EU Donor Policies in Situations of Fragility:
Promoting ‘Resilience’?
Dans les récents documents sur le ‘state-building’ dans le contexte du développement, par exemple
dans le Rapport sur le Développement 2009, le concept de résilience a été formulé comme un concept
qui s’oppose à la fragilité et aux ‘Etats fragiles’. Ce concept pourrait offrir la possibilité de créer une
‘approche européenne commune’. Alors qu’un nombre considérable de bailleurs (et en particulier la
Commission Européenne depuis 2012) se sont, depuis, emparés du concept et le déclinent dans leurs
stratégies et documents d’orientation de l’aide, l’état des lieux de sa mise en œuvre pratique reste
difficile à faire. En examinant de plus près l’exemple de la coopération de l’UE et de ses Etatsmembres au Sud Soudan, cet article évalue l’importance de la résilience dans leurs tentatives de
‘state-building’ et conclue à une ambivalence: tandis qu’il y a peu de références très explicites dans
les stratégies-pays et les programmes concrets, certaines composantes de la résilience
transparaissent cependant dans les interventions des bailleurs.
In recent policy papers on developmental statebuilding, for example in the European Report on
Development in 2009, the concept of ‘resilience’ has been introduced as an alternative to ‘fragility’
and ‘fragile states’. This concept even offers the possibility of forging a ‘common European approach’.
While a considerable number of donor agencies (and, in particular, the European Commission since
2012) have adopted the concept and are applying it in some of their guidelines and strategies, the
state of implementation in concrete interventions is unclear at present. Taking the development
cooperation of the European Union and its member states in South Sudan as an example, this paper
assesses the current status of resilience in statebuilding efforts to be ambivalent: while there is little
explicit reference to the concept in current country strategies and concrete programming, some
components of resilience inform interventions.
Keywords: Resilience, Fragility, Statebuilding, European Development Policy, South Sudan
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‘Resilience’ is a concept that is rapidly gaining prominence in both development and statebuilding
policies. One of the first documents built around this concept was the European Report on
Development in 2009 (ERD, 2009). The concept has also been applied to other spheres of
international policy by the European Union. In October 2012 the EC published a communication
on resilience in the context of humanitarian aid and civilian protection (EC, 2012), probably
inspired by some findings and recommendations of the ERD 2009. Even though this document
mostly stresses the connection between resilience and food security and focuses on the direct
support provided to vulnerable populations, the connection between resilience and state fragility
is also mentioned (EC, 2012:5).
In its conclusions on an EU approach to resilience, the Foreign Affairs Council interprets resilience
as ‘an opportunity to bring together political dialogue, humanitarian and development work and
priorities in a comprehensive, coherent and effective approach to achieve better results on the
ground’ (Council of the European Union, 2013:1). An EU Action Plan (EC, 2013b) thus develops a
concrete roadmap for its application in a range of foreign affairs activities.
Since it is now several years since resilience entered the wider realm of European development
policy – particularly in its efforts to support and foster statebuilding – an investigation of
‘resilience’ is important to understand developments on the conceptual level and their practical
implications. Based on a qualitative analysis of primary documents and interviews conducted at
the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (DAC), the European Commission and several
member states, and drawing on the results of research trips to South Sudan and Sudan from
November 2009 and February 2012, the paper will discuss to what extent and how resilience is
used in interventions undertaken by EU donors. The application of the concept will be discussed
in the context of South Sudan, an important test case for a common European approach to the
issues of statebuilding and conflict prevention.
In the first section, the article looks at the emergence of resilience in development policy and in
developmental statebuilding. To carve out the content of this concept, the article will develop
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three key criteria, allowing us to identify the presence or absence of a resilience-based approach:
(1) opposition to the stability paradigm, (2) reflexivity and contextualization, and (3)
acknowledgement of the need to find new partnerships. The second section discusses these
criteria in relation to donor practice – in policy and strategy design as well as in issues of
implementation, referring to the case study of South Sudan. Finally, the article will assess whether
this new term changes developmental statebuilding, in particular regarding the evolvement of a
common European approach.
Resilience in development policy
In the context of development policy in general, the term ‘resilience’ was used on a larger scale for
the first time in the joint European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes
(EADI) and Development Studies Association (DSA) general conference in 2011. The conference
was entitled ‘Rethinking Development in an Age of Scarcity and Uncertainty – New Values, Voices
and Alliances for Increased Resilience’. The title placed resilience in the context of ‘scarcities and
uncertainties’, which would represent a new background (an ‘age’) for development policy. The
novelty of the term was underlined by the contributions at the large plenary sessions. Whenever
resilience was discussed, it was defined as the process of withstanding or resisting crises and
shocks. However, for many attendants the term ‘resilience’ was not only novel, but also unheard
of.
