Hyatt Regency Walkway
Presented By:
Jack D. Gillum, P.E.
Configuration Management Benchmarking Group Conference
June 6 – 9, 2004 Kansas City, MO
© 2004 CMBG

Kansas City Hyatt
July 17, 1981
•
Two Walkways
Collapsed
•
114 People Lost
Their Life
•
Failure of Hanger
Rod Connection
(4th Floor)

The Team Owner/Design &
Construction Team
OWNER:
Crown Center
Redevelopment Corp.
DESIGN TEAM:
ARCHITECTS
• Patty Berkebile & Nelson
• Herbert Duncan
• Monroe - Lefbvre
• Marshal & Brown
STRUCTUAL ENGINEERS:
• Gillum Colaco
Concordia Project
Management
Havens Structural
Steel
Eldridge & Son
Construction
General Testing
Laboratories

Hyatt General Layout
Entrance

Kansas City Hyatt
Entrance to Hotel and Atrium

Bridge Plan
Tower
4 TH & 2 ND
BRIDGES
FLOOR
3 RD FLOOR
BRIDGE
N
Function Block

4@
29+=120’
15’ 2+”
Atrium Roof Plan
29’
-Typical

Physical description –
Bridge Plan
Guest Tower Connections
Des. by
Fabricator
N
Atrium
Function Block

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Major Events Occurring Design Phase
Fast Track Project
Project Engineer Leaves
Project Designer Leaves
QC Problems during construction
SE request to perform inspection: Refused
Screen Wall Changes
Bridge Hanger Changes
Portion of Atrium Roof Collapsed
Walkway Bridge Collapsed

CHRONOLOGY TIMELINE
1976 - MID 1977
 Schematic Design (750 Rms, 35 Flr,
120’ Atrium
Jan 1978
 Fast-Track Design/
Construct-Contract w/GC

CHRONOLOGY TIMELINE
April 1978
 Structural Contract
“All Structural Eng. Serv.”
Jan - Aug 1978
 Design continues during construction
 SE requested owner to be retained for inspection services
DENIED

Physical description –
Bridge Plan
Guest Tower Connections
Des. by
Fabricator
N
Atrium
Function Block

Design Phase – Bridge
Connection Evolution
•No rod size
•No reaction
•No rod strength

Design Drawings v.s.
Shop Drawings
Changes During Shop Drawings
 Requested two rods by phone
 Approved by phone with caveat “submit through channels”
The shop drawings are checked by a technician who did not work on the project. Questions are raised about the strength of the rod

CONNECTION AS BUILT
THIS
CONNECTION
WAS NEVER
DRAWN
NOR
SUBMITTED
FOR
APPROVAL

Chronology (Continued)
Summer 1979


Erection of Steel for Atrium
•
Contractor omits embedded inserts in
Concrete for steel connection
•
Needs to be modified by Engineer
Owner (again) refuses Engineer request for field representation third time
 Owner fires testing lab due to poor performance during inspection of const .

Construction Collapse /
Design Checks
Problems at connections along expansion joint at the interface between steel and concrete structures

Chronology (Continued)
October 1979
 Atrium roof collapse
 Deficiencies in modified construction at concrete/steel interface discovered
 Engineer initiates in-house check of
Atrium roof
 Outside Peer Review Initiated &
Completed

ATRIUM ROOF:STEEL TO CONCRETE
CONNECTIONS
Engineer Designed &
Modified

Construction Collapse /
Design Check
Problems at the screen wall are uncovered
EOR in-house check
EOR issues correction details for screen wall
Screen wall corrections are made in the field
Problem with the bridge connection is not discovered
Independent design check and field inspection does not uncover either error

Design Phase –
Screen Wall Changes
*
DURING THE
SHOP DWGS
Horizontals supporting splice points are moved for architectural reasons. The splice points on the truss drawings are not moved

Chronology ( Continued )
Late1979 to July 1980 Gen’l Contractor goes bankrupt and Crown Center takes over as contractor using personnel of Gen’l Contractor
July 1980

Hotel Opened
July 17, 1981

Walkway bridges collapse

Bridge Collapse
Double rod connection failed
Connection that failed was never shown on ANY drawings!!
Engineering or Detailer
Connection that failed was never designed

Video of Collapse

Why Did It Happen ?
Combination of :Personnel Errors
A.
Design Deficiencies
B.
Inadequate Oversight & Review
Process
C.
Missed opportunities to discover error
D.
Poor Communication

Standard of Practice
(During this period of time 1950’s -1980’s)
Standard of Practice in the profession was for the Fabricator to design and detail all structural steel details (includes design of connections) unless detailed by the
Structural Engineer
Standard Originated with the fabricator’s to insure a least costly and practical connection from the fabrication viewpoint

Factors That Contributed to the
Collapse
Fast Track Process

Architectural design changes & conceptual re-designs

Drafting Errors

Checking errors-Shop Drawings

Invalid initial design concept of hanger
Senior engineer personnel changes

Phone changes w/o follow-up by detailer or engineer in writing

Factors That Contributed to the
Collapse
No Structural Site Representation
(Refused several times)
Engineer Relied (ASSUMED) based on past projects on design of connections by Fabricator, w/no follow-up by Project
Manager

