Plan
In the absence of an individually-tailored warrant obtained via use of a specific
selector term, federal intelligence agencies should cease collection of domestic
phone, internet, email, and associated electronic records. This should include, but
not be limited to, ending the monitoring of United States persons under Sections 214
and 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act; Executive Order 12333; and Section 702 of the
FISA Amendments Act.
Advantage One is HUMINT
Information overload drains resources and trades off with targeted surveillance
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, “Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted Boston Marathon
Bombing: The former NSA contractor says a focus on mass surveillance is impeding traditional intelligencegathering efforts—and allowing terrorists to succeed”, October 20, 2014, ak.)
Edward Snowden on Monday suggested
that if the National Security Agency focused more on traditional
intelligence gathering—and less on its mass-surveillance programs—it could have thwarted the 2013 Boston
Marathon bombings. The fugitive leaker, speaking via video to a Harvard class, said that a preoccupation with collecting bulk
communications data has led to resource constraints at U.S. intelligence agencies, often leaving more
traditional, targeted methods of spying on the back burner. "We miss attacks, we miss leads, and
investigations fail because when the government is doing its 'collect it all,' where we're watching
everybody, we're not seeing anything with specificity because it is impossible to keep an eye on all of
your targets," Snowden told Harvard professor and Internet freedom activist Lawrence Lessig. "A good example of this is, actually, the Boston
Marathon bombings." Snowden said that Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev were pointed out by Russian intelligence to U.S.
officials prior to the bombings last year that killed three and left hundreds wounded, but that such actionable
intelligence was largely ignored. He argued that targeted surveillance on known extremists and diligent
pursuit of intelligence leads provides for better counterterrorism efforts than mass spying. "We didn't
really watch these guys and the question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of that is because we do have finite
resources and the question is, should we be spending 10 billion dollars a year on mass-surveillance programs of
the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective means of traditional [targeting]?" Anti-spying
activists have frequently argued that bulk data collection has no record of successfully thwarting a
terrorist attack, a line of argument some federal judges reviewing the NSA's programs have also used in their legal reviews of the activities.
Snowden's suggestion—that such mass surveillance has not only failed to directly stop a threat, but actually
makes the U.S. less safe by distracting resource-strapped intelligence officials from performing their
jobs—takes his criticism of spy programs to a new level. "We're watching everybody that we have no reason to be
watching simply because it may have value, at the expense of being able to watch specific people for which we
have a specific cause for investigating, and that's something that we need to look carefully at how to
balance," Snowden said.
The plan solves –
1) Creates effective surveillance methods
Walt, 14 (Stephen M. Walt is the (real papa Walt) and Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The
Big Counterterrorism Counterfactual Is the NSA actually making us worse at fighting terrorism?”,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/10/counterterrorism_spying_nsa_islamic_state_terrorist_cve, November 10, 2014, ak.)
The head of the British electronic spy agency GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, created a minor flap last week in an article he wrote for the Financial Times.
In effect, Hannigan argued that more robust encryption procedures by private Internet companies were unwittingly aiding terrorists such as the Islamic
State (IS) or al Qaeda, by making it harder for organizations like the NSA and GCHQ to monitor online traffic. The implication was clear: The more
that our personal privacy is respected and protected, the greater the danger we will face from evildoers. It's a serious issue, and democracies that want
to respect individual privacy while simultaneously keeping citizens safe are going to have to do a much better job of reassuring us that vast and
(mostly) secret surveillance capabilities overseen by unelected officials such as Hannigan won't be abused. I tend to favor the privacy side of the
argument, both because personal freedoms are hard to get back once lost, but also because there's not much evidence that these surveillance activities
are making us significantly safer. They seem to be able to help us track some terrorist leaders, but there's a lively debate among scholars over whether
tracking and killing these guys is an effective strategy. The
fear of being tracked also forces terrorist organizations to
adopt less efficient communications procedures, but it doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a
fair bit of harm regardless. The fear of being tracked also forces terrorist organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures,
but it doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm regardless. So here's a wild counterfactual for you to ponder: What would the
United States, Great Britain, and other wealthy and powerful nations do if they didn't have these vast
surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn't have armed drones, cruise missiles, or other implements
of destruction that can make it remarkably easy (and in the short-term, relatively cheap) to target anyone they
suspect might be a terrorist? Assuming that there were still violent extremists plotting various heinous acts, what would these
powerful states do if the Internet was there but no one knew how to spy on it? For starters, they'd have to rely more heavily on
tried-and-true counterterrorism measures: infiltrating extremist organizations and flipping existing
members, etc., to find out what they were planning, head attacks off before they occurred, and eventually roll up organization themselves.
States waged plenty of counterterrorism campaigns before the Internet was invented, and while it can be
difficult to infiltrate such movements and find their vulnerable points, it's not exactly an unknown art. If we couldn't spy on
them from the safety of Fort Meade, we'd probably be doing a lot more of this. Second, if we didn't
have all these expensive high-tech capabilities, we might spend a lot more time thinking about how
to discredit and delegitimize the terrorists' message, instead of repeatedly doing things that help
them make their case and recruit new followers. Every time the United States goes and pummels
another Muslim country -- or sends a drone to conduct a "sign ature strike" -- it reinforces the jihadis' claim that
the West has an insatiable desire to dominate the Arab and Islamic world and no respect for Muslim
life. It doesn't matter if U.S. leaders have the best of intentions, if they genuinely want to help these
societies, or if they are responding to a legitimate threat; the crude message that drones, cruise
missiles, and targeted killings send is rather different. If we didn't have all these cool high-tech
hammers, in short, we'd have to stop treating places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria as if
they were nails that just needed another pounding, and we might work harder at marginalizing our
enemies within their own societies. To do that, we would have to be building more effective partnerships
with authoritative sources of legitimacy within these societies, including religious leaders. Our
failure to do more to discredit these movements is perhaps the single biggest shortcoming of the
entire war on terror, and until that failure is recognized and corrected, the war will never end. Third, and
somewhat paradoxically, if we didn't have drones and the NSA, we'd have to think more seriously about
boots on the ground , at least in some places. But having to think harder about such decisions might be a
good thing, because it would force the United States (or others) to decide which threats were really
serious and which countries really mattered. It might even lead to the conclusion that any sort of military intervention is
counterproductive. As we've seen over the past decade, what the NSA, CIA, and Special Ops Command do
is in some ways too easy: It just doesn't cost that much to add a few more names to the kill list, to
vacuum up a few more terabytes of data, or to launch a few more drones in some new country, and all the more so
when it's done under the veil of secrecy. I'm not saying that our current policy is costless or that special operations aren't risky; my point is that such
activities are still a lot easier to contemplate and authorize than a true "boots on the ground"
operation. By making it easier, however, the capabilities make it easier for our leaders to skirt the more fundamental
questions about interests and strategy. It allows them to "do something," even when what is being done won't
necessarily help. Lastly, if U.S. leaders had to think harder about where to deploy more expensive
resources, they might finally start thinking about the broader set of U.S. and Western policies that
have inspired some of these movements in the first place. Movements like IS, al Qaeda, al-Nusra Front, al-Shabab, or
the Taliban are in some ways indigenous movements arising from local circumstances, but they did not
spring up out of nowhere and the United States (and other countries) bear some (though not all) blame for their emergence and growth. To say this is
neither to defend nor justify violent extremism, nor to assert that all U.S. policies are wrong; it is merely to acknowledge that there
is a causal
connection between some of what we do and some of the enemies we face. But if some of the things
the United States (or its allies) is doing are making it unpopular in certain parts of the world, and if some of
that unpopularity gets translated into violent extremism that forces us to spend hundreds of billions
of dollars trying to protect ourselves, then maybe we ought to ask ourselves if every single one of those
policies makes sense and is truly consistent with U.S. interests and values. And if not, then maybe we ought to change some of them, if only
to take some steam out of the extremist enterprise. What I'm suggesting, in short, is that the "surveil and strike" mentality that
has dominated the counterterrorism effort (and which is clearly reflected in Hannigan's plea to let Big Brother -- oops, I mean the
NSA and GCHQ -- keep its eyes on our communications) is popular with government officials because it's relatively easy,
plays to our technological strengths, and doesn't force us to make any significant foreign-policy changes or
engage in any sort of self-criticism at all. If we can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors and
former government officials in the process, what's not to like? If we can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at it, and enriching some
defense contractors and former government officials in the process, what's not to like? To be clear: I'm not suggesting we dismantle the NSA, fire all
our cryptographers, and revert to Cordell Hull's quaint belief that "gentlemen [or ladies] do not read each other's mail." But until
we see more
convincing evidence that the surveillance of the sort Hannigan was defending has really and truly kept a
significant number of people safer from foreign dangers, I'm going to wonder if we aren't
overemphasizing these activities because they are relatively easy for us, and because they have a powerful but
hard-to-monitor constituency in Washington and London. In short, we're just doing what comes naturally, instead of
doing what might be more effective.
2) That prevents tradeoffs with human-intel which is critical to overall US intel
Margolis 13
Gabriel Margolis – the author presently holds a Master of Arts (MA) in Conflict Management & Resolution from UNC Wilmington
and in his final semester of the program when this article was published in the peer-reviewed journal Global Security Studies . Global
Security Studies (GSS) is a premier academic and professional journal for strategic issues involving international security affairs. All
articles submitted to and published in Global Security Studies (GSS) undergo a rigorous, peer-reviewed process. From the article:
“The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem” - Global Security Studies - Spring 2013, Volume 4, Issue
2http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis%20Intelligence%20(ag%20edits).pdf
The United States has accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the technological advances of the 20th
century. Numerous methods of collection have been employed in clandestine operations around the world
including those that focus on human, signals, geospatial, and measurements and signals intelligence. An
infatuation with technological methods of intelligence gathering has developed within many intelligence
organizations, often leaving the age old practice of espionage as an afterthought. As a result of the focus on technical
methods, some of the worst intelligence failures of the 20th century can be attributed to an absence of human
intelligence. The 21st century has ushered in advances in technology have allowed UAVs to become the ultimate technical
intelligence gathering platform; however human intelligence is still being neglected. The increasing reliance
on UAVs will make the United States susceptible to intelligence failures unless human intelligence
can be properly integrated . In the near future UAVs may be able to gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time before
classical espionage is a thing of the past.
