policy
interventions.
2.2 Likely to benefit women specifically
The next section analyses how the various components of the interventions under
review will benefit women specifically.
2.2.1 2nd Level Registration
Most authorities generally accept that land registration has a beneficial effect on
women through security of tenure, as demonstrated in the geographic analysis.
140






Providing secure land use rights for women makes economic sense and is
important for poverty reduction. This is because of women’s roles as food
producers, their responsibilities for feeding family members and their broader
roles in household management. Female-headed households can benefit
enormously from the security, status and income-earning opportunities which
secure rights to even a small plot of land can provide. There is a strong positive
association between women’s land use rights and poverty reduction; this is
because women’s control over land assets enhances household welfare,
women’s cash incomes and spending on food, children’s health and
educationcccviii.
Secure land use rights for female farmers can improve investment, access to
sources of credit and better land use and productivity, with women frequently
regarded as at lower risk of credit default than men.cccix
“Tenure initiatives that support gender equity can serve to increase women’s
power in agricultural production as well as in social and political relationships”cccx
and thus addressing gender and governance of tenure is clearly essential to the
achievement of MDG3 (promoting gender equality and empowering women).
Stein Holden et al. (2011)cccxi found that 85% of respondents in their study
believed that the land registration programme improved the position of women
and confidence to lease out their land. The land productivity on rented out plots of
female-headed households is no longer lower than that of male-headed
households and female-headed households have become more willing to lease
out land after land certification. Upgrading 1st level certification to 2nd level
certification will strengthen the rights of women renting out land, protecting them
from encroachment by the tenant or inappropriate allocation of land by providing
easily verifiable evidence of the boundaries of their land parcels.
In a survey conducted in Amhara in 2013, Gebeyehucccxii, found that since 1st
level registration, 60% of female-headed households were renting out their land,
a finding confirmed in interviews with beneficiaries in the field.
Deininger et al (2011) cccxiii identified in Rwanda (i) improved land access for
legally married women and better documentation of inheritance rights; (ii)
significant investment impacts for female-headed households.
2.2.2 Land Administration
The sources quoted in the ranking against the 1st criterion of economic impact
provide evidence of the importance of the land administration system to sustain
tenure security provided to women through land registration.
Where land
administration is founded on a strong and equitable legal base it will further protect
women from exploitation and loss of land use rights without compensation or appeal.
2.2.3 Market Facilitation Interventions
In 2.2.1, the beneficial effect of registration on land rental by women was noted and
the development of the land rental markets will be a major element of this
component of the interventions, with an emphasis on the role of women who are
considered to be key drivers of rural economic growth.
The cross-cutting policy interventions that are included in the Market Facilitation
Interventions will include assisting GoE in developing policy and procedures in
respect of the allocation of land for large scale land investments, communal land,
and pastoralism that will protect the poor and emphasise equity. The work that
would be carried out in the area of pastoral policy will particularly address the rights
141
of women in respect of land rights both within the customary land systems and the
current trend towards agro pastoral and sedentary land use.
2.2.4 Application to the Options
The above analysis indicates that improved and sustainable security of tenure will
benefit women, building on the gains from 1st Registration and correcting the
imperfections of that exercise. The largest impacts will however come from work on
market laws (especially those relating to land rental), policies and interventions,
which will include focusing on improving women’s incomes together with crosscutting activities which seek to provide greater equity and protection for the rights of
the poor.
2.3
Degree to which mitigates risks associated with a) conflict b) land
policies that are not in line with international good practice and human
rights obligations
The major potential areas for conflict over land in Ethiopia are:



Parcel level disputes with neighbours, family or others
Conflicts arising from encroachment into one community’s land by another.
Conflicts arising as a result of land policies which are not clear or not
implemented in line with international good practice and human rights obligations.
2.3.1 2nd Level Registration
“Secure land use rights tend to promote social stability by reducing uncertainty and
conflicts over land; they also mitigate the insecurity, unemployment, poverty and
social exclusion associated with landlessness and homelessness”.cccxiv
Studies have shown that 1st level land registration had little effect in reducing the
number of land disputes over rights to a parcel that went into the judicial system after
an initial rise, reflecting the greater value placed by the landholder on the land and
also the number of errors found in the process.cccxv The ELAP baseline study
identified the major types of dispute as boundary-related (58.8%) followed by rights
disputes with non-family members (18.2%). However, the bulk of disputes are
settled by elders or other informal process (55.5%) or by the woreda or kebele
administrations (29.9%) with only 14.5% going into the formal legal system cccxvi.
Under 2nd level registration, with the provision of a boundary map for every parcel, it
is anticipated that the number of boundary disputes will also fall.
2.3.2 Land Administration
The recording of all land use rights in an up-to-date register will reduce disputes over
boundaries and ownership, since the only legally accepted transactions are those
recorded in the register. Furthermore, an effective land administration system, with
capable institutions and an appropriate basis in policy and law, will serve to reduce
the number of disputes that go to court as they should be mediated through the land
administration system on the basis of evidence.
Where there is a functioning land administration system supported by appropriate
laws and policies, large scale acquisitions can be undertaken as per international
good practice because the rights and spatial data are clear, as are the provisions for
compensation and legal redress.
Under current circumstances, the land administration system will have little impact
on conflicts between communities, which largely occur in pastoral areas. This is
because land policies to underpin the land administration system are not in place.
142
2.3.3 Market Facilitation Interventions
The market interventions under consideration are unlikely to resolve disputes in the
short term, and may even exacerbate them, because of the added value of parcels
as a result of increased productivity or rental values.
However, LIFT will seek to ensure that policies on e.g. communal and pastoralist
land are in line with international good practice and human rights obligations. This
component should mitigate conflicts arising from government priorities and remove
constraints on the land administration system. Similarly, work in the pastoral areas
will allow the development of procedures and policies that will reduce conflicts
through clear legislation. The impact of this will depend on Government’s willingness
to change policies where necessary and implement in line with those policies.
2.3.4 Application to the Options
The major interventions that will mitigate the risks associated with conflict are those
relating to policy in relation to the Developing Regional States (DRS) which will be
covered under cross-cutting activities. The land registration activities and the
improved land administration system will have greater impact on disputes rather than
conflict and these disputes are generally resolved through local level institutions.
3 Environmental
3.1 Degree to which mitigates risk to environment
3.1.1 2nd Level Registration
Deininger et al. (2011) found in Rwanda that “individuals whose parcels had been
registered through LTR, in particular female-headed ones, were much more likely to
invest in soil conservation measures on their lands.”cccxvii
According to a UN reportcccxviii, “clearly defined tenure and access arrangements over
natural resources provide a basis for long-term stewardship and reconciliation of
competing claims by different users and interest groups. Lack of these in rural areas
can lead to environmental degradation (e.g. deforestation, water, biodiversity,
grasslands and desertification).”
The detailed analyses in the geographic assessment set out the evidence for the
beneficial impact of land registration on the environment through the farmers having
higher confidence through security of tenure, leading to measures to ensure longterm sustainability of their land resource. Further evidence set out there included:



Experience from Rwanda through M&E reports under LTR demonstrated that
where farmers have greater security over their land they will take greater care of
it and employ practices that will reduce soil erosion and land degradation.
A study in 2007 by Deininger et al. on the impact of registration in the four HRS in
Ethiopia reported that a majority of beneficiaries perceived certification to
increase incentives for investment in trees (88%), soil and water conservation
structures (86%), and sustainable management of CPRs (66%). While these are
perceptions and need to be supported by actual investment data, they are
indicative of the benefits of land registration on the environment.cccxix
Research by Addis Ababa University in Amhara, in which some 75% of the
farmers interviewed indicated that they intended to increase investment in their
land following registration and to increase its sustainability through better land
management.cccxx
143

A report on Rwanda by Deininger who noted that within 2 years of registration
twice as many farmers in the trial cells had installed or rehabilitated soil
conservation structures as those in the control cells.
3.1.2 Land Administration System
As noted elsewhere, the operation of an effective and up-to-date land administration
system will sustain the gains under 2nd level registration and secure tenure on a
sustainable basis which will encourage the on-going conservation of the parcel.
Through the land cadastre underpinning the land administration, it will also allow the
development of effective land use planning systems that will facilitate environmental
planning and control within the woreda.
3.1.3 Market Facilitation
The markets interventions will encourage better conservation of land in order to
protect yields though this may be balanced by pressures to maximise the short term
income from the holding. Policy interventions are not currently considered directly in
the area of the environment or climate change but would be employed where the
efficiency of the rural land sector is threatened.
3.1.4 Application to the Options
The above evidence indicates that the incremental environmental effect will be
predominantly caused by the 2nd certification and security of tenure, supported by the
land administration system.
The evidence does not suggest significant
environmental impacts from market facilitation.
4 Operational
4.1 Degree of Preparedness for Support/Cultural Awareness
4.1.1 2nd Level Registration
As discussed in the geographic assessment, there is a high level of preparedness at
the federal and highland regional levels for systematic land registration.
The federal government has prepared the necessary regulations and all the four
HRS have these in place, together with the necessary guidelines.
During field visits, the ITSP found that all the regions have budgeted for support to
registration and three have started to roll out further 2 nd level registration using the
piloted REILA methodology. Amhara continues to do 2 nd level registration using total
station equipment, while the ortho-photo methodology is being studied.
Human capacity at federal, regional, and woreda level, while possibly adequate for
the low-scale registration being carried out, will require enhancing in terms of
numbers and skills in order to carry out mass first level registration.
4.1.2 Land Administration
While there is awareness of the need for land administration systems, there is little
capacity to develop them. Outside of Amhara, registers are poorly maintained and
not appropriate for sustainable use.
A computerised land administration database system is being developed by MoA
through REILA and SLMP which will be ready in October 2014 (estimated) for
adaption to regional needs and implementationcccxxi. Amhara has a computerised,
textual system but this will need significant modification and spatial capabilities to be
truly effective.cccxxii
144
4.1.3 Market Facilitation
While there is appetite for development of rental markets there is little preparedness
for market facilitation initiatives which will be developed under LIFT. Awareness
raising will be a very significant element of such initiatives prior to their
implementation. Similarly, there is no cultural readiness for policy interventions in
Somali province or other pastoral areas.
4.1.4 Application to the Options
In scoring the options against this criteria higher marks have therefore been
assigned to options with land registration components for which there was previous
experience to prepare the regions for 2nd level.
Cost of intervention is feasible – geographical coverage possible given
costs entailed
Estimates of costs of interventions have followed the Springfield Associates G4G
split of the expected funds available of £30 million, as for:
4.2



Land Registration and Administration £20 million
Market Facilitation Interventions £8 million
Monitoring and Evaluation £2 million
£0.5 million has been earmarked already for the inception phase, leaving £29.5
million. The following issues have been taken into account in identifying the cost of
the interventions:





The ITSP considers £8 million as adequate to fund the anticipated market-based
studies, grants and the cross-cutting policy interventions.
An allocation of £2 million is deemed adequate for the M and E activities given
their high importance under the M4P approach.
The Land Administration intervention is expected to cost £1.5 million for most
options. This will rise to £19 million in the option without land registration work, as
the geographical coverage of the land administration interventions will be larger.
£0.5 million has been allocated for interventions in one emerging region, where
relevant. The amount available for Market Facilitation is reduced by this amount.
The balance of funds will be available for land certification. It is calculated that
2nd level certification will cost some US$7 per parcel based on REILA trial figures
(US$ 8) and Rwanda experience (US$ 5).
Revisiting and updating 1 st
Registration is estimated to cost $3 per parcel. There are estimated to be
100,000 parcels to a woreda in the four HRScccxxiii.
4.2.1 Application to the Options
The affordability marking has been based on the number of woredas of 2nd level
registration that each option allows. Where land admin. is included in the option it
will be implemented in the same woredas as the 2nd level registration allows.
The ratings do not attempt to evaluate value for money but to give an indication of
the affordability of each option. Value for more money will be identified through
markings against the other criteria.
4.3 Capacity of implementing agencies and appropriate level of technology
This criterion seeks to measure the level of technology used by each intervention
and its appropriateness to the capacities of the implementers.
4.3.1 Implementation of Land Registration
145
The technology envisaged for use in land registration and land administration will be
similar to that successfully used in Rwanda, where mostly inexperienced staff were
quickly able to implement the processes following training by a small core of national
and international staff. It will involve the development of computerised systems but
these will be within the capacity of woredas to operate and regions to support with
appropriate training.
Woredas, with some exceptions, have computer experience. Experience from
REILA trials has demonstrated that inexperienced staff are able to operate the
systems after minimal training.
None of the implementing agencies other than the ITSP, however, have any
experience of designing and managing the mass land registration procedures and
logistical control required to meet the anticipated minimum of 4 million parcels over
the programme period.
4.3.2 Market Facilitation
The policies and market interventions will need specialist implementers. Training of
government and other staff is likely to be a lengthy process and so, where not being
implemented through LIFT, these activities will need support from specialists not
available within the Government.
4.3.3 Application to the Options
In summary:
A) GoE alone – less capacity than B or C to do more challenging aspects of
certification and administration; low focus on and capacity to do market facilitation
B) GoE + ITSP – higher capacity than A to do more challenging aspects of
certification and administration; higher focus on and capacity than A or C to do
market facilitation
C) Other donors + GoE – higher capacity than A to do more challenging aspects of
certification and administration; less focus on and capacity than B do market
facilitation.
5
Political Will/Acceptability to GoE
5.1 Meeting expectations of federal and local governments
Federal and regional government policy documents (as set out in the Geographical
options assessment) clearly demonstrate that the priority of these stakeholders is to
maximise 2nd level registration and to implement a land administration system.
GoE has expressed its intention through the ELALUDEP (Component 3)cccxxiv, the
GTP and the SRM, to prioritise the implementation of second level registration
through a phased approach across the four HRS of Amhara, Oromia, Southern
Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region (SNNPR) and Tigray. The SRM intends
to register about 49.98 million parcels covering a total of 12,288 kebeles and 496
woredas situated in Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray regional states. While this
is clearly unlikely to be achieved, the Government’s intentions are clear.
There have been continuing activities in the area of land registration and RLAUD
continues to be very involved in the pilots of ortho-photo 2nd level certification
supported by REILA and SLMP, in the four main regions.
The MoA’s Land Administration and Use Directorate continues to work with the
Somali and Afar regions in developing legal processes and mechanisms for land
registration in the pastoral communities, as identified in the ELALUDEP.
146
The Agency in MoA responsible for large scale land acquisitions has indicated in
interview its readiness for support in developing procedures.
In summary the LIFT interventions can be mapped against the ELALUDEP as
follows:
ELALUDEP Componentcccxxv
Component - 1. Improving the Policy
and Legal Framework for Land
Administration and Land Use
Component 2 – Reforming and
Strengthening
the
Institutional
Framework for Land administration and
land use
Component 3 – Land Registration and
Certification
Component 4 – Developing and
implementing Land Use Planning
Component 5 – Developing Human
Resource and Research
Component
Management,
Evaluation
6
–
Programme
Monitoring
and
LIFT Component
Land
Administration
Development
Market Facilitation at regional
level
Land Admin Development
Market Facilitation at regional
level
Other programmes
LAND
Land Registration at regional
level
Land Admin Development at
federal level
Land Admin Development at
regional level and federal
level, respectively
M and E
REILA
SLMP
LAND
LAND
REILA
LAND
5.1.1 Application to the Options
The federal and regional governments are mainly expecting contributions to
components of ELALUDEP. The ratings reflect that view.
6 Other
6.1 Degree to which fits with activities of others
The main institutions and projects with which the interventions are required to fit are:
Institution/project
The Federal and Regional Governments.
REILA – Development of computerised
land administration system, 2nd level
certification in Benishangul and Amhara,
Procurement of aerial survey imagery.
LAND – Policy advice, development of
policy and systems in pastoral areas,
development of land academic and
research institutions.
SLMP – Land Registration in selected
watershed woredas. Aerial photography,
PDP
PEPE
CSJ
How to fit
 Ensure all activities are consistent with Government policies
and priorities.
 Woreda selection should be consistent with regional priorities
 Leverage computerised land system for implementation under
LIFT including customising to regional needs, influencing design
 Harmonisation of woredas with REILA
 Utilisation of aerial imagery
 Influence policy advice being given
 Contribute to pastoral development
 Influence and utilise research institutions in LIFT studies and
pilots
 Harmonise woredas in which working
 Ensure use of land administration systems where they are
working
 Work through PDP in identifying opportunities in Somali
 Leverage relationships with Somali Region
Identify linkages in market interventions
Lesson learning for land administration system application.
6.2 Demonstrator effect likely to attract other donors
The major areas that are likely to attract other donors are the land registration and
land administration where significant concrete impacts can be derived. While policy
and markets will have significant impacts they are likely to be less replicable. The
marking in the matrix therefore scores such items more highly than policy items.
6.3 Cross-cutting Geographic Coverage
The land administration system that is developed will have cross-cutting
geographical coverage because the system will be tailored to each of the regions to
147
be covered within a national framework. In addition, the policy advice will be crosscutting and not just based on the participating woredas.
Examples of cross-cutting initiatives expected to be included are:
 Relationships between urban and rural land registration;
 Support to the Government in the development of transparent and equitable
procedures in relation to large scale land investment,;
 Development of policies and procedures in relation to pastoral communities.
The marking has therefore assigned higher rankings to the policy level items.
6.4 Criticality of timing
The major areas in which there is a criticality of timing relate to policy and particularly
the large-scale land investment system. Only 416,000 hectares in the land bank
have been allocated to date, out of an earmarked 3.5 million hectares. Delay will
lead to irreversible decisions being made on the remaining hectares available.
Other areas of intervention such as land registration and land administration will
suffer if there are delays because the system will continue to degrade and there will
be dangers of reverting to informal transactions. However, this is less time critical.
The marking will reflect this and rate policy interventions more highly.
6.5 Wider learning generated
Wider learning will be generated from all interventions though it is likely to be higher
in the market facilitation areas, where we expect to generate ground-breaking
national and international learning on the management of large scale acquisitions,
pastoral land tenure, and the development of rural land sector systems,. The land
registration and land administration work will contribute to a growing body of
knowledge on the design and impact of land registration systems, which will be
generated through the programme M&E system and studies undertaken during
implementation.
148
Annex 3 - Options for intervention assessment
1 DEEPENING OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL COMPONENT OF THE OPTIONS
The central geographical component was agreed as up to four of the main Highland
Regional States (HRS) and in this assessment we have identified two options:


