USCG Auxiliary Aviation
Safety Event Discussion
October 2014
Who Are These People
And Why Are They
Important To Us!
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Auxiliarists Skip and Madeline Mau
Auxiliarists Richard and Linda Smilgoff
Auxiliarists Duffield and Rene
Auxiliarists Anderson, Huhne, Nappi and
Polimeni
• Auxiliarist Feig
• Auxiliarists Frank and Frederika Lizak
• Auxiliarists Purvis and Fuller
July 1984
• New Hope, NY
• Piper PA-23-160; N4167P
• Two Auxiliarists were departing for a
Safety Patrol of southeastern Lake Ontario
when their twin-engine aircraft
experienced an engine malfunction in the
left engine. It subsequently crashed.
• Auxiliarists Skip and Madeline Mau are
dead.
January 1989
• Chicago, IL
• Piper PA-28-180, N16375
• The pilot and two observer/trainees were on a
flight along the Lake Michigan shoreline. After
about 23 min of flight, while approaching to land
at Chicago, the pilot reported an engine problem
of unknown origin. He attempted to land in a
parking lot at a water filtration plant. After
clearing the roof of a building, the plane turned &
subsequently collided with a retaining wall at the
edge of the parking lot. The pilot was seriously
injured.
• Auxiliarists Richard and Linda Smilgoff are dead.
September 1989
• Escondido, CA
• Beech A35; N566B
• While on a routine patrol the crew encountered
a thick cloud layer. After initiating a climb on
course, the pilot lost control of the airplane at
7100 feet and it entered a right descending
spiral. During the uncontrolled descent, just
prior to ground impact, the outer 1/2 or the right
wing separated due to overstress.
• Auxiliarists Duffield and Rene are dead.
May 1990
• At sea off of Davis Park, NY
• Bellanca 17-31A; N7SF
• This crew was on a routine training flight and
departed on what was to have been a local area
training flight for the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary.
There was no further contact with the airplane,
and it was reported overdue about 6 hrs after
takeoff. Recorded radar data showed that the
airplane had flown out over the ocean after
takeoff, and after some maneuvering reversed
course. At no time was the airplane above 500 ft.
Three days later, parts of the airplane were found
washed up on a beach.
May 1990
• Two passenger bodies were recovered; the
pilot and the remaining passenger were not.
Examination of the wreckage indicated that
the airplane had impacted the water at high
speed while structurally intact. The pilot had
reportedly suffered a head injury within the
previous 48 hrs, and had been complaining of
pain on the left side of his head.
• Auxiliarists Anderson, Huhne, Nappi and
Polimeni are dead.
January 1992
• 28 miles south of Key West
• Cessna C-172; N121L
• The aircraft was on patrol when a little over 3 hours into the
flight, the pilot reported that the engine began to miss.
Attempts to correct were unsuccessful. The condition
continued & the aircraft began to shake violently and oily
smoke entered the cockpit. The pilot ditched the aircraft
and it sank in 2,500 ft of water. Both occupants exited with
no injuries but the passenger reportedly lost his lifejacket
during the egression. The observer perished after the
crash. He had undergone a cardiac triple bypass in Nov of
1989, & was taking medication for high blood pressure &
diabetes.
• Auxiliarist Feig is dead.
June 1997
• Avon Park, FL
• Grumman American AA-5B; N28297
• Two Auxiliarists were returning from a Coast
Guard Auxiliary Conference in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida. The airplane was observed at about 100
to 125 feet in the traffic pattern. It was seen to
make a very steep left turn, lose altitude, and then
hit the ground. Examination of the airframe, flight
controls, engine assembly, and accessories,
revealed no evidence of a pre-crash mechanical
failure or malfunction. Low ceilings and poor
visibility were reported at the airport.
• Auxiliarists Frank and Frederika Lizak are dead.
February 2001
• Florida Keys
• Piper PA-32-300, N99WD
• The aircraft was conducting a night intercept training
mission (posing as a drug smuggling plane) with a Coast
Guard HU-25 from Air Station Miami. The accident pilot
stated that it was getting a bit hazy and informed the
Coast Guard pilot that he would be breaking off and
turning to the north to get separation for another
intercept. After some more communications between the
two aircraft, there was no other radio communications
with the Piper.
• Radar data at about 0100 revealed multiple turns at
1600 AGL. The last recorded hit was at 1500 AGL.
February 2001
• Examination of the airframe, flight controls,
engine assembly and accessories,
vacuum pump and flight instruments
revealed no evidence of a pre-crash
mechanical failure or
malfunction. However, only the tail of the
single-engine aircraft was in one piece,
indicating that the plane slammed into the
sea at a high rate of speed.
• Auxiliarists Purvis and Fuller are dead.
SUBJ: AIR STATION SUPPORT FOR CG
AUXILIARY AVIATION SAFETY TRAINING
EVENT
• 1. The Auxiliary Aviation program has
experienced five significant mishaps
since July, 2014. These mishaps
occurred in different regions with no
identifiable common causal
factors. Luckily, all Auxiliary air crews
involved have avoided serious injury.