Factors (Continued)
Fabricators in-house engineer transferred fabricator’s partial shop dwgs to outside firm who assumed connection was designed
Engineers technician, checked piece size but not connection. (Not Drawn or submitted)
Outside Peer Review didn’t check shop dwg

Factors (Continued)
“Design Check” questions answers not verified
In-house design check questions following atrium collapse were not verified. No Follow Up
Poor Testing & Inspection

Warning Signs!!!
Never Transmitted to Engineer
Walkway deflection of 3/4” observed by workman who notified architect’s site representative seven weeks B4 July 80 opening. No Follow Up
General Contractor's attorney reported :
“….from date of full dead load loading of
4th and 2nd floor bridges (July 1, 1980), box beams began to distort and distortions were visible to naked eye.”

Warning Signs!!!
Never Transmitted to Engineer
Handrail Deflection noted on punch list of 130 items (Aug, 1980)
Feb 1981 Box Beam Deformations noticed by dry wall installer. (No one notified)

What Should Have Occurred ?
Single Rod Concept detail on engrs dwg noted as conceptual only
Fabricator design connection
Picked up during shop dwg check as not designed
After atrium collapse picked up during design re-check which should have been a thorough design document check

What Should Have Occurred ?
EOR provide full time inspection
Engineer Notified of warnings!
Rundancy
All of above

Lessons Learned
Procedures must be implemented that assure that all connections are designed by a competent professional
Peer reviews and design checks should include a review of shop drawings

Lessons Learned
When questions come up look at surrounding issues for related problems
EOR should be retained to provide full inspection during construction of structure
Owner needs on site qualified representation

Lessons Not Learned
Design and construction is a collaborative process that requires professional integrity, judgment, and integrity on the part of all participants
We have not yet clearly defined the nature of the design and construction process and the information flow that is required for success in all respects
We have not learned to respect and teach the history of the profession and fully disseminate information of problems that occur

WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL
ISSUE?
WHO TAKES THE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ENSURING THE WHOLE OF
THE PROJECT CONFORMS TO THE
DESIGN INTENT AND THE SAFETY
OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC ?

Where does the buck stop?
ALL MEMBERS OF THE DESIGN TEAM
ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT THEY DO!

Take the time to check your own work!
 DON’T ASSUME SOMEONE ELSE WILL!
Continuing Maintenance and Inspections by OWNER !
Final Responsibility? The Engineer of Record!!

What Has Been Done
NY State Board of Regents Proposed
Amendment (Adopted 6/96)

Only ancillary to main components

Clearly specified performance criteria

Performed by licensed professional

Primary Design Team must check & approve, i.e...
“Each designer responsible for own work”

What Has Been Done (Cont’d.)
States of Florida and Connecticut added legislation relative to checking shop drawings. (Both are different)
Combined with NY, only these 3 states in 20 years have any legislation relative to who does what.

ASCE: “Quality in the Constructed
Project”, 2000
(After 20 years)
PP 17.3.2: Shop Drawings for Structural
Components
Conn. design by Fabricator to tailor to fabrication methods
EOR has authority & responsibility for overall Design of Project
Fabricator responsible for connections & details

ASCE: “Quality in the Constructed
Project”, 2000
(After 20 years)
Complex Structures (Two Approaches OK)
EOR performs complete engineering design
(including conn.)
Fabricator provides services of PE to design or supervise design of components not completely designed in the const.doc’s.
EOR responsible to Ck shop dwgs and design for either method

CONFIGURATION MANGEMENT
Strictly Regulated Industry by
Government
Regulations state that design, processes, documentation, changes and records must be managed
This is up to Producer/Operator

CONFIGURATION MANGEMENT
As the result of design problems,worker errors and equipment malfunctions of Three Mile Island and the Salem ATWS event in 1983, CM has continued to evolve and improve following the
NRC Bulletin 79-14
CM, reinvented under CMII and ISO 10007
Quality Management (3 tier/8 step program)
Adoption of Risk-Informed Baseline Inspection
Program

Configuration Management (cont’d)
Non Regulated Industry Design and
Construction have many similar problems
Dissemination of problems (CR”s) and solutions to include CM processes and which includes all team members is important

Configuration Management (cont’d)
Cost and time is always the problem
Owners are reluctant to participate and have tight budgets if any during design, construction and very little(if any) after turn-over (exception may occur with with public, state and federal ownership

In Conclusion: While our industries are different the process remains essentially the same:
Management
Planning
Programming
Designing
QC/QA
Construction
Turn Over
Operation
Maintenance
Continual Inspection
Oversight & Follow
Through
Requires: Integrity,teamwork, communication
& personal responsibility by all involved in the process

Consulting Engineer,
Norman Scott recently wrote:
“Responsibility issues in construction, as in most endeavors, can be effectively resolved by adhering to the principle that responsibility and authority must be exactly linked.”
The corollary principle is that everyone must be responsible for his or her own work and decisions