All four HRS of Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region
(SNNPR) and Tigray
Two of the above states selected as below (since to only cover one or to only omit one,
would be more negatively received at federal and regional level)
1.1 Selection of the Two Highland States
The two HRS selected for inclusion in the geographic option are Amhara and Oromia; the
following table sets out the criteria considered in their selection and the importance
attached to the adopted criteria.
Possible criteria
Gender
Poverty
Economic Impact from increased
production
Economic impact from land rental
markets
Level of tenure insecurity
Level of regional preparedness and
commitment
Potential for replication
Environmental effect
Existing
Support
from
other
programmes
Potential for future support in other
regions
Relevance
Not
considered
significant
impact
difference across the 4 regions
Different poverty levels
Differing levels of agriculture production
Included in criteria?
Not included
Arrangements different in different regions
Included – high importance
Due to differing land allocation exercises
by Government the land tenure insecurity
levels differ between regions
Some regions more prepared
Included - medium importance
Some regions using differing approaches
Different levels of degradation
No great difference between regions
Included – low importance
Included – low importance
Excluded
No great difference between regions
Excluded
Included – medium importance
Included – high importance
Included- high importance
The four regions have been ranked against the criteria as follows:
1. Economic impact from better utilisation
The following table sets out three factors which influence the potential for economic growth
in the four regions:
Regions
Amhara
Oromia
SNNPR
Tigray
Population
density
Per/Km2
Extent of Cash Crops
Extent of Cultivated Land
Ha
%
Ha (Millions)
111
95
142
104
850,000
1,900,000
720,000
140,000
14
19
20
10
5.7
9.6
3.6
1.4
% of the
region’s
Area
27
45
17
7
Ranking
High
High
Medium
Low
2. Economic impact from land rentals
Amhara has amended the land rental provisions of its proclamation to allow rental of up
to 25 years with very few restrictions. This has ranked highly as this can be leveraged
through market interventions. Oromia has also amended its provisions to provide for 15
years but with significant limitations on what can be rented out. SNNPR is very similar to
Oromia but Tigray is more restrictive.
3. Level of tenure insecurity
149
Land redistribution happens more frequently in Amhara and Tigray leading to greater
tenure insecurity, which can be addressed through a functioning land administration
system.
Deininger reported that 93% of the sampled population in Amhara and 83% in Tigray
had experienced at least one redistribution event since 1991, and it was still pervasive in
2007. In SNNPR it was reported as 50% and 25% in Oromia.
This ranks Amhara and Tigray as high and the other two as low.
4. Level of regional preparedness and commitment
All four regions have undertaken 2nd level registration and are therefore prepared for
involvement in LIFT initiatives, but capacities will differ between them. Amhara and
Tigray are the best staffed and equipped of the regions (though by no means fully
prepared), while SNNPR and Oromia need significant upgrading.
During visits to all four states we were informed that budgetary allocation has been
made for 2nd level registration, the highest reported being Amhara and Tigray regions.
Amhara has started putting land administration experts into the kebeles, to improve land
administration.
Amhara and Tigray are rated as high under this criterion with the others at medium.
5. Potential for replication
This was marked on the basis that registrations can be replicated across a region and is
therefore related to the number of parcels in the region. The SRM estimates the number
of parcels and woredas per region as follows:
Amhara
Oromia
SNNPR
Tigray
Parcels millions
15
23
10
2
Woredas
128
264
134
34
Ranking
High
High
High
Low
6. Environmental impact
The extent of land degradation in Amhara and Tigray states is high as a result of the
high relief topography and the inappropriate land use practices. This suggests that land
registration would achieve a higher impact in those regions.
7. Poverty impact
While all regions have high poverty indicators, relative poverty differs:
Rural poverty headcount index 2010/11cccxxvi
Tigray
Amhara
Oromia
SNNPR
.365
.307
.293
.300
Tigray has a higher poverty level than the others while Oromia has the lowest level.
150
6
7
Poverty
Environment
Total Weighted
5
for
4
Potential
replication
3
Level of regional
preparedness
and commitment
2
Level of tenure
insecurity
1
Economic
impact through
improved rental
market
Criteria
Economic
impact through
increased
investment
Region
Weight
High
High
Medium
High
Low
Low
Medium
Amhara
High
High
High
High
High
High
Medium
43
Oromia
High
Medium
Low
Medium
High
Medium
Medium
32
South
Medium
Medium
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
28
Tigray
Low
Low
High
High
Low
High
High
31
1.2 Selection of One Emerging State
The option here concerns which, if any, of the Developing Regional States (DRS) of Afar,
Benishangul, Gambella, and Somali should be included in LIFT for policy and
transformational activities.
Somali is the proposed region for the following reasons:
 Comparative advantage – DFID has an existing project (Peace and Development
Programme, PDP) in the region which has built up a good relationship base with the
regional government and other stakeholders. This is not the case in the other DRS.
 Other projects – the USAID-funded Land Administration for National Development
(LAND) project has been working for 5 years in the region on land policy development
with regard to pastoral land tenure regularisation. While REILA is operating in
Benishangul, it is largely involved in land registration, which provides little synergy for
LIFT. There are no other significant projects working in the other DRS.
 Transformational impact – achieving an equitable land tenure system is likely to be a
drawn out process due to the tensions between government policies and the prevailing
customary (not legally recognised) systems of land administration. But the possibilities
for transformation are great. While transformation can be achieved in the other DRS it is
unlikely to be of the magnitude possible in Somali.
 Economic impact – while the economic impact in Somali will be significantly lower than in
the agro-economic powerhouses of the HRS, it will be higher than in the other DRS
because of its size and higher population, despite a similar population density.
 Impact on the poor and disadvantaged – Somali has the second lowest poverty index
rating of the four DRS after Afar (GoE Household Income Survey 2010/11 indicators).
 Impact on Women –, Girls and women in Somali could benefit from a change in
livelihood options underpinned by improved property rights. (Flintan, 2010cccxxvii).
 Resettlements and large scale investment – both of these are occurring in the region.
 Learning opportunities – lessons learnt in the region will have applicability in Afar,
Oromia and SNNPR all of which have sizable pastoral communities. They will also be
applicable to other pastoral and dryland regions in East Africa.
However, there are substantial risks to involvement in this region:
 Security – operations will be constrained by the prevalent security risks.
 Resistance to change – there are strong positions held in the government and the
customary authorities which mean that agreed change will be difficult to achieve.
 Sensitivity – inappropriate or un-nuanced interventions could make things worse, not
better, leading to conflict over land.
 Possibility of failure – there is a strong possibility that after 5 years little or nothing
concrete will have been achieved.
1.3 Cross-cutting Geographic Interventions
The cross-cutting geographic interventions are covered in the interventions component.
2
The Intervention Components of the Options
151
The following three intervention options were ranked highest in the assessment of the
interventions and combinations thereof:
1) Second Level Registration, Land Administration, Market Facilitation, regional and
federal policy.
Delivered by the ITSP, working through Federal and Regional
Governments.
2) Second Level Certification, Land Administration, Market Facilitation, regional and federal
policy. Delivered by existing programmes including AGP for markets.
3) 2nd Level Certification and Land Administration. Delivered by the ITSP, working through
Federal and Regional Governments.
3 The Merged Options
The following are the options from which the feasible options will be selected:
Geographic
Intervention
Option 1. Four states – with Somali; ITSP delivers
Land Registration
Regions of Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR
Land Administration
and Tigray
Land sector facilitation and Policies
Customary land tenure mapping
Support to LAND Policy development and piloting
Somali Region
Support to LAND Capacity Devt.
Land sector facilitation and Policies
Policy development
Rural/Urban linkages
Cross Region Geographic
Large scale land investment
etc.
Option 2 Two states – with Somali; ITSP delivers
Land Registration
2 Regions of Amhara and Oromia
Land Administration
Land sector facilitation and Policies
Customary land tenure mapping
Support to LAND Policy development and piloting
Somali Region
Support to LAND Capacity Devt.
Land sector facilitation and Policies
Policy development
Rural/Urban linkages
Cross Region Geographic
Large scale land investment
etc.
Option 3 Four states – No Somali; ITSP delivers
Land Registration
4 Regions of Amhara, Oromia,
Land Administration
SNNPR and Tigray
Land sector facilitation and Policies
Policy development
Rural/Urban linkages
Cross Region Geographic
Large scale land investment
etc.
Option 4 – Four States - No Somali; delivered through other donors
Land Registration
4 Regions of Amhara, Oromia,
Land Administration
SNNPR and Tigray
Land sector facilitation and Policies
Policy development
Rural/Urban linkages
Cross Region Geographic
Large scale land investment
etc.
Option 5 – No rural land sector facilitation – no Somali
4 Regions of Amhara, Oromia, 2nd Land Registration
SNNPR and Tigray
Land Administration
Cross Region Geographic
Policy development
152
Delivering
Agency
ITSP
Gov’t
support
ITSP
Gov’t
support
ITSP
Gov’t
support
Government
with
Existing
programmes
ITSP
GoE
support
Geographic
Delivering
Agency
Intervention
Rural/Urban linkages
Large scale land investment
etc.
4
Assessment of Matched Options
4.1 Basis of Assessment
The options were initially ranked using the intervention and geographic rankings from the
previous assessments. To these overall criteria were added various additional criteria
which draw out the implications of combining the geographical and intervention types in
different ways. This gives the following rankings and weights:
Criterion
Explanation
Weighting
Interventions
Score from initial intervention assessment
High
Geography
Score from initial geography assessment
High
Capacity
Capacity for implementation
Low
Costs
Are costs of spreading widely mitigated?
Low
Transformation effect
What is the transformation potential?
Medium
Catalytic effect
Likely effect of inspiring regions and woredas to extend application further
Medium
Political
How does it meet the GoE’s priorities?
Medium
Weight
Option 1- M4P on Land, including 2nd level
certification, Land Administration in 2 regions +
additional activities. Delivered by ITSP/GoE
Option 2- M4P on Land, including 2nd level
certification, Land Administration in 4 regions +
additional activities. Delivered by ITSP/GoE
Option 3 - 2nd Level Certification, Land
Administration, markets, regional and federal policy
Delivered by existing programmes (REILA, LAND, AGP),
in 4 Regions
Option 4 - 2nd Level Certification and Land
Administration delivered by ITSP/GoE, in 4 Regions
Option 5 - 2nd Level Certification and Land
Administration delivered by ITSP/GoE, in 2 Regions
Rank
Weighted
mark
Political
Will/Acce
ptability
to GoE
Catalytic
Transfor
mation
Costs
Capacity
Options
Geograph
y
Results of the Assessment
Interventi
ons
4.2
3
3
1
1
1
2
2
High
Low
High
High
High
Med
Low
27
4
High
High
High
Med
High
High
High
38
1
Med
High
Med
Med
Med
High
High
32
2
Low
High
High
High
Low
Med
High
28
3
Low
Low
High
High
Low
Med
Med
20
5
4.3 Explanations of marking in the results
4.3.1 Intervention Criteria
The intervention criteria are derived from the results of the intervention assessments and
have been applied to the intervention components of the different merged options. As a
result, those options that included all of land registration, administration and market
facilitation (or other market interventions) scored most highly, which favoured Options 1 to 4
4.3.2 Geographic Criteria
The geographic ranking is similarly derived from the results of the geographic assessments
and has been applied to the geographic components of the different merged options. Those
153
options that are operating in the four HRS tend to score highly against these criteria
because of the higher economic impact and consistency with government expectations and
strategies.
This favours options 3, 4 and 5, as options 1 and 2 include an emerging state which
combination scored lower in the geographic assessment.
4.3.3 Capacity Criteria
The capacity criteria is set to rank the differing capacities of the entities that are supporting
GoE to deliver the options – i) the ITSP and ii) the other active projects in the sector.
i) The ITSP’s capacity to support GoE to deliver this intervention is rated highly due to the
international members’ experience in designing and supporting Government
implementation of land registration and administration programmes elsewhere in Africa,
including in Rwanda and Mozambique, as well as in Guyana in South America. The
team also has very wide experience in the implementation of projects using the M4P
approach to facilitate markets, through targeted interventions and policy reform, in
Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Vietnam. This international expertise is supported by
national team members with extensive experience of the Ethiopian rural land sector.
ii) Capacity in the other programmes to implement the interventions will be not as high as
capacity under the ITSP/GoE delivery method. While experienced in the development
and piloting of land registration systems, the other projects have no experience of scaling
them up to the levels required to make the necessary impact.
The market facilitation approaches considered in the AGP are not as holistic as those
provided by M4P and capacity will have to be built to make this effective. There is a great
deal of capacity within the LAND programme for policy development and preparation of
legislation and regulations, which will be available to this option.
On the basis of the above analysis, 1, 2, 3, and 5 are ranked as high, and 4 as medium.
4.3.4 Cost Criteria
This criteria ranks the relative costs of each option to take into account the effect of the
variable costs of:
 Operating in 2 rather than 4 states
 Not operating in Somali
 Not carrying out market facilitation approaches
An indicative cost profile based on the initial £30 million envelope and including operating in
4 states plus Somali and undertaking M4P market facilitation, is used as the baseline and
ranked as medium:
Activities
Land Registration
Land Administration
Somali Interventions
Market Facilitation
M and E
Total:
Inception Phase
Grand Total:
154
£ millions
18.0
1.5
0.5
7.5
2.0
29.5
0.5
30.0
The Cost ranking of the options is therefore as follows:
Option
Option 1. Four states, Land Reg, Land Adm, Somali,
Market facilitation
Option 2 Two states, Land Reg, Land Adm, Somali,
Market facilitation
Ranking
Medium
Comment
High
Option 3 Four states, Land Reg, Land Adm, Market
facilitation No Somali
High
Option 4 – Four States, Land Reg, Land Adm, Market
facilitation No Somali – Other programmes
Medium
Option 5 - Four States, Land Reg, Land Adm, No
Market facilitation No Somali
High
This option will allow a marginal increase (80,000 or
2%) in the numbers of parcels for which 2 nd level
registration can be carried out as a result of a lower
number of regional co-ordinators required for the
programme.
Cost savings from not being involved in Somali
(500,000), will allow an additional 110,000 parcels
(3%).
There will be cost savings of £500,000 resulting from
the lack of involvement in Somali. There will be
delays from the need to gear up and likely
procurement inefficiencies from use of government
systems that will hold back these savings
By not being in Somali and not undertaking market
facilitation activities an additional £8 million or 1.7
million parcels are available for 2nd Registration.
4.3.5 Transformation
As discussed in section 1.2, the transformational effects of working in Somali are high given
the social structures and the poor state of current policy and procedures. While it is a high
risk investment, the potential gains in terms of land tenure, women’s rights and market
change in this region are high, as confirmed by the PDP project.
2nd level certification will also provide a cadastre allowing improved land use planning and
environmental management, as well as improving tenure security.
Higher rankings have gone to those options with involvement in Somali (1 and 2).
4.3.6 Catalytic
The catalytic criteria ranks the options as to whether they are likely to drive change in the
regions in which they are being implemented, through demand from the farmers or the local
administrations, or through natural impetus being built.
2nd level registration and land administration will have that catalytic effect, as the increased
security of tenure is appreciated. It is anticipated that market facilitation measures will have
a similar effect of building their own momentum, as the beneficiaries see the improvement
in incomes of others and wish to have the same opportunities.
Higher marks are therefore given to options that emphasise land registration and market
facilitation systems, and operate in as wide an area as possible.
155
Annex 4: The “Making Markets Work for the Poor” (M4P) approach
Overview
The M4P approach was pioneered by DFID, SDC and others and helps to bring about
systemic change in the market133. The central concept of the approach is that the poor are
dependent on market systems for their livelihoods, so this approach aims to enable these
market systems to function more effectively, sustainably and beneficially for poor people.
M4P has obvious overlaps with Livelihoods and Value Chain approaches and the
recognition that agencies need to engage more directly with the private sector to deliver
pro-poor growth. It focuses on incentives within bureaucratic systems and the need to
understand “the rules of the game” (both formal and informal) that shape incentives,
attitudes and actions, and links in with “Drivers of Change” analytical approaches.
There are 42 current or pipeline programmes in DFID’s bilateral growth portfolio which take
an explicit M4P approach, with a total programme value of over £600m.
Key features of M4P programmes
The M4P approach suggests that the rural land sector system (see figure below) is formed
of three elements, which are considered essential for it to function effectively:
a. Core functions: this is the central set of exchanges between providers and consumers
of goods and services at the heart of any market. Exchange is conventionally through
money, but can be through informal
arrangements.
b. Rules (policies & institutions) act to shape
market outcomes and govern participation and
behaviour in markets. They include informal
rules or norms, formal rules or laws and other
standards and codes of practice. Formal
providers of rules are commonly Governments.
Rules are a non-commercial aspect of markets.
c. Support functions covers a range of
functions that support the core exchange and
help the market to develop and grow. They
include for example, information dissemination;
research & development and capacity
development. Their nature, and who provides
them, varies between contexts.
In implementing an M4P programme, it is
important to note that such programmes are
characterised by certain features:
 A focus on the poor: Participation of the
poor in markets, whether as producers,
employees or as consumers, is recognised from the outset.
 Large-scale change: By addressing underlying causes (rather than symptoms) of weak
market performance, the M4P approach aims to unleash large-scale change.
Interventions may be small in themselves, but should continually strive to leverage the
actions of key market players to bring about wider change.
133
A synthesis of the Making Markets for the Poor Approach. DFID, SDC, 2008.
156


Sustainability: This means considering not just the existing alignment of key market
functions and players but how they can work more effectively in the future, based on the
incentives and capacities of players to play different roles. For project managers, this
means in particular looking at how core functions in market systems and continuous
improvement of the regulatory and policy environment can be sustained in the long-run,
beyond the project lifecycle, without external support.
Facilitating role: M4P requires that implementing agencies play a facilitating role. As
external players they seek to catalyse others in the market system (while not becoming
part of it themselves). M4P emphasises explicitly that the role of intervention is
temporary and catalytic. Agencies should avoid performing market roles directly and try
to facilitate market players to perform more effectively.
Interventions therefore need to be sensitive to local market conditions and seek to stimulate
deeper and larger change by ‘crowding in’ other players to improve the functioning of the
market system, and strengthen competition and access for the poor. Successful facilitation,
although not a fixed model, requires implementers to have credibility, independence and
relevant knowledge and skill.
In order to implement M4P programmes and move from analysis to action, implementers
need to work with multiple partners and employ a variety of tools (technical assistance,
performance grants, challenge funds, loan guarantees).
Implications of using an M4P approach for procurement
The M4P approach requires flexibility in procuring and managing implementing
partners. This includes:
 Providing implementers some latitude over delivery – within the parameters of a clearly
defined approach which has been set during the design phase - to generate ownership
and to enable tailoring of programme content to experience of what works in practice.
 Recognising that results outcomes may take some time to generate, and consequently
ensuring development of clearly defined interim metrics for monitoring and evaluation, to
ensure delivery is on course.
 Ensuring DFID retains informed oversight of the programme – in the case of PEPE, this
is supported by the procurement of an independent contractor for providing strategy
guidance and undertaking monitoring and evaluation.
Implementation of an M4P approach within LIFT
As mentioned in the appraisal case, DFID has a strong track record working on land reform
programmes, but it has never used the M4P approach on a full-fledged land programme.
So far, DFID has only attempted to apply M4P in two land-related programmes:
 As part of DFID Nigeria’s Growth Employment and Markets (GEMS 3) programme
(2010-2016), which addresses land administration and tax reform as well as investment
promotion. However, land activities are mostly related to the political economy of land
reform and do not involve any support to land certification and land administration.
 In South Africa, DFID’s Urban LandMark (2006-2011) programme worked to make the
urban land sector work for the poor through research activities, dissemination of
findings, networking and advocacy, and communications and knowledge management.
It did not involve any land registration or administration activities.
Applying an M4P approach to a land certification and administration programme, however,
will allow DFID to maximise its impact on smallholder farmers. For them to fully benefit from
the positive effect of land certification and administration, it is essential that other additional
interventions are put in place to address the constraints that exist in the rural land sector
and in other related markets (e.g. inputs, finance, and information).
157
Annex 5: Climate & Environment Assurance Note and Checklists
5.1 Climate & Environment Assurance Note
Intervention Details
Title
Home Department
Budget
Land
Investment
for
Transformation
(LIFT)
Programme
DFID Ethiopia
Up to £68.2 million
Title
Name
Department
Project Owner
Shewit Emmanuel
DFID Ethiopia
Helen Bryer
DFID Ethiopia
Responsible Officers
Climate
Change
Environment Advisor
and
Appraisal
Success Criteria
Sensitivity Analysis
N/A
Yes
Climate & Environment Category
Risks
&
impacts
Option 1
B
Option 2
B
Option 3
B
Option 4
A
Opportunities
Option 1
B
Option 2
A
Option 3
B
Option 4
C
Management
Risks
and
defined
opportunities
Climate
&
Environment
Measures agreed
IMPACTS
RISK MITIGATION
No
significant
negative
environmental or climate
change impacts.
 Improved land tenure creates
incentives for better land
management. M4P will include
specific
assessment
and
analysis of the constraints to
farmers
in
maximising
productivity.
 Other
DFID
programmes
(SCIP
and
CHIP)
are
addressing wider climate and
DRM challenges
RISKS
 Environmental degradation
could reduce the ability of
farmers to maximise
productivity, and hence their
incomes, from increased
land tenure security, thus
effecting the project impact.
 Rescheduling programmes to
reduce delay and additional
158
Climate
&
Environment
Measures in log-frame
Impact: Protection of arable
land against environmental
degradation
Outcome: Area of land
covered
with
trees
in
‘000,000 hectares
 Adverse climatic conditions
derail growth and poverty
reduction and divert public
resources and
administrative capacity to
managing them.
 Seasonal extreme weather
and climate events may
cause implementation delay
and also reduction in
productivity.
costs. Plan implementation so
that areas with lower rainfall
have LIFT activities occurring
during the rainy season. Be
aware of droughts and other
climate shocks in regions and
change
the
work
plans
accordingly if the shocks
occur. Buy covered cars (not
pickups) and provide spades
and winches so that field
materials are protected and it
is unlikely the cars will get
stuck. Provide field teams with
all-weather
clothing
and
equipment.
MAXIMISING
OPPORTUNITIES
OPPORTUNITIES
 Land registers and
cadastres will enhance rural
land management and have
a role to play in supporting
governments and citizens in
their efforts at mitigating
climate change and trying to
adapt to its impact.
 Improved land tenure creates
incentives for better land
management.
 M4P will include specific
assessment and analysis of
the constraints to farmers in
maximising productivity.
 Climate and environment
experts in the team will
ensure sustainability issues
are addressed throughout
and will provide technical
support as needed
Evidence
Relevant documents