A closer look at the working group sessions of the conference demonstrated that resilience had
gained currency in certain sub-areas of development policy and development problems in general.
Regarding climate change primarily, but also in the fields of disaster management, social
development and statebuilding, resilience was a common term. These topical ‘resilience clusters’
are not coincidental: they represent the history of the concept in science, social science and,
subsequently, its transmission to a more policy-oriented usage.
The roots of this process can be traced along several lines, stemming from fields as different as
ecology, psychology, economics, and safety science (cf. Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011; Walker
and Cooper, 2011; Windle, 2011). The conceptual spectrum underlying this evolution, according
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to Walker and Cooper (2011:144), is the ‘horizon of critical future events that (we are told) we
cannot predict or prevent, but merely adapt to by “building resilience”.’ This particular aspect of
resilience – the need to adapt – is very evident in its contemporary application in development
policy.
Initially, resilience was introduced as a scientific concept in the 1970s. Mainly, it was used as a
theoretical approach to conceptualize complex adaptive ecosystems (cf. Gunderson and Holling,
2002). The fact that the term resilience has its roots in biology and system ecology meant that it
evolved in close relationship with the concept of sustainability, in particular in the area of
sustainable development. However, it took a considerable amount of time for the concept to gain
prominence in the development field: first accounts of references in the context of development
debates stem from the 2000s, in particular from the latter half of that decade (Perrings, 2006;
Adger, 2007:76). Its emergence was mainly due to the increasing importance of the topic of
climate change in development policy. Debates about sustainability increasingly became informed
by resilience concepts (cf. also the spectrum of literature cited by Perrings, 2006).
The other strand of resilience theory that is relevant for development policy stems from debates
taking place in safety sciences, from debates about vulnerability (Gaillard, 2010), in particular
regarding disaster management issues (cf. Manyena, 2006; Birkland, 2010) and from the evolving
field of Disaster Risk Reduction, DRR. For example, the concept was applied in the Hyogo
Framework for Action from 2005, the first internationally agreed framework for DRR, and
interestingly appeared in parallel with ‘sustainable development’ as the main feature of disaster
risk management (UNISDR, 2005:2). Through the closely interlinked issues of food security and
social safety nets, resilience also made its way into the debate about social protection (ERD, 2010).
Manyena (2012) argues that resilience offers a framework that represents the growing
convergence between the two fields of development policy and disaster management. Such
convergence also encompasses the sustainability paradigm, particularly regarding issues like
climate change and the management of natural resources (cf. Gaillard, 2010:220-221).
The particular connection between disaster, sustainability and development policies that is
provided by resilience has, for example, recently motivated the UNDP to put it ‘at the heart of
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development’, linking ‘prevention’ with ‘recovery’ by developmental means (UNDP, 2012). The
same is now true for USAID, which published programme guidance on ‘building resilience to
recurrent crisis’ in December 2012 (USAID, 2012). Most relevant multilateral actors, like the
World Bank (2011) in its World Development Report 2011 or the UNDP (Clark, 2013), now refer
to resilience, as do many bilateral actors.
The European Commission has now explicitly defined resilience as one of its action areas in
development policy (EC, 2013a:17). The EU Foreign Affairs Council goes one step further and
interprets resilience as the main conceptual building block that could catalyse coherence and
coordination among the EU’s international activities. Along with the conceptual framing resilience
provides when connecting humanitarian relief, development policy and the political level, it could
even guarantee the cost-effectiveness of EU activities (Council of the European Union, 2013:1, 3).
Hence, resilience-building shall be promoted ‘throughout the programming and project
management cycle, particularly in disaster-prone and conflict-affected countries’ (Council of the
European Union, 2013:4).
Resilience and the statebuilding debate: evolution of strategy papers and guidelines
Besides disaster and risk management, humanitarian aid and efforts regarding sustainability,
statebuilding is another area in development policy in which resilience has significantly gained in
importance in recent years. Tracing the particular statebuilding career of the concept is an
exercise of a different kind than tracing its more general history: the statebuilding subfield is much
more recent within development policy than disaster management. Peripheral statehood, which
used to be perceived as ‘weak’ or ‘failed’, has received increasing attention by international
security and development policy policymakers and analysts since the beginning of the 21st
century. Hereafter, statebuilding became one of the cornerstones of the evolving securitydevelopment nexus (Duffield, 2001).
