Operation Anadyr
Hypotheses
American Blockade
Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba
 13 days of Crisis between Soviet Union and United
States
 Cold War nuclear tension
 16-28 October 1962
 Soviet Union installed nuclear warheads in Cuba
which is discovered by American U-2 planes
 During the crisis President Kennedy initiated to
establish ExComm
 Why did Soviet Union attempt to place offensive
missiles in Cuba?
 Operation Anadyr: Strategic missile base in Cuba
 Soviet governments first gave arms Cuba in 1959
 Next phase of military assistance in 1962
 The medium and intermediate range ballistic
missiles transported to Cuba and followed by nuclear
warheads on 4 October 1962 (first time Soviets install
missiles out of its territory)
 Soviet decision to operationalize missiles –secret
operation
 Deployed tactical nuclear weapons
 Missiles were discovered by U-2 planes on 14
October
 Soviets did not started worrying about the American
discovery of Missiles until 22 October (until the news
bulletins upcoming Kennedy's address to the nation)
Why missiles in Cuba: four
hypothesis
• Why did Soviets deploy missiles in Cuba?
• Kennedy’s advisor consider following issues on 16 October,
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four hypothesis
Hypothesis 1:Cuban defence
To deter any U.S intervention to weaken or overthrow
Castro regime
Cuba was at risk of attack by U.S so as ally Soviet Union
would come to the aid of its weak friend (fail to invade
Cuba in 1961, possibility to believe that U.S might attempt
to invade again)
Increase Cuba’s defensive capacity
 But why not Soviet troops (tactical nuclear
weapons/easier to deploy/less costly/be ready before
discovered) but nuclear deterrence
 Cuban defense hypothesis actually made Cuba’s
position more dangerous in intense crisis.
Hypothesis 2: Cold War politics
• Competition/rivalry between superpowers
• Soviet opportunity to extend its global powers
• U.S administration assumes that Soviet military
buildup in Cuba demonstrates changing balance of
power/Soviet offensive power in U.S own hemisphere
• What is on stake?
• If U.S accepts/allows buildup it could lose its
allies in the region
• Changing Soviet policy and its affects on global
balance of power
 Kennedy believes there is three reasons of Soviet
action:
 1st: Soviet demonstrate it is capable to support
communist revolutions (impressing China)
 2nd:redifine context of Berlin
 3rd: Soviet deal with US and its political implications
• Hypothesis 3: Missile Power
• U.S strategic nuclear arsenal superiority
(intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBM)
• Strategic balance of power motivated the Soviet
Union
• Problem of hypothesis: why Khrushchev urgently
insists on strategic balance instead of developing
ICBM/ why Khrushchev take risk to balance nuclear
arsenal
• Hypothesis 4: Berlin-win, trade, or trap
• If its not the missile power than reason is “Berlin”
(Khrushchev wants to solve Berlin problem) if U.S did
not do anything than Soviet Union would force
U.S to get out of Berlin
• Missiles in Cuba aim to deter U.S to start war!!
• If U.S wants to bargain the terms it would be trade
off Cuba and Berlin (Khrushchev believes this is still
win)
• If the U.S attack/blockade Cuba it gives
Khrushchev opportunity to use this as an excuse
to attack/blockade Berlin!!
• So whatever the U.S do in regard to Cuba it would
increase the possibility that Soviets do the same thing
in Berlin!!
• Worse case scenario European allies could blame
US to lose Berlin which would be split and Moscow
could be the winner
 Most reasonable explanations are missile power
and Berlin hypothesis
 However still all hypothesis has inconsistency
 Soviet Union did install the air defense cover on time
to prevent shields the missiles from being discovered
and why did Soviet Union permit U-2 plane to fly
over Cuba and spot the missiles?
 October 18-Absence of camouflage of missiles, and
installation near U2 planes flying over/camouflage of
missiles during the shipment to Cuba
 U.S government concluded that Soviet government
must expected the U.S to discover missiles after
missiles shipped to Cuba!!