Final Business Case including Annex 5 (Climate & Environment Analysis and Checklist)
EDRM xxx [will be included after SofS’s approval]
Logframe 4327612
Climate and Environment Analysis 4231330
SIGNED OFF BY: Helen Bryer
DATE: 06/09/2013
159
5.2 Climate and Environment Sensitivity Analysis
Negative impacts:
Are the objectives of the
project likely to be at risk
from;
Is the proposed intervention
likely to contribute to;
Sensitivity
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
-
Climate change?
Environmental degradation?
B
B
B
B
B
B
-
Climate change?
Environmental degradation?
Increased vulnerability of communities
to climate change / environmental
degradation and shocks
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Positive impacts:
Could the outcomes of the
intervention be enhanced by;
-
A
A
A
Could
the
proposed
intervention help to;
-
Improved management of natural
resources?
Tackling climate change?
Tackle climate change?
Improve environmental management?
Reduce vulnerability and/or build
resilience and adaptive capacity to
climate change / environmental
degradation and shocks?
A
A
B
B
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
5.3 Climate and Environment Check Lists for Preferred Option
Impact of Climate Change on
Intervention
Positive
Opportunity for economic growth
through
development
and
dissemination of technologies
Opportunity for job creation
Increased
revenue
generating
opportunities
Opportunity for new agriculture and
livelihood options
Negative
In a climate sensitive area?
Y/N
In an area subject to frequent climatic
shocks /
variability
(floods/droughts/temperature)
Y
In an area where climate change could
lead to conflict
Y
Community has poor capacity to deal
Y
Detail
Measure
Extreme
events
such as extended
drought and floods
may
delay
implementation
and also cause
productivity
decreases
As above, delays
the
implementation
and
productivity
decreases
Proactive
adaptation
options
promoted that can be facilitated
through the market facilitation and
land administration interventions.
Advice on adjustment of planting
dates and crop variety; crop
relocation possibilities; improved
land management.
Proactive
adaptation
options
promoted and provide possible
information on weather-related and
scheduling of agricultural practices in
collaboration with the respective
regional
early
warning
and
agriculture offices.
Promotion on local level land use
plan,
dissemination
of
land
administration rights, restrictions and
responsibilities.
In PSNP woredas it will be alerted
N
N
N
N
Y
Delays
the
implementation
and
productivity
decreases
Delays
the
160
with or adapt to climate change or
shocks
implementation
and
productivity
decreases
Programme dependant on specific
climatic
condition
(agriculture,
aquaculture)
Climate sensitive policies / laws /
regulations
result
in
social
/
development impacts
Impact
of
Environment
on
Intervention
Positive
Dependant on environment / natural
resources for success
Y
Good governance of natural resources
would improve likelihood of success
Improved
revenue
generating
opportunities
Improved environmental management
could increase the number of benefits
from intervention
N
Environmental management
peace-building opportunities
N
offers
Negative
Dependant on environment / natural
resources for success
In an area subject to environmental
degradation?
In an area subject
environmental shocks
to
Narrows
market
related
opportunities
and promoted to launch its
contingency plan, in the non-PSNP
woredas share situation information
with
the
respective
local
administration for an emergency
response, if the worst happens, the
programme would temporarily hold
implementation.
Diversification and intensification as
proactive adaptation measure taken.
N
Y/N
Detail
Measure
Y
Accelerates
the
implementation
process
Sustainable intensification measures
encouraged,
community
based
resource
management
system
promoted.
Productivity
increases,
diversifies income
generation
opportunities,
sustaining
the
natural capital
Sustainable
intensification
of
production measures encouraged,
markets for the poor promoted and
enhanced.
Land productivity
decreases
and
delays
the
implementation
process
Delays
the
implementation
and productivity
decreases
Community-based
management promoted
N
Y
N
Y
frequent
Y
Community lack capacity to deal with
environmental degradation or shocks
Y
Delays
the
implementation
and productivity
161
watershed
In PSNP woredas, it will be alerted
and
promoted to
launch
its
contingency plan, in the non-PSNP
woredas share situation information
with
the
respective
local
administration for an emergency
response, if the worst happens, the
programme would temporarily hold
implementation.
Climate Change National Adaption
Programme of Action of Ethiopia can
be considered for detailed potential
adaption options.
Capacity enhancement through skill
training, credit and input provision
through the market facilitation
decreases
intervention.
Initiates conflicts,
delays
implementation
Establish the associated land use
rights through acceptable land
administration procedures. Policy
advocacy through public awareness
and information activities specific to
the rights, responsibilities and
restrictions.
Y/N
Detail
Measure
Y
Increased
productivity
Better
land
husbandry
Efficient land and
input
management
Changes in Land use System
Y/N
Detail
Measure
Y
Investment on the
land
Tenure security
Changes in land management
practices
Changes in land use system
Productivity
will
increase
Land as co-lateral
for borrowing
Changes in productivity per unit area
Y/N
Detail
Measures
Y
Increases
adaptive capacity
Diversified
Changes in vulnerability index
(V=E*S/AC)
Diversified livelihood of communities
Community dependant on natural
resources, which will be affected by
the intervention for their livelihoods
Property / land-rights are not well
defined / governed
N
Environmental
policies/laws/regulations
result
in
social / development impacts
In an area where natural resources are
a potential source of conflict
Impact of Intervention on Climate
Change
Positive
Increases mitigation capacity
N
Reduces Co2 emissions
Y
Provides an opportunity to achieve
low-carbon development?
Y
Negative
Increases CO2 emissions
Decreases mitigation capacity
Does
not
support
low-carbon
development
Impact
of
Intervention
on
Environment
Positive
Depends on natural resource use for
its success
Opportunity
for
improved
environmental management
Opportunity to achieve MDG7
Opportunity
for
co-financing
of
environmental management
Negative
Depends on natural resource use for
success
In an environmentally sensitive area
Causes direct and significant impact
on environment
Risks causing significant negative
impact on environment
Impact of Intervention on vulnerable
Communities
Positive
Opportunity to reduce the vulnerability
of communities to climate change
Opportunity to build the capacity of
Y
N
Changes in technology
Changes in adaptive capacity
through
skill
enhancement,
promotion on local level land use
plan,
dissemination
of
land
administration rights, restrictions and
responsibilities.
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Increased investment on the land
and changes in productivity
N
N
N
N
Y
162
communities
change
to
adapt
to
climate
Opportunity to build the resilience of
communities to climate change
Y
Opportunity to mitigate climate change
impacts for a community
Negative
Reduces adaptive capacity of a
community to climate change
Reduces resilience of a community to
climate change
Increases vulnerability of communities
to climate change
Reduces capacity of a community to
mitigate climate change
Y
production
and
improved
technology
use
through
the
programme’s
market
facilitation,
and
coordination with
regular extension
programs
Sensitivity
will
reduce
and
adaptive capacity
increase through
public awareness
and
skill
upgrading training
on improved land
management and
productivity
in
cooperation with
respective
agriculture
and
environment
offices.
Improved
land
management
N
N
N
N
163
and changes in productivity
Changes in community wellbeing
(adaptive capacity)
Changes in Ecosystems goods and
services (Sensitivity)
Annex 6: Assumptions for LIFT Cost-Benefit Analysis
A. General assumptions
Discount rate
Following correspondence with the DFID country economist in Ethiopia, Harry Hagan, we
have assumed the Ethiopian annual discount rate to be 12%.
Impact of first level certification
The process of first level certification in Ethiopia was conducted through iterative waves of
implementation with varying levels of intensity, beginning from 1998 and finalising in 2012.
Final levels of certification coverage lie between 92.6% in Oromia and 99.5% in Tigray. It is
however undisputed that the certification process was rushed and often carried out
inaccurately. A recent verification exercise has found that in Bahir Dar Zuria woreda nearly
25 percent of households were missed during the first level registration process.cccxxviii
Also, no adequate system of land administration (maintenance of land registers) has been
put in place.cccxxix This means that when land transfers occur (such as due to inheritance or
other change of land use rights), these are not captured by the system. As a result, the
benefits of first level certification have gradually eroded over time. However, the exact scale
and temporal spread of this process is unknown.
A 2010 WB case studycccxxx “indicates that “[...] an important lesson to be drawn from the
experience in Ethiopia, where a failure to keep records up-to-date is becoming a serious
challenge and is quickly undermining the reliability of the low cost registration system. Data
from the 2010 Ethiopia survey show that there is a high level of land transactions in the
sampled areas. Overall, about 10 % of the parcels were acquired since 2008, that is after
the demarcation and registration process, was completed in the treatment areas.” Deininger
et al (2009)cccxxxi estimate a transfer occurs on 3% of all plots each year. In a recent
document, the GoE (Ministry of Agriculture, 2012)cccxxxii estimates an annual transfer rate of
10%. Using the latter rate of attrition, this implies that any benefits from a first level
certification system with full coverage in year one will drop to less than 35% within 10 years.
Given the uneven nature of implementation since 1998, it is impossible to ascertain with
any accuracy to what extent effective certificates are still in place, and it is evident that
further attrition is unpreventable.
For these reasons, it appears reasonable to assume that the confidence-inspiring effect of
the first level certification scheme in Ethiopia is much lower than conventionally assumed
due to the deficiencies on how first level registration was implemented and the lack of a
functioning land administration system. As a result, we assume that 70% of the benefits of
first level certification are likely to have dissipated by the time of any LIFT intervention. We
also assume that, subsequently, the benefits of first level certification erode at a 10%
annual rate.
Value added
The calculation of value added derived from agricultural output in sub-Saharan African
contexts is notoriously difficult. For Ethiopia, a recent study by Rashid and Negassa
(2011)cccxxxiii estimates that cereals’ sector contribution to agricultural value added is 65
percent.
Average plot size
A large number of highly varying estimates exist for mean plot sizes. Taffesse et al
(2011)cccxxxiv state that the average parcel measures 1.17 hectares, which appears to be an
unrealistically high number. By contrast, Deininger et al. (2009) cccxxxv estimate parcel mean
sizes of as low as 0.32 hectares. A large baseline studycccxxxvi was carried in all of the four
164
HRS which are relevant to LIFT, and it determined an average plot size of 0.62 hectares.
Due to the direct geographic fit and the relatively conservative nature of this estimate, this
CBA has adopted this figure. However, bearing in mind the wide variation in estimates of
average plot size, and the importance of this figure in the model, we carry out a thorough
sensitivity analysis on this assumption.
Average number of plots per household
For the average number of plots per household, an equally large number of different
estimates exist. For example a study by Orgutcccxxxvii estimates the mean number of plots
per household to be as high as 3.89. That said, a certain consensus appears to emerge in
the literature, supported by several studiescccxxxviii conducted in Ethiopia. Following this
consensus, we estimate an average number of 2.3 plots per household.
Cost of second level certification
DFID’s Land Tenure Regularisation Programme in Rwanda (2009-2014) has reduced the
cost of production of second level certification down to US$7.56 per parcel.cccxxxix This cost
saving is mainly because of the innovative approach used by using locally recruited semiskilled labour rather than professional surveyors. We estimate that the cost of second level
certification in Ethiopia done by the ITSP will be significantly lower because of economies of
scale with the larger programme size, and the impact of the first level certification,
estimating likely costs at $5.88. If registration is done by REILA, however, the cost per
parcel would increase to $6.45134 due to increased management and registration costs.
B. Assumptions for each individual Benefit (B)
B1. Increased agricultural investment and resulting productivity increases
The following assumptions have been used to assess the investment-induced impacts of
the introduction of land certification.
Average output per hectare
Following Deininger et al (2011), we have assumed a mean output per hectare of ETB3,
476cccxl (around £121.54). This appears to be a very conservative estimate, as other studies
have suggested average output figures of over ETB 19,000 per hectarecccxli.
Propensity to invest
Based on extensive survey work on the effects of land certification in Ethiopia, Deininger et
al (2009)cccxlii determined that the propensity to invest in land (incl. soil conserving and
fertility increasing facilities) increases by 30% as a result of certification. These estimates
were based on first level certification, and it appears reasonable to assume that second
level certification will have an even greater effect due to the implied increase in tenancy
security. However, in this CBA, with the aim of reaching a conservative estimate, we have
followed their estimate of 30% as a result second level certification.
Output-effect of investment
Furthermore, Deininger et al (2009)cccxliii found that the mean increase in output due to
investment is 9%, or ETB90 (ETB3476 * .29 * .09), per hectare per year. Due to the
generally low technological levels of crop production systems in Ethiopian agriculture, the
returns of technological investment in agriculture are bound to be large. As a result, the
quoted figure of 9% appears to be a reasonably conservative estimate and has thus been
adopted in this CBA.
134
Information provided by David Harris, Team Leader of REILA. June 2013, $10 based on 4 million parcels discounted
for economies of scale for 14 million parcels.
165
B2. Reduction of land-related disputes
Prevalence of land-related disputes
A recent baseline study has found that, due to the rushed, inaccurate and unsustained
implementation of first level certification, the actual number of land-related disputes has
more than doubled. Households without land certificates reported the occurrence of land
disputes in the preceding two years in 10.5% of the cases, whereas 21.1% of those
households with first level certificate reported the occurrence of land-related disputes in the
same period. However, due to added precision, reliability and maintenance of second level
certification, only 15.1% of household holding second level certificates reported the
occurrence of land-related disputes. This would suggest, that a move from first to second
level certification will reduce the occurrence of land-related disputes by about 14.2% per
(21.1%−15.1%)
year (
÷ 2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 ). However, although potentially large, the economic impact of
21.1%
this reduction in disputes is not readily quantifiable. For this reason it has not been included
in quantified terms in the CBA, although this appraisal expects considerable benefits to be
incurred by reduced land-related disputes and improved dispute resolution.
B3. Improved resolution of land-related disputes
Economic costs of land-related disputes
There is scant literature that manages to calculate the economic costs incurred by of landrelated disputes. However, it appears reasonable to assume, that investment activity on
land that is under dispute will be cancelled or postponed. Furthermore, on many disputed
plots, economic production may be halted, although it appears difficult to quantify this effect
accurately. As a consequence, we have assumed that production will be interrupted on 1 in
4 disputed plots, resulting in a 25% productivity decrease of disputed land.
B4. Sustainability effects of land administration
Land administration system sustainability
A functioning land administration system will prevent any attrition loses and the investment
effect will be maintained over time.cccxliv.
B5. Increased tax revenue
Establishing systematic land certification systems will create a better basis for land
taxation.cccxlv Second level certification provides the government with the necessary
information for an even more accurate collection of land taxes. These ultimately lead to
higher fiscal revenue, producing a fairer tax system because land areas and boundaries are
defined clearly and providing information to identify and punish tax evaders. cccxlvi
B6. Increased farm productivity due to improved seed and management practices
An IFPRI study in Ethiopia shows that the use of improved seed varieties and improved
management practices remains a bottleneck in the systemcccxlvii. This is confirmed by a
study from Dercon, Vargas Hill and Zeitincccxlviii, who confirm that there is a need to promote
productivity via improved seeds, rebalancing input packages and supporting seed
multiplication.
The importance of addressing these elements to improve productivity in Ethiopia is well
established in the literature. Another IFPRI studycccxlix underlines the potentials of soil
fertility management on higher yields per hectare and production growth in Ethiopia. More
specifically, a study by Anchala et al.cccl shows that, in Ethiopia, using improved maize
varieties and production management gave higher mean grain yields when compared to
local varieties and traditional practices. The average grain yield increment of the improved
management practice over the local variety and practice ranged from 37 to 89%. Similarly,
166
Sasakawa Global 2000 work suggests that yields could improve threefold from using
packages of improved seed, fertiliser and extension.cccli
In keeping with conservative estimates, this CBA assumes a productivity increase of 10%
as a result of interventions that will aim to improve the seed market and agricultural
management practices.
B7. Increased farm productivity due to improved rental market efficiency
Supply in rental markets (w/o certification)
Based on a comprehensiveccclii baseline study carried out in all 4 HRS relevant to LIFT in
2013, we have assumed that the 33% of all households participate in the land sector as
suppliers (renting out).
Average plot size let per household (w/o certification)
The same studycccliii found that the average size of land rented out by these households is
0.79 hectares.
Participation in rental markets per household
Based on extensive survey work on the effects of land certification in Ethiopia, Deininger et
al (2009)cccliv determined that a household’s propensity to rent out land increases by 13% as
a result of certification. These estimates were based on 1 st level certification, and it appears
reasonable to assume that 2nd level certification will have an even greater effect due to the
implied increase in confidence in tenancy. However, in this CBA, with the aim of reaching a
conservative estimate, we have followed their estimate of 13% as a result 2nd level
certification.
Increase in let plot size due to certification
Deininger et al (2009)ccclv further estimate that the size of rented-out plots increases by 9%
as a direct result of land certification due to the corresponding enhancement of tenancy
security. Following the line of argument as in the above paragraph, we have followed this
estimate for the present CBA.
Efficiency of rental markets
Deininger et al (2009, 2011)ccclvi conclude that rental markets have a huge potential to
increase land productivity, due to tenants’ farming abilities exceeding landlords’ abilities by
a factor of 20%. However, due to the high prevalence of inherently inefficient sharecropping
agreements (over 95% of all rental agreements), they conclude that effective productivity on
rented plots is statistically indistinguishable from that on owned plots. In conclusion, they
assert changes in the rental agreements (i.e. an increase of agreements with fixed rents or
input-sharing arrangements) have a high potential of yielding an increase in productivity on
rented land. As a result and in continuation of the conservative nature of estimates, we
have assumed that, in the absence of complementary market enhancing measures, rental
markets do not yield an inherent increase in productivity.
Impact of interventions to improve the efficiency of the land sector
There is scant literature on the potential for market-focussed interventions (like M4P) on the
reduction of inefficient land use systems like sharecropping. However, one sophisticated
studyccclvii that examines the effects of community development projects on agrarian
production systems in India, concludes that the prevalence of sharecropping arrangements
can be reduced by a margin of up to 34% in favour of more efficient tenancy systems. In an
effort to attempt a very conservative estimate, we have assumed that a focussed facilitation
based on the M4P approach will be able to yield a reduction of conventional sharecropping
contracts (in favour of fixed-rate renting or input-sharing) by 6%. We also assume that on
167
these plots productivity will be increased by 10%, half of the increase in land productivity
achieved by renting land suggested in Deininger et al (2011). ccclviii
B8. Increased farm productivity due to better access to finance
Impact of interventions on access to finance
Addressing some of the challenges that currently prevent the use of second level
certification to be used as collateral will allow farmers to gain easier access to credit. This is
the case in Amhara, where the regulations allow for the use of the certificate as a guarantee
of productivity, but lack of understanding on the mechanisms of how the process works by
stakeholders prevents this from occurring. In the other three HRS, current regulations
impede the use of certification as collateral. Under Option 2, LIFT will work towards scaling
up the evidence and lessons from Amhara Region. However, even if financial institutions do
not directly accept the certificate as collateral, it could still have an impact on perceived
wealth or trustworthiness.135 This is actually the case in several regions, where MFIs are
using second level certificates.
The valuation of land (as collateral) is difficult in the Ethiopian context, due to the lack of a
functioning property market. However, the GoE has pledgedccclix that in cases where
evictions are deemed necessary for public use of land, it will pay a compensation set at 10
years’ worth of output. Therefore, we take this figure as an estimate for the value of land.
Trying to assess the potential impact of this intervention in Ethiopia, a comprehensive
studyccclx of the effect of land certification on collateral-based lending in Vietnam (where
land is owned by the state, similarly to Ethiopia) estimates that access to formal sources of
finance may be increased by between 9.9% and 17.9% due to certification.
Following this line of argument, this CBA assumes the following regarding the impacts on
access to finance:
- Based on the impact estimated in the Vietnam report, we assume that the issuance of
second level certification (net of remaining effective first level certificates) will lead to
increased access to finance for 7% of the households receiving certification. While we
understand that this figure is not based on evidence in Ethiopia, we feel that it is a
reasonable and achievable target for the programme and that it should be further tested
by the management team during implementation.
- Because we recognise that this is a difficult assumption, we test it thoroughly in the
sensitivity analysis against assumptions of 5% and 0%.
- We assume that the resulting investment from increased access to finance will yield an
increase in output productivity of 9% (following Deininger et al 2009)ccclxi
135
While in Amhara the Proclamation allows the use of the certificate as a guarantee of productivity, this is not
the case in Tigray, Oromia and SNNP. In all regions, however, MFIs are starting to request the certificate as a
requirement to allow farmers’ access group based lending.
168
Annex 7: The cost-benefit analysis
This annex presents the detailed cost benefit analysis undertaken to assess the feasible
options for Ethiopia LIFT. The CBA is based on a set of assumptions that are presented
below and further detailed in Annex 6. It is important to note, however, that the evidence
that we have used to construct a cost-benefit calculation for each option should be
considered of moderate quality.
Option 1: Land Registration and Administration Programme in four regions
A1. Incremental costs for option 1
Based on DFID’s experience implementing Land Registration and Administration
programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa, in general, and Rwanda in particular, the estimated
incremental costs of the intervention under option 1 are shown in table 1 below. Table 11
includes DFID costs as well as the GoE contribution to maintaining the land administration
system that would be set up by LIFT. These costs are used in the economic analysis
reported in section D1 below.
Table 1: Incremental costs for implementing option 1 (in £ million)
OPTION 1
Year
DFID Costs
Land certification
Land administration
M&E
Programme Management
Inception period
Total DFID costs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
£1.20
£0.23
£0.10
£0.36
£0.70
£2.59
£6.50
£0.35
£0.56
£0.52
£12.80
£0.65
£0.25
£0.56
£11.55
£0.80
£0.60
£0.51
£11.55
£0.87
£0.25
£0.45
£14.44
£0.65
£0.40
£0.43
£0.25
£0.05
£0.44
£0.18
£7.92
£14.26
£13.46
£13.13
£15.92
£0.92
GoE Costs
Maintenance of land adm system
Total GoE costs
£0.00
£0.00
£0.21
£0.21
£0.41
£0.41
£0.62
£0.62
£0.84
£0.84
£1.00
£1.00
£2.55
£2.55
£1.11
£1.11
£1.15
£1.15
£1.18
£1.18
£2.70
£2.70
£1.27
£1.27
£1.32
£1.32
£1.37
£1.37
£2.89
£2.89
£18.62
£18.62
Total costs
£2.59
£8.14
£14.67
£14.07
£13.97
£16.92
£3.47
£1.11
£1.15
£1.18
£2.70
£1.27
£1.32
£1.37
£2.89
£86.82
£58.30
£3.60
£2.60
£3.00
£0.70
£68.20
This option would register approximately 17 million parcels at an estimated cost per parcel
of £3.61 (USD 5.60) and allow for the upgrading and strengthening of the land
administration system. This would allow to sustain the benefits of registration over time.
B1. Incremental benefits for option 1
We anticipate that the following incremental benefits will be produced if the interventions of
option 1 would be implemented:
 Benefit 1: Increased agricultural investment and resulting productivity increases: As
evidenced by Deininger et alccclxii in Ethiopia, land certification systems can be assumed to
increase investment activities significantly due to the respective increased security of tenure
on 17,000,000 certified parcels. This effect has been noted for first level certification, and
can be expected to occur to an even larger extent as a result of second level certification.
 Benefit 2: Reduction of land-related disputes: A baseline study done in Ethiopia in 2013
has established, that households with first level certification have experienced much higher
occurrences of land-related disputes (21.1%), compared to those with second level
certification (15.1%). This is strong evidence that the increased quality of second level
certificates (mapping) will help to significantly reduce the extent of land-related conflict in
Ethiopia.
 Benefit 3: Improved resolution of land-related disputes: The same studyccclxiii furthermore
found that existing disputes were much easier resolved with the help of second level
certificates compared to first level certificates. Study participants stated that disputes were
resolved much more often in cases with second level certification (43.5%) to their
satisfaction (only 15.2% with 1st level certification).
 Benefit 4: Sustainability effects of land administration: The introduction of a systematic
land administration system parallel to the certification process has important effects on the
169
sustainability of certification-induced benefits. The failure to introduce such a system during
first level certification in Ethiopia (from 1998) has resulted in considerable attrition of its
benefits over time. This will be avoided with the enforcement of an effective land
administration system together with second level certification. This effect will be further
enhanced as a result of activities related to extensive training and capacity development on
land administration systems.
 Benefit 5: Increased tax revenue: Establishing systematic land certification systems will
also create a better basis for land taxation.ccclxiv Second level certification provides the
government with the necessary information for an even more accurate collection of land
taxes. These ultimately lead to higher fiscal revenue, producing a fairer tax system because
land areas and boundaries are defined clearly and providing information to identify and
punish tax evaders. ccclxv On the other hand, land taxation may constitute an important tool
for land policy, as it may create incentives for putting land to productive use.ccclxvi
 Benefit 6: Increased farm productivity due to improved rental market efficiency: One
studyccclxvii that examines the effects of community development programmes on agrarian
production systems in India, finds that more efficient tenancy systems can reduce
sharecropping arrangements by a margin of up to 34%. In an effort to attempt a very
conservative estimate due to the institutional differences of the African region, we have
assumed that we will be able to yield a reduction of conventional sharecropping contracts
(in favour of fixed-rate renting or input-sharing) by 6%. On these plots, we also assume that
productivity will be increased by 10%, a considerably lower estimate compared to that of
Deininger et al. Given the constraints that currently exist in the rural land rental market, we
assume that only 25% of these benefits will be captured.
 Benefit 7: Increased farm productivity due to better access to finance: Addressing some
of the challenges that currently prevent the use of second level certification to be used as
collateral will allow farmers to gain easier access to credit. Additionally, even if financial
institutions did not directly accept the certificate as collateral, it could still have an impact on
perceived wealth.136 For those households that are able to access finance due to LIFT
interventions, they are assumed to take loans for investment which boosts farm productivity
and hence output. Given the constraints that currently exist in the rural land rental market,
we assume that only 25% of these benefits will be captured.
Which of these benefits are quantifiable?
Out of the five potential benefits from Option 1 described above, we have been able to
quantify the returns for benefits number 1, 4, 6 and 7. Benefits 2, 3 and 5 can be
expected to yield considerable economic benefits, however, their quantification would have
to rely on a number of ambiguous assumptions (such as the impact of land-related disputed
on productivity; how would the GoE spend the increase in tax revenue) without scientific
basis.
C1. Summary of assumptions for quantification
To quantify Benefit 1 “increased agricultural investment and resulting productivity
measures”, the following assumptions were made:
 To retain a conservative estimate, we assume that investment effects of second level
certification are equal to those of first level certification, regardless of the fact that much
larger effects may be expected.
While in Amhara the Proclamation allows the use of the certificate as collateral, this is not the case in Tigray, Oromia and SNNPR. In all
regions, however, MFIs are starting to request the certificate as a requirement to allow farmers’ access to group based lending.
136
170

Following Deininger et alccclxviii, we assume that the propensity to invest is increased by
30% as a result of certification
 Furthermore, as evidenced by the same source, we assume that such investment will
lead to an increase in output of 9% (in the following year)
 Average output is estimated to be ETB 3,476 (or GBP 121.54).ccclxix
 Value added in Ethiopian agriculture is held to be 65%.ccclxx
To quantify Benefit 4 “sustainability effects of land administration”, the following
assumption was made:
 The implementation of a functioning land administration system will prevent the attrition
of the certificates as new transactions (i.e. land transfers) will be registered and the
system will remain up to date. As a result, the calculations of the above benefit do not
include a rate of annual attrition.
To quantify Benefit 6 “improved farm productivity due to improved rental market
efficiency”, the following assumptions were made:
 Participation in rental markets is increased by certification (1st and 2nd level) by a margin
of 13% of households, and the size of rented-out plots increase by 9% on average.ccclxxi
 Rental markets have a huge potential for productivity increases, due to the welldocumented higher farming abilities of tenants compared to landlords (by a margin of
20%).ccclxxii However, these benefits are usually not realised, mainly due to well-known
inefficiencies of sharecropping agreements which dominate the conventional Ethiopian
rental market (over 95%). Only fixed-rent or input-sharing agreements are able to unlock
these inefficiencies gains.
 Due to community support and farmer trainings, LIFT’s M4P-related activities under
option 2 will reduce the prevalence of traditional sharecropping agreements. One
studyccclxxiii has found that community development has the potential to reduce
sharecropping by up to 34%, but due to the cultural entrenchment of land use systems,
we make the conservative assumption that LIFT will reduce sharecropping by 6%.
 We further assume that on these plots productivity will be increased by 10%, a
significantly more conservative estimate than the one showed by Deininger et al. ccclxxiv
(“tenant’s productivity is higher than that of landlords by between 17 and 26 percentage
points” – page 3).
 Given the constraints that currently exist in the Ethiopian land rental market, we
assume that only 25% of these benefits will be achieved after second stage
certification.
To quantify Benefit 7 “increased farm productivity due to better access to finance”,
the following assumptions were made:


Due to land being owned by the Ethiopian state, it cannot be sold, mortgaged or used as
collateral on credit markets. As a result, Deininger et alccclxxv came to the conclusion that
land certification by itself will have no impact on farmers’ access to finance without
changes in the current legislation.
However, in Amharaccclxxvi second level certificates may be used as a guarantee to
facilitate access to credit. LIFT’s interventions will promote the adoption of equivalent
legislation in the other HRS in an attempt to improve access to finance for certified
farmers. The programme will also support MFIs, which already require certificates to
access group based lending to develop new systems to use the certificate for individual
based lending.
171





In the absence of an open property market, we assume the value of the certificate is
determined by 10 years of average output, in accordance with a government
proclamation to that effect.ccclxxvii
Formal lenders will be willing to provide investment credits to the extent of only half of
the yearly output (i.e. only 5% of the value = ETB 1738 per hectare) on the basis of
second level certificates.
We assume that LIFT’s interventions will allow an additional 7% of households to gain
access to finance on the basis of second level certificates.
The resulting investment will yield an increase in output productivity of 9% (following
Deininger et al)ccclxxviii.
Given the constraints that currently exist in the Ethiopian rural financial market, we
assume that only 25% of these benefits will be achieved after second stage
certification.
For a more detailed explanation of these assumptions, please refer to Annex 6.
D1. Balance of incremental costs and benefits
As a result, we were able to quantify the following benefits (undiscounted) for Option1.
Table 2: Balance of incremental costs and benefits of implementing Option 1 (in £ million)
OPTION 1 (in £ million)
Costs
Land certification
Land administration
M&E
Programme Management
Inception period
GoE Costs
Maintenance of land adm system
Benefits
Direct productivity impacts
Increased productivity - A2F
Increased productivity - rental markets
Value added
Net value flow
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
1.20
0.23
0.10
0.36
0.70
6.50
0.35
0.56
0.52
12.80
0.65
0.25
0.56
11.55
0.80
0.60
0.51
11.55
0.87
0.25
0.45
14.44
0.65
0.40
0.43
0.25
0.05
0.44
0.18
0.00
0.21
0.41
0.62
0.84
1.00
2.55
1.11
1.15
1.18
2.70
1.27
1.32
1.37
2.89
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-2.59
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-8.14
0.00
0.00
0.31
0.20
-14.47
1.60
0.03
1.17
1.82
-12.25
5.94
0.12
2.36
5.48
-8.49
12.03
0.25
3.57
10.30
-6.62
18.18
0.37
5.06
15.35
11.88
25.80
0.53
5.06
20.41
19.30
25.80
0.53
5.06
20.41
19.26
25.80
0.53
5.06
20.41
19.22
25.80
0.53
5.06
20.41
17.71
25.80
0.53
5.06
20.41
19.14
25.80
0.53
5.06
20.41
19.09
25.80
0.53
5.06
20.41
19.04
NPV (12%)
IRR
25.80
0.53
5.06
20.41
17.52
12.72
17.2%
This option shows an IRR at 17.2%, a NPV of £12,716,594 and a (discounted) benefit-cost
ratio (BCR) of 1.26.
Under this option, around 17 million certificates would be issued reaching close to 7.4
million137 farming households. Of these, 5,514,247 households would benefit from
increased security of tenure due to second level certification138 and 1,654,274 households
would benefit from increased productivity139.
E1. Results of cost benefit analysis for option 1
Table 3: CBA for option1
Economic indicators
Costs (15 years)
Benefits (15 years)
NPV
BCR (discounted)
IRR
£86,817,213
£196,403,259
£12,716,594
1.26
17.2%
137 17 million parcels at an average of 2.3 parcels per household = 7,391,304 households (see annex 6).
138 Out of the 7,391,304 households, only 70% of households (+10% attrition rate) experience a positive impact of second level
certification (see annex 6).
139139 Out of the 5,514,247 households that benefit from increased security of tenure due to 2nd level certification, only 30% have a
propensity to invest (=1,654,274) (see annex 6).
172
Achieve commercial viability?
Direct beneficiary numbers
Total number of farming households that receive second level certification
Total number of farming households that benefit from increased security
of tenure due to second level certification
Total number of farming households that benefit from productivity
increases due to second level certification
Cost per farming household140
Yes
7,319,304
5,514,247
1,654,274
£15.74
Option 2: Making Markets Work for the Poor Programme in Rural Land in four regions
A2. Incremental costs for option 2
Based on DFID’s experience, the estimated incremental costs of the intervention under
option 2 are shown in table 4 below. Table 4 includes DFID costs as well as the GoE
contribution to maintaining the land administration system. These costs are used in the
economic analysis reported in section D2 below.
Table 4: Incremental costs for implementing option 2 (in £ million)
OPTION 2
Year
DFID Costs
Land certification
Land administration
TA for M4P interventions
Performance grants
Training and capacity building
Research and Communications
M&E
Programme Management
Inception period
Total DFID costs
1
2
3
4
£1.92
£0.05
£0.07
£0.00
£0.00
£0.00
£0.15
£0.23
£0.69
£3.12
£7.72
£0.42
£0.69
£0.50
£0.20
£0.20
£0.55
£0.66
£8.49
£0.64
£0.63
£0.63
£0.35
£0.30
£0.23
£0.74
£10.43
£0.62
£0.61
£0.63
£0.35
£0.30
£0.22
£0.70
£10.93
£12.00
GoE Costs
Maintenance of land adm system
Total GoE costs
£0.00
£0.00
£0.16
£0.16
Total costs
£3.12
£11.09
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
£10.01
£0.62
£0.60
£0.63
£0.35
£0.30
£0.52
£0.74
£9.87
£0.63
£0.60
£0.63
£0.35
£0.30
£0.58
£0.69
£0.06
£0.01
£0.01
£0.00
£0.00
£0.00
£0.65
£0.16
£13.86
£13.76
£13.65
£0.89
£0.29
£0.29
£0.45
£0.45
£0.62
£0.62
£0.83
£0.83
£2.17
£2.17
£0.95
£0.95
£0.98
£0.98
£1.01
£1.01
£2.30
£2.30
£1.09
£1.09
£1.13
£1.13
£1.17
£1.17
£2.46
£2.46
£15.60
£15.60
£12.29
£14.30
£14.39
£14.47
£3.06
£0.95
£0.98
£1.01
£2.30
£1.09
£1.13
£1.17
£2.46
£83.80
£48.51
£2.99
£3.20
£3.00
£1.60
£1.40
£2.90
£3.91
£0.69
£68.20
This option would register approximately 14 million parcels at an estimated cost per parcel
of £3.65 (USD 5.66) and allow to upgrade and strengthen the land administration system.
Additionally, there would be a number of market interventions (linked to line items TA for
M4P interventions; performance grants; training and capacity building; and research and
communications) that would allow smallholder farmers to maximise the benefits of second
level certification.
B2. Incremental benefits for option 2
We anticipate that the following incremental benefits will be produced if the interventions of
option 2 would be implemented:
 Benefit 1: Increased agricultural investment and resulting productivity increases: As
evidenced by Deininger et alccclxxix for the case of Ethiopia, land certification systems can be
assumed to increase investment activities significantly, due to the respective increased
security of tenure on 14 million certified parcels. This effect has been noted for first level
certification, and can be expected to occur to an even larger extent as a result of second
level certification.
 Benefit 2: Reduction of land-related disputes: as described in option1.
 Benefit 3: Improved resolution of land-related disputes: as described in option1.
 Benefit 4: Sustainability effects of land administration: as described in option1.
140 This number is obtained by dividing the total costs of the intervention by the total number of farming households that benefit from
increased security of tenure due to second level certification.
173
 Benefit 5: Increased tax revenue: as described in option1.
 Benefit 6: Increased farm productivity due to improved rental market efficiency: One
studyccclxxx that examines the effects of community development projects on agrarian
production systems in India, finds that more efficient tenancy systems can reduce
sharecropping arrangements by up to 34%. In an effort to attempt a very conservative
estimate due to the institutional differences of the African region, we have assumed that a
focussed facilitation based on the M4P approach will be able to yield a reduction of
conventional sharecropping contracts (in favour of fixed-rate renting or input-sharing) by
6%. On these plots, we also assume that productivity will be increased by 10%, a
considerably lower estimate compared to that of Deininger et al.ccclxxxi
 Benefit 7: Increased farm productivity due to better access to finance: Addressing some
of the challenges that currently prevent the use of second level certification to be used as
collateral will allow farmers to gain easier access to credit. Additionally, even if financial
institutions did not directly accept the certificate as a guarantee of productivity, it could still
have an impact on perceived wealth or trustworthiness. 141 Also, interventions at the macro
and meso levels (which are likely to be undertaken by PEPE) may help to develop the
financial system leading to a further impact on access to finance. For those households that
are able to access finance due to LIFT interventions, they are assumed to take loans for
investment which boosts farm productivity and hence output.
 Benefit 8: Improved policy-making decisions results in better performing rural land sector:
A better functioning rental market will allow a more efficient allocation of labour (particularly
for women) that will lead to increases in investment and productivity. In China, improved
land rental markets contributed to occupational diversification and had a significant increase
in productivityccclxxxii. Several studies find a positive impact of policy-making decisions on a
better performing land sector. In Ethiopia, a study by Holden et al.ccclxxxiii shows that policy
interventions that affect rental market participation will have effects on households’
movements, in the long term.
Which of these benefits are quantifiable?
Out of the eight potential benefits of option 2 described above, we have been able to
quantify the returns to benefits number 1, 4, 6 and 7.
Benefits 2, 3, 5 and 9 can be expected to yield significant economic benefits. However, their
quantification would have to rely on a number of ambiguous assumptions (such as the
impact of land-related disputed on productivity or how would the GoE spend the increase in
tax revenue) without scientific basis.
C2. Summary of assumptions for quantification
The assumptions to quantify Benefit 1 “increased agricultural investment and resulting
productivity measures and Benefit 4 “sustainability effects of land administration”
are the same as those presented in Option 1.
To calculate Benefit 6 “improved farm productivity due to improved rental market
efficiency”, the following assumptions were made:
 Participation in rental markets is increased by certification (1st and 2nd level) by a margin
of 13% of households, and the size of rented-out plots increase by 9% on
average.ccclxxxiv
141 While in Amhara the Proclamation allows the use of the certificate as collateral, this is not the case in Tigray, Oromia and SNNPR.
In all regions, however, MFIs are starting to request the certificate as a requirement to allow farmers’ access group based lending.
174



