PLAN 502: Week 7
Chapters on public-private partnerships, and
the role of power in planning
Agenda for Today
 Next Wednesday, from noon to 1:30, there will be
an international luncheon in Building 355, Room
211. International students will be the guests of
honour.
 Policy papers are due today.
 To follow up on our discussion of Forester and
Healey last week, I will show a short clip of a film
about the Cowichan watershed called “Resilience,”
and I originally hoped to have a guest speaker,
Christine Brophy, who is part of the process of
seeking to heal the river and the overall watershed.
She is knowledgeable about multi-stakeholder
processes in the context of a specific place and of
restoration work. But she will come next week.
Introduction to Part IV:
Planning in Action
 The editors note that a “common theme [in the
articles in this section] is the frequent deviation
from the logic of prevailing models, such as the
‘rational planning model’ or the ‘public-private
partnership’. These cases remind us that
planning dynamics are embedded in local
contexts, that institutional arrangements are
complex and fluid…”
 They note that, in the case of public-private
partnerships, there is the conundrum: “how to
retain public accountability and citizen
deliberation in situations where confidentiality is
mandated by private sector involvement in a
competitive market process”.
Introduction to Part IV:
Planning in Action
 Other articles deal with the real role of power
in planning decisions and, by contrast, the
attempt to create alternative structures for
community control throughout American
history (one can find similar examples in
Canadian history).
Matti Siemiatycki:
Public-Private Partnerships
 Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have
become very popular in recent decades. The
most popular version is the design-buildfinance-operate (DBFO) model. As Matti
Siemiatycki notes, “In theory, the DBFO model
of public-private ownership seeks to balance
the advantage of government control of the
strategic allocation of scarce resources in the
protection of the broad public interest, with the
benefit of infusing competitive forces into the
delivery of public services to increase
efficiency.” (p. 241)
Matti Siemiatycki:
PPPs
 Hypothetically, “such an approach can be seen as
an attempt by cash-strapped governments to
take advantage of private-sector access to
capital to finance projects, deliver innovation,
and managing risk without the public sector
relinquishing control of strategic objectives as
occurred under outright privatization and
deregulation.” (p. 241).
 The author wants to know if this new model
overcomes the deficiencies of past processes
where there was undue “political influence,
interest-group lobbying, [and] poor
transparency…” (p. 242)
Matti Siemiatycki:
PPPs
 He uses the Richmond-Airport-Vancouver
(RAV) urban rail project – now known as the
Canada Line – as his test case.
 The Canada Line is the largest urban PPP in
urban transit ever undertaken in Canada.
 He claims that “the planning of the RAV line…
has largely failed to achieve the desired
benefits of eliminating cost escalations during
the planning process, delivering greater
technological innovation, or improving
procedural accountability.” (p. 243)
The Canada Line
• According to Siemiatycki, RAV
was chosen despite the fact that
improving bus infrastructure
had been previously seen as the
top transit priority. RAV had the
virtue of
 “being most conducive to
meeting the needs of local and
senior governments… [and] it
had added appeal for special
grants for the [2010] Olympic
Games…” (p. 248).
 The ability to attract private
investors was also a key factor
in its choice.
 See table 13.2 on pp. 250-251.
Matti Siemiatycki:
PPPs
 As Flyvjerg, at al. (2003) note, in theory, PPPs
1)increase the rationality of project development,
as different private firms compete to find the best
technical solution to the government’s
performance specifications; 2) they boost
accountability because private firms’ money is also
on the line and so they have a vested interest in
ensuring that the technology is good and the
efficiency of the process is high, and 3) they divide
the risk between the public and private sectors.
 Despite this narrative, many studies have shown
that PPPs are not all they are cracked up to be
(see summary table on p. 245).
Matti Siemiatycki:
PPPs
 Beginning in 2000, Translink (the greater
Vancouver regional transit authority), the
provincial government, the federal government,
and the airport authority formed RAVCO – a
subsidiary of Translink – to “coordinate the
procurement, design, financing, and
implementation of the RAV project.” (p. 249).
