Early Cold War and the Korean War
from Pusan through Inchon
Lsn 19
Cold War
• A state of political
tension and military
rivalry between
nations that stops
short of full-scale war,
especially that which
existed between the
United States and
Soviet Union following
World War II
Iron Curtain
• “From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the
Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across
the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals
of the ancient states of central and eastern
Europe– Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna,
Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia.
From what I have seen of our Russian friends
and allies during the war I am convinced that
there is nothing they admire so much as
strength and nothing for which they have
less respect than military weakness.”
– Winston Churchill March 5, 1946
George Kennan and Containment
• Kennan was a Soviet expert and director of the
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff
• In the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs he
wrote an article under the pen name “Mr. X”
titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”
• He described the USSR as being driven by an
aggressive and uncompromising ideology that
would stop “only when it meets some
unanswerable force.”
George Kennan and Containment
• Kennan wrote that the
US must adopt a
“policy of firm
containment
designed to confront
the Russians with
unalterable
counterforce at every
point where they show
signs of encroaching
upon the interests of
a peaceful and stable
world.”
Greek Civil War
• During the German
occupation of Greece
during WWII, the
Communists and other
parts of the Greek Left
formed a resistance army
called the National
People's Liberation Army
(ELAS)
• By 1944, ELAS controlled
large areas of the country
and continued to have
success against the British
liberation force after the
war
Truman Doctrine
• On Feb 21, 1947, the British
informed the US that they were
pulling out of Greece.
• On March 3, the Greek
government requested US aid.
• On March 12, President Truman
announced the Truman
Doctrine:
– “I believe that it must be the policy
of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures.”
Harry Truman
JUSMAPG
• On 22 May, Truman
signed a bill authorizing
$400 million in aid to
Greece and Turkey.
• By 1952, Greek forces
would receive $500
million in US aid.
• Even more important
was LTG James Van
Fleet and his 350-man
Joint US Military
Advisory and Planning
Group.
Grumman Avengers and Curtis
Helldivers aboard the USS
Leyte preparing for operations
over Greece in 1948
Success
• Van Fleet set out to
retrain and reorganize the
Greek Army and cut off
the flow of supplies
reaching guerrillas from
Yugoslavia, Albania, and
Bulgaria
• On Oct 16, 1949,
Greece’s Communist
leaders announced a
cease-fire
“As in Greece, the enemy strikes from sanctuary”
Occupied Berlin
Berlin Airlift
• In June 1948, the Soviet
Union attempted to control all
of Berlin by cutting surface
traffic to and from West Berlin.
• The Truman Administration
initiated a daily airlift which
brought much needed food
and supplies into West Berlin.
• The airlift lasted until the end
of September 1949 -although on May 12, 1949, the
Soviet government had
yielded and lifted the
blockade.
Berlin Airlift
The maximum effort of the airlift was the “Easter Parade”
on April 16, 1949 when 1,398 sorties (one landing in Berlin
every minute) delivered 12,940 short tons.
Berlin Airlift
NATO and Warsaw Pact
• In 1949 the US, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Portugal formed the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization to provide collective security
against Soviet aggression
• Provided a military and political complement to
the Marshall Plan
• Greece and Turkey joined in 1952
• NATO admitted West Germany in 1954 and
allowed it to rearm
• The Soviets responded by creating the Warsaw
Pact.
NATO and Warsaw Pact
Divided Korea
• After World War II,
Japan’s former colony
of Korea was divided
into two occupation
zones along the 38th
parallel with the Soviet
zone in the north and
the US zone in the
south
• Before the occupation
forces departed, an
anticommunist regime
was established in the
south and a communist
one in the north
US in Asia
• The US was uncertain as to the
extent of its commitment in
Asia
• It knew its umbrella definitely
covered Japan, Okinawa, and
the Philippines, but it was
unclear about Taiwan, South
Korea, and Southeast Asia
• Believing the US did not intend
to protect South Korea, the
USSR allowed the North
Koreans to invade the south in
1950
Secretary of State Dean
Acheson’s speech to the
National Press Club
omitted South Korea from
the US “defensive
perimeter”
North Korea Attacks:
June 25, 1950
• North Korean army crossed the
38th parallel with an invasion
force totaling over 90,000 troops
and 150 Soviet-built tanks
• By the night of June 28, Seoul
had fallen and the South Korean
forces were in disarray.
• South Korea appealed to the
United Nations for assistance
• The UN passed a resolution
recommending that “the members
of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Republic of
Korea as may be necessary to
repel the armed attack and to
restore international peace and
security to the area.”
United Nations
• As a member of the UN Security Council, the Soviet
Union could have vetoed UN involvement in the war, but
instead Moscow was boycotting the Security Council at
the time in protest of the UN’s failure to seat a
representative of the newly established People’s
Republic of China
• In the absence of the USSR, the UN passed a resolution
sending a military force to South Korea
• The force was predominately American with Douglas
McArthur as the Supreme Commander.
