4.
3.
1.
2.
5.
Table of contents
Abbreviations and acronyms
Intervention Summary
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for DFID intervention
B. Impact and outcome
Appraisal Case
A. Feasible options
B. Assessing the evidence base for each option
C. Costs and benefits of each feasible option
D. Measures to assess value for money
E. Summary value for money statement for preferred option
Commercial Case
Direct Procurement
A. Procurement requirements
B. Use of competition to drive commercial advantage
C. Market response
D. Cost drivers
E. Procurement Process
F. Contract management
Indirect Procurement
A. Appropriateness of proposed funding mechanism
B. Value for money through procurement
Financial Case
A. How much will it cost?
B. How will it be funded?
C. How will funds be paid out?
D. Assessment of financial risk and fraud
E. Expenditure monitoring, reporting, accounting
Management Case
A. Management arrangements
B. Risks and risk management
C. Financial aid conditions
D. Monitoring and evaluation
End notes
15
15
24
34
34
34
34
35
35
35
36
36
36
1
3
3 ii iii
13
15
40
42
44
44
46
37
38
38
39
39
40
37
37
37
37

IIED
IPCC
IRR
KPI
LAPA
MA
MDB
M&E
M/F
MPRLP
MTR
NAPA
NAPCC
NCAR
NF
NGO
NPV
NREGA
ODA
OJEU
OPR
PEI
PMU
ACCRA
ADB
APRC
BCCRF
Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance
Asian Development Bank
Asia-Pacific Regional Centre
Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund
BCCSAP Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
BCR Benefit Cost Ratio
CAADP
CC
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
Climate change
CIF
CKDN
COWI
CPGD
CPIER
CRED
CSIRO
CSO
Climate Investment Fund
Climate Knowledge Development Programme
Danish consultancy company
Climate Proofing Growth and Development programme
Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review
Centre for Research in the Epidemiology of Disasters
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
Civil Society Organisation
DECC
DEFRA
Department of Energy and Climate Change, UK
Department of Environment, Agriculture and Food, UK
EM-DAT International disaster database
EU European Union
FAO
FTE
GDP
GEF
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
Full-time equivalent
Gross Domestic Product
Global Environment Facility
GIZ
GTZ
HMG
ICCAD
ICAI
ICF
IFAD
IFPRI
German government technical development agency
Old name for GIZ
UK Government
International Centre for Climate Change and Development
Independent Commission on Aid Effectiveness
International Climate Fund
International Fund for Agricultural Development
International Food Policy Research Institute
International Institute for Environment and Development
International Panel on Climate Change (under UNFCCC)
Internal Rate of Return
Key Performance Indicator
Local Adaptation Plans of Action
Management Agent
Multilateral Development Bank
Monitoring and Evaluation
Male/female
Madhya Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Programme
Mid-Term Review
National Adaption Programme of Action
National Action Plan for Climate Change
National Centre for Atmospheric Climate
National Forum
Non-Government Organisation
Net Present Value
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, India
Official Development Assistance
Official Journal of the European Union
Output to Purpose Review
UNDP Poverty and Environment Initiative
Programme Management Union

PPCR
PPP
PRSP
PSC
Pilot Programme on Climate Resilience
Public Private Partnership
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Programme Steering Committee
REDD
R&D
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
Research and development
SAFANSI South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative
SAARC South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
SACRA
SAPA
SAWI
ToR
UCCRP
UN
UNDP
UNFCC
USAID
VfM
WB
WHO
WRI
South Asia Climate Resilience Alliance
State Adaptation Plan of Action
South Asia Water Initiative
Terms of Reference
Urban Climate Change Resilience Partnership
United Nations
United Nations Development Programme
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
United States Agency for International Development
Value for Money
World Bank
UN World Health Organisation
World Resources Institute

CLIMATE PROOFING GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA
What support will the UK provide?
ICF will contribute £28.5 million over five years for climate proofing growth and development in South Asia through a regional programme covering Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan.
Why is UK support required?
What need are we trying to Address
1. South Asia is exposed to impacts of climate change . South Asia is disproportionately exposed to the impacts of climate change, including higher temperatures, greater temperature extremes, more erratic rainfall, increased run-off, sea level rise, increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events and glacial melt. These impacts are already being felt. Weather is increasingly variable and the intensity and frequency of extreme events are increasing - having significant implications for development, water resources, agriculture, health and natural disasters along with impacts and/ or effects on ecological, social and economic systems making the region one of the most vulnerable to climate change.
2. South Asia is vulnerable to climate change . The region has a high density of the climate vulnerable. South Asia generates less than 2 percent of global income, yet supports 22 percent of the world’s population.
1 It has over 420 million people living on less than $1.25 a day and one third of the world’s hungry and undernourished. These people will feel the impacts of climate change hardest because most of them lack the resilience to withstand shocks. By 2050, the population of the region is expected to jump from 1.6 to 2.2 billion people 2 which, coupled with economic growth and rapid urbanisation, will challenge governments seeking sustainable development for their citizens.
3
Additionally, these countries often lack the knowledge and resources to adequately adapt to growing climate-related risks. In this context, climate change exacerbates what are already significant development challenges, and adds another layer of risk and uncertainty to efforts to achieve sustainable development.
3. South Asia’s contribution to GHG emissions : While vulnerability to climate change is high in South
Asia, the region has also emerged as a viable contributor to GHG emissions. GHG emissions in the region have risen by about 3.3 percent annually since 1990, more rapidly than any other region except the Middle East 4 . Higher emissions are driven by rapid development that has fuelled growth and lifted millions out of poverty.
4. How to address climate change . Responses to climate change can be put into one of two categories. Responses intended to address the “cause” of human-induced climate change (e.g., production of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation) through energy efficiency measures, green building techniques, and reforestation are classified as mitigation (low carbon development) measures. Efforts to address the “symptoms" of climate change (e.g., drought, intense precipitation, sea level rise, and heat waves) through water resource management, drought resistant crops, coastal hardening, and providing shelters for populations exposed to disasters can be considered measures of adaptation (resilience building & disaster risk reduction) .
5.
Responding to climate change is not simple . There are vast opportunities for countries in the region to participate in emission stabilisation and adaptation activities in ways that support their development objectives, nevertheless, a major policy and development challenge has been to determine what constitutes a socially, economically and environmentally justifiable mix of mitigation, adaptation and development policy, and how it can be achieved 5 . Further, addressing climate change is a highly complex problem that cuts across sectors and administrative and political boundaries and requires innovative, flexible systems thinking 6 specially because the direction and magnitude of climate change is uncertain and depend on complex interactions that are not well-understood.

6. Responding to climate change requires addressing it in development plans and policies that already direct public and private investment and development 7 . This is considered as an effective way to sustain growth in climate change 8 . For example, taking account of potential long-term effects of climate change in decisions concerning investments in long-lived infrastructure, or when providing development assistance that will shape future patterns of human settlement and livelihoods 9 10 . The expected benefits include avoided policy conflicts, greater efficiency compared with managing climate risks separately, and leveraging the much larger financial flows in sectors affected by climate risks than the amounts available for financing climate change separately 11,12 . Development intervention that does not account for climate change can lead to mal-adaptation, for e.g. in Bangladesh, poorly maintained flood defences that were designed for a certain level of floods became counter-productive, trapping floodwaters and prolonging floods during the 1999 disaster 13 .
7. Addressing climate change in development planning will be a challenge for South Asia .
Meeting this complex planning challenge will place considerable demands on governments in South
Asia, as will the challenge of delivering plans. Most governments in the region have developed
National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Disaster
Mitigation plans. However, these tend to take a sectoral and projectised approach to planning with a top down focus on government delivery, rather than enabling private sector engagement and bottom up “autonomous” adaptation. Some underlying factors for these are:
 Plan and implement programmes in a fragmented manner within specially created climate change programmes rather than mainstreaming climate risk in development frameworks 14 . For example. PRSPs are useful entry points for addressing climate change 15 . However, environment, natural resource and disaster management issues are not adequately covered in these papers 16 .
 Lack of political support and leadership.
Learning 17 from the region demonstrate the need for ensuring political engagement and strong leadership for favourable climate change policies and programmes, funding prioritisation and predictable markets for private sector investment.
 Lack the tools and evidence to make informed judgements. The region also faces a range of data gaps, capacity challenges, and structural issues that further creates complexities.
 Lack of engagement of stakeholders in planning and delivery 18 have resulted in failure to conduct a proper needs assessment or make use of the best available knowledge 19 .
20 21 .
 Lack of resources . The scale of the public and international funding available for climate resilience initiatives is insufficient in the region. Integrated planning can help in leveraging larger financial flows than the amounts available for financing adaptation separately 22 .
 Lack of clear policy from government to stimulate private sector investment through conducive tax regime, innovative financing products such as credit lines, loan guarantee instruments and sharing of R & D costs 23 .
8. Need for external intervention.
Changing development planning to address climate change will require new analysis, planning tools and implementation techniques that many government ministries, research institutions, NGOs and communities in the region have not undertaken or used in the past.
Countries in the region need support to build these tools, skills and the systems for climate compatible planning and delivery. There is a need for the existing body of research and conceptual work on adaptation and mitigation to be translated into practices, programmes and policies on the ground.
These need to be effective, scalable, and context-specific in order to address vulnerabilities and to build long-term resilience. Support through the programme could help in bringing in international expertise, knowledge, best practices, tools and technique and exchange of learning among countries in the region that will help in overcoming existing challenges to planning and policy development. It will help in enhancing the capacities of governments to access domestic and international finance and help in creating the right incentive and investment environment to promote private sector participation.
9. DFID/HMG is well placed to provide this support.
We have a formal invitation from the
Government of India (GOI) to work with state governments for formulation and implementation of
State Action Plans for Climate Change (SAPCCs), following the launch of the National Action Plan on
Climate Change in 2008. GOI has a central coordination body with representation from key ministries including the environment & forests, Planning, Finance, which will help in ensuring that the plans drive

resource allocation, sectoral and sub-national plans. DFID is already working with the governments of
Nepal and Bangladesh on local and national planning for climate change, and this programme will enable us both to deepen that engagement and share lessons across the region. There is also emerging interest from Pakistan with their recent announcement for a green fund likely to drive climate planning. Apart from deploying ICF resources, HMG can also add value by sharing UK domestic experience with planning for climate change, e.g. from UKCIP and Defra.
What will we do to tackle this problem
10. Climate Proofing Growth and Development . The programme aims to transform the ways governments in South Asia plan and deliver development programmes, policies and investments and serve as a foundation for climate resilient low carbon growth and development in the region. The programme will provide flexible and responsive funds to support governments and other stakeholders to:
 Transform their systems of planning and delivery by setting the right institutional architecture in place to build political leadership, incentivising new ways of working to support convergence, linking planning and budgetary framework to drive resource allocation for plans, developing analytical and decision support tools and strong systems for transparency, accountability and feeds back - resulting in increasing resilience of people, protecting investments and infrastructure, reducing economic damage, reducing the numbers of lives lost under climate change and ensuring sustainable poverty reduction. The expected benefits also include avoided policy conflicts and greater efficiency compared with managing climate change separately.
 Build Knowledge and capacity of political leaders, governments, practitioners and investors by capturing and sharing lessons on how to plan and deliver for climate change, creating robust set of options to consider as strategies and approaches and promoting networking and knowledge exchange between a wide range of actors, including existing knowledge networks – resulting in ensuring political engagement and strong leadership for establishing favourable policies and programmes, funding prioritisation over long time scales, pro-active policies for private sector investment; and curriculum development for relevant professional academic and training programmes and preparing communities to adapt to climate change,
 Technical support to help governments and communities design and deliver climate resilience and low carbon measures by testing new approaches in practice and generating evidence for design of specific policy instruments, develop and test innovative approaches to address delivery challenges with focus on accountability & learning - resulting in improving the quality and impact of resilience plans and interventions, secure domestic & private sector funding, shape political goals and capture knowledge of what works.
 Leverage and shape investments for climate compatible development from public (domestic and international) and private sectors by developing architecture for future climate financing that is transparent and accountable and by developing proposals for domestic & international climate funds that offer value for money and good potential for replication and incentivise action and investment by government and private sector – resulting in raising budgetary allocation, prioritisation of sectoral resources for addressing climate change, increasing private sector investment and leveraging larger financial flows (domestic and international) in the sector exposed to climate risks than the amount available for financing adaptation and mitigation separately.
11. Funding and delivery . T he programme, which will cost £28.50 million and will be implemented by a
Supplier (regional hub institution) under a services contract that will act as a Regional Technical
Assistance Support Team (R-TAST) and National Implementation Partners (NIPs) in each of the 5 countries recruited thorough competitive tender, following OJEU procedures.
12. Partners . DFID also has a long working in this region and the programme will enable us both to deepen that engagement and share lessons across the region with other development agencies. The programme will work closely with agencies including UNDP on the Public Expenditure Review work.
We are also consulting key stakeholders and donors engaged on strengthening capacity of governments to plan and implement climate change programmes. They have welcomed our initiative.
We would seek to work more closely and coordinate with them during delivery. These include: ADB,
EU, FAO, IFAD, USAID; UNEP; UNDP, World Bank. We have also talked to SAARC.

What are the expected results?
13. Results . Programme is expected to deliver the following results, all of which will be attributable to UK support: at outcome level

Climate integrated into plans and budgets. Climate change and disaster resilience explicitly assessed and integrated into public and private sector policies/plans and budgets/investments in of
5 South Asia countries; and £1 billion of extra finance committed to climate compatible development by public (domestic and international) and private sectors. at output level

Skills and systems. Institutional mechanisms created in 15 national and sub-national governments to promote integrated climate compatible planning and implementation; 200 planners developed professional skills in climate planning; and effective knowledge sharing mechanisms on climate change operating among 15 national and sub-national governments.

