Andrew Smith
Dr. Lloyd Benson
FYW-Civil War
“The Most Amazing Upset”
Although William Seward is little talked about today by either historians or the modern public, nevertheless, if it had not been for what historian
Clarence Macartney called the “most amazing upset in the history of American politics,” the accomplished, talented, and popular Seward would
have likely won the Republican nomination and the White House . The obscure and nationally insignificant Abraham Lincoln would have likely
remained so. Somehow, though, this dramatic upset occurred and changed the course of history. What happened at the Republican Convention
on May 16-18, 1860 to bring about such a shocking outcome?
Leading Up to Chicago
UPSET ALERT
How Unlikely was Lincoln Stealing
the Nomination From Seward?
Number of Newspaper Mentions (6/1/1859
to 5/16/1860)
McLean
Chase
Number of Newspaper Mentions (6/1/1859 to
5/16/1860)
Bates
Lincoln
Seward
0
100
200
300
400
This chart compares the number of times each
of the candidates who made it to the third
ballot were mentioned in the newspapers
contained in the Infotrac 19th century
database in the year leading up to the
Convention. The overwhelming amount of
attention given to Seward speaks to his
popularity, relevance, and near celebrity
status. All of the other candidates, especially
Lincoln, were no-names competing against a
superstar.
There did exist,
however, a
committed NotSeward coalition
that was jealous
and resented his
long-time reign
of the
Republican and
Whig Parties,
questioned his
William Henry electability in
Pennsylvania
Seward
and other states
with a strong
Not only was Seward
anti-immigrant
extremely qualified for bent , and had
the Presidency, having heard rumors of
served as Governor of Seward and his
the Union’s biggest
top operative,
state (New York), as a Thurlow Weed,
prominent senator,
pursuing
and as a founder of the cronyistic
Republican Party, he
policies in New
was also an extremely York. Even this
talented speaker and
group, though,
was praised by
had no doubt
abolitionists for his
that Seward
bold stands against
would be
slavery. Virtually
nominated at
everyone expected
the Convention.
Seward to be the
nominee.
which he used to
launch his nationwide speaking tour.
The country
was mesmerized
by the “RailSplitter’s”
biography and was
blown away by his
public speaking.
People were drawn
to his “honest,
simple” style and
Abraham
had tremendous
Lincoln
respect for his
conviction on
issues, even
The self-made
though he was
frontiersman had
more moderate
proved to be a
than the
somewhat
Republican base.
unsuccessful
Though he was still
politician at this
not considered a
point in his career,
serious contender
losing two Senate
for the
campaigns after
nomination,
serving just one
Lincoln’s speaking
term in the House.
The one bright spot tour had raised his
national profile
from his loss to
and given himself a
Douglas 1858,
though, was that the solid reputation
among Republicans
Lincoln-Douglas
nationally, setting
Debates brought
himself up to be a
Lincoln into the
possible Plan B.
national spotlight,
Norman Judd
The Lincoln adviser
pulled off a major coup
in bringing the
Republican Convention
to Chicago. Judd
convinced the other
candidates’ strategists
that Lincoln would not
run and was no threat
and that Chicago would
be “good neutral
ground where
everyone where
everyone would have a
chance (Jones).” When
Lincoln announced he
would pursue the
nomination, he did so
with “home-court
advantage” already
secured.
Meanwhile…
Horace Greeley
As editor of the New
York Tribune, Greeley
got to know Seward
and Weed well, but a
personal feud
developed between
them. Greeley began
writing nasty editorials
about Seward and
advocating the party
go a different
direction. Weed,
however, didn’t see
him as a serious threat
and didn’t find a way
to cool Greeley in the
time leading up to the
Convention. Greeley
would play a huge role
in Chicago.
Simon Cameron
This highly influential
Pennsylvanian was one of
Weed’s most critical mistakes
embodied. Weed felt
comfortable that Cameron
would deliver the PA delegation
to Seward on the second ballot
and did not meet with him
before the convention. The PA
delegation would prove very
significant at the convention.
This headline, originally run in the Chicago
Democrat on May 1 and then republished
in the Milwaukee Sentinel, expresses
disgust at the collapse of the Democratic
Convention in Charleston just weeks ahead
of the Republican Convention. The inability
of Northern and Southern Democrats to
come to any agreement without
disbanding the Convention exemplified
and fueled the increasing tensions. All
could feel the country moving toward the
precipice of the “irrepressible conflict.”
Ballot by Ballot Results
Ballot 1
May 16-18. Chicago, Ill
A Tale of Two Teams
Sources:
Bancroft, Frederic. The Life of
William H. Seward. Gloucester:
Peter Smith, 1967.
Denton, Lawrence. William
Henry Seward and the
Secession Crisis: The Effort to
Prevent Civil War. Jefferson:
McFarland & CO, 2009.
Goodwin, Doris. Team of
Rivals. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2005.