– There were also substantial contributions from the UK, Canada
and other Commonwealth countries.
Force Comparison
• North Korean People’s
Army (NKPA)
– 14 Divisions (9 in
invasion force)
– Soviet trained, armed
and advised
– 150 tanks, almost 100
modern aircraft
• U.S. Armed Forces in
1950:
– 10 Army divisions (4
in Japan)
– 48 USAF air groups
– 331 combatants (64 in
Pacific)
– 2 Marine divisions (-)
Task Force Smith
• To stem the North
Korea advance, the
US deployed “Task
Force Smith,” a
delaying force of two
reinforced rifle
companies to Pusan
• MacArthur thought
this “arrogant
display of strength”
would cause the
North Koreans to
take pause and slow
their aggression
Elements of Task
Force Smith arriving
at Taejon
Task Force Smith
• Task Force Smith began
occupying defensive positions on
July 5 at 3:00 am
– At 7:00 they began seeing enemy
movement
– At 8:16 they began firing artillery
– At 2:30 the commander decided to
withdraw
• When LTC Smith arrived at
Ch’onan on July 6, he counted
185 men
– He began with 540
• After all stragglers returned, the
total loss to TF Smith was 35%
Implications of Task Force Smith
• Task Force Smith has become the
poster child for the cost of military
unpreparedness
• “No more Task Force Smiths”
– GEN Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff,
1991-1995 (administered the post Desert
Storm Army downsizing)
“Hollow Army”
- World War II peak Army strength was 8,268,000
- 89 combat divisions in June 1945
- June 1950 strength was about 591,000 (1/14 the
peak World War II size)
- 10 active combat divisions
- But to keep them fielded, one battalion from
each infantry regiment and one firing battery
from each field artillery battalion had been
eliminated
- This move effectively reduced combat power
by 1/3
Far East Command (FEC)
• 108,500 troops under MacArthur
• 4 infantry divisions in Japan (7th, 24th, 25th and 1st Cavalry)
• Authorized peacetime divisions strength was 12,500 (13,500 for the
25th )
• Authorized wartime strength was 18,900
• 3 of the 4 divisions in Japan had about 11,000 men
• In addition to the missing infantry and artillery battalions each
• Lacked three anti aircraft artillery batteries
• Lacked the regimental tank companies
• Had only a company of M24 Chaffee light tanks in place of the
divisional tank battalion
• Estimated the divisions could field 62% of normal infantry firepower,
69% of normal anti-aircraft capability, and 14% of armored support
Equipment in FEC
• Mostly outdated World War II equipment and much of it
was unserviceable
• Of 18,000 jeeps only 8,000 were serviceable
• Of 13,780 2 1/2 ton trucks, only 4,441 were serviceable
• Had none of the new 3.5 inch antitank rocker launchers
• Only the 2.36 inch Bazooka which had proved
inadequate in 1944 – 1945
• Hydraulic fluid for recoil mechanisms in the M24 tanks had
been on backorder for two years, so most of their 75 mm
guns had never been fired
• Some men were wearing tennis shoes because of a lack
of boots
• ¼ of the small arms were defective
Training
• Occupation duties had taken
precedence over training
• No unit training above the
company level had taken
place in Eighth Army before
April 1949
• Limited maneuver area and
an annual personnel turnover
rate of 43% impeded training
• The four divisions were
rated as 65% to 84% combat
ready
– Some senior officers felt
that 40% was more
realistic
US troops parade across
the Yoshida Bridge
Pusan Perimeter:
June 27 to Sept 15
• The American forces
were unprepared for the
North Korean attack.
• By the end of July, the
North Koreans had
pushed the U.N. forces to
the southeast corner of
the peninsula, where they
dug in around the port of
Pusan.
Inchon (Operation Chromite)
Sept 15
• MacArthur completely changed
the course of the war overnight
by ordering -- over nearly
unanimous objections -- an
amphibious invasion at the
port of Inchon, near Seoul.
• The Americans quickly gained
control of Inchon, recaptured
Seoul within days, and cut the
North Korean supply lines.
• American and ROK forces
broke out of the Pusan
Perimeter and chased the
retreating enemy north.
Inchon and Selected Principles of
War
• Surprise
– Inchon was an unlikely
landing site because of
strong tides and mud flats
• Maneuver
– Amphibious turning
movement
• Offensive
– Had to do something to
reverse Pusan situation
and gain the initiative
• Objective
– Landing at Inchon
facilitated capture of
Seoul; both the South
Korean capital and the
site of important road and
railroad intersections
Elements of Operational Design
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Synergy
Simultaneity and depth
Anticipation
Balance
Leverage
Timing and tempo
Operational reach and
approach
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Forces and functions
Arranging operations
Centers of gravity
Direct versus indirect
Decisive points
Culmination
Termination
Inchon and Selected Elements of
Operational Design
• Operational reach and
approach
– The distance over which
military power can mass
effects and be employed
decisively.