Tools for decision making. 10 decision support tools developed, tested and packaged for dissemination and use; Key stakeholders trained and mentored in use of good practice tools and evidence in decision making.

Innovative approaches for climate compatible growth and development. 10 innovative approaches designed and delivered for climate compatible development; Climate Public Expenditure and
Institutional Reviews done in 5 national and sub-national governments to priortise/ make new allocation for climate compatible development.

Extra financed leveraged. Evidence generated for design of 5 Climate Finance Framework & Fiscal instruments that help in securing domestic & private sector funding; analysis of private investment flows in 5 countries facilitate dialogue to establish partnership frameworks between government and private sector; 7 proposals developed to access international climate finance.
14. Impact . By achieving these outcomes, the programme will contribute towards adapting the economic and social systems of the countries in the region better cope with climate change resulting in (i)
Sustainable economic development by protecting investments and infrastructure, reducing economic damage, reduced carbon emissions, enhanced economic opportunities resulting from ‘green growth’ and ensuring sustainable poverty reduction. (ii) increasing resilience of people by improving quality of life (health, education, energy, sanitation, water) protecting livelihoods & reducing the numbers of lives lost.
15. Monitoring . DFID’s Asia Regional Team will carefully monitor the progress of the programme, focusing especially on the extent to which the R-TAST and NIP, is able to support governments to transform their systems for climate change and disasters planning and delivery.

A. CONTEXT AND NEED FOR DFID INTERVENTION
CHALLENGES of climate change & OPPORTUNITIES for climate proofing development and growth
1. South Asia is vulnerable to climate change . South Asia 24 will be seriously affected by climate change. By 2050, the IPCC estimates that the region will experience higher temperatures, greater temperature extremes and more erratic precipitation, with some areas receiving more than they do now and other suffering more frequent and serious droughts 25 . Over the same period, the population of the region is expected to jump from
1.6 to 2.2 billion people 26 which, coupled with economic growth and rapid urbanisation, will challenge governments seeking sustainable development for their citizens.
27
Additionally, these countries often lack the knowledge and resources to adequately adapt to growing climate-related risks. In this context, climate change exacerbates what are already significant challenges, and adds another layer of risk and uncertainty to efforts to achieve sustainable development. The drivers that make South Asia especially vulnerable to climate change and the opportunities offered by climate compatible development are outlined in this section.
2. Climate change hits the poorest hardest . South Asia has the largest number of poor people in the world, with over 420 million people living on under $1.25/day, mostly in rural areas where they depend on agriculture or other natural resources for their livelihoods 28.
The most vulnerable groups live in drought and flood-prone areas, and in coastal zones
(e.g., pastoralists living in semi-arid regions, indigenous people depending on forests, coastal farming and fishing communities, who could be hit by increasing tropical cyclones and sea level rise, and poor women, whose workloads will increase as agricultural yields fall and water becomes scarce). Even small climate shocks could cause irreversible losses and force large numbers of vulnerable people into destitution.
These people will feel the impacts of climate change hardest because most of them lack the resilience to withstand shocks. The rural poor are vulnerable, as they depend on the productivity of climate-sensitive ecosystems for their livelihoods, including agriculture and fisheries. The urban poor are vulnerable to infrastructure and land development decisions that drive settlements into areas that are already exposed to flooding, landslides, and other climaterelated disasters, or likely to become so. In both realms, poverty hinders access to education, health care and other important services and resources.
3. Threats to water supply and agriculture.
Population growth and economic development will increase water demand and climate change will influence its availability
– reducing the predictability of supply. This coupled with higher temperatures, is expected to cut agricultural output by 8%-18% 29 potentially affecting national food security and the livelihoods of poor and marginal farmers, and agricultural workers. Reduced water availability will also affect urban areas and industries and potentially hit economic growth. Sharing of the great regional rivers (e.g., the Brahmaputra, Ganges and Indus) could become an even greater source of tension between neighbouring countries and

among states 30 within the same country.
4. Vulnerability to natural disasters. Climate change is increasing weather variability and the intensity and frequency of extreme events in South Asia. Between 1990 and 2008, over 750 million people (50% of the population in the region) were affected by floods, droughts and tropical cyclones, which left almost 60,000 dead and about US$ 45 billion in damages 31 .
5. Significant economic value is at risk . If current development trends continue, by 2020,
South Asia will lose 10% of its GDP through climate disasters, with poor and vulnerable people suffering most 32.
Economic losses and loss of life from such events place a heavy and increasing burden on public expenditures that is unlikely to be sustainable in the future 33 . There is a need for governments to respond proactively and build resilience through prevention and preparedness, rather than by relief and response. Enhancing the local communities’ ability to manage current natural hazard risks will help improve their capacity to prepare for and respond to future climatic changes.
6. Urbanisation . By 2050, the United Nations estimates that the population living in towns and cities in South Asia will more than double to over 1.2 billion people (52% of the population) 34 as a result of population growth and migration of poor people from rural areas to slums and shanties, partly as a result of climate change. The cities of South Asia already face immense challenges including low-quality buildings, poorly maintained infrastructure, inadequate services, scant livelihood opportunities, and unhealthy living conditions of poor people. Climate change will add to these pressures. At the same time, the fact that 80% of the infrastructure that will be required in India by 2030 remains to be built represents a major opportunity. Building urban resilience will require improvements in urban planning, buildings, infrastructure, governance, and increased finance 35 .
7. Sensitivity of ecosystems . The natural ecosystems of the region are under tremendous pressure from rapid economic growth and the burgeoning population, which is leading to unsustainable resource use (e.g., in agriculture, forestry, fisheries) and accelerating levels of air and water pollution. Climate change will exacerbate these stresses across all ecosystems. Biodiversity and ecosystem services will be severely threatened as vegetation boundaries shift in response to changing temperature and precipitation patterns 36 .
8. South Asia’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions . Since 1980, South Asian has experienced strong economic growth of 5%-6% (with the highest growth rates in India and Bangladesh). GHG emissions in the region have risen by about 3.3 percent annually since 1990, more rapidly than any other region except the Middle East 37 . As a result, the region is emerging as a significant contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions, though per capita emissions remain low. Higher emissions are driven by urbanisation, industrialisation and rising prosperity, and are likely to rise significantly over coming decades. This will be especially so in India, which has by far the largest economy in
South Asia. However, these emissions have also driven rapid development that has fuelled growth and lifted millions out of poverty.
9. Region needs to collectively learn and address these challenges . Most governments in the region have made some progress in addressing climate change and have tried

different approaches, which provide knowledge and learnings on addressing these challenges. For e.g. Nepal’s National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) process demonstrated the need to link national priorities with bottom-up planning processes and experience of development of the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) in Orissa, India demonstrates the need for political engagement and leadership; high level administrative coordination and inter-departmental consultations. These evidences can work well across the region given they have shared agro-ecological zones and similar socio-economic and institutional context. Therefore the region needs to collectively learn and address these challenges. Further, better synergies are needed in policy development as certain policy approaches can create externalities that affect each other – for example water pollution such as pesticides and nitrates or market distortions from subsidies in one country influence prices elsewhere through porous borders. But there is limited learning from each other – there are low levels of trust and limited scientific collaboration in the region, and evidence is highly contested 38 .
10. How to address climate change.
Responses to climate change can be put into one of two categories. Responses intended to address the “cause” of human-induced climate change (e.g., production of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation) through energy efficiency measures, green building techniques, and reforestation are classified as mitigation (low carbon development) measures. Efforts to address the
“symptoms" of climate change (e.g., drought, intense precipitation, sea level rise, and heat waves) through water resource management, drought resistant crops, coastal hardening, and providing shelters for populations exposed to disasters can be considered measures of adaptation (resilience building & disaster risk reduction) .
11. Responding to climate change is not simple South Asia faces a significant challenge in continuing to develop to meet its objectives of improving living standards and income, while grappling with the consequences of climate change. There are also vast opportunities for countries in the region to participate in emission stabilisation and adaptation activities in ways that support their development objectives, nevertheless, the resources needed to tackle the problem vastly exceeds the available fund. Given limited resources, a major policy and development challenge has been to determine what constitutes a socially, economically and environmentally justifiable mix of mitigation, adaptation and development policy, and how it can be achieved 39 . Further, addressing climate change is a highly complex problem that cuts across sectors and administrative and political boundaries and requires innovative, flexible systems thinking 40 .
Policy makers find it difficult to define problems or policy outcomes in the context of climate change because (1) the direction of change and magnitude of climate change is uncertain and depend on complex interactions that are not well-understood; (2) the complexity generated by the many (socio, economic, political & environmental) drivers of vulnerability; (3) and the long-time horizons across which climate change will unfold, and hence define, the appropriate policy solutions.
12. Responding to climate change requires addressing it in development plans and policies.
Among the best ways to address climate change at the local, national and regional level is by adapting and improving policy priorities and funding that already direct public and private investment and development. This requires climate compatible development planning. It is is considered as an effective way to sustain growth in climate change 41 . This can be done by integrating climate change in the overall development

planning and cross-sectoral policy formulation that drives resource allocation, prioritises action and facilitates implementation and monitoring processes at national, sector and subnational levels 42 . This process is seen as on-going, involving multiple stakeholders and contributing to human well-being. For example, there is a recognised need to take into account the potential long-term effects of climate change when making decisions concerning investments in long-lived infrastructure, or when providing development assistance that will shape future patterns of human settlement and livelihoods 43 44 .
Similarly, mitigation strategies can and should be aligned with adaptation strategies, and vice-versa 45 46 47 . Lessons from experience with climate change planning and policy development 48 are still emerging, but work to date highlights the importance of: engaging multiple stakeholders in identifying the problem and effective solutions; communicating widely; ensuring a comprehensive focus and integrated “whole-of-government” planning; explicitly managing uncertainty of climate change; maintaining a long-term focus and effective monitoring and evaluation.
13. The expected benefits include avoided policy conflicts, greater efficiency compared with managing climate risks separately, and leveraging the much larger financial flows in sectors affected by climate risks than the amounts available for financing climate change separately 49 , 50 .
Need for climate proofing development and growth
Embracing climate change challenges
Risk reduction that does not account for climate change can lead to mal-adaptation, for e.g. in Bangladesh, poorly maintained flood defences that were designed for a certain level of floods became counter-productive, trapping floodwaters and prolonging floods during the 1999 disaster. Source: Adaptation to climate change: Making development disaster-proof, DFID
Vulnerability due to Current Policy Measures
An agricultural policy might support a monoculture of high-value crops (e.g. through subsidies) that could increase vulnerability. For e.g. the rationale for widespread cultivation of paddy rice in the drylands of Andhra Pradesh, India is based in part on government price-support policies for producers, which buffer the risk of price volatility and thus dilute incentives to switch to more environmentally appropriate, droughttolerant crops. A better policy to support drought adaptation would be to eliminate such a distorting subsidy or at least provide a similar price incentive for millet, one of the best cereals to cultivate in drylands. Source: Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate
Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources Management Projects, World Bank
2010 2010.
Economic Analysis of Current and Future Drought-Related Losses
In the Indian state of Maharashtra, by 2030, a significant drought could lead to a countrywide agricultural loss of more than $7 billion, and affect the income of 10 percent of the population. Extreme climate change could increase that frequency to once every eight years. Research assessment shows that, Maharashtra can eliminate much of its expected drought loss by 2030 through low-cost measures with benefits that often exceed their cost. Source: Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group
2009, Shaping Climate-Resilient Development: A Framework for Decision-Making.

ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND POLICY
14. Policy challenges are often complex anyway . Some policy problems are amenable to straightforward and ‘linear’ processes of decision-making. For example: governments define the problem, with the help of technical experts; collect and analyse necessary data, decide what should be done and implement the project or programme (see Figure
1). This approach is often known for producing “blueprints” with simple solutions being delivered in a range of contexts as “magic bullets”. But these linear approaches do not work for some policy challenges because they deal with complex systems – and are
‘wicked’ in nature 51 . Urban planners coined the term “wicked” problems in the 70s for where a problem (e.g. exclusion, obesity, land degradation, drug dependency or climate change) is difficult to frame, where there are many interdependencies, where this complexity leads to unintended consequences of actions, where there are many potential stakeholders with overlapping mandates, where there are many uncertainties and no single solutions.
Figure 1: Linear policy-making process
Define problem
Policy makers and experts
>
Collect/analyse evidence
Experts
>
Decide what should be done
Policy makers
>
Implement decision
Public programmes guided by experts
15. Lessons from development planning . In recognition of the complexity of the systems that planners are dealing with, development projects have been promoting careful monitoring and feedback systems – to enable stakeholders to adjust the approach as they go along. And in order to capture the range of different perspectives, government officials are encouraged to work collaboratively with other stakeholders in defining problems, generating and evaluating evidence, and deciding on and implementing investments. In development processes, good practice has shown the value of policy makers shifting away from linear decision-making models to ones based on collaboration and stakeholder participation. And of following an iterative process of action feedback and learning (see Figure 2). This gives flexibility to planning, enabling stakeholders to respond as learning is derived from experiences and scientific knowledge and other evidence updated.

