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Legalization requires the plan to make marihuana legal
Fauperl 3 Charles Faupel, Department of Sociology Auburn University 2003 Drug Policy:
Prohibition, Decriminalization, Legalization Lecture 10
http://www.auburn.edu/~faupece/CR501/Powerpoint/lecture10.ppt.
Legalization A general policy orientation that involves the lifting of all criminal and civil proscriptions
and sanctions
An opt-out waiver doesn’t mandate legalization
Chemerinsky et al-prof law UC Irvine-3/19/14
Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2014-25
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411707&download=yes–
Importantly, modifying the CSA to allow cooperative agreements between the states and the federal
government would allow the federal government to guide state policy without commandeering the
state legislatures, while giving states freedom to develop the best approach for regulating marijuana.
Furthermore, variations among the state laws and regulations would allow for experimentation short
of full legalization. While some states would maintain their current marijuana prohibitions , others
would likely test out different regulatory schemes permitting more or less marijuana activity. The
relative successes and failures of the various marijuana legalization models would help inform other
states – and possibly, eventually the federal government – about the best practices for legalizing
marijuana for adults while maintaining public safety. Moreover, this model mitigates the impact of
marijuana legalization on states choosing to maintain the status quo.
Vote Negative-Their interpretation explodes the topic by allowing an infinite number
of small incremental reform cases. It guts negative ground by undermining links to
core generics linked to explicitly repealing prohibition
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Uniqueness – Iran negotiations will succeed now – Obama’s PC is key to prevent
Congress from derailing them.
Hassibi, Non-Resident Fellow with the Nuclear Security Working Group and a doctoral candidate with
the Research Group in International Politics at the University of Antwerp, 10-20-14 (Navid, “On Iran:
Congress, Please Step Aside,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/iran-congress-please-step-aside11497?page=show, accessed 10-20-14, CMM)
While Secretary of State John Kerry, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and High Representative Catherine Ashton
gathered last week to kick-start a new round of negotiations between the so-called P5+1 and Iran in
efforts to meet a looming November 24 deadline to reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement, one
particular actor has been implicitly threatening to sabotage the entire process —the U.S. Congress .
Considering Congress’s dismal approval ratings, and polls indicating that a large majority of Americans favor making a nuclear deal with Iran,
Congress is hardly representing the majority of the American people on the issue of a nuclear deal with Iran and is towing a tough line
seemingly intent on derailing any prospective breakthrough on the nuclear issue. Earlier
this month, over 350 members of the
U.S. House of Representatives signed and sent a letter to Secretary Kerry expressing concern over Iran’s
missed deadline for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) investigation into prior possible military
dimensions (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear program. Essentially, the letter asserts that information on PMD is necessary to
assess Iran’s current and future nuclear activity, which, as duly noted by Paul Pillar in the National Interest, is an
assertion that lacks logic and is an issue likely being pursued by congressional opponents of a nuclear
agreement, precisely because it will be a “deal killer”. This is but the most recent example of some
lawmakers on Capitol Hill trying to derail a nuclear agreement with Iran. Some legislators have
suggested terms for the comprehensive agreement with which Iran would find impossible to agree,
such as the complete dismantlement of its uranium-enrichment program. Indeed, both chambers of Congress
have repeatedly moved to undermine the negotiating process with tough Netanyahu-like rhetoric since negotiations with Iran under the
Rouhani era began over a year ago. The
Obama administration has thus far been successful at pushing back against
congressional derailment efforts. The White House successfully thwarted congressional efforts earlier
this year at enacting additional sanctions that would have been in contrary to the terms of the interim
Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) signed last November. However, it seems that some in Congress have resumed their
pursuit of additional measures against Iran. This past summer, Senate Republicans Bob Corker, Lindsey Graham, John
McCain and Marco Rubio introduced the Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act of 2014 that would require the
White House to submit any agreement for Senate review. Also this summer, Senators Marco Rubio and Mark Kirk
tabled the Iran Human Rights Accountability Act of 2014 into the Senate, which would impose
additional sanctions on Iran, among other things. The Obama administration is thus far relying on Senate Democrats
to block attempts by the Republicans to act on Iran. To satisfy the inclination toward sanctions by
some lawmakers and other opponents of a nuclear deal, the administration has adopted additional
restrictive measures within existing sanctions legislation; an act that is not within the spirit of the JPOA but well within
its legal framework. Unfortunately for supporters of a nuclear deal, Capitol Hill’s role in the entire process is critical, particularly as it relates to
sanctions relief. Since the mid-1990s, Congress has legislated seven acts targeting Iran’s energy, financial and trade sectors. Many of these
sanctions can be temporarily waived by the president for a period of 180 days to a year, depending on the statute. The
president cannot remove sanctions passed by Congress through an executive order. The repeal or amendment of the congressionally enacted
sanction must follow the same legislative process all bills must undergo to be passed and signed into law. While sanctions relief within a
mutually agreed timeline will surely be part of a comprehensive agreement, should the president fail to convince Congress to repeal legislated
sanctions against Iran, the president will likely rely on the semi-annual renewal of waivers. Although
this might not be attractive
to Iranian negotiators due to uncertainties surrounding future U.S. presidents and their willingness to
waive sanctions, the United States can provide assurances that it will honor its commitment to provide
sanctions relief by including such language in a United Nations Security Council resolution codifying the terms
of the comprehensive agreement, mandating the United States, the other members of the P5+1 and UN
members at large not to adopt sanctions against Iran, so long as Tehran remains compliant, with validation
from the IAEA, with the terms of the comprehensive agreement. This will provide future U.S. presidents
the legal impetus and authority to continue providing waivers to legislated sanctions or risk violating
international law and face possible legal recourse. Of course, Congress can pass a bill barring the president from providing
waivers and override the presidential veto that would likely follow with two-thirds majority of each house, but such a scenario is uncommon
and has not occurred since President George W. Bush’s final two years in office. To
be safe, the president will need the help
of Congress if a comprehensive agreement is reached to repeal sanctions. In this regard, Democrats must retain a
majority in the Senate to continue blocking derailment efforts by Iran hawks. The White House can also opt to negotiate with a
hostile Republican leadership, although this would seem unlikely given indications suggesting the president’s lack of appetite in doing
so. Alternatively, President Obama can lambast legislators much like he did last fall/winter when lawmakers
tried to pass additional sanctions after the JPOA was signed. The Obama administration significantly lobbied
Congress by sending delegations led by Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary Kerry, and also invited
committee staffers and legislators to the White House for special briefings. This was done in concert
with public statements by the president and others in the administration who opposed further
sanctions. To be sure, the upcoming midterm elections could be telling in how the Obama administration chooses to engage Congress on
Iran, particularly if Republicans win a majority in the Senate. Nevertheless, a historic opportunity exists for the United States,
the other members of the P5+1 and Iran to peacefully resolve the long-standing nuclear dispute,
potentially opening the door to cooperation on other regional issues and a new era of relations with Iran. To this end,
Congress must work to be part of the solution, not the problem.
Plan drains PC
Daw, Harvard Law J.D., 12 (Jeremy, contributor of Cannabis Now Magazine, “Marijuana Not A
Priority For Obama,” http://cannabisnowmagazine.com/current-events/politics/marijuana-not-apriority-for-obama, accessed 8-29-14, CMM)
Before the statement even officially airs, many commentators are missing the point. These statements reveal no new shift in policy – the federal government has not engaged in widespread
arrests of recreational pot users since the late 1930s, after the nation’s first drug czar Harry Anslinger endured massive public outcry over his strict enforcement of cannabis prohibition. More
likely, the interview is nothing more than a PR move, designed to buy the president more time while he tries to fix the budget and figure out what on earth he’s going to do about the real
elephant in the room: the large-scale cultivators and retailers who want to enter the legal recreational cannabis business, and the state regulators who have been ordered by the people to
It is likely that even the president himself doesn’t know what he will do – yet. To give the curious cannabis activist a
better grasp of the choice the chief executive now faces, I have endeavored to provide a summary of the debate raging within the White House right now. All of Obama’s
help them.
choices are bad . The Despotic Route At one point early in the debate, a Cabinet member or staffer may have suggested that Obama take the hardest line possible, to position
far to the right of his political opponents to neutralize all criticism that he may be too “soft on crime.” In such a policy, the White House would use the DEA to take over the job of cannabis
policing from the state and local cops who will no longer bother to arrest adults in possession of up to an ounce – to essentially nullify the will of the people entirely. As I predicted weeks ago,
it is very unlikely that Obama would choose such a course – and with the lifting of prohibitions on small amounts of pot in both states without more than a peep from D.C., it appears that I was
right. Nevertheless, the political calculus behind this option is sufficiently instructive to warrant some examination. Believe it or not, such a despotic policy would have some advantages; the
most attractive of these would be to avoid potential criticism from neighboring states. The lifting of penalties for possessing an ounce of marijuana, although it may not seem like a big deal,
could in fact have a significant effect on the availability of the drug across state lines, based on principles of economics. While an ounce may not seem like much, given pot’s high potency to
weight ratio, an ounce of high-grade marijuana could easily represent a year’s supply for the occasional recreational smoker (for an excellent analysis of American pot usage rates, see
Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone Needs to Know by Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, pp. 16-30). And drastically different risk profiles for possessing pot between Colorado and
Nebraska will lead to drastically divergent prices on either side of the state line, creating significant incentives for Coloradoans to traffic their legal weed to where it’s more difficult to obtain.
This arguably makes local pot policy a federal problem, which Republicans in the nation’s heartland could accuse Obama of ignoring. Nevertheless, the disadvantages of directing federal
resources to arrest tens of thousands of citizens for doing something which isn’t criminal under state law far outweigh the advantages; just ask George W. Bush, who chose to discontinue the
raids and prosecutions on individual medical marijuana patients in the face of a strong public backlash. While some of the backlash came from a sense of compassion for often seriously ill
individuals, no small amount of the public anger also stemmed from constitutional principles: the policing of drug laws has traditionally been left to the states, and federal interference with
the people’s will had proven quite unpopular. Given that legalization initiatives in Washington and Colorado received more votes than Obama did, such a blatant disregard for popular will
would be the equivalent of political suicide – especially in Colorado, which has tenuously voted for Obama twice after a streak of Republicanism. The same federalist principles also work to
blunt some of the Republican criticism Obama would face for his acquiescence – while many Tea Party activists may personally despise marijuana, they would nevertheless strenuously object
to an overreach of federal power. Choosing Free Love
Many optimistic cannabis advocates have expressed to me their hope
that weeks of near-silence from the Justice Department signals tacit acquiescence by Obama – in essence,
that he’s given Washington and Colorado the green light. Yet there is no more reason to believe that
Obama will refrain from all federal interference in the legalization experiment than there is to believe
that he will shut it completely down. Still, it must be tempting. Here is a president whom we know to object to the disparate racial outcomes of drug crime
sentencing, and with good reason: African Americans are 2.5 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana crimes than the general population. As Caulkins et al point out (pp. 42-45), some of
that disparity can be attributed to environmental factors (i.e., blacks are more likely to purchase marijuana outside than whites), but not all: despite sincere reform efforts, American cannabis
laws still reflect prejudice. A completely hands-off approach to Washington and Colorado may result in setting a shining example for other states to follow – a lasting legacy of reduced racism
With the most recent polls suggesting that a majority of
Americans favor reform of pot laws, why not seize the moment and end federal prohibition entirely?
Obama could order the DEA to reschedule cannabis out of Schedule I to a less restrictive classification,
which would effectively end the conflict with the federal government in medical marijuana states.
Such a move could harness political will for change and put the president on the winning side of public
opinion. But such moves would have serious downsides. The politics of pot, rife with cultural and
for the country’s first multi-racial president. Some hope for even more radical change.
political divisions since the tumultuous 1960s, remain bitterly divisive ; any politician who proposes
liberalization of cannabis laws risks becoming saddled with labels borne out of a long history of
ingroup/outgroup dynamics and which can rapidly drain a leader’s store of political capital . Given
Obama’s susceptibility to an even older tradition of racial stereotyping which associates cannabis use
with African Americans, any kind of green light to relaxed marijuana laws will cost the president
dearly.
Sustaining negotiations prevents Iranian prolif and Israel strikes – PC is key
Ross, Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service
and counselor at The Washington Institute, 10-16-14 (Dennis, previously served as special assistant to
President Obama and senior director for the central region at the National Security Council, “How To
Muddle Through With Iran,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142219/dennis-ross/how-tomuddle-through-with-iran, accessed 10-20-14, CMM)
One negotiator from the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) told me that he expects that if
there
is no agreement before the talks end, the Iranians will take the lid off their program and rapidly ramp
up their uranium enrichment program. Tehran would resume enriching uranium at 20 percent,
increase its use of next generation centrifuges, and expand its stockpiles of enriched material. This
would shrink the so-called break-out time that Iran would require to produce weapons-grade
enriched uranium and potentially hide it. And that, in turn, would mean that the United States could no
longer be confident that it could prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons. How would the United States
respond? Its first step would almost certainly be to introduce more draconian sanctions against Tehran and mobilize international support for
them. (The most important of these sanctions would be designed to greatly curtail Iran’s ability to export its oil.) Notwithstanding the new
sanctions, the
Israeli government’s temptation to launch a military strike against the Iranian nuclear
program would surely grow -- not only because of the increased threat of Tehran’s program, but also
because the international community might be more forgiving of Israeli military action in
circumstances where the Iranians appear to be rapidly accelerating their nuclear program. So, is this
dangerous sequence of events likely to take place? It’s possible, but neither the P5+1 nor the Iranians
are keen on escalation, so both sides are likely to look for a way out. A PARTIAL DEAL One possibility would
be to agree to an extension of the negotiations under the current terms. The benefit of such an
extension, for the West, is that it would keep the Iranian program contained, and the Islamic Republic
would not move closer to break-out capability. For their part, the Iranians would receive additional
economic relief, even though the basic structure of the sanctions regime would remain intact. Jofi Joseph, a former U.S.
National Security Council official, has argued that preserving the status quo is preferable to the
uncertainty and danger of no deal as it still leaves room for the possibility of achieving a sustainable
comprehensible agreement. A possible variant of this scenario would be a partial deal in which both
sides would formalize an agreement on several issues -- redesign of the Arak heavy water reactor, reconfiguration of
Fordow into a research facility, enhanced verification protocols for nuclear inspectors -- and continue the dialogue on the areas
where there are still significant disagreements. In each case, diplomacy would continue and there
would be no new sanctions. Washington would have to accept that it could not roll back the Iranian program immediately, although
it would still hope to do so over time.
nuclear war
Edelman et al., distinguished fellow – Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
11 (Eric S, Andrew Krepinevich, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments President, Evan Braden
Montgomery, Research Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “The Dangers of a
Nuclear Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January/February, ebsco, accessed 11-14-13, CMM)
The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention Of Weapons
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have
highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed
Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal.
Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates— all signatories to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)—have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of
these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors
cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these
moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-
armed Iran. The npt does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is,
the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to
accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium—the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear
weapons capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and di⁄cult process, even for states with considerable economic
resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states’ access to critical materials and technology. Without external
support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.¶ There is, however, at
least
one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could
accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would
face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian
coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim
world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow
road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting
its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation
throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from
China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also oªered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear
warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads eªectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and
Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security
guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and
delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce
nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not
only has Pakistan provided such
support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a
second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more
fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might oªer an
extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the
United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It
would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an
extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi
territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would
gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival,
India. The
Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how
India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or
nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in
either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out
nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other
nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by
eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the
nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.¶ n-player competition¶
Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the
Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and
perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear
deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the
interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and
escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with
an attack from the other. Multipolar
systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems
because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important,
emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional
stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a
secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a
devastating retaliation. However, emerging
nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities
the close proximity of states
in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers
might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces
preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders,
heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into
robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without
sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is,
assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was
responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would
retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.
such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability,
1nc cp
Text: The federal judiciary should rule that the Controlled Substances Act restriction
on marihuana usage and distribution is not constitutionally grounded in the
commerce clause. The federal judiciary should rule that the legal status of marihuana
including its regulation is properly the domain of state police power.
The 50 states and territories should legalize nearly all marihuana and adopt
regulations as per their 1AC Kleiman evidence.
Judicial clarification of marijuana and the CSA regarding the commerce clause and
police power captures certainty and federal key warrants.
Kopel-prof con law Denver-12 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 543
LAW IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY: REDUCING THE DRUG WAR'S DAMAGE TO GOVERNMENT BUDGETS
[*561] III. HOW TO SAVE MONEY BY OBEYING THE TENTH AMENDMENT Given the growing support for marijuana legalization, it might be
worthwhile to look to the lessons, both fiscal and constitutional, that can be learned from the failed experiment with alcohol prohibition. By
taxing alcohol, states generated nearly $ 6 billion in revenue in 2009, 105 and, as late as 1950, 5% of federal tax revenue came from alcohol
taxes. 106 Constitutionally speaking, lessons
can be taken from both pre-Prohibition constitutional doctrine and
post-Prohibition doctrine, specifically regarding the Commerce Clause. In general, prohibition-whether of drugs, alcohol, or switchblades--poses a unique challenge for our federalist system of dual
sovereignty. Ideally, either prohibition or legalization should be the result of each state's decision
whether to exercise its police power. Within their own borders, states should be able to choose
either a prohibition system or a tax and regulatory system ; the choices made by any particular state should not unduly
impinge on the ability of other states to make different choices. Yet prior to the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
often gave the "dormant" prong of the Commerce Clause a broad interpretation and thereby rendered states unable to effectively prohibit
alcohol within their borders. 107 Thus, out of necessity, what began as a movement for local prohibition became a movement for national
prohibition, eventually coalescing into the Eighteenth Amendment. We face a similar problem now. This time, however,
because of the
Court's excessive and aggressive interpretation of the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich , 108
states are unable to [*562] effectively legalize and tax marijuana --even medicinal marijuana-- within their
borders . Under both situations--that is, both the expansive interpretation of the dormant commerce clause prior to Prohibition and the
modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause that supposedly authorizes nationwide drug prohibition--states face difficulties being
laboratories of democracy that can "try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 109 In October 2010, as
Californians were preparing to enter the voting booth and vote on Proposition 19, which would have legalized non-medicinal marijuana and
allowed for its taxation, 110 U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder told the citizens of California that they were essentially powerless, because the
federal government would "vigorously enforce the [Controlled Substances Act] against those individuals and organizations that possess,
manufacture or distribute marijuana for recreational use, even if such activities are permitted under state law . . . ." 111
A paradigmatic
use of the police power --the power to legislate over the health, safety, welfare, and morals of a
people-- is to prohibit drugs , which are deemed harmful to all four objects of the power. 112 For exactly the same
reason, the decision to legalize drugs also is a paradigmatic example of the States' police power . Yet
through the C ontrolled S ubstances A ct's prohibition on mere possession, the federal government has
unconstitutionally usurped these traditional powers of the States . 113 Commentators remark on the parallels
between modern drug prohibition and federal alcohol prohibition of the 1920s and early 1930s. 114 There is one aspect, however, that is
sharply disanalogous: Federal
alcohol prohibition required a constitutional amendment, whereas federal
drug prohibition has been [*563] accomplished entirely by statute. Before national alcohol prohibition, the Supreme
Court made it essentially impossible for a state to fully prohibit alcohol within its borders; today, Congress has made it essentially
impossible for a state to legalize drugs within its borders. Both problems arose from illegitimate
interpretations of the Commerce Clause that usurp the sovereign powers of the States. The Controlled
Substances Act, as amended, declares that "[c]ontrolled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differentiated from
controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled
substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate." 115 The statute also
declares that "[f]ederal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the
interstate incidents of such traffic." 116 Although these two statements might be true, they also were true of alcohol prior to prohibition.
Initially, alcohol prohibition was pushed on a local level by the temperance movement. 117 In 1890, sixteen states had laws prohibiting alcohol.
118 That same year, Congress passed the Wilson Act 119 to empower states to deal with the problem of imported alcohol. 120 The Act
provided that, upon arrival in the state, shipments of imported liquor would be "subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or
Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent [*564] and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had
been produced in such State or Territory . . . ." 121 The Wilson Act was largely a response to Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.,
which invalidated an Iowa law that required in-state shippers of alcohol to have certificates from proper state officials. 122 In concurrence,
Justice Stephen Field stated that the "law of Iowa prohibiting the importation into that State of intoxicating liquors is an encroachment on the
power of Congress over interstate commerce." 123 Yet even after the Wilson Act, the Supreme Court, in Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., ruled
that a state could not use the Act to completely prohibit the importation of alcohol across its borders. 124 As the Court noted: [t]he right of
persons in one State to ship liquor into another State to a resident for his own use is derived from the Constitution of the United States, and
does not rest on the grant of the state law. Either the conditions attached by the state law unlawfully restrain the right or they do not. If they
do . . . then they are void. 125 Vance was based on a constitutional doctrine now referred to as the "dormant commerce clause," 126 which is
premised on the idea that states are prohibited from some actions that interfere with interstate commerce." 127 The dormant commerce
clause remains a major element of constitutional law today. 128 As a result of Vance, states were hamstrung in maintaining an effective level of
prohibition. 129 With Congress operating under the original meaning of the Commerce Clause, Congress recognized that it could not use the
clause to prohibit simple [*565] possession. Thus, there seemed to be no governmental entity with the power to enforce alcohol prohibition. In
response to the problem, temperance advocates did not advocate a specious new interpretation of Congress's Commerce Clause power that
would give Congress the power to impose prohibition. Instead, prohibitionists pushed for a narrowly worded constitutional amendment that
would expand Congress's powers just enough to accomplish alcohol prohibition. 130 The
C ontrolled S ubstances A ct, and the
Commerce Clause-expanding Supreme Court cases it depends upon , takes the opposite tack:
Congress's power is increased by judicial fiat . The Supreme Court endorsed an extensive federal
power over drugs in Gonzales v. Raich, holding that the federal prohibition on medical marijuana lawfully
used according to state law is a valid use of the Commerce Clause power. 131 The proper relationship
between the federal government and the states should allow for those states that desire to either
prohibit or legalize drugs, or even alcohol, and to effectively use their police powers to accomplish
the task . Under pre-Prohibition interpretations of the Commerce Clause, effective prohibition was extremely difficult. Before the
Eighteenth Amendment, the anti-prohibitionist states' preferences were imposed upon the states that desired prohibition. Now the obverse is
true: Modern
Commerce Clause doctrine imposes the preferences of the prohibitionists on states that
choose to legalize. The modern misuse of federal power severely impedes a state's ability to
effectively tax legalized marijuana within its borders. At a time when the State of California and California local
governments are having terrible budget problems, their taxation of legal medical marijuana is being thwarted by the U.S. Attorney General.