 The City of Vancouver, the City of Richmond, the
Greater Vancouver Regional District, and the port
authority were given special stakeholder status
within RAVCO.
 RAVCO hired a consulting firm to investigate the
feasibility of developing the line as a PPP.
Matti Siemiatycki:
PPPs
 In the first phase, RAVCO sought to create
performance specifications based on the policy
directions and interests of the various parties. This
was to set a standard for private-sector actors to
innovate to create the best system at the lowest
cost.
 There was then a protracted procurement process
to determine the preferred company.
 As Siemiatycki notes on p. 253, an insider even
admitted that the RAV was foreordained, that
other alternatives were discounted – both in
terms of location and technology. The desire for
an Olympics legacy was a huge motivation.
Matti Siemiatycki:
PPPs
 RAVCO has good intentions. As Siemiatycki notes,
“RAVCO intended to overcome the need for
secrecy… by using international best practices of
public disclosure, accountability, and govern-ance,
such as enhancing online posting of technical and
meeting minutes, ongoing citizen engagement,
and public access to internal documents….
Nevertheless… the need for secrecy and the
prevalence of commercially confidential
information associated with the competitive
tendering process appears to be incongruent with
the need for openness and transparency
associated with an accountable planning
process.”(p. 255)
Matti Siemiatycki:
PPPs
 Page 257 (Table 13.3) contains an interesting
table on the donations to political parties by the
various companies competing for the contract or
pieces of it. “Despite the potential for there to be
the appearance of corporate conflicts of interest,
requests to have the entire process reviewed
during the planning stages by the auditor general
of British Columbia – the agency charged with
protecting the public interest with the public
interest – were denied repeatedly.”
 Also, by this point, a Richmond city councillor had
begun to express doubts about the integrity of the
consultation process.
Matti Siemiatycki:
PPPs
 On the financial front, at one point when it seemed
decision-makers would reject the project, it came
to be realized that the budget of $1.559 billion
was going to be shouldered primarily by the public
sector ($1.35 billion). The estimate for the whole
project later went up to $1.9 billion, or
significantly above what had been projected.
 So, at the end of day, despite the decision-makers’
best intentions, the project didn’t a) achieve cost
efficiencies; b) did not enable technological
innovation (the route and the technology had
basically been already decided); c) was not
particularly consultative, and d) did not end
corporate influence and political interference.
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 His frontispiece quote suggests that the left in the
U.S. suffers from amnesia. It doesn’t know its own
history.
 His article has three parts: the 19th century
experiments with collectivism and community
control, the 1960s when the community
development emerged, and more recent times where
that movement has become institutionalized and
professionalized.
 He starts by talking about the history of black
“organized communities” (mostly before the end of
the Civil War) where blacks in the northern U.S. and
southern Ontario sought to segregate themselves to
build up the necessary resources to make it on their
own.
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 In other words, it wasn’t
genuine cooperativism or
collectivism, but a waystation to
individual success. The overall
impact of these communities
was apparently relatively slight.
 He notes that the vision behind
these communities was not
dissimilar to that of Booker T.
Washington, who wanted blacks
to segregate themselves and
build up their capacity as
tradespeople or small-scale
capitalists so they could
eventually be accepted on an
equal footing.
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 In addition to the more
individualist and capitalistic
traditions just mentioned, there
were also utopian, communistic
experiments founded on a
blending of “Jeffersonian agrarian
democracy… and British socialism”
(p. 270. Robert Owen, for
instance, founded his New
Harmony in Indiana, which failed
after two years and ate up most
of his fortune; it was one of a
number of attempts to build a
cooperative society, whether
secular or under the flag of
religion.
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 Owen was a real pioneer. He took over a textile factory
and associated village (New Lanark) in Scotland populated by 1500 adults and 500 children (from poor houses
and orphanages). Before the takeover, people were
relatively well-treated but social dysfunction was rife.