Feedback loops
Figure 2: Iterative learning approach to policy making
16. Incorporating climate change in development planning requires further embracing uncertainty and complexity . Policy makers formulating climate compatible development strategies make policy and investment decisions, in the face of uncertainty about (i) the predicted timing and severity of climate change in South Asia and different parts of the region; (ii) the impacts of climate change in the different countries and ecosystems of
South Asia and the complex interactions (biophysical, social and economic), which will determine these; (iii) the specific impacts on climate-vulnerable poor people, which requires understanding of the causes of vulnerability and how climate change will impact on these; (iv) the opportunities, which climate change could bring for sustainable lowcarbon growth.
17. Planning for climate change is also political . The challenge of uncertainty is compounded by the lack of consensus about priorities specially because climate change impacts are expected to unfold in longer time horizon and is generally not considered as immediate priority. Interest groups (e.g., government, private sector, civil society and citizens) and specialists (e.g., scientists, engineers, social scientists) often hold very different views on what the evidence says and what should be done. Further kind of resources and cross sectoral (working across several ministries) and multi-disciplinary approach needed to address climate change requires a high level political will and direction that can help in establishing favourable policies and programmes, funding prioritization over long time scales, pro-active policies for private sector engagement
Climate change is thus a ‘political’ policy problem.
18. Approaches to climate planning are evolving . Figure 3 below sets out one way of understanding the emerging approaches to integrating climate change into development plan and investments – from addressing the root causes of vulnerability to climate and other shocks, to risk based approaches, to climate proofing largely of infrastructure. The first is not reliant on climate information, the middle one requires some understanding of how climate risks will change and the last requires detailed climate information. The

weather in the region
– the summer monsoon and winter westerly - are poorly understood and therefore current climate risks are not accurately predicted, let alone how these risks will change with climate change. There is a huge range in the climate model outputs. So it is therefore not possible to provide planners with accurate, local-level projections of climate change impacts at scales and with the certainty needed for most planning decisions. However, despite that, much of the climate planning in the region is predicated on averages of climate models which over simplifies the uncertainty as identifying investments that are robust to the range of potential climate futures
Figure 3: A Continuum of Climate Change Approaches for Handling Uncertainty
19. Lessons from innovative planning . Meeting the complex planning challenge of climate change will place considerable demands on governments in South Asia, as will delivering integrated investments across sectors. It will challenge both governance structures and the skills and organisational capacity of governments. But early experiences from the last five years or so suggest some lessons for how to support planning and delivering climate compatible development - see Box 1.
Box 1:
Lessons on planning climate compatible development
1. Integrate climate change into the wider development priorities of the country 52
South Asian governments need to rethink their development strategies, in the light of likely climate change. Bangladesh has created clear links between its National Adaptation Programme of Action
(NAPA) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in order to facilitate the mainstreaming of adaptation to climate change into development planning frameworks. The challenge is to ensure that national climate change action plans (e.g., the India National Action Plan on Climate Change and
Pakistan National Climate Change Policy) are fully consistent with and reflected in national development strategies and vice versa.

2 . Whole of government approach
Integrated planning and delivery requires a ‘whole of government’ approach’ with high-level political buy in and coordination, for example from the Prime Minister’s Office or national ‘missions’ on climate change
(e.g., India’s eight national missions under its National Action Plan for Climate Change). Without high level coordination sector ministries and different levels of government (national and subnational) generally do not work together effectively. Too often, prime responsibility for climate change is left to a single ministry (e.g., Ministry of Environment in Bangladesh, Ministry of National Disaster Management in
Pakistan) without the high-level coordination necessary to make integrated planning decisions.
The experience of development of the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) in Orissa demonstrates the need for political engagement and leadership; high level administrative coordination and interdepartmental consultations; broad stakeholder consultation; and integration with regular planning and budgetary processes.
53 This evidence clearly indicates that multi-stakeholder engagement, effective communications, evidence-based planning, outcome-oriented monitoring and evaluation, and integrated planning can help deliver effective climate compatible development plans.
3. Link budgetary and planning frameworks
If climate change is to be mainstreamed into national and sub-national development plans, it must be incorporated explicitly in budgets and expenditure management. The UN is undertaking Climate and
Public Expenditure Reviews in selected countries (including Bangladesh and Nepal) 54 to recommend ways of doing this and Bangladesh is generating important lessons. It has set up an architecture for climate planning and delivery, which brings donors together behind one plan – the Bangladesh Climate
Change Strategy and Action Plan, with its own climate fund and a multi donor trust fund to support it.
4. Integrate different levels for planning – link local, regional and national levels
Nepal’s National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) process demonstrated the need to link national priorities with bottom-up planning processes. The country piloted Local Adaptation Plans of Action
(LAPA), which provide a process for integrating global, national and local planning and budgeting processes in a way that responds to local priorities and builds adaptive capacity 55 . Bolivia has also emphasised linking the national and the local, through a participatory approach, which galvanises political support and stimulates demands for evidence-based planning 56 . India has started to formulate State
Action Plans for Climate Change. Pakistan, which recently developed responsibility for the environment to provinces, under the 18 th Constitutional Amendment, has yet to engage in sub-national climate planning. Nepal is the only county in the region to make LAPAs the basis of its national climate change strategy.
5. Use better decision-making tools 57
Planning decisions need to be based on evidence.
Tools such as climate change scenario planning, rootcause analysis and poverty and social impact analysis can help policymakers understand the complexity involved in making decisions in the face of uncertainty and change and to develop plausible scenarios on which to make those decisions. Without quantitative decision-support tools, there is a risk that policy makers will make knee-jerk decisions, putting lives, livelihoods and economic value at risk. Effective monitoring, evaluation, learning and feedback onto planning is also critical. No countries in the region use such tools yet.
6. Engage multiple stakeholders
All key stakeholders – at all levels, from local to national - need to be involved in framing the problem and solution. No one stakeholder can have all the knowledge necessary to tackle a complex and uncertain problem like climate change. Engaging all key stakeholder groups in planning processes will require governments to build their capacity and change the way they operate and communicate. Evidence indicates that deliberative, multi-stakeholder models of decision-making are better able to guide evidence-based policy that responds to uncertainty 58 .
59 Although some plans climate change strategies and policies did involve discussion at sub-national level, and with other stakeholders, including civil society (e.g., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh), in most cases, this was not done thoroughly.
20. Principles for climate compatible development planning . The challenges of complexity and uncertainty, mean that policy makers and planners in the region will need to adopt new approaches involving innovative and flexible systems-thinking coupled with collaborative methods. Approaches that have been used successfully in managing other

complex systems 60 combined with the emerging lessons from planning and delivering climate compatible development indicate the importance of the following principles:

Be comprehensive. Ensure inclusive and integrated “whole-of-government” planning that engages a wide range of stakeholders with different perspectives and disciplines in framing the problem and deliberate on solutions. This means that key ministries need to work together - using inter-disciplinary teams (i.e., experts from a range of disciplines, instead of only relying just on technical experts from ‘obvious’ disciplines) to prioritise investments and find convergence across sectors.

Think holistically. Think in terms of holistic systems rather than partial, linear thinking.
This will help to promote innovation and maintaining a long-term focus. For example, for national climate responses, climate change should be mainstreamed into national development plans and budgets (a ‘whole of government approach’) and best development practice is used in implementing climate change. Similarly, national and sub-national programmes (e.g., at state/province and district levels) should be planned and implemented in coherent way and designed to complement each other.

Acknowledge uncertainty. Explicitly manage uncertainty by making decisions that maximise flexibility, prioritise actions that are robust to a range of futures, enable resilience to shocks, build redundancy in systems and capabilities. One approach is to use tools for ‘decision-making under uncertainty’ developed in business and conflict spheres and recently tested in long term development planning. For example, robust decision-making, decision thresholds, scenario planning and tipping point analysis that offer options for managing uncertainty, in contrast with approaches that require substantial reduction of uncertainty.

Incentivise change. Develop budgeting and reporting mechanisms, which incentivise
‘whole of government’ approaches. Find and support climate champions to build the political space for changing ways of working – from the private sector, parliamentarians, social entrepreneurs, media and government

Keep learning. By (i) flooding the region with a cadre of people skilled in the use of innovative planning tools; (ii) supporting decisions makers to foster knowledge generation and dissemination and (iii) supporting real time, iterative learning processes by building in time to reflect for accountability, monitoring and process evaluation.
21. Challenges of using these principles . Government planning and decision-making processes tend to be bureaucratic and hierarchical and take place in ‘sector silos’. Each of the principles is challenging
– and many are already promoted in core development work, but become even more important with climate change. For example, collaboration across government (‘whole of government’ approaches) is difficult to achieve unless incentives to preserve a ministry’s mandate are fundamentally addressed – and equally governments find it difficult to engage effectively with the private sector or civil society.
Government efforts to tackle climate change have tended to also be fragmented and uncoordinated, with especially created climate change programmes and projects usually implemented by single ministries (e.g., environment, water, agriculture, transport). And early experience suggests that ‘business as usual’ approaches that result in ‘single sector’ solutions (e.g., water engineers recommending construction of embankments) may be sub-optimal for a range of future climates and have little flexibility once built.
Whilst solutions that could be robust to a wider range of futures, more flexible and often lower cost require integrated plans across sectors e.g., agriculture, watersheds and roads
– where roads can be made more resilient to flash floods through good land use

management.
22. This will be more challenging for South Asia.
Meeting this complex planning challenge will place considerable demands on governments in South Asia, as will the challenge of delivering plans. Most governments in the region have developed National Adaptation
Plan of Action (NAPA), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Disaster Mitigation plans. However, these tend to take a sectoral and projectised approach to planning with a top down focus on government delivery, rather than enabling private sector engagement and bottom up “autonomous” adaptation. They also tend to focus on ‘incremental change’ of existing programmes rather than identifying opportun ities for ‘transformational change’.
Some underlying factors for these are: a. Plan and implement climate change programmes in a fragmented & uncoordinated way.
A largely impacts driven and sectoral approach is being taken for the identification, prioritisation and implementation of climate change responses in
South Asia. This in part is due to the way climate challenges are diagnosed and the ways climate finance is being made available. This is leading to a fragmented rather than integrated approach. The current initiatives tend to be fragmented within specially created climate change programmes rather than being achieved through mainstreaming climate risk management into social and economic development frameworks of the countries. Neither do the current initiatives seek synergies through public policy areas pulling together toward shared climate resilience objectives.
61 A fragmented and thereby projectised approach will not lead to climate resilient development. Aggregation of efforts and mainstreaming is needed for that outcome. b. Lack of cross sectoral policy integration.
There is a lack of recognition that climate change is a complex policy issue which needs an unconventional (multi-sectoral, inter-disciplinary) approach. Integration of information, policies and measures to address climate change into on-going development planning and decision making is the key to achieving climate resilient growth and development. It is seen as making more sustainable, effective and efficient use of resources than designing and managing policies separately from on-going activities. For e.g PRSPs are seen by many as useful entry points for addressing climate change 62 . However, it has also been noted that environment, natural resource and disaster management issues are rarely covered in these papers 63 . Analysis of official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows to Nepal suggest that as much as 50-65 per cent of ODA funding goes to activities that could be affected by climate change. PRSP for Nepal, however, have paid little attention to climate-related risks or the potential impacts of climate change 64 . c. Lack of political support and leadership.
Learnings 65 from the region demonstrate the need for ensuring political engagement and strong leadership for establishing favourable policies and programmes, funding prioritisation over long time scales, establish larger and more predictable markets for private sector to invest in emission reduction and resilience systems and prepare communities to adapt to climate change. d. Lack the tools and evidence to make informed judgements about which interventions will be most effective. The region also faces a range of data gaps, capacity challenges, and structural issues that further creates complexities. The importance of knowledge (data, skills, technique) to deal with the impacts of climate

change is illustrated by the situation in the state of Maharsashtra, India, where recently a prolonged drought severely affected around 15 million small-scale farmers.
Historically, such droughts have occurred every 25 years, but climate projections suggest that their frequency will increase to once every 8 years. A combination of low-cost technical soil and water conserving irrigation measures could offset most drought-related losses, but the first step is access to knowledge on climate change and techniques to address them 66 . e. Lack of engagement of stakeholders in planning and delivery . The 2008
Bangladesh Climate Change Strategic Action Plan 67 was a followup to the country’s
2005 NAPA, which despite initial acclaim, had failed to lead to many projects, and remained separate from normal government programmes. The 2008 Action Plan was meant to overcome this implementation gap, but was widely criticised for its lack of consultation with stakeholders, the vagueness of its lists of programmes, and failure to conduct a proper needs assessment or make use of the best available scientific knowledge 68 . In September 2009, a revised version of the plan was released by the new government with promises of further periodic reviews 69 70 . This complex history underlines the importance of engaging with key stakeholders and encouraging local participation in adaptation planning. f. Lack of resources . The scale of the public and international funding available for climate resilience initiatives is insufficient in the region. Integrated planning can help in leveraging the much larger financial flows for the sectors affected by climate risks than the amounts available for financing adaptation separately 71 . The role of private sector investment to support low carbon climate resilient growth is also not understood. g. Lack of clear policy from government to stimulate private sector investment.
The region is not able to make good use of available sources of investment finance.
Private sector offers unique competencies for building climate resilience and catalysing low carbon development by promoting innovative technology and products, provision of finance and development of effective information system among others.
However, lack of appropriate pricing and regulatory policies which incentivise climatesmart investment through conducive tax regime, innovative financing products such as credit lines, loan guarantee instruments and sharing of R & D costs inhibit private sector engagement 72 . Evidence suggests that the private sector is well placed to deliver certain adaptation products and services. Innovative public-private partnerships are required to help the poorest access these goods and services
– for example in the case of weather-indexed micro-insurance.
73
23. Risks of poor climate planning . If there is no change in the ways governments plan and implement programmes, climate change interventions will have only limited impact and, in the worst cases, the wrong investments with be made , which could constrain a country’s ability to respond flexibly to future climate change. The current fragmented approaches will not result in climate resilient or climate compatible development.
24. Proposed Programme . The proposed programme would aim to transform the ways governments in South Asia plan and implement climate change programmes and serve as a foundation for climate compatible development in the region. Based on the above analysis it would need to support governments to:


Transform their systems of climate change planning and delivery resulting in increasing resilience of people, protecting investments and infrastructure, reduce economic damage, reducing the numbers of lives lost and ensuring sustainable poverty reduction. The expected benefits also include avoided policy conflicts and greater efficiency compared with managing climate change separately.