Contrary to the campaign promises of then-candidate Barack Obama, 132 Attorney General Eric Holder [*566] announced a policy to devote
federal resources to the prosecution of medical marijuana dispensaries in California. 133 The problem of federal interference with state
taxation will grow worse when, almost inevitably, states' voters choose to legalize marijuana in general, not just for medical use. Consider, for
example, California's Proposition 19. Had a mere 4% of voters changed their minds, the legalization would have passed. 134 Supporters of the
ballot initiative pointed to the savings that could result from eliminating the $ 156 million that California spends on marijuana prohibition 135
and to the $ 1.4 billion in tax revenue that marijuana excise and sales taxes would provide. 136 Professor Robert A.
Mikos examined
how the "wrench thrown into the machine by federal law" would lead to widespread tax evasion . 137
Mikos argues that continuing federal prohibition concurrent with state legalization would incentivize tax evasion for two reasons: 1) [i]t would
preserve the current fragmented structure of the marijuana market, by giving marijuana distributors an incentive to remain small and to
operate inconspicuously; and 2) it would put state tax collectors in a dilemma, because federal authorities could use state tax rolls (and similar
state-gathered information) to track down and punish tax-paying marijuana distributors. 138 The first reason is based on the simple fact that
the risk of federal prosecution creates an incentive for a business to remain small and try to stay
under the radar . F urthermore, other federal laws, such as the Lanham Act, 139 prohibit trademark
[*567]
registration for any "product proscribed by federal law, including marijuana." 140 Insofar as trademarks help build market share--
as they have done in the strongly brand-loyal cigarette market--such prohibitions could inhibit growth of marijuana producers. The second
reason is that the paper trail of state taxation could be seized by federal agents "and there is nothing the states can do to stop them." 141
This is wrong. Police powers reside in the States, and the People have never granted them to
Congress. 142 Yet because of Raich, it is Congress, and not the States, which de facto exercises the
police power as to whether certain drugs will be legal.
The Supreme Court properly retreated from the excessive
Commerce Clause interpretations in Bowman and Vance. Today, a state can ban the shipment of alcohol, as long as the state does not
discriminate between shippers who are located within the state and shippers whose product is produced outside the state. 143
The Court
should likewise retreat from Raich, and recognize , as did Raich's three dissenters, that it is indisputable that the
Founders who wrote the
Constitution and the People who ratified it unanimously intended to deny Congress a
general police power . 144 If there is any ambiguity, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide the decisive rules of interpretation: The
People's liberties are to be construed broadly, and the federal government's powers are to be construed narrowly, especially when those
powers are attempted to be used to infringe the People's right of self-government within the States. 145
Among the many reasons
that the Court should perform its duty to declare unconstitutional the congressional usurpation of
the police power is that such usurpation infringes not only the police power, but also the tax power
of the States . During a time of fiscal austerity, it is wrong as a matter of policy, and as [*568] a matter of constitutional law, for Congress
to prevent states from raising revenue from intrastate economic activities whose control was never granted to Congress, but which the
Constitution reserved to the States and the People, respectively.
Raich’s upholding of the CSAs regulatory authority is a death blow for a limited
interpretation of the commerce clause and decentralized federalism.
Slansky-JD Candidate Depaul-7 56 DePaul L. Rev. 759
V. Federal Power Unchecked, Federalism's Benefits Unrealized The Court's decision in
impact on the Commerce Clause landscape.
Raich could very well have a substantial
The apparent abrogation of as-applied challenges, combined with the further
development of the "comprehensive scheme" principle, severely limits the available challenges to commerce legislation. 299 And the Court's
willingness to uphold the regulation of local activities without any real showing of necessity enables Congress to justify its actions with ease.
Most importantly, however,
the doctrinal developments in Raich allow Congress [*792] to reach into the states
to an extent that threatens to obliterate the very benefits to individuals that federalism is intended
to create . 300 A. Raich Leaves Almost No Limits on the Reach of the Commerce Power Justice O'Connor, in dissent, noted that the
Court's decision in Raich essentially turned Lopez into a "drafting guide." 301 It is hard to argue otherwise. The
considerations that guided the Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison - the economic nature of the activity, the existence of findings, the
jurisdictional element, and the presence of a comprehensive scheme 302 - are still present in the substantial effects analysis. But Raich seems
to give Congress an example of how to satisfy those considerations to reach nearly any activity it desires. The jurisdictional element prong is
easy to satisfy. 303 If Congress is attempting to reach an activity that involves some object or instrument, it need only draft the statute to apply
to any such object that has moved in interstate commerce. The clearest example of this is the GFSZA at issue in Lopez. After the Court
invalidated the GFSZA, Congress amended the statute to apply only to guns that "[had] moved in or that otherwise affected" interstate
commerce. 304 Because the existence of a jurisdictional element spares the statute in question from the more demanding substantial effects
analysis, 305 it allows Congress to regulate conduct under the pretense of regulating objects. 306 This is the most "glaring fault" with the
jurisdictional element: "It [can] be exploited by Congress to uphold any Commerce Clause statute." 307 Raich indicates that the only thing
easier to provide than a jurisdictional element is a set of "findings." As long as Congress puts forth a list of assertions that if true would support
the claimed connection to commerce, the Court will be satisfied. 308 In Raich, the Court did not [*793] question the methods or data used to
generate those findings, or even whether such data exist. The Court seems to be saying, "give us a story - as long as it's not too farfetched (i.e.,
Lopez), we'll accept it." This blind acceptance of "bare declarations" 309 is not particularly significant with respect to findings about Congress's
reasons for legislating or the wisdom thereof. 310 There may even be reasons for judicial deference to such findings; the role of courts in
Commerce Clause review is to determine whether Congress can legislate in a certain area, not whether Congress should. But Raich seems to
sanction judicial deference not only to these findings of policy, but also to what could be called "jurisdictional" findings - those findings that
provide support for Congress's exercise of authority. The effects of this deference are best illustrated by the final two factors - the economic
nature of the activity and the existence of a comprehensive scheme - considered by the Court in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich. Lopez and
Morrison suggest that Congress may not aggregate the effects of noneconomic activity in order to show a substantial effect on commerce. 311
Under this principle, presumably, if Raich and Monson's activities had been termed noneconomic, 312 the effect of their conduct could not be
considered in the aggregate, and it would be difficult to see how their medicinal marijuana use substantially affected interstate commerce. But
Lopez and Raich recognize an exception to this nonaggregation principle where the activity being regulated is part of a larger regulatory scheme
that would be undercut unless the noneconomic activity were included. 313 So how does the Court determine whether the regulated activity in
a given case is an "essential part of a larger regulation"? 314 Raich suggests that it should simply ask Congress - or more accurately, examine
Congress's "findings." Specifically, the Court looked at findings asserting that the regulation of intrastate marijuana possession was essential to
regulating interstate marijuana possession. 315 In short, the Court took Congress's word for it. [*794] What this means is that the doctrinal
limitations on the scope of the commerce power have been eliminated. When the Court reviews commerce
legislation under the "instrumentalities" or "channels" prongs, the analysis is typically very deferential, and generally results in the validation of
the act in question. 316 Lopez and Morrison seemed to indicate that, at least in the substantial effects prong, the Court may still have been
willing to impose some limitations on Congress's authority over intrastate affairs. But after Raich, those limitations may have eroded.
If
Congress wishes to regulate purely intrastate, noneconomic activity of virtually any type it chooses, it
has a host of options to insulate itself from constitutional challenge . Congress can attach a jurisdictional element,
pulling the legislation into the instrumentalities prong, and thereby receiving more lenient review. 317 Congress can also include the activity
within a larger scheme, thus shielding it from the economic/noneconomic analysis. 318 All Congress needs to do to convince the Court that the
activity is an "essential" part of that larger scheme is include a "finding" to that effect, which the Court seems to accept unquestioningly. And
should Congress fail to utilize one of these options, it still need not fear that the Court will find the subject of legislation to be noneconomic the Court's "exceedingly broad" definition of economic 319 puts that threat to rest. Raich gave Congress all the necessary tools to get around
the Court's doctrinal limits on regulation of intrastate activities, rendering those limits nugatory. B. The Limitless Reach of the Commerce Power
Prevents Individuals from Realizing Federalism's Benefits So what? There are many who reject the notion of "states' rights" insofar as it
suggests that states should have a judicial remedy for any federal intrusion. 320 And if, as Wechsler proposed, courts are on their [*795]
"weakest ground" when invalidating federal legislation on federalism grounds, 321 that would seem especially true where, as with the CSA,
invalidation on federalism grounds may contradict the will of not only the federal and state governments, but the citizens themselves. 322 But
for those who would reserve judicial resources for the protection of individual rights, 323 it is important to realize that our federalist system is
in many respects a guardian of individual values rather than states' rights. 324 Angel Raich and Diane Monson are unique examples of how
federalism serves individuals, and how the expansion of federal power can harm individual interests. First, federalism serves individuals by
providing a diverse array of "legal regimes" from which citizens can choose. 325 This not only allows individuals to "vote with their feet" 326 by
moving to states that reflect their legal positions. It also allows citizens to have a stronger voice in local legislation by means of ballot initiatives
and other direct voting mechanisms, which are not available on the federal level. 327 The citizens of California chose to create a legal
exemption for medicinal marijuana use, apparently finding it to be of a different moral character than recreational marijuana use. Federalism
allows citizens of a particular state to draw such distinctions, and enact or support state legislation accordingly. And it allows individuals such as
Angel Raich and Diane Monson to reap the benefits of that legislation by living in (or moving to) a state that allows them legal access to what
they feel is the most effective remedy for their multitude of maladies. Intrusive federal legislation such as the CSA allows none of these things.
Second,
federalism allows the states to act as "critical staging grounds" for changing national policy. 328
By allowing states to act as laboratories for democracy, 329 other states may see the results of
experimental [*796] legislation and adopt it themselves . Thus, changes in policy can gain support on a state-by-state level
until that support is sufficient to influence federal policy.
330 Medicinal marijuana again provides a useful illustration.
Since California enacted the CUA in 1996, eight more states have adopted similar medicinal
marijuana laws . 331 Given the recent number of attempts at reforming the CSA's classification of
marijuana, 332 it may be that medicinal marijuana will eventually gain enough support to make those
attempts successful . But by allowing the CSA to reach purely intrastate activity, the Court publicly
validated the exercise of federal power and may have discouraged states from further
experimentation in that area . 333 All this is not meant to imply that the CSA is unconstitutional or that the federal government
lacks authority to reach any "purely intrastate" activity. The point is that questions of states' rights do have profound impacts on individual
values. As such, constitutional challenges based on questions of federalism deserve no less scrutiny, and no more deference to Congress, than
questions of individual rights. VI. Conclusion
The Raich decision has removed most - if not all - of the doctrinal
limitations on the reach of the commerce power. It has done so at the expense of the individual
values that federalism is designed to protect . But it may yet be possible for the Court to limit the effects of this decision if it
chooses. One avenue is to recognize the as-applied challenge in the commerce context. Although it seems like the Court rejected this option in
Raich, there is language in the opinion that could support another reading. 334 Analysis of a given regulation by reference to the specific
activity at issue in a particular case would, at a minimum, limit Congress's reach to those activities that actually affect interstate commerce in
some way. Another option would be to simply demand a stronger showing on the record of the claimed connection [*797] to commerce, at
least in terms of the jurisdictional findings. 335 Although Raich's treatment of congressional findings is very deferential, the ongoing shift in the
Court's personnel may be accompanied by a shift in attitude. 336
As it stands, there are few areas that remain off limits
to federal regulation . Time will tell if the Court will reestablish some limitations and retreat from its
deference to Congress, or whether the federal government will forevermore be able to regulate
"quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States ." 337
The counterplan sets a precedent for decentralized state action in other areas that the
plan and perm block
Crick, Haase, and Bewley-Taylor 13(Emily Crick - Research Assistant, Global Drug Policy
Observatory, Heather J. Haase - Consultant, International Drug Policy Consortium/Harm Reduction
Coalition, Dave Bewley-Taylor - Director, Global Drug Policy Observatory, “Legally regulated cannabis
markets in the US: Implications and possibilities,” November,
http://konyvtar.eski.hu/tmpimg/378746103_0.pdf
Furthermore, the CSA calls on the federal government ‘to enter into contractual agreements… to
provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities .’151 This means that in theory the
federal government could come to agreements with the individual states on their cannabis regulation
policies, which may be exactly what the Department of Justice is seeking to do in issuing its guidance.
Indeed, some have argued that it would be preferable for them to do so rather than let the states
merely give up enforcing the federal prohibition on marijuana .152 It has also been argued that despite
the recent Department of Justice guidance there are no guarantees that state attorneys will cease to
prosecute those who work in the marijuana industry especially in the light of federal crackdowns on the
medical marijuana industry.153 In a recent hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Committee on the issue,
James M. Cole, US Deputy Attorney General (and author of the memorandum) attempted to put many
of these concerns to rest.154 Needless to say, the situation is evolving gradually and it remains to be
seen how this guidance is applied in practice. Moreover, these state-federal tensions must be
considered in a wider context , and it has been argued that allowing states to determine their own
cannabis policy may result in other states demanding further independence with regards to other
aspects of federal policy such as gun control, immigration and health care .155
US federalism’s modeled in Iraq
AP 8/22/14 – “Biden: US would help Iraq pursue federal system”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-us-would-help-iraq-pursue-federalsystem/2014/08/22/499e75c0-2a59-11e4-8b10-7db129976abb_story.html
WASHINGTON — Vice President Joe Biden
would decentralize power
says the U.S. is prepared to help Iraq pursue a federal system that
away from Baghdad. In an opinion piece in The Washington Post, Biden says
Iraq is making
progress in forming a new government. But he says sectarian divisions are fueling extremist movements
like the Islamic State. Biden says federalism is emerging as one approach to Iraq’s future. He’s alluding to a
plan he proposed in 2006 that would see Iraq divided into three semi-independent regions for Shiites, Sunnis
and Kurds. Biden says such a plan would keep Iraq united, protect local populations and ensure oil
revenues are shared fairly, while squeezing the Islamic State group.
He says the
U.S. would offer
training and other assistance to help that model of government succeed.
Decentralization prevents Iraqi civil conflict – federal institutions trigger the DA
Khalilzad 7/13/14 – Zalmay, Counselor at CSIS, served as US Ambassador to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
United Nations, “Get Ready for Kurdish Independence”
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/opinion/iraqs-urgent-need-for-unity.html?_r=0
WASHINGTON — In the coming weeks, Iraq’s
leaders must make existential decisions . If they cannot form a unity
government led by a new prime minister and motivate Sunni moderates and tribes to fight the I slamic S tate of I raq and
S yria, Iraq is likely to disintegrate . If the central government fails to grant satisfactory concessions to
Sunnis and Kurds, the Kurds will push for sovereignty and independence. The Kurds are serious, and the international
community must adapt to this emerging reality. While all Iraqi leaders bear responsibility for resolving the current crisis, the greatest share lies
with the country’s Shiite politicians, who dominate the central government. Shiite
parties must select a candidate for prime
minister who can share power, decentralize the government and depoliticize the security forces. As a
prerequisite for working with the central government, Kurdistan seeks the right to export its own oil;
integrate Kirkuk and other recently acquired areas; settle past budget issues and keep its own autonomous
finances; and maintain control of the region’s Peshmerga security forces, including acquiring weapons to defend
itself against ISIS. The Kurds aren’t confident that Baghdad will accept these demands and have initiated parallel
preparations for independence. Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish president, has asked the region’s parliament to establish an electoral commission
and set a date to conduct a referendum. Kurdistan’s arguments for sovereignty are reasonable. It is different than Arab
Iraq: it is more stable, more prosperous and more tolerant. Baghdad is unable to protect its people, and won’t be able to do so for the
foreseeable future. Close to one million Iraqis, including many Christians, have taken refuge there. In
the wake of ISIS advances,
Kurdistan now shares a 600-mile border with a terrorist entity that proclaims itself the new Islamic
Caliphate. In order to defend itself, the Kurds must be able to acquire their own arms and maintain security
relations with other nations. Baghdad has suspended budget payments to Kurdistan. To pay its bills,
Kurdistan must therefore sell its oil. For years, Iraq’s Shiite-led government has failed to treat Sunnis or
Kurds as equal partners . Many Sunnis now so profoundly oppose the government that they have
aligned themselves with a terrorist organization that even Al Qaeda considers extremist . The Sunnis
demand federalization and autonomy for their provinces , an end to de-Ba’athification, and the delegation of local
security to local forces. For their part, the Kurds were incorporated into Iraq against their will, and endured much of the 20th century under
repressive, often murderous, rule. In recent weeks, Kurdish leaders have launched a major diplomatic initiative, both regionally and
internationally, to promote their dual-track approach to independence. As Washington adapts to the new reality on the ground, it would do
well to adopt a similar two-pronged strategy: continue to help Iraq’s leaders forge a unity government, but prepare for the failure of those
efforts. Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, whose parliamentary bloc emerged victorious in the April 30 election, has no intention of giving up
power. The
major obstacle to the formation of a unity government is the vehement opposition of Sunni
Arabs, Kurds, and some Shiite parties to prolonging Mr. Maliki’s rule. Iraq’s senior Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, has also signaled his preference for change. As the American ambassador to Iraq, I worked directly with Mr. Maliki, and I know that
he will stubbornly resist attempts to replace him. If he ultimately agrees to step down, he will likely demand a guarantee that his successor be
chosen from among a small, trusted circle; he may also insist on a position elsewhere in the government. Absent
the formation of a
unity government, Iraq’s civil war will continue unabated . Sectarian conflict, and chaos in the Sunnis
areas, will grow — and so will ISIS . Shiites will become more reliant on sectarian militias, and on Iran .
This trajectory threatens America’s security . The U nited S tates must continue to work for a unity
government in Iraq, and extend limited assistance in the fight against ISIS. But it should also step up
relations with Kurdistan by deploying a team to assess Kurdistan’s needs and coordinate security
strategies to protect the region against ISIS . To help Kurdistan pay it bills, Washington should soften its opposition to direct
Kurdish oil sales while increasing humanitarian assistance for refugees and displaced persons there.
The coming weeks will be
decisive . The best-case scenario would be the establishment of a decentralized Iraq with a federal
system in the Arab-majority areas, operating in confederation with Kurdistan. The alternative is civil
war between Shiites and Sunnis, and the emergence of an independent Kurdistan.
Although Washington
shouldn’t abandon its efforts to help Iraq form a unity government yet, it must think seriously about realistic alternatives if Iraq falls apart.
Whatever happens, strengthening
ties with Kurdistan now will serve American interests down the road.
Spills over to the rest of the Middle East
Brooks 13 (David, New York Times, “Middle East sectarian strife biggest threat,”
http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/Middle-East-sectarian-strife-biggestthreat-4787199.php)
What's the biggest threat to world peace right now? Despite the horror, it's not chemical weapons in Syria. It's not even, for the
moment, an Iranian nuclear weapon. Instead, it's the possibility of a wave of sectarian strife building across the Middle
East. The Syrian civil conflict is both a proxy war and a combustion point for spreading waves of
violence. This didn't start out as a religious war. But both Sunni and Shiite power players are seizing on religious symbols and sowing sectarian passions that
are rippling across the region. The Saudi and Iranian powers hover in the background fueling each side. As the death toll
in Syria rises to Rwanda-like proportions, images of mass killings draw holy warriors from countries near and far. The radical groups are the most effective fighters
and control the tempo of events. The Syrian opposition groups are themselves split violently along sectarian lines so that the country seems to face a choice
between anarchy and atrocity. Meanwhile, the
strife appears to be spreading. Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq is spiking
upward. Reports in The New York Times and elsewhere have said that many Iraqis fear their country is sliding back to the worst
of the chaos experienced in the past decade. Even Turkey, Pakistan, Bahrain and Kuwait could be
infected. “It could become a regional religious war similar to that witnessed in Iraq 2006-2008, but far
wider and without the moderating influence of American forces,” wrote Gary Grappo, a retired senior
Foreign Service officer with long experience in the region. “It has become clear over the last year that the upheavals in the Islamic and Arab world have
become a clash within a civilization rather than a clash between civilizations,” Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote
recently. “The Sunni versus Alawite civil war in Syria is increasingly interacting with the Sunni versus Shiite tensions in the Gulf that are edging Iraq back towards civil
war. They also interact with the Sunni-Shiite, Maronite and other confessional struggles in Lebanon.” Some experts even say that we
are seeing the
emergence of a single big conflict that could be part of a generation-long devolution , which could end
up toppling regimes and redrawing the national borders that were established after World War I. The forces ripping
people into polarized groups seem stronger than the forces bringing them together.
Nuclear war
James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring)
“Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI,
Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that
can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into
relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent
relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States
that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect
that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United
States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants.
These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose
or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine
scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use
of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow
magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic
asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen
quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own
and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously,
and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples
of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world .
fed
Oil spills are inevitable in Alaska – that will result in environmental calamity without
an effective response
Cramer 3/20/14 – Virginia, Senior Press Secretary at Sierra Club, “Alaskans Highlight Lessons Learned,
Continuing Risks” http://content.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2014/03/exxon-valdez-25-years-later-0
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Alaskan community
members, along with oil spill, climate and offshore drilling
experts, gathered today in Washington, D.C. to mark the 25th anniversary of the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster. On
March 24, 1989, the Exxon tanker spilled more than 11 million gallons of oil into Alaska’s Prince William Sound, coating 1,300 miles of shoreline
– about the length of California’s coast. Twenty-five years
later the environment and the local economy have still
not recovered , and plans for new offshore drilling in the dangerous Arctic waters show that few lessons have
been learned.