HUMINT key to verification of nuclear weaponization in North Korea
Johnson ‘9
-
Most spending goes to expensive intelligence hardware
Surveillance satellites can’t look inside North Korean nuclear facilities (apparently they’re
underground lol)
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of the journal "Intelligence
and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign policy. Dr. Johnson served as staff director of the
House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in political science from the
University of California at Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign Agents in U.S. Security" Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE",
New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 – available via:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html
Despite the many negative critiques of humint, former DCI Tenet emphasizes that intelligence is still "primarily a
human endeavor.” — He is obviously not referring to the government's intelligence budget priorities. Recall that the United States
devotes only a small percentage of its annual intelligence budget to human spying. — Spy machines are costly, while
human agents are relatively inexpensive to hire and sustain on an annual stipend. One of the ironies of American intelligence is
that the vast percentage of its spending goes into expensive intelligence hardware, especially surveillance satellites, even
though the value of these machines is questionable in helping the United States understand such
contemporary global concerns as terrorism or China's economic might. Cameras mounted on satellites or airplanes are
unable to peer inside the canvas tents, mud huts, or mountain caves in Afghanistan or Pakistan where terrorists plan their lethal
operations, or into the deep underground caverns where North Koreans construct atomic weapons. "Space cameras
cannot see into factories where missiles are made, or into the sheds of shipyards," writes an intelligence expert. "Photographs cannot tell
whether stacks of drums outside an assumed chemical-warfare plant contain nerve gas or oil, or whether they are
empty” — _As a U.S. intelligence officer has observed, we need "to know what's inside the building, not what the
building looks like”.
North Korean proliferation is increasing now
Huessy 6/11 (Peter, 2015, Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, founded in 1981, and the senior defense consultant at the Air
Force Association and National Security Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, “North Korea's Serious New Nuclear Missile Threat,”
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5914/north-korea-nuclear-missile)//RTF
North Korea appears to have made significant progress in extending its capability as a nucleararmed rogue nation, to where its missiles may become capable of hitting American cities with little or
no warning. What new evidence makes such a threat compelling? North Korea claims to have nuclear warheads small
enough to fit on their ballistic missiles and missiles capable of being launched from a submerged platform such as a submarine.
Shortly after North Korea's April 22, 2015 missile test, which heightened international concern about the military capabilities of North Korea, U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry urged China and our regional allies to restart the 2003 "six-party talks" aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons from the
Korean peninsula and reining in North Korea's expanding nuclear missile program. There
are some "experts," however, who
believe that North Korea's threat is highly exaggerated and poses no immediate danger to the
United States. Consequently, many believe that, given China's oft-repeated support for a "nuclear weapons free" Korean peninsula, time is on
America's side to get an agreement that will guarantee just such a full de-nuclearization. But, if North Korea's technical advances
are substantive, its missiles, armed with small nuclear weapons, might soon be able to reach the
continental United States -- not just Hawaii and Alaska. Further, if such missile threats were to come from
submarines near the U.S., North Korea would be able to launch a surprise nuclear-armed missile
attack on an American city. In this view, time is not on the side of the U.S. Submarine-launched missiles come without a "return address"
to indicate what country or terrorist organization fired the missile. The implications for American security do not stop there. As North Korea
is Iran's primary missile-development partner, whatever North Korea can do with its missiles and
nuclear warheads, Iran will presumably be able to do as well. One can assume the arrangement is
reciprocal. Given recent warnings that North Korea may have upwards of 20 nuclear warheads, the United States seems to be facing a critical
new danger. Would renewed negotiations with China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea really be able to address this threat? Two years ago,
Andrew Tarantola and Brian Barrett said there was "no reason to panic;" that North Korea was "a long way off" -- in fact "years" -- before its missiles
and nuclear weapons could be "put together in any meaningful way." At the same time, in April 2013, an official U.S. assessment by the Defense
Intelligence Agency stated the U.S. had "moderate" confidence that "North Korea had indeed developed a nuclear device small enough to mount on a
ballistic missile." That was followed up two years later, on April 7, 2015, when the commander of Northcom, Admiral Bill Gortney, one of the nation's
leading homeland security defenders, said the threat was considerably more serious. He noted that, "North Korea has deployed its new road-mobile
KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile and was capable of mounting a miniaturized nuclear warhead on it."[1] At a Pentagon press briefing in April,
Admiral Cecil Haney, Commander of the US Strategic Command and America's senior military expert on nuclear deterrence and missile defense, said
it was important to take seriously reports that North Korea can now make small nuclear warheads and put them on their ballistic missiles.[2] And
sure enough, in April, North Korea launched a ballistic missile from a submerged platform. Media
reaction to the North Korean test has been confused. Reuters, citing the analysis of two German "experts," claimed the North Korean test was fake -a not-too-clever manipulation of video images. The Wall Street Journal, on May 21, 2015, echoed this view, noting: "[F]or evidence of North Korea's
bending of reality to drum up fears about its military prowess," one need look no further than a consensus that North Korea "doctored" pictures of an
alleged missile test from a submarine. This, they claimed, was proof that the "technology developments" by North Korea were nothing more than
elaborately faked fairy tales. However, Israeli
missile defense expert Uzi Rubin -- widely known as the "father" of
Israel's successful Arrow missile defense program -- explained to this author that previous North
Korean missile developments, which have often been dismissed as nothing more than mocked-up
missiles made of plywood, actually turned out to be the real thing -- findings confirmed by
subsequent intelligence assessments. Rubin, as well as the South Korean Defense Ministry, insist
that on April 22, the North Korean military did, in fact, launch a missile from a submerged
platform.[3] Kim Jong Un, the "Supreme Leader" of North Korea, supervises the April 22 test-launch of a missile from a submerged platform.
(Image source: KCNA) What gave the "faked" test story some prominence were the misunderstood remarks of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Admiral James Winnefeld. He had said, on May 19, that the North Korean missile launch was "not all" that North Korea said it was. He also
mentioned that North Korea used clever video editors to "crop" the missile test-launch images. Apparently, that was exactly what the editors did. The
Admiral, however, never claimed in his speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies there had been no successful missile test.[4] The
same day, a high-ranking State Department official, Frank Rose -- Assistant
Secretary of State for Arms Control,
Verification, and Compliance -- told a Korean security seminar on Capitol Hill that North Korea had
successfully conducted a "missile ejection" test, but from an underwater barge rather than a
submarine.[5] To confuse matters further, additional pictures were released by the South Korean media to illustrate stories about the North
Korean test. Those pictures, however, were of American missiles, which use both solid and liquid propellant; as a result, one photo showed a U.S.
missile with a solid propellant smoke trail and one, from a liquid propellant, without a smoke trail. These photographs apparently befuddled Reuters'
"experts," who may have jumped to the conclusion that the photos of the North Korean test were "faked," when they were simply of entirely different
missile tests, and had been used only to "illustrate" ocean-going missile launches and not the actual North Korean test.[6] According to Uzi Rubin, to
achieve the capability to eject a missile from an underwater platform is a significant technological
advancement. The accomplishment again illustrates "that rogue states such as North Korea can achieve military
capabilities which pose a notable threat to the United States and its allies." Rubin also stated that the North
Korean underwater launch test was closely related to the development of a missile-firing submarine,
"a first step in achieving a very serious and dangerous new military capability."[7] Admiral Winnefeld and
Secretary Rose, in their remarks, confirmed that the North Korean test was not the "dog and pony show" some have claimed. In other words, the
U.S. government has officially confirmed that the North Koreans have made a serious step toward
producing a sea-launched ballistic missile capability. While such an operational capability may be "years away," Rubin
warns that "even many years eventually pass, and it will also take many years to build up the missile defenses, so we had better use the time wisely."[8]
Will diplomacy succeed in stopping the North Korean threats? U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry seemed to think it worth a try; so he began the push
to restart the old 2003 "six-party" talks between the United States, North Korea, Russia, China, South Korea and Japan, to bring North Korea's
nuclear weapons under some kind of international control and eventual elimination. After all, supporters of such talks claim, similar talks with Iran
appear to be leading to some kind of "deal" with Tehran, to corral its nuclear weapons program, so why not duplicate that effort and bring North
Korea back into the non-nuclear fold? What such a "deal," if any, with Iran, will contain, is at this point unknown. Celebrations definitely seem
premature. If the "deal" with North Korea is as "successful" as the P5+1's efforts to rein in Iran's illegal nuclear weapons program, the prognosis for
the success of diplomacy could scarcely be more troubling. Bloomberg's defense writer, Tony Carpaccio, reflecting Washington's conventional
wisdom, recently wrote that of course China will rein in North Korea's nuclear program: "What might be a bigger preventative will be the protestations
of China, North Korea's primary trade partner and only prominent international ally. Making China angry would put an already deeply impoverished,
isolated North Korea in even more dire straits." Unfortunately, no matter how attractive a strategy of diplomatically ending North Korea's nuclear
program might look on the surface, it is painfully at odds with China's established and documented track record in supporting and carrying out nuclear
proliferation with such collapsed or rogue states as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, North Korea and Libya, as detailed by the 2009 book The Nuclear Express, by
Tom C. Reed (former Secretary of the Air Force under President Gerald Ford and Special Assistant to the President of National Security Affairs
during the Ronald Reagan administration) and Daniel Stillman (former Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). Far from being a
potential partner in seeking a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, China, say the authors, has been and is actually actively pushing the spread of nuclear
weapons to rogue states, as a means of asserting Chinese hegemony, complicating American security policy and undermining American influence. The
problem is not that China has little influence with North Korea, as China's leadership repeatedly claims. The problem is that China has no interest in
pushing North Korea away from its nuclear weapons path because the North Korean nuclear program serves China's geostrategic purposes. As Reed
and Stillman write, "China has been using North Korea as the re-transfer point for the sale of nuclear and missile technology to Iran, Syria, Pakistan,
Libya and Yemen". They explain, "Chinese and North Korean military officers were in close communication prior to North Korea's missile tests of
1998 and 2006". Thus, if China takes action to curtail North Korea's nuclear program, China will likely be under pressure from the United States and
its allies to take similar action against Iran and vice versa. China, however, seems to want to curry favor with Iran because of its vast oil and gas
supplies, as well as to use North Korea to sell and transfer nuclear technology to both North Korea and Iran, as well as other states such as Pakistan.
As Reed again explains, "China has catered to the nuclear ambitions of the Iranian ayatollahs in a blatant attempt to secure an ongoing supply of oil".