As statebuilding appeared on the development and security policy agenda, the term ‘state failure’
was used less and less frequently. Instead, from the years 2004/2005 onwards, ‘fragile states’ and
‘fragility’ became the terms of reference in policy development. This change could be observed
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first at the conceptual policy level (e.g. DFID, 2005; USAID, 2005; BMZ, 2007) and soon afterwards
also in research and scientific publications (e.g. Debiel et al., 2005; Stewart and Brown, 2009). In
the course of this conceptual replacement, the spatial scope changed as well: at first explicitly
referring just to statehood (as ‘fragile states’), fragility was soon also applied to broader ‘fragile
situations’ and/or particular regional or local settings. McGillivray (2005) noted that ‘fragility’
changed the donors’ approach in countries or regions that were perceived as fragile.
The conceptual change from ‘failure’ to ‘fragility’ notwithstanding, international statebuilding
remained – and still remains – a highly problematic area of operation for international actors. In
its comparably young history, it has produced very few success stories (Timor-Leste, despite
many problems remaining, is generally perceived to be one of these) compared to many
problematic (e.g. Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina) or even seemingly unresolvable (e.g. Afghanistan,
DRC) situations.
This unsuccessful track record has forced international actors to critically rethink their
approaches, which had mainly relied on measures of good governance and blueprint concepts of
institution and capacity building and support for democratization. Donors particularly paid
attention to supporting the rule of law and re-establishing state monopoly of the use of force (for
diverse accounts representative of this mainstream approach cf. OECD, 2001; Fukuyama, 2004;
Ghani and Lockhart, 2009:124-166).
The Fragile States Group (FSG) of the DAC became the main forum for such debates. Due to the
conceptual merger of statebuilding and conflict prevention issues in the discussions at the DAC,
in 2010 the FSG was merged with the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC), thereby creating the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF).
Within INCAF, international approaches to state fragility and statebuilding were discussed in a
systematic manner based on significant scientific input from academia and think tanks (mainly
from the International Peace Academy, now the International Peace Institute, e.g. Jones and
Chandran, 2008; and the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics, e.g. LSE
and PwC, 2008).
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The ten ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations’ (OECD,
2007) were the first authoritative output of these discussions. It is still the main reference
document in the statebuilding field, endorsed by all OECD countries to date. The enactment of
these principles was remarkable, since it was the first time the international actors had shifted
their focus away from the stabilization of state institutions and instead strongly emphasized the
contextualization of all statebuilding efforts (as shown in Principle 1: ‘Take Context as a Starting
Point’).
In the conceptual debates following the enactment of these principles, the term ‘resilience’ was
discussed at the working group. The discussion was mainly triggered by an initial input paper that
became an official report ‘Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From
Fragility to Resilience’ (OECD, 2008). However, resilience did not, contrary to expectations, gain
momentum in the latest policy recommendation documents. Resilience is mentioned and resilient
states are defined as those that can ‘exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population
and its territory’ (OECD, 2011a:21). However, resilience was not included in the title of the
guidance document (‘Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility’).
While still not sufficiently discussed and conceptually clarified (cf. Levine et al., 2012), resilience
has nevertheless made its way into the wider policy realm of developmental statebuilding. The
efforts of INCAF to promote a new, more flexible and context-dependent approach to statebuilding
in the donor landscape are probably responsible for that. Most relevant multilateral actors, like
the World Bank (2011) in its World Development Report 2011 or the UNDP (Clark, 2013), refer
to the concept.
Resilience is also used at the bilateral level. In Germany, for example, the Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) explicitly refers to the concept in a guidance note
on statebuilding (BMZ, 2009). In further strategic documents, the resilience concept is also
present, although not prominently. The inter-ministerial guidelines on a coherent German fragile
states policy (Auswärtiges Amt et al., 2012), for example, eschew the term ‘resilience’. In the
recent BMZ strategy on the development of peace and security, resilience is one of four main policy
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goals (besides inclusive and democratic politics, human rights and the legitimacy of institutions,
cf. BMZ, 2013:11). However, within this strategy resilience is not understood as a statebuilding
vision, but as a necessary capacity against external shocks and crises.
The United Kingdom very closely follows the path set out by the INCAF at the DAC. Utmost
importance is given to questions of legitimacy (DFID, 2010:16) and strong state-society relations
(DFID, 2010:17). Resilience is used in that regard, though – besides peace and security – it is seen
more as a background concept. In terms of DFID strategy, resilience is mentioned frequently in
the context of humanitarian policy (DFID, 2011), and not only as an answer to natural disasters,
but also to violent conflict. The role of the concept is even more prominent in programming. In its
governance programme in Afghanistan, DFID is implementing the so-called ‘Resilient Governance
Initiative’ (RGI) in collaboration with Cranfield University (Samy, 2012) to encourage the ‘[…]
formation of inter-institutional linkages, particularly between state institutions and civil society’
(Wilkinson, 2012:3).
