Party Government E.E. Schattschneider 1. How does the author illustrate that the relationship between the Constitution and political parties is an “unhappy marriage?” Constitution was both pro and anti party; allowed for civil liberties and free speech, but also for balance of power and division of powers Madison was definite in his disapproval of party government, but willing to tolerate parties. The discussion was over how to limit their ill effects. But never was it considered how parties might be used to foster a more popular government; Constitution makes rise of parties inevitable, but incompatible with party government. 2. Explain how the author builds a case for his so-called “law of the imperfect political mobilization of interests. Shows that people are not totally self-interested, there is a common good Also that even within “organized minorities”, there are cleavages t has never been possible to mobilize any interest 100% because each individual is torn by the diversity of his own interests. Divided We Govern David R. Mayhew 3. The author discusses five questions about unified (UNI) vs. divided (DIV) party control. Briefly provide his conclusion about the effect of party government on the area noted. #1 – Even if laws are enacted under DIV, aren’t they worse laws? Kind of avoids it, but admits the logic is reasonable because 1) the coalitions formed under divided government to write laws would not have unified policy goals, and therefore might be less apt to be clear about ends or efficient about means in their statutes. 2) since they are free from unambiguous “party government” checks by the electorate down the line, might worry less about the actual effect of the laws. #2 – Even if important and good laws are made by DIV, what about program “coherence?” 1) Is coherence even desirable, if we can define it 2) We’ve seen ideological coherence under both UNI and DIV, in Johnson/Reagan, and Nixon/Ford 3) We’ve seen budgetary coherence under both as well; real deficits didn’t start until 1980s, and before then mostly Congress goes along with whatever the president asks for. #3 – Doesn’t the administration get hindered by the push-and-pull of DIV? Well, we saw the idea of Congress micro-managing under Nixon/Ford, which was DIV, but also from 3854, which saw both UNI and DIV; so we can’t really say that DIV causes these hinderances. #4 – Does the conduct of foreign policy suffer under DIV? It seems no; we can’t really think of any foreign policy situation since WWII that was worse under DIV, and one man’s lack of coordination, is antoher man’s blocking a bad policy. #5 – Are lower income people served better under DIV? Not necessarily; we had Great Society and New Deal under UNI, but some of the programs that Reagan assaulted came under Nixon/Ford and DIV 4. What conclusion does the author come to about whether party control makes a difference in the policies and performance of government? How does this tie-in to his comment on reforming the separation of powers system? That it doesn’t really matter if UNI or DIV is the rule of the day; we can see examples mostly that government functions about the same, even today He comments that ideas about reforming the separation of powers system might not be the best move; parties serve an important function as part of the pluralistic society we live in. There are many components to the governing process, and he doesn’t believe that governing by party majorities would work well here.