 Group Think
 ExComm Committee (Executive Committee of the
Nations Security Council)-advise President
Kennedy-diversity of ideas according to their job and
backgrounds
 declassification of tapes and documents help to
understand crisis
 Soviet decision making process still opaque-
 President Kennedy under pressure,
 If Kennedy fail to respond the crisis there could
be undesirable outcomes: undermine confidence of
the members of his administration, weak leadership
view by public and Congress, difficulty of re-election
in the weakness.
 Why American Blockade?
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) wanted an invasion
 Dean Dusk, Secretary of State wanted diplomatic –
suggest o convince Castro to push Soviets out of Cuba.
 R. Mcnamara, Secretary of Defense, believed that
missiles were political problem
 Raised the idea of blockading future weapons
shipments to Cuba- but not solving the issue of
missiles already shipped to Cuba but warned Soviet
not to use them.
 Options:
 Narrow air strike against the missile sites only
 Air strike
 Invasion follow up the air strike
 Robert Kennedy against any surprise attack which
would be immoral (like Pearl Harbour)
 Blockade or immediate air strike???
 So Kennedy changed his idea from surprise attack
to blockade
 Blockade-negotiate approach: following the
blockade U.S would negotiate for the removal of
missiles from Turkey and Italy and closing U.S base at
Guantanamo in Cuba but this option was disagreed
 New solution: blockade and air strike ultimatum
demanding removal of the missiles
 Other option offered by Dean Dusk: blockade but
instead of ultimatum or trade of US assets is to
freeze the situation, leaving to the UN observation,
installation of missiles would be monitored by UN
 Kennedy refused blockade-negotiation approach: it
raised an idea that US had been frightened
 And he choose blockade-ultimatum (any air strike
would be limited to missiles)
 Advantages of blockade: middle course between
inaction and attack, aggressive enough to
communicate of intention but not as a strike, it gave
responsibility/burden to Khrushchev of choice for
the next step
 Blockade began on the morning of 24 October,
500 miles off the coast of Cuba and Soviet ships
turned around before challenging quarantine
 Why Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba?
 US blockade was initial step in series of moves that
threatened air strikes or invasion!!
 Khrushchev sent two letters secretly to Kennedy
 In the first letter he claimed to remove missiles
from Cuba in return for ending US quarantine and
not to invade Cuba
 In the second letter adding new demand and seek
into bargain with US removal of missiles in Turkey
in return for taking Soviet missiles out of Cuba
 So the second letter was problematic, US could
simply reject bargaining, if US tradeoff NATO
missiles in Turkey there would be consequences
for the NATO alliance and US commitments in
elsewhere.
 US response to letters (Robert Kennedy met to
Abassadorn Dobryin): no Soviet missiles in Cuba
and no US invasion, no deal over Turkish missiles
but they would be get out once the Cuban crisis
was resolved.
 R. Kennedy insisted on secrecy
 Deal that withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons
in exchange for the non-invasion!!!!!
 Blockade did not change Khrushchev’s mind but
threat of further action in the form of alternatives did
it succeed for withdrawal of missiles
 Blockade with threat
 Three conceptual frameworks for analyzing foreign
policy
 MODEL I:Rational Actor Model: why did Soviet
Union decide to install missiles in Cuba? attention on
goals and objectives of government-but also
calculations about the situation
 The actions of states are analyzed by assuming
that nations consider all options and act
rationally to maximize their utility
 Analyst considers on objectives and alternatives
 states are key players and decision makers try to
maximize expected utilities by looking at all
different options and calculating cost and
benefits so decision makers look for highest benefits
with lowest cost
 Analyze why Khrushchev deployed missiles in Cuba or
Why US responded with blockade and
ultimatum./leaders choices as unitary decision maker
 MODEL II-Organizational Behavioral Model: decision
making according to regular patterns of behaviors
 This model focuses on the standard or routine
operating procedures and solves problems in
immediate urgency.
 Decision makers prefer to apply this routine procedure
as automatic response to some problems
 Model II extend first model and analyze organizations
coordinated by leaders (Model I)
 Soviet missiles in Cuba: Model II analyst focus on
the existing organizations and their standard
operating producers for acquiring information,
defining feasible options, and implementing
programme
 Government is not the individual/presidents (rational
decision maker aim to maximize utilities) but allied
organizations
 Government/leaders define alternatives and
consequences as their component organization
process information.