 He ended the token system where workers were paid in
tokens that could only be redeemed at the company store
for shoddy goods. He started selling quality goods at just
over the wholesale price, and put tight controls on the
distribution of alcohol. He also insisted that children should
go to school up to a certain age.
 Social dysfunction declined drastically.
 In 1810, he advocated for a 10-hour day and implemented
it. Shortly thereafter, he advocated for an 8-hour day.
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 He also founded the first consumer co-ops, whose
(Rochdale) principles still animate all co-ops today.
 He also proposed co-operative communities where
people would have private apartments, but otherwise
would live and work in common. None of these were
successfully established. He was criticized by Marx as
being a “utopian socialist.”
 In the ‘60s, three new overlapping movements
emerged in the U.S.: the Black Power movement, the
direct democracy movement, and the cooperative
living movement.
 One long-lasting institution to emerge from this time
was the community development corporation (CDC).
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 According to Wikipedia, a “community development
corporation (CDC) is a not-for-profit organization
incorporated to provide programs, offer services
and engage in other activities that promote and
support community development. CDCs usually
serve a geographic location such as a
neighbourhood or a town. They often focus on
serving lower-income residents or struggling
neighborhoods. They can be involved in a variety of
activities including economic development,
education, community organizing and realestate
development. These organizations are often
associated with the development of affordable
housing.”
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 A couple of examples in Canada are the 1000
Islands Community Development Corporation in
Eastern Ontario (www.tcdc.ca/) and the Chukuni
CDC near the Ontario/ Manitoba border
(http://www.chukuni.com/).
 The origin in the U.S. was the “War on Poverty,”
with its Office of Economic Opportunity and
“community action agencies.” The Community
Action Program oversaw the CAAs and operated on
the principle of “maximum feasible participation.”
 Some CAAs became watchdogs for service delivery
programs; others were more confrontational. This
eventually led to a re-orientation of urban policy
towards economic development.
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 In 1969, the Federal Community Self-Determination Act was passed leading to the creation of
first CDCs.
 Another shift in urban policy was the Model Cities
program, which put “control over anti-poverty/
neighbourhood development policies back into the
hands of city governments.” (p. 272).
 At the same time, the Black Power movement
came on the scene as a more militant offshoot of
the civil rights movement seeking community
control of economic resources. In the end, it was
dismissively characterized as a ‘60s version of
Booker T. Washington with a veneer of radicalism.
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 There was also a direct democracy movement that
rejected both the class politics of the left and the
centralized social welfare policies of the New Deal/
Great Society. Milton Kotler, together with Jane
Jacobs (who, by this point, had moved to
Toronto), argued for the decentralization of
political and economic control to neighbourhoods.
 While some reforms were achieved, in general the
business as usual of municipal politics prevailed.
In Canada, however, quite significant municipal
reform movements occurred in Vancouver,
Toronto, Montreal, and Winnipeg that resulted in
much more politically sensitive mayors, councils,
and planning directors who encouraged real
consultation.
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 The movement of communes and co-ops (less so
the latter) was relatively short-lived and on a quite
small scale and did little to shift the mainstream of
society. Instead of “small is beautiful,” it was often
“small is irrelevant.”
 The author claims a mistake was made in
separating class at work from community at home
and neighbourhood.
 He discusses the Industrial Areas Foundation of
Saul Alinsky, and the various organizations it
spawned, and describes them indirectly as a kind
of advocacy planning movement without an
adequate theory or ideology. While nonideological, they did not shirk confrontation.
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 In the late ‘70s and ‘80s, CDCs – borne in the ‘60s
– became more profit-oriented and professionalized, in part because of the need to compete in the
capitalist marketplace. Instead of being vehicles of
community control, they became more vehicles of
economic development.
 As of 2002, there were 3600 CDCs in the U.S.
While achieving much in the realms of affordable
housing and social service provision, etc., they
also lost what federal funding they had enjoyed.
They had to become more entrepreneurial to stay
afloat. A rather blunt assessment from the Ford
Foundation stated that “with rare exceptions, the
1960s are now as much history for them (CDCs)
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 as for the rest of American society. One can’t very
hurl his body into the path of an oncoming
bulldozer when he (or she) is the developer.”