– As the North Koreans
moved south, they
overextended their lines
of communication.
– Conversely, shorter
American lines of
communication allowed
the strengthening of the
Pusan perimeter.
Inchon and Selected Elements of
Operational Design
• Culmination
– The point in time and space at which an
attacker’s combat power no longer
exceeds that of the defender
– Because of operational reach, by
August 23, numerical parity between
the two forces north of Pusan was
surpassed in favor of the Americans
– The NKPA had reached its culminating
point while Eighth Army was getting
stronger
– UN combat forces at this point
outnumbered the North Koreans,
92,000 to 70,000
Inchon and Selected Elements of
Operational Design
• Direct versus indirect
– Where direct attack means
attacking into an opponents
strength, commanders should
seek an indirect approach.
– MacArthur’s concept was to
“rely upon strategic maneuver
to overcome the great odds
against me… [T]he alternative
is a frontal attack which can
only result in a protracted and
expensive campaign.”
– Amphibious turning
movement
Inchon and Selected Elements of
Operational Design
• Center of gravity
– Those characteristics,
capabilities, or sources of
power from which a military
force derives its freedom of
action, physical strength, or
will to fight.
– If the enemy CoG was the
North Korean People’s
Army, how did Operation
Chromite succeed when it
took place some 140 miles
north of the main NPKA
forces?
Inchon and Selected Elements of
Operational Design
• ….. by focusing on
a critical
vulnerability, the
enemy lines of
communication
• “The vulnerability
of the enemy is his
supply position.”
– Douglas
MacArthur
Seoul railroad yards burning after Air Force
dropped napalm, September 26, 1950.
Inchon and Selected Elements of
Operational Design
• Critical vulnerabilities
are “critical
requirements or
components thereof
which are deficient, or
vulnerable to
neutralization,
interdiction, or attack
(moral/physical harm)
in a manner
achieving decisive or
significant results,
disproportional to the
military resources
applied.”
Bombed North Korean
railcars Sept 21, 1950
Inchon and Selected Elements of
Operational Design
• Decisive points
– A point, if retained,
that provides a
commander with a
marked advantage
over his opponent.
– Seoul was decisive
both for its
symbolic value as
the capital and as
the most critical
node in the supply
line of the enemy
attack.
Seoul railroad yards burning after
Air Force dropped napalm,
September 26, 1950
Inchon and Selected Elements of
Operational Design
• Simultaneity and depth
– The simultaneous
application of power
against key adversary
capabilities and sources of
strength.
– Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Air struck targets
ranging from the enemy’s
strategic marshalling areas
to tactical forces
– Included both the
amphibious turning
movement and the
breakout from Pusan
Inchon and Selected Elements of
Operational Design
• Simultaneity and Depth
– “The deep envelopment based on surprise,
which severs the enemy’s supply lines, is and
always has been the most decisive maneuver
of war. A short envelopment which fails to
envelop and leaves the enemy’s supply
system intact merely divides your own forces
and can lead to heavy losses and even
jeopardy.”
• Douglas MacArthur
Inchon and Selected Elements of
Operational Design
• Termination
– Knowing when to
terminate military
operations and how to
preserve achieved
advantages.
– Success led MacArthur
to continue attack into
North Korea; a strategic
miscalculation that
ultimately leads to his
relief.
Integration
• On 26 June 1948, Truman
signed Executive Order
9981 calling for the equal
treatment and opportunity
of blacks in the military
• The Army initially moved
slowly to follow this order,
but military necessity
brought on by the Korean
War accelerated the
process
– By 1952 integration was
a fate accompli in the
Far East Command
Segregated Units
Integrated Units
• The Army’s integration was “the great victory of the Korean War”
-- The Compact History of the Korean War, Middleton, 1965, p. 90.
• “Jim Crow died on the hills of Korea”
-- A Short History of the Korean War, Stokesbury, 1988, p. 232.
Military Integration in Context
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1948 Executive Order 9981
1954 Brown vs. Topeka Board of
Education
1957 Little Rock Central High
School desegregated
1961 James Meredith becomes
first black to enroll at Ole Miss
1964 Civil Rights Act
1965 Voting Rights Act
1965 First black students enroll at
Southern Miss
1967 Loving v. Virginia rules that
prohibiting interracial marriage is
unconstitutional
1971 Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education
upholds busing
Clyde Kennard, a former Army
paratrooper, tried
unsuccessfully to enroll at USM
in 1957, 1958, and 1959
Review
• Describe the post-World War II international relations
environment.
• What were the training, personnel, and equipment
readiness problems with Task Force Smith and the
post-WW II Army in general?
• Describe Inchon in terms of the principals of war of
surprise, offensive, maneuver, and objective.
• What is a critical vulnerability and what was the
critical vulnerability MacArthur attacked at Inchon?
• What were the broader social implications of the
Army’s integration policy?
Next
• Korea
– Relief of MacArthur
– Stalemate
– Armistice
• Cuba