Rental markets have a huge potential for productivity increases, due to the welldocumented higher farming abilities of tenants compared to landlords (by a margin of
20%).ccclxxxv However, these benefits are usually not realised, mainly due to well-known
inefficiencies of sharecropping agreements which dominate the conventional Ethiopian
rental market (over 95%). Only fixed-rent or input-sharing agreements are able to unlock
these inefficiencies gains.
Due to community support and farmer trainings, LIFT’s M4P-related activities under
option 2 will reduce the prevalence of traditional sharecropping agreements. One
studyccclxxxvi has found that community development has the potential to reduce
sharecropping by up to 34%, but due to the cultural entrenchment of land use systems,
we make the conservative assumption that LIFT will reduce sharecropping by 6%.
We further assume, that on these plots productivity will be increased by 10%, a
significantly more conservative estimate than the one showed by Deininger et al. ccclxxxvii
(“tenant’s productivity is higher than that of landlords by between 17 and 26 percentage
points” – page 3).
To calculate Benefit 7 “increased farm productivity due to better access to finance”,
the following assumptions were made:

Due to land being owned by the Ethiopian state, it cannot be sold, mortgaged or used as
collateral on credit markets. As a result, Deininger et alccclxxxviii came to the conclusion
that land certification by itself will have no impact on farmers’ access to finance without
changes in the current legislation.
 However, in Amharaccclxxxix second level certificates may be used as a guarantee of
productivity to facilitate access to credit. LIFT’s interventions will promote the adoption
of equivalent legislation in the other HRS in an attempt to improve access to finance for
certified farmers. The programme will also support MFIs, which already require
certificates to access group based lending to develop new systems to use the certificate
for individual based lending.
 In the absence of an open property market, we assume the value of the certificate is
determined by 10 years of average output, in accordance with a government
proclamation to that effect.cccxc
 Formal lenders will be willing to provide investment credits to the extent of only half of
the yearly output (i.e. only 5% of the value= ETB 1738 per hectare) on the basis of
second level certificates.
 We assume that LIFT’s interventions will allow an additional 7% of households to gain
access to finance on the basis of second level certificates.
 The resulting investment will yield an increase in output productivity of 9% (following
Deininger et al)cccxci.
For a more detailed explanation of these assumptions, please refer to Annex 6.
D2. Balance of incremental costs and benefits
We were able to quantify the following benefits (undiscounted) for Option 2.
Table 5: Balance of incremental costs and benefits of implementing option 2 (in £ million)
175
OPTION 2 (in £ million)
Costs
Land certification
Land administration
Technical assistance
Performance grants
Training and capacity building
Research and communications
M&E
Programme Management
Inception period
GoE Costs
Maintenance of land adm system
Benefits
Direct productivity impacts
Increased productivity - A2F
Increased productivity - rental markets
Value added
Net value flow
1
2
1.92
0.05
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.15
0.23
0.69
7.72
0.42
0.69
0.50
0.20
0.20
0.55
0.66
0.00
0.16
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
8.49
0.64
0.63
0.63
0.35
0.30
0.23
0.74
10.43
0.62
0.61
0.63
0.35
0.30
0.22
0.70
10.01
0.62
0.60
0.63
0.35
0.30
0.52
0.74
9.87
0.63
0.60
0.63
0.35
0.30
0.58
0.69
0.06
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.65
0.16
0.29
0.45
0.62
0.83
2.17
0.95
0.98
1.01
2.30
1.09
1.13
1.17
2.46
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.00
0.89
3.26
0.00
0.00
0.58
2.92
-£3.12 -£11.09 -£11.71 -£11.38
4.16
0.34
7.66
7.90
-£6.48
9.76
0.80
12.47
14.97
£0.50
15.89
1.30
16.71
22.04
£18.98
21.29
1.74
16.71
25.83
£24.88
21.29
1.74
16.71
25.83
£24.86
21.29
1.74
16.71
25.83
£24.82
21.29
1.74
16.71
25.83
£23.54
21.29
1.74
16.71
25.83
£24.75
21.29
1.74
16.71
25.83
£24.71
21.29
1.74
16.71
25.83
£24.67
NPV (12%)
IRR
21.29
1.74
16.71
25.83
£23.37
£33.07
24.1%
This option presents an IRR of 24.1%, a NPV of £33,071,509 and a (discounted) BCR of
1.67.
A total of 14 million parcels would be second level certified, reaching over 6 million farming
households142. Of these, 4,549,942 households would benefit from increased security of
tenure143 and 1,364,983 households would benefit from increases in productivity (as
detailed in table 6 in section E2).
It is important to note, however, that given the nature of market-related interventions, the
number of beneficiaries is likely to be higher. For example, interventions to improve the land
policy framework or improve the seeds markets are likely to impact farmers positively who
will not receive second level certificates. Moreover, it is likely that as a result of the
demonstration effect, in the long run the propensity to invest becomes higher than the 30%
identified by Deininger et alcccxcii and used as a key assumption in the construction of this
CBA. Neither of these two likely impacts, however, have been quantified given the
difficulties of identified plausible assumptions.
E2. Results of cost benefit analysis for option 2
Table 6: CBA for option 2
Economic indicators
Costs
£83,804,735
Benefits
NPV
£255,091,741
BCR (discounted)
1.67
IRR
24.1%
Achieve commercial viability?
Yes
£33,071,509
Direct beneficiary numbers
Total number of farming households that receive second level certification
6,086,957
Total number of farming households that benefit from increased security
of tenure due to second level certification
4,549,942
Total number of farming households that benefit from productivity
increases due to:
1,364,983
142 14 million parcels at an average of 2.3 parcels per household = 6,086,957 households
143 Out of the 6,086,957 households, only 70% of households (+10% attrition rate) experience a positive impact of second level
certification (see annex 6).
176
1. Improved seed/agricultural management practices (818,990)
2. Increased access to finance (191,098)
3. Increase in rental agreements (354,895)
Cost per farming household144
£18.42
Option 3: Increasing coverage and uptake of REILA and LAND
A3. Incremental costs for Option 3
The estimated incremental costs of the intervention under option 3 are shown in table 7
below. Table 7 includes DFID costs as well as the GoE contribution to maintaining the land
administration system. These costs are used in the economic analysis reported in section
D3 below.
Table 7: Incremental costs for implementing option 3 (in £ million)
OPTION 3
Year
DFID Costs
Land certification
Land administration
Training and capacity building
M&E
Programme Management
Inception period
Total DFID costs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
£1.57
£0.16
£0.00
£0.10
£0.34
£0.63
£2.79
£7.17
£0.46
£0.40
£0.40
£1.02
£11.30
£0.72
£0.70
£0.20
£1.21
£10.43
£0.91
£0.60
£0.40
£1.21
£10.43
£0.95
£0.50
£0.20
£1.00
£11.92
£0.76
£0.25
£0.30
£0.90
£0.25
£0.05
£0.05
£0.40
£0.33
£9.45
£14.13
£13.55
£13.08
£14.13
£1.08
GoE Costs
Maintenance of land adm system
Total GoE costs
£0.00
£0.00
£0.19
£0.19
£0.36
£0.36
£0.53
£0.53
£0.71
£0.71
£0.88
£0.88
£2.30
£2.30
£1.01
£1.01
£1.04
£1.04
£1.08
£1.08
£2.44
£2.44
£1.15
£1.15
£1.19
£1.19
£1.24
£1.24
£2.61
£2.61
£16.73
£16.73
Total costs
£2.79
£9.64
£14.48
£14.08
£13.79
£15.01
£3.38
£1.01
£1.04
£1.08
£2.44
£1.15
£1.19
£1.24
£2.61
£84.93
£53.07
£4.00
£2.50
£2.00
£6.00
£0.63
£68.20
This option would register approximately 15 million parcels at an estimated cost for parcel
of £3.90 (USD 6) as well as support to upgrade and strengthen the land administration
system. The cost of per parcel certification is higher in this option because REILA uses a
different methodology from that presented in options 1 and 2. This option would also
include support for training and capacity building activities through the LAND project.
B3. Incremental benefits for option 3
We anticipate that the following benefits will be produced if the interventions of option 2
would be implemented:
 Benefit 1: Increased agricultural investment and resulting productivity increases: As
evidenced by Deininger et alcccxciii for the case of Ethiopia, land certification systems can be
assumed to increase investment activities significantly, due to the respective increased
security of tenure on 15,000,000 certified parcels. This effect has been noted for first level
certification, and can be expected to occur to an even larger extent as a result of second
level certification.
 Benefit 2: Reduction of land-related disputes: as described in option1.
 Benefit 3: Improved resolution of land-related disputes: as described in option1.
 Benefit 4: Sustainability effects of land administration: as described in option1.
 Benefit 5: Increased tax revenue: as described in option1.
 Benefit 6: Increased farm productivity due to improved rental market efficiency: as
described in option1.
 Benefit 7: Increased farm productivity due to better access to finance: as described in
option1.
144 This number is obtained by dividing the total costs of the intervention by the total number of farming households that benefit from
increased security of tenure due to second level certification.
177
 Benefit 8: Improved policy-making decisions results in better performing a land sector: as
described in option 2.
Which of these benefits are quantifiable?
Out of the six potential benefits of option 3 described above, we have been able to quantify
the returns to benefits number 1, 4, 6 and 7.
Benefits 2, 3, 5 and 9 can be expected to yield significant economic benefits. However, their
quantification would have to rely on a number of ambiguous assumptions (such as the
impact of land-related disputed on productivity, the types of policies that would be reviewed
or how would the GoE spend the increase in tax revenue) without scientific basis.
C3. Summary of assumptions for quantification
The assumptions to quantify Benefit 1 “increased agricultural investment and resulting
productivity measures” and Benefit 4 “sustainability effects of land administration”
are the same as those presented in Option 2. The assumptions to quantify Benefit 6
“Increased farm productivity due to improved rental market efficiency” and Benefit 7
“Increased farm productivity due to better access to finance” are the same as those
presented in Option 1.
For a more detailed explanation of these assumptions, please refer to Annex 6.
D3. Balance of incremental costs and benefits
Table 8: Balance of incremental costs and benefits of implementing Option 3 (in £ million)
OPTION 3 (in £ million)
Costs
Land certification
Land administration
Training and capacity building
M&E
Programme Management
Inception period
GoE Costs
Maintenance of land adm system
Benefits
Direct productivity impacts
Increased productivity - A2F
Increased productivity - rental markets
Value added
Net value flow
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
1.57
0.16
0.00
0.10
0.34
0.63
7.17
0.46
0.40
0.40
1.02
11.30
0.72
0.70
0.20
1.21
10.43
0.91
0.60
0.40
1.21
10.43
0.95
0.50
0.20
1.00
11.92
0.76
0.25
0.30
0.90
0.25
0.05
0.05
0.40
0.33
0.00
0.19
0.36
0.53
0.71
0.88
2.30
1.01
1.04
1.08
2.44
1.15
1.19
1.24
2.61
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-2.79
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-9.64
0.00
0.00
0.42
0.27
-14.21
2.14
0.04
1.17
2.17
-11.90
5.94
0.12
2.21
5.38
-8.41
11.27
0.23
3.27
9.60
-5.42
16.65
0.34
4.47
13.94
10.57
22.76
0.47
4.47
18.00
16.99
22.76
0.47
4.47
18.00
16.96
22.76
0.47
4.47
18.00
16.92
22.76
0.47
4.47
18.00
15.56
22.76
0.47
4.47
18.00
16.85
22.76
0.47
4.47
18.00
16.81
22.76
0.47
4.47
18.00
16.76
NPV (12%)
IRR
22.76
0.47
4.47
18.00
15.39
6.72
14.8%
This option shows an IRR of 14.8%, an NPV of £6,724,697 and a (discounted) BCR of 1.14.
Under this option, around 15 million certificates would be issued reaching over 6.5 million
farming households145. Of these, 4,863,861 households would benefit from increased
security of tenure due to second level certification146 and 1,459,158 households would
benefit from increased productivity147.
It is important to note that given the nature of LAND related interventions (focused in the
area of policy), it is likely that the number of beneficiaries is higher. Any intervention of the
programme that addresses some policy constraints will benefit more farmers than just those
who receive a certificate.
145 15 million parcels at an average of 2.3 parcels per household = 6,521,739 households (see annex 6).
146 Out of the 6,521,739 households, only 70% of households (+10% attrition rate) experience a positive impact of second level
certification (see annex 6).
147 Out of the 4,863,861 households that benefit from increased security of tenure due to 2nd level certification, only 30% have a
propensity to invest (=1,459,158) (see annex 6).
178
E3. Results of cost benefit analysis for option 3
Table 9: CBA for option 3
Economic indicators
Costs
£84,926,228
Benefits
NPV
£175,364,195
BCR (discounted)
1.14
IRR
14.8%
Achieve commercial viability?
Yes
£6,724,697
Direct beneficiary numbers
Total number of farming households that receive second level certification
6,521,739
Total number of farming households that benefit from increased security
of tenure due to second level certification
4,863,861
Total number of farming households that benefit from productivity
increases
1,459,158
Cost per farming household148
£17.46
Option 4: Do nothing
Under a do nothing option, the situation around land administration in the woredas where
LIFT would be operating will continue to deteriorate. The effects of first level certification will
continue to be eroded by a rate of 10% per annum (GoE figures, see annex 6). This means
that further work will still be required to stop the attrition of the system and to re-certify
those plots where the benefits of first level certification are completely gone. In the woredas
where LIFT would be operating, subsistence agriculture will continue to prevail and there
will be no productivity gains from land registration and a functioning land administration
system. In addition, the possible gains in productivity that could be achieved from improving
the efficiency of rental markets, enhancing seed markets and agricultural management
practices, and increasing access to finance for smallholder farmers will be lost.
In woredas different from the ones where LIFT would be operating, it is estimated that 4.3
million parcels would be certified with funding from the regional governments and two donor
programmes (REILA, SLMP2). Additionally, another donor programme would be
undertaking interventions to build capacity and provide legal advice on land issues and
support policy development on pastoral communities (LAND). These interventions,
however, would occur in different woredas from those where LIFT would be taking place
and have therefore not been incorporated into the CBA.
As options 1, 2 and 3 are assessed against a do nothing option and therefore only measure
the incremental costs and benefits, the NPV of option 4 is necessarily zero. The gains that
are quantified in the other options are incremental to the do nothing option.
3.2 Balance of incremental costs and benefits
A summary of the incremental costs and benefits of all three options is presented below.
148 This number is obtained by dividing the total costs of the intervention by the total number of farming households that benefit from
increased security of tenure due to second level certification.
179
Table 10: Summary of CBA across the three options
Option 1
£86,817,213
Costs
Option 2
£83,804,735
Option 3
£84,926,228
£196,403,259
£255,091,741
£175,364,195
1.26
1.67
1.14
£12,716,594
£33,071,509
£6,724,697
17.2%
24.1%
14.8%
Total
number
of
farming
households that receive 2nd level
certificates
7,391,304
6,086,957
6,521,739
Total
number
of
farming
households that benefit from
increased security of tenure due to
2nd level certificates
5,514,247
4,549,942
4,863,861
1,654,274
1,364,983149
1,459,158
Cost per farming household150
£15.74
£18.42
£17.46
Benefit per farming household151
£35.62
£56.06
£36.05
Benefits
BCR (discounted)
NPV
IRR
Total
number
of
farming
households that benefit from
productivity increases
The table above shows that option 2 is the option that presents a higher IRR (24.1%) as
well as the highest NPV (£33,071,509). This option also presents the highest BCR of the
three (1.67).
Sensitivity analysis
In order to test the robustness of our key assumptions, we tested them against two
alternative (and in most cases more conservative) estimates. All sensitivity analyses are
compared to the headline results from the cost benefit analysis.
Table 11: Sensitivity analyses
Headline results
NPV
Option 1
Option 2
£12,716,594
IRR
17.2%
£33,071,509
24.1%
Option 3
£6,724,697
14.8%
Value addition
The initial assumption for value added in Ethiopian agriculture is a significant one for the
model and as our evidence was based on findings applicable to the cereals sector, which
are the main crops of smallholder farmers. Our estimate for value added was 65%. The
149 This number includes the beneficiaries from each of the 3 interventions costed in the CBA: beneficiaries due to improved seed
and agricultural management practices (818,990) + beneficiaries due to increased access to finance (191,098) + increase in rental
agreements (354,895). The number of beneficiaries does not, however, include the people who would benefit by being able to rent
the land. This calculation has not been undertaken as there is no reliable information on the number of tenants that will be in the
market.
150 This number is obtained from dividing the total costs of the intervention by the total number of farming households that benefit
from increased security of tenure due to second level certification.
151 This number is obtained from dividing the total benefits of the intervention by the total number of farming households that benefit
from increased security of tenure due to second level certification.
180
analysis shows that reducing the estimation for value added down to 45% has a significant
effect on the commercial viability of options 1 and 3, as their NPVs become negative. If
value added is only reduced to 55%, then only option 3 becomes non-viable commercially.
Original value: 65%
NPV
IRR
Option 1
Option 2
£3,112,463
13.3%
45%
Option 1
NPV
-£6,491,668
IRR
9.0%
£20,400,411
19.9%
Option 2
£7,729,313
15.2%
Option 3
-£1,928,305
11.1%
Option 3
-£10,581,307
7.0%
55%
Average plot size
As there was wide variation in the estimates for average plot size in the academic literature,
our decision to take the middle value of the three estimates makes this an important value
to test. Reducing the average plot size to 0.32 ha makes the NPV of all options negative. It
is important to note, however, that a very modest change in some of the assumptions for
option 2 (e.g. increase the reduction of inefficient sharecropping from 6 to 8%) is sufficient
to generate a positive NPV in option 2. Increasing average plot size to 1.17ha increases the
overall benefits to all options.
Original value: 0.62 hectares
0.32
Ha.
(Deininger
et
al.)
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
NPV
IRR
-£16,996,589
3.3%
1.17 Ha.
(Taffesse
et al.)
Option 1
-£5,158,468
9.7%
Option 2
£103,159,799
42.2%
-£20,045,800
1.5%
Option 3
£55,803,941
30.6%
NPV
IRR
£67,190,763
33.6%
Pr
op
en
sit
y
to
inv
est
due to first/second level certification
The sensitivity of the model to the propensity to invest due to first/second level certification
is key to assess the returns of the different options. Reducing the propensity to invest by 10
and 20 percentage points would make the NPVs of options 1 and 3 negative, and therefore
these options would become non commercially viable. Option 2 would remain commercially
viable, although when the propensity to invest is reduced by 20 percentage points the NPV
and IRR are reduced significantly.
Original value: 30%
20%
NPV
IRR
Option 1
Option 2
-£3,900,075
10.2%
10%
Option 1
£19,408,313
19.7%
Option 2
£5,745,117
14.5%
Option 3
-£8,249,425
8.1%
Option 3
-£23,223,547
-0.9%
NPV
-£20,516,745
IRR
0.8%
Productivity impact of first level certification
The model is very sensitive to the assumption over the impact that first level certification
has on productivity. We tested the initial assumption from Deininger et al. (2009, 2011) that
first level certification increases productivity by 9%, testing it also at 6% and 3%. Reducing
the variables for this assumption makes options 1 and 3 commercially non-viable, but
option 2 remains with a positive NPV.
181
Original value: 9%
6%
NPV
3%
IRR
NPV
IRR
Option 1
-£3,900,075
10.2%
Option 1
-£20,516,745
0.8%
Option 2
£19,408,313
19.7%
Option 2
£5,745,117
14.5%
Option 3
-£8,249,425
8.1%
Option 3
-£23,223,547
-0.9%
Annual attrition rate of first level certification effects
The model is sensitive to the rate of attrition of first level certification. The GoE assumption
of 10% is tested at 5% and 0%. In both cases, all options remain with a positive NPV and
IRR.
Original value: 10%
5%
Option 1
Option 2
NPV
IRR
£10,927,432
16.5%
£30,654,334
Option 3
£5,139,940
0%
NPV
IRR
Option 1
£9,024,901
15.7%
23.3%
Option 2
£28,082,277
22.5%
14.2%
Option 3
£3,452,552
13.5%
Average output per hectare
The average output per hectare is a significant driver of the outputs of the model. We test
the Deininger et al. (2011) figure of ETB 3,476 against a more conservative ETB 2,500 and
a very conservative ETB 2,000. If average output per hectare is reduced to ETB 2,500, the
NPVs of options 1 and 3 become negative. Option 2 remains commercially viable, although
its NPV and IRR are significantly reduced. If average output is reduced to ETB 2,000, then
all options become commercially non-viable.
Original value: ETB 3,476
ETB 2,500
NPV
IRR
ETB 2,000
Option 1
-£4,811,774
9.8%
Option 1
-£13,791,470
5.2%
Option 2
£9,945,661
16.1%
Option 2
-£1,901,597
11.2%
Option 3
-£9,067,778
7.7%
Option 3
-£17,158,185
3.3%
NPV
IRR
Remaining effects of first level certification
The remaining effects of first level certification are an important driver of the model.
Increasing the remaining effects of first level certification to 40% reduces the NPV and
IRR’s of all three options, but they all remain commercially viable. However, increasing the
effects of first level certification to 50% makes the NPV for options 1 and 3 negative, and
therefore commercially non-viable.
Original value: 30%
40%
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
NPV
IRR
£5,556,422
14.3%
£23,681,314
£247,931
50%
NPV
IRR
Option 1
-£1,603,751
11.3%
21.0%
Option 2
£14,291,119
17.7%
12.1%
Option 3
-£6,228,835
9.2%
Access to finance
The assumption over the impact of increased access to finance due to the M4P
interventions is one of the less grounded of the assumptions in the model due to lack of
comparable evidence. However, it is also not a major driver of the results. Bringing the total
182
impact of access to finance on investment from 9% of household to 0% of households has
only a marginal impact on the analysis.
Original value: 9%
5%
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
NPV
IRR
£12,263,436
17.0%
£31,581,056
£6,316,333
0%
NPV
IRR
Option 1
£11,696,988
16.8%
23.6%
Option 2
£29,717,990
23.1%
14.6%
Option 3
£5,805,878
14.4%
We also tested the assumptions over increased prevalence of renting out land due to first
level certification and the higher productivity of tenants over landlords and increased
productivity and found the results to be very inelastic to changes in the assumptions.
Additional analysis was also undertaken to test the effects of an erosion of benefits over
time in all options. Two alternative scenarios were assessed:
 A 5% erosion of benefits after year 4 of the programme: in this scenario, the NPV of
options 1 and 3 becomes negative and therefore commercially non-viable. Option 2
presents a lower NPV but remains commercially viable.
 A 5% erosion of benefits after year 7 of the programme: in this scenario, the NPV of
option 3 becomes negative, but options 1 and 2 remain with positive NPVs and
commercially viable.
The sensitivity analysis indicates that option 2 is the only option that remains commercially
viable regardless of the changes in the assumptions. It is also the option that most
consistently delivers the highest NPV and IRR.
Selecting the preferred option
The analysis undertaken so far suggests that only options 1 and 2 for interventions present
positive returns to DFID and are therefore worth undertaking. The cost benefit analysis,
however, points towards a positive and higher impact of option 2 as it is the option that
delivers the highest NPV and IRR, and reaches the highest number of beneficiaries. It is
also the only option that runs positively through most sensitivity scenarios.
It is important to note, however, that the results of the cost benefit analysis are derived
from a set of assumptions on the potential benefits of each option. These assumptions,
which are clearly presented earlier and detailed in annex 6, are based on literature from
Ethiopia and elsewhere that needs to be considered as “moderate evidence”. It is also the
case that there are a number of non-quantifiable benefits that could significantly increase
the positive impact of these options, particularly in the case of option 2. As a result of these
constraints, the actual impact of the different options is hard to establish in advance. This
also implies that the results of this CBA should be taken as indicative, and that the
suggested potential benefits and the assumptions made should be tracked over the
programme’s life. This will be done through the VFM indicators.
183
Annex 8 – Financial Tables
Table A8.1: Estimated capital and resource costs for Year 1
Intervention
Second level land
certification
Apr-13
May-13
Jun-13
Jul-13
Aug-13
Sep-13
Oct-13
Nov-13
Dec-13
Jan-14
Feb-14
Mar-14
2013/14
CEDL
25,000
32,000
57,000
REDL
74,660
134,114
208,774
Total
99,660
166,114
265,774
CEDL
0
0
0
REDL
9,600
12,705
22,305
Total
9,600
12,705
22,305
TA for Markets and
Policy
REDL
22,110
26,780
48,890
Performance grants
REDL
0
0
0
Training and
capacity building
REDL
0
0
0
Research and
Communications
REDL
0
0
0
M and E
REDL
61,120
78,280
139,400
Land administration
Programme
Management
CEDL
0
0
0
REDL
49,906
48,483
98,389
Total
49,906
48,483
98,389
CEDL
Inception Period
Total
2,000
REDL
19,221
212,855
17,381
2,000
62,280
6867
37969
70444
39298
26609
492,924
DFID
197,345
197,345
Total
197,345
19,221
0
212,855
19,381
62,280
6,867
37,969
70,444
CEDL
0
0
0
0
2000
0
0
0
0
0
25000
32000
59000
REDL
197,345
19,221
0
212,855
17,381
62,280
6,867
37,969
70,444
39,298
244,005
300,362
1,208,027
197,345
19,221
0
212,855
19,381
62,280
6,867
37,969
70,444
39,298
269,005
332,362
1,267,027
184
626,362
Table A8.2: Estimated capital and resource costs for Year 2 (£)
Component
CDEL
Second
level
certification
land
Land administration
TA for Markets and
Policy
Performance grants
Qtr 1
Qtr 2
Qtr 3
1,544,000
2,008,000
Qtr 4
Total
0
1,320,000
4,872,000
RDEL
739,756
993,812
876,576
1,418,355
4,028,499
Total
2,283,756
3,001,812
876,576
2,738,355
8,900,499
CDEL
0
28,000
68,000
96,000
192,000
RDEL
73,065
73,065
51,845
79,845
63,080
131,080
59,025
155,025
247,015
Total
RDEL
127,698
172,201
184,816
168,671
653,386
439,015
RDEL
83,333
125,000
125,000
125,000
458,333
Training and capacity
building
RDEL
33,333
50,000
50,000
50,000
183,333
Research
Communication
RDEL
59,813
36,356
51,856
39,856
187,881
RDEL
243,370
240,220
30,410
32,000
546,000
CDEL
100,000
0
0
0
100,000
RDEL
180,919
152,414
163,211
145,673
642,217
Total
280,919
152,414
163,211
145,673
742,217
CDEL
1,644,000
2,036,000
68,000
1,416,000
5,164,000
RDEL
1,541,287
1,821,848
1,544,949
2,038,581
6,946,665
3,185,287
3,857,848
1,612,949
3,454,581
12,110,665
M and E
Programme
Management
Total
and
Total
Table A8.3: Input sector codes
Funding Type:
Benefiting Country: Ethiopia
Input Sector
Input
Percentage
Sector
Allocation
Code
Component 1:Second level land cert.
1
Production
31130
70
2
Environmental
41032
10
3
Production
31120
10
4
Social Other
16012
10
Component 2: Land administration
1
Production
31130
60
2
Environmental
41032
10
3
Production
31120
10
4
Development
43040
10
Planning
5
Social Other
16012
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
Component 3: TA for M4P interventions
Production
31110
20
Environmental
41032
5
Production
31130
50
Production
31120
10
Production
31191
10
Social Other
16012
5
Input Sector
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
185
Input
Sector Code
Percentage
Allocation
Component 4: Performance Grants
Economic
25010
5
Production
31120
20
Production
31130
60
Production
32130
10
Environmental
41032
5
Component 5: Training and Capacity Building
Education
11020
10
Education
11330
10
Government & Civil 15020
10
Society
Government & Civil 15150
60
Society
Social Other
16012
10
Component 6: Research and Communications
Research
80010
10
Research
80014
70
Research
80015
10
Research
80024
10
Annex 9 – LIFT Logframe
PROGRAMME NAME
Land Investment for Transformation
IMPACT
Impact Indicator 1
Contribute
to
increased economic
growth, increased
incomes of the
poor,
without
harming
the
environment.
Poverty headcount ratio
at rural poverty line (% of
rural population) 153
Planned
Source(s)
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
Milestone
Mar 2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
Milestone
Mar 2019
30.4%
27%
24.325.5%
24.0%
22.5%
20.6%
Target
Aug 2019
19.5%
Baseline: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank.
Sources for Measurement: WDI, CSA (5 yearly House Consumption-expenditure Survey); MoFED data; LIFT
Indicator tracking.
Baseline
2011
Planned
22,500
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
Milestone
Mar 2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
Milestone
Mar 2019
23,500
24,000
26,500
29,000
31,900
Target
Aug 2019
34,401
Achieved
Source(s)
Impact Indicator 3
Protection of arable land
against
environmental
degradation
(‘000,000
ha)155
Baseline152
2010
202900
Achieved
Impact Indicator 2
Agricultural productionmajor food crops (‘000
tonnes)154
ARIES No.
Baseline GTP Annual Progress Report 2011-12; Sources for measurement from GTP monitoring results, LIFT
indicator tracking reports.
Baseline
2011
Planned
8.5156
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
Milestone
Mar 2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
Milestone
Mar 2019
6.8
7.7
8.5
9.6
10.7
Target
Aug 2019
12.0
Achieved
Source(s)
Baseline; GTP Annual Progress Report 2011-12. Sources for measurement from GTP monitoring results,
LIFT indicator tracking reports.
152
Baseline date is most recent date for which data is available
GoE’s GTP states that national poverty headcount in 2009/10 was 29.2% and the target is to reduce this to 22.2% in 2014/15. This implies an annual rate of poverty reduction of 5.4%. This
rate of poverty reduction has been applied to the baseline rural poverty % age to identify the milestones under this indicator, because of the lack of targets for rural against urban poverty in
GTP. Measurement of actuals through LIFT will be gender disaggregated. Planned Indicator can change when the new GTP is made available in 2015/2016.
154
Milestones - MOFED - GTP 2010/11-2014/15 Policy Matrix, Vol.2. For years 2016-2019 milestones are calculated using the GTP growth rate. Planned Indicator can change when the new
GTP is made available in 2015/2016.
155 Area of land under which community based natural resource conservation works is taken as a proxy. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development-GTP 2010/11-2014/15 Policy Matrix,
Vol.2.
156 Milestones - MOFED - GTP 2010/11-2014/15 Policy Matrix, Vol.2. 2016-2019 milestones are calculated based on GTP trend though there is a high baseline figure due to extreme one year
performance. These will be adjusted with any revision to the GTP to reflect actual performance.
153
186
Impact Indicator 4
Improved
economic
empowerment of women
(number)
Baseline
2011
Planned
Outcome Indicator 1
Better working rural
land sector.
Number
of
rural
households that have
strengthened security of
tenure as a result of 2nd
level
certification158
(cumulative)
3,500,000
Milestone
Mar 2017
5,500,000
Milestone
Mar 2018
7,000,000
Milestone
Mar 2019
Target
Aug 2019
9,500,000
11,000,000
Number of women benefited from credit and saving services is taken as a proxy indicator from the GTP
policy Matrix. GTP Annual Progress Report 2011-12.For years starting 2016 the target rate of change of the
preceding years used to calculate the milestones. 157 Measurement through GTP monitoring and LIFT
indicator tracking reports.
Planned
Milestone
Mar 2015
0
60,000
Milestone
Mar 2016
460,000
Milestone
Mar 2017
1,525,000
Milestone
Mar 2018
2,821,000
Milestone
Mar 2019
Target
Aug 2019
4,180,000
4,549,942
Achieved
M/F159
Source(s)
Planned: Lift Business Case - Cost benefit analysis(baseline + milestones)
Achieved: LIFT MIS data, verified by LIFT tracking of perceptions of security of tenure (M/F)
Baseline
2013
Planned
No:
% Inc. Increase:
Milestone
Mar 2015
0
0
18,300
0
Milestone
Mar 2016
142,000
1.7%
Milestone
Mar 2017
462,700
3.9%
Milestone
Mar 2018
853,100
7.3%
Milestone
Mar 2019
1,260,516
12.1%
Target
Aug 2019
1,364,983
20.5%
Achieved No:
% Inc. Increase:
Source(s)
Outcome Indicator 3
2,500,000
Baseline
2013
Outcome Indicator 2
Number
of
rural
households that benefit
from increased income
1,478,152
Milestone
Mar 2016
Achieved
Source(s)
OUTCOME
Milestone
Mar 2015
Planned: CBA (baseline + milestones)
Achieved: LIFT MIS data through woredas, verified by LIFT tracking of perceptions of agricultural (M/F)
Baseline
Milestone
157
Milestone
Milestone
Milestone
Milestone
Assumptions
1.Increased
investment leads
to
increased
incomes of the
poor
2.
Additional
investment
generated will be
put
to
economically
productive and
environmentally
beneficial use.
3.
Increased
economic growth
and
improved
incomes will be
gender sensitive.
Target
Achievements against milestones to be obtained from GTP monitoring reports
This number assumes that only 70% of households have complete benefit from second level certification and there is a 10% attrition rate. Those who have received first level registration
for all their parcels and not transacted since will receive relatively lower additional security of tenure under second. Further details are included in the CBA. MIS will identify those parcels
where the 2nd level registration are different from those recorded in registers.
159
Achievements will be tracked by gender
158
187
2013
% rural households
where women have
equal rights over land as
male members160
Planned
Source(s)
Planned
Mar 2017
Mar 2018
Mar 2019
Aug 2019
Baseline – The LIFT baseline survey
Baseline
2011
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
Milestone
Mar 2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
Milestone
Mar 2019
Target
Aug 2019
TBD162
3%
8%
12%
22%
35%
----163
Achieved
Source(s)
Outcome Indicator 5
Revenue from rural land
based
sources
in
programme woredas.
Mar 2016
Achieved
Outcome Indicator 4
Area of land covered with
trees in ‘000,000 hectares
Mar 2015
TBD161
Planned
1. Land Tax
2. Transaction
Fees
Milestone annual increases to be derived from weighted regional plans supporting GTP national rates and
baseline data. Measurement from woreda and regional reports. LIFT indicator tracking report will report
on agroforestry practices.
Baseline
2014
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
Milestone
Mar 2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
Milestone
Mar 2019
Target
Aug 2019
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
Achieved
Source(s)
TOTAL
INPUTS
and HR)
PROGRAMME
Milestone annual increases to be derived from weighted regional plans supporting GTP national rates and
baseline data. Measurement from woreda and regional reports. LIFT indicator tracking report will report
on agroforestry practices.
DFID (£)
Govt (£)
Total (£)
DFID
Share
68,200,000
5,300,000
73,500,000164
95%
(£millions
160 This will be calculated as rural households whose land is certified as held by a woman, or a married couple.
161 To be Determined – from baseline study after which milestones will be derived, with adequate evidence to support the definitions.
162 To be collected from Programme woredas and regions.
163 No target is set for the year 2019 because the planting season (July) doesn’t match with the project completion month (March).
164 Cost is allocated across outputs at direct estimated output cost plus management, inception and M and E costs prorated.
188
DFID HR
(FTEs) %
4.
Climate
Change
shocks
impede farmers
ability to invest
and
thus
to
increase
incomes.
OUTPUT 1
Output Indicator 1.1
Output 1 – 2nd level
certificates
issued
recognising rights of
joint,
polygamous
and FHH land holders
% of agricultural land that
is second stage certified in
the
four
programme
states cumulative
Planned
Source(s)
Output Indicator 1.4
TBD
165
Milestone
Mar 2016
Milestone
Mar 2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
Milestone
Mar 2019
Target
Aug 2019
Baseline – Regional Data166, milestones = baseline plus LIFT issued, achieved - LIFT MIS systems, verified
by baseline, midline and end line surveys.
Baseline
2013
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
Milestone
Mar 2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
Milestone
Mar 2019
Target
Aug 2019
Planned
1- 0
2- 0
3- 0
260,000
200,000
180,000
1,600,000
1,500,000
1,350,000
5,000,,000
4,800,000
4300,000
9,000,000
8,750,000
7,900,000
13,125,000
12,925,000
11,633,000
14,000,000
14,000,000
12,600,000
Achieved
1M / 1F
1Married
2M / 2F
2Married
3M / 3F
3Married
Source(s)
LIFT MIS will collect achieved data disaggregated. LIFT Indicator Tracking Report also
Baseline
2009
Output Indicator 1.3
Cumulative number of
certificates issued with
LIFT
support
by
household167
Milestone
Mar 2015
Achieved
Output Indicator 1.2
Cumulative number of
parcels supported by LIFT
for:
1. Demarcation
2. Certificates issued
3. Certificates collected
Baseline
2013
Milestone
Mar 2015
MHH
FHH
Source(s)
LIFT MIS data will collect achieved data disaggregated. LIFT Indicator Tracking Report also.
Milestone
Mar 2017
3,062,000
742,000
Milestone
Mar 2019
Achieved
Milestone
Mar 2016
1,680,000
407,000
Milestone
Mar 2018
MHH
FHH
Milestone
Mar 2015
525,000
127,000
Milestone
Mar 2017
Planned
Baseline
2009
70,000
17,000
Milestone
Mar 2016
Milestone
Mar 2018
165
Milestone will be baseline from regions plus parcels issued in 1.2 multiplied by average number of hectares per parcel (0.32 per CSA).
166
Being collected currently from regions
4,524,000
1,096,000
Milestone
Mar 2019
Assumptions
1.
Increased
security
of
tenure through
second
level
certification
leads
to
increased
investment
in
land, and land
rental markets.
2. Woreda staff
utilise
mass
approval
and
signing systems.
3.
Woredas
provide timely
arrangements
for
certificate
issue.
Target
Aug 2019
4,900,000
1,187,000
Target
Aug 2019
167 Assumption of 70% of parcels being issued to women, singly or jointly, based on data received from Amhara Regional Government. Disaggregation percentage to be tested during
baseline study and amended.
189
Cost per certificate issued
with LIFT support (£)168
Planned
NA
INPUTS (£millions and
HR)
9.46
4.79
3.91
3.47
Annual LIFT Reports
40%
RISK RATING (H, M, L)
DFID (£)
Govt (£)
Total (£)
DFID Share
(%)
53,100,000
4,500,000
57,600,000
91%
OUTPUT 2
Output Indicator 2.1
Output 2 - Land
administration
system
implemented and
operational
in
targeted Woredas
Number of land transactions
(disaggregated by gender) 169
recorded in the improved land
registers
Baseline
2013
Planned
Milestone
Mar 2016
Mileston
e
Mar
2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
30,000
180,000
397,000
N/A170
Milestone
Mar 2019
Target
Aug 2019
612,000
700,000
M/F/
Married
Source(s)
Planned calculated as 5% of registered holdings. Ref: SRM, MoA, 2012, Pilot land tenure in Rwanda,
evidences and initial impact, WB, 2010. Actuals to be obtained from LIFT MIS system. LIFT Indicator
tracking report will collect data on land transactions recorded and unrecorded.
Baseline
2013
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
3%
8%
Mileston
e
Mar
2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
10%
TBD
Milestone
Mar 2019
Planned
TBD
Achieved
FHH/MHH
Source(s)
Baseline, endline and midline survey. Complaints will be tracked by MIS system.
Milestone is % increase against baseline to a target of 90% in total
Output Indicator 2.3
Queries per year received on
rural land information database
N/A
Milestone
Mar 2015
Baseline
2013
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
Mileston
e
Mar
2017
Planned
N/A
N/A171
3%
8%
Achieved
M/F
Milestone
Mar 2018
12%
TBD
Milestone
Mar 2019
18%
MEDIUM
DFID HR
(FTEs) %
Achieved
Output Indicator 2.2
% of rural households satisfied
with land administration services
in certified woredas
3.45
Achieved
Source(s)
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)
20
Target
Aug 2019
90%
Target
Aug 2019
25%
Assumptions
1. GoE continues to
allocate resources
to maintain the
Land Admin system
2.
land
users
understand
the
importance
of
registering
transactions
3. fees for land
transactions
are
affordable for poor
farmers
+4.
Complaints
system in place
5. As awareness of
database becomes
greater use will be
greater.
168 Total cumulative cost including aerial survey costs and equipment but excluding management costs. High commencement as a result of initial capital investment. Total Cost £17.2 million.
169
Disaggregation through baseline measurements
170 The computerised database is only expected to become available in December 2014 therefore no impact until 2015
171 As for 6
190
as % of total parcels on database
Annual LIFT Reports
Source(s)
20%
INPUTS (£millions and
HR)
RISK RATING (H, M, L)
DFID (£)
Govt (£)
3,400,000
500,000
OUTPUT 3
Output Indicator 3.1
Output
3
–
Improved
supporting
functions for the
rural land market
for women and
poor farmers
Cumulative additional
number
of
rural
households accessing
finance by using second
stage certificates in
certified
woredas
(cumulative)
Baseline
2013
Cumulative additional
% of rural households
renting out their land
in certified woredas
that receive second
level
certification
(cumulative)
Total (£)
3,900,000
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
Planned: CBA (baseline + milestones)
Achieved: LIFT baseline, midline and endline surveys, and indicator tracking reports; Records of lending
institutions
Planned
0
0
2%
3.5%
Milestone
Mar 2018
7.2%
225,800
Target
Aug 2019
Source(s)
Milestone
Mar 2017
130,000
Milestone
Mar 2019
MHH
FHH
Milestone
Mar 2016
44,200
87%
Milestone
Mar 2018
Achieved
Milestone
Mar 2015
13,100
DFID HR (FTEs) %
MHH
FHH 0
Baseline
2013
0
Milestone
Mar 2017
DFID Share
MEDIUM
Planned
Output Indicator 3.2
INPUTS (£millions
and HR)
Query logging to be included in the computerised database, excludes transactions. Planned based on
assumption of starting at low number and growing over time. No regional experience to draw from –
UK 100%. Milestones to be updated from data in baseline survey.
Milestone
Mar 2019
10%
318,495
Target
Aug 2019
13%
Achieved MHH
FHH
Source(s)
Planned: CBA (baseline + milestones)
Achieved: LIFT baseline, midline and endline surveys, and indicator tracking reports surveys;
DFID (£)
Govt (£)
Total (£)
DFID Share
(%)
6,400,000
150,000
6,550,000
98%
191
DFID HR (FTEs)
%
Assumptions
Second
level
certificates can be
used as guarantee
of productivity
Improved
land
governance
increases
willingness
of
farmers to invest
GoE allow pilots
on PPP projects
Target
June 2019
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)
20%
OUTPUT 4
Output Indicator 4.1
Output 4 – Improved
policies and institutions
for the rural land sector
Number
of
regulations,
strategies and plans at various
levels drafted and approved to
improve functioning of land
sector (cumulative)
RISK RATING (H, M, L)
Baseline
2013
Planned
Source
Milestone
Mar 2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
10
18
30
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
Milestone
Mar 2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
21.0%
20.0%
19.0%
17.5%
0
2
Milestone
Mar 2019
35
Target
Aug 2019
40
GoE Reports, Project MIS data
Baseline
2013
Planned
21.1%
Milestone
Mar 2019
16.0%
Achieve
d
FHH
MHH
Source
Baseline – ELAP data, thereafter MIS systems, LIFT baseline, midline and endline surveys
Output Indicator 4.3
Number of research &
evidence land policy reports
that allow Gov't to make
informed decisions on land
governance (cumulative)
Milestone
Mar 2016
Achieve
d
Output Indicator 4.2
Rural households involved in
land-related
disputes
(cumulative)
Disaggregated172
Milestone
Mar 2015
HIGH
Baseline
2013
Planned
Milestone
Mar 2015
Milestone
Mar 2016
Milestone
Mar 2017
Milestone
Mar 2018
1
5
9
14
0
Milestone
Mar 2019
16
Target
Aug 2019
15.0%
Target
Aug 2019
20
Achieve
d
Source
INPUTS (£millions and
HR)
172
Project MIS data
DFID (£)
Govt (£)
Total (£)
DFID Share
(%)
5,300,000
150,000
5,450,000
97%
Disaggregation of data for milestones to be inserted through baseline measurement.
192
DFID HR
(FTEs) %
Assumptions
GoE supports the
development of land
rental markets
Second
level
certification leads to
a reduction in the
number of disputes
Annex 10 - Risk Matrix
Risk
Triggers
Probability173
Impact
Mitigation measures
Macro condition risks
1. Macro-economic
instability
weakens
growth
and
opportunities
for
farmers to engage in
markets.
Global
or
regional Low - Ethiopia has enjoyed Medium
economic
shocks; strong
growth
despite
Domestic
macro- macro instability. IMF and
economic issues
World Bank project strong
growth
2. Political instability or
widespread civil unrest
undermine government
capacity, markets and
the certification process
Domestic
or
regional
conflicts escalate to a
level that undermines
political stability
Low - The country has
remained stable since the
last election and the death
of the Prime Minister
High
3. Political commitment to
land
certification
processes
is
not
maintained
Change of key personnel Low – Land certification
in Ministry of Agriculture; currently high policy priority
Change
in
key
government
policy
priorities
High
Medium – MoA keen to
ensure opportunities from
land
certification
are
maximised.
High