While all these activities demonstrate a certain willingness to practically engage with the concept
of resilience, previous research findings show that the application and subsequent
implementation of scientifically developed policy concepts is always a slow process (for
‘resilience’, cf. Gaillard, 2010; regarding other concepts used in statebuilding, cf. Paris, 2011; Hout,
2010). To further assess the application of resilience-based statebuilding, it is necessary to
identify the key criteria of such an approach, given that there are no agreed indicators of resilience
in this sector at present, neither scientifically nor in the policy arena.
Three criteria of a resilience-based approach to statebuilding
Identifying criteria enables a critical observer to assess the impact of resilience-based thinking on
concrete statebuilding concepts and interventions, even if they are not labelled in terms of
‘resilience’. When establishing these criteria, we focused on the OECD DAC statebuilding guidance
from 2011 (and in particular on the ‘overall objectives’ identified for policy guidance, cf. OECD,
2011a:45-57), since this document represents the most comprehensive and internationally
accepted framework for a resilience-based approach.
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We have identified three criteria that we see as characteristic for resilience in contrast to other,
conventional approaches to state-building: process-orientation, contextualization and selfreflexivity, and the search for new partnerships. We describe these criteria below:
(1) A resilience-based approach works along ‘processes and dynamics’ (OECD, 2011a:46) instead
of privileging short-term stability. This emphasis on processes means that there is no such thing
as a desired end-state, since ‘[f]ragility and resilience are neither fixed nor immutable, but rather
should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum’ (OECD, 2011a:22). In fact, this criterion
rightfully comes first, as the opposition to a static understanding of ‘stabilization’ has been the
starting point of the resilience-debate in statebuilding. In the first resilience-based OECD report
in 2008, resilience was, provocatively, defined as the opposite vision to stability: ‘We presume the
opposite of fragility not to be stability, though this has often been the goal of external actors, but
rather “resilience” – or the ability to cope with changes in capacity, effectiveness, or legitimacy’
(OECD, 2008:12).
Furthermore, following this initial move to define fragility by excluding its opposite, the already
established concept of fragility was also refined. The main focus in the definition became no longer
the dysfunction of state institutions, but the abilities of the state to unfold integrative capabilities
and to manage and mediate societal expectations. This novelty in the policy field echoed previous
attempts to define fragility in the scientific field. Fragility therefore resembles earlier accounts of
the conceptualization of statehood like the ‘State-in-Society Approach’ by Joel Migdal (1988;
2001).
What does resilience mean in the context of a state that is apparently stable, but has gradually lost
connection with its society? Jones and Chandran (2008:5), for example, argue that aid should be
targeted at improving health systems in authoritarian states because ‘[t]his may, at the margins,
extend regime survival – but only at the margins, and it may have a positive impact in terms of
reducing the likelihood of state collapse in situations of rapid political transition.’ In fact, it would
be neither the society nor the state institutions that needed to be resilient, but the social contract
(Jones and Chandran, 2008:13). The ERD 2009 thus puts strong emphasis on the importance of
social cohesion (ERD, 2009:90-103) and process orientation (ERD, 2009:72).
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(2) Increased emphasis is given to the local context and to the particular role donors play therein.
Self-reflexivity is highlighted, in addition to a strong focus on coordination and coherence (within
the donor community and the partners in the region), prevention and ‘do no harm’ (OECD,
2011a:47-51). A necessary consequence of such an approach is a change in the concrete modes of
operation of international actors. Contrary to traditional statebuilding, an approach based on
resilience seems to call for less active interference and for a more passive mode of management
instead. The focus on prevention has led David Chandler (2012) to characterize resilience as a
‘post-interventionist paradigm’.
More than traditional statebuilding, resilience urges development projects to increase both
ownership and self-reliance. This liberal search for self-reliance could thus echo something like
the idea of the ‘Big Society’ in Great Britain, calling for more responsibility from the population,
and for attributing a larger role to civil society solidarity in comparison to state solidarity. At the
same time, the importance of the state for development is not denied. Consequently, resilience is
also rooted in a post-Washington consensus (Jones and Chandran, 2008:1). The 2010 European
Report on Development (ERD, 2010) focused increasingly on the issue of social welfare in fragile
states. This is contrary to the idea that resilience could simply be equated with self-reliance. One
section of the ERD, for example, specifically addresses the ‘building [of] resilient social protection
institutions’.