North Korea is a partner with Iran in the missile and nuclear weapons development business, as Uzi Rubin has long documented. Thus, it is
reasonable to believe that China may see any curtailment of North Korea's nuclear program as also curtailing Iran's access to the same nuclear
technology being supplied by North Korea. Any curtailment would also harm the Chinese nuclear sales business to Iran and North Korea, especially if
China continues to use the "North Korea to Iran route" as an indirect means of selling its own nuclear expertise and technology to Iran. It is not as if
Chinese nuclear proliferation is a recent development or a "one of a kind" activity. As far back as 1982, China gave nuclear warhead blueprints to
Pakistan, according to Reed. These findings indicate that China's nuclear weapons proliferation activities are over three decades old.[9] Reed and
Stillman also note that nearly a decade later, China tested a nuclear bomb "for Pakistan" on May 26, 1990, and that documents discovered in Libya
when the George W. Bush administration shut down Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi's nuclear program revealed that China gave Pakistan the CHIC4 nuclear weapon design. Unfortunately, China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan did not stay just in Pakistan. The nuclear technology made its way from
Pakistan to North Korea. For example, high explosive craters, construction of a 50 megawatt nuclear reactor (finished in 1986) and a secret
reprocessing facility begun in 1987 all were done in North Korea with major Pakistani help from the A.Q. Khan "Nukes R Us" smuggling group, as
Reed and Stillman document in their book. Reed and Stillman write that when, amid disclosures in 2003 of a major Libyan nuclear weapons program,
the U.S. government sought help in shutting down the Khan nuclear smuggling ring, "Chinese authorities were totally unhelpful, to the point of
stonewalling any investigation into Libya's nuclear supply network." More recently, Chinese companies have now twice -- in 2009 and 2011 -- been
indicted by the Attorney for the City of New York for trying to provide Iran with nuclear weapons technology. The indictments document that
Chinese companies were selling Iran steel for nuclear centrifuges and other banned technology. A leaked State Department cable, discussing the
indictments at the time, revealed "details on China's role as a supplier of materials for Iran's nuclear program," and that "China helped North Korea
ship goods to Iran through Chinese airports." And more recently, in April 2015, the Czech government interdicted additional nuclear technology
destined for Iran -- the origin of which remains unknown -- in violation of current sanctions against Iran. From 1982 through at least the first part of
2015, the accumulation of documentary evidence on nuclear proliferation reveals two key facts: First, despite literally hundreds of denials by Iran that
it is seeking nuclear weapons, and amid current negotiations to end Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, there is solid evidence that Iran still seeks
nuclear weapons technology; and that North Korea has nuclear weapons and is advancing their capability. Second, China continues to transfer,
through its own territory, nuclear weapons technology involving both North Korea and Iran. Although the Chinese profess to be against nuclear
proliferation, their track record from the documented evidence illustrates just the opposite. In summary, it
is obvious North Korea's
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are a serious threat to America and its allies. And China, from its
proliferation record for the past three decades, is making such a threat more widespread. In this light, is dismissing North Korea's advances in military
technology and ignoring China's record of advancing its neighbors' nuclear weapons technology really best for U.S. interests?
That causes miscalc- leads to global nuclear war
Metz 13 – Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National
Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute (Steven, 3/13/13, “Strategic Horizons: Thinking the
Unthinkable on a Second Korean War,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/strategichorizons-thinking-the-unthinkable-on-a-second-korean-war)
Today,
North Korea is
the most
dangerous
country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security. For years, the bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent, while declaring
that it will defeat this offensive just as -- according to official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often the press releases from the official North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do so,
though, could be dangerous as events and rhetoric turn even more ominous. In response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council recently tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and protector, went along.
Convulsed by anger, Pyongyang then threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A
spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may prove true. No American leader wants another war in Korea. The problem is that the North
American policymakers fail to recognize signs of
impending attack every recent war began with miscalc
policymakers misunderstood
intent of opponents
Koreans make so many threatening and bizarre official statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that
. After all,
their
might
U.S.
the
ulation; American
the
, who in turn underestimated American determination. The conflict with North Korea could repeat this pattern. Since the regi me of Kim Jong Un has continued its predecessors’ tradition of responding hysterically to every action and
statement it doesn't like, it's hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang over the edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United States considers modest and reasonable, or it could be some sort of internal power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the
outside world. While we cannot know whether the recent round of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would be prudent to think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S.
security. The second
Korean War could begin with missile strikes
Early attacks include nuc
s
something North Korea has prepared for many decades.
might
lear weapon
against South Korean, Japanese or U.S. targets, or with a combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South -, but even if they didn't, the United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles. The war itself would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are backward but huge. It's hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime,
would resist U.S. and South Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United States and its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla
operations and insurgency could potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South Korea and Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime
would require a lengthy occupation, whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. The second Korean
War would force military mobilization in the U S
This
would shock the economy and
nited
initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would probably ultimately require a major expansion of th e U.S. military and hence a draft. The military's training infrastructure and the defense industrial base would have to grow.
government spending in the United States and postpone serious deficit reduction for some time, even if Washington increased taxes to help fund the war. Moreover, a second Korean conflict
have
destabiliz
ing effects outside Northeast
Asia
tates. This would
would be a body blow to efforts to cut
global
potentially
. Eventually, though, the United States and its allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be impossible for the United States to simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it did after the first
Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to tolerate. Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America's strategic objective. China would pose the most pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of
North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung after he invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim famil y dictatorship in power. Since the second Korean War would invariably begin like the first one - with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the world to remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a multinational operation to remo ve the
Kim regime. Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a unified Korea allied with the United States. One way around this might be a g rand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this might be, Korea might hesitate to adopt
the result could be
economic connections do not
prevent
neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at any poi nt in its history. If the aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly,
U S
war
nited
tates and
China
, perhaps even a new cold
war
. After all,
history shows
that deep
easily
automatically
heightened hostility between the
nations from hostility and
-- in 1914 Germany was heavily involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is not in conceivable then, that after the second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same time that the two
continued mutual trade and investment. Stranger things have happened in statecraft.
Effective verification creates deals that stop prolif
Hernandez 13 – Research Associate, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Jason, “Proliferation
Pathways to a North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missile”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Dec. 20, 2013)
RMT
During the Clinton Administration, the United States and
North Korea came extremely close to concluding a "Missile Deal"
that would have halted North Korean development, production, and testing of increasingly longer-range missiles. However,
the deal never came to fruition, and under the Bush Administration it was scrapped completely. One of the primary issues for both the Clinton
and Bush administrations was monitoring and verification. The United States sought a comprehensive monitoring and verification
regime that would have permitted U.S. inspectors on-site access to rocket and missile facilities, while North Korea believed that the United States
could accomplish verification through imagery analysis and other national technical means.
[20] It is therefore likely that any future missile deal
negotiations will focus heavily upon verification. Detection and Monitoring Any advances in rocket technology using the three
pathways described above will require numerous tests before the missile can be accepted into service and deployed. Given North
Korea's limited geographical size, all long-range missile tests will result in debris falling into international waters. For the
December 2012 Unha-3 launch, the rocket's first stage fell into the Yellow Sea, and the second fell off the coast of the Philippines. By recovering the
first stage debris, South Korea was able to confirm some facts about the Unha, while discovering new data that indicated progress in the Unha's
design. The debris demonstrated continued areas of struggle and primitive design elements, such as in the propellant, airframe, and welding, while also
showing program advancements and new design elements, such as the use of steering engines in place of jet vanes for orientation. [21] It is reasonable
to assume that over the course of a testing program, debris will be recovered to enlighten the world on the progress of North Korea's missile program.
New deployment methods, such as the use of silos or road-mobile launchers in pathways two or three will not
necessarily be detected. While the construction of silos could be detected by satellite imagery analysis, it is not guaranteed that the international
community would detect every silo. Iran's Shahab silos went unnoticed in the open source until displayed on Iranian media during the Great Prophet 6
military exercises. [22] A road-mobile TD-2/Unha would seemingly go undetected unless paraded or displayed publically. The KN-08 was unknown in
the open source until it was displayed at the April 2012 military parade in Pyongyang. Deployments and launches of silo-based or road-mobile TD2/Unha's would be very difficult to detect and monitor. Verification The issue of verification is complex, and any missile
deal will undoubtedly
cover the entirety of North Korea's missile production, from battlefield and short-range ballistic missiles to space launch vehicles and
ICBMs. However, this brief will only address the relationship between a missile deal and the three pathways to an ICBM. For the purpose of this
section, the author assumes that a future missile deal will either aim to prevent or reverse a missile program in four key areas:
development; manufacturing and production; acquisition; and deployment. The question becomes for each of the three pathways to an ICBM, can the
international community verify that North Korea is abiding by a deal that prevents or reverses 1) development; 2) manufacturing and production; and
3) deployment of an ICBM?
Verification efforts are a deterrent and prevent tech development
Walker 11--UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit
(ACDRU) since March 1985.Published widely on aspects of CBW history in the Harvard-Sussex Program’s
‘The CBW Conventions Bulletin’[John R., “The CTBT: Verification and Deterrence”, VERTIC BRIEF • 16 •
OCTOBER 2011]RMT
We can however consider that any
state contemplating a clandestine programme, or in this case one or more underground
nuclear tests, must make certain calculations about its ability to conceal all of the evidence all of the time
from a watchful international community. Balancing risks—military and strategic gains against the
political, diplomatic and economic costs—is not easy. A potential violator has to be sure that his preparations
to test, as well as its conduct and aftermath, can be concealed from the international community indefinitely. In the case
of the CTBT, it will be a combination of national technical means (NTMs) and the treaty’s International Monitoring System (IMS) and on-site inspections that place a series
of high hurdles in the face of a would-be proliferator. Tripping
over just one can compromise his plans and negate any
conceivable military advantage that he might have been hoping to derive from a clandestine test, or
tests. It is worth recalling here that Sir William Penney, the leader of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme in the 1950s and early 1960s, advised Harold Macmillan’s
government in 1962 that even though the Soviet Union might be confident in avoiding the detection of one test under the then envisaged verification system, it could not
be at all sure that a series of, say, three tests would go unnoticed. Penney’s view was that one test would not alter the strategic balance and so the risk of a test ban treaty was
worth taking as one would need a series of tests to obtain a strategically significant advantage. M ore than fifty years later we have the CTBT’s IMS, which, as of August
2011, has 86 per cent of its primary stations (including seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations), 83 per cent of its auxiliary seismic stations and 63 per
cent of its radionuclide laboratories certified. Their detection capabilities are immeasurably superior to those planned by the 1958 Geneva seismic experts’ meeting.
Simulations of global detection thresholds today, measured in terms of equivalent nuclear-yield in kilotons of TNT (kt), suggest that the IMS network is capable of detecting
and identifying, worldwide, explosions fired close- coupled underground in hard rock, in the atmosphere, and in the ocean, with a yield equal to or more than one kiloton.