Jones, Archie. “The 1860
Republican Convention.”
transcript of Chicago station
WAAF radio broadcast, May
16, 1960, Chicago Historical
Society, Chicago, Ill.
Macartney, Clarence. Men
Who Missed It: Great
Americans Who Missed the
White House. Freeport: Books
for Libraries Press, 1970.
"Procedings of the National
Republican Convention" The
Chicago Tribune. May 17,1860.
West, Richard. Gideon Welles:
Lincoln's Navy Department.
The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
1943.
Thurlow Weed
Despite having one of the best political
minds of his generation, Weed did not
succeed in his goal nearly thirty years in the
making, making William Seward president.
Nobody, not even Seward himself, took the
loss harder than Weed, a normally stoic
character who “gave way to angry words
and tears (Bancroft 540).” The nomination of
his friend and advisee of almost thirty years
had just slipped through his fingers, and to a
large degree, it appeared to be his fault: the
overconfidence, the failure to meet with
Cameron, and the miscalculation of Greeley.
There is some disagreement among scholars
as to how much Weed is to blame; Doris
Goodwin blames his arrogance, but
Lawrence Denton defends him by citing bad
luck as the reason the meeting with
Cameron never materialized. Though, it still
seems understandable that Weed was
devastated.
The Wigwam
The Wigwam was built specifically to house the Convention, and for
the first time, the public was allowed to attend “wholesale.” The
10,000-seat convention center provided a much bigger home-court
advantage to Lincoln than just being in his home state. The Lincoln
campaign organized their young supporters , gave them counterfeit
tickets, and sent them into the Wigwam early to take almost all of the
seats. These “fans” created an electric atmosphere, and when
Pennsylvania swung to Lincoln on the second ballot, the crowd roared
and created the momentum and pressure on the delegates to get on
board with Lincoln. The Wigwam was also beneficial to the Lincoln
campaign because, with Norman Judd as floor manager, the entire
setup of the Convention favored Lincoln. Knowing how pivotal the
Pennsylvania delegation would be, Judd placed New York and
Pennsylvania on opposite ends of the floor. When Pennsylvania went
for Lincoln, an irate Weed was unable to get his messengers to the
Pennsylvania people because of all the traffic between them and the
deafening crowd noise.
Seward’s supporters, led by Thurlow Weed,
could not have felt more confident as the
convention approached, and as Denton tells
the story, arrived in Illinois in a “train with
plenty of money to pass around and an
unlimited amount of liquor.” Team Seward was
not just partying on the train either; on the
night before balloting was to begin, the New
York delegation helped themselves to three
hundred bottles of champagne in their nice
hotel rooms. In the meantime, Team Lincoln
and the bitter and determined Horace Greeley
bargained and schemed throughout the night
just to try to even get a second ballot. Team
Lincoln’s strategy was two-pronged: sell him as
a solid second choice the whole party could
compromise on and go negative on Seward.
For the first part, the Lincoln camp relied on a
positive image generated by his speaking tour,
a short, untainted public record, and playing
nice with the other campaigns. To accomplish
the second part, Greeley and the pro-Lincoln
operatives were telling every delegate that
would listen that Seward was too radical to win
and his pro-immigrant positions would keep
him from carrying Pennsylvania in the general.
This ground work laid by the Lincoln campaign
combined with the home-court advantage and
the failure of the Seward campaign to do what
they needed to do set the stage for the upset.
Delegate Count (233 needed to win): 1. Seward-173.5
2. Lincoln-102 3. Cameron- 50.5 *Nobody else above 50
Ballot 2
Headline, Chicago Tribune,
May 19, 1860
Images:
Butler, Preston. “Abraham Lincoln, August
13, 1860.” Library of Congress Prints and
Photographs Division.
Hesler. “The Wigwam.” Ray, Orman, P. The
Convention That Nominated Lincoln: An
Address. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1916.
“Horace Greeley.” Library of Congress Prints
and Photographs Division. Horace Greeley
Biographical Collection, Library of Congress.
“Inside the Wigwam.” Prints and
Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
Harper’s Weekly. May 19, 1860, pp. 312-313.
“Judd, Norman Buel.” Nicolay, John.
Abraham Lincoln; A History. Century
Magazine. 1886.
“Simon Cameron.” Library of Congress Prints
and Photographs Division. Civil War Glass
Negative Collection, Library of Congress.
“The Democratic Party Gone to Smash.”
Milwaukee Sentinel. May 2, 1860.
“Thurlow Weed, detail.” Weed, Thurlow, and
Harriet Weed. Life of Thurlow Weed
including his autobiography and a memoir.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1883.
“William Henry Seward, circa 1860.” Prints
and Photographs Division, Library of
Congress.
Delegate Count (233 needed to win): 1. Seward- 184.5
2. Lincoln- 181 *Nobody else above 50
Ballot 3
Delegate Count (233 needed to win): 1. Lincoln- 349
2. Seward-111.5
LINCOLN WINS!
Maps created at diymaps.net