(3) The search for new partnerships is a consequence of an increased emphasis on the role of the
society vis-à-vis the state. So-called state-society relations are now seen as being central ‘for
understanding what makes states resilient and enduring’ (OECD, 2011a:20). In other recent OECD
documents, state-society relations are framed within the concept of a so-called ‘political
settlement’ (cf. OECD, 2011b), which is a result of bargaining based on regional and local power
dynamics. A new framework for understanding fragility goes hand in hand with a critical review
of the definition of state legitimacy. The Western assumption that legitimacy would automatically
result from improved state performance (OECD, 2010:13) is complemented with the insight that
in fragile situations ‘[m]ultiple sources of legitimacy often compete and conflict’ (OECD, 2010:59).
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Therefore, donors will avoid teaming up with their usual development partners (‘leading political
figures […] and a few NGOs’, OECD, 2011a:52) and engage with a much broader range of actors.
This shift from known partners to unknown ones entails particular challenges, in particular for
European donors, given the high importance of, for example, human rights and anti-corruption
policies. How and in what ways can – or should – European donors engage with societal actors
who perhaps do not share their values or do not comply with their standards? And are these new
partnerships compatible with the established decentralization and democracy promotion
policies?
The implications and policy hurdles brought about by this discussion on legitimacy can be
highlighted by the above-mentioned 2010 OECD paper on ‘the state’s legitimacy in fragile
situations’. This paper is based on a report by a French-Norwegian team. In France, the report was
promoted by the Governance Branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Direction Générale de La
Mondialisation du Développement et des Partenariats) and the French development agency
(Agence Française du Développement), which are both institutions that have little autonomy to
define the main orientation of French development policy. On the one hand, this intercultural
institutional setting enabled provocative findings (for the development policy realm) to be
published, such as an acknowledgement of the fact that legitimate actors for donors are not
necessarily the same as for the local population itself (OECD, 2010:17). On the other hand, due to
the weak political backing it remains difficult (to the point of being almost impossible) to
transform these findings and recommendations into concrete policies.
In the UK, the debate has been much more affected by the development policy realm and,
furthermore, by very influential scientific input (in particular by the LSE’s Crisis States Research
Centre). These influences affect DFID in multiple ways. Taking the example of development
assistance in Sierra Leone, Lisa Denney (2010) argues that, at an initial stage, a ‘thin security
approach’ has been preferred by DFID over a larger-scale integration of the informal security
actors, like traditional chiefs. This reluctance of DFID to work with chiefs was based on the
scientific finding that the chieftaincy structure had caused many grievances prior to the civil war
and is therefore in need of reform. However, according to Lisa Denney, DFID only starts to
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understand that while parts of the population question the current chieftaincy structures, they
nevertheless confirm that chiefs are needed in contemporary Sierra Leone. Even though DFID
starts to be aware of this demand, it generally remains difficult for its administration to engage
with informal actors who do not necessarily share the same values (e.g. regarding gender). The
same debate is underway in Germany under the label of ‘grounded legitimacy’ (Clements, 2008;
Clements et al., 2007).
The debate about legitimacy is also connected to the decentralization debate, which is also difficult
to translate into straightforward policy recommendations. In an article by the preparatory
commission for the ERD 2009, Seth Kaplan advocates for the DRC ‘[...] a looser, more horizontal
governing structure, in which power and responsibilities flowed from large municipalities
upward and outward’ (Kaplan, 2009:8). The OECD DAC concludes from such contradictory
findings that there is no universal policy recommendation in the field of governance:
‘Decentralization is a necessary element of successful state-building. […] However, when
decentralization is not supported by minimum levels of effective central state capacity,
responsiveness and accountability, it could lead to a number of undesirable outcomes’ (OECD,
2011a:67). The ERD 2009 also calls for a ‘bottom-up’ approach as the foundation for resilience
(Pouligny, 2009).
The consequence of such culture-sensitive approaches can – or could – be accepted relatively
easily by development actors, but are far less acceptable to diplomatic actors, whose partners are
states, and for political actors, who are publicly responsible for these choices. Of course, resilience
does not necessarily mean that the social contract has to be rooted in traditions. However, it is
often the case that informal or traditional institutional structures are much more influential than
formal state structures, and therefore have to be addressed by a resilience-based approach.
France for example, whose view on fragile states is mostly led by diplomatic actors, has been very
reluctant to adopt the concept of resilience for this reason. On the other hand, the UK and
Germany, who have comparably powerful development ministries, are slowly adapting in their
respective donor contexts.
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EU donors in South Sudan: statebuilding based on a resilience perspective?
For the European Union, South Sudan is seen as a test case for the EU’s ability to prevent state
failure (van der Zwan, 2011), as well as for establishing a joint approach including the European
Commission and the member states. The latter is reflected in the ‘South Sudan Joint EU/MS
Programming Document 2011-2013’ (EU, 2011), which for the first time tried to integrate these
various approaches in a single strategy (nine EU member states are active as development actors
in South Sudan, in addition to the European Commission as a tenth actor). Given this particularity,
South Sudan offers an excellent case study for assessing the presence of a resilience-based
approach in the implementation of EU aid. This assessment is based on a content analysis of the
country strategy papers of seven of the ten EU donors (besides the Joint Programming Document,
this review includes the strategies of Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the
United Kingdom; no country strategies are available for France, Ireland and Spain, which are
minor donors in terms of allocated funds) and on the results of field research.