“Our wild fishing way of life collapsed overnight. Herring
and wild salmon runs disappeared and have
never fully recovered . The herring fishery was 50% of our annual income and provided food and jobs for our families. So, what have
we learned in the last 25 years? I know that no matter where
an oil spill happens, industry and government can't
clean it up, no matter what they say or try to make the public believe. I also learned that preservation is the key to restoration of any kind,
whether it is endangered habitat, culture or Native languages,” said Eyak Native Dune Lankard, a commercial and subsistence fisherman. The
oil spill took a devastating toll on wildlife , from shorebirds and the nearly $300 million herring fishery. More than half
of the wildlife populations, habitats, and resource services injured in the spill have yet to be considered “recovered”
by the government. Many animal populations are considered “not recovering” today, including herring and the AT1
pod of orca whales, which is expected to go extinct. The disaster illustrated the difficulty of cleaning up an oil spill in Arctic conditions, and
forebodes future offshore drilling disasters where the risk of oil spills is inevitable . Despite this, plans
continue to move forward to drill in the Arctic Ocean. “Shell Oil’s 2012-2013 Arctic program was a disaster, its mishaps
culminating with its drilling rig running aground near Kodiak Island, Alaska. It was forced to abandon its plans to drill this summer because of its
own lack of preparedness and technical failures. Shell
has only proven that no oil company is ready to drill in the
Arctic’s harsh and unpredictable climate,” said Cindy Shogan, Executive Director, Alaska Wilderness League. “The take-home
lesson from Exxon Valdez is this: if we genuinely care about a coastal or marine area, such as the Arctic Ocean or Bristol Bay, we should not
expose it to the dangerous risks of oil development. Even
with the best safeguards possible, spills will undoubtedly occur .
And when they do, they can’t be cleaned up; they can cause long-term, even permanent, ecological injury; human communities can be
devastated; and restoration is impossible. This would be particularly true of a major spill in ice-covered waters of the Arctic Ocean,” said Rick
Steiner, a professor and international oil spill expert involved with the Exxon Valdez oil spill clean-up and restoration.
Cooperative federalism undercuts effective responses to oil spills – multi-layered
confusion
Leckrone 11 – J. Wesley, Associate Professor of Political Science at Widener University, “Federalism
and the Gulf Oil Spill” http://theamericanpartnership.com/2011/04/20/federalism-and-the-gulf-oil-spill/
Disasters always seem to highlight some of the difficulties inherent in our noncentralized form of American
federalism. As we commemorate the first anniversary of the disaster on the Deepwater Horizon, I thought it
might be important to revisit some of the federalism issues that affected the response to the Gulf oil spill. The
major issues revolved around lack of familiarity with oil spill policy jurisdiction, differing government
objectives in the aftermath of the blowout, and political positioning. Federalism, Planning , the Unified Command
and The Clean-up One major intergovernmental controversy involved control over the clean up in the immediate
aftermath of the blowout. State and local officials argued that the lines of authority were blurred between
the BP response team and the Coast Guard. Local officials felt the system was too top heavy, resulting in
sluggish response times to requests and the impression that no one was in charge. Both state and local
officials claimed that the response should operate under the assumption of spend first and argue over
reimbursement later. Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco gave voice to this sentiment when she declared that states should “act and
send them the bill and fight over it later”. Part of the problem was that state and local officials were more accustomed to
operating under the federal legislation responding to natural disasters such as hurricanes than regulations
dealing with off-shore oil spills. Gulf state officials are used to operating under the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act
which covers natural disasters such as hurricanes. Under this federal legislation governors request help from the federal government but the
states retain primary control over the effort with FEMA assisting them. The
Gulf Oil Spill was covered by the National
Contingency Plan (NCP) which gives the federal government the primary responsibility for responding to
the crisis. Under this legislation the federal On-Scene Coordinator acts as the primary partner with states in a
Unified Command structure. State and local governments cannot spend funds without the authorization from
the On-Scene Coordinator . As a consequence there was a lot of conflict between governments because
of an unfamiliarity with the NCP . Throughout the process there was very little role for local governments
who felt they were being kept out of the decision making process. Economic Development vs. Long-term
Environmental Clean-up The second conflict resulted from the tension between the economic development
priorities of some Gulf states and the federal government’s focus on the long-term environmental
consequences of the disaster. State governments, particularly Louisiana, were interested in quick action to protect
their economies based on tourism, fishing and the oil industry (13.4% of Louisiana’s employment is oil-related). In a post-Katrina environment
their attitude was do something first and worry about the consequences later. Conversely, the federal
government was concerned that quick solutions might exacerbate the long-term environmental
consequences of the oil spill. Needless to say, the conflict over economics also extended to the federal government’s moratorium on
offshore drilling in the Gulf which state and local governments claimed would lead to job losses for their constituencies. There was
particular conflict over Louisiana’s plan to build sand berms and rock barriers to prevent oil from
reaching its shores. On the one hand the state viewed their construction as a job creation tool. However,
they sought to use the oil spill as a reason to begin construction of permanent berms and barriers
which were part of the state’s long-term plans to address coastal restoration. For policy wonks this was a classic
example of Kingdon’s policy streams where an existing solution (berms) is attached to a focusing event (oil spill) to achieve political objectives.
The federal government was less sanguine concerning the construction of the berms which led to
political struggle between the levels of government.
Federalism and Politics Finally, good old-fashioned political posturing
accounted for some of the conflict between governors and the federal government. Bobby Jindal was elected governor in post-Katrina
Louisiana partly on his claim that he had the background to competently address natural disasters. His assertiveness on behalf of the state was
an achievement heading into his 2011 reelection campaign. It should also be noted that all five Gulf states had Republican governors (Jindal,
Charlie Crist – Florida, Haley Barbour – Mississippi, Bob Riley – Alabama, Rick Perry – Texas) who had no incentive to make the Obama
administration look good, particularly since three of them (Barbour, Crist and Jindal) were potential presidential candidates at the time. Models
of Federalism The
intergovernmental problems related to the Gulf spill were in many ways the result of
conflicting jurisdictional priorities that are endemic to our federal system . State and local governments,
responsive to their electoral constituencies, were focused on ensuring the economic livelihoods of their
citizens. Federal officials were responding to a national emergency and were focused on the longterm consequences of their actions as opposed to their immediate impact . In the final analysis the response to
the Gulf Oil Spill could be considered an example of cooperative federalism from the vantage point of
the Obama Administration while state and local governments perceived it as top-heavy coercive
federalism.
Extinction
Ford, Inuit Circumpolar Conference vice president, 2003
(Violet, “Global Environmental Change: An Inuit Reality”, 10-15,
http://www.mcgill.ca/files/cine/Ford.pdf)
The Arctic ecosystem is a fundamental contributor to global processes and the balance of life on earth. Both the
unique physical and biological characteristics of the Arctic ecosystem play key roles in maintaining the integrity of the global
environment. Massive ice sheets and ice cover regulate the global temperatures by reflecting much of the solar radiation back into
space, the Arctic ocean influences global ocean currents which are responsible for a variety of weather conditions and events, to name but two. The Arctic is also
the recipient of the by-products of southern-based industry and agricultural practices. In February 2003, UNEP’s Governing Council passed a
resolution
effectively recognizes the Arctic as a “barometer” or indicator region of the globe’s environmental
health. This is important and is further reason why Arctic indigenous peoples should work together at the international level. Late last year ICC and RAIPON
participated in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council meeting in Beijing, China with the aim of sensitizing this organization to the Arctic dimension of global
environmental issues. I understand that the GEF is now willing to consider indigenous peoples and their organizations to be distinct and separate from
environmental and other NGO’s.
Cooperative federalism allows the EPA to asymmetrically dominate the states through
the Clean Air Act – undercuts U.S. competitiveness and job growth
US Senate 13 – U.S. Senate Minority Report, “United States Senate Committee on Environment &
Public Works – Minority Report”
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=6ceef5b2-07ef4f68-8938-d947f409019d
Regrettably, the
current EPA regularly circumvents the States in implementation and enforcement of the
Clean Air Act . As explained in a recent letter signed by 17 State Attorneys General and the environmental official of an 18th State, there
is a “serious, ongoing problem in environmental regulation: the tendency of the EPA to seek to
expand the scope of its jurisdiction at the cost of relegating the role of the States to merely
implementing whatever Washington prescribes , regardless of its wisdom, cost, or efficiency in light of local
circumstances.”33 There
is a growing concern that EPA, instead of cooperating with the States as equal and
valued partners , is coopting and coercing the States by treating them as mere regional offices of a
massive federal environmental bureaucracy . Cooperative federalism is treated as an obstacle to be
overcome, rather than a principle which guides and informs. This trend, if left uncorrected, threatens to undermine the
cooperative strategy that has helped to ensure the CAA’s success and garnered it broad public support. It also
threatens to undermine job growth and America’s global economic competitiveness.
Causes blackouts – raises electricity costs and undercuts grid reliability
Harder 7/30/14 – Amy, reports on Energy Policy for The Wall Street Journal’s Washington, D.C.,
bureau, “Energy Regulators Say EPA's Climate Rule Poses Grid Challenges”
http://online.wsj.com/articles/energy-regulators-say-epas-climate-rule-poses-grid-challenges1406659902
WASHINGTON—President Barack Obama's proposed rule
to curb carbon emissions from the nation's power plants
could raise costs and affect reliability in the U.S. electricity system, federal regulators told Congress.
But the commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the government agency charged with overseeing the electric grid and
other parts of the nation's energy infrastructure, also said at a House hearing that the government has a responsibility to act on climate change.
As part of Mr. Obama's climate agenda, the
E nvironmental P rotection A gency is proposing to cut carbon emissions from
the electricity sector by 30% by 2030 based on emissions levels in 2005. States are expected to comply with the rule by using
cleaner, though potentially more expensive, energy. Utility companies are already shifting away from coal because of
the natural-gas boom and other environmental regulations. The rule is expected to accelerate the trend , which
could put pressure on a grid that has been dominated by coal-fired plants. "I think all transitions cost
money , so a transition to a new resource mix because of the environment or some other reason—the long-term
costs are unknown and depend on the relative cost of the fuel," said Acting FERC Chairman Cheryl
LaFleur, a Democrat first nominated by Mr. Obama in 2010. Tony Clark, a Republican commissioner, pointed to the extreme
cold weather seen in many parts of the country last winter—known as a polar vortex—to say FERC must
ensure that the high electricity costs and close calls with rolling blackouts that have occurred in the
Northeast " aren't exported to other regions of the country."
Extinction
Marlo Lewis, Senior Fellow Competitive Enterprise Institute, 6/25/2008, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming,
http://cei.org/cei_files/fm/active/0/Statement%2520of%2520Marlo%2520Lewis.pdf
Notice what they leave out. The report does not consider whether climate
change policy could adversely affect the U.S.
industrial base, the combat readiness of U.S. armed forces, global food and energy supplies, or
international stability . Nor does it advise DOD to assess these risks in future studies. So let’s consider some of the geopolitical risks
global warming policies may create. “Money,” an old adage declares, “is the sinews of war.” If we learned anything from the Cold
War, it is that economic power is the foundation of military power . The Soviet Union imploded because it
lacked the economic base to support its military and geopolitical empire. U.S. economic might was
critical to winning the Cold War—as it was to winning World War I and World War II. At the risk of belaboring the
obvious, there is always in democratic politics a tradeoff between guns and butter. It is harder in tough economic times than in prosperous
times to raise the funds required to recruit, train, and equip the armed forces. It is harder to sustain public support for military interventions
abroad when unemployment and malaise are rising on the home front. So to the extent that climate
policies pose a risk to U.S.
economic growth, they also pose a risk to U.S. military strength and defense preparedness. In this light, let’s
consider the Lieberman-Warner bill, which would require a 70-percent reduction in U.S. carbon dioxide emissions by 2050. CEI commissioned
University of Guelph economist Dr. Ross McKitrick to assess both the economic impacts of the Lieberman-Warner bill and the Energy
Information Administration’s analysis of the bill. The EIA estimates that up to 1 million manufacturing jobs could by lost by 2030.8 However,
this is likely an underestimate, because the EIA’s reference case assumes rates of population growth, emissions growth, and income growth
that are significantly lower than the long-term rates over the past 45 years.9 In his forthcoming paper, Dr. McKitrick explains that a society’s
total emissions are a product of three factors: population, per capita GDP, and the carbon intensity of production. To reduce aggregate
emissions, it is necessary to reduce one or more of those three factors. And there’s the rub. Population is growing at +1.1 percent per year.
There is not much Congress can do about that. Real income is growing at about +2.2 percent per year, and presumably Congress wants that to
continue. So to reduce emissions 70 percent by 2050, the other factor— emissions intensity—must decline by the following approximate
amounts: • 4.4% per year on average between 2006 and 2012 • 5.2% per year on average between 2006 and 2030 • 6.2% per year on average
between 2006 and 2050 Dr. McKitrick comments: “There is no historical precedent for such rapid reductions in carbon dioxide intensity.”
Indeed, the historic rate of emissions intensity decline over the past 45 years is 1.6 percent per year. If these somewhat miraculous reductions
in carbon intensity do not occur, then the
only way to reach the 70-percent emission reduction target will be through
big increases in energy prices leading to big declines in economic growth . This is a recipe for
stagflation and worse . In another paper CEI has commissioned, Dr. McKitrick shows what happens to per capita GDP under several
climate bills if population growth and emission intensity decline continue at their historic rates. Instead of per capita GDP more than
doubling between 2005 and 2060, it falls by half or more. The American dream becomes the American nightmare. Does it
have to happen that way? No. Technology breakthroughs that dramatically lower the cost of cutting emissions may occur. But it is in the nature
of breakthroughs that they are difficult to plan or even predict. Thus, under these emission reduction mandates,
there is a
significant risk of severe economic damage. So again let me state the obvious: An economically weakened
America would be less able to sustain its defense commitments, keep the peace, and remain
vigorously engaged in the world. The top agenda item of many global warming activists today is stopping the
construction of new coal-fired power plants. No new coal power plants should be built, we are told, unless
they are equipped with carbon capture and sequestration. But it could take a decade to determine whether carbon
capture and storage is economical under a range of emission reduction scenarios, years to develop the regulatory framework for a carbon
capture system, years to overcome NIMBY opposition, and a decade to build the infrastructure on an industrial scale.10 In
the
meantime, U.S. electricity demand is growing, and coal is the fuel of choice in many markets. The EIA
forecasts that between 2007 and 2030, coal will provide 67 percent of all new electric generation in the United States, and new coal generation
Moratoria that effectively ban new coal -based power
could create a severe supply-demand imbalance. This would not only inflate electricity and natural gas
costs (demand for coal would be diverted to natural gas as an electricity fuel), it would also jeopardize electric supply
reliability. Indeed, some parts of the country may experience chronic energy crises characterized by
will constitute 15 percent of all U.S. electric power in 2030.11
repeated power failures and blackouts. From a national security standpoint, this poses two main risks. One is that America
will increasingly resemble a Third World country where nothing works very well. We will lose our
international prestige and ability to lead by example . The other risk is that terrorists will view America’s
over-stretched, failure-prone electricity grid as a tempting target . They may calculate: If America’s electric
supply system is tottering on the edge , why not give it a few helpful shoves? The anti-coal campaign is, of course, not limited to
the United States. Global warming activists seek to ban new coal-fired power plants not only here but also in China, India, and other developing
countries. This is essential to their agenda, and for a very simple reason. The emissions from new coal plants here and elsewhere will swamp all
of the emission reductions that Europe, Japan, and Canada might, in theory, achieve under the U.N. global warming treaty, the Kyoto
Protocol.12 Either the global warming movement kills coal, or coal will bury Kyoto. The
campaign to ban new coal worldwide raises
additional national security concerns. First, how would a global moratorium on new coal plants be enforced, and by whom?
Presumably this would be accomplished, initially, via trade sanctions. Already European and U.S. leaders are calling for carbon tariffs to penalize
goods from countries like China and India that refuse to limit their emissions.13 Warning:
Trade wars are not always resolved
peacefully ! In any event, if the United States vigorously presses for a ban on new coal plants around the world, it will
continually butt heads with China, India, and many other developing countries. We often hear that the world
must reduce global emissions 50 percent by 2050 to avert the more dangerous effects of global warming. Those who say this may not realize
the kind of sacrifice they are asking developing countries to make. Almost all the growth in emissions over the next few decades is expected to
occur in developing countries. Analysis by the Department of Energy shows that even if the industrialized countries somehow go cold turkey by
2050 and achieve zero net emissions, developing countries would still have to cut their emissions 57 percent below baseline projections to
reduce global emissions 50 percent below 2005 levels. The “energy source” is wood chopped from the forest. The “energy transmission”
system is the backs of women and girls, hauling the wood a U.N.-estimated average of 3 miles each day. The “energy use” system is burning the
wood in an open fire indoors for heat and light. These villagers breathe indoor air that is much dirtier than outdoor air in the world’s most
polluted cities. Respiratory disease among this large segment of humanity is rampant and kills more than a million people a year, most of them
women and children. Reliance on traditional biomass also takes a heavy toll on forests and wildlife habitat. A coal-fired power plant would
improve the lives of those villagers in Kenya in many ways. Women would be freed from backbreaking toil and could pursue more fulfilling
activities. People would be healthier because indoor air quality would improve. Refrigeration would make food preparation easier and safer.
Electric lighting would allow people to read and study at night. Computers and Internet access would follow. The beautiful forests and the
species dependent on them would be saved. Denying these people—and millions of others like them—access to
would be a humanitarian disaster . Some might even call it
coal-based power
a crime against humanity . Trapping people in
energy poverty will very likely make them hungry, desperate, and angry. The potential for conflict within
and among countries under a global ban on coal-based power may be quite large. Schwartz and Randall warn that abrupt climate
change would cause food shortages and destabilize governments. Well, during the past six months food riots have broken out
in more than 30 countries, and in at least one case—Haiti—rioters brought down the government.15 Big jumps in the price of
staples—corn, wheat, and rice—are pushing millions of people below the absolute poverty line.16 Today’s food
price inflation has several causes including a weak dollar, high oil prices, drought, and surging demand in India and China. But one factor fueling
this crisis is a global warming policy—government subsidies and mandates for corn ethanol production.17 Biofuels provide only about 1.5
percent of total motor fuel liquids, yet they accounted for almost half the increase in global consumption of major food crops in 2006-07,
according to the World Bank.18 More aggressive efforts to replace petroleum with biofuels could literally starve the hungry, creating chaos and
conflict. Schwartz and Randall warn that abrupt climate change will create millions of environmental refugees fleeing across borders to escape
from hunger and water shortages. Millions of illegal migrants already cross the U.S. southern border from Mexico. Poor Mexicans obtain 40
percent of their daily calories from tortillas, and the U.S. ethanol program, by inflating the price of corn, contributed to a “tortilla crisis” in
Mexico.19 Burning food in gas tanks exacerbates the poverty that is a root cause of illegal migration. Expect an increase in ‘biofuel refugees’ as
the mandates ramp up. Schwartz and Randall warn that abrupt climate change, by intensifying winter storms and expanding sea ice, could
reduce the availability of gas and oil, leading to conflict over dwindling resources. Well, this implies that non-abrupt climate change, which is far
more likely, could make gas and oil more available by opening up the long-sought Northwest Passage.20 More importantly, since Kyoto-
style policies aim to restrict access to fossil fuels, they too have the potential to engender conflicts over energy . Capand-trade programs force participants to compete over slices of a shrinking pie. That is how cap-and-trade is
supposed to work. When it doesn’t work that way—as in phase one of the European Emissions Trading System—it is because companies and/or
governments are cheating.21
Turn – cooperative federalism guts effective disaster relief – It blurs lines of
responsibility, causing collective action problems
Schneider, Professor in the Department of Political Science at Michigan State
University, 8 (Saundra, “Who's to Blame? (Mis) perceptions of the Intergovernmental Response to
Disasters,” Publius (2008) 38 (4): 715-738, oxford journals, accessed 9-20-14, CMM)
Basic Assumptions of the Intergovernmental Response System The
intergovernmental response system for natural disasters
involves a very complicated, widespread structure. The viability of this structure is based upon several
crucial assumptions about the nature of disaster situations and the responsibilities of governmental
organizations and personnel within the entire framework. The first and most fundamental assumption
is that disaster preparation and response is best handled at the local level (Bea 2005a; Col 2006; Federal Emergency
Management Agency 2008c). City and county officials are uniquely positioned to anticipate and meet the needs of their constituents; they should only look
elsewhere when disaster-related events exceed their capabilities. Of course, it is anticipated that some situations will require the involvement of state and national
governments. But, the scope of the disaster clearly should exceed the capacities of lower governmental units before requests for additional assistance move up to
the next level of government (Schneider 1995; U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004; Federal Emergency Management Agency 2008c). The response should
start at the national level only when a catastrophic event arises or is likely to occur. Such extreme situations do not happen frequently. Hence, the federal
government should not take the leading role in most disaster responses. A
second crucial assumption is that all three levels of
government are supposed to participate as partners, rather than as superiors and subordinates, in the
nation's emergency preparedness and response system (Carson and MacManus 2006; Scavo, Kearney, and Kilroy, 2007). No
single level of government should dominate or control the entire process (Schneider 1995). Even when the state and
national governments become involved in a disaster situation, they do not supersede or overpower the actions of lower levels. Instead, all three levels of
government should work together to provide emergency relief and assistance to disaster-stricken
citizens. Thus, the effectiveness of the entire response depends heavily upon intergovernmental
communication and cooperation (Comfort 2007). Third, all governmental units must take seriously their emergency management functions and
obligations. This means that each level of government must possess the administrative and technical resources necessary to perform its own disaster relief
responsibilities (Schneider 2005). Local, state, and federal officials must set aside funds for disaster-relief purposes; they must hire appropriate staff to develop and
administer plans; they must possess the requisite equipment and technical expertise to handle emergency situations; and they must have effective leadership to
implement disaster relief policies (Lester and Krejci 2007). Lower levels of government can usually obtain some assistance from higher levels. But, all three levels of
government must still maintain a fairly high level of administrative capability and expertise of their own. The
final, and perhaps most critical ,
assumption is that the public officials who are directly involved in the process must understand the
structure and operation of the governmental response system during all kinds of emergency
situations. For the vast majority of disasters, the entire process should operate according to the “pull” system introduced earlier. Local emergency
management officials are to provide the first response. State personnel are to stand by, so that they can organize and manage broader state-level resources if they
are called upon to do so. And, federal officials should view their general role as supplemental and supportive, assisting the efforts of lower governmental units. If
federal resources are requested (i.e., officials “pull” the assistance from the national government), state and local governments continue to play a pivotal role in the
process: they identify the needs of disaster-stricken communities and articulate those needs to federal officials (Townsend 2006). The
system also
assumes that public officials understand their responsibilities during Incidents of National Significance .