Build Knowledge and capacity of political leaders, governments, practitioners, donors, and investors resulting in ensuring political engagement and strong leadership for establishing favourable policies and programmes, funding prioritisation over long time scales, pro-active policies for private sector investment; leveraging of existing technical support programmes on climate change; and curriculum development for relevant professional academic and training programmes and preparing communities to adapt to climate change

Design and deliver climate resilience and low carbon measures resulting in improving the quality and impact of resilience plans and interventions, secure domestic & private sector funding, shape political goals and capture knowledge of what works. The delivery process will seek to develop architecture for future climate financing that is transparent and accountable.

Leverage and shape investments for climate compatible development from public (domestic and international) and private sectors resulting in raising budgetary allocation, prioritisation of sectoral resources for addressing climate change, increasing private sector investment and leveraging larger financial flows
(domestic and international) in the sector exposed to climate risks than the amount available for financing adaptation and mitigation separately.
STRATEGIC FIT
25. Fit with ICF priorities . This proposal fits with the ministerial and SR10 priorities for the
ICF Strategy. Firstly, it recognises that climate change offers real opportunities to drive innovation and new ideas for action, and to create new partnerships with the private sector to support low carbon climate resilient growth. Second, it will demonstrate that building low carbon, climate resilient growth at scale is feasible. Third, it supports the negotiations, particularly through providing support for adaptation in poor countries. In relation to the SR10 priorities, programme will focus on; (1) developing and scaling up innovative low carbon, climate resilient programmes and approaches to reduce emissions, support adaptation and protect forests, including biodiversity (2) building an enabling environment for private sector investment and (3) engaging the private sector to leverage finance and deliver action on the ground; and (4) mainstreaming climate change into UK overseas development assistance and potentially, EU and MDB lending.
26. Links to other ICF programmes . This programme Climate Proofing Growth and
Development (CPGD) will work closely with other DFID programmes in South Asia funded under the ICF (see Figure.3). These include:

Climate Science This programme will support CPGD through its work on improving the quality and use of climate science and information in decision-making. CPGD will be able to support Climate Science through feeding through the demand for climate information and reflection by its partners on the usefulness of different ways of analysing and presenting the climate information.


Urban Climate Change Resilience Partnership. This programme will be a sister programme to CPGD, as it is seeking to deliver climate compatible urban planning – with a strong focus on mechanisms to leverage private sector investment. It will select cities in South and South-East Asia
– and there is potential for a great deal of cross learning to take place between this partnership and the CPGD programme, which will need to be incentivised in management arrangements.

South Asia Water Governance Programme. This programme focuses on improve regional governance of shared river systems in South Asia. It will build multistakeholder mechanisms to resolve trade-offs between different uses of water and to build support for policy reform. It will offer CPGD partners a source of expertise and information on climate change impacts on water resources. And CPGD will offer the water governance programme an opportunity to understand the particular issues in a focal district or state and ground their meta-analysis at local levels.

South Asia Climate Resilience Alliance. This programme will build the evidence of what builds resilience in agricultural systems and for the poor who largely rely on agricultural livelihoods. It will provide CPGD partners with the evidence for rural interventions and how to reach scale. Equally CPGD will offer innovation for evaluation and its partners will be potential members of the national and regional
Alliance forums.

National programmes to support to climate planning. DFID offices in Bangladesh,
Nepal and Pakistan have, or are developing, country programmes to support climate compatible planning and delivery with their partner governments. These programmes will be supported by CPGD to share their tools and experience with others in the region, draw on expertise from outside their countries and undertake comparative analysis on approaches and institutional arrangements.

27. Other HMG activities .
This approach to strengthening governments’ capacity for climate change planning and delivery will also draw on wider development experience from DFID and others in public sector reform programmes in South Asia – in decentralisation and in sectors such as health, education and justice reform. This approach will also be able to draw on and inform the South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative and work with
DECC on low-carbon growth in the region. It will also be able to draw on experience and lessons from other programmes internationally working on climate planning at a national level, such as STARCK in Kenya and SCIP in Ethiopia.
28. Demand from South Asian Governments: There are opportunities to work with governments on this agenda, and DFID/HMG is well placed to provide support. We have a formal invitation from the Government of India to work with state governments on the formulation and implementation of State Action Plans for Climate Change (SAPCCs), which all states have been asked to prepare following the launch of the National Action
Plan on Climate Change in 2008. DFID is already working with the governments of Nepal and Bangladesh on local and national planning for climate change, and this programme will enable us both to deepen that engagement and share lessons across the region.
There is also emerging interest from Pakistan with their recent announcement for a green fund likely to drive climate planning.
29. Other donor activities . Current interventions are partial and usually involve action in just one sector (e.g., flood control) and do not take an integrated and multi-sector approach.
Focusing on just one sector limits opportunities as low cost solutions in one sector often depend on actions by other sectors. The existing programmes are largely focused on one level (central government, local government or community planning) rather than looking at the links between them. There is currently no mechanism to share lessons or draw on the expertise in other places. There are real issues in the current approaches to climate planning and delivery systems in the region
– and country by country programmes do not offer the comparative cross country learning that would offer real challenge to some of the institutional barriers. There is an urgent need to develop integrated climate change planning systems, which exploit synergies among sectors, engage a range of stakeholders, recognise uncertainty and support robust, flexible and resilient systems, with sufficient redundancy to avoid catastrophic loss. We are consulting key stakeholders and wider donors engaged on strengthening capacity of governments to plan and implement climate change programmes regionally and globally. They have welcomed our initiative. We would seek to work more closely and coordinate with them during delivery.
These include: ADB, EU, FAO, IFAD, USAID; UNDP, World Bank. We have also talked to
SAARC.
B. IMPACT AND OUTCOME WE EXPECT TO ACHIEVE
30. Impact and outcomes . The impact, outcome and outputs of programme, together with expected results are given in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1: Impact and Outcome Results
Impact
Economic and Social systems of the countries in South Asia adapt to climate change ensuring Climate resilient and sustainable economic development
Results
Indicators including ICF standard indicators
More climate resilient livelihoods due to ICF programmes:

120 mvulnerable people better prepared to deal with disasters and climate related shocks and

Outcome
Climate change integrated into the planning and delivery of public and private sector policies and investments in South Asia stresses [ICF 1,3,4]

US $ 9b reduction in loss and damages to infrastructure, investments from climate change and disasters
Poor people have greater economic opportunities through green growth:

400 m people with improved access to clean energy as a result of ICF programmes [ICF 2].

1 m jobs created through green growth and climate resilience investments [ICF 5].)
Co-benefits in terms of reduced carbon:

35 mt of CO2 equivalent reduced/avoided [ICF 6].
Results
5 S Asian countries have climate change integrated into government plans & budgets.
£1 billion of extra finance committed to climate compatible development.
All 5 countries in South Asia accept international climate financing and using it effectively to tackle climate change.
31. Outputs . The outcome will be achieved by the following outputs which involve strengthening the capacity of governments, government ministries and agencies, private sector and civil society organisation in the following areas (Table 2):
Outputs
1. Skills and systems for integrated, participatory planning and budgeting of climate change
Outputs
Table 2: Output Results
Results
14 Inclusive institutional mechanisms created at national and sub-national governments have high level political representation and wide stakeholder engagement of that promote integrated climate compatible planning, implementation, monitoring and feedback
200 planners have successfully completed professional development programmes in integrated evidence-based climate change planning, delivery and monitoring.
Effective knowledge sharing mechanisms on climate change operating among 14 national and sub-national governments.
Results
2. Tools for climate compatible planning and development
10 tools (i) tested, (ii) developed and (iii) packaged for dissemination across South Asia
80 decision makers trained and mentored in use of a portfolio of appropriate ‘good practice’ tools and evidence for climate change decision-making each year.

3 . I nnovative approaches to climate compatible development
4. Finance leveraged for climate compatible investments
10 innovative technical, organisational and financial approaches to planning and delivery (i) developed and tested, (ii) proved for scaling-up, (iii) shared across South Asia, and (iv) replicated by at least one other government in South Asia.
5 Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional
Reviews done at national and sub-national governments
Evidence generated for design of 5 Climate
Finance Framework & Fiscal instruments that help in securing domestic & private sector funding
Analysis of private investment flows in 5 countries and facilitate dialogue to establish partnership frameworks between government and private sector
7 proposals developed to access international climate finance
32. Specific results to be defined . Forecasting and quantifying impact-level results from the programme ex ante is not possible because of the limited and nascent evidence base on the impact of integrated planning for climate change, and because actual climate change results will be determined by the priorities and targets adopted within individual plans.
Based on plans developed to date by South Asian governments, results across a range of
ICF priorities can be expected, covering both adaptation and low carbon development.
Systems will be established to track these during programme delivery.

A. OPTIONS APPRAISAL
OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE PLANNING
33. Option 1 . Do nothing new
34. Option 2 . Extra efforts in to existing initiatives
35. Option 3 . Mainstream into programmes
36. Option 4 . Regional programme
OPTION 1 : DO NOTHING NEW (the counterfactual)
37. Description . An argument could be made to do nothing, on the grounds that all governments in the region have, or soon will have national climate change action plans and there are a number of initiatives on different aspects of climate change planning in
South Asia being implemented with support by DFID, multi-lateral (World Bank, ADB,
UNDP) and bilateral agencies.
38. Advantages . The main advantage of this option is that it frees up DFID funds and capacity to tackle other challenges. There are other DFID and other donor programmes at the country level supporting climate planning such as Nepal’s bottom up climate planning programme, community based adaptation and disaster risk reduction in
Bangladesh (also being developed in Pakistan), support to the multidonor climate resilience fund in Bangladesh which supports the Bangladesh climate change strategy and action plan. These programmes are generating some evidence for how to plan and develop tools for climate planning.
BOX 2 – SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT CLIMATE PLANNING IN SOUTH ASIA
A. Fragmented . Government climate change efforts are fragmented among different ministries and between different levels of government (most planning is top-down) and climate planning is not fully integrated into budgets.
B. Top down . Governments do not consult or involve other stakeholders (private sector, civil society, vulnerable communities) sufficiently in defining the problem and finding solutions.
C. Technically weak . Policy makers and planners often fail to take into account (1) the high levels of uncertainty about climate change and its impacts and the need to plan for flexible responses; (2) that clima te change is a ‘wicked’ problem needing complex systems thinking and innovative approaches/policies); (3) the likely impact of climate change on the climate vulnerable communities; (4) the limitations of data and often misuse or abuse climate change information (e.g. use of averages or use of only one model to give inappropriate precision to climate model outputs).
D. Short term.
Planners do not take account of the medium and long term development scenarios (economic growth, population growth, urbanisation) in planning climate change investments.
39. Disadvantages . The do nothing option fails to address the urgent need to comprehensively strengthen the capacity of government and other stakeholders (e.g.,

private sector and civil society) to plan effectively for climate compatible development.
The existing programmes are largely focused on one level (central government, local government or community planning) rather than looking at the links between them. There is currently no mechanism to share lessons or draw on the expertise in other places
There are real issues in the current approaches to climate planning and delivery systems in the region (see box 2) – and country by country programmes do not offer the comparative cross country learning that would offer real challenge to some of the institutional barriers. There is an urgent need to develop integrated climate change planning systems, which exploit synergies among sectors, engage a range of stakeholders, recognise uncertainty and support robust, flexible and resilient systems, with sufficient redundancy to avoid catastrophic loss. Otherwise climate change investments are likely to be sub-optimal
Evidence for Option 1: medium .
40. There is strong evidence that climate change is likely to adversely affect livelihoods of hundreds of millions of poor people in South Asia, with serious impacts on food security and poverty. The IPCC predicts that agricultural yields (e.g., rice, wheat) will fall by 18%, though some authors predict even greater losses of 30%+ 74 . Burgess et al look at mortality and poverty in the context of climate change in India, predicting that a one degree increase in annual temperature will lead to a 10% increase in mortality rates in rural areas and 8.5% decrease in agricultural wages.
41. There is a relatively new but good evidence base that failing to design and implement integrated plans to address climate change would have significant long-term costs:

Current interventions are partial and usually involve action in just one sector (e.g., flood control) and do not take an integrated and multi-sector approach. Interventions are not coordinated under the kind of robust system needed to address the ‘wicked’ nature of the problem 1 . Focusing on just one sector limits opportunities as low cost solutions in one sector often depend on actions by other sectors (ADB annual review of adaptation TA)
 Oxfam’s Review of Climate Change Adaptation Practices in South Asia (2011) 75 found that current efforts in the region are “fragmented, lacking a strong link between national climate change strategies, plans, and existing disaster risk reduction, agricultural, and other relevant policies”. See also CKDN on Orissa and the DFID learning Hub 76 .