 Large organizations functioning according to standard
pattern of behaviors.
 MODEL III-governmental (bureaucratic) politics
model: decision is result of the bargaining within the
government
 Events in foreign affairs are characterized neither as
unitary actor nor as organization outputs
 Bargaining among national government players/
who did/what to/ whom that-decisions re result of
these bargaining
 What bargaining among which players yielded the
critical decisions and actions?
 Predictions are generated by identifying the game
 Politics is based on bargaining between
hierarchical government agencies.
 Government behavior can be understood according to
third conceptual model/as a result of bargaining
games
 Not unitary actor but many actors and players, so
decision is not result of single person but bargaining
games within the government
 Model I: why Khrushchev deployed missiles to
Cuba or why US responded with blockade and
ultimatum.
 Model II: the subjects are never individuals or
governments instead explanations are organizations
 Organizational purposes and practices common to the
members of organization
 Model III: focuses on the politics inside a
government, A nation's actions are best
understood as the result of politicking and
negotiation by its top leaders.
 Foreign relations result of bargaining games among
players in the national governments
 Puzzle posed by Soviet missiles in Cuba?
 Bargaining among players on critical decisions players
interest and actions/ their perception and stands on
the issue
 Competing preferences (secretary of defensesecretary of state)
 Government action can be understood according
to result of bargaining between players in
government agencies. No unitary actor but many
actors
 Not by a single rational choice but by the pushing
and pulling that is politics.
 None of these three models simply describe
events/each emphasized different factors in
explaining puzzled of crisis.
 Models complements each others
 Why did the Soviet Union decide to place
offensive missiles in Cuba?
 Why did the United States respond to the missile
deployment with a Blockade ?
 Why did the Soviet Union withdraw the missiles?
 Model I-Understand government behavior
as the choice of a unitary decision maker
 1-Nikita Khrushchev’s aim to make nuclear
balance and believe that US would not respond
aggressively after the Bay o Pig fiasco
 2-Kenndy choose blockade option to give next move
to Khrushchev and something between
action/inaction, not necessary lead nuclear war
 it forced the Soviets to make the next move.
 3-Soviet leader cannot afford nuclear destruction,
nuclear crises are manageable when vital interest are at
stake-leaders/withdrawal was the only option for
Soviet Union
 High saliency (perception of threat)
 Short time horizon (high anxiety)
 Imperfect information
 The Rational Model does not apply
 MODEL II organizational routines that produce the
information, options and actions.
 1-First time missiles installed outside of Soviet
Union, lack of set of procedures in both side
 Soviets assigned the tasks to established
departments, which in turn followed their own set
procedures. However, their procedures were not
adapted to Cuban conditions, and as a result,
mistakes were made that allowed the U.S. to quite
easily learn of the program's existence.
 2-Blockade or air strike, risk of surgical air strikes by
US Air Force so existing plans (routine behaviors)
could create collateral damage during surgical air
strike and possibility of escalation of war so US
decided on blockade option
 U.S. Air Force couldn't guarantee it would disable
all the nuclear missiles
 3-Lack of organized procedures to any U.S
decision so only option was withdrawal
 The Soviets simply did not have a plan to
follow if the U.S. took decisive action against
their missiles. Khrushchev's communications
indicated a high degree of desperation. Without
any back-up plan, the Soviets had to withdraw.
 Model III-competing perceptions and preferences
of each player
 1-Governmental problems in Soviet Union, lack of
trust to Khrushchev (military and economy) so
installation of missies in Cuba increase popularity of
him and his policies
 military leaders were unhappy with
Khrushchev's decision to cut the size of the
army. Placing missiles in Cuba was a cheap and
quick way for him to secure his political base.
 2-Failure of Bay of Pig fiasco (result of
misinformation of CIA) and expectation of strong and
decisive response from Kennedy administration but
lack of trust to CIA and Robert Kennedy's (Attorney
General) insist on Blockade/result of bargaining
between government agencies
 3-US government decision not to bargain missiles
in Cuba with missiles in Turkey but guarantee of not
to invade Cuba and withdrawal of Jupiter missiles
six months later leaded to Soviet withdrawal.