In many areas of the world, such as continental Eurasia, the detection threshold is significantly less than one kiloton. In the 1977–1980 Tripartite Test Ban Treaty
negotiations, UK and US scientists took the view The CTBT: Verification and Deterrence2 that it would only be yields of around ten kilotons that would permit meaningful
developments in new warhead design. Any
state contemplating a clandestine test has to be sure that, even assuming its preparations go
find the right geological conditions on its
territory in a reasonably remote area. It has to be sure, too, that it can stem a borehole or tunnel effectively to guarantee no venting of radioactive
undetected (it can take about a year to prepare for an underground test), it still must
particles or radioactive noble gases that could be picked up by IMS radionuclide stations. Such a task would be challenging for a state with no prior experience of
underground testing. Then there is the small matter of the seismic stations— primary and auxiliary—detecting the event and the strong likelihood that it will be
subsequently correctly identified as an explosion from the Treaty’s International Data Centre (IDC) Reviewed Events Bulletin. How convincing an explanation could a state
provide when pressed for clarification under the Treaty’s Article IV provisions? Could it be absolutely confident that it could conjure up a fool-proof cover story that would
hoodwink all of the treaty’s states parties? This
is where we first begin to see that the more effective the verification
system and the greater the integration of the elements that combine to make it up, the greater the
level of deterrence of non-compliance is. A regime that can demonstrate a very high level of technical
reliability, coverage and sensitivity presents a formidable obstacle to anyone who wants to cheat. The
IMS does that. A state might hope that the CTBT Organisation’s Executive Council would fail to act on the compelling evidence presented by the IDC as well as any
supporting information from states parties NTMs and other sources (such as commercial satellite data) and vote against an on-site inspection. However, could any state
guarantee that this would indeed be the case? Just how confident ahead of time could it be? As Tibor Toth— the
Provisional Technical Secretariat
(PTS) Executive Secretary—has pointed out, the very nature of the Treaty’s verification regime will
be democratic in that the information behind an inspection request is derived from an independent
system whose results are open to all states parties. There may, therefore, be very strong pressures to
respond to a well-substantiated compliance concern, which it would be politically much more
difficult to ignore or dismiss. Building an on-site inspection capability for the CTBT is a demanding and lengthy process—but such a capability
provides the one clear way of confirming that an event that triggered an inspection was a nuclear test conducted in violation of the treaty’s Article I prohibitions. Effective
inspections require a well-equipped, trained and experienced cadre of inspectors and an ability to deploy to the field promptly. If the future Technical Secretariat cannot
meet these criteria then the OSI regime is a paper tiger. However, major strides have been taken by the PTS and some states signatories in recent years and efforts are
continuing on building up an initial capability that would be fit for purpose on entry-into-force of the treaty. There will be a large-scale OSI exercise Integrated Field
Exercise in 2014 that will be a key milestone in the development of the Treaty’s OSI regime. OSIs present a violator with an array of techniques and technologies that will
make it immensely difficult to be sure that absolutely all incriminating traces of illegal activity can be concealed for up to the 130 days that an inspection could last.
Deployment of these techniques and technologies in an integrated and intelligent manner provides a potent tool for detecting
non-compliance. And, if the
traces cannot be concealed, finding sustainable and convincing technical explanations that will
persuade not just the inspectors but the Executive Council back in Vienna is no easy matter. The Council will
review the final inspection report and determine whether any non-compliance has occurred.
Knowing that the treaty’s OSI capability is effective and would stand a very good chance of
uncovering facts strongly suggestive of non-compliance, a cheating state will have to obstruct the
inspectors in the field. A systematic pattern of evasion, delay, obstruction, obfuscation and down-right hostility tells its own story, especially since inspectors
are allowed to comment on the co-operation (or lack thereof ) provided by an Inspected State Party in their final inspection report. Even a remote chance of detection is a
difficult thing for a would-be violator to guard against. Moreover, the greater the level of uncertainty in the mind of such a state, the greater the role that OSIs play in the
deterrent effect of the treaty’s overall verification regime. During the 1977–1980 tripartite test ban treaty nego- tiations the UK noted that: ‘Ther
e is no known
remote method of determining unambiguously whether an underground event was man-made in
origin and, if so, was due to a nuclear explosion. Such conclusive evidence is only obtainable b y a n o n-the-spot i nvestigation i nto t he p
resence of radioactive materials. Provision for OSI would help deter clandestine testing by posing a threat that it
would be identified as such; OSI would also enhance the confidence of all parties to the treaty that
its provisions were being observed.’ This statement remains valid today. 1 The CTBT verification regime—comprising the
IMS stations (i.e. primary seismic, auxiliary seismic, hyrdoacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide, including stations with radioactive noble gas detection capabilities), the
International Data Centre, National Data Centres, consultations and clarification procedures and on-site inspections armed with an array of detection techniques and
technologies—presents
a formidable set of obstacles for a would-be violator to surmount. And in this equation we
should not overlook the role that can be played by NTMs—remote sensing data such as multispectral and infrared images to give but one example. Nor should we forget
that science and technology does not stand still and we can confidently expect that the capabilities of all aspects of the verification regime will increase. In particular, as the
June 2011 Science and Technology for the CTBT Conference in Vienna noted, progress in sensors, networks and observational technologies as well as in computing and
We might still not know exactly what
deters in deterrence in the context of preventing non-compliance in arms control and disarmament agreements, but in the
context of the CTBT the negotiators designed an integrated system that will clearly complicate the
processing offer promising benefits for the efficacy of all components of the treaty’s verification regime.
plans of any state thinking that it could evade that system successfully and derive a meaningful
political, military or strategic advantage from doing so. The overall regime must inevitably impact on the
calculations of a wouldbe evader, and the higher the assurance of detection the more uncertain he must be
that he can get away with cheating. Deterrence of non-compliance is therefore strengthened.
Status quo programs like “Accumulo” empirically fail
Konkel, 13
Frank Konkel is the editorial events editor for Government Executive Media Group and a technology journalist for its publications.
He writes about emerging technologies, privacy, cybersecurity, policy and other issues at the intersection of government and
technology. He began writing about technology at Federal Computer Week. Frank is a graduate of Michigan State University. “NSA
shows how big 'big data' can be” - FCW - Federal Computer Week is a magazine covering technology - Jun 13, 2013 http://fcw.com/articles/2013/06/13/nsa-big-data.aspx?m=1
As reported by Information Week, the NSA
relies heavily on Accumulo, "a highly distributed, massively parallel processing key/value store capable of
analyzing structured and unstructured data" to process much of its data. NSA's modified version of Accumulo, based on Google's BigTable data model,
reportedly makes it possible for the agency to analyze data for patterns while protecting personally identifiable information –
names, Social Security numbers and the like. Before news of Prism broke, NSA officials revealed a graph search it operates on top of Accumulo at a Carnegie Melon tech
conference. The graph is based on 4.4 trillion data points, which could represent phone numbers, IP addresses, locations, or calls made and to whom; connecting those
points creates a graph with more than 70 trillion edges. For a human being, that kind of visualization is impossible, but for a vast, high-end computer system with the right
big data tools and mathematical algorithms, some signals can be pulled out. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, publicly stated that
the government's collection of phone records thwarted a terrorist plot inside the United States "within the last few years," and other media reports have cited anonymous
Needles in endless haystacks of data are not easy to find , and the
NSA's current big data analytics methodology is far from a flawless system, as evidenced by the April 15 Boston
Marathon bombings that killed three people and injured more than 200. The bombings were carried out by Chechen
brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the latter of whom was previously interviewed by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation after the Russian Federal Security Service notified the agency in 2011 that he was a follower of radical Islam. The
brothers had made threats on Twitter prior to their attack as well, meaning several data points of
suspicious behavior existed, yet no one detected a pattern in time to prevent them from setting off bombs in a public place
intelligence insiders claiming several plots have been foiled.
filled with people. "We're still in the genesis of big data, we haven't even scratched the surface yet," said big data expert Ari Zoldan, CEO of New-York-based Quantum
Networks. " In
many ways, the technology hasn't evolved yet, it's still a new industry."
Advantage Two is Competitiveness
Snowden leaks jeopardized credibility and public confidence – only the plan solves
Vijayan 14 (Jaikumar, writer for Computer World who specializes in privacy topics, formerly worked as a
contributor to the Economic Times, “Tech groups press Congress to pass USA Freedom Act”,
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2604630/tech-groups-press-congress-to-pass-usa-freedomact.html)
Concerns over the U.S. government's data collection activities have caused substantial problems for
U.S. technology companies over the past year. Former NSA contractor Edward Snowden's leaks about PRISM and
other NSA data collection programs have caused U.S. companies to lose customers and business in
other countries. Technology giants like IBM and Cisco have reported blowback from overseas
customers as a result of concerns stoked by Snowden's revelations. Some have predicted that U.S. cloud hosting
companies could lose tens of billions of dollars over the next few years as overseas customers take their business to
foreign rivals. Many vendors, including Google, Microsoft and others have asked the government for
permission to disclose more details about the kind of customer data they have provided to the
government in recent years in response to requests under the Patriot Act and FISA. The companies have
argued that such transparency is vital to regaining the confidence of international customers. It is against this
background that the tech groups are calling for quick passage of the USA Freedom Act. Reforms contained
in the bill "will send a clear signal to the international community and to the American people that government surveillance
programs are narrowly tailored, transparent, and subject to oversight," this week's letter to the senators noted. U.S.
technology companies have experienced losses in overseas markets as a result of the surveillance
programs revelations, the letter noted. Other countries are also mulling proposals that would limit free data flows between countries, the letter
cautioned. The measures in the USA Freedom Act would alleviate some of these concerns and would
help restore faith in the U.S. government and the U.S. technology sector, the letter said. Civil rights groups and
the Electronic Freedom Foundation, which support the bill, called it a good first step in reining in the NSA's domestic data collection practices. The
bill addresses many concerns but still leaves some wiggle room for the NSA and other U.S. spy agencies to exploit it to their advantage, the EFF said
in blog post this week. Even so, it offers the best chance for some positive change, according to the EFF. "Congress can do the right thing by pushing
forward with the USA Freedom Act and passing much needed NSA reform," the EFF said.
That destroys US tech competitiveness – the plan solves
Mindock ’15 (Clark Mindock - Reporting Fellow at International Business Times – Internally quoting The
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. ITIF is a non-partisan research and educational
institute – a think tank – whose mission is to formulate and promote public policies to advance technological
innovation and productivity internationally, in Washington, and in the states. “NSA Surveillance Could Cost
Billions For US Internet Companies After Edward Snowden Revelations” - International Business Times June 10 2015 http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-surveillance-could-cost-billions-us-internet-companies-afteredward-snowden-1959737)
Failure to reform National Security Administration spying programs revealed by Edward Snowden could be more
economically taxing than previously thought, says a new study published by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
Tuesday. The study suggests the programs could be affecting the tech nology sector as a whole , not just
the cloud-computing sector , and that the costs could soar much higher than previously expected.
Even modest declines in cloud computing revenues from the revealed surveillance programs, according to a previous report,
would cost between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by 2016. New estimates show that the toll “will likely far exceed ITIF’s initial $35 billion estimate.”