The context analyses of South Sudan provided by the EU donors in their respective strategy papers
are very similar. This seems a surprising result at first glance, given the wide variety of conflict
issues and the respective interpretations elaborated in the scientific literature. However, this
strong convergence can, in our opinion, be well explained by the comparably high degree of donor
coordination in South Sudan. As a consequence, just a small number of very influential common
reference documents have been prepared and used in donors’ administrations. The main one of
these is the ‘Aiding the Peace’ multi-donor evaluation from 2010 (Bennett et al., 2010). This
evaluation, commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, included all significant
European donors, as well as the United States, Canada and the UN organisations.
The evaluation document applied various analytical frameworks, but remained mostly limited to
the state of the debate on South Sudanese state fragility from the latter half of the 2000s. The
donor conflict analyses which share the main ideas of this document are based on a certain kind
of knowledge one could call conventional: South Sudan’s fragility would originate primarily from
the North-South conflict, intercommunal violence, and the weak capacity of the Government of
South Sudan (GoSS). The latter is perceived by donors to be characterized by (mostly clan-based)
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patronage systems, the respective corruption, power struggles and the limited or non-existent
separation of the GoSS from the SPLM and the SPLA. The extremely low level of economic
development and the high dependency on the oil sector are seen as further causes of fragility. An
innovative enhancement to this traditional way of conflict analysis in South Sudan is the inclusion
of the recent approach of the ‘political marketplace’, developed by Alex de Waal (2009), at several
points of the evaluation (Bennett et al., 2010:31,128). Interestingly though, this concept is not
reflected in the EU country strategies; with the sole exception of the UK, which uses de Waal’s
approach as well (DFID, 2012:2).
While all the factors commonly mentioned in the strategies – corruption, power struggles, oil
dependency –are not wrong, they still represent a way of doing conflict analysis which is rather
static. Instead of understanding socio-economic and socio-political dynamics and their
consequences for the changing types of legitimacy, donor agencies tend to follow the logic of
looking for root causes and trigger factors, which then could be addressed point by point by
particular measures or programmes.
The analysis of perceived threats regarding peace- and statebuilding in South Sudan provided by
the European donors is closer to the ideal-type of a ‘dynamic’ analysis, since the donors obviously
conducted it attention to current events and practical challenges in the ongoing work. Factors like
low government and bureaucratic capacity, refugees, humanitarian challenges, the threat of
outbreaks of violent conflict (North-South related proxy wars, intercommunal violence or
SPLM/A-power struggles) and the proliferation of small arms are seen as the main relevant
problems. However, factors like expectation management of the population via the GoSS (e.g.
Embassy of the Netherlands in South Sudan, 2012:6) or issues of legitimacy (e.g.
Udenrigsministeriet, 2011:6) also come into play.
The main drawback of these country strategies is their pessimistic assessment of potential
‘drivers of change’: in fact, none of the donors identifies any significant peace- or statebuilding
potential in any of the national or local actor groups. As a consequence, the main responsibility –
and hope – is put on the GoSS. While this is in line with internationally endorsed policy strategies
like the Paris Agenda and the Fragile States Principles, such an assessment overestimates the
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possibility for the government to become more accountable, democratic and able to improve the
daily life of its citizens. Alternatives are hard to find for donors: while some see churches (e.g. EU,
2011:13) and women’s organisations (e.g. Embassy of the Netherlands in South Sudan, 2012:6) as
potentially valuable, civil society in general is perceived as being weak. Traditional authorities,
although still relevant in conflict mediation, are perceived as quickly losing influence and are at
times discarded because of their problematic clan patronage networks.
Hence, the donors’ context analyses do not provide a concrete answer to the puzzle of whom could
be the main partners of a renewed peace- and statebuilding intervention, and what such an
intervention could look like.
Evaluating the criteria of a resilience-based approach in South Sudan
The most striking result of the analysis of the country programmes and strategies in relation to
resilience is that the term ‘resilience’ is not used in any of them. Since all of the strategies are from
2010 or later, this is surprising given the prominence of the term in international strategy
documents like the ERD 2009 and the OECD guidelines on statebuilding. In assessing the country
strategies case by case, only the DFID South Sudan Operational Plan 2011-2015 (in its update from
July 2012; DFID, 2012) displays all above-mentioned criteria of a resilience-based approach: the
need for long-term transition is highlighted, the local and regional context is emphasised –
especially regarding the need for empirical ‘evidence’ (DFID, 2012:5), and the necessity of
achieving an ‘inclusive political settlement’ (and therefore the necessity to take all relevant actors,
and not only the traditional partners of development cooperation, into operational account) is
pushed forward (for all three aspects cf. DFID, 2012:2).