During such extreme, rare situations, the federal government does not wait for a state-level request. Instead, it takes on a proactive, leadership role, and it “pushes”
its resources and aid into the affected areas. Even during these circumstances, however, local and state officials are not left out of the process. They continue
interacting with federal entities to insure timely and effective emergency relief (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004). In sum, all relief officials must be
knowledgeable about their own roles and responsibilities; they must be aware how their actions relate to others who are involved in the emergency management
process; and they must understand what they are supposed to do during both “typical” disasters and more extreme Incidents of National Significance. Previous
Section Next Section The Disaster Response System in Practice We have just seen how the intergovernmental response to disasters is supposed to function. At least
on paper, there exists a well-coordinated, integrated management system that can handle each and
every emergency, no matter when or where it occurs. However, the governmental response does not always unfold so
smoothly or effectively. Some disasters generate unusually severe, disruptive, and complicated
conditions. During such circumstances, emergency management personnel and agencies are unable or
unwilling to perform their pre-assigned responsibilities and duties. As a result, public officials at the local,
state, and national levels fail to react in appropriate ways, and the entire response is slow,
haphazard, and misguided . Unfortunately, this is precisely what happened during the intergovernmental
response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana during the summer of 2005. Katrina in Louisiana: Intergovernmental Misunderstandings The traditional
bottom-up response process was already underway before Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast. Local officials advised residents to evacuate and they set up shelters
to facilitate this process. At the state level, Governor Kathleen Blanco declared a state of emergency and mobilized relevant assets. Responding to state needs, the
federal government was also involved before the storm hit. FEMA called a “full alert” and sent emergency supplies into areas that lay in the predicted storm path.
At the request of Governor Blanco, President George W. Bush issued an emergency declaration on August 27 and then declared a federal state of emergency in
Louisiana on August 29 (the morning before the storm hit the Louisiana Coast). At this early stage, public officials across all three levels of government seemed to
have a fairly clear understanding of their roles in the process and how they were supposed to perform their emergency management functions. But,
the
bottom-up process collapsed almost immediately. Everyone involved in the response appeared to be
stunned by the severity of the situation. The worst conditions developed at the local level, particularly in the city of New Orleans (Forman
2007). The city's emergency management plan was not implemented, and many personnel were so overwhelmed that they could not fulfill their obligations as first
responders (Baum 2006; Horne 2006). This
made it impossible for the process to begin at the local level and flow
upward through the intergovernmental framework. At the next level, state emergency management
officials did not stabilize local conditions or mobilize additional resources in an effective manner (Treaster
2005). Governor Blanco refused to declare martial law, and she declined a proposal from the White House to put National Groups troops under the control of the
federal government (Luo 2005; Shane, Lipton, and Drew 2005). The media described the governor as “shell-shocked” and “bewildered;” federal officials
characterized her as “dysfunctional;” and local leaders expressed little confidence in her abilities (Nossiter 2007). Other state personnel exhibited similar behavior
and did not act quickly or forcefully to implement key emergency response and recovery operations (van Heerden and Bryan 2006). For example, the Louisiana
National Guard was unable to stabilize local conditions even when they were deployed into the most devastated locations (Anatomy of a Disaster 2005). Afraid of
the growing crowds of stranded people, the troops actually retreated from the area, saying that they were not there to restore “law and order” (Roig-Franzia and
Hsu 2005; Brinkley 2006). Overall, key state officials did not seem to understand their emergency management roles and responsibilities. The situation was not any
better at the national level. DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff delayed declaring Katrina an Incident of National Significance until the day after Katrina made landfall.
As a result, the normal “pull” system of intergovernmental relief had already been initiated by that point. So, federal officials assumed the normal stance of waiting
for requests (i.e., the pull) from lower level governments before they responded. Unfortunately, lower
level officials were already
overwhelmed in their efforts to deal with the disaster. The traditional “bottom-up” response process
simply did not fit this situation. Some federal officials in the field immediately realized the severity of the situation and the need for a more
proactive stance by the national government and took it upon themselves to initiate a top-down, push system as quickly as possible. But, this required working
outside the normal channels (U.S. House of Representatives 2006). Consequently, federal aid was further delayed and only implemented in an ad hoc,
uncoordinated manner (Cooper and Block 2006; Brinkley 2006). Other federal-level
decisions and actions also occurred far too
slowly. Secretary Chertoff convened an interagency incident management team (IIMG)—an important component of the national response plan—on Tuesday,
August 30, almost 36 hours after Katrina hit the Louisiana coast. But, the IIMG is supposed to be created immediately when (or even before) an incident of national
significance occurs. By delaying more than a day, the federal government missed an important opportunity to pre-deploy emergency response teams and mobilize
federal resources into the area before the storm hit. As the Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina states, “we will never know what the IMMG would have done” if it had been created at an earlier point (U.S. House of Representatives 2006, 134).
But, it is possible that it would have accelerated federal involvement, created better plans to evacuate the stranded residents from the Superdome and Convention
Centers, and led to more effective search and rescue operations. There
was also a great deal of confusion about who was
actually in charge of the federal response. Secretary Chertoff appointed FEMA Director Michael Brown as the PFO in charge of the
governmental effort. As the PFO, Brown was to coordinate the overall management of federal activities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004). But, he did
not have the legal authority to direct the activities of other federal agencies or commit the expenditure of federal funds for this disaster. Instead, those powers fell
to another federal official—William Lokey who had been appointed as the FCO for the Louisiana disaster.2 This meant that, during the initial critical days of the
response, there was no single, unified command structure for governmental operations (U.S. House of Representatives 2006). Two weeks later, Coast Guard
Admiral Thad Allen was appointed as both PFO and FCO. At that point, leadership was consolidated and the lines of authority were clarified. But, the long delay in
taking this key step exacerbated the already chaotic situation. It prevented the federal government from organizing its own resources and coordinating its
operations with those of state and local emergency management agencies. In sum, it “degraded” the relief effort in serious ways (U.S. House of Representatives
2006). It
is clear that officials across all levels of government misunderstood key elements of their
responsibilities during the response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana. At the local level, parish and city officials
expected the national government to step in and take charge of the situation (Brinkley 2006). As Representative
Charles W. Boustany Jr. (R-LA) stated, “we needed direct federal assistance, command and control, and security—none of the three were present” (White and
Whoriskey 2005, A01). At
the state level, Governor Blanco made broad decisions but apparently did not
understand that additional actions were necessary to implement them. For example, she requested federal
aid but did not identify the specific types of assistance that were needed (Brinkley 2006). Similarly, the governor
identified resources that would be useful for relief activities (e.g., school buses), but she did not issue
executive orders to move them into the stricken areas (U.S. House of Representatives 2006). The most serious
misunderstandings occurred at the federal level (Derthick 2007). Part of the problem was due to the new elements of the national
response plan, adopted in 2004. Katrina was the first declared incident of national significance. The federal government had not yet developed policies and
guidelines to implement the process. Therefore, officials
were operating in uncharted territory during Katrina; they simply did
not know what they were supposed to do. This uncertainty about responsibilities permeated the
entire system (U.S. House of Representatives 2006). Adding to the confusion, many federal officials continued to act
as if the bottom-up system were still in place—even after it was superseded by the push process for
an incident of national significance (van Heerden and Bryan 2006). All in all, the federal government did not seem
to understand its role in the response process. It did not take proactive steps to help residents and
communities prepare for the impending hurricane; it did not act immediately to provide emergency
assistance to disaster victims; and it did not mobilize the operations of other public or private disaster
assistance organizations. President Bush and Secretary Chertoff did try to jump-start the response by appointing a new director of FEMA, creating a
White House Task Force on Hurricane Katrina Response to review governmental actions, and implementing an incident management system. FEMA also modified its
policies and procedures to expedite the delivery of emergency aid and to facilitate the recovery efforts (Blumenthal 2006; Eaton 2007). But, many of these decisions
were not made in a timely or consistent manner.3 When actions were taken, they often bypassed existing policies and procedures. This created greater confusion
and further disruptions in the government's relief operations (U.S. House of Representatives 2006). Stated simply, the
intergovernmental
response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana did not match the premises upon which the system was
developed. Given the severity of this situation, it was impossible to follow the traditional bottom-up response process. Local, state, and
national governments were not equipped to perform their pre-assigned functions, and they were
unable to work with one another in a coordinated or collaborative manner. More importantly, perhaps, those
who were involved in the process did not understand their own responsibilities or how the entire
system was supposed to operate. These misperceptions and misunderstandings played a major role in
the collapse of the government's relief efforts. They also contributed to an atmosphere of criticism and recrimination within the
intergovernmental framework. Public officials at one level of government blamed those at the other levels for not responding quickly or effectively. An
intergovernmental game of blame developed (ABC News 2005; Barr 2005; “Fire Every FEMA Official!” 2005; Walters and Kettl 2005). No
one seemed
willing to assume responsibility for what was happening or to take steps to rectify the situation. In turn,
this contributed to the general impression of governmental incompetence, nonresponsiveness,
ineptitude, and failure.
Coop federalism can’t solve warming
Lewis 9/18/13 – Marlo, Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, writing on global
warming, energy policy, and public policy issues, Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, “Rep.
Pompeo Questions EPA Administrator McCarthy on Obama Climate Plan”
http://www.globalwarming.org/2013/09/18/rep-pompeo-questions-epa-administrator-mccarthy-onobama-climate-plan/
Through persistent questioning, Pompeo spotlighted a key fact well-known to the climate cognoscenti but not to the general public. Even
assuming climate change is as bad as the global warming movement says it is, the
administration’s policies will have no
discernible effect on climate change and produce no identifiable benefit to public health and
welfare. The real objective of the administration’s current and proposed g reen h ouse g as regulations is not to
protect the public but to influence “the international community,” particularly China, India, and other developing
nations. Developing country emissions are growing so rapidly that no combination of U.S. domestic
actions — not even a magical carbon tax that eliminates all U.S. carbon dioxide emissions — would detectably affect global
temperatures . The administration’s underlying theory, apparently, is that if the U.S. sets a good example, others
will follow suit. But that’s been the thinking behind international climate negotiations from day one,
and so far it hasn’t panned out . China and India feel no obligation to limit their emissions (and,
consequently, economic growth) just because Western nations are willing to shoot themselves in the
foot. My unofficial transcript of the exchange between Pompeo and McCarthy follows: Pompeo: Ms. McCarthy I want to ask a couple of
questions of you. So one of the objectives today is to identify the greenhouse gas regulations that already existed and those in the future —
how they actually impact the climate change, right? So you’d agree we want to have a successful climate policy as a result of those sets of rules
and regulations that you promulgate? Fair base line statement? McCarthy: In the context of a larger international effort, yes. Pompeo: You bet.
And on your Web site you have 26 indicators used for tracking climate change. They identify various impacts of climate change. So you would
believe that the purpose of these rules is to impact those 26 indicators, right? So you put a good greenhouse gas regulation in place, you’ll get a
good outcome on at least some or all of those 26 indicators. McCarthy: I actually . . . I think that the better way to think about it, if I might, is
that it is part of an overall strategy that is positioning the U.S. for leadership in an international discussion. Because climate change requires a
global effort. So this is one piece and it’s one step. But I think it’s a significant one to show thecommitment of the United States. Pompeo: Do
you think it would be reasonable to take the regulations you promulgated and link them to those 26 indicators that you have on your Web site?
That this is how they impacted us? McCarthy: It
is unlikely that any specific one step is going to be seen as having a
visible impact on any of those impacts — a visible change in any of those impacts. What I’m suggesting is that climate
change [policy] has to be a broader array of actions that the U.S. and other folks in the international
community take that make significant effort towards reducing greenhouse gases and mitigating the impacts of climate change. Pompeo:
But these are your indicators, Ms. McCarthy. So . . . McCarthy: They are indicators of climate change, they are not directly applicable to
performance impacts of any one action. Pompeo: How about the cumulative impact of your actions? Certainly you’re acting in a way . . . you
say these are indicators of climate change. Certainly it can’t be the case that your testimony today is that your cumulative impact of the current
set of regulations and those you’re proposing isn’t going to have any impact at all on any of those indicators? McCarthy: I think the President
was very clear. What we’re attempting to do is put together a comprehensive climate plan, across the administration, that positions the U.S. for
leadership on this issue and that will prompt and leverage international discussions and action. Pompeo: So you’re putting regulations in place
for the purpose of leadership but not to impact the indicators that you, the EPA, says are the indicators of climate change? I’m puzzled by that.
McCarthy: Congressman we work within the authority that Congress gave us to do what we can. But all I’m pointing out is that much more
needs to be done and it needs to be looked at in that larger context. Pompeo: In 2010 with NHTSA [National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration], in your opening statement you said you’ve gotten rid of about 6 billion metric tons [of greenhouse gases]. One of your
indicators, for example, is heat-related deaths. How many heat-related deaths have been eliminated as a result of the 2010 NHTSA rules?
McCarthy: You can’t make those direct connections Congressman. Neither can I. Pompeo: There’s literally no connection between the activities
you’re undertaking and . . . McCarthy: I didn’t say that. Pompeo: Well, you said you can’t make the connections, so tell me what I’m not
understanding. Can you draw a connection between the rules you’re providing, the regulations you’re promulgating, and your indicators? Or is
it just . . . McCarthy: I think what
you’re asking is can EPA in and of itself solve the problems of climate change.
No we cannot. But the authority you gave us was to use the C lean A ir A ct to regulate pollution, carbon
pollution is one of those regulated pollutants, and we’re going to move forward with what we can do that’s reasonable and appropriate.
Pompeo: I’m actually not asking that question that you suppose that I’m asking. I’m not asking whether you have the power to solve
greenhouse gases. What I asked was: Is anything you’re doing, doing any good? As measured by the indicators that you’ve provided. Is your
testimony that you just have no capacity to identify whether the actions EPA has undertaken has any impact on those indicators? Literally, this
is about science — cause and effect. Is there any causal relationship between the regulations you promulgated and the 26 indicators of climate
change that you have on your Web site? McCarthy: The indicators on the Web site are broad global indicators. . . Pompeo: They’re not broad,
they’re very specific. McCarthy: . . .of impacts associated with climate change. They are not performance requirements or impacts related to
any particular act. Pompeo: I actually like the indicators — they’re quantifiable, right? Heat-related death, change in ocean heat, sea-level rises,
snow cover — those are very quantifiable things. But now you’re telling me . . . McCarthy: They indicate the public health associated with
climate change. Pompeo: Exactly, but you’re
telling me you can’t link up your actions at EPA to any benefit
associated with those quantifiable indicators that the EPA itself has proposed as indicative of climate
change.
Climate change won’t threaten humans.
HSU, Live Science staff, 2010
(Jeremy, “Can Humans Survive?”, 7-19, http://www.livescience.com/9956-humans-survive.html, DOA:
10-4-12, ldg)
experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the
worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The
scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic
scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the
His views deviate sharply from those of most
technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to
encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental
action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution
to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker,
a geochemist and renowned climate
scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that
governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might
become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity ,"
Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop
yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."
cartels
Legalization fails-pot isn’t worth enough, and doesn’t free up enough resources to
outweigh across the board institutional deficiency.
Hope, IMCO security policy analyst, 2014
(Alejandro, “Legal U.S. Pot Won’t Bring Peace to Mexico”, 1-21,
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-01-21/legal-u-s-pot-won-t-bring-peace-to-mexico, ldg)
So does this creeping legalization of marijuana in the U.S. spell doom for the Mexican drug cartels?
Not quite. The illegal marijuana trade provides Mexican organized crime with about $1.5 billion to $2
billion a year. That’s not chump change, but according to a number of estimates, it represents no more
than a third of gross drug export revenue. Cocaine is still the cartels’ biggest money-maker and the
revenue accruing from heroin and methamphetamine aren’t trivial. Moreover, Mexican gangs also obtain
income from extortion, kidnapping, theft and various other types of illegal trafficking. Losing the marijuana
trade would be a blow to their finances, but it certainly wouldn’t put them out of business. But surely Mexico would experience less
violence if marijuana was legal? Yes, to some extent, but the decline wouldn’t be sufficient to radically
alter the country’s security outlook . In all likelihood, marijuana production and marijuana-related violence are highly correlated
geographically. Marijuana output is concentrated in five states (Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa, Michoacan and Guerrero) that accounted
for approximately a third of all homicides committed in Mexico in 2012. Assuming improbably that half of all murders in those
areas were marijuana-related, we can estimate that the full elimination of the illegal marijuana trade
would reduce Mexico’s homicide rate to 18 per 100,000 inhabitants from 22 -- still about four times
the U.S. rate. Well, but couldn’t the Mexican government gain a peace dividend by redirecting some
resources from marijuana prohibition to other law enforcement objectives? Yes, but the effect would probably be modest.
Only 4 percent of all Mexican prison inmates are serving time exclusively for marijuana-related crimes. In
2012, drug offenses represented less than 2 percent of all crime reports in the country. When it comes to only
federal crimes (7 percent of the total), the share of drug offenses rises to 20 percent, but that percentage has been declining since 2007. So the
legalization of marijuana won’t free up a huge trove of resources to be redeployed against predatory
crime. Whatever the legal status of marijuana, Mexico needs to tackle its many institutional
malfunctions. Its police forces are underpaid, undertrained, under motivated and deeply vulnerable to
corruption and intimidation. Its criminal justice system is painfully slow, notoriously inefficient and deeply
unfair . Even with almost universal impunity, prisons are overflowing and mostly ruled by the inmates
themselves.
Changing that reality will take many years . Some reforms are under way, some are barely off the ground. As a result of a 2008
constitutional reform, criminal courts are being transformed, but progress across states has been uneven. With a couple of local exceptions, police reform has yet to
find political traction. The federal Attorney General’s Office is set to become an independent body, but not before 2018. The reformist zeal that President Enrique
Pena Nieto has shown in other policy areas (education, energy, telecommunications) is absent in security and justice. Security policy remains reactive, driven more
by political considerations than by strategic design. And results have been mixed at best: Homicides declined moderately in 2013, but both kidnapping and extortion
reached record levels. Marijuana
legalization won’t alter that dynamic. In the final analysis, Mexico doesn’t
have a drug problem, much less a marijuana problem: It has a state capacity problem . That is, its institutions are
too weak to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens.
Even if drug trafficking might very well decline in the future,
in the absence of stronger institutions, something equally nefarious will replace it.
Mexico won’t become a failed state – their ev is biased
Nava ‘10
Major Juan P Nava, US Army, “Narco-Crime in Mexico: Indication of State Failure or Symptoms of an
Emerging Democracy?” online pdf.
The Mexican military and security forces, branches of the executive branch of government with a long tradition of
domestic stabilization and an early history of political power, enjoy the respect of the people,
institutionally professionalize, and respond to the constituted authority of elected civilian leaders. Outresourced and underequipped, these forces struggle to establish control and achieve the delicate balance between policing a state and a police
state. The
Mexican economy demonstrates durability, diversity and resiliency as the second largest
trading partner to the United States. Largely due to the ongoing continued efforts at globalization and
in no small part due to previous free trade status with the US, the Mexican economy will achieve
growth on pace or ahead of the US. Wealth distribution inequities with Mexican society will continue
to produce internal tensions, but do not represent a threat to national economic progress .
With increased enrollment in education, increased life expectancy, decreased infant mortality, and
modern public transportation, energy, and medical care systems, Mexico provides essential services
to its citizens . Other characteristics identified by Rotberg also provided by Mexico for its citizens include: roads, railways, harbors, arteries
of commerce, communications networks, and a banking system. The
overwhelming empirical evidence supports the
finding that Mexico will not fail and that the narco-criminal violence evidenced within Mexico reflects
a reformist government’s attempts to exert strength by establishing sovereignty and governance with
a monopoly on the use of violence.
Mexico has a complex criminal problem. The drug cartel organizations evolved and currently permeate legitimate elements of Mexican society
with expanded international networks. Though
the cartels operate among the Mexican people, the people still
regard the cartel organizations negatively. Though overwhelmingly poor, the people continue to try to achieve
altruistic reform and achieve a society void of opportunistic and greedy criminals. Drug crime in
Mexico, and the violence associated with it, does not reflect an insurgency movement.
As the aggressive tactics of a reformist President stir the proverbial hornets nests within certain regions of Mexico, the increase in violence will
likely increase. Calderon's clear-hold-build strategy continues to achieve results on both sides of the border, both in terms of captured or
eliminated cartel members, and in increased and successful prosecutions of narco-criminals, especially in the United States. Metrics of
Calderon's success or failure do not include the number of those killed in drug related crime. Rather, more appropriately, President Calderon
measurement of success centers on his ability to convince and maintain credibility with both the Mexican people and the international
community that his aggressive efforts will achieve a stable and secure environment within a highly competitive new media information
environment rife with counter-messaging of instability, violence, and potential state failure.
The close election of Calderon represented the exertion of the cartel political power as they strove to re-acquire positions of power within
government. Calderon, however, prevailed and decided to exert even more pressure on the cartels to the eventual tune of approximately
50,000 troops and police to combat the drug networks. This
pressure caused cartels to react with both increased
number and ferocity of attacks on all elements, the citizens, police, military, judiciary and politicians.
With the increased focus on the problem of cartel organizations and their violent reactions, US media,
especially those from the border regions, leverage the spectacular nature of the deaths to agitate the
US citizenry to the point of contemplating Mexico as a failed state.
Mexico exhibits all the necessary traits of a young and struggling democracy that, without significant support, could easily fall back into
previous semi-authoritarian practices that would embolden and further enable cartels to operate beyond the influence of the Mexican
government. However,
a return to a semi-authoritarian, or even an authoritarian government does not
mean the state will fail .
The 400+ cases of corruption within US agencies emerged from within the US system. These officials,
possibly beholden to Mexican cartels, stand accountable for their own actions. They operated within our
systems. Likewise, the market for illegal drugs stems from a prevalent US hunger for the substances. Most of the weapons used in the narcoviolence originate from the US. Still, American citizens living in Washington D.C., statistically and proportionately, are more likely to die from
murder than will a Mexican citizen. While
the Mexican economy, about the size of California, shows more
promise of emerging from the global recession .
The ongoing drug-related violence in the northern regions of
Mexico and the Southwest border regions of the United States indicate Mexican state weakness in
the area of security, but falls well short of indicating that Mexico will fail. The violence epitomizes the will of the
people carried out by a duly and truly democratically elected government against a powerful system of opposition. Lacking any desire
to replace the current government, the cartel organizations respond to the deliberate pressures of the
Mexican government with coercive intimidation and heightened violence in an effort to outlast the
will of the government and continue to engage in lucrative illegal activity. As the democratic government
continues to conduct aggressive counterdrug operations on behalf of the Mexican people, this violence will also continue.