“The U.S. government’s failure to reform many of the NSA’s surveillance programs has damaged the
competitiveness of the U.S. tech sector and cost it a portion of the global market share,” a summary of the
report said. Revelations by defense contractor Snowden in June 2013 exposed massive U.S. government surveillance capabilities and showed the NSA collected American
phone records in bulk, and without a warrant. The bulk
phone-record revelations, and many others in the same vein, including the required complacency of
Internet companies in providing the data , raised questions about the transparency of American
surveillance programs and prompted outrage from privacy advocates. The study, published this week, argues that unless the
American telecom and
American government can vigorously reform how NSA surveillance is regulated and overseen, U.S.
companies will lose contracts and, ultimately, their competitive edge in a global market as
consumers around the world choose cloud computing and technology options that do not have
potential ties to American surveillance programs. The report comes amid a debate in Congress on
what to do with the Patriot Act, the law that provides much of the authority for the surveillance programs. As of June 1, authority to
collect American phone data en masse expired, though questions remain as to whether letting that authority expire is
enough to protect privacy. Supporters of the programs argue that they provide the country with necessary capabilities to fight terrorism abroad. A
further reform made the phone records collection process illegal for the government, and instead
gave that responsibility to the telecom companies.
The industry is key to the global economy – facilitates private growth and innovation
Polonetsky and Tene 13 (Jules, Co-Chair and Director, Future of Privacy Forum, and Tene, Associate
Professor, College of Management Haim Striks School of Law, Israel; Senior Fellow, Future of Privacy
Forum; Affiliate Scholar, Stanford Center for Internet and Society, published in the Stanford Law Review,
“Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet”, http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-bigdata/privacy-and-big-data)
Big data analysis often benefits those organizations that collect and harness the data. Data-driven profits may
be viewed as enhancing allocative efficiency by facilitating the “free” economy.[15] The emergence,
expansion, and widespread use of innovative products and services at decreasing marginal costs have revolutionized global economies
and societal structures , facilitating access to technology and knowledge[16] and fomenting social change.[17] With more data,
businesses can optimize distribution methods , efficiently allocate credit , and robustly combat fraud,
benefitting consumers as a whole.[18] But in the absence of individual value or broader societal gain, others may consider enhanced business profits to be a mere value
transfer from individuals whose data is being exploited. In economic terms, such profits create distributional gains to some actors (and may in fact be socially regressive) as
opposed to driving allocative efficiency. D. Society Finally, some data uses benefit society at large. These include, for example, data mining for purposes of national security.
We do not claim that such practices are always justified; rather, that when weighing the benefits of national security driven policies, the effects should be assessed at a broad
societal level. Similarly, data
usage for fraud detection in the payment card industry helps facilitate safe,
secure, and frictionless transactions, benefiting society as a whole. And large-scale analysis of geo-location data has
been used for urban planning, disaster recovery, and optimization of energy consumption. E. Benefits
Big data creates enormous value for the global economy , driving innovation, productivity, efficiency,
and growth. Data has become the driving force behind almost every interaction between individuals,
businesses, and governments.
Economic decline goes nuclear and escalates
Royal 10
(Jedediah Royal is the Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense,
“Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives”, pg. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a
moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein
has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances
Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms
in the global economy are associated
with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the
next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also
Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron.
1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment
for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also
shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers,
although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a
dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding
economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they
have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as
energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises
could
potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers
protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external
armed conflict at a national level. Momberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict
and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between
internal and external conflict and prosperity is strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn
internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been
linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the
capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a
sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic
decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to
create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting
evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering
(2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic
leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing
that periods of weak
economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity,
are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates
economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external
conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in
the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
Trust in internet business is being eroded every day by surveillance –new restrictions
in the Freedom Act are vital to solve
Gross 14 (Grant, Washington, D.C., correspondent for IDG News Service, covers legislation and regulation
related to the technology and telecommunications, contributor to PCWorld, “Snowden leaks after one year:
Wrangling over the meaning of 'bulk'”, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2361120/snowden-leaks-after-oneyear-wrangling-over-the-meaning-of-bulk.html)
The Snowden leaks have forced a national conversation that’s necessary and important, but policymakers
“haven’t waved the flag and said, ‘what was happening before will not happen again,’” Castro said. While
some policy debates in Washington, D.C., take years to play out, speed is important in this case , as other nations look for alternatives
to U.S. tech products, Castro said. “There’s basically a clock on this,” he said. “If you don’t address this in a certain
you lose out on long-term competitiveness. Every day you don’t
address this, you’re losing out.” Castro doesn’t expect the controversy over the surveillance to die down.
period of time,
“It’s defining the brand of American tech companies as something that is both insecure and
available to government surveillance,” he said. “Once you’re branded a certain way, it’s really hard to shake.” This week, the
CEOs of nine major U.S. tech vendors— including Facebook, Google and Apple —wrote a letter to
senators, calling on them to strengthen the USA Freedom Act. “ Confidence in the Internet , both in the
has been badly damaged over the last year, ” the letter said. “It is time for action. As the
Senate takes up this important legislation, we urge you to ensure that U.S. surveillance efforts are
clearly restricted by law, proportionate to the risks, transparent, and subject to independent oversight.”
U.S. and internationally,
Advantage Three is India
New Freedom Act fails to restore US’s global credibility on Internet freedom. The
original version solves by closing SST loopholes.
Brinkerhoff ‘14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before
joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of
their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a
particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the
Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the
technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in
China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights Watch is an independent,
international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights
for all. Noel Brinkerhoff is a Political reporter and writer covering state and national politics for 15 years. “With Support of Obama
Administration, House NSA Surveillance Reform Bill Includes Gaping Loopholes” – AllGov – May 26th http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/with-support-of-obama-administration-house-nsa-surveillance-reform-bill-includes-gapingloopholes-140526?news=853242)
Lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives claim they have addressed the problems of the National Security Agency’s (NSA)
notorious bulk collection of data, made so famous last year by whistleblower Edward Snowden. But the
legislation adopted to end this controversial practice contains huge loopholes that could allow the
NSA to keep vacuuming up large amounts of Americans’ communications records, all with the blessing of the
Obama administration. Dubbed the USA Freedom Act, the bill overwhelmingly approved by the House (303 to 121) was
criticized for not going far enough to keep data out of the hands of government. “This so-called
reform bill won’t restore the trust of Internet users in the U.S. and around the world,” Cynthia Wong,
senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch (HRW), said. “Until Congress passes real reform ,
U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will continue to fade.” Julian Sanchez, a researcher at the Cato
Institute, a libertarian think tank, warned that the changes could mean the continuation of bulk collection of phone records by another name. “ The core
problem is that this only ends ‘bulk’ collection in the sense the intelligence community uses that
term,” Sanchez told Wired. “As long as there’s some kind of target , they don’t call that bulk collection, even if
you’re still collecting millions of records…If they say ‘give us the record of everyone who visited these
thousand websites,’ that’s not bulk collection, because they have a list of targets.” HRW says the bill,
which now goes to the Senate for consideration, contains ambiguous definitions about what can and cannot be collected by the agency. For instance,
an earlier version more clearly defined the scope of what the NSA could grab under Section 215 of the Patriot Act,
which has formed the legal basis for gathering the metadata of phone calls. “ Under
an earlier version of the USA Freedom Act, the
government would have been required to base any demand for phone metadata or other records on a
“ specific selection term” that “uniquely describe[s] a person, entity, or account.” Under the House version,
this definition was broadened to mean “a discrete term, such as a term specifically identifying a person, entity, account, address, or
device, used by the government to limit the scope” of information sought,” according to Human Rights Watch. “ This definition is too open-ended and
ambiguous to prevent the sort of creative interpretation by intelligence agencies that has been used to justify overbroad collection
practices in the past,” the group claims. The New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute is similarly disappointed in the final House bill. “Taken
together,” the Institute wrote, “the changes to this definition may still allow for massive collection of millions of
Americans’ private information based on very broad selection terms such as a zip code, an area
code , the physical address of a particular email provider or financial institution , or the IP address of a web
hosting service that hosts thousands of web sites.”
The US can alter global practices that threaten privacy, but only when US is
credible—specifically shapes Indian surveillance
Wong 13 (Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong
worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the
organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy &
Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology
sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the
organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law.
(“Surveillance and the Corrosion of Internet Freedom,” HRW, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internet-freedom, July 30, 2013)
Defenders of US and UK surveillance programs argue that collecting metadata is not as problematic as
“listening to the content of people’s phone calls” or reading emails. This is misleading. Technologists have long recognized
that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially if it is collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized data can be easily combined and
analyzed. The
revelations have also exposed glaring contradictions about the US Internet freedom agenda . This
has emboldened the Chinese state media, for example, to cynically denounce US hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on
the widening rift between US values and actions
has real, unintended human rights consequences. For the human rights movement, the Internet’s impact on rights crystalized in 2005 after
we learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account information over to the Chinese government,
leading to a 10-year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao. The US government forcefully objected to the Chinese
government’s actions and urged the tech industry to act responsibly. In the end, that incident catalyzed a set of new human
rights standards that pushed some companies to improve safeguards for user privacy in the face of
government demands for data. US support was critical back then, but it is hard to imagine the
government having the same influence or credibility now. The mass surveillance scandal has damaged the US
government’s ability to press for better corporate practices as technology companies expand globally. It will also be
more difficult for companies to resist overbroad surveillance mandates if they are seen as complicit
in mass US infringements on privacy. Other governments will feel more entitled to ask for the same
privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though there is hypocrisy on both sides,
cooperation that the US receives . We can also expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user data locally or maintain a
local presence so that governments can more easily access it, as Brazil and Russia are now debating. While comparisons to the Chinese government are overstated, there
is reason to worry about the broader precedent the US has set . Just months before the NSA scandal broke, India
began rolling out a centralized system to monitor all phone and Internet communications in the country,
without much clarity on safeguards to protect rights. This development is chilling, considering the government’s problematic use of
sedition and Internet laws in recent arrests. Over the last few weeks, Turkish officials have condemned social media as a key tool for Gezi
Park protesters. Twitter has drawn particular ire. Now the government is preparing new regulations that would make it
easier to get data from Internet companies and identify individual users online. The Obama administration and US
companies could have been in a strong position to push back in India and Turkey.
Instead, the US has provided these governments with a roadmap for conducting secret, mass surveillance
and conscripting the help of the private sector.
US surveillance sets a precedent for surveillance in India
Sinha 14 – G. Alex Sinha is an Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties
Union. Sinha holds a J.D. from New York University’s School of Law. This includes a specialization as a Scholar from NYU’s Institute for International Law & Justice. The
author also holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy University of Toronto. Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno is a US Program deputy director at Human Rights Watch, who
participated in some of the research interviews. Andrea Prasow is the deputy Washington Director at Human Rights Watch, who also participated in one of the research
interviews and provided key contacts. (“WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law and American Democracy,”
this report is based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists covering intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times,
the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR, http://www.hrw.org/node/127364, July 2014)
The questions
raised by surveillance are complex. The government has an obligation to protect national security, and in some cases, it is
legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end. At the same time, international human rights and constitutional law set
limits on the state’s authority to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to undermine so many other rights.