Adaptation, mitigation and disaster risk reduction have tended to be dealt with by different ministries (environment, power, home affairs) with separate strategies and separate partners – missing the opportunity to explore where the “win win win’s” lie.
42. There is a solid qualitative evidence base that a ‘wicked’ problem requires a solution where “all levels of government and a wide range of non-governmental organisations” are brought together to analyse the problem, identify and implement solutions 77 . Facilitiators are needed to catalyze programmes across sectors and engage diverse stakeholders
(e.g the private sector) - see GEF Earth Fund review 78 .
OPTION 2 : EXTRA EFFORT IN TO EXISTING INITIATIVES
43. Description . One way of improving climate planning in the region would be to put extra

effort into some of the existing initiatives that try to deal with specific elements of climate compatible planning. Possible candidates could include: UNDP (e.g., through its Poverty and Environment Initiative (PEI)), the Climate Investment Funds (World Bank and regional development banks) and expanding the scope of the existing DFID-financed
Climate and Knowledge Development Network (CKDN).
44. Advantages . This option would be administratively straight-forward and would probably involve either an MoU or an Accountable Grant. If the implementing partner was a multilateral, it would not be necessary to tender or monitor so closely as with a private sector organisation. It also may have the potential for wider impact if it influences these organisations’ other programmes. Some of the potential organisations have good experience of working across agencies.
45. Disadvantages . There are three disadvantages with this option. First, none of these initiatives comprehensively address all the objectives of CPGD – and often do not tackle the fundamental challenges to planning identified here (e.g. public engagement, use of climate information, whole of government and interdisciplinary approaches). Neither do they involve all the CPGD stakeholders - in particular the private sector is largely excluded. Second, these initiatives have their own network of stakeholders and institutions and would operate through them. This would limit the outreach of the programme to particular constituencies. And third, experience in initiatives DFID is already supporting suggests it is difficult to ensure quality and focus on the priorities identified in the strategic case when working through multilaterals (MDBs, UNDP) and through consortia (CDKN).
Evidence for Option 2: medium .
46. There are a number of donor financed initiatives on climate change in the region doing important work but none of these address the need to strengthen integrated and inclusive planning in the region or adopts a holistic ‘systems thinking’ approach 79.
For example,
UNDP’s Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (CPIER) programme promotes integration of climate change into government budgets; the DFID-financed
CKDN, aims to provide demand-led research and channel the best available knowledge on climate change and development to support policy processes at the country level; and the multi-donor Climate Investment Funds, help developing countries pilot low-emissions and climate-resilient development. Each of these initiatives has its own focus and could be involved in aspects of CPGD but would not be suitable to implement the programme.
47. There is evidence that channelling climate change funds through existing initiatives may not be efficient and reduces DFID’s ability to ensure quality and accountability. The ICAI report (2011) 80 on DFID’s Bangladesh climate change programme, where DFID funds are largely channelled through the World Bank and UNDP, states that delays in start-up and coordination have led to only a small proportion of available funds being used, and with
DFID being unable to account for quality in delivery.
OPTION 3 : MAINSTREAM INTO PROGRAMMES
48. Description . Another option to improve climate planning would be to integrate these objectives into existing DFID country or regional programmes. This could provide an opportunity to mainstream climate change into other DFID programmes (climate compatible development).
49. Advantages . This option would aim to leverage existing investments for climate results.

This has the potential to offer good value for money and fits with DFID’s broader policy of looking to integrate climate change as fully as possible into development activities.
50. Disadvantages . There are five disadvantages with this option. First, most DFID programmes are sector-based and this approach would thus not lend itself easily to the
CPGD objective of promoting integrated planning for climate change. Second, DFID governance programmes can operate across a number of sectors but, if climate change were added, it would compete for focus with the other objectives of these programmes.
Also, governance programmes often focus on particular states or provinces (which may not be climate change priorities). Third, operating through DFID country programmes risks losing the integrated regional approach as it is difficult to incentivise programme managers to prioritise regional learning. And fourth, mainstreaming climate change requires a significant investment of the time and effort by DFID staff, implying high transaction costs. The fifth disadvantage to this approach is that DFID has already committed to making all its programmes climate compatible, so this could be considered a counterfactual option (Option 1). Option four could support this mainstreaming process through providing additional support to the programmes and supporting learning between them and so address the earlier disadvantages.
Evidence base for Option 3: medium .
51. This approach has worked well in DFID, in country or regional programmes. CPGD requires an explicit and targeted focus on climate change and on strengthening capacity in the region on planning and delivery for climate change programmes, which DFID
Country Programme Evaluation indicate is best done through focused programmes
(DFID 2006-10) 81 .
OPTION 4 : REGIONAL PROGRAMME
52. Description . The last option would be to encourage and support governments to develop integrated and inclusive planning for climate compatible development through a new regional programme, implemented by an organisation, which would manage the programme through partner organisations in each of the countries and ensure crosslearning throughout the region.
53. The programme would be premised on the principles for climate compatible planning and delivery and will therefore focus on delivering:

Getting the right institutional architecture in place to build political leadership for longer term planning that considers potential climate futures. This would need to enable high-level central coordination and inter-departmental collaboration, public and private engagement and integration with regular planning and budgetary processes.
One approach developed in Nepal to build cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary work was through taking a range of stakeholders into the field together to look for creative solutions beyond the usual sector by sector planning and explore synergies around key challenges. Promoting collaboration between the public, private, civil society and research institutions increases the robustness of analysis and resolution of trade-offs as a range of perspectives and knowledge are brought together.

Incentives for new ways of working - supporting convergence between policies and programmes will offer opportunities to find win wins between development, adaptation and lower carbon growth. It can also help deliver climate compatible development at

lower cost. This is likely to require changing staff incentives as well as organisational objectives and approaches but also offers the opportunity to building synergies between programmes so they work together coherently and effectively. It will consider how to incentivise and support bottom-up (autonomous) adaptation by the private sector and communities, such as through providing good climate information, decision tools and incentives through policy, taxation and regulatory frameworks.

Robust tools – Analytical and decision support tools will be developed, tested and compared. For example, to evaluate the utility of tools such as strategic environmental assessments; climate vulnerability assessments; low carbon growth analytics; participatory action research, systems analysis, futures scenarios, historical analogues, threshold/tipping points analysis and climate impacts analysis (with ranges and analysis of performance of models from which impacts derived), cost benefit, multi criteria and Monte Carlo analysis.

Accountability
– systems for transparency and accountability of climate financing are vital given the limited and contestation of the evidence base on which decisions are being made. A major focus of the programme will be to support processes to engage the public and interest groups in decisions that affect them and in providing feedback through participatory monitoring.
54. Innovation and delivery . Support will be provided to support innovation and enable rapid learning to feedback into planning. This will also deliver tangible results for poor people.

Policy instruments - technical support for the detailed design of specific policy instruments proposed in plans (e.g. fiscal measures, pricing of environmental goods and services);

Innovation
– to develop and test innovative approaches and address delivery challenges in the climate plans.

Design – support for costing and preparing proposals for international climate funds or mechanisms to increase private sector investment.

Continuous learning
– supporting strong monitoring and evaluation that feeds back into the planning process will enable rapid learning and increase accountability to stakeholders. This focus on learning and accountability will also help secure international funding, shape political goals and capture knowledge of what works. The delivery process will seek to develop architecture for future climate financing that is transparent and accountable.
55. Skills, knowledge, commitment.
The programme has a strong focus on building the skills, understanding and commitment of climate champions and a cadre of climate planners. Support will be given for building evidence, capturing and analysing lessons.
And sharing these lessons through tools, guidelines and knowledge products. The programme will promote networking and knowledge exchange between thought and practice leaders in the region, and more widely through existing knowledge networks such as CDKN, Asia-Pacific Adaptation Network.

Professional development. The programme will build the knowledge and skills of political leaders, governments, practitioners, donors, and investors on how to appropriately interpret and apply information generated by climate models and in the use of analysis and decision tools
– through training, coaching and mentoring. The

programme will test the effectiveness of two approaches to skills development
– firstly carefully targeting intensive support to people in key positions and secondly providing training to broad group of experts and officials to flood the region with people with greater understanding of the issues and the tools available.

Networking and partnership will be supported to develop tools and mechanisms, capture and share lessons, analysis and skills - creating an active community of practice between countries and states/districts. Public engagement and strategic communications will be supported to debate climate compatible development and what are acceptable levels of risk and how to resolve trade-offs with the development agenda.

Champions of change. Programme will support climate champions to create political space for innovation, to promote rapid learning from innovation and support organisational change. The programme will compare and evaluate different approaches to selecting champions
– for example identifying them by position, by their interest or by their demonstrated commitment. Individuals could come from politics, public service, civil society, media or research organisations. They would need to be thought leaders who shape opinion and practice. The champions will facilitate a dialogue between policymakers at different levels to ensure planners hear demand and respond to domestic priorities.

Address exclusion. The programme will tackle structural barriers to learning which excludes certain groups (women, elderly etc.). Care will be taken to ensure information reaches all concerned targets through appropriate channels. These channels will build strong systems of accountability that will provide feedback on how plans work on the ground.
56. Leverage resources . The programme will provide support to leverage resources to implement plans from national budgets (e.g. helping Indian and Pakistani states access federal resources), international climate funds, and the private sector.

Accessing public finance: Programme will generate evidence for design of Climate
Finance Framework & Fiscal instruments that help in securing domestic & private sector funding and support the preparation of proposals to access domestic and international financing. It will also support developing mechanisms for raising and allocating budgetary resources for climate change plans (e.g. green taxes/levies, earmarked climate change funds, incentive-based fiscal transfer mechanisms).

Accessing private sector investment. The programme will help to attract private sector investment by (1) analysis of private investment flows in countries and facilitate dialogue to establish partnership frameworks between government and private sector;
(2) by facilitating the promotion of a conducive tax regime (3) through innovative financing products and (4) by sharing R & D costs; and (5) by incentivising the market provision of resilience oriented goods, finance and services. The aim will be not only to leverage private sector finance for public infrastructure or clean energy provision
(e.g. through PPP approaches) but also to influence private investment more widely through appropriate pricing and regulatory policies, which incentivise climatecompatible investment. Constraints to private sector investment could be addressed by supporting governments with design of financial products such as credit lines, loan guarantee instruments, venture capital funds, carbon finance facilities that monetize the advanced sale of emissions reductions to finance project investment costs, and

technical assistance to build the capacity of all actors along the financing chain.
57. Why a regional approach?
Through working at a regional level, the programme can support a network of experts that draw on each other’s experience, share the costs of developing tools and training programmes and share lessons from using the tools and approaches they develop. This comparative analysis and learning would not be possible if each country was supported separately. And this comparative analysis will add value to existing support to the countries in the region. The region already has a range of institutional arrangements for planning and financing and used some very different approaches to developing climate strategies and prioritising actions
– from which a wealth of comparative analysis and lessons can already be drawn. The other advantage of a regional approach is to attract and retain the best international minds on the range of technical issues will be easier for a bigger, regional programme than country by country.
58. Who will steer the programme?
To build high level political commitment for climate compatible development, the programme will set up a steering committee of partner government representatives and of influential thought leaders. This group will guide the programme to ensure it hears and responds to demand. They will help select focal states and districts and building the partnerships with them. And they will support identifying and developing the network of experts, the cadre of climate planners and the climate champions.
59. How will focal states and districts be selected?
The programme will cover the entire
South Asian region and work with each of the national governments, to demonstrate linking with other levels of government, the programme will focus down on five to six
Indian states and at least one province or region in each of the other countries. These will be selected through an area prioritisation framework that will be developed during the inception phase with criteria such as the nature of climate and disaster risks and exposure to date, numbers of climate vulnerable poor, sensitivity of economic growth and development to climate risks, planning approaches and current capabilities.
60. Common yet flexible approach . The programme will promote common principles for planning (see above), but with sufficient flexibility to take account of differences in political and institutional frameworks and in the skills and interests of the participating governments. The planning process will emphasise multi-stakeholder engagement ensuring interdepartmental coordination, public private partnerships, engagement of financial institutions, civil society, media, elected representatives and primary stakeholders.
61. Advantages . This option would aim to leverage existing investments for climate results.
This has the potential to offer good value for money and fits with DFID’s broader policy of looking to integrate climate change as fully as possible into development activities. The specific advantages of this option are as follows:
62. Dedicated to climate planning. A stand-alone regional programme would be fully focused on strengthening integrated and inclusive climate change planning (i.e. planning which is cross-sectoral, multi-stakeholder and multi-level (national, state. province, district, local)).
63. T ailored to partners’ needs. The programme could also focus on addressing partners’ demands (i.e., interventions most appropriate in each country), while ensuring good

practice is captured and shared across the region.
64. Tackles low carbon development, disaster risk reduction and adaptation. This option would address low carbon development, disaster and climate resilience together.
65. Better able to: a. ensure quality and focus of the programme and coherent delivery of the theory of change for the programme; b. promote a deliberative approach involving government ministries and agencies, sub-national governments, private sector, civil society and local communities; c. develop and test innovative and potentially transformative approaches; d. build a strong cohort of skilled climate planners and network of experts; e. develop and comparatively test tools and institutional arrangements; f. bring in evidence and lessons / establish links with from the other climate programmes and sectoral/governance development programmes; g. ensure effective and timely evaluation and lesson learning and sharing to improve programme performance and influence wider practice by others; h. develop and test approaches and models (e.g., low-cost climate resilient housing) that could be used in other DFID programmes.
66. Disadvantages . A standalone regional programme would involve higher management costs than the other options and DFID would still have to closely monitor and supervise the programme. However, these disadvantages are felt to be outweighed by the benefits.
Evidence for option 4: medium
67. DFID learning Hub (2010) 82 reviewed the experience on climate change planning and identified a number of challenges: planning processes take a linear, projectised approach to planning; institutions do not match the scale of planning and planning frameworks have tend to take a ‘Business as usual’ approach which focus on ‘incremental change’ rather than transformational change. There are evidences that indicate that integrated planning and delivery requires a ‘whole of government’ approach’ (Global Environment Facility
(2009) 83 , Oxfam 2011 84 and IIED/COWI (2011) 85 .
68. The National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPAs) and the Nationally Appropriate
Mitigation Action (NAMAs) have been where most countries have started to think how to plan for climate change. They have proved to be a useful start, but have tended to deliver narrow sectoral shopping lists, rather than holistic, programmatic approaches.
And the biggest lesson has been the importance of linking funding with the planning process and of political ownership
– linking the climate planning process with the wider development priorities of the country 86 . They have, on the whole not sought to integrate climate resilient development objectives into country-wide planning frameworks – although this has been attempted in Nepal, Rwanda, Bangladesh and Kiribati. For example, the Republic of Kiribati has undertaken two national adaptation processes: the
NAPA and the Kiribati adaptation programme (KAP). While the NAPA gives attention to urgent and immediate adaptation needs, the KAP focuses on long-term planning for climate change adaptation. Lessons learnt from both of these initiatives were used to plan the national response to climate. This initiative notes that “climate change is posing costly risks to economic growth, and calls for the development of participatory and costeffective ways of minimizing and managing risk of loss from climate change related events and provides an opening for integrating climate change adaptation planning into the national policy process.” 87