The current security conditions in Mexico, rather then representing a fragile or failing state, provide
an opportunity for Mexico’s full emergence as a strong democracy, a strategic regional partner, and
an important economic ally to the US. The amount of violence indicates the amount of neglect and
disregard for cartel proliferation during previous administrations. The criminal problem appears to have penetrated
both licit and illicit systems within Mexican society.
Mexico has gradually democratized since the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Evolving
from military authoritarianism to
reform minded single-party rule and finally to a multi-party free election, the evolution has not been
without struggle, turmoil, or violence. The current struggle for power and influence between the
Mexican government and criminal entities or organizations will test the power of the current system.
The resolve of the Mexican people, reflective in free and fair elections will determine the viability of
the government. That Mexico could fail would require the unlikely deterioration of several currently
strong elements of government to include the military, economy and judiciary. If the government remains able
to maintain the support of the population and with increased indirect assistance from the US, Mexico will emerge from the
current security struggle stronger and better from it . To believe otherwise either reflects a myopic
and biased view of the facts, or a lack of understanding of the complex system that is Mexico .
Heg decline doesn’t cause war
Friedman et al., MIT political science PhD candidate, 2012
(Benjamin, “Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable”, Orbis, 56.2, Science Direct, ldg)
Standard arguments for maintaining the alliances come in two contradictory strains. One, drawn mostly from the run-up to World War II, says that without
American protection, the ally would succumb to a rival power, either by force or threat of force, heightening the rival’s
capability and danger to the United States. The other argument says that without the United States, the ally would enter a spiral of hostility with a neighbor,
creating instability or war that disrupts commerce and costs America more than the protection that prevented it. The main problem with the first argument is that
no hegemon today threatens to unify Europe or Asia. Europe is troubled by debt, not conquest. Russian
GDP is today roughly equivalent to that of Spain and Portugal combined. Whatever Russia’s hopes, it has no ability to resurrect its Soviet Empire, beyond perhaps
those nations in its near abroad that Americans have no good reason to defend. Even today, the military capabilities of Europe’s leading powers are sufficient to
defend its eastern flank, and they could increase their martial exertions should a bigger threat arise. Asia is tougher case. South Korea’s military superiority over its
northern neighbor is sufficient to deter it from an attempt at forcible reunification. By heightening North Korea’s security, nuclear weapons may reinforce its
capacity for trouble-making, but they do not aid offensive forays. U.S. forces long ago became unnecessary to maintaining the peninsula’s territorial status quo.
Chinese efforts to engage in old-fashioned conquest are unlikely, at least beyond Taiwan. Its more
probable objective is a kind of Asian Monroe doctrine, meant to exclude the United States.6 China naturally
prefers not to leave its maritime security at the whim of U.S. policymakers and, thus, has sought to improve its anti-access and area-denial capabilities. In the longer
term, China’s leaders will likely pursue the ability to secure its trade routes by building up longer-range naval forces. They may also try to leverage military power to
extract various concessions from nearby states. Washington’s defense analysts typically take those observations as sufficient to establish the necessity that U.S.
forces remain in Asia to balance Chinese military power. But to
justify a U.S. military presence there, one also needs to show both that
Asian nations cannot or will not balance Chinese power themselves and that their failure to do so would
greatly harm U.S. security. Neither is likely. Geography and economics suggest that the states of the region
will successfully balance Chinese power—even if we assume that China’s economic growth allows it to continue
to increase military spending.7 B
odies of water are natural defenses against offensive military operations. They allow weaker states to achieve security at relatively low cost by
investing in naval forces and coastal defenses. That defensive advantage makes balances of power more stable. Not only are several of China’s Asian rivals islands,
but those states have the wealth to make Chinese landings on their coast prohibitively expensive. India’s
mountainous northern border creates similar dynamics. The
prospects of Asian states successfully deterring future Chinese
aggression will get even better if, as seems likely, threats of aggression provoke more formal security
alliances. Some of that is already occurring. Note for example, the recent joint statement issued by the Philippines and Japan marking a new ‘‘strategic
partnership’’ and expressing ‘‘common strategic interests’’ such as ‘‘ensuring the safety of sea lines of communication. ’’8
This sort of multilateral
cooperation would likely deepen with a more distant U.S. role. Alliances containing disproportionately large states historically
produce free-riding; weaker alliance partners lose incentive to shore up their own defenses.9 Even if one assumes that other states in the region would fail to
balance China, it is unclear exactly how U.S. citizens would suffer. China’s territorial ambitions might grow but are unlikely to span the Pacific. Nor would absorbing
a few small export-oriented states slacken China’s hunger for the dollars of American consumers. The argument that U.S. alliances are necessary for stability and
global commerce is only slightly more credible. One
problem with this claim is that U.S. security guarantees can create
moral hazard—emboldening weak allies to take risks they would otherwise avoid in their dealings
with neighbors. Alliances can then discourage accommodation among neighboring states, heightening instability and threatening to pull the United States
into wars facilitated by its benevolence. Another point against this argument is that even if regional balancing did
lead to war, it would not obviously be more costly to the U.S. economy than the cost of the alliance
said to prevent it. Neutrality historically pays.10 The larger problem with the idea that our alliances are justified by the balancing they
prevent is that
wars generally require more than the mutual fear that arms competition provokes . Namely, there is usually
a territorial conflict or a state bent on conflict. Historical
examples of arms races alone causing wars are few.11 This
confusion probably results from misconstruing the causes of World War I—seeing it as a consequence of mutual fear
alone rather than fear produced by the proximity of territorially ambitious states.12 Balances of power, as noted, are especially liable to
be stable when water separates would-be combatants, as in modern Asia. Japan would likely increase defense spending if U.S.
forces left it, and that would likely displease China. But that tension
is very unlikely to provoke a regional conflagration. And even
that remote scenario is far more likely than the Rube Goldberg scenario needed to argue that peace in Europe requires U.S. forces stationed there. It
is not
clear that European states would even increase military spending should U.S. troops depart. If they
did do so, one struggles to imagine a chain of misperceived hostility sufficient to resurrect the bad old
days of European history.
global prohibition
Too many obstacles to reforming global approaches to drugs.
Gomis, European Geostrategy associate editor, 2014
(Benoit, “Illicit Drugs and International Security: Towards UNGASS 2016”, February,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/fil
es/0214Drugs_BP2.pdf, ldg)
Persistent political challenges In the last three years, the drug policy debate has evolved more than in
the previous three decades. However, there remain a number of obstacles to making recent
developments sustainable ahead of UNGASS 2016.54 Although Latin American leaders have been instrumental in pushing the
debate forward, the political context is more complicated today than it was around the 2012 Summit of the
Americas. There is widespread consensus in the region that the ‘war on drugs’ has failed, that drugs are
primarily a health problem, and that use and possession should be decriminalized further. However, disagreements remain on how to
control supply (in particular on the effectiveness of regulation models), what law enforcement should
look like in a regulated market, and what public health strategies mean in practice, especially in
countries that have had difficulty in controlling parts of their territory and collecting taxes.55 Political
leadership towards reform is also more hesitant than it was in 2012. In Mexico, President Enrique Peña Nieto has been
willing to discuss alternative policies. He has said he would aim to prioritize social and economic issues, and readjust security policy towards reducing violence while
ending widespread US access to Mexican intelligence. However,
the Mexican government is undertaking other ambitious
reforms, including in the energy and education sectors and in economic and fiscal policy . The country’s
diplomatic efforts with the United States have also prioritized immigration and gun laws over drug policy reform. President Santos of Colombia
has taken a back seat in the international debate to some extent, focusing instead on the peace
process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army
(ELN), and on the forthcoming presidential elections. Guatemala, under the leadership of President Molina and Foreign Minister
Fernando Carrera, remains very proactive and continues to punch above its weight in the drug debate. However, it is a small country that needs partners and has
been more reluctant than its neighbours to engage in a review of its domestic policy.56 Two
elements further complicate the political
context in Latin America. The revelation by Edward Snowden of widespread US intelligence activities
that included targeting the emails of former president Felipe Calderón and the text messages of Peña
Nieto when he was running for president may have an impact on Mexico’s collaboration with the
United States. Although such intelligence practices were arguably always presumed within the country’s political elite, their public revelation means that
government leaders need to address the issue.57 In addition, the populations of Latin American countries are still
predominantly against more progressive drugs policies. In Uruguay, 63 per cent of the population were
opposed to the marijuana bill in July 2013.58 Around the same time in Mexico, only 32 per cent of the
population supported marijuana legalization.59 The support has been even lower in Colombia and
Peru – respectively 13 per cent and 11 per cent in 2010.60 In the United States, the referendums in Colorado and Washington,
and the OAS report, have put pressure on the Obama administration to discuss domestic and international drug policy reforms more openly. Some notable progress
has been made domestically. US Attorney General Eric Holder has announced that the federal government would order prosecutors to sidestep federal mandatory
minimum sentencing in certain low-level cases as a way to reduce the prison population. He also confirmed that the Department of Justice would not seek to
challenge the marijuana regulation laws in Colorado and Washington.61 However, concerns remain on the international stage as to how open the United States will
be in discussing and promoting reform given the country’s historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions. Meanwhile
Russia has
expressed concerns over flows of drugs from Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2014. It is pushing for harsher counter-narcotics
policies in the country, as the latest UN report indicates a record annual increase of opium production.62 Russia has also supported
a series of counter-narcotics programmes focused on law enforcement and interdiction training in
Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, and in Central American countries.
Russia’s uncompromising prohibitionist stance continues to be popular in numerous countries in Asia
and Africa that advocate zero-tolerance policies.63 Europe certainly has lessons to offer regarding
drug policy but European governments have largely stayed away from the recent international
debates. In countries such as Portugal, where progressive policies have been implemented, budgetary pressures and the rise of conservative views are
endangering progress domestically.64 In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron rejected the
parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee’s proposal for a Royal Commission to comprehensively
reassess current policies. Home Secretary Theresa May has been reluctant to discuss reform, even disregarding recommendations from the Advisory
Council on the Misuse of Drugs and putting in place a ban on khat.65 An internal review into drug policy concluded that decreases in use in the country demonstrate
that existing policies are working. This argument, however, ignores the international nature of the challenge and the larger responsibility of West European
governments in tackling a truly global and complex problem that fuels high levels of organized crime and violence. In addition, the United Kingdom faces an increase
in the use of other drugs, including new psychoactive substances and over-the-counter or prescription medicine. Other regions of the world face increased levels of
political uncertainty and insecurity related to drug production and trafficking. West Africa struggles to tackle the multiple challenges linked to the growing trade
through the region, including corruption, organized crime, financing of extremist organizations, an increase in addiction and an increased burden on lawenforcement agencies and other already struggling public institutions.66 In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF from the country and the transition to an Afghan-led
security apparatus shows little promise of mitigating opium production and related corruption.67
This international political context
makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to substantially reform the UN conventions . However, current
difficulties and the overall complexity of the problem should not be used as an excuse for policy inaction and inertia. The current situation – characterized by
persistent levels of violence, insecurity and corruption, changing trade routes causing instability in new regions, the emergence of new drugs and the negative
impact of drug policies – is no longer sustainable.
---AIDS doesn’t cause extinction and will eventually be harmless --- Every new case
weakens the virus’ lethality.
World Now 2005
“Researchers: HIV Eventually Not a Threat,” September 30, http://www.kron4.com/Global/story.asp?S=3921680&nav=5D7y
Researchers believe the AIDS virus is not as strong as it was twenty years ago. According to
the Institute of Tropical Medicine, samples of the virus are less potent now than in the 1980s. They
believe the virus weakens each time it passes from one person to another. It also means the virus
responds quicker to medication. Eventually, they think HIV will one day become so weak it won't
be a threat to the human body.
Food prices won’t cause instability
WFP 2012
(World Food Program, “High Food Prices: Why This Is Different From 2008”, 9-4,
http://www.wfp.org/stories/high-food-prices-why-different-2008, ldg)
1. Global
stocks of rice and wheat are higher than they were in 2008. The price and supplies of rice, a staple food for many
2008, several major food-producing countries imposed export bans,
millions of people, are relatively stable in Asia. 2. In
which caused shortages on world markets. Meanwhile, in food-deficit countries, there was panic-buying, with governments paying very high prices, especially for
rice. So
far this time this has not happened. 3. In contrast to 2008, global economic growth is presently weak, so demand is not
pushing prices further upwards. 4. Many countries are better prepared to face the current situation. Some have
worked on establishing and improving social safety nets such as school meals, and public works programmes. 5. Better tools
exist at the international level to coordinate the policy response . For example, in 2011 the G20 set up the Agricultural Market
Information System (AMIS), hosted at FAO, which
tracks food commodity markets and aims to improve transparency and
act as an early warning system.
Regeneration solves
Morano and Washburn 2K (Marc and Kent, Producers of American Investigator's "Amazon Rainforest:
Clear-Cutting the Myths" “Shaky Science Behind Save-Rainforest Effort”, 6-26,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=17543)
The idea that a cleared rainforest can grow back is an idea that is not accepted by most environmental
campaigns and the popular culture. Yet recent studies indicate that trees do in fact regrow very well in
rainforests. A 1998 study by Charles Cannon of Duke University found that eight years after industrial logging in
Indonesian rainforests, recovery of both native flora and fauna far exceeded expectations. In Borneo, logged forest
contained just as many tree species as unlogged forest. "These findings warrant reassessment of the conservation potential of large tracts
of commercially logged tropical rainforest," wrote Cannon. Science magazine contributor Robin Chazdon, an ecologist at the University of
Connecticut, says: "You can find species that will show increased growth and increased population as a result of logging." "There
are
many, many tree species that we see commonly in the tropical flora whose regeneration is not occurring in natural
forests. They require large scale disturbances," she says.
2nc
Counterplan
2nc solvency – a2: cartels
The counterplan solves cartels
Mikos 10—Robert, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. A.B., Princeton University; J.D.,
University of Michigan, “Article: State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other Federal Crimes,”
2010 U Chi Legal F 223
The above analysis assumed a unitary system, that is, a marijuana market governed only by state law. This Part adds another
layer of complexity and realism by considering how federal law changes distributors' incentives. Once federal law is considered,
tax evasion becomes a much bigger concern and the tax proposal loses much more of its luster.
Federal
law bans the possession , cultivation , and distribution of marijuana. 90 Though the federal
government has repeatedly dismissed calls to decriminalize marijuana outright, the Obama Administration has recently
assumed a more tolerant stance towards medicinal uses of marijuana. In particular, Attorney General Eric Holder has announced that the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") will no longer target distribution of medical marijuana. 91 The Administration, however, remains [*249]
steadfastly committed to enforcing the federal ban on recreational marijuana (a bigger market). 92 Thus,
anyone who possesses, cultivates, or distributes recreational marijuana, even pursuant to state law, remains subject to harsh federal sanctions.
93 (For example, distribution of any quantity of marijuana carries a possible five-year prison term and $ 1 million fine. 94) This Part provides the
first in-depth analysis of the unique issues posed by state taxation of federal crime. Section A sets the necessary foundation by discussing
preemption and the legal status of state taxation. Section B discusses the federal ban's impact on the structure of the marijuana market. And
Section C discusses the federal ban's effect on state monitoring. Section D concludes by reevaluating estimates of the marijuana tax gap in light
of the special hurdles posed by federal law. Preemption Before discussing whether California's proposal would satisfy its considerable promise
($ 1.4 $ 1.2 billion!), it seems prudent to discuss whether California could constitutionally legalize and tax something Congress expressly forbids.
After all, if preempted by federal law, the California reforms would be null and void, in other words, unenforceable ($ 1.4 $ 1.2 billion! $ 0 ). As
it stands, federal law does permit California to legalize (under state law) and tax marijuana. By congressional design--and constitutional
limitation--the Controlled Substances Act 95 ("CSA") preempts state law only to the extent it positively conflicts with the federal ban. In a
nutshell, this means a state may not 1) engage in or 2) aid and abet conduct banned by the CSA (that is, the possession, distribution, or
production of marijuana). 96 California's proposal passes muster because it does neither of these things. First, the state itself would not
produce or dis [*250] tribute marijuana; rather, it would merely allow its residents to do so, unimpeded by state sanctions. (Of course, the state
could more easily and effectively control marijuana if it were allowed to grow and distribute the drug itself; after all, state ownership of alcohol
establishments contributed to the states' ability to impose controls on alcohol immediately following Prohibition's repeal. 97) Second, California
would not aid and abet others who produce and distribute marijuana, in the legally relevant sense. 98 In other words, it would not subsidize
private production and distribution of marijuana. Indeed, the state marijuana tax would, if anything, curb CSA violations by raising the cost of
marijuana. California's power to legalize marijuana is protected by the anti-commandeering rule. That rule blocks Congress from simply forcing
California to ban marijuana. 99 However, that protection is somewhat limited, for the anti-commandeering rule does not block Congress from
1) bribing California to forego legalization or even 2) forcing California to scrap the marijuana tax. As to the former (bribe California), the anticommandeering rule does not curb Congress's conditional spending power, since states can (ostensibly) decline federal grants. Thus, in theory
Congress could offer California federal grants ($ 1.4 $ 1.2 billion!) on the condition that California maintain its criminal ban on marijuana. As to
the latter (scrap just the tax), the anti-commandeering rule is not implicated by congressional field preemption, that is, by wiping out all state
regulation of a given field in Congress's expansive domain. Thus, in theory Congress could preempt California's tax on marijuana (a form of
regulation), even though it could not preempt California's legalization of the drug (a form of non-regulation). 100 [*251] As a practical matter,
however, Congress seems unlikely to pass legislation aimed at blocking California's proposed reforms. First, there is substantial public support
for marijuana legalization. A recent poll shows that 45 percent of Americans now favor legalization, versus 54 percent who favor prohibition
101 --not a majority, but probably enough to thwart anti-legalization mea-sures (for example, conditional grants) in Congress. 102 Second,
preempting a state marijuana tax represents a serious gamble for drug hawks, since California might legalize marijuana anyway, even if could
not tax the drug. 103 Given that the federal government's own drug enforcement resources are quite limited, drug hawks would probably
prefer that California impose some sanction on marijuana (that is, a tax) than no sanction at all. B.Market Structure Though the
federal
on marijuana would impair
enforcement of a state marijuana tax for two reasons: 1) it would preserve the current fragmented structure of the
marijuana market, by giving marijuana distributors an incentive to remain small and to operate
inconspicuously; and 2) it would put state tax collectors in a dilemma, because federal authorities could
use state tax rolls (and similar state-gathered information) to track down and punish tax-paying marijuana
distributors. This Section discusses the structure of the marijuana market and its implications for the enforcement of the proposed
government would probably allow the states to legalize and tax marijuana, its continuing ban
marijuana tax. The next Section discusses federal law and the dilemma it poses for state monitoring of marijuana distribution. [*252] 1. The
fragmented marijuana market. As it stands,
the marijuana market is highly fragmented ; in other words, there are many small
producers and distributors. Not surprisingly, the exact number of "firms" is unknown; however, law enforcement data suggest it is several
thousands. In 2008, for example, law enforcement agents seized 2,455 marijuana grow sites in California. 104 Assuming this number represents
between 10-25 percent of all California grow sites, 105 and assuming that one grow site represents one firm, there would be anywhere from
10,000 to 25,000 firms operating illegally across the state. 106 The fragmented structure of the legal medical marijuana market in California
lends some support to the high estimate. In Los Angeles County alone, for example, there are more than 1,000 dispensaries that distribute
medical marijuana; in other words, it is now easier for patients to obtain cannabis than a Frappucino or Big Mac. 107 2. Why market
structure matters. California's ability to monitor marijuana distribution is
severely constrained by the
fragmentation of that market. Monitor [*253] ing thousands of growers and distributors would overwhelm
the state's limited enforcement capacity. 108 Indeed, market structure is one reason prohibition has been such a costly--and
largely futile--endeavor; despite investing billions annually, law enforcement agencies apprehend only a small fraction of all marijuana
offenders (perhaps 10 percent). 109 Contrast the highly fragmented marijuana market with the highly concentrated cigarette market. Three
firms dominate cigarette production: Altria, R.J. Reynolds, and BAT/Brown & Williamson in combination control more than 85 percent of that
market. 110 Although cigarette distributors are more numerous, consolidation at the manufacturing stage greatly enhances government
monitoring and taxation of distribution. Most importantly, it means government need not monitor individual distributors closely to figure out
how much a given distributor sells; rather, it can estimate sales (and tax burdens) by examining manufacturers' sales records. 111 For example,
if the government examined Altria's accounts and found that Altria had sold 100 thousand cartons of cigarettes to Firm A, it could easily infer
Firm A's (probable) tax burden. If Firm A reports only 10 thousand cartons sold, government investigators would know to target Firm A for
audit. As suggested above, the industry's highly concentrated structure helps explain why the cigarette tax gap remains tolerably low. 3. The
prospect of consolidation. To be sure, one might expect the marijuana market to consolidate post-legalization. The alcohol industry sets a
precedent for such consolidation. During Prohibition, tens of thousands of small distillers supplied spirits, largely unchecked by law
enforcement. 112 In the decades following the repeal of Prohibition, [*254] the market has become increasingly concentrated; by 2003, for
example, three firms together controlled more than 80 percent of the beer market. 113 Similarly, various barriers to entry that enabled the
cigarette market to become--and remain--consolidated could enable the marijuana market to become consolidated as well. First, there are
enormous economies of scale to cigarette manufacturing. 114 Cigarette rolling machines significantly reduce the cost of manufacture and
increase the minimum efficient scale of firms. In fact, scholars attribute the consolidation of the cigarette industry in part to the introduction of
such machines in the late 1800s. 115 Presumably, the production of marijuana joints, like the production of cigarettes, could be mechanized as
well. Such mechanization would give larger growers and distributors a competitive edge, eventually weeding out numerous smaller, less
efficient firms. 116 [*255] Second, there is strong brand loyalty among consumers in the cigarette market. 117 Strong brand loyalty, built up
through substantial firm investments in advertising, helps explains why new cigarette firms cannot easily capture market share from the
entrenched firms. 118 Namely, it would take enormous investments to dislodge customers from their existing brands. It seems plausible that
commercial marijuana firms could cultivate similar brand loyalty, which would enable them eventually to consolidate market share. To be sure,
the marijuana market might never achieve the same level of consolidation as the alcohol or cigarette markets. For example, the comparative
ease of producing marijuana could enable smaller producers (including many users) to survive in the marijuana market. And, in any event, it
could take years for the above-mentioned forces to consolidate the marijuana market. 119 In other words, the tax gap could be especially large
at the outset, that is, when California needs the revenue most. But one could reasonably suppose that over time, only a few firms would survive
in a truly legal marijuana market. If so, the task of collecting the marijuana tax would be made much simpler. 4. How the federal ban blocks