The current, large-scale, often indiscriminate US approach to surveillance carries enormous costs. It erodes
global digital privacy and sets a terrible example for other countries like India , Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others that
are in the process of expanding their surveillance capabilities. It also damages US credibility in
advocating internationally for internet freedom, which the US has listed as an important foreign
policy objective since at least 2010. As this report documents, US surveillance programs are also doing damage to some
of the values the United States claims to hold most dear. These include freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, and
the right to counsel, which are all protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.
Domestic is key
Pitter ‘14
Laura Pitter, senior national security counsel in Human Rights Watch's US Program, monitors, analyzes and writes on US national
security policies. Prior to joining Human Rights Watch, Laura was a journalist, human rights advocate, and attorney who practiced in
both the public and private sectors. She was a reporter during the war in Bosnia where she wrote for Time Magazine and Reuters
News Agency among other media outlets. Following the war she worked for the United Nations in both Bosnia and post Sept. 11Afghanistan as a protection and political affairs officer. After Afghanistan, Laura practiced law for eight years, first as a public
defender and later with a product liability law firm, both in New York. Laura holds a bachelor's degree from the University of
California at Santa Barbara, a master's in international affairs from Columbia University, and a law degree from the University of San
Francisco. “US: It's Been a Year Since Snowden, and Nothing's Really Changed” – Human Rights Watch is an independent,
international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights
for all. June 5, 2014 - http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/05/us-its-been-year-snowden-and-nothings-really-changed
Prior to these disclosures, the United States was considered a world leader in promoting Internet
freedom. It made it a signature part of American foreign policy and spent millions of dollars supporting
new tools to protect the digital privacy of human rights activists globally. But the last year has deeply undermined global
trust in U.S. leadership in this area, not to mention its commitment to the rule of law and transparency in government. If this trust
continues to erode, it will have huge ramifications for U.S. business and foreign policy interests.
Technology companies are already losing billions of dollars and overseas customers who want their data stored away from the snooping eyes of the U.S. government.
Studies estimate a loss of between $35 billion and $180 billon to the U.S. cloud computer industry over
the next three years. And U.S. diplomats are now at a distinct disadvantage when negotiating economic and
foreign policy agreements abroad. The leaks have dealt a blow to America's standing when
criticizing countries with repressive regimes, who threaten fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and
association -- rights that Washington purports to hold dear. Hypocrisy does not sell.
Indian surveillance centralizes information—creates a vulnerability for financial
markets
Trivedi 13 – Anjani Trivedi holds a Master Degree in Journalism from the University of Hong Kong and a Bachelor’s Degree in Mathematics from MIT. The
author has previously held internships at the New York Times and CNN International. This piece internally quotes Meenakshi Ganguly, The South Asia director for Human
Rights Watch, Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project, and Sunil Abraham, executive director of India’s Centre for Internet and Society. (“In India, Prism-like
Surveillance Slips Under the Radar,” Time Magazine, http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillance-slips-under-the-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB, June
30, 2013)
CMS is an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text messages, social-media engagement
and phone calls on landlines and cell phones, among other communications. That means 900
million landline and cell-phone users and 125 million Internet users. The project, which is being implemented by the
government’s Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), is meant to help national law-enforcement agencies save time and avoid manual intervention, according to
the Department of Telecommunications’ annual report. This has been in the works since 2008, when C-DOT started working on a proof-of-concept, according to an older
report. The government set aside approximately $150 million for the system as part of its 12th five-year plan, although the Cabinet ultimately approved a higher amount.
Within the internal-security ministry though, the surveillance system remains a relatively “hush-hush” topic, a project official unauthorized to speak to the press tells TIME.
In April 2011, the Police Modernisation Division of the Home Affairs Ministry put out a 90-page tender to solicit bidders for communication-interception systems in every
state and union territory of India. The system requirements included “live listening, recording, storage, playback, analysis, postprocessing” and voice recognition. Civil-
liberties groups concede that states often need to undertake targeted-monitoring operations.
However, the move toward extensive “surveillance capabilities enabled by digital communications,” suggests that
governments are now “casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives,” according to Meenakshi
Ganguly, South Asia director for Human Rights Watch. This extensive communications surveillance through the likes of Prism and CMS are “out of the realm of judicial
authorization and allow unregulated, secret surveillance, eliminating any transparency or accountability on the part of the state,” a recent U.N. report stated. India is no
stranger to censorship and monitoring — tweets, blogs, books or songs are frequently blocked and banned. India ranked second only to the U.S. on Google’s list of userdata requests with 4,750 queries, up 52% from two years back, and removal requests from the government increased by 90% over the previous reporting period. While these
were largely made through police or court orders, the new system will not require such a legal process. In recent times, India’s democratically elected government has barred
access to certain websites and Twitter handles, restricted the number of outgoing text messages to five per person per day and arrested citizens for liking Facebook posts
and tweeting. Historically too, censorship has been India’s preferred means of policing social unrest. “Freedom of expression, while broadly available in theory,” Ganguly
tells TIME, “is endangered by abuse of various India laws.” There is a growing discrepancy and power imbalance between citizens and the state, says Anja Kovacs of the
Internet Democracy Project. And, in an environment like India where “no checks and balances [are] in place,” that is troubling. The potential for misuse and
misunderstanding, Kovacs believes, is increasing enormously. Currently, India’s laws relevant to interception “disempower citizens by relying heavily on the executive to
safeguard individuals’ constitutional rights,” a recent editorial noted. The power imbalance is often noticeable at public protests, as in the case of the New Delhi gang-rape
incident in December, when the government shut down public transport near protest grounds and unlawfully detained demonstrators. With an already sizeable and growing
population of Internet users, the government’s worries too are on the rise. Netizens in India are set to triple to 330 million by 2016, according to a recent report. “As
[governments] around the world grapple with the power of social media that can enable spontaneous street protests, there appears to be increasing surveillance,” Ganguly
explains. India’s junior minister for telecommunications attempted to explain the benefits of this system during a recent Google+ Hangout session. He acknowledged that
CMS is something that “most people may not be aware of” because it’s “slightly technical.” A participant noted that the idea of such an intrusive system was worrying and
he did not feel safe. The minister, though, insisted that it would “safeguard your privacy” and national security. Given the high-tech nature of CMS, he noted that telecom
companies would no longer be part of the government’s surveillance process. India currently does not have formal privacy legislation to prohibit arbitrary monitoring.
The new system comes under the jurisdiction of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, which allows for monitoring communication in the “interest of public
safety.” The surveillance system is not only an “abuse of privacy rights and security-agency overreach,” critics say,
but also counterproductive in terms of security . In the process of collecting data to monitor criminal
activity, the data itself may become a target for terrorists and criminals — a “honeypot ,” according to Sunil Abraham,
executive director of India’s Centre for Internet and Society. Additionally,
the wide-ranging tapping undermines financial
markets , Abraham says, by compromising confidentiality, trade secrets and intellectual property.
vulnerabilities will have to be built into the existing cyberinfrastructure to make way for
such a system. Whether the nation’s patchy infrastructure will be able to handle a complex web of surveillance and networks, no one can say. That, Abraham
What’s more,
contends, is what attackers will target.
Hacks on India’s central data files will succeed—crushes their financial markets
Dharmakumar 13 – Rohin Dharmakumar is an Editor at Forbes India. He holds degrees from The Indian Institute of Management in Calcutta and The R.
V. College of Engineering in Bangalore. (“Is CMS a compromise of national security?,” Forbes India Magazine, http://forbesindia.com/printcontent/35543, July 12, 2013)
Meanwhile, government
bodies like the R&AW, Central Bureau of Investigation, National Investigation Agency, Central Board of Direct Taxes, Narcotics
Control Bureau and the Enforcement Directorate will have the right to look up your data. Starting next year, all mobile telephony operators will
also need to track and store the geographical location from which subscribers make or receive calls. “I see it as the rise of techno-determinism in our security apparatus.
Previously, our philosophy was to avoid infringing on individual privacy, and monitor a small set of
individuals directly suspected of engaging in illegal activities. Now, thanks to the Utopianism being offered up by ‘Big Data’ infrastructure,
putting everybody under blanket surveillance seems like a better way to serve our security and law
enforcement agendas more effectively,” says Abraham. There is a real risk that CMS and the
numerous other monitoring programmes that will subsequently connect to it will end up harming
more Indians than protecting them. The biggest risk is that these programmes will turn into
lucrative ‘honey pots’ for hackers , criminals and rival countries. Why bother hacking individuals and companies
if you can attack the CMS? We’ve seen private corporations and government agencies in the US, Israel and the UK
getting hacked. So let’s not have any illusions that India is going to fare much better. Another consequence is
that sooner or later innocent citizens will be wrongly accused of being criminals based on mistaken data patterns. While searching for matches in any database with hundreds
of millions of records, the risk of a ‘false positive’ increases disproportionately because there are exponentially more innocents than there are guilty. And in the nearDystopian construct of the CMS, it will take months or years for such errors to be rectified. As more Indians become aware of these programmes, they will adopt
encryption and masking tools to hide their digital selves. In the process, numerous ‘unintended consequences’ of failing to differentiate law-abiding citizens from criminals
will be created. What answer will a normal citizen offer to a law enforcement official who wants to know why he or she has encrypted all communications and hosted a
personal server in, say, Sweden? But arguably the
biggest threat of 24x7 surveillance is to businesses. Security and trust are the
foundations atop which most modern businesses are built . From your purchase of a gadget on an
ecommerce site to a large conglomerate’s secret bid in a government auction to discussions within a
company on future business strategies to patent applications—everything requires secrecy and
security. All an unscrupulous competitor, whether it be a company or a country, has to do to go oneup on you is to attack the CMS and other central databases . “The reason why the USA historically decided not to
impose blanket surveillance wasn’t because of human rights, but to protect its businesses and intellectual
property. Because while we may be able to live in a society without human rights, we cannot be in one without
functional markets,” says Abraham.
Hack could create havoc – Indian infrastructure will inevitably digitize and is already
vulnerable.
Shukla ‘13
Ajai Shukla is Indian journalist and retired Colonel of Indian Army. He currently works as Consulting Editor with Business Standard
writing articles on strategic affairs, defence and diplomacy. He earlier worked with DD News and NDTV– “India's digital
battleground” - Business Standard - June 21, 2013 - http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-s-digitalbattleground-113062101013_1.html
But the
government has understood that an
ostrich-like response to the digital threat
-
which is to have as little digitisation as possible - is not a viable, long-term strategy. The economic
ministries are finding that volumes of data are becoming larger and larger. And the compulsion for more open
governance requires the Internet to be harnessed, mastered and adequately secured. Although India's day-to-day
governance and infrastructure management is not heavily reliant on the Internet, there is unease
within the government at the growing vulnerability of private Internet users to cyber-attacks. According to figures that the
government shared with Business Standard, India was the 10th most intensely cyber-attacked country in 2010-11; today, it is second only to the US.