Assessing the three criteria individually, the first criterion, which focuses on the processual
character of resilience, can only be identified in DFID’s strategy. The other three strategies put a
strong emphasis on the (from a resilience perspective) old-fashioned stabilization approach. This
is the case for the Joint Programming Document itself (EU, 2011:1; the other two using this
approach are Denmark – Udenrigsministeriet, 2011:16 – and the Netherlands – Embassy of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands in South Sudan, 2012:5).
15
Donors also have a weak record of implementation of the second criterion, contextuality and selfreflexivity. The UK, as mentioned, is focusing on context in a rather detailed fashion, and the other
donors also include some kind of context analysis in their programming. Still, Denmark is the only
country which explicitly highlights the potentially negative impact of its interventions
(Udenrigsministeriet, 2011:2). Even with respect to the above-mentioned low expectations
towards local ‘drivers of change’, this absence of self-reflexivity is astonishing given that,
historically, development as well as humanitarian assistance in Sudan has had severe
shortcomings in terms of the sensitive handling of conflict and fragility. Even without a military
component, complex operations did have a military impact. For example, the Operation Lifeline
Sudan, launched in 1989, indirectly contributed to the support of the South Sudanese guerrilla
movement SPLM/A (Reno, 2010:120). This example of humanitarian action was assessed
critically (Duffield, 2001; Marriage, 2006; Loane and Moyroud, 2001) because those involved ‘[…]
in fact prioritized saving lives over trying to resolve the underlying war’ (Barltrop, 2011:7).
The third criterion, the search for new partnerships, is – compared with the other two criteria –
by far the most applied in the country strategies. However, this element of implementation might
not be necessarily due to the application of a resilience perspective, but caused by the low level of
trust that all international actors put in the willingness and capability of GoSS –and the capacity
of civil society. Under various headings, the criterion is visible in most of the assessed strategies,
with the exception of Sweden and the Joint EU/MS strategy. Nevertheless, innovative conceptual
developments remain within the boundaries of the group of traditional front-runners in European
Development Policy: an explicit reference to ‘state-society relations’ (and also the social contract)
is only to be found in the Danish strategy (Udenrigsministeriet, 2011:16), and ‘inclusive political
settlements’ in the British strategy (DFID, 2012:2).
The most common topics covered in these strategies in the context of new partnerships are longstanding issues such as local governance, inclusiveness and decentralization, although sometimes
reinterpreted. A striking example in that regard is the engagement of the German development
cooperation in drafting the Local Government Act in South Sudan. Since 2007, the German Agency
for International Cooperation (GIZ, then the GTZ) has been involved in supporting local
16
governance under the heading ‘administrative reform and decentralization’. This programme has
become one of the two major components of German assistance. Besides the effort to establish
what
is
called
‘responsive
decentralized
administrative
structures’
(http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/subsahara/suedsudan/zusammenarb
eit.html), the Act made an attempt to include traditional authorities in formal state structures
(GTZ Juba, 2009, personal communication; Aeberli, 2012:55). Other attempts to include
traditional authorities in formal state structures are undertaken by the UK. The influence of
experts from academia and the development policy field in the Stabilisation Unit encouraged the
UK to take into consideration informal security sectors in the justice sector, like the chiefs in South
Sudan (FCO et al., 2008:42).
Such attempts are discussed critically in the donor community, however. The chieftaincy system
in South Sudan is not necessarily as traditional as it is perceived to be by the donor agencies and
is in flux (cf. Schomerus and Allen, 2010:83-86). The decentralization efforts by the German
development cooperation have therefore to be considered the result of a compromise, which
might be difficult to sustain (1). There was a need to integrate new partnerships and informal
institutions into statebuilding efforts on the one hand, and the necessity to maintain established
working methods on the other.
Besides these three criteria, a more general problem which donors have to face when applying a
resilience-based approach can be seen by looking at the DFID strategy: in accordance with the
international aid effectiveness agenda and its request of the ‘use of country systems’ when
implementing aid programmes, the main partners for the whole DFID programme come from
state structures. This follows the logic that South Sudan’s state structures are considered to be
weak to the point of being dysfunctional (DFID, 2012:2), and thus should be the main focus of
intervention. In parallel, the DFID is following strong, evidence-based performance criteria, in
which ‘poorly performing projects’ are discontinued (DFID, 2012:3).