consolidation. California, however, does not have the power to lift prohibition writ large, only state prohibition. Marijuana would remain
criminal under federal law. And for at least two reasons, the federal ban would impede consolidation of the marijuana market. 120 [*256] First,
the federal ban creates a strong disincentive for distributors to grow big . Compared to smaller
distributors, larger distributors are more likely to be caught and punished by federal authorities. 121 Every drug
transaction conducted by a distributor carries a distinct risk of detection. To be sure, the risk probably declines with every transaction, since the
distributor who evades detection once probably acquires knowledge that could help her evade detection again. At the same time, however, the
consequences of being caught escalate with every transaction, since the detection of one transaction could reveal others. For example, if
authorities catch D distributing marijuana once, they might search D's home; in the course of the search, the authorities might discover
evidence of previously undetected transactions. 122 In the ensuing plea deal (or trial), D would be punished for all of the offenses, boosting the
effective sanction for the nth transaction. In a related vein, if
caught, a larger distributor is more likely to be prosecuted
and punished. The United States Attorneys (USAs) have wide latitude to decide what cases to pursue. And when it comes to marijuana
offenses, some USAs decline to pursue cases unless they involve substantial quantities of the drug. Many United States Attorneys' Offices have
set this threshold at 200 pounds or more. 123 To be sure, the USA can ignore these guidelines; but their very existence suggests a reluctance
(or perhaps inability) to expend resources chasing down mom-and-pop marijuana operations. The CSA's graduated penalty schedule provides
added incentive for USAs to focus on cases involving substantial quantities; for example, cases involving more than 100 kilograms trigger
mandatory sentences of five years imprisonment and fines up to $ 10 million, and those figures are doubled for cases involving 1,000 kilograms
or more. 124 A marijuana distributor might choose to forgo the benefits of expansion (for [*257] example, economies of scale) in order to avoid
detection and prosecution by federal authorities. 125 Second, federal
laws impede distributors' ability to build brand
names and consolidate market share. The federal Lanham Act bars the registration of a trademark
used on any product proscribed by federal law, including marijuana. 126 For similar reasons, federal law would
presumably bar common law protection of an unregistered trademark on marijuana. 127 Hence, a
distributor that wanted to expand its market share by building a brand name could not seek federal
protection of its trademark. 128 Suppose, for example, that D, our distributor, develops a new strand of marijuana she labels
"Acapulco Gold." D could not easily capture the benefits of her development. If her new strain becomes a hit, other distributors could exploit
the name "Acapulco Gold" to push their own (inferior) products. D could not sue for [*258] trademark infringement (in federal court, anyway),
so any money spent building the brand name would be lost. Lacking
the means to differentiate their products through
branding, marijuana distributors and producers could not achieve the high concentration seen in the
cigarette market. In short, the federal ban would frustrate California's monitoring of marijuana distribution by preventing consolidation
of the marijuana market. The federal ban on marijuana gives firms an incentive to stay small, and, in any
event, hampers attempts to grow via branding. To detect tax evasion, California would need to adopt costly enforcement
measures (for example, random audits) that may not yield positive returns. 129 C.The Monitoring Dilemma Even supposing, arguendo, that
California could find a way to observe marijuana distribution (for example, via licensing), it would not be out of the woods yet, for the federal
ban creates another, even more daunting problem: federal law enforcement could use California's monitoring system to track down and
sanction marijuana distributors who obey state law. Monitoring marijuana distribution creates a long paper trail. If successful, a state licensing
or tax administration system would reveal the name, place of business, and sales of every marijuana distributor in the state. Such data may be
needed for enforcing a state tax, but it could also be used to help enforce the federal ban. Federal law enforcement agents could seize the data
and there is nothing the states can do to stop them. First, the states cannot shield distributors from federal sanctions. Although states may
"legalize" marijuana distribution for purposes of state law, they cannot eliminate federal sanctions. 130 Second, states cannot necessarily
conceal data from federal authorities, even when that data is privileged under state law. As I argue elsewhere, federal statutory privileges, the
anti [*259] commandeering rule, and the privilege against self-incrimination, among other legal doctrines, provide only limited protection for
sensitive information states require citizens to report. 131 As a consequence,
marijuana distributors could be made worse
off by obeying state law . To be sure, distributors could be prosecuted by federal authorities regardless of
whether they pay the state tax; however, the
probability they would be detected by federal authorities goes up
dramatically if they do so--the federal government simply would not have the resources to track down
any but the largest marijuana distributors without using a state database. 132 Of course, evading state taxes
carries a risk as well; a distributor who does so faces state punishment if caught. But a drug distributor might still find it worthwhile to face this
risk (it is only a risk) rather than face near certain (and very large) sanctions that could be imposed by the federal government upon paying the
state tax. Simply put, to the extent expected federal sanctions increase by paying the state tax, distributors are given added incentive to evade
the tax. Ironically, the better information states gather, the worse off they (or drug distributors) become. Even
if marijuana
distributors would rationally choose to pay the state tax in the absence of the federal regime, they
may opt to evade the tax in the presence of the federal regime. Marijuana tax proponents have
overlooked this threat. 133 [*260] D.The Tax Gap (Version 2) Given the persistence of the federal prohibition on marijuana, comparing
the proposed marijuana tax to the tax on a legal vice like cigarettes seems less appropriate. A more fitting benchmark for assessing the
marijuana tax gap could be, well, the marijuana tax gap. Twenty-one states have laws on the books that tax the sale of marijuana (and other
illicit drugs). 134 In these states, however, the drug remains prohibited. The tax merely supplements the criminal and various other civil
sanctions these states impose on the cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana. Unfortunately for California, such taxes on illicit
drugs are seldom paid and generate correspondingly paltry revenue. 135 Until recently, for example, the state of Tennessee imposed a tax on
possession of all illicit drugs--the rate was set at $ 3.50 per gram for marijuana. 136 Nonetheless, the state collected only $ 10 million total over
four years. 137 The state of Oklahoma, which has a similar tax, 138 has fared even worse--it collected only $ 80 in tax year 2005-2006. 139 It is
easy to see why states have done poorly when it comes to collecting taxes on illicit substances. As discussed above, prohibition gives drug
distributors ample incentive to hide from law enforcement authorities--this hinders monitoring that is necessary for effective collection of civil
taxes. Proponents had hoped that by legalizing marijuana, California could reap significantly more tax revenues than are generated by extant
taxes on illicit [*261] drugs. In essence, the hope--or assumption--is that marijuana distribution would consolidate and come out into the open,
enabling civil taxation and regulation to occur. The
problem is that the federal ban mitigates the differences
between California's proposed tax and extant marijuana taxes in prohibition states. To be sure, state
legalization is likely to make some difference. Some consolidation could occur--and some marijuana
distributors would operate in the open, because the federal government's law enforcement resources are limited. 140 But it
seems likely marijuana will remain a predominantly black market so long as federal prohibition --and
some willingness to enforce it-- remains
in place . California may be able to decriminalize--even legalize--marijuana, but it
cannot necessarily regulate the drug effectively. Hence, California could face a much steeper gap than anticipated above in Part I(C).
In fact, the state might collect only a small fraction of taxes due, a realization that substantially diminishes the financial appeal of the proposals
currently under consideration. Conclusion This Article has examined a proposed state marijuana tax to highlight previously ignored tax
compliance problems states face when attempting to tax goods or services that are forbidden under federal law. Due largely to the strains
caused by the recession and attendant fiscal crises, several states are seriously contemplating legalizing and taxing marijuana. The financial
allure is enormous--policymakers and economists suggest that a marijuana tax could generate billions in new revenues for the states. The
federal ban on marijuana, however, complicates enforcement of the tax. In particular, the federal ban makes state
monitoring of marijuana distribution especially difficult and potentially self-defeating. First, the federal ban will keep
the marijuana market fragmented. This means that thousands of small growers and distributors will continue to compete on the marijuana
market, potentially overwhelming limited state tax collection resources. Second, even assuming a state could find a way to track taxable
marijuana sales, doing so would only create a new problem. Federal law enforcement agents could use this state-gathered information to
impose harsh federal sanctions on tax-paying marijuana distributors. The threat of being exposed in [*262] state records gives marijuana
distributors an additional incentive--above and beyond the state tax--to evade state tax authorities. For both reasons, the continuing federal
ban on marijuana is likely to exacerbate a marijuana tax gap. The states might collect only a fraction of the revenues proponents now claim a
tax would generate. There
is no obvious solution to the problems posed by the federal ban, short of federal legalization .
Many of the steps states could normally take to enhance tax compliance would be stymied or
preempted by federal law . A state, for example, could not sell marijuana at state-operated stores; this option is clearly preempted
by the CSA, which bars states--no less than private citizens--from distributing the drug. A state could attempt to foster consolidation of the
marijuana market--for example, by limiting the number of licenses it issues or by imposing a lower tax rate on larger distributors--but doing so
would not relieve distributors' fears of getting caught in the crosshairs of federal prosecutors. Allowing distributors to pay the tax anonymously
would eliminate the paper trail for federal authorities, but it seems unlikely to deter tax evasion--existing drug taxes are paid anonymously and
generate paltry revenues. The most promising reform could be to focus on taxing medical marijuana. The federal government's announcement
that it would halt enforcement of the federal ban on medical marijuana would seemingly pave the way for consolidation of this niche market
and would remove the concern that federal agents would use state gathered information against medical marijuana distributors. 141 A tax on
this niche market, however, would generate only a fraction of the revenues now being touted by tax proponents. What is more, singling out
medical marijuana for taxation could prove politically unpalatable; indeed, many state lawmakers are considering exempting medical marijuana
from any marijuana tax. In sum, as
long as federal law proscribes marijuana--and federal agents remain committed to
enforcing the ban--a state tax on marijuana would be largely unsuccessful. The tax would not force marijuana users to internalize
the social costs of their activity; nor would it be a panacea for state budget woes. There [*263] are reasonable arguments favoring legalization
of marijuana; rescuing the states from dire fiscal straits, however, is not one of them.
2nc a2: links to politics
Court decisions shield presidents’ political capital
Altmann 2007 (Jennifer Greenstein, assistant editor at the Princeton Weekly Bulletin, News At
Princeton, http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S18/17/72G06/?section=featured)
In his new book, "Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court and Constitutional Leadership in U.S.
History," Whittington
argues that in recent years the court has become the key player in an important
political tussle: Who has the final say in constitutional matters? Whittington asserts that the court has become the final arbiter, but that
status did not result from a power grab by the court. Its power, remarkably, has come from politicians, who have pushed onto the
court the responsibility for making final rulings on constitutional matters because, paradoxically, it benefits the politicians.
"Presidents are mostly deferential to the court," said Whittington. "They have pushed constitutional issues into the courts
for resolution and encouraged others to do the same. That has led to an acceptance of the court's role in these issues." It seems
counterintuitive that politicians would want to defer to the court on some of the most high-stakes decisions in government, but
Whittington has found that they do so because the court often rules in the ways that presidents want — and provides
politicians with the political cover they need. In 1995, the Clinton administration faced a proposal from the Senate to
regulate pornography on the Internet. The president thought the bill was unconstitutional, but he didn't want to
risk appearing lenient on such a hot-button issue right before he was up for re-election, Whittington said. Clinton signed the
legislation with the hope that the Supreme Court would strike it down as unconstitutional, which it later did.
Obama doesn’t get the blame for Court actions
Sanger-Katz 12 (Margot, healthcare correspondent for the National Journal, Poll: No Blame if Court
Nixes Health Care Law, June 5, http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/poll-no-blame-if-court-nixeshealth-care-law-20120605)
Even though President Obama
fought for passage of the landmark 2010 health care law, very small minorities say
their attitudes about him would change one way or the other should the Supreme Court strike down
the law that is so often referred to as “Obamacare.” Two-thirds of those surveyed in a new public-opinion poll said
that their respect for Obama would be unchanged if the Supreme Court struck down his signature
legislative achievement. Fourteen percent said they would respect Obama more under such a scenario, while 15 percent said they
would respect him less. That trend was consistent across the political spectrum—similar proportions of
Republicans, Democrats, and independents said they would be unmoved, despite the pundits’
speculation that a Court decision declaring the A ffordable C are A ct unconstitutional in part or in its entirety
might alter public opinion toward the president. The nonplussed attitude also held across nearly all age, income, regional,
and racial categories, with at least 60 percent of each surveyed group saying that the ruling would have no
impact on their view of the president.
2nc a2: dual federalism dead
The Counterplan solves
A-Vacating the Raich precedent reverses federalism trends by limiting an expansive
interpretation of federal commerce and police power. That’s Kopel and Slansky
More evidence the Counterplan brings dual federalism back from the dead
Dorn-JD Candidate Temple-8 18 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 213
NOTE: THE UNTIMELY DEATH OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: GONZALES V. RAICH'S THREAT TO
FEDERALISM, THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
D. Expansion of the Commerce Power: A Slippery Slope for Citizens' Rights
Raich opens the door for huge expansions of
federal regulation into previously uncharted and undesirable territory . Since Raich obliterates
previously constructed Commerce Clause boundaries by disregarding and overstepping these bounds,
no meaningful limits remain on Congress' exercise of regulatory commerce power. American social
policy and political and civil rights face a slippery slope, with no clear end in sight for Congress'
potential expansion of its power affecting and impinging on more and more rights. The logical place to draw the line and curtail
federal power would have been the line drawn by the Lopez/Morrison framework, based on principles of federalism and protection of states
and individual rights. By impinging on federalism, Raich blazed the trail for and begun a journey down this slippery slope.
Setting its own
limits, Congress has begun to regulate more intrastate activities , with Courts acquiescing in light of Raich. 405 The
slippery slope is likely to continue pushing toward more expansive federal regulatory [*252] power.
Regulation of isolated intrastate wetlands , according to one author, would be constitutional in light of Raich.
406
The Raich majority has effectively obliterated the bounds of the Commerce Clause. The Constitution's
two structural protections, accountability of state governments to citizens 407 and protection of liberty via federalism, 408 are at risk. The goal
of these protections, reservation of individual rights to the people against the federal government, is likely to suffer. Conclusion In
Raich,
the Supreme Court held that marijuana regulation under the CSA is "squarely within" Congress'
Commerce Clause power, 409 even as applied to "troubling facts" like those of Raich's and Monson's cases. 410 Justifying its
conclusion, the Court claimed that marijuana activity solely and specifically intended for home use has a "substantial effect" on national
marijuana market conditions. 411 The Court erred in holding the CSA valid as applied, and in finding that "a rational basis existed for concluding
that" 412 marijuana meant for medically authorized home use "substantially effects" national marijuana market conditions. 413 The
consequences are disastrous and far-reaching, and will affect those who otherwise would, on a doctor's advice and with state
law approval, be able to enjoy their lives and health to a greater degree in times of medical crises. This decision upsets recent
precedent, opens doors for huge expansions of federal power, and endangers the individual rights and civil liberties of
American citizens. The only escape from this slippery slope of expanding federal power seems to be legislative action, which has not yet been
forthcoming. Otherwise, " dual
federalism is dead; indeed, it was never really alive." 414
ISIS DA
2nc impact overview
ISIS will shut down the U.S. national grid – it’ll independently kill 9 out of 10
Americans
Bedard 9/3/14 – Paul, columnist at the Washington Examiner, “New ISIS threat: America's electric
grid; blackout could kill 9 of 10” http://washingtonexaminer.com/new-isis-threat-americas-electric-gridblackout-could-kill-9-of-10/article/2552766
Former top government
officials who have been warning Washington about the vulnerability of the nation’s
largely unprotected electric grid are raising new fears that troops from the jihadist I slamic S tate are poised to
attack the system , leading to a power crisis that could kill millions . “Inadequate grid security, a
porous U.S.-Mexico border, and fragile transmission systems make the electric grid a target for ISIS ,”
said Peter Pry, one of the nation’s leading experts on the grid. Others joining Pry at a press conference later Wednesday
to draw attention to the potential threat said that if just a handful of the nation’s high voltage transformers were
knocked out, b lackouts would occur across the country. “By one estimate, should the power go out and stay
out for over a year, nine
out of 10 Americans would likely perish ,” said Frank Gaffney, founder and president of
the Center for Security Policy in Washington. At the afternoon press conference, Gaffney dubbed the potential crisis the "grid
jihad." A lack of electricity would shut off water systems, impact city transportation services and shutdown
hospitals and other big facilities. Fresh and frozen foods also would be impacted as would banks, financial
institutions and utilities. Pry provided details of recent attacks on electricity systems and said that ISIS could easily team
with Mexican drug cartels to ravage America. He told Secrets, for example, that the Knights Templar drug gang
blacked out the electric grid of the Mexican state of Michoacan in 2013 to provide cover for killing those
fighting the drug trade. “The Knights Templars and other criminal gangs in Mexico will do anything for money,
and ISIS , the richest terrorist organization in history, has hundreds of millions of dollars at its
disposal ,” said Pry. “ISIS could hire one of the Mexican cartels, or one of their criminal gangs already in the U.S.,
or activate jihadist terror cells already in the U.S., and inflict a multi-state blackout immediately ,
within days or weeks . Perhaps even a nationwide blackout ,” Pry explained to Secrets. “I am not saying it is likely they will
do so. But given the capabilities and objectives of ISIS and our obvious vulnerabilities, it would be foolish to ignore the
threat to the grid, to regard the threat as unlikely. Our planning should be based on imminent
asymmetrical threats , and not assume that another 9/11 large-scale attack is years away,” he added.
2nc a2: no modeling
Iraq models the U.S. – diplomatic pressure
Saayman 2013 – Matthew, FEDERALISM, TRUST, AND THE PROBLEM OF SECTARIANISM IN IRAQ,
Master’s candidate at the University of Ottawa – public and international affairs,
http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/fr/bitstream/handle/10393/26097/SAAYMAN,%20Matthew%2020135.pdf
?sequence=1
Second, how does a federal system generate trust among the citizenry? I provided an overview of federalism, comparing and contrasting
holding together federations to coming together federations, consociationalism to territorial federalism, and asymmetrical federalism to
symmetrical federalism. Then I examined the concept of trust and its related concept social capital. I described the various forms of trust and
social capital, including particularized and generalized trust, and bridging and bonding social capital, and I examined the apparent relationship
between such forms of trust and social capital and ethnic strife. I proceeded to apply the concepts of trust and federalism to the modern
political history of Ethiopia
and Nigeria. Both are heterogeneous states and political elites of both countries
have struggled to generate a common identity, a ―civic nationalism.‖ While Ethiopia uses a model similar to the
consociational model to mitigate ethnic divisions, Nigeria uses the territorial model for the same purpose. Both models were found wanting in
the way of ameliorating relations between the major groups. Third, will
restructuring Iraqi federal relations contribute to
resolving sectarian tensions? I identified the concept of regional federalism and defined it as a synthesis of consociationalism and
territorial federalism. I examined the articles of Iraq‘s constitution pertaining to federalism and to the treatment of minorities. The Iraqi
constitution is implicitly a regional federal model but in practice has not upheld the rights of minorities or allowed
for a greater devolution of power from the central government. The actual upholding of certain
constitutional provisions, Article 125 and Article 119 for example, could aid in resolving sectarian tensions. But
what is the likelihood of federal relations being restructured? For a peaceful settlement to emerge
between two or more parties, leaders of the conflicting parties must perceive that they are in a situation in which
neither can defeat the other and that an impending catastrophe will harm them both if no settlement is
reached. Thus the timing must be ―ripe‖ for peace.215 This is what Zartman calls the ―mutually-hurting stalemate.‖ What
ended the civil war of 2006-2008 may have been the recognition of such a situation, as some commentators have argued that the reduction in
violence had more to do with fatigue from violence than with prudential leadership.216 217 As of today, it would appear that Iraqi political
elites have yet to perceive a mutually-hurting stalemate. Maliki,
who has condemned federalism, is unlikely to pursue
a policy of restructuring federal relations and he continues to enjoy the support of Tehran and
Washington.218 219 To put pressure on Maliki, Washington could shift its support from the central government
to the KRG, although some analysts worry that doing so could lead to the break-up of Iraq. On the other hand, supporting Erbil would
undermine Iran while benefiting Turkey220 and would also mean supporting a government with a greater commitment to liberal
democracy.221 Critics might point out that it is against Turkish interests to have a more autonomous Kurdistan, given its own problems with
the Kurds. That might be true if we conceive of the state in the realist sense, as a unitary actor. If, on the other hand, we conceive of the state in
more liberal terms, as being made up of a multitude of societal actors222, then in some ways Turkey could benefit from a more autonomous
Kurdistan. Finally, I have neglected to discuss the ongoing conflict in Syria and its effect on Iraqi sectarian tensions. In fact, the sectarian
tensions in Syria are fuelling growing animosity in Iraq. How and when that civil war is resolved will affect the future stability of Iraq. 223
Modeling is supported by history-contains nationalism and violence
Calabresi-prof law Northwestern-95 –Associate Professor at Northwestern University School of Law(Steven, "Symposium: Reflections On United States V. Lopez: "A Government Of Limited And
Enumerated Powers": In Defense Of United States V. Lopez," Michigan Law Review, December 1995,
Lexis)
The fifty years since then have seen the birth of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union,
the European Convention on Human Rights, the British Commonwealth, the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), the GATT, the
NAFTA, and countless other transnational "federal" entities of varying degrees of importance. Many of these were openly inspired by the
success story of American
federalism, which, for example, led many Europeans to want to build a Common
Market that could become a "United States of Europe." While many of these new democratic
transnational entities are very weak, they nonetheless have developed important powers: they have
helped to keep the peace , and in some instances, as with the European Union, they show real potential for
some day attaining essentially all the attributes of sovereignty commonly associated with a
federal nation-state, like the United States. The growth and success of transnational confederal forms since 1945 is
truly astonishing and rightly is viewed by many - either with alarm or with hope - as holding out the eventual prospect of a future global
U.S.-style
constitutional federalism has become the order of the day in an extraordinarily large number
federal government or at least the prospect of several continental-sized federal governments. At the same time,
of [*760] very important countries , some of which once might have been thought of as pure
nation-states. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria, the Russian Federation, Spain, India,
and Nigeria all have decentralized power by adopting constitutions that are significantly more
federalist than the ones they replaced. n25 Many other nations that had been influenced long ago by American
federalism have chosen to retain and formalize their federal structures. Thus, the federalist constitutions of Australia, Canada, Brazil,
Argentina, and Mexico, for example, all are basically alive and well today. As one surveys the world in 1995,
federalism
American-style
is everywhere triumphant , while the forces of nationalism, although
still dangerous, seem to be contained or in retreat. The few remaining highly centralized democratic nation-states like
of some kind or another
Great Britain, n26 France, and Italy all face serious secessionist or devolutionary crises. n27Other highly centralized nation-states, like
China, also seem ripe for a federalist, as well as a democratic, change. Even many existing federal and confederal entities seem to face
serious pressure to devolve power further than they have done so far: thus, Russia, Spain, Canada, and Belgium all have very serious
devolutionary or secessionist movements of some kind. Indeed, secessionist pressure has been so great that some federal structures
recently have collapsed under its weight, as has happened in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union.