With internet usage (including cellphones) rising dramatically - from 202 million users in March 2010 to 412 million in March 2011 and 485 million in
March 2012 - India is now second only to China in the number of devices connected to the Internet.
Strong financial markets are key to India’s economy
Goyal 14 – Dr. Sakshi Goyal is a former Faculty member at the Kaling Institute of Management Studies, Faridabad, Haryana (India). “Indian Financial Markets: A
Global Perspective” - Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research (JBM&SSR) - Volume 3, No.6, June 2014 - ISSN No: 2319-5614. Available at:
http://www.borjournals.com/a/index.php/jbmssr/article/viewFile/1729/1078
Financial markets are a vital part of an economy making it possible for industry, trade and
commerce to flourish without any obstacle in terms of resources. Today most economies around the world are judged
by the performance of their financial markets. The financial markets have indicators in place that reflect the performance of companies
whose securities are traded in those markets. The financial markets also serve a vital purpose in the growth and development of a company, which wants to expand. Such
companies with expansion plans and new projects are in need of funding and the financial market serves as the best platform from which a company can determine the
feasibility of such possibilities Krishnan (2011) mentioned that, the economic literature acknowledged that efficient and developed financial markets
could lead to increased economic growth by improving the efficiency of allocation and utilization of savings in the economy. Better functioning financial systems ease the
external financing constraints that impede firm and industrial expansion. “ There
is a growing body of empirical analyses, including
firm-level studies, industry-level studies, individual country studies, and cross-country comparisons, which
prove this strong, positive link between the functioning of the financial system and long-run
economic growth . In addition, they better allocate resources, monitor managers and exert corporate control, mobilize savings, and
facilitate the exchange of goods and services”. A capital market is a market for securities (debt or equity), where business enterprises
(companies) and governments can raise long-term funds. It is defined as a market in which money is provided for periods longer than a year as the raising of short-term
funds takes place on other markets (e.g., the money market). The capital market includes the stock market (equity securities) and the bond market (debt) The capital market
of a country can be considered as one of the leading indicators in determining the growth of its economy. As mentioned by C.Rangarajan, Ex Governor, RBI (1998), “The
growth process of any economy depends on the functioning of financial markets which also helps to augment its Capital formation. According to Professor Hicks, the
industrial Revolution in England was ignited more by the presence of liquid financial market than the technological investment”. He writes interestingly- “What happened in
the Industrial Revolution is that the Range of fixed capital goods that were used in production Began noticeably to increase. But fixed capital is sunk; it is embodied in a
particular form, from which it can only gradually be released. In order that people should be willing to sink large amounts of capital it is the availability of liquid funds which
is crucial. This condition was satisfied in England ...by the first half of the eighteenth century The liquid asset was there, as it would not have been even a few years earlier “
Thus, liquidity is a very important component of Financial Market and plays a very vital role in the long run economic development of any country as it helps not only in
promoting the savings of the economy but also to adopt an effective channel to transmit various financial policies by creating liquidity in the market. Therefore Financial
System of any country should be well developed, competitive, efficient and integrated to face all shocks. The financial system and infrastructure of any country at any time
can be considered as the result of its own peculiar historical evolution. This evolution is resulted by continuous interaction between all the participants existing in the system
and public policy interventions. The evolution of Indian financial markets and the regulatory system has also followed a similar path. India began with the central bank,
Reserve Bank of India (RBI), as the banking sector regulator, and the Ministry of Finance as the regulator for all other financial sectors. Today, most financial service
providers and their regulatory agencies exist. The role of regulators has evolved over time from that of an instrument for planned development in the initial stage to that of a
referee of a relatively more modern and complex financial sector at present. Over this period, a variety of financial sector reform measures have been undertaken in India,
with many important successes. An important feature of these reforms has been the attempt of the authorities to align the regulatory view the needs of the country and
domestic factors. These reforms can be broadly classified as steps taken towards: a) Liberalizing the overall macroeconomic and regulatory environment within which
financial sector institutions function. b) Strengthening the institutions and improving their efficiency and competitiveness. c) Establishing and strengthening the regulatory
framework and institutions for overseeing the financial system.The history of Indian capital markets spans back 200 years, around the end of the 18th century. It was at this
time that India was under the rule of the East India Company. The capital market of India initially developed around Mumbai; with around 200 to 250 securities brokers
participating in active trade during the second half of the 19th century. There are a number of factors that have paved path for India market growth. After the economic
liberalization, policies were undertaken in the 1990s, the economy of the country has been steadily rising which has led to more demands and supply circles. This has
introduced diverse market sectors and industries in the country, which has led to a competitive consumer market. Through this research paper, an attempt is made to
understand the evolution of Global financial system with more emphasis on Indian markets. It also aims to study the global perspective of financial markets of any country
and to understand that how a country’s financial markets is integrated with the other world markets. Also the concept of efficiency is highlighted which says that a country
whose financial markets are well integrated with the world markets are more efficient as compared to one whose financial markets are not very well integrated. Lastly the
paper concludes by leaving scope and opportunities to understand these global concepts in an easier way to the reader and further can be used for extensive research. A
financial system or financial sector functions as an intermediary and facilitates the flow of funds from the areas of surplus to the areas of deficit. A Financial System is a
composition of various institutions, markets, regulations and laws, practices, money manager, analysts, transactions and claims and liabilities. Indian
Financial
market can be considered as one of the oldest across the globe and is experiencing favorable time
during the recent years, which have prospered the economy of the country to a great extent . Presently,
India is rated by six international credit rating agencies, namely Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investor Services, FITCH, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), the
Japanese Credit Rating agency (JCRA), and the Rating and Investment Information Inc., Tokyo( R&I).
Decline sparks nuclear war with Pakistan
Busch 04 – Dr. Nathan Busch is the Professor of Government and co-director of the Center for American Studies at Christopher Newport University. The author
holds a Ph.D. in International relations from the University of Toronto and an MA in Political Science from Michigan State University. The author previously held the
position of Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. (“No End in Sight: The
Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation,” pg. 202-209)
In addition, because
the Indian military currently has little experience handling nuclear weapons, the risks of
accidental use could be very high during a crisis situation, at least for some time to come. If the order were given to prepare India's
nuclear weapons for possible use, the military (perhaps in conjunction with India's nuclear scientists) would need to assemble the warheads rapidly; mate them to the
deliver)' vehicles (gravity bombs or missiles); and prepare them for use, either by loading them into bombers or by aiming the missiles and preparing them for launch. All
these procedures require training and precision, and, given the early stages of India's new command-and-control arrangements, it is not at all clear that the Indian military
would be able to carry them out safely under extreme time constraints.194 If India decided to develop a rapid-response capability, some of these dangers would be lessened,
but more serious dangers would be introduced. In particular, there would be a significantly increased risk of an accidental launch of nuclear-armed missiles. India
would need to engage in a great deal of additional research into safety mechanisms to prevent such
an accidental launch, and it is simply not known how much effort India is devoting, or will devote, to
this area.195 Because the Prithvi and the two-stage Agni-I missiles contain a nonstorable liquid fuel, it would be impossible to deploy the current configuration of
either missile to allow for a rapid response. This significantly reduces the likelihood of these missiles being launched accidentally during normal circumstances, though the
risks of accidental launches would probably increase significantly if they were fueled during a crisis situation. As noted,
however, India has conducted several successful flight tests of the Agni and Agni-II missiles. Because these missiles use a solid fuel, they could be deployed in a rapidresponse state. If India were to choose such a deployment option, the risks of an accidental launch could increase significantly. These risks would depend on the extent to
which India integrates use-control devices into its weapons to prevent accidental launches, but there is little evidence that India is currently devoting significant efforts to
develop such use-control devices.196 Furthermore, even if India intends to develop such use-control devices, if a nuclear crisis were to arise before India had developed
them, it still might be tempted to mate warheads on its missiles. If India does decide to weaponize its arsenal, it still remains to be seen what type of deployment option it
would choose. According to a statement in November 1999 by India's foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, India would not keep its weapons on a "hair-trigger alert," though he
did suggest that these weapons would be dispersed and made mobile to improve their chances of surviving a first strike.197 If this statement is true, then the risks of
accidental launch would be relatively small during normal circumstances.198 But these risks would increase significantly during crisis situations, when India would
presumably mate the warheads to the missiles.199 If the military still has not been given physical control over the warheads, this would further reduce risks of accidental use
during peacetime, though the transfer of nuclear weapons to the military during a crisis could significantly increase the risks of an accident due to the military's inexperience
in handling the nuclear weapons.200 What deployment option Pakistan might adopt depends in part on India's weapon deployment. It appears that if India were to adopt a
rapid-response option, Pakistan would probably adopt a similar missile deployment, thereby increasing the risks of an accidental launch of its nuclear weapons as well. But
even if India were to deploy its weapons (in field positions) withour the warheads mated, concerns about survivability might nevertheless cause Pakistan to adopt a rapidresponse capability. If such an event were to occur, the risks of Pakistani accidental missile launches could be quite high, especially because it is unlikely that Pakistan
currently has the technical capacity to integrate sophisticated launch controls into its missile designs. Just
as in India, it is also unlikely that
Pakistan's nuclear devices are designed to minimize risks of accidents. Because Pakistan's warheads are based on an early
Chinese warhead design, they probably do not contain one-point safety designs, IHE, or fire-resistant pits. If Pakistan were to assemble its nuclear warheads, there could be
an unacceptable risk of an accidental detonation of its nuclear weapons. Moreover; if Pakistan were to mate nuclear warheads to its missiles, either because it chose to
establish a rapid-response capability or because of an ongoing nuclear crisis, then similar concerns would exist about accidental launches of Pakistani nuclear weapons. The
current risks of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan are probably relatively
small because they have a very small number of nuclear weapons and those weapons are tightly controlled by their nuclear establishments. But there are a number of
factors that could increase risks of unauthorized use in the future. Although both India and Pakistan currently possess nuclear
weapons that could be delivered by aircraft, and are both actively developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, none of their weapons appear to contain sophisticated usecontrol devices to prevent unauthorized use. Instead, the nuclear
controls in both countries appear to be based on guards, gates,
and guns . As we have seen in the Russian and Chinese cases, while the "3 G's" might be sufficient during normal
circumstances, they are particularly vulnerable during political, economic , and social upheaval s. The
Russian case has demonstrated that severe domestic upheavals can undermine central controls and weaken the infrastructures
that previously maintained the security for nuclear weapons. In particular, such upheavals can undermine the loyalty of
guards and workers at nuclear facilities, especially if the state collapses economically and can no longer afford to
pay those employees. Neither India nor Pakistan appears to have taken the necessary steps to
prevent such weaknesses from arising in their nuclear controls. Because Indian and Pakistani nuclear
controls rely on the "3 G's" while reportedly lacking personnel reliability programs, there could be a significant risk of
thefts of nuclear weapons during severe upheavals. The Russian analogy is particularly relevant in the Pakistani case. The Pakistani state
is far from stable. After the nuclear tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999, the Pakistani economy came close to collapsing and remained quite unstable for the next
several years.202 In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States removed economic sanctions and approved nearly $1 billion in international