The decision to build state capacity from within and to focus on performance at the same time is
a paradox that sheds light on the present structural limits of any application of resilience in
programme and project design. Firstly, the focus on state structures in the aid effectiveness
17
agenda – while reasonable in terms of the standard model of statebuilding – limits any practical
focus on state-society relations and how they could be influenced and supported. Secondly, a
purely performance-based approach risks neglecting long-term perspectives in favour of shortterm effectiveness, which is the exact opposite of resilience. Resilience is, to a certain extent, based
on redundancy (Brunner and Giroux, 2009:8), and simplistic concepts like giving priority to state
structures or focusing on efficiency in aid delivery might indeed hamper any serious application
of a resilience-based approach.
Conclusions: what kind of resilience for whom?
Based on our observations, it is now possible to answer the research question about the
implementation of resilience in current European development policymaking. We have shown
that there is a definite change in how European donors render stability – and this is reflected in
concrete interventions, even though the term ‘resilience’ itself is not widely used. When judging
the relevance of the concept of resilience in present attempts at statebuilding, the results are
ambivalent. Some aspects clearly inform concepts, strategies and also particular elements of
concrete interventions. Yet, for European donors at least, resilience is not a distinct approach as
such, even though it is relevant in some sectors of implementation. The term resilience is still
mainly used in disaster prevention and disaster management, not – or at least not as much – in
statebuilding and conflict prevention. The concepts of stability and institution building still exist,
but in particular the meaning of ‘institutions’ has evolved according to the current
‘fragility’/’resilience’ debate.
Regarding reflexivity, the present record shows a mixed picture at best. Certainly, there is a new
flexibility and openness to new approaches to statebuilding in complex and highly dynamic
settings like South Sudan. Nevertheless, long-standing donor practice and knowledge regarding
planning, standards and procedures, though necessary in many ways, are also likely to make
donors path dependent.
Currently, most of the DAC donors (as well as the DAC itself) no longer define ‘institutions’ along
legal lines (in the sense of state institutions), but along sociological lines. Nowadays, the idea that
18
institutions can be hybrid is at least considered a relevant issue when donors plan statebuilding
interventions. Discussions of concepts such as ‘Good Enough Governance’ (for this debate cf.
Grindle, 2007) signify a certain openness of donors towards the problems ‘on the ground’ and an
attempt to provide guidance for the daily pragmatic manoeuvring that takes place during the
implementation of development policy. It would be valuable – if not essential – to build on this
pragmatism and to connect it with the new flexibility on the conceptual level.
The third criterion of resilience deserves to be examined in detail. It remains unclear what
strategic ‘partnerships for resilience’ could look like in the near future. At present, this question
is hidden behind sociological terms that have not yet been transformed into concrete policies
(‘state-society relations’ and ‘legitimacy’ are two of the most frequently used terms). On a political
level, there is also a substantial contradiction inherent in this debate: all donors, at least officially,
seem to be content with the new active role taken by fragile states themselves as they do for
example in the G7+ group. But what is the way forward, given that state institutions are no longer
the primary focus in the new concepts? Whose resilience is to be promoted, if not the state
institutions’?
The recent activities of the European development cooperation in South Sudan demonstrate that
the search for new partners is taken seriously and is ongoing for some donors. At present, since
alternatives are lacking, these activities mainly focus on traditional leaders or authorities, or at
least those who are perceived as being authorities. This bears resemblance to Hobsbawm’s
famous phrase ‘invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm, 1983:1): traditional leaders or authorities are
necessarily in a highly dynamic process of change and adaption to other, parallel processes of
institutionalization. While the willingness to start dealing with such traditional authorities is a
clear sign of the growing influence of a resilience perspective, taking this perspective seriously
would indeed help to overcome such naïve distinctions between ‘modernity’ and ‘traditionalism’.
An abstract, unclear definition of a ‘resilience vision’ is not likely to make its way into operationalized
practices unaided, even if it is prominently placed in strategy papers and policy guidelines. Given the
history of many development concepts which waxed and waned and the practical constraints
most desks and headquarters in the partner countries have to face on a daily basis, significant
19
problems within the process of concept dissemination are likely to occur. Therefore, it remains to
be seen whether resilience is really in the process of becoming the conceptual starting point for a
new approach to statebuilding by European development policymakers, or if it is the expression
of a new type of fashion for concepts related to ‘crisis states’ that produces nothing more than
some policy papers, however interesting they might be.
Notes
(1) German Federal Foreign Office, Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York
University, and Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Peace operations and the
extension of state authority: the experiences of Libya and South Sudan, 19 April 2012, Foreign
Affairs Ministry, Berlin; Personal Communication, Juba, 2009.
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