DFID through several forums such as DAG, PBS/PFM monitors the
macro-economic situation.
Effects of instability would be partially mitigated by the
improvements to the investment climate brought about by PEPE
programme
LIFT market based approach would adapt to maximize benefits
under prevailing environment.
Other DFID Programmes such as PDP seek to improve stability.
Land certification can mitigate one major cause of instability through
provision of security of tenure.
DFID works closely with FCO for early identification and mitigation.
DFID and other DPs through the Governance Technical Working
Group under the DAG regularly consult with GoE.
ITSP will work through MoA and policy makers to ensure political
commitment is maintained by continually demonstrating LIFT’s
results and impact.
DFID continued dialogue with MoA policy makers
Policy risks
4. Government
prefers
that LIFT supports land
certifications only rather
than
land
sector
facilitation and support
on
rules
and
regulations
development.
Inadequate understanding
in MoA of the strategic
opportunities and benefits
associated with improved
rural land sector, building
on land certification.




173
Probability and impact ratings are before mitigating actions.
193
LIFT ensures that market facilitation is within the existing constitution
and law.
Provide sufficient evidence to MoA on the benefits of linking land
certification with existing markets, in order to maximize benefits for
the poor.
LIFT takes a facilitative and evidence driven approach to ensure that
evidence feeds into government policy and planning, mitigating risk
of adverse policy changes.
DFID continued dialogue with MoA policy makers
Risk
Triggers
Probability173
Impact
Mitigation measures
Operational risks

5. Inadequate
local
government capacity to
issue certificates in the
number and quality
required
results
in
reduced outputs.
Inadequate investment in High Hitherto woredas have
capacity development
only been involved in
piecemeal approach, and
have low capacities
High
6. Government fails to
maintain
the
land
register, resulting in the
register
becoming
obsolete.
Inadequate understanding Medium. Hitherto woredas
of the need for continuous have
not
maintained
updating
of
land registers
registration systems.
High
7. Significant numbers of
landholders opt out of
registering
future
transactions such as
inheritance, and the
register falls out of
date.
8. Quality
control
of
survey & certification
process is inadequate
to provide accurate and
reliable
land
certificates.
9. GoE
programme
implementation
priorities & ‘campaigns’
result in administrators
unable to pay adequate
attention
to
land
certification and market
facilitation.
Inadequate attention to
awareness
raising
of
certificate holders and
capacity development of
local administrators
Medium:
Where
landholders unaware of
benefits will not see need
for formal registration of
inheritance or gifts.
High
Lack of investment in a
robust quality control /
oversight system and
standards.
Medium: As programme is Medium
working through region and
woredas, there is a risk of
lack of quality control.


GoE intensifies local level Low: LIFT is aligned to Medium
campaigns to achieve government policy priorities
GTP targets that are not
aligned
to
LIFT
objectives.

194
LIFT invests in capacity development of local land administrators
and provision of supporting staff to fill temporary capacity gaps.
 Use appropriate technology to allow mass certificate preparation and
issuance.
 Close collaboration with existing partner programmes that support
sector capacity development.
 Increased accountability of the government staff through use of
ITSPE monitoring and follow up systems.
LIFT to work with other partners (LAND, REILA etc.):

Awareness raising of landholders as to importance of register will
create demand from below.
 Capacity building of senior officials at federal and regional levels will
create understanding and demand from above.
 MIS system to provide early warning of failure to update.
LIFT to work with other partners (LAND, REILA etc.):




Awareness raising of benefits of registration of transaction to the
farmers
Capacity building at woreda and kebele level including LAC
members.
Robust quality control checks embedded by LIFT in the process.
ITSP with other partner programmes to support MoA in finalising
approval of surveying standards,
ITSP to be responsible for ensuring quality.
Regional governments and woredas to sign up to annual
implementation plans against which progress will be monitored on a
quarterly basis
Memorandums of Understanding to be signed with regional
government heads.
Risk
10. Agricultural input and
output markets do not
respond to demand
Triggers
Probability173
Impact
Insufficient attention to Low:
Markets
naturally Medium
market linkages; lack of respond to demand unless
coordination with other constrained.
market
development
policies and programmes
Mitigation measures



11. DFID E is unable to
manage and maintain
oversight of the various
different components /
flows of money.
DFID E staff allocated Low: there are strong
insufficient
for
the safeguards built in place
purpose.
including a strong financial
management within the
implementing team as well
as in the financial aid that
requires
regions
and
woredas to open dedicated
accounts for the LIFT funds.
Funds
will
only
be
disbursed according to
agreed annual operational
plans for specific objectives,
on a quarterly basis. The
transfers will be made on
the assurance of the ITSP
that any previous advance
has been accounted for, the
funds
have
been
appropriately used, and
work plan targets have
been met.
High

12. The development of the
MIS database will be
delayed
by
development problems
13. Lack of coordination
between
LIFT
and
other land and market
support
programmes
Initial
development Medium
procedures
encounter
unexpected problems
Low


Insufficient awareness of Low: Forums are available Medium
the
approaches
and for co-ordination
objectives
of
other
programmes
195



LIFT’s explicit focus on market linkages will work to support better
functioning input and output markets.
Co-ordination with existing government and development partner
projects working on market linkages including DFID’s PEPE
programme.
Programme Monitoring and Evaluation to identify such failures and
new or revised interventions to be introduced
Early recognition by DFID–E of requirements and mapping of
available staff time against them to ensure prepared and equipped.
Use of experienced programmers using professional systems
development standards
Ensuring all data is captured and available for processing when
system functional.
Formal technical team meetings to be held monthly for Land and
Market projects to exchange experiences and to co-ordinate work.
Membership of LAUTT will provide for exchange of ideas.
Regular bilateral discussions with all DPs working on land.
Triggers
Probability173
Impact
Mitigation measures
Lack of attention to
women during certification
and market development
activities
Low: The current land
administration
reform
specifically targets women
and is already showing
results.
Medium

Risk
leads to overlap and
confusion.
Women
and
Disadvantaged
14. Failure
intended
women
to
deliver
benefits to


15. The
disadvantaged
groups in society do not
benefit equally from
LIFT initiatives.
Cultural
taboo
and Low:
all
the
legal Medium
entrenched
traditional frameworks clearly state the
practices.
need to treat all groups
equally.