2nc a2: no impact
Best studies proves civil conflict in the middle east will spillover and escalate
Russell, senior lecturer, National Security Affairs – Naval Postgraduate School, managing editor –
Strategic Insights, ‘7
(James A, “REGIONAL THREATS AND SECURITY STRATEGY: THE TROUBLING CASE OF TODAY’S MIDDLE
EAST,” Strategic Studies Institute)
The World Economic Forum reports all note the threat posed by geopolitical instability in the Middle East to global security. That
geopolitical instability flows from a discombobulated regional environment that is still rearranging itself
in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion—the most important regional event since the Six-Day War in 1967. The Iraq war has
altered the distribution of power throughout the region, with a number of critical external and internal
elements pressuring regional governing elites:17 • The perceived decline in U.S. global military power and political
influence and a consequent loss of credibility in the American extended deterrent. The global decline in U.S.
political influence is mirrored in the region—and has been particularly exacerbated by the Iraq invasion and its
distraction from a more constructive involvement in the Arab-Israeli dispute. • The emergence of an alliance of powerful
state and nonstate actors: Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and various Shi’ite-based militias and political
organizations in Iraq. Various of these actors have successfully portrayed themselves as representatives of a
“successful” resistance movement opposed to Israel and the United States in Iraq, Lebanon, and the occupied territories. The newfound public legitimacy and popularity of these actors represent a profound challenge to the established ruling elites. • The Sunni state
elites of the Eastern Mediterranean and Gulf states now confront an ascendant Irandominated Shia bloc. As a result, they are
scrambling to build a series of balancing political relationships to fill the vacuum created by the loss of
U.S. influence and the necessity for them to distance themselves from Washington. Iran’s so far successful defiance of the United
States and the international community in its relentless movement toward acquiring a nuclear capability. Its achievement of nuclear status is
one aspect of its enhanced regional power and influence in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. Iran now arguably exercises a
preponderant influence in Iraq—particularly in the south. • Strengthened Islamist political movements throughout the region.
These must now be accommodated by regional regimes. • Anxious regional oil producers. While still dependent on
U.S. military protection, they are actively building political, economic, and military partnerships with outside
powers such as India, China, Russia, and Pakistan.
2nc a2: econ !
Bazzi et al., UCSD economics department, 2011
(Samuel, “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices”,
November,
http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4,
ldg)
VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize logic
lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet we
see no
evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and
unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite
correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of
conflict.
Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with
emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state
prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of
absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in
income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous
independent variable than price volatility. Moreover,
other time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit
robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller
sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues
drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of
revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom
times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most
likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For
example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more
directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup
risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity
cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As
we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t
mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with
psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971).
Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately, however, the fact that
commodity
price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets , but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that
political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One
possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that
the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous.
If a nation is so fragile
that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a
price shock. The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the
1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication
bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks
and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions,
and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability. Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the
majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to
be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is
greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in
the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these.
Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic
robustness checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant
regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this
decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about
problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the
file drawer. In the aggregate, the
consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant
results than ambiguous ones.20
2nc cooperative federalism bad – CAA
2nc impact overview
Competitiveness decline independently triggers great power wars
Baru 9 (Sanjaya, Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore Geopolitical
Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 ,
pages 163 – 168)
The management of the economy, and of the treasury, has been a vital aspect of statecraft from time immemorial.
Kautilya’s Arthashastra says, ‘From the strength of the treasury the army is born. …men without wealth do not attain their
objectives even after hundreds of trials… Only through wealth can material gains be acquired, as elephants (wild) can be captured only by
elephants (tamed)… A
state with depleted resources, even if acquired, becomes only a liability.’4 Hence, economic
policies and performance do have strategic consequences.5 In the modern era, the idea that strong economic
performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. ‘Victory (in war),’ Kennedy
claimed, ‘has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base.’6 Drawing attention to the interrelationships
between economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize
economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that
nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. ‘The fact
remains,’ Kennedy argued, ‘that all of the major shifts in the world’s military-power balance have followed
alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and
states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars , where
victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources.’7
Attack on grid causes nuclear war
Andres and Breetz 11 (Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a
Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of
Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities,
Costs, andTechnological Implications, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)
Grid Vulnerability. DOD
is unable to provide its bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is
offline for an extended period of time. Currently, domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their electricity
from the civilian power grid. As explained in a recent study from the Defense Science Board: DOD’s key problem with electricity is
that critical missions, such as national strategic awareness and national command authorities, are almost entirely dependent on the national
transmission grid . . . [which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity limit, and outside of DOD control. In most cases, neither the grid nor onbase backup power provides www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 262 3 sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and
oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long term (several months) outage. 7 The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003
Northeast blackout in which 50 million people in the United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a week, when one Ohio utility failed
to properly trim trees. The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, border
check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the interdependence of modern infrastructural systems. 8 More recently, awareness has been
growing that the
grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security
suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid could result in a third of the country losing power for a
period of weeks or months. 9 Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for instance, whether existing
terrorist groups might be able to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It
is likely, however, that some nation-states
either have or are working on developing the ability to take down the U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of
these states, it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid would cease to function, taking with them
military bases located in affected regions. Government and private organizations are currently working to secure the grid against
attacks; however, it is not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases currently have backup power that allows them to function for a
period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, the results could be disastrous. First,
military assets taken offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, during
an extended blackout,
global military operations could be seriously compromised; this disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout
was induced during major combat operations. During the Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the making bases more
resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to attack the grid United States and Soviet Union shared the
common understanding that blinding an opponent with a grid blackout
current opponents, however, may not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility.
could escalate to nuclear war. America’s
2nc a2: plan solves
Cooperative federalism reinforces centralization – it is almost wholly dependent on
federal interest
Greve 11 – Michael S., Professor at the George Mason University School of Law, “The State of Our
Federalism” http://www.aei.org/files/2011/09/16/State-of-Federalism-Greve.pdf
The seemingly paradoxical persistence of intergovernmental administrative cooperation is surely due, in
part, to the path dependence produced by a long history of such cooperation . Furthermore, even during
the height of cooperative federalism, cooperation was largely defined as the willingness of state and
local governments to implement federal policies . The theorists of cooperative federalism said little
about reciprocity , namely, federal willingness to cooperate with state and local governments, especially in
the formulation of federal policies, except to argue that the then non-centralized party system served as a
conduit for communicating state and local government views to federal officials and for pressing federal officials to
accommodate state and local government preferences in their policymaking. The transformation of the party system during
the late 1960s, however, virtually eliminated this party conduit , leaving elected state and local
officials out in the cold.
cooperative federalism is anti-federalism
Greve 1 – Michael S., Professor at George Mason University School of Law, “Big Government
Federalism” http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/europe/big-governmentfederalism/
The list of pathologies and phony defenses is easily extended: • Cooperative federalism supposedly
averts a "race to the bottom " among the states (meaning that com-petition for business might induce states to underprovide
public goods). Putting
aside the lack of empirical evidence for that proposition ,3 the competitive
institutional checks that allegedly create a "race to the bottom" also preclude states from adopting
interest group schemes.
The Founding Fathers argued that fewer "partial laws" would well be worth a lost public good here or there.
Cooperative federalism, in contrast, provides interest groups with multiple opportunity and access
points—and celebrates the ensuing scramble.4 • Cooperative federalism is said to preserve flexibility
and sensitivity to varying local needs and circumstances. The point of cooperative federal programs, however,
is to drag states into programs they would not otherwise pursue . Cooperative federalism is thus less
flexible and variegated than competitive federalism. It "preserves flexibility" only in comparison with an
imagined world of wholesale centralization. • Cooperative federalism is supposed to strengthen state
and local self-government. Federal aid, however, now constitutes a whopping 30 percent of state
revenues . The marginal dollar that drives the policy choices is usually the feds’. The recipients are certainly "governing,"
but they are not governing themselves.
2nc can’t solve warming
C. Non-Retroactivity
Miller 13 – R.L., chair of California Democratic Party’s Environmental Caucus, “Will Obama’s New
Power Plant Regulations Really Cut Carbon Pollution?”
http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/09/21/clean-air-act-proposal-cutting-carbon-emissions
This week the Obama administration proposed
its first-ever regulations of carbon dioxide from new coal and natural
gas plants— but the regulations' practical effects may prove to be negligible. Gina McCarthy, the Environmental
Protection Agency chief, announced the proposed Clean Air Act standards, which will cut carbon pollution from new power plants in order to
combat climate change and improve public health. "Climate change is one of the most significant public health challenges of our time,"
McCarthy said in a statement. "By taking common sense action to limit carbon pollution from new power plants, we can slow the effects of
climate change and fulfill our obligation to ensure a safe and healthy environment for our children." The announcement is part of President
Barack Obama's promise to act on climate without Congressional approval; Congress has been gridlocked on energy issues since a cap-andtrade bill passed the House but failed in the Senate in 2009-10. Under the proposed standards, new
coal plants will be held to
1,100 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt/hour, down from the current average of 1,800-to-2,100 pounds per
megawatt/hour. Natural gas-fired plants will be held to 1,000 pounds of carbon dioxide per
megawatt/hour, though emissions from advanced natural gas plants are already below the new
standard, at 800 pounds per megawatt/hour.
Climate scientist Dr. Michael Mann, author of The Hockey Stick and the
Climate Wars, says, "Limiting carbon emissions from coal-fired power plants is an important first step in the wider battle to stabilize greenhouse
gas concentrations before we commit to dangerous, potentially irreversible changes in our climate." Former Vice President and chairman of The
Climate Project, Al Gore, also commended the proposed guidelines in his public statement, "This is a critical achievement for President Barack
Obama and his administration. In the face of an intransigent and inactive Congress, the President has made halting the climate crisis a priority."
But the regulations won't have much of an impact for a while, if at all.
The EPA plans a year-long listening tour, a
60-day comment period, and an army of litigators, so the regulations might not go into effect until fall 2014—just in time to be campaign
fodder in the entirely chimerical "war on coal." More
importantly, new regulations apply to new power plants
only —not the nation's hundreds of existing coal plants—and even new plants will be given up to
seven years to comply.
2nc cooperative federalism bad – disasters
2nc turns disaster reposne
It encourages inaction and blame shifting- Katrina
Wells, University of Missouri School of Law professor, 6 (Christina,” Katrina and the Rhetoric
of Federalism,”http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1391&context=facpubs,
accessed 9-20-14, CMM)
The Bush administration's response
to Hurricane Katrina does, however, highlight some of the potential perils
of cooperative federalism programs. On the one hand, having multiple levels of government provide
disaster relief and response services may be both necessary and beneficial in that it provides a
protective redundancy. 95 But such benefits do not always occur. Critics of cooperative federalism
programs argue that their format of "shared political responsibility" make it increasingly difficult for
citizens to "finger the culprits for government ...train-wrecks."96 In a sense, when everyone is
responsible, no one is responsible , and it becomes difficult to know which government officials are at
fault for problems that result from cooperative federalism programs. As a result, officials can more easily
shift blame -a phenomenon that was reflected in the federal government's response to Katrina. The
cooperative federalism at the core of disaster relief and response efforts allowed the federal
government to focus blame elsewhere rather than on its own failings. Although ultimately unsuccessful on many
levels, the White House succeeded in convincing the House and Senate to pass legislation giving the President authority over the National
Guard in certain circumstances involving natural disasters. 97 There is little evidence that such a law is necessary or justified by the events that
unfolded during Katrina. In fact, most of the investigatory findings suggest the opposite. But the Bush administration was able to point to
Governor Blanco's refusal to voluntarily allow federal military officials to command Louisiana National Guard troops to bolster its claim that
federalism hindered the federal government's response.98 Despite the fact that myriad other problems led to the ineffective military response,
including poor preparation and execution by federal officials, the ability to legitimately claim that federalism was at fault eased the bill's
passage through Congress. The
events of Hurricane Katrina may also reflect the concerns of those who fear
that cooperative federalism programs will concentrate authority in the federal government. 99 There is
little question that state and local governments implement national policy regarding disaster
response and rescue. In fact, the federal government makes clear the importance of having a national policy,' 00 especially via such
tools as the NRP. To be sure, states and localities have some discretion to implement that plan, but conditional funding grants require fairly
rigid adherence to federal standards. 101 Furthermore, state
and local authorities had little input into the original
development of the NRP. 102 As the federal government increasingly focused disaster response on
terrorism after 9/11,103 coupled with its enlarged law enforcement and surveillance powers generally,
one could rightfully wonder whether concerns regarding federal concentration of power had merit.
2nc a2: bioweapons
No impact- bioweapons are ineffective- even if they weren’t their record of failure
deters their use
Stratfor, 2007
(“Bioterrorism: Sudden Death Overtime?" 12-22-2007,
www.lebanonwire.com/0712MLN/07122212STR.asp, ldg)
First, it must be recognized that during
the past several decades of the modern terrorist era, biological weapons have
been used very infrequently — and there are some very good reasons for this. Contrary to their portrayal in movies and television
shows, biological agents are difficult to manufacture and deploy effectively in the real world. In spite of the fear such
substances engender, even in cases in which they have been somewhat effective they have proven to be less
effective and more costly than more conventional attacks using firearms and explosives. In fact, nobody even noticed what
was perhaps the largest malevolent deployment of biological agents in history, in which thousands of gallons of liquid anthrax and
botulinum toxin were released during several attacks in a major metropolitan area over a three-year period. This use of biological agents was perpetrated by the
Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo. An examination of the group’s chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program provides some important insight into
biological weapons, their costs — and their limitations. In the late 1980s, Aum’s team of trained scientists spent millions of dollars to develop a series of state-ofthe-art biological weapons research and production laboratories. The group experimented with botulinum toxin, anthrax, cholera and Q fever and even tried to
acquire the Ebola virus. The group hoped to produce enough biological agent to trigger a global Armageddon. Between April of 1990 and August of 1993, Aum
conducted seven large-scale attacks involving the use of thousands of gallons of biological agents — four with anthrax and three with botulinum toxin. The group’s
first attempts at unleashing mega-death on the world involved the use of botulinum toxin. In April of 1990, Aum used a fleet of three trucks equipped with aerosol
sprayers to release liquid botulinum toxin on targets that included the Imperial Palace, the Diet and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, two U.S. naval bases and the airport
in Narita. In spite of the massive quantities of agent released, there were no mass casualties and, in fact, nobody outside of the cult was even aware the attacks had
taken place. When the botulinum operations failed to produce results, Aum’s scientists went back to the drawing board and retooled their biological weapons
facilities to produce anthrax. By mid-1993, they were ready to launch attacks involving anthrax, and between June and August of 1993 the group sprayed thousands
of gallons of aerosolized liquid anthrax in Tokyo. This time Aum not only employed its fleet of sprayer trucks, but also use sprayers mounted on the roof of their
headquarters to disperse a cloud of aerosolized anthrax over the city. Again, the attacks produced no results and were not even noticed. It was only after the
group’s successful 1995 subway attacks using sarin nerve agent that a Japanese government investigation discovered that the 1990 and 1993 biological attacks had
occurred. Aum Shinrikyo’s team of highly
trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country
with a virtually unlimited budget. The team worked in large, modern facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons.
Despite the millions of dollars the group spent on its bioweapons program, it still faced problems in creating virulent biological agents, and it also
found it difficult to dispense those agents effectively. Even when the group switched to employing a nerve agent, it only
succeeded in killing a handful of people. A comparison between the Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway attack and the jihadist attack against the
Madrid trains in 2004 shows that chemical/biological attacks are more expensive to produce and yield fewer results than attacks using conventional explosives. In
the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack — Aum’s most successful — the group placed 11 sarin-filled plastic bags on five different subway
trains and killed 12 people. In the 2004 Madrid attack, jihadists detonated 10 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and killed 191 people.
Aum’s CBW program cost millions and took years of research and effort; the Madrid bombings only cost
a few thousand dollars, and the IEDs were assembled in a few days. The most deadly biological terrorism attack to date was the case
involving a series of letters containing anthrax in the weeks following the Sept. 11 attacks — a case the FBI calls Amerithrax. While the Amerithrax letters did cause
panic and result in companies all across the country temporarily shutting down if a panicked employee spotted a bit of drywall dust or powdered sugar from
doughnuts eaten by someone on the last shift, in practical terms, the attacks were very ineffective. The Amerithrax letters resulted in five deaths; another 22
victims were infected but recovered after receiving medical treatment. The letters did not succeed in infecting senior officials at the media companies targeted by
the first wave of letters, or Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, who were targeted by a second wave of letters. By way of comparison, John Mohammed, the socalled “D.C. Sniper,” was able to cause mass panic and kill twice as many people (10) by simply purchasing and using one assault rifle. This required far less time,
effort and expense than producing the anthrax spores used in the Amerithrax case. It
is this cost-benefit ratio t hat, from a militant’s
perspective, makes firearms and explosives more attractive weapons for an attack. This then is the
primary reason that more attacks using biological weapons have not been executed: The cost is higher than the benefit.
****A2: add-ons
A2: prez power
No risk of nuclear war
Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the
Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for
Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A
Reconsideration”, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf)
In the
hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare.
However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the
purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi
experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by
public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is
7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse.
true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive
warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country
with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies
we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the
preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might
as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical
sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the
White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting
policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry,
however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total
security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of
government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to
preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is
a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a
debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.
that supposedly can restore security. But
Cartels
2nc legalization fails
Switch to other industries
Morris, Belfer Center International Security Program research fellow, 2013
(Evelyn, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels”, 12-3,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels, ldg)
"The Problem Is the War on Drugs. Legalization Would Help." Hardly. Legalization has become an increasingly popular, if still controversial, proposal among those
who think that the costs of the war on drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like Guatemalan President Otto
Pérez Molina. But
because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal drugs, the disappearance of one
revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode their power. Even if the cartels
were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that legalization is a binary switch that
would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed. In the context of drugs like marijuana, "legalization"
implies wide availability and fairly easy access, but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove all, or
even many, restrictions on drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics
intact. What's more, even legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is
tightly controlled. Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and
sold in the United States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled
Substances Act. Those restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market in the drug, with prices reaching as high as
$150 per pill. Licit drugs can also create highly profitable arbitrage opportunities for enterprising criminals
if the laws that govern their distribution differ from state to state, as would likely be the case if
marijuana or other drugs were widely legalized. Cigarettes are legal, yet interstate cigarette smuggling makes a
great deal of money for organized crime; because of differing state tax rates, the opportunity for profit is substantial.
Virginia, for example, which has among the lowest cigarette taxes in the nation, is grappling with increased criminal activity, because of trafficking to high-tax states
like New York and New Jersey. (And Virginia's hardly the only one; other states, like Texas, have even seen armed hijackings of cigarette trucks.)
Legalization just shifts the violence to other industires and different parts of the
country—the root cause is the unjust judicial system.
Smith, Warwick Latin America history professor, 2013
(Benjamin, “Legalising marijuana is no easy fix for Mexico’s drug problem”, 8-27,
http://theconversation.com/legalising-marijuana-is-no-easy-fix-for-mexicos-drug-problem-17146, ldg)
In fact, it
is even open to debate as to whether US legalisation would improve the situation. Economists argue that up to
60% of the cartels’ money comes from the sale of marijuana. Mexico’s most important criminal organisation, the Sinaloa cartel, probably gains an even greater
proportion of its wealth from the drug. Yet, would cutting off the cash from cannabis change much? Some
traffickers would move more
heavily into cocaine transportation and methamphetamine production. And conflicts over routes would
continue . Others might shift into the legal marijuana trade, building on their contacts with peasant growers to dominate the
Yet, this could cause its own problems. For centuries , the introduction of commercial crops
into rural Mexico has caused bloody disputes. High profits not only lead to increased tension over
land and commercial control, but also the breakdown of traditional systems of conflict resolution and
social balance. In the 1950s, conflicts over the cultivation and commercial monopoly of coffee production caused what observers
described as “civil wars” in coffee growing regions like Oaxaca, Guerrero and Veracruz. In southern Oaxaca, family blood feuds and inter-village fire fights
new industry.
pushed the homicide rate up to over 300 murders per 100,000. (In comparison, the murder rate in Ciudad Juarez in 2009 was 130 per 100,000.)
Legalising
marijuana then might simply shift the battlefield from the desert-bound cities of the north to the
poor rural villages of the south.
As Alfredo Corchado, one of the leading journalists on the war on drugs and author of the devastating portrait
of the country’s decline, Midnight in Mexico, has recently argued, debate about legalisation is a little more than a sideshow. Mexico’s
fundamental
problem is still the complete lack of a functioning judicial system. In Mexico there are no open
hearings and no juries. Judges remain subservient to politicians and the system determines one guilty
until proven innocent. It is these legal problems, and not the drug trade itself, that add up to a
structure where murderers regularly walk free . The jails, meanwhile, remain full of the innocent, the poor, and the indigenous.
Only when this is resolved will the real murder rates - and not the heavily massaged official figures truly fall.
2nc hege d
Can’t leverage hegemony
Maher, Brown political science professor, 2011
(Richard, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a PostUnipolar World”, Orbis, 55.1, Science Direct, ldg)
At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as
universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades,
perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its
position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At
The absence of constraints and
America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And
times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world.
because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the
policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in
particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its
period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens
in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia,
the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive
terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when
excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a
and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade,
troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the
considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve
to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape
world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The
United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and
risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose
important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to
exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek
Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent
states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an
acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly
to maintain their preeminence in the international system.
compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to
overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the
feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine
that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive
war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge
costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost
are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American
military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world
politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are
necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states
are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that
result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all
over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded
NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own
democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism;
imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans
for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global
financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges
ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously
is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S.
could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The
attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of
Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based
on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms
of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain.
Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of
maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other
countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to
help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or
the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial
markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world,
particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American
security guarantee for their own security.
Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social
welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an
additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is
expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its
reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is
further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States
dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate
increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence
in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals.
Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it
As a result of both its
vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States
have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors
give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast
disparity i
is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest.
n power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In
societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s
own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific
American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral
decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore
friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force
A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have
provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a
could be used.
number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu
Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand
anti-American
sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and
priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’
evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of
dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had
Now that the United
States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous
courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making
these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s
European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the
equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create
incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce
their security relationships with the United States.
with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II.
1nr
CP
Condo
1. Neg flex-aff gets to pick the focus of the debate-that means we need options to
compensate for reactionary and concessionary ground.
2. Information process-multiple options force 2AC efficiency and best answers-which
focuses the debate and increases critical thinking
3. Logic-proving the CP bad doesn’t prove the plan is good-logic outweighs because it
is key to make any portable skill meaningful
4. Ideological flex-only way to read a K and a CP in the same round-alternatives result
in community schisms.
5. Skews are inevitable-T violations and case defense are no risk and it is the NEG’s job
to generate time imbalances
6. They should have to defend opportunity costs-any other interp artificially insultates
the AFF from testing
Prohibition
Can’t Solve
Overwhelming suspicion of US drug policy the AFF can’t overcome—there’s
disagreements regarding regulations and nonenforcement practices that means the
AFF doesn’t spillover—that’s Gomis
Aids Impact
It’s becoming less lethal over the years which proves their ev is alarmism—that’s
World Now
---AIDS won’t cause extinction --- Doesn’t kill fast enough.
Caldwell 2000
Joseph, PhD in mathmatics @ The University of North Carolina, "The End of the World, and the New World Order," March
6, http://www.foundationwebsite.org/TheEndOfTheWorld.htm
Disease could wipe out mankind. It is clear that HIV/AIDS will not accomplish this – it is not even having
a significant impact on slowing the population explosion in Africa, where prevalence rates reach over
thirty percent in some countries. But a real killer plague could certainly wipe out mankind. The interesting thing about plagues,
however, is that they never seem to kill everyone – historically, the mortality rate is never 100 per cent (from disease alone). Based on
historical evidence, it would appear that, while plagues may certainly reduce human population, they are not
likely to wipe it out entirely. This notwithstanding, the gross intermingling of human beings and other species that accompanies
globalization nevertheless increases the likelihood of global diseases to high levels
Food Impact
Countries at risk of food shocks are preparing in the status quo and have sufficient
stocks to overcome price increases which solves the impact—that’s WFP
No empirical basis for a resource war
Salehyan, University of North Texas assistant political science professor, 2008
(Idean, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet”, Journal of Peace Research, 45.3, SAGE,
ldg)
A few caveats are in order here. It is important to note, again, that the most severe effects of climate change are likely to be felt in the future, and the future is
inherently uncertain.4 While fundamental shifts in the environment are not inconceivable, our best bet for predicting what is to come is to look at what has
transpired in the past. Since it is frequently argued that climate change will lead to resource scarcities and exacerbate inequality, it is possible to draw upon past
evidence regarding these factors to develop a sense of how conflicts might unfold given changes in the Earth’s atmosphere. Additionally, I do not take issue with the
claim that climate change will present considerable challenges for human societies and ecosystems more generally. Humanitarian crises stemming, in part, from
climate change have the potential to be severe, and steps must be taken quickly to attenuate such contingencies. Rather, my purpose here is to underscore the
point that environmental processes, by themselves, cannot
explain why, where, and when fighting will occur; rather,
the interaction between environmental and political systems is critical for understanding organized armed violence. First, the deterministic view has poor predictive
power as to where and when conflicts will break out. For
every potential example of an environmental catastrophe or
resource shortfall that leads to violence, there are many more counter-examples in which conflict
never occurs. But popular accounts typically do not look at the dogs that do not bark. Darfur is frequently cited as a case
where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing.5 Yet, food scarcity and hunger
are problems endemic to many countries – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – but similar problems elsewhere have
not led to large-scale violence. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, food shortages and malnutrition
affect more than a third of the population in Malawi, Zambia, the Comoros, North Korea, and Tanzania,6
although none of these countries have experienced fullblown civil war and state failure. Hurricanes, coastal flooding, and
droughts – which are all likely to intensify as the climate warms – are frequent occurrences which rarely lead to violence. The Asian Tsunami of 2004,
although caused by an oceanic earthquake, led to severe loss of life and property, flooding, population displacement, and resource scarcity, but
it did not trigger new wars in Southeast Asia. Large-scale migration has the potential to provoke conflict in receiving areas (see Reuveny,
2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), yet most migration flows do not lead to conflict, and, in this regard, social integration and citizenship
policies are particularly important (Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan, 2007). In short, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts
are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare; therefore, environmental conditions, by themselves, cannot
predict violent outbreaks. Second, even if local skirmishes over access to resources arise, these do not
always escalate to open warfare and state collapse. While interpersonal violence is more or less common and
may intensify under resource pressures, sustained armed conflict on a massive scale is difficult to
conduct. Meier, Bond & Bond (2007) show that, under certain circumstances, environmental conditions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East
Africa, but these conflicts rarely escalate to sustained violence. Martin (2005) presents evidence from Ethiopia that, while a large refugee influx and population
pressures led to localized conflict over natural resources, effective resource management regimes were able to ameliorate these tensions. Both of these studies
emphasize the role of local
dispute-resolution regimes and institutions – not just the response of central governments – in
preventing resource conflicts from spinning out of control. Martin’s analysis also points to the importance of international
organizations, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in implementing effective policies governing refugee camps. Therefore, local hostilities need not
escalate to serious armed conflict and can be managed if there is the political will to do so.
DA
OV
Iran proliferation outweighs the AFF—it results in cascading proliferation which
destabilizes the entire region—existence of many nukes in the Middle East means
escalation is likely and high risk of use because deterrence breaks down and security
commitments exist
1NC had Israel stikes internal link—nuclear war
Reuveny, PhD, Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana
University, 10 (Rafael, "Unilateral Strike on Iran could trigger world Depression", Op-ed distributed
through McClatchy Newspaper Co,
http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml, accessed
12-26-13, CMM)
A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a
regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed,
it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full
force.¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are
not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.¶ All of these widely spread
facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and,
likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear
facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and
enlarged its armed forces.¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even
numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. ¶ A regional war¶ Unlike Iraq,
whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of
Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might
compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a
regional war.¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of
weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and betterequipped opponents.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and
terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence
of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear
weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s
capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash
global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red
Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production
declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients.
Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.¶ The world economy would
head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United
States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and
maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and
openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ Replaying Nixon’s nightmare¶ Russia and China might rearm their
injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R.
threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert,
replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows
that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be
muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using
force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed
necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A
unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.
AT: Negs fail now
Obama has the political capital to hold off Congressional attempts to derail
negotiations with Iran – his leadership galvanizes Senate Democrats to his side and
gives him leverage to dominate the public debate over Iran – that’s Hassibi.
Prefer our evidence – not only is it predictive of how the legislative session will play
out BUT it also cites the debates last winter as proof that a concerted push from
Obama can overcome anti-Iran factions in Congress. PC solves all of the non-uniques.
Tobin, Commentary, 9-29-14 (Jonathan, “Who Will Show Leadership on Iran?,”
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2014/09/29/who-will-show-leadership-on-iran-ted-cruz/,
accessed 10-4-14, CMM)
One of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s goals in his speech today before the United Nations General Assembly was to put the debate about
Iran’s nuclear program back on the international community’s front burner. But whether he succeeded or not—and given the hate for Israel
that is integral to the culture of the UN it is unlikely that many nations will heed his warnings about the moral equivalence between ISIS and
Hamas Iran—the real question that needs to be asked is why
the Iranian threat has dropped off the radar screen here
in the United States in the last year and whether anyone of stature in this country is willing to speak up consistently and forcefully on
the issue. Shutting down the debate about Iran is one of President Obama’s few political triumphs during
his second term . Though the president pledged to shut down Iran’s nuclear program during his
campaigne for reelection, his main focus after his victory was on appeasing Tehran and enticing the
Islamist regime to sign an interim nuclear deal that undermined economic sanctions while doing
nothing to end the threat. Having squandered immense political, economic, and military leverage over Iran in order to secure that
agreement, he then branded critics of this travesty as warmongers. With the help of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, he was able to
squelch efforts to increase sanctions on Iran if negotiations failed despite the support of majorities in
the both Houses of Congress for a measure that would have strengthened his hand in talks with the ayatollahs. Since the
collapse of that effort, the issue has remained largely dormant in the U.S. as diplomacy with Iran has
remained largely under the radar. And while conservatives can generally be counted on to attack virtually any Obama initiative, let
alone one as misguided as his attempt at engagement with Iran, many on the right have been far more interested in following Senator Rand
Paul’s lead in criticizing the president’s misuse of executive authority rather than sounding the alarms about Iran. Even if, in the wake of the
new concerns about the rise of the ISIS terrorist movement, it appears that the isolationist moment in American politics may be fading, the
president is probably right if he thinks he still has plenty of room to maneuver in negotiating a new
Iran deal that may be even more dangerous than last year’s accord. Given the leaks about possible
compromises—including the absurd one last week about an American proposal that Iran disconnect the pipes that link the centrifuges
that enrich the uranium used for nuclear fuel—there is little doubt about the administration’s zeal for a deal. In
response, Iran has stiffened its demands to the point where it is clear that any accord will leave their nuclear infrastructure in place and quickly
eviscerate sanctions while making it impossible to re-impose them even if it quickly became clear that Tehran wasn’t keeping its promises. But
in the absence of serious debate about the issue or the willingness of GOP leaders to draw a line in
the sand on the nuclear issue, it is possible to envisage a repeat of last year ’s fiasco in which critics of
Iran appeasement were routed by the administration.
Obama will successful hold off sanctions and a vote on the deal now
WSJ, 10-14-14 (“Obama, Congress and Iran; The White House denies the Senate a say on a Tehran
arms deal.,” proquest, accessed 10-19-14, CMM)
Lost in the chaos of the Middle East is that the United States and Iran are fast approaching next month's
deadline to strike a deal on Tehran's nuclear program. This has been teed up for years as the crown
jewel of President Obama's foreign-policy legacy. On current course, it's more likely to end up as another setback to U.S.
security. President Obama 's insistence on consulting largely with himself on the world's most complex issues is well known. Most
troublesome for the outcome with Iran is his rejection of needed support from Congress. The Administration
is currently leaning on
Democrats in the Senate to block an attempt by Republicans to give Congress a say on any Iran
accord. In late July, Bob Corker, Lindsey Graham, Marco Rubio and John McCain--the GOP's strongest voices on foreign policy-introduced the "Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act of 2014." The bill compels the Administration to submit
any agreement for Senate review within three days of completion. If Iran walks away from the table
without a deal, the sanctions waived last November would be immediately reimposed. The bill also
puts in place a quick mechanism to reimpose sanctions in case Iran cheats on a deal. Both provisions are
sensible safeguards. Unlike previous sanctions legislation, this effort has failed to get a single Democratic co-sponsor.
New Jersey Sen. Robert Menendez, the otherwise hawkish Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has refused to mark up the bill.
Democratic skeptics on Iran say they're holding their political powder to look closely at a final
agreement. But by then the White House will be turning up the heat on Democrats to support what Mr.
Obama will portray as his signature diplomatic achievement. In his first Inaugural address, President Obama extended a
hand to Tehran's mullahs, and the interim nuclear deal struck last November was the first concrete step toward that goal. Iran froze work on
advanced centrifuges, and the U.S. and European Union rolled back some economic sanctions. The two sides were supposed to strike a final
agreement by July but extended talks to Nov. 24. Throughout the negotiations, however, the Obama Administration has gone out of its way to
weaken the U.S. negotiating hand. Earlier
this year, the White House twisted arms in the Senate to abandon a
bipartisan bill, co-sponsored by 60 of the chamber's 100 legislators, that put in place stronger
sanctions against Iran in case those talks failed. Despite Mr. Obama's opposition, the Senate had led the push to hit Iran's
economy harder, forcing the regime to the table. Noting Iran's opposition to this year's sanctions bill, Administration officials said
they wanted to send a goodwill gesture to Tehran. As the summer deadline extension showed, the Iranians offered nothing
in return.
AT: Midterms
This card says nothing—but if they make the arg that post-Midterm GOP leads to deal
failure that’s irrelevant because PC is sufficient to hold them off
Leverett, professor at Pennsylvania State University’s School of International Affairs,
and Leverett, Senior Professorial Lecturer at the American University, 11-10-13
(Flynt and Hillary Mann, “Nuclear Negotiations and America’s Moment of Truth About Iran,”
http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/?q=node/13358, accessed 11-14-13, CMM)
During Obama’s presidency, many U.S. sanctions initially imposed by executive order have been
written into law. These bills—signed, with little heed to their long-term consequences, by Obama himself—have also greatly
expanded U.S. secondary sanctions, which threaten to punish third-country entities not for anything they’ve done in America, but
for perfectly lawful business they conduct in or with Iran. The bills contain conditions for removing sanctions stipulating not just the dismantling
of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but also termination of Tehran’s ties to movements like Hizballah that Washington (foolishly) designates as
Obama administration may have
managed to delay passage of yet another sanctions bill for a few weeks—but Congressional Democrats
no less than congressional Republicans have made publicly clear that they will not relax conditions for
removing existing sanctions to help Obama conclude and implement a nuclear deal. If their obstinacy
holds, why should others respect Washington’s high-handed demands for compliance with its
extraterritorial (hence, illegal) sanctions against Iran?¶ Going into the next round of nuclear talks in Geneva on
Thursday, it is unambiguously plain that Obama will have to spend enormous political capital to realign
relations with Iran. America’s future standing as a great power depends significantly on his readiness
to do so.
terrorists and the Islamic Republic’s effective transformation into a secular liberal republic.¶ The
AT: Fail Now
Their ev is speculation – ours is descriptive
PC is effective and being used now to keep deal in place
Silverman, San Diego Jewish World, 2-7-14
(Noah, Republican Jewish Coalition, “RJC: Obama pressure forces AIPAC reversal on Iran,”
http://www.sdjewishworld.com/2014/02/07/rjc-obama-pressure-forces-aipac-reversal-iran/, accessed
2-7-14
What happened next should trouble every pro-Israel American deeply. The Obama administration unleashed
an unprecedented
campaign to portray Kirk, Menendez and their backers as ‘warmongers.’¶ And they enlisted
Democratic members of non-partisan pro-Israel organizations to work from within to undermine the
push for Kirk-Menendez.¶ The Obama White House’s tactics have been disgraceful. But they’ve clearly had an effect.
Democratic Kirk-Menendez cosponsors endorsed delaying a vote on the legislation they ostensibly
support. Liberal news outlets attacked Republicans as ‘partisan’ for demanding a vote on bipartisan
legislation.¶ And now the most prominent organization in the coalition of activist groups supporting
Kirk-Menendez – the American Israel Public Affairs Committee – has reversed itself and is calling for
Senate action on Kirk-Menendez to be delayed.
But, diminished capital means Dems defect
Krasuhaar, National Journal, 11-21-13
(Josh, National Journal, “The Iran Deal Puts Pro-Israel Democrats in a Bind”
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-iran-deal-puts-pro-israel-democrats-in-a-bind20131121, accessed 1-24-14, CMM)
All of this
puts Democrats, who routinely win overwhelming support from Jewish Americans on Election Day,
in an awkward position. Do they stand with the president on politically sensitive foreign policy issues,
or stake their own course? That difficult dynamic is currently playing out in Congress, where the
Obama administration is resisting a Senate push to maintain tough sanctions against Iran. This week,
Obama met with leading senators on the Banking and Foreign Relations committees to dissuade them from their efforts while diplomacy is
underway.¶ "There's
a fundamental disagreement between the vast majority of Congress and the
president when it comes to increasing Iran sanctions right now," said one Democratic operative involved in the
advocacy efforts. "Pro-Israel groups, like AIPAC, try to do things in a bipartisan way; they don't like open confrontation. But in this instance, it's
hard."¶ That awkwardness has been evident in the lukewarm reaction from many of Obama's Senate Democratic allies to the administration's outreach to Iran.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez of New Jersey said last week he was concerned that the administration seems "to want the deal
almost more than the Iranians." Normally outspoken Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York, a reliable ally of Israel, has been conspicuously quiet about his views on the
negotiations. In a CNN interview this month, Democratic Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz of Florida, whose job as chairwoman of the Democratic National
Committee is to defend the president, notably declined to endorse the administration's approach, focusing instead on Obama's past support of sanctions. This,
despite the full-court press from Secretary of State John Kerry, a former congressional colleague. ¶ On Tuesday, after meeting with Obama, Menendez and Schumer
signed a bipartisan letter to Kerry warning the administration about accepting a deal that would allow Iran to continue its nuclear program. The letter was also
signed by Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., Susan Collins, R-Maine, and Robert Casey, D-Pa.¶ Democrats, of course, realize that the president plays
an outsized role in the policy direction of his party. Just as George W. Bush moved the Republican Party in a more hawkish direction during his war-riven presidency,
Obama is nudging Democrats away from their traditionally instinctive support for the Jewish state. "I can't remember the last time the differences [between the
U.S. and Israel] were this stark," said one former Democratic White House official with ties to the Jewish community. "There's now a little more freedom [for
progressive Democrats] to say what they want to say, without fear of getting their tuchus kicked by the organized Jewish community."¶ A Gallup survey conducted
this year showed 55 percent of Democrats sympathizing with the Israelis over the Palestinians, compared with 78 percent of Republicans and 63 percent of
independents who do so. A landmark Pew poll of American Jews, released in October, showed that 35 percent of Jewish Democrats said they had little or no
attachment to Israel, more than double the 15 percent of Jewish Republicans who answered similarly. At the 2012 Democratic National Convention, many delegates
booed a platform proposal supporting the move of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In 2011, Democrats lost Anthony Weiner's heavily Jewish,
solidly Democratic Brooklyn House seat because enough Jewish voters wanted to rebuke the president's perceived hostility toward Israel. ¶ Pro-Israel advocacy
groups rely on the mantra that support for Israel carries overwhelming bipartisan support, a maxim that has held true for decades in Congress. But most also
reluctantly acknowledge the growing influence of a faction within the Democratic Party that is more critical of the two countries' close relationship. Within the
Jewish community, that faction is represented by J Street, which positions itself as the home for "pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans" and supports the Iran
negotiations. "Organizations that claim to represent the American Jewish community are undermining [Obama's] approach by pushing for new and harsher
penalties against Iran," the group wrote in an action alert to its members.¶ Some supporters of Israel view J Street with concern. "There's a small cadre of people
that comes from the progressive side of the party that are in the business of blaming Israel first. There's a chorus of these guys," said a former Clinton
administration foreign policy official. "But that doesn't make them the dominant folks in the policy space of the party, or the Hill."¶ Pro-Israel activists worry
that one of the ironies of Obama's situation is that as his poll numbers sink, his interest in striking a deal with Iran will grow because he'll be
looking for any bit of positive news that can draw attention away from the health care law's problems. Thus
far, Obama's
diminished political fortunes aren't deterring Democrats from protecting the administration's
prerogatives. Congressional sources expect the Senate Banking Committee, chaired by South Dakota Democrat
Tim Johnson, to hold off on any sanctions legislation until there's a resolution to the Iranian negotiations. ¶
But if Obama's standing continues to drop , and negotiations produce a deal that Israel doesn't like, don't be surprised
to see Democrats become less hesitant about going their own way.
Link
Obama will face massive opposition from conservative groups which swamps his PC—
that’s Daw
Their card says popular with specific lobbies—that just proves it’ll be a legislative fight
GOP hates it
Fang, Huff Post, 7-31-14 (Marina, “Congressional Republicans Rail Against Legalization Of
Marijuana,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/31/colorado-marijuanalegalization_n_5638758.html, accessed 8-30-14, CMM)
Congressional Republicans on Thursday railed against states that have legalized marijuana, citing its
connection to auto accidents. During a hearing entitled "Planes, Trains and Automobiles: Operating While Stoned," Rep. John
Mica (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Government Operations, said stronger federal
regulations on marijuana were needed in light of the wave of states legalizing the drug for medical
and recreational uses. Rep. John Fleming (R-La.) joined in the criticism, attacking Colorado's recent decision
to legalize recreational marijuana. Fleming cited a study by the University of Colorado at Denver
showing an increase in marijuana-related traffic fatalities since the state legalized medicinal
marijuana in 2009. He implied that a further loosening of restrictions on marijuana is a slippery slope,
especially for young people. "As marijuana is de-stigmatized, use goes up, and it finds its way into the homes and candy and cookies and baked
goods, and once it gets there, it finds its way into the brains of teens," he said. "Marijuana will also become more pervasive as states continue
to embrace permissible laws on medical marijuana and the recreational use of marijuana, and kids and youth will have easier access to the
dangerous, addictive drug." Committee
members also argued for a federal standard for drug-testing drivers.
AT: PC low
Obama approval is rebounding now
Pianin, The Fiscal Times, 10-20-14 (Eric, “Obama Gets Surprising Bump in Approval Amid
Widespread Criticism,” http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2014/10/20/Obama-Gets-Surprising-BumpApproval-Amid-Widespread-Criticism#sthash.uiSkGFD2.dpuf,
Despite relentless criticism of his handling of the Ebola crisis, ISIS and the economy, President Obama
appears to be enjoying a bump in his approval rating just two weeks before the mid-term election – at
least in one poll. A new Zogby Analytics Poll conducted online October 15-16 showed a slight rebound
in Obama’s approval rating – from 43 percent in September to 46 percent. The nationwide poll of 887
likely voters has a margin of error of +/-3.4 percentage points. Writing for Forbes.com, veteran pollster
John Zogby said, “While critics and opponents are having a field day charging that Mr. Obama is
probably not up to the job, the public doesn’t appear to be giving up on him.”