 One exception to the decline in CDC ideals is
ShoreBank, founded in 1973 to provide financial
services to African-American communities in
Chicago that were being neglected by traditional
financial institutions. “It was the nation's first
community development bank. During its 37 years
of operation, ShoreBank played a critical role in
stabilizing and rebuilding many of Chicago's lowincome neighborhoods and eventually expanded
globally, setting the standard for the development
of a socially just finance industry.”
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 “As its range of financial products grew, so did its
geographic reach and influence in the banking industry.
ShoreBank expanded into low-income communities in
Detroit, Cleveland, Michigan's Upper Peninsula,
Arkansas, and the Pacific Northwest. Its influence in
Arkansas influenced Bill Clinton, then governor to
propose the Community Development Financial
Institutions Act, which he signed in 1994. In addition,
ShoreBank executives assisted in the development of
the international microfinance industry.”
James deFilippis:
Utopianism and Communal Traditions in the U.S.
 After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the corporation's
international affiliate, ShoreBank Advisory Services,
assisted banks in Central Europe with small business
lending. It also assisted Mohammed Yunis in
incorporating the micro-lending Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh.
 In 1997, it collaborated with EcoTrust to create
ShoreBank Pacific, the nation’s first environmental
bank.
 While ShoreBank never received any federal assistance
and eventually became involvent (2010), a number of
its independent branches – in Detroit, Chicago, and
Northwest, have remained functioning.
 Champlain Housing Trust (http://www.getahome.org/)
is another praiseworthy CDC-like model.
Bent Flyvbjerg: Bringing Power to
Planning Research
 He cites Friedmann on the need to bring power as
an explicit dimension into the conceptual framework
of planning theory.
 Flyvbjerg cities his own experience as a young
Danish intern studying the arguments for and
against urban decentralization as they related to
social, educational, and health services. He report
was sent out to heads of those service
departments, and it was clear from their comments
that they had no tolerance for the idea of
decentralization; it just wasn’t in the cards.
 He then talks about his experience as a young
academic in researching the fate of the “Aalborg
Project” in Denmark.
Aalborg, main centre for northern Jutland
in Denmark
Bent Flyvbjerg: Bringing Power to
Planning Research
 The upshot of this part is that the city government
initially had an enlightened vision of “preserving the
historical character of the downtown area; radically
improving public transit; enhancing environmental
protection; developing an integrated network of
bike paths, pedestrian malls, and green spaces; and
developing housing stock.” (p. 295)
 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) touted it as a model for
international adoption. However, a decade and a
half later its promise had largely failed to be
realized. Why? One reason he feels is the undue
influence of the Chamber of Commerce, which
received special treatment not accorded to any
other body.
Bent Flyvbjerg: Bringing Power to
Planning Research
 “…the rationality of the chamber could be
summarized in the following three propositions:
1)What is good for business is good for Aalborg; 2)
people driving automobiles are good for business,
whereas, conversely, what is bad for drivers is bad
for Aalborg. In short ‘the car is king’ was the
rationality of the chamber” (pp. 298-299).
 As it turned out, the chamber secretly negotiated
changes to the planners’ proposals before they were
submitted to the democratically elected city council.
The chamber was acting like a “supreme city
council” and other stakeholders were shut out.
Bent Flyvbjerg: Bringing Power to
Planning Research
 Some of the provisions of the original plan were
implemented, but without restricting automobile
access, which led to an increase in accidents
involving bikes and cars.
 Recognizing the undue influence of the Chamber of
Commerce, Flyvbjerg recommends the creation of
planning councils representing all stakeholders and
interested and affected parties, where dialogue and
debate would occur in the open, not behind closed
doors.
 In essence, he says that the Aalborg got warped by
the power of the Chamber of Commerce.
Interestingly enough, there were different outcomes
in Copenhagen, Bogotá, Medellín, and Curitiba.