However, air facility damage ranged
from minor to total loss.
SUBJ: AIR STATION SUPPORT FOR CG
AUX AVIATION SAFETY TRAINING
EVENT
• 2. The National Commodore of the Auxiliary, in
concurrence with the Office of Auxiliary and Boating
Safety (CG-BSX) and the Assistant Commandant for
Capability (CG-7), has issued a mandatory Safety
Training Event for all Auxiliary Aviation personnel. This
event will be accomplished prior to 31 October 2014 and
will include completion of the mandatory tasks outlined in
the attachment. Auxiliary members unable to attend in
person or participate via webinar may satisfy this
mandate by watching a recorded version of the required
training session. Recordings will be made available
through the Auxiliary District Flight Safety Officer (DFSO)
and District Staff Officer (DSO-AV), and completion of
the tasks will be recorded via AUXDAT
SUBJ: AIR STATION SUPPORT FOR CG
AUX AVIATION SAFETY TRAINING
EVENT
• 3. Air Stations are encouraged to host the safety
training event and are directed to provide Command
Cadre representation. It is highly recommended that
the Air Stations Commanding Officer, Operations
Officer, Flight Safety Officer (FSO) and unit Auxiliary
Liaison (AUXLO) attend the safety event. It is also
encouraged that the event be open to all interested
unit members. Station commands, FSOs and
AUXLOs are encouraged to reach out to their
regional Auxiliary counterparts to offer coordination
and assistance. However, it should be highlighted
that this event is coordinated, led and primarily
delivered by the DFSO/DSO-AV.
SUBJ: AIR STATION SUPPORT FOR CG
AUX AVIATION SAFETY TRAINING
EVENT
• 4. Commencing on 1 November 2014,
orders will not be issued to any Auxiliary
Aviation member whose completion of
the training has not been recorded in
AUXDATA. The Unit Auxiliary Aviation
Coordinator shall verify training with the
Auxiliary Training Officer prior to issuing
orders to ensure compliance.
SUBJ: AIR STATION SUPPORT FOR CG
AUX AVIATION SAFETY TRAINING
EVENT
• 5. It is not recommended that this event be
combined with any other Air Station training. It
is recommended that Air Stations offer to host
the event, but that is not mandatory if another
facility makes better logistical sense.
• 6. CG-711 POCs: LCDR Jeffrey Dorwart and
LCDR Paul Beavis.
• 7. CAPT Tom McDevitt, Acting Chief, Office of
Aviation Forces sends.
• BT
• NNNN
Recent Events
– An off-airport landing due to engine roughness – no
damage or injuries;
– An off-airport landing due to engine failure – major
damage, minor injury;
– A case of temporary pilot incapacitation – no damage
or injuries;
– The unintentional inflation of a 54-man life raft in an
aircraft on the ground – major damage, no injuries;
--Pictures to follow-– A long landing from an instrument approach in which
the airplane exited the end of the runway and flipped
over – major damage, minor injuries.
Interrupting the Trend
• The current trend is unacceptable and
unsustainable in a professional and disciplined
organization. Normalization of deviation is not
an acceptable standard. Decreased pilot
proficiency, faulty aeronautical decisionmaking, violation of Coast Guard standards,
and non-compliant attitudes contribute to
unacceptable deviations.
• Human Error is the greatest casual factor in
aviation mishaps.
• So what can we do about this?
Interrupting the Trend
• It starts with you! Each and everyone
one of us.
• Look in the mirror and consider how you
approach things.
• Be HONEST & critical of what you see.
• Are you current? Do you need some
training?
• Aircraft commanders, you set the tone
for the crew.
Interrupting the Trend
• Does your pre-mission brief layout
functions and responsibilities on each
mission?
• Do you understand exactly what your
role is?
• Are you allowed to carry out your role?
• Do you use CRM/ORM effectively?
• Why not? What do you do about it?
• Post Mission Brief?
• Use your DFSO! This is confidential.
Operational Risk
Management (ORM)
• Factors are
– Aircraft Performance – right facility for job?
– Pilot Proficiency
– Human Limits – are you current and
proficient?
• Are your adequately rested? OTC meds?
– Environmental Conditions – Weather, crew
makeup
How does it apply to me?
Are all members of the crew reviewing the
changing circumstances of the mission?
Just Culture
• Errors: When personnel commit errors,
the normal human response is
embarrassment, shame, and
disappointment. The appropriate
leadership response is to support and
console personnel that commit those
errors. Consoling includes verbal and
candid discussion in an empathetic and
supportive environment. Over time,
uncorrected errors tend to become at-risk
behavior.
Just Culture
• At-Risk Behaviour: At-risk behaviour
increases risk and leads individuals to
unrecognized risk acceptance or
justification. Constructive leadership
response to at-risk behaviour is coaching,
with a values-supportive discussion of safe
behaviour. Coaching must be productive,
and yield organizational learning and
personal growth.