LIFT (and other programmes) include awareness raising specifically
targets women’s land and inheritance rights.
The market facilitation components of the programme to include
activities that explicitly target women and female headed
households.
Programme M and E to identify such failures and new or revised
interventions to be introduced
LIFT will develop strategy targeting them and follow also the
implementation accordingly.
LIFT (and other programmes) include awareness raising specifically
targets rights of the disadvantaged (children, handicapped, elders)
Programme M and E to identify such failures and advise
improvements on the implementation tools
Climate and environmental risks
16. Adverse
climatic
conditions derail growth
and poverty reduction
and
divert
public
resources
and
administrative capacity
to managing them.
Sustained
widespread
drought
or
flooding
require significant and
sustained GoE response.
Medium:
Ethiopia
is Medium
increasingly well equipped
to deal with droughts and
social protection measures
are in place.
17. Climate change is likely
to exacerbate current
processes
of
soil
degradation. This, in
conjunction with poor
More
frequent
and
intense climate shocks,
resulting in increased
pressure on forests, farm
and
rangeland
for
Medium: Predictability of Medium
climate shocks and the
effects on farmers is
improving, increasing the
chances of mitigation.
196
 Other DFID programmes such as the Climate High-Level Investment
Programme (CHIP) and the Strategic Climate Institutions Programme
(SCIP) are operating to mitigate environmental risk, in line with
GoE’s Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy. CHIP is
mainstreaming climate resilience into forestry and food security while
SCIP is building institutional capacity within GoE, civil society and the
private sector. The Disaster Risk Management and Food Security
Sector provide overarching support and strategy to mitigate climate
change impact.
 More secure land tenure through certification is expected to be
environmentally beneficial as certificate holders show greater
propensity to invest in their land and conserve.
 The work of Farmers Groups, CSOs and NGOs to understand their
ability to overcome climate shocks,
 Review of CBA and income through the logframe, any deterrents
from the expected path can be queried,
 Review of IRR in the case of a major climate disaster,
Risk
land husbandry, will
reduce the ability of
farmers to maximise
productivity,
harming
incomes and benefits
felt from improve land
tenure security.
18. Dramatic
weather
patterns can impede
the field implementation
of LIFT.
Triggers
Probability173
Impact
Mitigation measures
 Use Monitoring and Evaluation framework to understand the current
constraints to farmers in regards to maximising productivity.
production and coping
Untypically intense rainfall
events are likely to make
land certification difficult
with
fields
becoming
inaccessible,
flooding
masking boundaries, and
farmer displacement as a
result of spoilt crops.
Conversely a multi-year
drought
would
also
impede the certification
process
with
farmer
displacement
and
resettlement.
Medium: Given the scope of Medium
the programme and the
weather patterns it is likely
that implementation will
suffer in some way due to
the weather.
 Rescheduling of programmes to reduce delay and additional costs.
 Plan implementation so that areas with lower rainfall have LIFT
activities occurring during the rainy season.
 Be aware of droughts and other climate shocks in regions and
change the work plans accordingly if the shocks occur.
 Buy covered cars (not pickups) and provide spades and winches so
that field materials are protected and it is unlikely the cars will get
stuck.
 Provide field teams with all-weather clothing and equipment.
Insufficient attention to
existing and potential
land-related disputes in
programme
area;
inadequate support to
conflict mitigation and
mediation
Medium: Land certification Medium
will be in sedentary areas,
where statutory laws are
generally recognized.

Conflict risks
19. The land certification
process
exacerbates
local level disputes and
conflicts.
20. Conflicts
between
smallholder
and
commercial farmers.


Land
allocated
to Medium: Land certification
commercial farmers in a will provide boundaries and
non-transparent manner reduce disputes.
and without clarity on
boundaries.
197
High


Programme to strengthen traditional and formal dispute mediation
institutions at kebele and woreda levels.
LIFT to conduct a conflict assessment during its inception phase and
integrate a conflict sensitive approach throughout the programme
cycle.
The programme Monitoring and Evaluation to identify such issues
and new or revised interventions to be introduced as appropriate.
Programme to work with MoA on refining procedures for transparent
land allocation and compensation, influencing regulations and
procedures with the aim of bringing it into line with international good
practice and human rights obligations.
LIFT will not certify any communal, pastoral or commercial land until
policies are in places which are line with international good practice
and human rights obligations.
Risk
Triggers
Probability173
Impact
Mitigation measures
Fiduciary and corruption risks
21. GoE
procurement
systems
undermine
transparency,
timeliness and VfM
Lack of attention to Low: Bulk of high value Medium
procurement constraints procurement to be done
of GoE counterparts
through DFID
22. Significant corruption in
the
allocation
of
certificates resulting in
lack of trust in the
certification process.
Insufficient attention to
potential
sources
of
corruption in certification
process;
inadequate
and/or
non-transparent
systems
for
land
certification
Low:
The
certification Medium
process is public, with a
high level of transparency,
making it difficult for local
officials to abuse.

Overall local procurement framework to be agreed in advance with
federal and regional agencies.



Programme internal audit procedures to ensure compliance.
Monitoring against time-based action plans to identify slippages.
LIFT Design to include robust computerised security procedures for
land registry to reduce opportunities for individual corruption.

LIFT to simplify the land registry and administration process, making
it more transparent and less easy to manipulate.
LIFT to establish complaints procedures to encourage
whistleblowing.
M and E system to identify citizen concerns about corruption for
follow up.
The 2nd level certification and land administration systems will be
designed and implemented with high transparency levels and
internal controls to mitigate risk.


23. Corrupt officials in the
woreda administration
do not register farmers
in order to gain control
of their land.
24. Those
with
vested
interests
in
the
continuance of
the
current
system
weaknesses
hinder
implementation of the
programme.
Political risks
Lack of controls in the Low:
Possible
that Medium
certification
and individuals will attempt to
administration systems.
profit from their positions,
but process very open.

Lack of close support by Medium:
Instances
of
woreda
and
regional corruption
in
land
officials.
processes
regularly
reported in the press, but
high GoE commitment to
programme.

Woredas will sign implementation programmes.

Lack of performance against plans to be reported to the Regional
and Federal authorities.
25. Real or perceived use
of land certification and
administration
to
reward ruling party
supporters. Certificates
only issued to party
members.
Even
perception of this can
be reputational risk for
DFID.
Inadequate systems and Low The land certification Medium
reporting
procedures; process is participatory and
insufficient investment in public
monitoring
and
rapid
response to allegations
198
High
 Land certification will cover the whole woreda and not just kebeles
reducing the risk of coverage by political affiliation of the kebeles.
 Criteria to select woreda will be transparent, clear and agreed by
DFID to ensure that there is no politicisation of the woreda selected
 LIFT to monitor (spot checks independently and randomly) and follow
up any reports of politicised allocation of certificates in concert with
DFID and press for MoA to address these concerns.
 Complaints procedure will mitigate risk.
Risk
26. More
robust
and
efficient
land
administration system
solidifies
inappropriately
acquired land
Probability173
Triggers
Inadequate transparency
in dialogue on overall land
reform between LIFT and
MoA
counterparts;
insufficient investment in
monitoring
and
rapid
response to allegations
Impact
Mitigation measures
Medium: LIFT should make Medium
all land initiatives more
transparent
through
improved title security and
federal-level
input
to
improve land policies and
procedures.
MoA
has
demonstrated
its
willingness
and
commitment to work with
LIFT to improve alignment
with
international
good
practice and human rights
obligations in its procedures
via the joint declaration
made under the UK G8
presidency.

Low:
The
2nd
level Medium
certification will be open
and recognise existing user
unless
other
title
or
restriction is present.

Medium: Due to lack of
capacity, implementation of
the policies that govern land
administration
may
be
mismanaged.

27. Farmers
with
customary or informal
holdings lose their land
as
a
result
of
certification.
Lack of information to
farmers on their rights
allows land to be taken by
authorities for other uses.
28. LIFT supports land
certification
where
parcels have been
reallocated
without
appropriate
compensation
and
process.
Land
reallocation
or
acquisition for public use
(eminent
domain)
purposes
without
appropriate
compensation.
29. Land which has been
certified
with
LIFT
Reallocation of land or Low:
other eminent domain land
High









GoE may reallocate
High
for
commercial
199


By ensuring that up to 6.1 million smallholder farmers have more
secure land title via certification, LIFT will help them to claim the
compensation they are constitutionally entitled to if the MoA decides
to reallocate their land.
LIFT will include support to MoA to put in place policies and
procedures in e.g. communal and pastoralist land and large scale
land acquisition that align with international good practice and
human rights obligations.
LIFT will not certify any communal, pastoral or commercial land until
policies are in places which are line with international good practice
and human rights obligations.
ITSP will specifically monitor where commercial farm land is
allocated within the programme woredas after LIFT has certified the
woredas.
Programme Monitoring and Evaluation systems to monitor situations
with early warning system.
If abuse was considered to have taken place, press for action to
address the situation. If DFID made a judgement that abuse
amounted to systematic or widespread abuse, DFID would consider
whether LIFT itself was contributing to instances of poor
implementation and/or abuse, and take steps accordingly
Awareness raising by LIFT and other programmes during 2 nd level
certification.
LIFT will use the first level certification information as the basis for
the second level to verify existing occupancy and rights.
LIFT will strengthen grievance mechanisms and their availability to
all land holders
LIFT would monitor and assess the situation, and if abuse was
considered to have taken place, press for action to address the
situation.
If DFID made a judgement that abuse amounted to systematic or
widespread abuse, DFID would consider whether LIFT itself was
contributing to instances, and take steps accordingly
Co-ordination with other partners and stakeholder for early
identification of occurrences.
Communication of what LIFT doing in these areas.
By ensuring that up to 6.1 million smallholder farmers have more
secure land title via certification, LIFT will help them to claim the
Risk
support is subsequently
reallocated
without
appropriate
compensation
and
process.
30. DFID is perceived as
being complicit in any
wrongdoing that might
arise from commercial
investments.
Triggers
purposes.
Probability173
Impact
purpose if area is found to
be
suitable
and
economically viable for the
regional
and
national
benefit.
However, the
current
Land
Bank
earmarked
for
those
purposes are mainly in the
DRS with only 416,000
hectares currently allocated
to
date,
out
of
an
earmarked
3.5
million
hectares
NGOs or individuals raise Medium: No risk of being
issues.
complicit
but
risk
of
allegation
being
made
publically, given polarised
and politicised nature of
debate on land.
Mitigation measures





Low


31. Land
reform
jeopardises customary
pastoral lifestyles.
Land certification policy
pays inadequate attention
to needs of customary
communities
Medium: LIFT is not directly Medium
involved in pastoral areas
under
the
current
programme.




32. DFID
Partnership
Principles assessment
requires change of
approach to delivering
aid.
GoE fails to uphold its Medium
commitment to the four
principles
Medium
200

compensation they are constitutionally entitled to if the GoE decides
to reallocate their land
Co-ordination with other partners and stakeholders for early
identification of occurrences.
LIFT will work with GoE on refining these processes to meet
international good practice standards (FAO guidelines, African Land
Policy Initiative etc.)
Where encountered LIFT will work with federal and regional
authorities to understand the situation and to agree appropriate
measures.
If failure to agree DFID E will review its support.
Communication of what LIFT is doing in these areas.
Mitigated through cross cutting measures whereby the programme
will, in co-operation with the Government of Ethiopia and other
partners supporting programmes on land, review existing policies
and procedures, including improving security of tenure for communal
land holdings, pastoralists and customary land use, improving
transparency of land allocation and that will comply with international
good practice and human rights obligations.
LIFT will not certify any communal, pastoral or commercial land until
policies are in place which are line with international good practice
and human rights obligations.
Continuing dialogue between DFID and GoE
LIFT to work closely with LAND, and PDP to advise on land policy
appropriate to pastoralists
LIFT proposals will bring to GoE attention international good practice
and encourage its application to Ethiopia.
LIFT will not certify any communal, pastoral or commercial land until
policies are in places which are line with international good practice
and human rights obligations.
Close monitoring and high level dialogue on Partnership Principles
with coordination of impact on LIFT if principles not upheld.
Annex 11 Voluntary Guideline Contents
A: FAO Guidelines
1. Guiding principles of responsible tenure governance
2. Rights and responsibilities related to tenure
3. Policy, legal and organizational frameworks related to tenure
4. Delivery of services
5. Legal recognition and allocation of tenure rights and duties




Safeguards
Public land, fisheries and forests
Indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems
Informal tenure
6. Transfers and other changes to tenure rights and duties






Markets
Investments
Land consolidation and other readjustment approaches
Restitution
Redistributive reforms
Expropriation and compensation
7. Administration of tenure






Records of tenure rights
Valuation
Taxation
Regulated spatial planning
Resolution of disputes over tenure rights
Trans boundary matters
8. Responses to climate change and emergencies



Climate change
Natural disasters
Conflicts in respect to tenure of land, fisheries and forests
B: AU/ACP Policy Framework
1. The Process of Land Policy Development






An Emerging Consensus Across the Continent
Developing a Vision for Land Policy Development
The Status of Land Policy Development in Africa
Challenges to Comprehensive Land Policy Development
Appropriate Strategies for Land Policy Development
Summary of Fundamental Steps in Land Policy Development
2. Land Policy Implementation


The Challenge of Land Policy Implementation
Some Common Impediments to Land Policy Implementation
201



Necessary Steps for Effective Land Policy Implementation
Necessary Steps for Effective Land Policy Implementation
Assessing the Impact of Land Policy Implementation Processes
3. Tracking Progress in Land Policy Development and Implementation