foreign aid to Pakistan. But with a debt burden of nearly $39 billion, massive economic disparities, and continuing low levels of foreign investment, there still is significant
cause for concern about the prospects for Pakistan's long-term political and economic stability.203 If the Pakistani state were to fail, there could be significant risks of a
collapse in its nuclear controls. Were such an event to occur, there could be an extreme risk of thefts of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of
Islamic militants.204 In the events following the September 11 attacks and President Musharraf's decision to support U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan, there were serious
concerns about a potential collapse of Pakistani nuclear controls. These concerns were spurred by reports of public riots, a close affiliation among some elements of the
Pakistani military and intelligence community with the Taliban regime and al Qaeda, and the tenuous hold that Pakistani president Musharraf appears to have in
Pakistan.205 In October 2001, President Musharraf took significant steps to centralize his control by removing high-level military and intelligence officers with ties to the
Taliban, but analysts have nevertheless continued to raise concerns about Musharraf's ability to maintain control.206 Due to the seriousness of these risks, President
Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the United States has offered to advise Pakistan on methods for securing its nuclear
stockpile. ' If the U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan had extended for a longer period, Musharraf might have found it increasingly difficult to remain in power and reign in
the more extreme elements in his country. One
also cannot rule out the possibility that terrorists might choose to
target nuclear facilities in India and Pakistan, especially if domestic instability were to increase . Both
India and Pakistan have serious problems with domestic terrorism.208 These terrorists are increasingly well-armed and have targeted critical infrastructures and military
bases in the past.209 Although current defenses at both Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facilities are probably sufficient to defend against most terrorist
attacks,210 the physical protection systems at other nuclear facilities might be less effective.211 Moreover, if
the defenses at the most sensitive facilities
were weakened by domestic upheavals, then the risks of successful terrorist attacks—either for
purposes of theft or sabotage—could increase significantly. But even if such extreme events did not occur, the tightly controlled
decision-making and underdeveloped command-and-control structures in both India and Pakistan could potentially allow unauthorized use, particularly during crises. In
India, some of these risks have been minimized by the formalization of its command structure, though the military units are still fairly inexperienced with handling these
weapons.212 Moreover, because
India probably still lacks clearly defined, detailed operational procedures and
established, resilient communication channels, there would still be a fairly high risk of unauthorized
use arising from confusion or miscommunication during a crisis. These concerns will probably remain for some time to
come, though the specific risks could eventually be improved, depending on the training the military receives and the degree of professionalism among the troops. Because
Pakistan is currently under military rule, and its nuclear weapons are controlled by the military, one would expect a better coordination of nuclear decision-making and
command-and-control systems. Nevertheless, there are potential problems with Pakistani command and control as well. The lack of a clear operational use doctrine,
combined with inadequate C3I could increase the risks of unauthorized use during crises: "there is no enunciated nuclear doctrine, nor are there decision-making and
communications systems adequate for either strategic or tactical command and control in the nuclear environment. Nuclear targeting information could not be passed in
time to be of use in a rapidly changing situation, which would increase the probability of own-troop strikes by tactical [nuclear] missiles."213 The risks or unauthorized use
would increase if India and Pakistan were to deploy their weapons on ballistic missiles. Risks of decapitation and questions about the survivability of the nuclear forces
would probably cause both India and Pakistan to deploy mobile systems if they were to operationalize their nuclear forces. These systems would significantly increase
difficulties in command and control, especially because their weapons lack use-control devices.214 In addition, because of the risks of decapitation, Pakistan is likely to
adopt a "delegative" system, where the authority to launch nuclear weapons is given to a number of military officials.215 As the number of people authorized to launch
nuclear weapons increases, so does the risk of a use of nuclear weapons that has not been commanded by the central authorities.216 The
greatest concerns
have been raised about a possible inadvertent use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. The combined effects of mutual
mistrust, very short flight times for missiles, continual armed conflicts along their borders, and few reliable CBMs make the risks of inadvertent use quite severe, especially
during crisis situations. According to George Perkovich, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Kargil
proved that
having nuclear weapons would not deter new conflicts . It also showed that unless such conflicts themselves were prevented, the
possibility of an accidental or deliberate nuclear exchange would also increase given both states' relatively poor systems of intelligence surveillance and nuclear command
and control."217 Due
to continual mistrust between the two countries, each would be likely to misinterpret
military movements, missile tests, or accidental detonations as an impending attack by the other side. The risks of misinterpreting
each other's motives are compounded by the vulnerability of their nuclear forces and the short flight times of the forces to key targets. For example, because the runways at
Pakistani Air Force bases could be destroyed by a conventional air strike or nuclear attack,218 India could effectively eliminate Pakistan's nuclear bomber capability.
During an acute crisis, Pakistan might be faced with a "use them or lose them" dilemma, in that it
would need to attack rapidly or lose its ability to retaliate altogether. For this reason, Pakistani officials would be extremely
suspicious of any Indian actions that could be interpreted as preparations for an attack. Because the flight time of Indian bombers is approximately ten minutes, Pakistani
leaders would have a very limited amount of time to decide whether to launch their own attack.219 These conditions thus create an ongoing environment in which
inadvertent use is quite possible. In addition, both countries have unreliable intelligence systems, which have repeatedly misinterpreted the other's intentions. For example,
during the Brasstacks incident, Pakistani intelligence reported that India's exercise was merely a cover for an attack. Meanwhile, Indian intelligence overlooked the defensive
nature of the Pakistani troops' position. These intelligence failures caused each side to escalate the tensions unnecessarily. In addition, their intelligence systems have
sometimes failed to detect major troop movements altogether. As we have seen, during the Brasstacks crisis, Indian surveillance planes did not detect Pakistani troops
positioned at their border for two weeks. And in the 1999 Kargil war, Indian intelligence failed to detect the Pakistani invasion until several months after they had
positioned themselves at strategic locations in the Kargil heights. These intelligence failures could have two consequences. First, if either side were surprised by
comparatively benign actions (such as Pakistan's defensive positioning during the Brasstacks crisis), it would be more likely to overreact and mistakenly conclude that an
attack is imminent. And second, if one side (especially Pakistan) is confident that an invasion would not be detected at first, it might be more likely to launch attacks across
the border: Each of these scenarios would greatly increase the risks of nuclear escalation.220 Presumably owing to the massive intelligence failure prior to the 1999 Kargil
war, however, India has recently made significant investments in its intelligence-gathering capabilities, which could reduce risks of such failures by India in the future.221
The dangers of miscalculations and intelligence failures are increased by the crude early-warning
systems employed by both countries, particularly Pakistan. Several incidents serve to illustrate this point. First, prior to Pakistan's nuclear tests in
1998, Pakistan reported that it had detected an air force attack on its radars and warned that it had mated a number of warheads to its Ghauri missiles.222 While this report
might have been circulated in order to justify their nuclear tests, circulating such a report could have caused India to mate weapons to its missiles, greatly increasing the risks
of inadvertent use (as well as accidental and unauthorized use). Another, perhaps more troubling, incident occurred prior to the U.S. missile strike on Afghanistan in August
1998. The United States sent a high-level U.S. official to Pakistan because it feared Pakistan would detect the missile and interpret it as an Indian strike. Pakistan never even
detected the missile, however. Scholars have pointed out that this incident emphasizes not only the U.S. concern about inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan,
but also that Pakistan's early-warning system "has serious flaws, and such shortcomings are more likely to foster nervousness than calm. To the extent that they lack reliable
early-warning systems, India or Pakistan could base launch decisions on unreliable sources, increasing the chance of mistakes."223 But even if India and Pakistan had
reliable early-warning systems, the risks of inadvertent war would still be extremely high. If Indian or Pakistani radars detected aircraft headed toward them, they would have
very little time to decide what to do before the aircraft reached their targets. In addition, because there would be a great deal of uncertainty about whether attacking bombers
carried conventional or nuclear weapons, the attacked side (especially Pakistan) could
face a "use them or lose them" scenario and
be tempted to launch a nuclear attack to ensure that its nuclear capability was not destroyed.224 Thus,
even if India and Pakistan do not deploy nuclear weapons on missiles, the risks of an inadvertent use in these circumstances could be extremely high. If India and Pakistan
were to deploy their nuclear weapons on missiles (a scenario that is quite likely, given the vulnerability of Pakistani airfields and India's stated need for deterrence against the
People's Republic of China), the risks of inadvertent use would become even worse. Because the flight time for ballistic missiles between the two countries is less than five
minutes,225 Indian and Pakistani leaders would have virtually no time to decide what action to take (or perhaps even to launch a retaliatory strike) before the missiles hit
their targets.226 The psychological effect on the two countries would be tremendous. According
to Francois Heisbourg, once theater missiles are
strategic situation will resemble the Cuban missile crisis, except that it "would be permanent
rather than tempo-rary, would occur without adequate C3I in place, and with political leadership located less than
five minutes from mutual Armageddon .”
deployed in South Asia, the
The impact is extinction
Chaffin 11 – Greg Chaffin is a Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus. (“Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia,”
http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia, July 8, 2011)
Portions of the military
and ISI, whose primary concern is the strategic challenge posed by India, operate largely without
constraints or civilian oversight. As a result of this strategic calculus, Pakistan has not and will never be the strategic ally the United States wants or
needs. Indeed, so long as Pakistan’s overriding security concern emanates from India, U.S. and Pakistani interests in Afghanistan will diverge. The greatest
threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased IndiaPakistan tension will erupt into all-out war that could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. Indeed, in
just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely
belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war. Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional
forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its
This policy is probably not directed from the top. Indeed, any characterization of Pakistan as a unitary actor would be fallacious.
military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict
unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away
from the brink. However, it is equally likely that India
would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state
possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control elements would be
disabled, leaving individual commanders to respond in an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of
war and decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their
forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities. As a result any such
conflict would likely continue to escalate until one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted
its nuclear arsenal. A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world
as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the
global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies
conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would
result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could very well place the survival of the
human race in jeopardy . In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in
which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets
would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb
as high as 20 million. The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices
would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the
lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would
remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore,
these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s
ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as
much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages,
and widespread political upheaval. Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to
warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between
India and Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off. Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Laden’s compound,
several members of India’s security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own crossborder incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that
could quickly escalate.