Just Culture
• Reckless choices: Reckless choices
involve deliberate behaviour to accept
unwarranted risk. Known reckless choices
are clearly called out in education, training,
policy, and workshops. In a just culture, an
Auxiliary member who chooses to engage
in a reckless choice should expect a level
of personal and professional
accountability.
Aux Air Culture
• For our program, compliance and
competency are the bare minimums.
• Excellence is what we seek.
• Flight Examiners have the duty and
responsibility to insist on performance to
the FAA and Coast Guard Standards.
AUX AIR Tools
• The Flight Examining Board and the
Aviation Board are extremely useful tools
for maintaining objectivity and keeping
personalities out of our decision-making
about our aviators. Please USE THEM as
a robust tool for doing so. We must be
open and transparent with each other
about everything – including ourselves.
• The Coast Guard is and they expect the
same from us.
Standards for Training and
Operations
– Continuing Operational Risk Management
in on-going operations
– CRM Principles
– Aircraft systems knowledge and its
importance
– Weather minimums for patrols, stabilized
approaches, go-arounds
– Currency -- day, night, Instrument flight
conditions
– Flight and duty limits - Importance of rest
– Emergency egress review
Standards for Training and
Operations
– Standard crew complements for IMC operations
and passenger transport
– Value of ATC Services and CG AirSta Ops – Don’t
hesitate to call the ODO
– Pre-flight activities
– Use of Check Lists
– Spatial Disorientation
– Review of aircraft performance and limitations,
including weight & balance
– Engine Stop Policy
– Careful determination of the cargo and its nature
and risks
– Compliance with maintenance standards
Personal Self Analysis
• All aviators must conduct a personal selfanalysis regarding their ability to perform
at the level required by the FAA Practical
Test Standard, and recheck their
commitment to the disciplines set by the
FAA and the Coast Guard.
• This includes an attitude of
professionalism to be able to self-select
out of a flight when all conditions are not
met for the safety of the mission.
Privilege of Auxiliary
Flying
• Flying for the Coast Guard is a privilege
and not a right.
• When we are flying under orders we are
part of the Coast Guard.
• We have a duty and responsibility for
compliance and excellence, meeting
and exceeding the expectations of the
Coast Guard.
Privilege of the Auxiliary
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Must have FAA flight certificates
The aircraft offered for use Must be N registered.
CIM_16798_3E, Section A, Authority for Flights states:
Auxiliary aircraft, while assigned to authorized Coast
Guard duty, shall be deemed to be Coast Guard aircraft,
public vessels of the United States, and vessels of the
Coast Guard within the meaning of 14 U.S.C. § 646 and
647 and other applicable provisions of law. Subject to
the provisions of 14 U.S.C. § 823(a) and 831, while
assigned to duty, qualified Auxiliary pilots shall be
deemed to be Coast Guard pilots.
Privilege of the Auxiliary
• This does not exempt nor remove any
FAA requirements.
• The Auxiliary aircraft are NOT public use.
• The Public Use designation requires that
an LOA has be issued by the FAA to the
specific aircraft.
• A log book entry is made reflecting this
change.
• The aircraft is no longer available for
personnel use.
Characteristics of Well
Functioning Teams
• Purpose: Members proudly share a sense of why
the team exists and are invested in accomplishing its
mission and goals.
• Priorities: Members know what needs to be done
next, by whom, and by when to achieve team goals.
• Roles: Members know their roles in getting tasks
done and when to allow a more skillful member to do
a certain task.
• Decisions: Authority and decision-making lines are
clearly understood.
• Conflict: Conflict is dealt with openly and is
considered important to decision-making and
personal growth.
Characteristics of Well
Functioning Teams
• Personal traits: Members feel their unique
personalities are appreciated and well utilized.
• Norms: Group norms for working together are set
and seen as standards for everyone in the group.
• Effectiveness: Members find team meetings
efficient and productive and look forward to this time
together.
• Success: Members know clearly when the team has
met with success and share in this equally and
proudly.
• Training: Opportunities for feedback and updating
skills are provided and taken advantage of by team
members.
Characteristics of Well
Functioning Teams
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Is this how your crew operates?
If not, why not?
What have you done to fix it?
If so, what have you do to cement it?
Resources if you need assistance!
– DFSO – Confidential
– ADSO-AV
– DSO-AV
Procedure for Credit
• Make sure your name is on the Attendance
Roster – **No Name = No Credit**
• AUXDATA Entry: Once completed, Safety
Event Training will be recorded in AUXDATA as
a task titled “Air Safety Seminar.” This task will
be assigned to all five AUXAIR competencies
to complete. This task can only be entered by
the DIRAUX office. If not completed by 31
October 2014, members will go into REWK and
will not be able to receive credit for AUXAIR
missions.
Discussion
• What will you do to improve the safety
of your operations?
• What road blocks do you have?