The Development of Tracking Systems
Challenges Related to Tracking
Development and Application of Tracking Principles
The Need for Feedback
202
Annex 12 – Acronyms and Glossary of Terms
ADB
ADLI
AGP
BEPULA
BCR
BDS
BIF
CBA
CDEL
CSR
CSJ
DFID E
DP
DRS
3 E’s
EETSP
ELALUDEP
ELAP
ELTAP
EMA
ENABLE
EPDRF
ERR
ESSP
ETB
FAO
FHH
GEMS
G4G
GDP
GoE
GIS
GPS
GTP
Ha.
HRS
IMF
INSA
IRR
ISFM
IT
ITSP
LAC
LAIS
LAND
LAU
LAUTT
LIFT
LTR
Asian Development Bank
Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation
Agricultural Growth Programme
Amhara Bureau of Environmental Protection, Land Administration and Use
Benefit Cost Ratio
Business Development Services
Business Innovation Fund
Cost Benefit Analysis
Capital Departmental Expenditure Limit
Comprehensive Spending Review
Community, Security and Justice Programme
Department for International Development, Ethiopia
Development Partner
Developing Regional States
Economy, Effectiveness and Efficiency
External Evaluation Technical Service Provider
Ethiopia Land Administration and Land Use Development Programme (2011)
Ethiopia Strengthening Land Administration Programme
Ethiopia Strengthening Land Tenure and Administration Programme
Ethiopian Mapping Agency
Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy for a Better Business Environment Programme
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
Economic Rate of Return
Ethiopian Strategic Support Programme
Ethiopian Birr
Food and Agriculture Organisation
Female Headed Households
Growth and Employment Markets in the States, Nigeria
Government for Growth
Gross Domestic Product
Government of Ethiopia
Geographic Information System
Global Position System
Growth and Transformation Programme Plan
Hectare
Highland Regional States
International Monetary Fund
Information Network Security Agency
Internal Rate of Return
Integrated Soil Fertility Management
Information Technology
Implementing Technical Service Provider
Land Administration Committee
Land Administration Information System
Land Administration to Nurture Development
Land Administration and Use
Land Administration and Use Task Team
Land Investment for Transformation
Land Tenure Regularisation (Rwanda)
203
M&E
MIS
M4P
MCC
MDG
MFI
MoFED
MoA
NGO
NPV
ODI
OJEU
PDP
PEPE
PFM
PPP
PrG
PSD
PSNP
RBM&E
RED&FS
RDEL
REILA
RLAS
RLAUD
SARDEP
SDC
SIDA
SLMP
SNNPR
SRM
SWC
TEPLUA
ToC
ToR
UNEP
USAID
UK
VfM
WB
Monitoring and Evaluation
Management Information System
Making Markets Work for the Poor
Millennium Challenge Corporation
Millennium Development Goals
Micro Finance Institutions
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Non-Governmental Organisation
Net Present Value
Overseas Development Institute
Official Journal of the European Union
Peace and Development Programme
Private Enterprise Programme Ethiopia
Public Financial Management
Public Private Partnership
Procurement Group
Private Sector Development
Productive Safety Net Programme
Results Based Monitoring and Evaluation
Rural Economic Development and Food Security
Resource Departmental Expenditure Limit
Responsible and Innovative Land Administration in Ethiopia
Rural Land Administration System
Rural Land Administration and Use Directorate
Sida Amhara Development Programme
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Swedish International Development Agency
Sustainable Land Management Programme
Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region
Strategic Road Map for National Rural Land Administration and Use System (20122015)
Soil and Water Conservation
Tigray Environmental Protection, Land Administration
Theory of Change
Terms of Reference
United Nations Environment Programme
United States Agency for International Development
United Kingdom
Value for Money
World Bank
204
Glossary of Terms
Adjudication: the process of recording a right holder’s claim to a parcel. This is usually performed by
a locally nominated official at the same time as Demarcation.
Cadastre: a parcel-based, and up-to-date land information system containing a record of interests in
land (e.g. rights, restrictions and responsibilities).
Demarcation: the process of identifying the boundaries of a land parcel. This requires the land holder
to walk around the perimeter of the parcel, indicating the boundaries to a para-surveyor who will mark
these clearly onto an aerial image or a map. This process takes place in the presence of the
neighbouring land holders.
Disadvantaged: socially, economically or educationally less served due to different discriminatory
circumstances, or/and social practices so that they are relatively vulnerable to deprivation, poverty,
disease and ignorance, which undermine their benefiting from development compared to their
advantaged peers and require particular attention from policy makers and society. This includes, but
is not limited to, women, orphans, the elderly people living with disabilities, people living with
HIV/AIDS, etc.
Developing Regional State: Afar, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambella, or Somali
Digitisation: The process of converting the geographic features on an analogue map into digital
format
First level certification: in the Ethiopian context, the process of recording occupancy and user rights
on a parcel or parcels of land. Certification involves the recording of these rights in: i) a register
maintained at woreda level; and ii) a ‘holding book’ (‘green book’) held by the rightholder.
GIS: Geographic Information System. An integrated collection of computer software, processes and
data used to view and manage information about geographic places, analyse spatial relationships,
and model spatial processes. A Land Information System operates under similar principles, having
the cadastre as its baseline data.
Highland Regional State: Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, or SNNPR
Kebele: the smallest administrative unit of Ethiopia each with a population of approx. 4,000 people.
There are in excess of 10,000 rural woredas out of a total of 15,000 in total
Land Administration: Land administration is the way in which the rules of land tenure are applied
and made operational. Land administration, whether formal or informal, comprises an extensive range
of systems and processes to administer land use rights, land valuation and taxation, and to regulate
land use.
Land Governance: Land governance concerns the rules, processes and structures through which
decisions are made about access to land and its use, the manner in which the decisions are
implemented and enforced, the way that competing interests in land are managed.
Land Information System: See GIS
Land tenure: The legal regime by which land is owned, or user rights are conferred to individual land
holders.
Land Use: Land use is characterised by the arrangements, activities and inputs people undertake in
a certain land cover type to produce, change or maintain it.
Land Use Planning: Land-use planning is the systematic assessment of land and water potential,
alternatives for land use and economic and social conditions in order to select and adopt the best
land-use options. Its purpose is to select and put into practice those land uses that will best meet the
needs of the people while safeguarding resources for the future. The driving force in planning is the
need for change, the need for improved management or the need for a quite different pattern of land
use dictated by changing circumstances.
Registration: The recording of land ownership or user rights.
Second level certification: second level certification adds an additional spatial component to first
level certification. This is in the form of a parcel map, supplied to the rightholder in hard copy and
205
maintained digitally at woreda level. The dimensions of the parcel are demarcated in the field and
digitised into a GIS. This spatial information forms the cadastre.
Woreda: the third-level administrative divisions of Ethiopia, after the federal and regional state
governments. They are often referred to as districts and there are approximately 670 rural and 100
urban ones.
i
World Bank data (2013) http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/eth_aag.pdf - accessed June 2013
CIA World Fact book data (2013) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html accessed June 2013
iii Taffesse, A. S. , Dorosh, P. and Asrat, S. (2011) Crop Production in Ethiopia: Regional Patterns and Trends,
Ethiopia Strategy Support Program II, ESSP II Working Paper No. 0016, March 2011, International Food Policy
Research Institute
iv Yigremew, A. (2001) ‘Some queries about the debate on land tenure in Ethiopia’, in Proceedings of the Tenth
Annual Conference on the Ethiopian Economy, edited by Mulat Demeke and Tassew Woldermariam, Ethiopian
Economic Association
v International Monetary Fund data (2013)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/download.aspx - accessed June 2013
vi World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GNI-per-capita-Atlas-and-PPP-table - accessed June 2013
vii The Economist (May 2012) http://www.economist.com/node/21554547, accessed June 2013 and IMF World
Economic Outlook data
viii Nathan Associates London (2012) Private Enterprise Programme Ethiopia Business Case, DFID
ii
Ethiopia’s Progress Towards Eradicating Poverty: An Interim Report on Poverty Analysis Study (2010/11),
p.11, Table 7.
ix
x
Ministry of Education (2012) Education Statistics Annual Abstract 2011/12, Addis Ababa, p.28 available at
http://www.moe.gov.et/English/Information/Pages/edustat.aspx and Ministry of Education (2001) Education
Statistics Annual Abstract 2000/2001, Addis Ababa, p.6.
xi
http://web.undp.org/africa/documents/mdg/ethiopia_september2010.pdf Government of Ethiopia, Demographic
and Health Survey, 2011
xii World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI - accessed June 2013
xiii World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI - accessed June 2013
xiv Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2011) ‘Ethiopia’s Progress Towards Eradicating
Poverty: An Interim Report on Poverty Analysis Study (2010/11)’
xv Salami, A., Kamara, A., Brixiova, Z. (2010) Smallholder Agriculture in East Africa: Trends, Constraints and
Opportunities, Working Papers Series No 105, African Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia.
xvi Kolli, R. (2010) ‘A Study on the Determination of the Share of the Private Sector in Ethiopian Gross Domestic
Product’, p.27
xvii ILO data http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/addisababa/sro/pdf/dwcp.pdf - accessed June 2012
xviii The World Bank (2013): Ethiopia Economic Update II, Laying the Foundation for Achieving Middle Income
Status.p.22
xix World Bank. 2012. Ethiopia - Country partnership strategy (FY2013-FY2016). Washington D.C. - The World
bank http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/08/16702735/ethiopia-country-partnership-strategy
xx Deininger, K. et al. (2009) ‘Impacts of land certification on tenure security, investment and land sectors:
Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development’, Discussion paper series, April 2009
xxi World Bank (2007) Urban Labor Markets in Ethiopia: Challenges and Prospects. Volume I: Synthesis report
38665 World Bank: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Africa Region.
xxii
World
Economic
Forum
(2012)
Global
Gender
Gap
Report
2012.
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2012.pdf
xxiii
UN //ethiopia.unfpa.org/drive/EthiopiaUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFramework_2012to2015.pdf
xxiv Nathan Associates London (2012) Private Enterprise Programme Ethiopia Business Case, DFID
xxv CSA (2007) and (2008)
xxvi Mulugeta Gashaw (2013: 3) Causes of Rural Land Disputes in Amhara National Regional State of Ethiopia: A
Relational and Contextual Study.
xxvii Hagmann, T., & Mulugeta, A. (2008). Pastoral conflicts and state-building in the Ethiopian lowlands. Africa
Spectrum, 19-37.
xxviii Stein, H., and T. Tefera. 2008. From being property of men to becoming equal owners? Early impacts of land
registration and certification on women in Southern Ethiopia. Final research report prepared for UNHABITAT,
Shelter Branch, Land Tenure and Property Administration Section. December 1, 2007, Revised Jan. 2, 2008.
xxix Alemneh Dejene, 2003. Environment, Famine, and Politics in Ethiopia: View from the Village. Lynne Rienner:
London, 2003.
206
xxx
Selome Bekele & Assefa Hailemariam (2010) Population Dynamics and Environment in Ethiopia: An
Overview (P.53).In: Sue Edwards (editor): Ethiopian Environment Review, No 1, 2010. Forum for Environment.
xxxi McSweeney et al. (2010) UNDP Climate Change Country Profile: Ethiopia, UNDP
Hepworth, N. (2012) Scoping study on engagement in Ethiopia’s Land Sector, Strategic Climate Institutions
Programme. DFID Ethiopia / Common Futures Consulting Ltd.
xxxiv http://www.mofed.gov.et/English/Resources/Documents/GTP%20Policy%20Matrix%20(English)2.pdf
xxxv US. Department of State (2012) New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Ethiopia. G8 Action on Food
Security and Nutrition. http://www.state.gov/s/globalfoodsecurity/190282.htm
xxxvi FDRE Constitution, Art.40
xxxvii Lavers, T. (2011). The Role of Foreign Smallholder-focused Agricultural Development Strategy.
xxxviii Gebreselassie, S. (2006) “Land, Land Policy and Smallholder Agriculture in Ethiopia: Options and
Scenarios.” Future Agricultures Consortium Meeting. March 20-22, 2006, Brighton, UK. Institute of Development
Studies.
xxxix The Springfield Centre (2012) Government for Growth (G4G) Second Stage Scoping Report, Produced for
DFID Ethiopia, April 2012
xl Gebreselassie, S. (2006) ‘Recent Experiences in Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia: Impact on Equity, Efficiency and Poverty’, in Land
and the Challenge of Sustainable Development in Ethiopia, edited by Dessalegn Rahmato and Taye Assefa, 2006
xli Gizachew (2013) ‘Summary of lessons and experiences on rural land certification programme’, April 2013
xliiEthiopian Land Administration and Land Use Development Programme: Revised Concept Note. Ministry of
Agriculture. March 2011. Page 15, updated orally by MoA/RLAUD 2014.
xliii The World Bank (2011): OPTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING LAND ADMINISTRATION FEDERAL
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA Report No: 61631-ET, page 31.
xliv Plummer, J. (2012) ‘Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia’, World Bank Publications
xlv World Bank, World Development Indicators
xlvi World Bank (2009) ‘Towards the Competitive Frontier, Strategies for Improving Ethiopia’s Investment Climate’
xlvii Croppenstedt, A., Demeke, M. and Meschi, M. M. (2003), Technology Adoption in the Presence of
Constraints: the Case of Fertilizer Demand in Ethiopia. Review of Development Economics, 7: 58–70. doi:
10.1111/1467-9361.00175
xlviii
USAID
Country
Profile
Property
Rights
And
Resource
Governance,
Ethiopia
http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/fullreports/USAID_Land_Tenure_Ethiopia_Profile.pdf, accessed June 2012
xlix Gebreselassie, S. (2006) Intensification of Smallholder Agriculture in Ethiopia: Options and Scenarios, DFID
Future Agricultures Consortium Meeting at Institute of Development Studies
l Dercon, S. and Christaensen, L. (2011) Consumption risk, technology adoption and poverty traps: Evidence
from Ethiopia, Journal of Development Economics, Vol 96, Issue 2
li Alemu et al. 2006, Alemu et Pender, 2007
lii Government of Ethiopia (2013) Growth and Transformation Plan, Annual Progress Report for 2011-2012
liii ODI (2010) Small-scale irrigation in the Ethiopian highlands What potential for poverty reduction and climate
adaptation? Ripple Briefing Paper No 3, http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publicationsopinion-files/6141.pdf
liv Kaur, N., Getnet, M., Shimelis, B., Tesfaye, Z., Syoum, G. and Atnafu, E. (2010) Adapting to climate change in
the water sector. Assessing the effectiveness of planned adaptation interventions in reducing local level
vulnerability. RiPPLE Working Paper. Addis Ababa.
lv World Bank (2006) Ethiopia: Managing Water Resources to Maximise Sustainable Growth. A World Bank
Water Resources Assistance Strategy for Ethiopia. Washington DC: World Bank.
lvi Gebremedhin, B. et al. (2006) 'Commercialisation of Ethiopian agriculture: extension service from input
supplier to knowledge broker and facilitator', IPMS Ethiopia, Working Paper No 1, International Livestock
Research Institute, Kenya.
lvii ODI (2010) Small-scale irrigation in the Ethiopian highlands What potential for poverty reduction and climate
adaptation? Ripple Briefing Paper No 3, http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publicationsopinion-files/6141.pdf
lviii Gender And Governance In Rural Services (2010) An Insight India , Ghana And Ethiopia
lix
USAID (2011) USAID Country Profile Property Rights And Resource Governance, Ethiopia
http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/fullreports/USAID_Land_Tenure_Ethiopia_Profile.pdf, accessed June 2012
lx Rahmato and Assefa 2006; Abegaz 2004; Griffin et al. 2001; Gebreselassie 2006
lxi Bezeuayehu.T, et al. (2000) Nature and causes of Land Degradation in the Oromia Region: A Review. SocioEconomics and Policy Research Working Paper No.30, ILRI, Nairobi, Kenya.
lxii Alemu, T. (2006) ‘The Land Issue and Environmental Change in Ethiopia’, in Land and the Challenge of
Sustainable Development in Ethiopia, edited by Dessalegn Rahmato and Taye Assefa, 2006
xxxiii
207
Hepworth, N. 2012. Scoping study on engagement in Ethiopia’s Land Sector, Strategic Climate Institutions
Programme. DFID Ethiopia /Common Futures Consulting Ltd., page 4.
lxiv Benin, S., M. Ahmed, J. Pender, and S. Ehui. 2005. Development of land rental markets and agricultural
productivity growth: the case of northern Ethiopia‖. Journal of African Economies, 14(1): 21–54.
lxv Hepworth, N. 2012. Scoping study on engagement in Ethiopia’s Land Sector, Strategic Climate Institutions
Programme. DFID Ethiopia /Common Futures Consulting Ltd.
lxvi Hepworth, N. 2012. Scoping study on engagement in Ethiopia’s Land Sector, Strategic Climate Institutions
Programme. DFID Ethiopia /Common Futures Consulting Ltd., page 4.
lxvii Deininger, K. et al. (2009) ‘Impacts of land certification on tenure security, investment and land sectors:
Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development’, Discussion paper series, April 2009
lxviii Hepworth, N. 2012. Scoping study on engagement in Ethiopia’s Land Sector, Strategic Climate Institutions
Programme. DFID Ethiopia / Common Futures Consulting Ltd.
lxix Berry, L. Et al. (2003) Land Degradation in Ethiopia: Its Extent and Impact, FAO
lxx FAO (2010) http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al501E/al501e.pdf
lxxi Alemu, T. (2006) ‘The Land Issue and Environmental Change in Ethiopia’, in Land and the Challenge of
Sustainable Development in Ethiopia, edited by Dessalegn Rahmato and Taye Assefa, 2006
lxxii Hepworth, N. 2012. Scoping study on engagement in Ethiopia’s Land Sector, Strategic Climate Institutions
Programme. DFID Ethiopia / Common Futures Consulting Ltd
lxxiii Hepworth, N. 2012. Scoping study on engagement in Ethiopia’s Land Sector, Strategic Climate Institutions
Programme. DFID Ethiopia / Common Futures Consulting Ltd
lxxiv Among agricultural land holders in Ethiopia women constitute only 19 percent, whilst men constitute 81
percent (CSA, 2007/08).
lxxv About eighty five percent of Ethiopians depend on agriculture for their livelihoods; out of these women
constitute 49.4% (CSA 2008).
lxxvi Pathfinder International reports that “Low status characterizes virtually every aspect of girls’ and women’s
lives. Given the heavy workload imposed on girls at an early age, early marriage without choice, and a
subservient role to both husband and mother-in-law, girls and women are left with few opportunities to make and
act on their own decisions.” See Pathfinder International, Women’s Empowerment in Ethiopia; New solutions to
ancient
problems,
September
2007,
http://www.pathfind.org/site/DocServer/PI_WE_paper_final.pdf?docID=10202,
lxxvii Social Institutions and Gender Index, Gender Equality and Social Institutions in Ethiopia, undated, (ibid)
lxxviii
US
State
Department,
2008
Human
Rights
Reports,
Ethiopia,
February
2009,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119001.htm,
lxxix “Minority communities that are discriminated against, excluded and marginalized are frequently victims of
conflict, may be forcibly displaced from their traditional territories and lack opportunities and capacity to promote
and protect their rights.” See UN Human Rights Council: Addendum to the Report of the Independent Expert on
Minority Issues, Gay McDougall, Mission to Ethiopia (28 November – 12 December 2006), 28 February 2007
lxxx According to USDOS Ethiopians with disabilities suffer societal discrimination: US State Dept. 2008 Human
Rights Reports: Ethiopia, 25 Feb 09; http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119001.htm,
lxxxi The Independent Expert on Minorities states that, “While women generally face discrimination in Ethiopian
society due to patriarchal systems and traditional gender roles and practices, women from different ethnic
communities may face multi-dimensional obstacles based on the particularities of the customary or religious
practices of their communities and the relative status of their ethnic group within the ethnic hierarchy in their
region and nationally.” See UN Human Rights Council: Addendum to Report of the Independent Expert on
Minority Issues, Mission to Ethiopia (Nov –Dec 2006), Feb. 2007,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,MISSION,ETH,461f9ea82,0.html,
lxxxii See Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2012
lxxxiii Reducing Poverty by Tackling Social Exclusion (2005) DFID Policy Paper
lxxxiv Fikre Markos Merso (UNFPA): Women & Girls and HIV/AIDS in Ethiopia. An Assessment of the Policy
and Legal Framework Protecting the Rights of Women and Girls and Reducing Their Vulnerability to
HIV/AIDS.PP 35-36
lxxxv Lorenzo Cotula, Camilla Toulmin and Ced Hesse (2004): Land Tenure and Administration in Africa: Lessons
of Experiences and Emerging Issues.P.20.
Badeg Bishaw, 2001. Deforestation and Land Degradation in the Ethiopian High Lands: A Strategy for Physical
Recovery. Oregon State University, Corvallis. In: Northeast African Studies, Vol. 8, No.1 (New Series) 2001, pp.
7- 26.
lxxxvi Although some debate exists, there is a body of evidence that supports this, such as Smith, R.E., (2004)
‘land tenure, fixed investment, and farm productivity: evidence from Zambia’s Southern Province’. World
Development, 32(10), pp. 1641–1661, a study of land tenure and investment in Zambia which found evidence
that documentation of land title is positively associated with fixed investments and agricultural productivity.
Moreover, a study conducted by Graham and Darroch (2001) ‘Relationship between the mode of land
redistribution, tenure security and agricultural credit use in KwaZulu-Natal’ Development Southern Africa, 18(3),
lxiii
208
pp. 295–308, found evidence that households that had more security of tenure were more likely to demand and
receive credit for agricultural investment financing and complementary inputs in South Africa.
lxxxvii Quy-Toan, D. & Iyer, L. (2003); Land rights and economic development”, Policy Research Paper 3120,
World Bank
lxxxviii Feder, G., Onchan, T., Chamlamwong, Y. and Hongladarom, C., 1988. Land Policies and Farm Productivity
in Thailand, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD
lxxxix Deininger, K. et al. (2009) ‘Impacts of land certification on tenure security, investment and land sectors:
Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development’, Discussion paper series, April 2009, p.21
xc DFID EPS-PEAKS, Helpdesk Response, Rapid review of the literature on Property Rights, October 2012
xci Deininger, K. and J. S. Chamorro (2003), "Investment and Income Effects of Land Regularization. The Case of
Nicaragua", Agricultural Economics.
xcii Deininger, K. et al. (2009) ‘Impacts of land certification on tenure security, investment and land sectors:
Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development’, Discussion paper series, April 2009
xciii Gebresellaise, S. (2006) Land, Land Policy and Smallholder Agriculture in Ethiopia, Policy Brief 001, Future
Agricultures
xciv For example, Feder, G., Onchan, T., Chamlamwong, Y. and Hongladarom, C., 1988. Land Policies and Farm
Productivity in Thailand, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, Graham and Darroch (2001)
‘Relationship between the mode of land redistribution, tenure security and agricultural credit use in KwaZuluNatal’ Development Southern Africa, 18(3), pp. 295–308,
xcv DFID EPS-PEAKS, Helpdesk Response, Rapid review of the literature on Property Rights, October 2012
xcvi De Soto, H. (2000). The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else.
Basic books. And The Springfield Centre (2012) Government for Growth (G4G) Second Stage Scoping Report,
Produced for DFID Ethiopia, April 2012
xcvii A study in rural India (Pender and Kerr 1994) found no significant positive effects on investment or credit
access. Studies in Africa; in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda (Migot-Adholla et al. 1991) found that land registration
had no significant impact on land productivity, land investment or credit access. Jacoby and Minten (2007) also
found no significant effects of land titling in Madagascar.
xcviii The Springfield Centre (2012) Government for Growth (G4G) Second Stage Scoping Report, Produced for
DFID Ethiopia, April 2012
xcix Bezabih, M., Holden, S. and Mannberg, A. (2012) The Role of Land Certification in Reducing Gender Gaps in
Productivity in Rural Ethiopia, Centre for Land Tenure Studies Working Paper, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences
c Stein, H., and Tefera, T. (2008) ‘From being property of men to becoming equal owners? Early impacts of land
registration and certification on women in Southern Ethiopia.’ Final research report prepared for UNHABITAT,
Shelter Branch, Land Tenure and Property Administration Section. December 1, 2007, Revised January 2, 2008.
http://www.gltn .net/index.php?option=com_docman&gid=193&task=doc_details&Itemid=92
ci World Bank (2002), "Mexico- Land Policy A Decade after the Ejido Reforms", The World Bank Rural
Development and Natural Resources Sector Unit.
cii The Springfield Centre (2012) Government for Growth (G4G) Second Stage Scoping Report, Produced for
DFID Ethiopia, April 2012
ciii Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute (2013) ‘A final baseline survey
report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Programme (ELAP)’, April 2013
civ Hepworth, Nick. 2012. Scoping study on engagement in Ethiopia’s land sector, DFID, March 2012.
cv USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2008. Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Tenure and
Administration Program (ELTAP): Evaluation. Final Report. Washington, DC. April.
cviDercon, S. and Ayalew, D. (2007) Land Rights, Power and Trees in Rural Ethiopia, CSAE Discussion Paper
WPS/2007-07
cvii Deininger, Klaus and Songqing Jin. 2006. Tenure Security and Land-Related Investment: Evidence from
Ethiopia. European Economic Review 50 (5): 1245-77.
cviii Holden, S. T. and Tefera, T. (2008). From Being Property of Men to Becoming Equal Owners? Early Impacts
of Land Registration and Certification on Women in Southern Ethiopia. UN-HABITAT, Shelter Branch, Land
Tenure and Property Administration Section. Nairobi.
cix Plummer, J. (2012) ‘Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia’, World Bank Publications
cx Government of Ethiopia (2010) Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010/11-2014/15 Volume II, Policy Matrix,
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, November 2010, Addis Ababa
cxi Government of Ethiopia Growth and Transformation Plan, volume 1 (2010)
cxii DFID (2011) Business Case: Programme to End Child Marriage, Ethiopia
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2010) GENDER AND GOVERNANCE IN RURAL
SERVICES 2010 an insight India , Ghana and Ethiopia.World Development Report 2012 on gender equality
and development (Part I &II)
cxiii Revised Concept Note on the Design and Implementation of Ethiopia: Land Administration and Land Use
Development Project Ministry of Agriculture, March 2011
209
Ethiopia’s Progress towards Eradicating Poverty: An Interim Report on Poverty Analysis Study (2010/11),
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, March 2012.
cxv http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/eth_aag.pdf
cxvi https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html
cxvii 2007 census, Central Statistical Agency
cxviii Woody biomass and Land Cover Report, Ministry of Agriculture
cxix 2007 census, Central Statistical Agency
cxx Ricardo Fort, Land titling and investments in rural Peru
cxxi Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
cxxii Observation by ITSP during field visits.
cxxiii Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
cxxiv Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development website, accessed 2013.
cxxv GoE Household Income Survey, 2010/11
cxxvi Ethiopian Land Administration and Land Use Development Programme, MoA, March 2011
cxxvii Draft Strategic Road Map, Government of Ethiopia, 2012
cxxviii Draft Strategic Road Map, Government of Ethiopia, 2012.
cxxix Whitehead et al, 2012, The Economic Benefits of Geospatial Technology in the Developing World,
cxxx DFID Nigeria, Propcom Project Completion Report, 2010
cxxxi The Role of Land Certification in Reducing Gender Gaps in Productivity in Rural Ethiopia, Stein Holden et al,
2011
cxxxii Secure Land Rights for all; Global Land Tool Network, UN-Habitat, 2008
cxxxiii How to Map 50,000,000 rural land parcels in Ethiopia, Zerfu Hailu and David Harris
REILA, Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty” 2013
cxxxiv Ethiopian Land Administration and Land Use Development Programme, MoA, March 2011
cxxxv Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010/11 to 2014/15, MoFED, 2010
cxxxvi MoA website, accessed June 2013.
cxxxvii http://www.ethombudsman.gov.et/
cxiv
cxxxviii
SLMP 2, draft PAD, June 2013
REILA Inception Report, July 2011 to June 2016, October 2012
cxl LAND Statement of Work, USAID
cxli Evidence obtained from discussions with REILA Team Leader, Mr. David Harris. June 2013.
cxlii
AGP, Project Appraisal Document, 2010.
cxliii There is prior experience from DFID-Finland Delegated agreement in Ethiopia in the Education sector, and
also from Southern Africa (land administration) – source Embassy of Finland.
cxliv Informal discussion with David Harris Chief Technical Adviser & Team Leader, REILA.
cxlv Meeting with Dr Solomon Bekure, Chief of Party, LAND,
cxlvi Deininger et al, Pilot Land Tenure Registration in Rwanda Evidence of initial impacts, 2010
cxlvii SIAPAC Int., Process Monitoring 2012 Midline Assessment:
National Land Tenure Regularisation
Programme, 2012
cxlviii Secure Land Rights for all; Global Land Tool Network, UN-Habitat, 2008
cxlix Deininger, K & Jin, S (2002); Land rental markets as an alternative to government reallocation - equity and
efficiency considerations in the Chinese land tenure system; Policy Research Paper2930, World Bank
cl Stein Holden et al; Tenure, Gender, Land Certification, and Rental Market Participation, Journal of
Development Studies, 2011.
cli Participatory and Pro-Poor Land Administration System of the Amhara National Regional State of Ethiopia:
Evaluation and Lessons Learnt of the Current Status, Gebeyehu Belay Shibeshi, , Helmut Fuchs, Reinfried
Mansberger, Presented to the Land and Poverty Annual Conference: April 8-11, 2013, Washington
clii A Final Baseline Survey Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP), 2013
cliii
Klaus Deininger et al Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment, and Land sectors,
Ethiopia 2009
cliv Reported by Director RLAUD, 29/6/13
clv Land Administration in the UNECE Region; Development trends and main principles; 2005
clvi Secure Land Rights for all; Global Land Tool Network, UN-Habitat, 2008
clvii Evaluating the Impact of M4P programmes, Synthesis Paper, M4P Hub Team, September 2012
clviii Whitehead, J, Marbell, W, (2012) The Economic Benefits of Geospatial Technology in the Developing World,
Presented at the Annual World Bank Land and Poverty Conference, Washington DC.
clix Adams, MJ, Cousins, B, Manona, S, (1999) Land Tenure and Economic Development in Rural South Africa:
Constraints and Opportunities, ODI Working Paper 125
cxxxix
210
clx
Deininger, K. D. Ayalew, and T. Alemu (2009).Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors, Evidence from Ethiopia. Environment and Development, Discussion Paper Series, EfD DP 0911
clxi Final Baseline Survey Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP), 2013.
clxii Holden, S. and T. Tefera (2008) From Being Property of Men to Becoming Equal Owners? Early Impacts of
Land Registration and Certification on Women in Southern Ethiopia, Final Research Report prepared for
UNHABITAT, Shelter Branch, Land Tenure and Property Administration Section, January 2, 2008.
clxiii Studies include: i) Carter, M. R. and P. Olinto (2003) Getting Institutions "Right" for Whom? Credit Constraints
and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics. February 85(1): 173-86; ii) Boucher, S., B. Barham and M. R. Carter (2004). The impacts
of "market-friendly" reforms on credit and land sectors in Honduras and Nicaragua. World Development 33(1):
107-28.; and iii) Barrows, Richard and Michael Roth (1990). “Land Tenure and Investment in African Agriculture:
Theory and Evidence.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 28, no. 2.
clxiv Braselle, Anne-Sophie, Frederic Gaspart, and Jean-Philippe Platteau (2002) Land Tenure Security and
Investment Incentives: Puzzling Evidence from Burkina Faso. Journal of Development Economics 67:373–418.
clxv Gavian, S. (1993) Land Tenure and Soil Fertility Management in Niger, Food Research Institute, Stanford
University, Stanford, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).
clxvi Migot-adholla SE, Benneh G, Place F, Atsu S (1994). Land, Security of Tenure, and Productivity in Ghana, in
J.W. Bruce and S.E. Migot-Adholla (eds.), Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, Dubuque, Iowa:
Kendall/Hunt Publishing Cy, pp. 97-118.
clxvii Place & K. Otsuka, 2002. "Land Tenure Systems and Their Impacts on Agricultural Investments and
Productivity in Uganda, “The Journal of Development Studies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 38(6), pages
105-128.
clxviii Fleisig, Heywood W. and de la Peña, Nuria. (Jun. 2003b). Legal and Regulatory Requirements for Effective
Rural Financial Markets. Lead Theme Paper for the International Conference on Best Practices: “Paving the Way
Forward for Rural Finance”, Washington, DC, prepared for the World Council of Credit Unions, Inc. (WOCCU)
and supported by USAID through (BASIS-CRSP).
clxix Studies include: i) Boucher, Stephen R., Barham, Bradford and Carter, Michael R. (2005). The Impact of
“Market-friendly” Reforms on Credit and Land sectors in Honduras and Nicaragua. World Development 33(1),
107-128; ii) Sanjak, Jolyne. (Jun. 2003). Commentary and Reaction to Theme Paper: Legal and Regulatory
Requirements for Effective Rural Financial Markets. Lead Theme Paper for the International Conference on Best
Practices: “Paving the Way Forward for Rural Finance” by Heywood W. Fleisg and Nuria de la Peña,
Washington, DC, prepared for the World Council of Credit Unions, Inc. (WOCCU) and supported by USAID
through (BASIS-CRSP); iii) Skees, Jerry R. (Jun. 2003). Risk Management Challenges in Rural Financial
Markets: Blending Risk Management Innovations with Rural Finance. “Paving the Way Forward: An International
Conference on Best Practices in Rural Finance.” Washington, D.C.; and iv) Payne, G., A. Durand-Lasserve and