69. Addressing challenges of adaptation and low carbon development is a highly complex,
“wicked” problem that cuts across administrative and political boundaries and requires innovative, flexible systems thinking 88 that recognises uncertainty and complexity, with holistic systems thinking (Gaventa and McGee (2010) 89 .
70. The handling of climate change requires holistic rather than linear thinking. This is thinking capable of grasping the big picture, including the interrelationships between the full range of causal factors and policy objectives. By their nature, the climate change issues are imperfectly understood, and so initial planning boundaries that are drawn too narrowly may lead to a neglect of what is important in decision making. The is a need to involve multiple stakeholders into a deliberative decision-making process (Australian
Public Service Commission (2007), 90 Gaventa and McGee (2010), 91
71. Nepal’s Local Adaptation Plans of Action (LAPAs) initiative demonstrates the need to link national priorities with bottom-up planning process. LAPAs potentially represent a tangible process for integrating global, national and local planning and budgeting processes in support of local practical priorities for interventions that respond to the impacts of climate change and build adaptive capacity 92 . Bolivia also tried to bring together perspectives from different scales in planning . Bolivia’s approach to building links between local and national institutions to ensure cross-scale scrutiny of the poverty reduction strategy process provides interesting lessons for climate compatible development planning. It built links between local and national institutions, it ensured a participatory approach that engaged both national and local needs, it gained political support, and it stimulated evidence-based planning 93 .
72. HMG supported Caribbean Planning for Adaptation to Global Climate Change (CPACC) project focused in providing tools and capacity to twelve Caribbean countries to cope with the adverse effects of climate change. The project supported vulnerability assessments, adaptation planning and capacity building, which led to increased focus of climate change issues at the policy-making level. CPACC enabled more unified regional positions for climate negotiations; resulted in a significant increase in monitoring and early warning capabilities; and the development of national climate change adaptation policies and implementation plans 94 . Lessons highlight the importance of developing leadership and ambition through multi-stakeholder platforms and strong communication, of the value of flexible, responsive support to build capacity without overloading institutions 95 .
73. There is a need to enhance the capacity of planners and policy makers and provide them with new decision-making tools. (ECA (2009) 96 and Alejandro (2002), 97
74. The need to understand the political economy of decision-making in partner governments most effectively to support processes of change. The experience of development of
Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) in Orissa also demonstrates the need for political engagement and leadership, high level administrative coordination and integration with regular planning and budgetary processes 98 . Also there is a need to understand the political economy of decision-making in partner governments most effectively to support processes of change (Greenstone and Hanna (2011).
99 .
75. Recommended option . A summary of the arguments for and against each option and main evidence sources for the options is contained in Table 3 (p.21-23). Option 4 is clearly the preferred of the 3 options (Options 2-4) and most likely to result in climate

change being integrated into the planning and delivery of public policies and public and private sector investments in South Asia. Options 2 and 3 are judged not to be feasible, for the reasons given above. In view of this, the remainder of the appraisal will comprise an integrated appraisal of Option 4 against Option 1 (the counter-factual – ‘do nothing’).
B. EVIDENCE FOR OPTIONS
76. Evidence good . All Options have a medium evidence base – there is well documented qualitative evidence for similar approaches. A more detailed discussion of the available evidence for Option 4 is contained in Section C below.
Option Evidence rating
0 Medium
1
2
3
Medium
Medium
Medium
C. CLIMATE & ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT
77. Likely risks and opportunities . The likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for each feasible option is as follows;
Option
1
2
3
4
Climate change and environment risks and impacts
A high risk
B medium risk
B medium risk
C low risk
Climate change and environment opportunities
C low opportunity
B medium opportunity
B medium opportunity
A high opportunity

OPTION
Option 1
Do nothing
For
There are some other programmes supporting:
 aspects of climate change planning in the region and in different countries in the region (e.g., the UNDP’s CPEIR in
Bangladesh and Nepal; LAPAs in
Nepal; SAPAs in India; community based adaptation in Bangladesh and
Pakistan);
 generation of research evidence and tools for climate change planning and implementation, but these are generally small-scale and narrow in scope.
Table 3: COMPARISON OF OPTIONS
Against
Climate change planning and implementation systems in the region are currently:
 carried out by national governments without adequately involving other levels of government, the private sector, civil society or local communities;
 fragmented - planning is by sector ministries rather than crossgovernment and not integrated with budgetary systems of government;
 do not sufficiently recognise the uncertainty about climate change and its impacts and the need to plan for flexible future responses;

do not recognise climate change as a
‘wicked’ problem needing complex systems thinking and innovative approaches/policies);

Not based on a thorough understanding of the likely impact of climate change on climate vulnerable communities;
 misuse or abuse climate change information (e.g., in down-scaling computer models);
 do not take account of the medium and long term development scenarios
(economic growth, population growth, urbanisation) in planning climate change investments.
There is an urgent need to develop integrated climate change planning systems, which exploit synergies among sectors and involve a range of stakeholders and recognise uncertainty and the need for flexibility. Otherwise climate change investments are likely to be sub-optimal.
Evidence Base
Evidence base: Medium
There is strong evidence against Option 1 - do nothing:
1. Strong evidence that climate change is likely to adversely affect lives and livelihoods of hundreds of millions of poor people in South Asia, with serious impacts on food security and poverty. The IPCC predicts that agricultural yields (e.g., rice, wheat) will fall by18%, though some authors predict even greater losses of 30%+ 100 . Burgess et al look at mortality and poverty in the context of climate change in India, predicting that a one degree increase in annual temperature will lead to a 10% increase in mortality rates in rural areas and 8.5% decrease in agricultural wages.
2. Strong evidence that failing to design and implement integrated plans to address climate change would have significant long-term costs:

Current interventions are partial and usually involve action in just one sector (e.g., flood control) and do not take an integrated and multisector approach. Interventions are not coordinated under the kind of robust system needed to address the ‘wicked’ nature of the problem 1 .
Focusing on just one sector does not work because initiatives in one sector depend on actions by other sectors (ADB)
 Oxfam’s
Review of Climate Change Adaptation Practices in South
Asia (2011) 101 found that current efforts in the region are “fragmented, lacking a strong link between national climate change strategies, plans, and existing disaster risk reduction, agricultural, and other relevant policies”. See also CKDN on Orissa and the DFID learning
Hub 102 .

The response to climate change in the region has been focussed on disaster mitigation, rather than a holistic approach, which includes adaptation and low carbon growth (e.g. climate change is subsumed within the Ministry for Disaster Management in Pakistan).
3. Strong evidence that a ‘wicked’ problem requires a solution where “all levels of government and a wide range of non-governmental organisations” are brought together to analyse the problem, identify and implement solutions 103 . Facilitiators are needed to catalyze programmes across sectors and engage diverse stakeholders (e.g the private sector) - see GEF Earth Fund review 104 .

Climate Change/Environment Score:
A – High risk
C
– Low opportunity
OPTION
Option 2
Back existing initiatives
(CDKN, UNDP,
GIZ, CIF)
Option 3
Integrate the CCP programme into other programmes of DFID.
For
Administratively easier – involves either an
MoU or an Accountable Grant. No need to tender or monitor so closely.
Potential wider impact - support through the programme might influence their wider programmes.
UNDP and GIZ have good experience of working across agencies.
An opportunity to mainstream climate change into DFID’s other programmes – climate-smart development?
Potentially cheaper in terms of ICF resources but expensive in terms of DFID staff time.
Table 3: COMPARISON OF OPTIONS (Cont).
Against
None of these organisations or initiatives (i) tackles all the objectives of CCPSA; (ii) includes all the planned partners of the
CCPSA programme (e.g., private sector) but they could possibly be involved in some aspects of the programme.
It is difficult to ensure quality and focus on
DFID priorities when working through other multilateral or bilateral agencies, or CDKN.
There is a danger that these organisations would focus on their own programmes and would try to use programme funds to support other agendas.
Most DFID programmes are narrow and sectoral and this approach would thus not lend itself easily to the CCPIPSA objective of promoting integrated planning for climate change.
DFID governance programmes can be cross-sectoral. However, if climate change were added, it would compete for focus with the other objectives of these programmes.
Also, governance programmes often focus on particular states or provinces (which may not be climate change priorities).
Operating through DFID country
Evidence Base
Evidence base: Medium
There are a number of donor financed initiatives on climate change in the region doing important work but none of these addresses the need to strengthen integrated and inclusive planning in the region or adopts a holistic ‘systems thinking’ approach 105 . For example, UNDP’s CPIER promotes integration of climate change into government budgets; the
DFID-financed CKDN, aims to provide demand-led research and channel the best available knowledge on climate change and development to support policy processes at the country level; and the multi-donor Climate
Investment Funds, help developing countries pilot low-emissions and climate-resilient development. Each of these initiatives has its own focus and could be involved in aspects of CCPIPSA but would not be suitable to implement the programme.
There is evidence that channelling climate change funds through existing initiatives may not be efficient and reduces DFID’s ability to ensure quality and accountability. The ICAI report (2011) 106 on DFID’s Bangladesh climate change programme, where DFID funds are largely channelled through the World Bank and UNDP, states that delays in start-up and coordination have led to only a small proportion of available funds being used, and with DFID being unable to account for quality in implementation.
Climate Change/Environment Score:
B – Medium risk
B – Medium opportunity
Evidence base: Medium
This approach has worked well in DFID, in country or regional programmes. CCPIPSA requires an explicit and target on climate change and on strengthening capacity in the region on planning and implementation for climate change programmes, which DFID Country
Programme Evaluation indicate is best done through focused programmes
(DFID 2006-10) 107

OPTION
Option 4
New regional programme
For
Focuses on strengthening integrated climate change planning, which is cross-sectoral and multi-stakeholder and multi-level
(national, state. province, district, local).
Focuses on addressing partners’ demands
(i.e., interventions most appropriate in each country), while ensuring good practice is captured and shared across the region.
Brings together low carbon development and climate resilience in the same programme.
Better able to:
 ensure quality and focus of the programme and coherent delivery of the theory of change for the programme;
 promote a deliberative approach involving government ministries and agencies, sub-national governments, private sector, civil society and local communities;
 develop and test innovative and potentially transformative approaches;
 bring in evidence and lessons / establish links with from the other 5 ICF programmes;
 ensure effective and timely evaluation and lesson learning and sharing to improve programme performance and influence wider practice by others;
 develop and test approaches and models (e.g., low-cost climate resilient programmes risks losing the integrated regional approach
– difficult to incentivise programme managers to prioritise regional learning and outcomes.
Time and effort needed to influence other
DFID programmes to ensure quality and focus on climate change.
Climate Change/Environment Score:
B
– Medium risk
B
– Medium opportunity
Table 3: COMPARISON OF OPTIONS (Cont).
Against
Team resources needed to manage a new and complex programme.
Partners are keen to participate but many are already over-stretched.
Evidence Base
Evidence base: Medium
There is strong evidence in favour of Option 4.
This is as follows:
 The need for an integrated ‘whole of government’ approach (Global
Environment Facility( 2009) 108 , DFID learning Hub (2010) 109 , Oxfam
2011 110 , IIED/COWI (2011); 111
 The need to recognise that climate change is a ‘wicked’ policy issue which needs an approach which recognises uncertainty and complexity, with holistic systems thinking (Australian Public Service
Commission (2007) 112 Gaventa and McGee (2010) 113 ,

The need to involve multiple stakeholders into a deliberative decisionmaking process (Australian Public Service Commission (2007), 114
Gaventa and McGee (2010), 115

The need to enhance the capacity of planners and policy makers and provide them with new decision-making tools. (ECA (2009) 116 and
Alejandro (2002), 117

The need to understand the political economy of decision-making in partner governments most effectively to support processes of change
- CKDN 2010 on Orissa 118 ; Greenstone and Hanna (2011).
119 .

housing) that could be used in other
DFID programmes.
Components of the programme could be implemented in partnership with one or more of the partners listed in Output 2.
Climate Change Score:
C
– Low risk
A
– High opportunity