C. Rakodi. (2008). Social and Economic Impacts of Land Titling Programmes in Urban and Peri-urban Areas:
International Experience and Case Studies of Senegal and South Africa. Oslo and Stockholm: SIDA and
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
clxx See studies: i) Pender, John L. & Kerr, John M., 1996. "Determinants of farmers' indigenous soil and water
conservation investments in India's semi-arid tropics, EPTD discussion papers 17, International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI); and ii) Pender, John L., 1996. "Discount rates and credit markets: Theory and
evidence from rural India, “Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 257-296, August.
clxxi A Final Baseline Survey Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP), 2013
clxxii Interview with Haddis Zemen, USAID, April 2013
clxxiii Strategic Road Map, RLAUD,2012
clxxiv Confirmed by Flintan, Menberu, Nigutu
clxxv Hepworth, N. (2012) Scoping study on engagement in Ethiopia’s Land Sector, Strategic Climate Institutions
Programme. DFID Ethiopia / Common Futures Consulting Ltd.
clxxvi DFID (2011) ‘What the UK is doing to support Ethiopia’s response to climate change: Climate Briefing’,
Crown Copyright
clxxvii Ibid
clxxviii Deininger, K. et al. (2009) ‘Impacts of land certification on tenure security, investment and land sectors:
Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development’, Discussion paper series, April 2009
clxxix Categorised as: A, high potential risk/opportunity; B, medium/manageable potential risk/opportunity; C,
low/no risk/opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
clxxx Action Aid ”Securing women’s rights to land and livelihoods: a key to ending hunger and fighting AIDS”
Action Aid briefing paper, p.7
clxxxi Action Aid p.7-8
clxxxii COHRE, (2006) ‘A Survey of Law and Practice related to women’s inheritance rights in the MENA Region’
clxxxiii “Limited land rights and income affect the extent to which a woman can influence intra-household decisionmaking. Global evidence indicates that the amount of household assets including land an individual has,
significantly affects the decision-making processes that go into consumption patterns, with women making
211
decisions to invest more of the family income on children’s education and nutrition than men. Deininger, K
(2003), Land policies for growth and poverty reduction, World Bank Policy Research Report, Washington DC,
page 49.
clxxxiv Low-cost land reform in southern Ethiopia has contributed to increased perceptions of tenure security for
both women and men. Fifteen percent of the households in the sample were polygamous and polygamous men
and women perceived their tenure security to have increased due to the reform. See Land Registration in
Ethiopia – Early Impacts on Women: Summary Report. (2008) UN Habitat
clxxxv The 2013 ELAP Baseline Survey confirmed that that the overwhelming majority of wives interviewed
expressed a sense of improved security of tenure following registration.
clxxxvi Involvement of female-headed households in land rental markets has increased after the land certification.
Holden, et al found female-headed households with land certificates had become more willing to let out their land
and did so significantly more after land certification. See Holden, S.T., and M. Bezabih (2008) Gender and Land
Productivity on Rented Land in Ethiopia. In The Emergence of Land sectors in Africa: Impacts on Poverty, Equity
and Efficiency, edited by S.T. Holden, K. Otsuka, and F. Place. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
clxxxvii About 51% of first wives and 53.4% of second wives believed that the certificate would enhance their
capability to negotiate with rental partners
clxxxviii The 2013 ELAP Baseline Survey confirmed that that the overwhelming majority of wives interviewed
predicted improvements for women in terms of enhanced bargaining power within the household and increased
economic independence.
clxxxix Bezabih and Holden found out that land certification has increased land productivity among female-headed
households though the productivity increment is not as much as among male-headed households. See Bezabih,
M. and S. Holden (2010) The Role of Land Certification in Reducing Gender Gaps in Productivity in Rural
Ethiopia. Environment and Development, Discussion Paper Series, EfD DP 10-23.
cxc Gebreselassie, M., 2005. Women and Land Rights in Ethiopia. Photocopy. Mekelle, Ethiopia: Relief Society of
Tigray and the Development Fund.
cxci The new land laws state that consent of the family is required for land to be rented out and land rental
contracts should be reported to the village (kebele). While such enforcement may strengthen the rights of
women, it may also increase the transaction costs in the land rental market and cause such rental arrangements
to go unrecorded. See Land Registration in Ethiopia – Early Impacts on Women: Summary Report. (2008) UN
Habitat
cxcii See Report of a post-certification Gender Assessment carried out by the gender desk of the Oromiya Bureau
of Rural Land which confirms that women’s are not participating in arbitration committees and all of the members
are males who usually neglect the right of women to land. See also Land Registration in Ethiopia – Early Impacts
on Women: Summary Report. (2008) UN Habitat “Female representation in LACs has been very weak, as is the
case in the land administrations at higher levels.”
cxciii The overall literacy rate is 35.9% (50.0% for men and just 22.8% for women)
cxciv See Land Registration in Ethiopia – Early Impacts on Women: Summary Report. (2008) UN Habitat: “There
is an urgent need to develop a system for training of local Land Administration Committee members and conflict
mediators to strengthen their knowledge of the law and their gender awareness.
cxcv Customary courts and other traditional systems of justice, such as Councils of Elders, continue to function. It
is reported that women are not treated equally to men in this traditional justice system and are excluded from
participation in Elders' Councils. UN Human Rights Council: Addendum to the Report of the Independent Expert
on Minority Issues, Gay McDougall, Mission to Ethiopia (28 November – 12 December 2006), 28 February 2007
cxcvi Askale Teklu (2005) Research Report 4 Land Registration and Women’s Land Rights in Amhara Region,
Ethiopia, Securing Land Rights for Women in Africa IIED
cxcvii See Zemen Haddis Gebeyehu (2013) ibid :
cxcviii See also Land Registration in Ethiopia – Early Impacts on Women: Summary Report. (2008) UN Habitat
cxcix Nzinga H. Broussardy, Tsegay Gebrekidan Tekleselassie (2012): Youth Unemployment: Ethiopia Country
Study. P. 2 April 21, 2012
cc Sosina Bezu and Stein Holden (2013): Land Access and Youth Livelihood Opportunities in Southern Ethiopia,
School of Economics and Business /Centre for Land Tenure Studies Norwegian University of Life Sciences. 13
June 2013 (Presented at the workshop organized by the MoA, RLAUD, on 26 August 2013.Addis Ababa
cci Pastoralist Perspectives of Poverty Reduction Strategy Program Experiences and lessons from Afar Region of
Ethiopia February 2009.P.4.
ccii PASTORALIST FORUM ETHIOPIA, Proceedings of the Fourth National Conference on PASTORAL
DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA Millennium Development Goals and Pastoral Development: Opportunities &
Challenges in the new Ethiopian Millennium UN ECA Conference Hall August 29-30, 2007, Addis Ababa). P.61
cciii Pastoral and Agro- parstoral Land Tenure and Administration Study, Ethiopia- Strengthening Land
Administration Program, page xii, 2012
cciv Sharecropping contracts are not subject to the same restriction as fixed rent contracts whereby husbands
must obtain the consent of their families before being allowed to sharecrop their land, thus preserving sufficient
land for food production. There is evidence that the requirement to report fixed-rent contracts has led to and is
being undermined by a prevalence of unreported sharecropping contracts. See Zemen Haddis Gebeyehu:
212
Towards Improved Transactions of Land Use Rights in Ethiopia, USAID, Ethiopia. Paper prepared for
presentation at the Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty. World Bank - Washington DC, April 811, 2013
ccv See Zemen Haddis Gebeyehu: (April 8-11, 2013) Towards Improved Transactions of Land Use Rights in
Ethiopia, USAID, Ethiopia. Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual World Bank Conference on Land and
Poverty. World Bank - Washington DC.
ccvi The increasing vulnerability of pastoral areas to drought and climate changes left many people poor. There
are reports that “Livestock, the most important commodity for pastoralists have been confiscated and access to
water restricted” by government agents in conflict-affected regions. “See 2009 World Report Human Rights
Watch
ccvii Deininger, Klaus and Songqing, Jin. 2006 ‘Tenure security and land related investment: Evidence from
Ethiopia.’ European Economic Review 50 (5): 1245-77.
ccviii Ethiopian Economic Association (2013) A Final Baseline Survey Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land
Administration Program (ELAP).
ccix Ethiopian Economic Association (2013) A Final Baseline Survey Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land
Administration Program (ELAP).
ccx Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccxi Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, A Final Baseline Survey
Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP) 2013.
ccxii Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing Countries by Tim Handstad
ccxiii See id
ccxiv Land Tenure and Administration in Africa: Lessons of Experience and Emerging Issues, Lorenzo Cotula,
Camilla Toulmin and Ced Hesse, 2004
ccxv Mukherji, A., 2007, Agrarian Households in Semi-Arid Tropics, PhD dissertation, RAND.
ccxvi Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccxvii Mukherji, A., 2007, Agrarian Households in Semi-Arid Tropics, PhD dissertation, RAND.
ccxviii Deininger, Klaus, Ali, Daniel A. and Alemu, Tekie, 2011, ‘Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in
Ethiopia - Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
5727.
ccxix Deininger, K & Jin, S (2002); Land rental markets as an alternative to government reallocation - equity and
efficiency considerations in the Chinese land tenure system; Policy Research Paper 2930, WB.
ccxx Holden, Stein T. and Deininger, Klaus and Ghebru, Hosaena (2007): Impact of Land Certification on Land
Rental Market Participation in Tigray Region, Northern Ethiopia. MPRA Paper, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences.
ccxxi Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccxxii FAO; Good Governance in land tenure and administration; FAO Land Tenure Studies No. 9, 2007
ccxxiii FAO; Good Governance in land tenure and administration; FAO Land Tenure Studies No. 9, 2007
ccxxiv W. Zakout, B. Wehrmann and M-P. Törhönen; Good Governance in Land Administration, Principles and
Good Practices; WB/FAO, 2006
ccxxv Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, A Final Baseline Survey
Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP) 2013
ccxxvi LTR Support Programme. Rwanda. Draft final report 2013.
ccxxvii Information gathered by LIFT’s Team Leader and Deputy Team Leader in field visits undertaken in May
2011.
ccxxviii Nin-Pratt, A., and B. Yu. 2008. An Updated Look at the Recovery of Agricultural Productivity in SubSaharan Africa. Discussion paper 00787. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
ccxxix Deininger, K & Jin, S (2002); Land rental markets as an alternative to government reallocation - equity and
efficiency considerations in the Chinese land tenure system; Policy Research Paper 2930, WB.
ccxxx Holden, Stein T. and Deininger, Klaus and Ghebru, Hosaena (2007): Impact of Land Certification on Land
Rental Market Participation in Tigray Region, Northern Ethiopia. MPRA Paper, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences.
ccxxxi Carter, M.R. and P. Olinto. (2003). “Getting Institutions ‘Right’ for Whom? Credit Constraints and the Impact
of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
85(1), 173–86.
ccxxxii Dower, Paul and Potamites, Elizabeth. (2005). Signalling Credit-Worthiness: Land Titles, Banking Practices
and Access to Formal Credit in Indonesia. Department of Economics, New York University.
ccxxxiii Goyal, Aparjita and Deininger, Klaus. (Mar. 2010). Going Digital: Credit Effects on Land Registry
Computerization in India. Policy Research Working Paper 5244, the World Bank, Development Research Group,
Agricultural and Rural Development Team.
213
ccxxxiv
Macours, Karen. (2009). Land Titles and Conflicts in Guatemala. School of Advanced International Studies,
John Hopkins University. Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper CSI-I 64.
ccxxxv http://www.katalyst.com.bd/op_ai_Fertilizer.php
ccxxxvi Ghebru, H. and S. Holden (2008) Land certification in Ethiopia: an illusion or a solution?
ccxxxvii Joint IDA-IMF Staff Advisory Note on the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). World Bank, 2011.
ccxxxviii Zenawi, M.; African Development: dead ends and new beginnings
ccxxxix http://www.ata.gov.et/programs/system-programs/seeds/
ccxl http://www.moa.gov.et/land-leased
ccxli Secure Land Rights for all; Global Land Tool Network, UN-Habitat, 2008
ccxlii World Bank (2003a) ‘Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction’. Washington: World Bank.
ccxliii See, for example: i) Markussen, Thomas. (2008). Property Rights, Productivity, and Common Property
Resources: Insights from Rural Cambodia. World Development 36 (11), 2277-2296.; ii)
ccxliv Do, Q.T., and L. Iyer. (2008). Land Titling and Rural Transition in Vietnam. Economic Development and
Cultural Change, 56(3), 531–79.
ccxlv Carter, Michael R., Wiebe, Keith D. and Blarel, Benoit. (1994). Tenure Security for Whom? Different Effects
of Land Policy in Kenya. In Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, edited by John W. Bruce and Shem E.
Migot-Adholla. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
ccxlvi Deininger, Klaus and Ali, Danial Ayalew (2007). Do Overlapping Property Rights Reduce Agricultural
Investment? Evidence from Uganda. The World Bank, mimeo.
ccxlvii Smith, R. E. (2004) ‘Land tenure, fixed investment, and farm productivity: evidence from Zambia’s
Southern Province’. World Development, 32(10), pp. 1641–1661.
ccxlviii Gebremedhin, B. and Swinton, S. M. (2003) ‘Investment in soil conservation in northern Ethiopia: the role of
land tenure security and public programs’. Agricultural Economics, 29(1), pp. 69–84.
ccxlix Graham, A. W. and Darroch, M. A. G. (2001) ‘Relationship between the mode of land redistribution, tenure
security and agricultural credit use in KwaZulu-Natal’. Development Southern Africa, 18(3), pp. 295–308.
ccl Holden, S. Zevenbergen, J. Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D,(2007), Rural Land Certification in Ethiopia: Process,
initial impact, and implications for other African countries, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4218
ccli Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
cclii Shantayanan Devarajan, W. R. Easterly and H. Pack (2001) “Is Investment in Africa too Low or too High?”
ccliiiEvangelos Calamitsis, A. Basu, and D. Ghura (1999) “Adjustment and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa”
cclivProsperity for All: Making Markets Work, Private Sector Strategy, DFID
cclvMohsin Khan and C. Reinhart (1989) "Private investment and economic growth in developing countries"
cclvi Indicators for measuring and maximizing value added and job creation arising from private investment in
value chains’, Inter-Agency Working Group on Private Sector and Job Creation Pillar of the G20 Multi-Year
Action Plan on Development, 2011.
cclvii A useful summary of the evidence can be found in Promoting Pro-Poor Growth, OECD DAC, 2006
cclviii When is Growth Pro-Poor, Kraay, A, IMF 2004
cclix Pro-Poor Growth: A Primer. Ravallion M, 2004. Policy Research Working Paper 3242 World Bank.
cclx World Development Indicators 2013, World Bank.
cclxi Pro-Poor Growth: A Primer. Ravallion M, 2004. Policy Research Working Paper 3242 World Bank.
cclxii Women’s Economic Empowerment. OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality Issues Paper. April 2011.
cclxiii See i) Reducing Poverty by Tackling Social Exclusion (2005) DFID Policy Paper; and ii) Klasen, S. (1999):
Does Gender Inequality Reduce Growth and Development? World Bank Policy Research Report Working Paper
No. 7. Washington CD: The World Bank.
cclxiv See: i) World Bank (2001): Engendering Development. New York: Oxford University Press; ii) Udry (1996):
Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household. Journal of Political Economy 104: 551-69;
and iii) World Bank (2004): Gender and Development in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington DC: The
World Bank.
cclxv Women tend to opt for lower fertility when they have the power to do so. See Blumberg, Rae Lesser. 1993.
“Poverty vs. ‘Purse Power’: The Political Economy of the Mother-Child Family III.” Pp. 13-52 in Where did All the
Men Go: Women-Headed Households in Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed. by Joan Mencher and Anne Okongwu.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
cclxvi World Bank (2001): Engendering Development. New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank 2010: Gender Dimensions of Investment Climate Reform A Guide for Policy Makers and
Practitioners
cclxvii Blumberg, Rae Lesser. 1989a. Making the Case for the Gender Variable: Women and the Wealth & Wellbeing of Nations. Washington, DC: Agency for International Development (PN-ABC-454).
cclxviii Klasen S. and F. Lamanna (2003): “The Impact Gender Inequality in Education and Employment on
Economic Growth in the Middle East and North Africa”. Background paper for World Bank Study: Women in the
Public Sphere. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
cclxixCaterina Ruggeri Laderchi, Hans Lofgren and Rahimaisa Abdula (2010) “Addressing Gender Inequality in
Ethiopia: Trends, Impacts, and the Way Forward”
214
cclxx
Towards improved transaction of land use right Presented on annual conference on land and poverty: Zemen
Haddis, April, 2013 Washington DC.
cclxxi UNEP (2011) Towards a Green Economy.
cclxxii UNEP (2008) Background paper in green jobs.
cclxxiii UNEP (2011) Report on the Green economy.
cclxxiv Working Paper No. 2011/74, Environmental and Gender Impacts of Land Tenure Regularization in Africa,
Pilot Evidence from Rwanda, Daniel Ayalew Ali, Klaus Deininger, and Markus Goldstein, November 2011
cclxxv See: i) Do, Q.T., and L. Iyer. (2008). Land Titling and Rural Transition in Vietnam. Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 56(3), 531–79; and ii) Alston 1996.
cclxxvi See: i) Ghebru, H. and S. Holden (2008) Land certification in Ethiopia: an illusion or a solution?; ii)
Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment, and
Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11; iii)
Deininger, Klaus and Songqing, Jin. 2006 ‘Tenure security and land related investment: Evidence from Ethiopia.’
European Economic Review 50 (5): 1245-77; and iv) Deininger, Klaus and Ali, Danial Ayalew (2007). Do
Overlapping Property Rights Reduce Agricultural Investment? Evidence from Uganda. The World Bank, memo.
cclxxvii Holden, Stein T. and Deininger, Klaus and Ghebru, Hosaena (2007): Impact of Land Certification on Land
Rental Market Participation in Tigray Region, Northern Ethiopia. MPRA Paper, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences.
cclxxviii cclxxviii Abate Tsegaye, Enyew Adgo & Yihenew G. Selassie. Journal of Agricultural Science; Vol. 4, No. 12;
2012 ISSN 1916-9752 E-ISSN 1916-9760
cclxxix Simane B, Zaitchik B.F and Ozdogan M, 2013. Agroecosystem Analysis of the Choke Mountain
Watersheds, Ethiopia. Sustainability 2013, 5, 592-616.
cclxxx DFID’s Approach to Value for Money (VfM). DFID, July 2011
cclxxxi DFID, RNRA, HTSPE (2013 in prep) Rwanda Land Tenure Regularisation Support Programme Final
Report.
cclxxxii DFID, RNRA, HTSPE (2013 in prep) Rwanda Land Tenure Regularisation Support Programme Final
Report
cclxxxiii Personal communication with David Harris, Team Leader of REILA project.
cclxxxivRose, I (2013) Lessons from Land Titling and Land Administration in Mozambique, presented at
Information for Africa Conference, June 2013. Also personal communication with Ian Rose, Team Leader, MCC
Land Project Mozambique
cclxxxv$42 of which is the survey cost. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTIE/Resources/4754951302790806106/RES2Pres3Valletta.pdf
cclxxxviBurns, T. Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 37. Land Administration Reform:
Indicators of Success and Future Challenge, World Bank (2007)
cclxxxvii DFID Ethiopia Operational Plan 2011-2015, Updated June 2012
cclxxxviii World Bank (2008) Project Appraisal for the Sustainable Land Management Programme, http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/04/10/000334955_20080410050936/Re
ndered/PDF/429270PAD0P10710and0IDAR20081007211.pdf
[ii] Audit Services Corporation (2012) Independent Auditors’ Report on the Designated Account of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Productive Safety Net and
Household Assets Building Programmes, Accounts for Year Ended July 2012
cclxxxix Evaluating the Impact of M4P programmes, Synthesis Paper, M4P Hub Team, September 2012
Deininger et al. (2009) ‘Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment, and Land sectors’.
Secure Land Rights for all; Global Land Tool Network, UN-Habitat, 2008
ccxcii Stig Enemark, Building Land Information Policies, UN, FIG, PC IDEA Inter-regional Special Forum on The
Building of Land Information Policies in the Americas, Aguascalientes, Mexico 26-27 October 2004
ccxciii Ghazali Desa and Majid Kadir, The Social and Economic Impacts of Coordinated Cadastral System
Implementations in Peninsular Malaysia, 3rd FIG Regional Conference, Jakarta, Indonesia, October 3-7, 2004
ccxciv Secure Land Rights for all; Global Land Tool Network, UN-Habitat, 2008
ccxcv
ANZLIC, 1995. ANZLIC Benefits Study. Australian & New Zealand Land Information Council. AUSLIG,
Canberra.
ccxcvi Land Administration in the UNECE Region; Development trends and main principles; 2005
ccxcvii Secure Land Rights for all; Global Land Tool Network, UN-Habitat, 2008
ccxcviii Pilot Land Tenure Registration in Rwanda; evidences and initial impact. World Bank Case Study; 2010
ccxcix Sustainability of the Rural Land Registration System in Ethiopia; World Bank Conference on Land and
Poverty 2013; Gisachew Abegaz, Tony Burns, Tigistu G. Abza
ccc DFID Nigeria, Propcom Project Completion Report, 2010
ccci DFID Bangladesh, Katalyst Review 2011 report, Sarah Barlow, Markus Engler, Roel Engler, Role
Hakemulder, Handenmulder Pfeifer and Kaniz Siddique.
cccii Deininger, K & Jin, S (2002); Land rental markets as an alternative to government reallocation - equity and
efficiency considerations in the Chinese land tenure system; Policy Research Paper 2930, World Bank
ccxc
ccxci
215
ccciii
Deininger, K. (2008) Implementing Low-cost Rural Land Certification: The Case of Ethiopia, Agriculture and
Rural Development Notes - Land Policy and Land Administration
ccciv Holden, S. T. and Tefera, T. (2008). Early Impacts of Land Registration and Certification on Women in
Southern Ethiopia. Final Research Report submitted to UNHABITAT, Shelter Branch, Land Tenure and Property
Administration Section. Nairobi.
cccv Holden, S. T., Deininger, K. and Ghebru, H. (2011). Does Land Registration and Certification Reduce Land
Border Conflicts? CLTS Working Paper No.5/2011. Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences, Ås, Norway.
cccvi Ministry of Agriculture (2013). Rural Land Certification and Administration. SLM Knowledge Base. Ministry of
Agriculture,Ethiopia.http://www.slmethiopia.info.et/index.php/aboutus/programme-components/rural-land
certification
cccvii World Bank (2002); Mexico – Land policy a decade after the Ejido reforms; World Bank, Rural Development
and Natural Resources Sector Unit
cccviii Secure Land Rights for all; Global Land Tool Network, UN-Habitat, 2008
cccix ibid
cccx FAO, 2009c. Towards Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land and Other
Natural Resources – Discussion Paper, Land Tenure Working Paper 10, Rome: FAO
cccxi Holden, S. T., Deininger, K. and Ghebru, H. (2011). Does Land Registration and Certification Reduce Land
Border Conflicts? CLTS Working Paper No.5/2011. Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences, Ås, Norway.
cccxii See Zemen Haddis Gebeyehu: Towards Improved Transactions of Land Use Rights in Ethiopia, USAID,
Ethiopia. Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty. World
Bank - Washington DC, April 8-11, 2013
cccxiii Working Paper No. 2011/74, Environmental and Gender Impacts of Land Tenure Regularization in Africa,
Pilot Evidence from Rwanda, Daniel Ayalew Ali, Klaus Deininger, and Markus Goldstein, November 2011
cccxiv Secure Land Rights for all; Global Land Tool Network, UN-Habitat, 2008
cccxv Effects of Rural Lands Registration and Certification on Land- Related Disputes in Rural Areas of Amhara,
Tigray, Oromia, and Southern Nations and Nationalities People’s Regional States of Ethiopia, ELAP Draft, 2013
cccxvi Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, A Final Baseline Survey
Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Programme (ELAP) 2013
cccxvii Working Paper No. 2011/74, Environmental and Gender Impacts of Land Tenure Regularization in Africa,
Pilot Evidence from Rwanda, Daniel Ayalew Ali, Klaus Deininger, and Markus Goldstein, November 2011
cccxviii Secure Land Rights for all; Global Land Tool Network, UN-Habitat, 2008
cccxix Holden, Stein T., Deininger, K. and Ghebru, H. (2007): Impact of Land Certification on Land Rental Market
Participation in Tigray Region, Northern Ethiopia. MPRA Paper, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
cccxxSimane B, Zaitchik B.F and Ozdogan M, 2013. Agro ecosystem Analysis of the Choke Mountain Watersheds,
Ethiopia. Sustainability 2013, 5, 592-616.
cccxxi Consulting Services to Produce an Integrated Information Systems/Information Technology (Is/It)
Strategy and Detailed Implementation Plan for a National Rural Land Administration Information System in
Ethiopia (NRLAIS), NIRAS/Orgut June 2012.
cccxxii Study on institutional structure and human resources development needs in the sector of land
administration in Ethiopia; ORGUT, 2010
cccxxiii Government of Ethiopia, Department of Land Administration and Use Directorate, Strategic Road Map
(Draft Document, 2010)
cccxxiv Revised Concept Note on the Design and Implementation of Ethiopia: Land Administration and Land Use
Development Project Ministry of Agriculture, March 2011
cccxxv Revised Concept Note on the Design and Implementation of Ethiopia: Land Administration and Land Use
Development Project Ministry of Agriculture, March 2011
cccxxvi GoE Household Income Survey, 2010/11
cccxxvii Flintan, F. (2010). Sitting at the table: securing benefits for pastoral women from land tenure reform in
Ethiopia. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 4(1), 153-178.
cccxxviii Communication from LIFT Team Leader and Deputy Team Leader. May 2013.
cccxxix E.g. The Springfield Centre (2012) Government for Growth (G4G) Second Stage Scoping Report, Produced
for DFID Ethiopia, April 2012.
cccxxx WB Case Study “Pilot Land Tenure Registration in Rwanda; evidences and initial impact” September 2010.
cccxxxi Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
cccxxxii GoE, Ministry of Agriculture, 2012, Strategic Road Map for National Rural Land Administration and Use
System (2012-2016), Draft.
cccxxxiii Shahidur Rashid and Asfaw Negassa. Policies and Performance of Ethiopian Cereal Markets. Ethiopia
Strategy Support Program II (ESSP II). ESSP II Working Paper No. 21. May 2011
cccxxxiv Taffesse, A, Dorosh P. & Asrat S., 2011, “Crop Production in Ethiopia: Regional Patterns and Trends”
ESSP II, Working Paper No. 0016; IFPRI-EDRI.
216
cccxxxv
Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
cccxxxvi Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, a Final Baseline Survey
Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP) 2013.
cccxxxvii Orgut Consulting AB (2010) Business Process Data Management Strategy, final Report for World Bank,
Ethiopia, June 2010, updated as per SRM.
cccxxxviii Rahmato and Assefa 2006; Abegaz 2004; Griffin et al. 2001; Gebreselassie 2006
cccxxxix Final report, Land Tenure Regularisation Programme in Rwanda. June 2013.
cccxl Deininger, Klaus, Ali, Daniel A. and Alemu, Tekie, 2011, ‘Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in
Ethiopia - Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
5727,
cccxli Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, A Final Baseline Survey
Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP) 2013.
cccxlii Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
cccxliii Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
cccxliv Cotula, Camilla Toulmin and Ced Hesse, (2004) Land Tenure and Administration in Africa: Lessons of
Experience and Emerging Issues, Lorenzo
cccxlv Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing Countries by Tim Handstad
cccxlvi See id
cccxlvii Davis, K., B. Swanson, D. Amudavi, D. Ayalew, Mekonnen, A. Flohrs, J. Riese, C. Lamb, and E. Zerfu: InDepth Assessment of the Public Agricultural Extension System of Ethiopia and Recommendations for
Improvement. IFPRI Discussion Paper 01041, December 2010
cccxlviii Dercon, S., R. Vargas Hill and A. Zeitin. In search of a strategy: Rethinking agriculture-led growth in
Ethiopia. Synthesis paper presented as part of a study on Agriculture and Growth in Ethiopia. May 2009.
cccxlix Zelleke, Gete ,Agegnehu, Getachew, Abera, Dejene and Rashid, Shahidur; (2010), Fertilizer and Soil
Fertility Potential in Ethiopia Constraints and Opportunities for Enhancing the System, International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI)
cccl Anchala, C., Aberra Deressa, Shemelis Dejene, Fekadu Beyene, Nigusse Efa,
Belete Gebru, Akalu Teshome and Maikel Tesfaye: Research Center Based Maize Technology Transfer: Efforts
and Achievements. Second National Maize Workshop of Ethiopia. 12-16 November, 2001.
cccli Cited in page 2 of: Dercon, S., R. Vargas Hill and A. Zeitin. In search of a strategy: Rethinking agriculture-led
growth in Ethiopia. Synthesis paper presented as part of a study on Agriculture and Growth in Ethiopia. May
2009.
ccclii Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, A Final Baseline Survey
Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP) 2013.
cccliii Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, A Final Baseline Survey
Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP) 2013.
cccliv Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccclv Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccclvi Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
Deininger, Klaus, Ali, Daniel A. and Alemu, Tekie, 2011, ‘Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5727,
ccclvii Mukherji, A., 2007, Agrarian Households in Semi-Arid Tropics, PhD dissertation, RAND.
ccclviii Deininger, Klaus, Ali, Daniel A. and Alemu, Tekie, 2011, ‘Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in
Ethiopia - Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
5727,
ccclix Government of Ethiopia, Expropriation of Land Holdings for Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation
Proclamation No.455/2005
ccclx Kemper, N., Klump, R., and Schumacher, H. (2011), Representation of property rights and credit market
outcomes: Evidence from a land reform in Vietnam, Paper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik, Research
Committee Development Economics in its series Proceedings of the German Development Economics
Conference, Berlin 2011.
ccclxi Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccclxii Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccclxiii Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, A Final Baseline Survey
Report on Ethiopia: Strengthening Land Administration Program (ELAP) 2013.
217
ccclxiv
Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing Countries by Tim Handstad
See id
ccclxvi Land Tenure and Administration in Africa: Lessons of Experience and Emerging Issues, Lorenzo Cotula,
Camilla Toulmin and Ced Hesse, 2004
ccclxvii Mukherji, A., 2007, Agrarian Households in Semi-Arid Tropics, PhD dissertation, RAND.
ccclxviii Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccclxix Deininger, Klaus, Ali, Daniel A. and Alemu, Tekie, 2011, ‘Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in
Ethiopia - Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
5727,
ccclxx Shahidur Rashid and Asfaw Negassa. Policies and Performance of Ethiopian Cereal Markets. Ethiopia
Strategy Support Program II (ESSP II). ESSP II Working Paper No. 21. May 2011
ccclxxi Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccclxxii Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccclxxiii Mukherji, A., 2007, Agrarian Households in Semi-Arid Tropics, PhD dissertation, RAND.
ccclxxiv Deininger, Klaus, Ali, Daniel A. and Alemu, Tekie, 2011, ‘Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in
Ethiopia - Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
5727.
ccclxxv Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccclxxvi Discussions with senior regional officials during field visits.
ccclxxvii Government of Ethiopia, Expropriation of Land Holdings for Public Purposes and Payment of
Compensation Proclamation No.455/2005
ccclxxviii Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security,
Investment, and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series
DP09-11.
ccclxxix Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccclxxx Mukherji, A., 2007, Agrarian Households in Semi-Arid Tropics, PhD dissertation, RAND.
ccclxxxi Deininger, Klaus, Ali, Daniel A. and Alemu, Tekie, 2011, ‘Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in
Ethiopia - Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
5727.
ccclxxxii Deininger, K & Jin, S (2002); Land rental markets as an alternative to government reallocation - equity and
efficiency considerations in the Chinese land tenure system; Policy Research Paper 2930, WB.
ccclxxxiii Holden, Stein T. and Deininger, Klaus and Ghebru, Hosaena (2007): Impact of Land Certification on Land
Rental Market Participation in Tigray Region, Northern Ethiopia. MPRA Paper, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences.
ccclxxxiv Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security,
Investment, and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series
DP09-11.
ccclxxxv Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security,
Investment, and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series
DP09-11.
ccclxxxvi Mukherji, A., 2007, Agrarian Households in Semi-Arid Tropics, PhD dissertation, RAND.
ccclxxxvii Deininger, Klaus, Ali, Daniel A. and Alemu, Tekie, 2011, ‘Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in
Ethiopia - Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
5727.
ccclxxxviii Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security,
Investment, and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series
DP09-11.
ccclxxxix ccclxxxix Discussions with senior regional officials during field visits.
cccxc Government of Ethiopia, Expropriation of Land Holdings for Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation
Proclamation No.455/2005
cccxci Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
cccxcii Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
cccxciii Deininger, K, Ayalew Ali, D, Alemu, T, (2009) Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment,
and Land sectors: Evidence from Ethiopia, Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series DP09-11.
ccclxv
218