D. THEORY OF CHANGE
78. Impact and outcome . The theory of change is shown schematically in Figure 4. The impact the programme is aiming to deliver is Economic and Social systems of the countries in South Asia adapt to climate change ensuring Climate resilient and sustainable economic development. The outcome is climate change integrated into the planning and delivery of public and private sector policies and investments in South Asia.
79. The outcome will be achieved by strengthening the capacity of governments, government ministries and agencies, private sector and civil society organisation in the following areas:
1. Skills and systems for integrated, participatory planning and budgeting climate compatible development.
2. Tools for climate compatible planning and development.
3. Innovative approaches to climate compatible development.
4. Access to finance for climate compatible investments.
80. Basic premise . The basic premise underlying the theory of change is that, in order to transform the ways governments in South Asia plan and implement climate change and disaster reduction programmes and serve as a foundation for climate compatible development in the region it is necessary to (i) build the skills of policy makers and planners to plan and implement climate change programmes through training, tools and new approaches, and (ii) create political space for changing ways of working and (iii) improve access to national and international finance for climate change.
81. What wrong now?
Currently governments in South Asia (i) plan and implement climate change programmes in a fragmented and uncoordinated way, (ii) do not take the views of civil society, the private sector and affected communities sufficiently into account; (iii) do not recognise that climate change is a complex policy issue which needs an unconventional (multi-sectoral, inter-disciplinary, deliberative) approach; (iv) lack the tools and evidence to make informed judgements about which interventions will most effectively deliver climate compatible development; and (v) do not make good use of available sources (international and national) of investment finance.
82. What will programme do?
Provide flexible and responsive funds to support governments and other stakeholders to:
83. Transform their systems of planning and delivery 120,121 by getting the right institutional architecture in place to build political leadership 122 for longer term planning, incentivising new ways of working to support convergence, linking planning and budgetary framework to drive resource allocation for plans 123 , link national and sub- national policy priority through bottom up planning process 124,125 , developing analytical and decision support tools and a system, along with strong systems for transparency and accountability and feeds back into the planning process and enable rapid learning - resulting in increasing resilience of people, protecting investments and infrastructure, reduce economic damage, reducing the numbers of lives lost and ensuring sustainable poverty reduction. The expected benefits also include avoided policy conflicts and greater

efficiency compared with managing climate change separately.
84. Build Knowledge and capacity 126 of political leaders, governments, practitioners and investors by capturing and sharing lessons on how to plan and deliver for climate change, creating robust set of options to consider as strategies and approaches to strengthen climate resilience and low carbon development and promote networking and knowledge exchange between a wide range of actors, including existing knowledge networks – resulting in ensuring political engagement and strong leadership for establishing favourable policies and programmes, funding prioritisation over long time scales, pro-active policies for private sector investment; leveraging of existing technical support programmes on climate change; and curriculum development for relevant professional academic and training programmes and preparing communities to adapt to climate change,
85. Technical support to help governments and communities design and deliver climate resilience and low carbon measures by testing new approaches in practice and generating evidence 127 for design of specific policy instruments, develop and test innovative approaches to address delivery challenges with focus on accountability & learning - resulting in improving the quality and impact of resilience plans and interventions, secure domestic & private sector funding, shape political goals and capture knowledge of what works. The delivery process will seek to develop architecture for future climate financing that is transparent and accountable.
86. Leverage 128 and shape investments for climate compatible development by developing mechanisms 129 for leveraging Climate (domestic and International) finance 130 and private sector investments that offer value for money, catalytic, with good potential for replication and scalability and incentivise action and investment by government and private sector 131 and developing proposals to access climate funds (domestic &
International) – resulting in raising budgetary allocation, prioritisation of sectoral resources for addressing climate change, increasing private sector investment and leveraging larger financial flows (domestic and international) in the sector exposed to climate risks than the amount available for financing adaptation and mitigation separately.
The activities to be undertaken to achieve the outputs are shown in Figure 4 (p.26).
87. Assumptions.
The main assumptions in moving along the results chain are as follows:
From activities to outputs: (i) planners and officials from key departments and agencies at national and sub-national levels willing to participate in professional development programmes; (ii) ministers and senior officials willing and able to develop, trial and introduce systems of planning and budgeting appropriate for climate compatible development; and (iii) Innovative technical, organisational and financial approaches and mechanisms that meet the needs of public, private sector and civil society organisations can be identified.
From outputs to outcome: (i) decision-makers willing and able to adopt and use new systems for planning and budgeting; (ii) decision-makers and other key stakeholders trained in the use of ‘best practice’ tools and evidence and willing and able to use them;
(iii) strong commitment and political will to integrate climate change into policy frameworks, strategies and programmes; (iv) capacity building is followed up by action;

(v) public, private sector and civil society organisations willing and able to adopt innovations and scale-up.
From outcome to impact: beyond the end of the project: (i) governments and development partners continue to prioritise climate compatible development; (ii) public and private finance continues to be available to finance delivery and scaling-up of green growth and climate resilience investments; and (iii) macro-economic and political stability does not adversely impact on delivery of programmes.
88. The design mission visited Bangladesh, India and Pakistan and discussed the proposed programme with a wide range of stakeholders. It also discussed it with DFID advisers from Afghanistan and Nepal. These conversations indicate there is strong interest in the programme and the assumptions are reasonable, even though the programme is rated as medium risk (see Section 5D, below). The main risks relate to the political economy of policy-making in government.
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
89. Unified comparison of Option 1 and 4.
In this section a detailed unified cost-benefit analysis of the preferred option – Option 4(a new regional programme) with Option 1 (do nothing).
90. Costs.
The costs of the 5 year programme (20132017) will be £28.50 million (Table 4).
A detailed costing is given in the Financial Case, below.
Table 4: Programme Costs
Budget Head
Output 1: Skills and systems
Total
£ m
7.74
Output 2: Tools for decision-makers
Output 3: Innovative approaches
Output 4: Access to finance
Regional Technical Assistance Support Team & National
Implementing Partners
Monitoring and evaluation
Total
5.06
7.71
4.72
2.43
0.85
28.50
91. Benefits . The benefits of the programme would be as Follows:
Output level: improvements in (i) the skills of government policy makers and planners; (ii) the types of initiatives to be implemented; and (iii) the availability of international and national funds for investing in climate compatible development.
These would result in:
Outcome level: (i) climate integrated development plans and budgets in 4 out of 5
South Asian countries; (ii) all 5 countries in South Asia accept international climate

financing and using it effectively to tackle climate change; and (iii) £1 billion of extra finance committed to climate compatible development.
Which, in turn, would result in:
Impact level: (i) more poor people with climate resilient livelihoods and economic opportunities through green growth, and (ii) reduced carbon emissions.
Economic Appraisal
92. Economic analysis . This analysis uses four models that can be broadly categorized into two approaches:
1. Top-down models estimates the impact CPGD will need to have on:
A. Disaster costs
B. Adaptation expenditures
C. Adaptation costs in order for the benefits of the programme from any one of these three areas to pay for programme costs. These three analyses are complementary and the results are not additive (i.e., the benefits from reduced adapatation costs cannot and are not added to disaster costs)
2. A bottom-up model estimates the impact CPGD will need to have on:
D. the quantum of additional investment by governments, the private sector, and civil society, which CPGD would have to leverage in order to yield sufficient net benefits that pay for programme costs.
93. Models B and D most relevant.
Given the nature of the programme, models B and D are most relevant as they focus on improved returns to climate change investment and additional climate change investments leveraged, areas which CPGD will be directly involved in.
A. Costs of climate related disasters in South Asia to 2050
94. This model builds on the EM-DAT database, which is hosted by the University of Louvain and supported by USAID. The database has been maintained since 1988 by the WHO
Collaborating Centre for Research in the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and compiles information on the occurrence and effects of various types of disasters. For the purpose of this model, climate related disasters in the five target countries (Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan) from 1991 to 2010 were considered. All values were standardised to 2012 US$ figures.
95. A general increasing trend in annual damage due to disasters is visible. The increase in damage has been approximately 1.1% per year, since 1991, though major events highly skew specific annual amounts. A linear model was also considered, but an exponential one is more logical and consistent with longer-term trends.
96. In order to project values for the future, the average damage cost for the last 20 years was taken as the base for 2010 (the last year for which data are available), and values were estimated for 2011-2050. The damages from the start of the program in 2013 to
2050 were estimated to have an NPV of £29.2 billion at a discount rate of 10% (£69.2bn at 3.5%).
97. The ADB and World Bank predict significant increases in costs of disasters in South Asia,

due to climate change, but there are few quantitative estimates. In view of this, three models with different estimates of increases in disaster damage costs due to climate change were tested (Table 5):
Table 5: Scenarios for the cost of disaster damage
(% improvement in cost-effectiveness)
% increase in Disaster Damage Costs Description
No Climate Change
(base scenario)
1.1% per year from 2013 to 2050
1.1% per year from 2013 to 2020
Low Climate Change
2.2% from 2021 to 2050
1.1% per year from 2013 to 2020
Medium Climate
Change
2.2% from 2021 to 2030
5% from 2031 to 2050
High Climate Change
Discount
Rate
1.1% per year from 2013 to 2020
5% from 2021 to 2050
98. Sensitivity analysis was conducted for discount rates of 3.5% and 10% (Table 6).
Table 6: Reduction in disaster damage cost required to justify investing in programme
(% reduction in cost of disaster damage)
Climate Change
Low Medium High
3.5% 0.27% 0.11% 0.06%
10.0% 1.06% 0.52% 0.24%
99. In the medium climate change scenario, if CPGD reduces additional disaster damage costs by 0.52% (10% discount rate) or 0.11% (3.5% discount rate), the benefits of the programme will outweigh its costs. Under the most conservative scenario with low climate change and 10% discount rate, a disaster damage cost reduction of 1.06% would be required for the programme to pay for itself.
100. It is unlikely that CPGD will effect a 1.06% decrease in the cost of disaster damages.
However, the other three areas explored in the economic analysis will also see change.
B. Improvements in adaptation expenditure
101. CPGD can be expected to improve the returns to adaptation expenditure in South Asia.
The minimum improvement in adaptation expenditure as a result of the programme that would be required to justify the programme was calculated using a range of assumptions.
102. The total annual costs of adaptation for all sectors in South Asia has been estimated at between £8 and £12 billion per year 132 . Given the high degree of uncertainty in these calculations (especially because they represent estimated rather than actual expenditure), the analysis also considered the possibility of a lower (£4 million) and

higher (£16 million) annual expenditure. The analysis then used the conservative assumption that CPGD would only influence adaptation policy and expenditure for a ten year period from year 3 (2014/15) to 12 (2024/25). Policy and expenditure before (i.e. during the inception phase) and after that period is assumed to be uninfluenced.
103. The model answers the question: what is the minimum improvement in the costeffectiveness of adaptation expenditure that would be required over this ten-year period as a result of CPGD to justify the programme? Sensitivity tests were conducted for discount rates of 10% and 3.5%.
Table 7: Improvement in cost-effectiveness of adaptation expenditure required to justify investing in programme
(% improvement in cost-effectiveness)
Annual Adaptation Expenditure
£4bn £8bn £12bn £16bn
3.5% 0.063% 0.032% 0.021% 0.016%
Discount
Rate
10.0% 0.071% 0.035% 0.024% 0.018%
104. In other words, as long as CPGD results in a 0.071% improvement in the costeffectiveness of £4 billion of adaptation expenditure in South Asia (at a 10% discount rate) or 0.063% at 3.5%, the programme is justified. This is the most conservative tested scenario.
105. This seems plausible since the programme aims directly to address public expenditure on climate change in a comprehensive manner. For example, among the proposed activities are “climate public expenditure reviews”, which can be reasonably expected to impact the cost-effectiveness of expenditure. Additionally, CPGD will work with several partner governments in providing technical expertise to planners, which is likely to lead to more cost-effective spending on climate change.
C. Reduced adaptation costs
106. The IFPRI report (2009) on the climate change impact on agriculture and adaptation contained estimates for the production of rice, wheat, maize, millet and sorghum to
2050 for South Asia using two climate projections: the National Centre for Atmospheric
Research (NCAR) and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation (CSIRO). An average of these models was used to calculate ‘with’ and
‘without’ climate change estimates for South Asia.
107. The difference between the with and without climate change gives a net present value
(NPV) at a 10% discount rate of £85 billion (or £245 billion at a 3.5% discount rate). This is the estimated cost of CC in South Asia with no additional adaptation expenditure
108. The NPV of the costs of CPGD equals £ 21 million. CPGD would need to reduce the estimated costs of climate change in South Asia to 2050 by 0.020% in order to justify the cost of the programme using a 10% discount rate (or 0.009% at a 3.5% discount rate).

D. Additional Investment in Adaptation and Mitigation required
109. CPGD will seek to leverage additional investment in climate change adaptation and mitigation by governments, the private sector, and civil society. This model provides an estimate of the additional investment (in £m) required to justify CPGD costs. The following assumptions are made:

The rate of return assumed for adaptation and mitigation projects (20% and 10% respectively) is based on reviews of IRRs estimates for similar projects in the region.

Sensitivity analyses are carried out for: (i) the rate of return (+/- 5% for both adaptation and mitigation projects); (ii) the discount rate (3.5% and 10%); and (iii) the duration of benefits from the additional investment.

The mix of adaptation and mitigation projects is assumed to be 85:15 (based on the expected programme mix of 75:25 for India, 90:10 for Bangladesh and Pakistan, and
100:0 for Afghanistan and Nepal).
110. A review of 22 climate change adaptation projects, conducted by the design team, shows that the estimated internal rate of return (IRR) for such projects ranges from 10%
(for an IFAD Community Development programme in Pakistan) to 34% (an IFAD agricultural technology enhancement programme in Bangladesh). The mean IRR for the 22 projects is 21% and the median is 20%. For this model, we use 20% as a base adaptation IRR. Although these are exante estimates, they are based on IFAD’s long experience of implementing and evaluating projects of this kind in the region.
111. Because of the long-term nature of mitigation projects, IRRs are difficult to estimate. A
GTZ project on generating electricity from biogas in Bangladesh finds an IRR of 20%. A number of mitigation strategies piloted in DFID’s Madhya Pradesh Rural Livelihoods
Programme (MPRLP) are estimated as having benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) ranging from
0.96 to 2.85 over a 10 year period. McKinsey’s extensive review of mitigation approaches finds that a combination of strategies to improve energy efficiency in the industrial, residential, commercial and transport sectors would have an IRR of 17%. In this model, we use a very conservative estimate of 10% as a base mitigation IRR.
112. The following two assumptions are made in running the model:

A one-time additional investment is made by regional governments, the private sector, and civil society in Year 5 of the programme (85% of this is for adaptation interventions and 15% for mitigation efforts).

The benefits from this additional investment yield returns for 10 years.
113. Building on these assumptions, sensitivity tests are performed for discount rate and for
IRRs. The following three IRR conditions are tested (Table 8):

Table 8: Internal rates of return for adaptation and mitigation investments
Description IRRs
Low
Medium
15% for adaptation, 5% for mitigation
20% for adaptation, 10% for mitigation
High 25% for adaptation, 15% for mitigation
114. The investment needed at the given IRRs to achieve for returns sufficient to cover
CPGD costs are given in Table 9. For the Medium IRR case, and a discount rate of 10% an additional investment of £ 25 million in Year 5 will generate sufficient returns to pay for CPGD.
Table 9: Amount of Additional Investment Required in Year 5 for Benefits to pay for programme
(10-year benefits from investment - £ million)
IRR
Low Medium High
3.5% 23 17 13
Discount
Rate
10.0% 34 25 20
115. Under the most conservative assumptions, that (i) benefits from the additional investment last for only 5 years, (ii) a discount rate of 10%, and (ii) low IRRs, an additional investment of £ 55 million in Year 5 would be sufficient to cover programme costs. It is highly likely that this amount will be leveraged successfully by CPGD (Table
10).
Table 10: Additional Investment required in Year 5 for benefits to pay for CPGD
(5-year benefits from investment - £ million)
IRR
Low Medium High
3.5% 41 30 24
Discount
Rate
10.0% 55 40 32
116. It is worth noting that models B and D, which analyse areas to be directly influenced by
CPGD, are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In other words, their impact is likely to be additive. Leveraged investments made (analysed in D) will be spent in a cost-effective manner (model B). In this scenario, the actual impact of the programme for CPGD to pay for itself would need to be less than the most conservative estimates of both models.
117. Therefore the net benefits and the quantum of additional investments by governments, private sector and civil society leveraged by the programme will pay for programme costs.

Political and Institutional Appraisal
118. Main institutional problems . Option 4 (a new regional programme) responds to the main institutional problems that prevent an integrated approach to climate change planning and investment, in public and private sectors, in South Asia. These are:
 weak convergence between climate change and development policies (e.g., in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, water, energy, industry and transport sectors), which are driven by separate funding streams and different ministerial priorities;
 public policy-making on climate takes insufficient account of uncertainty – climate change is not a ‘business as usual’ policy issue;
 policy makers and planners do lack the knowledge and skills needed to plan and implement integrated programmes on climate change;

South Asia lacks applied research centres to foster learning and critical analysis on key policy questions;

Insufficient funding public and private sector to tackle the scale of the problem.

South Asia lacks frameworks for regional dialogue, sharing and learning on climate change and other key issues.
119. Weak convergence between climate change and development policies: Despite a consensus that governments and development partners need to work in an integrated way towards climate compatible development, this consensus has not yet been reflected in the policy, practice or research priorities of governments and other development actors 133 .
120. Problems in convergence . The problems governments face in ‘converging’ the programmes of different ministries and agencies to address climate resilience and lowcarbon growth, in a comprehensive way, is common to all countries in the region. One of the main problems to building climate resilient approaches is their fragmentation within specially created climate change programmes, rather than mainstreaming climate risk management into the main social and economic development frameworks. Different ministries are responsible for development and for climate change, making it even more difficult to ensure a more integrated approach to delivery. High-level coordination (e.g., from the Prime Minister’s Office, Planning Commission or Finance Ministry) is an essential first step towards convergence. This exists in India but not in other South
Asian countries, where responsibility is generally vested in ministries of environment, which are mosly weak and unable to move beyond formulating climate change strategies and policy frameworks.
121. Sectoral approach results in stand-alone projects. . A largely impacts-driven 134 and sectoral approach is being taken for to plan and implement climate change interventions in South Asia (as elsewhere in the world). This approach results in stand-alone interventions such as dams, flood embankments, early-warning systems, seeds and irrigation schem es; or ‘climate proofing’ of development investments in which projections of climate change are considered in the decision-making of relevant government departments and agencies, so that technologies are chosen that are suitable for a possible future climate challenges. This is partly due to the way climate

challenges are diagnosed and the ways climate finance is made available.
122. Climate change funding promotes fragmentation . Climate change funding promotes fragmentation of response as the financing requires the creation of new climate changespecific programmes and institutional structures 135 . These funds reward “climateproofing” of additional investments rather than mainstreaming climate risk management into social and economic development frameworks. There are high risks of maladaptation with investments wasted on inappropriate development interventions that could possibly lead to irreversible harm to livelihoods and ecosystems.
136
123. Lack of coherence in policies and plans . From the development side, responding to climate change has led to some re-targeting of development strategies on the most vulnerable (e.g., the Bangladesh CCSAP addresses both the impacts of climate change on agriculture and food security, but also examines the role of food security and social protection in building resilience to climate change) but has not resulted more coherence in overall policies and plans.
137 In other countries in the region there is a disconnect between national development plans and climate change strategies. Pakistan, for example in early 2012 produced a Framework for Economic Growth, with little focus on climate change, as also happened in Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy
(2009).
124. A fragmented and projectised approach will not lead to climate resilient development.
Interventions in one sector can undermine developments in another. For example: agricultural policies supporting irrigation can lead to unsustainable use of groundwater supplies (as in parts of India) and flood control embankment and drainage schemes can adversely affect flood plain capture fisheries, on which vulnerable people depend for their livelihoods, as has happened in Bangladesh. Using a geographically focused approach, however, can help to bring different sectoral interventions together and make apparent possible trade-offs and opportunities for convergence. This has happened under the ADB implenmented Pilot Programme one Climate Resilience (PPCR) in
Bangladesh, where three major investments (in roads, coastal embanments and agricultural development) have been coordinated in parts of the coastal zone.
Aggregation of efforts and mainstreaming is needed to achieve this outcome. There is a need to challenge/rethink development in light of climate change.
125. Good development practice essential in responding to climate change . In order to achieve climate compatible development, good development practice has to be central to the delivery of climate change programmes 138 . It is as important to mainstream climate resilience into public policy for social and economic development as it is to bring proven good development practice into delivery of climate change programmes. This requires an integrated approach to policy making and planning. Only in this way can inclusive development be kept on track irrespective of climate change challenges. The artificial distinction made between adaptation and development in political and negotiating arenas must be put aside and investments made in climate compatible development .
139
126. Option 4 encourages integrated planning . explicitly sets out to encourage governments in the region to encourage coherent, integrated and inclusive approaches to planning, in which (i) climate change is mainstreamed into national development plans and budgets (a
‘whole of government approach’); (ii) best development practice is

used in implementing climate change; and (ii) key ministries and agencies (at national and sub-national levels) work together to prioritise investments, develop action plans and implement integrated and inclusive programmes;
127. The wrong approaches to public policy-making in a context of uncertainty: Due to uncertainty and complexity, policy makers find it difficult to define problems or solutions in the context of climate change. It is difficult to assess the extent of climate change in the region, the nature of climate change impacts, and hence, the appropriate policy solutions. In countries, where climate change investments are being implemented, it is difficult to assess progress as the ever evolving nature of the problem forces policy makers to focus on a moving target. Policy, which should be about risk management and understanding uncertainty, remains stuck in a highly linear causal framework that cannot predict and deal with the uncertainty caused by climate change 140 . Similarly the translation of scientific evidence into terms policy makers can understand remains a challenge.
141 Risk assessments are conducted by ‘expert’ institutions that attempt to isolate climate trends from other potential influences on medium and long term development, to inform climate-proofing strategies, rather than adopting the holistic, systems-thinking perspective necessary to judge how best to respond to a complex and uncertain policy problem.
128. Linear approaches to policy making . This framing of climate risk has resulted in policy frameworks that adopt conventional ‘linear’ approaches to policy making that are the norm when dealing with ‘scientific’ or ‘technical’ problems (problem framingevidence generation-solution), as was highlighted in the Strategic Case.
142 This approach does not deal with uncertainty or multiple drivers of vulnerability for the poor.
The uncertainty and complexities of the interactions between climate change, development and vulnerability mean scientific approaches to evidence generation only poorly define the problem. It can result in: (i) potential mal-adaptation; (ii) fragmented approaches - where different drivers are not acknowledged and responses are not holistic; (iii) a focus on the ‘scientific’ basis to problem solving; (iv) insufficient innovation to catalyse required behaviour change; and (v) poor adaptability and flexibility in policy responses. It is often thought that the more complex the problem is, the more important it is to follow this orderly flow.
143 Under climate change, a linear model would involve identifying the climate change risk; generating evidence about that risk, requiring scientific climate change expertise to identify and quantify the existing or predicted impacts of climate change; and then designing interventions to specifically target those impacts.
144 Evidence from other areas of public-policy making indicate that such linear pathways of decision-making are not suited to dealing with complex problems with high levels of uncertainty.
145
129. Uncertainty and gaps in knowledge . Relying on a linear model of decision-making ignores uncertainties and the gaps that exist in climate expertise. Overstating the value of science undermines the potential contributions of other non-scientific sources of information such as ‘lay’ knowledge which can be extremely important in informing accurate assessments of risks and solutions. Greater attention to lay knowledge can improve decision-making and outcomes, and can often address the uncertainties that the 'science' missed.
130. Option 4 addresses uncertainty by encouraging governments to work with multistakeholder forums and collaboration among experts from a wide range of disciplines.

131. Skills and understanding of policy makers and planners. Policy makers formulating climate compatible development strategies have no choice but to make policy and investment decisions, in the face of uncertainty about (i) the predicted timing and severity of climate change in the region; (ii) the impacts of climate change and the complex interactions (biophysical, social and economic), which will determine these; (iii) the specific impacts on climate-vulnerable poor people; (iv) the opportunities, which climate change could bring for more sustainable low-carbon growth. However, there is much that could be done to help them understand these uncertainties and complexities better and to equip them with the tools and approaches to help them make decisions in the context of uncertainty and complexity (e.g., scenario planning, vulnerability analysis, risk assessment techniques, monitoring and feedback). Currently, very few decisionmakers in national government ministries or implementing agencies have been trained systematically in climate compatible development planning.
132. Option 4 focuses on professional development (a structured programme of training and mentoring) of key decision-makers and planners from 14 national and sub-national governments in evidence-based planning and delivery and the use of these decisionmaking techniques and skills. The programme will include training, coaching and mentoring on how to apply and interpret information generated by climate models to decisions faced by planners and decision-makers in the region.
133. South Asia lacks applied research and policy organisations to foster learning and critical analysis on key policy issues on integrated climate compatible development.
With the possible exception of India, South Asian countries lack organisations that take an integrated, inter-disciplinary approach to climate planning and policy analysis, founded on a sound understanding of the uncertainties associated with climate science and impacts on climate vulnerable people. Some organisations focus on aspects of the problem (e.g., engineering and agricultural research organisations) but policy makers lack national centres able to take an integrated approach to climate compatible development. Some international organisations (e.g., IUCN, CKDN, IIED) are supporting emerging national research organisations in some countries, but as yet effective and autonomous national centres do not exist.
134. Option 4 will involve developing partnerships with national hubs in each country to implement the programme. These will be organisations with extensive experience of working with government on climate change and sustainable development. In some cases they could be national organisations linked to international organisations with an environment or development mandate. CPGD will build the capacity of these organisations and strengthen the institutions or experts that the hubs work in partnership with, though involvement in the programme.
135. Insufficient funding to tackle scale of problem. To be effective in implementing national and sub-national climate change action plans, approaches and interventions need to be designed and delivered at significant scale. Evidence from recent evaluations of adaptation funds indicates there are currently insufficient financial resources to implement the scale of measures necessary across all countries in the
South Asian region, except for Bangladesh.
146 CPGD (Option 3) will explicitly address the issue by (i) supporting governments to design investment-ready proposals for intervention, (ii) catalysing innovative financing mechanisms and investments involving

the private sector, and (iii) ensuring climate change is fully integrated into government development budgets at national and sub-national levels. It is expected that the initial
DFID investment will leverage £1 billion in other government, donor and private sector funds (both nationally and internationally).
136. The need for a regional approach. It is increasingly recognised in South Asia that climate change impacts and ecosystems cut across national boundaries, and that there is an acute need to adapt and develop regional approaches/strategies to respond to common climate change related challenges. For example Afghanistan, India, Nepal and
Pakistan face problems related to climate change impacts mountain ecosystems and communities; Bangladesh, India and Pakistan on problems of sea level rise and river flooding; and Afghanistan, India and Pakistan on semi-arid ecosystems This has led not only to the definition of joint and articulated positions on climate change such as the
Thimpu statement on Climate Change, SAARC Agriculture perspective 2020 but also of the recognition of the need for regional cooperation by resolving to commission intergovernmental initiatives on mountain ecosystems, monsoon and rapid response to disaster risk reduction
137. However, it has proved difficult, in the past, to build cooperative relationships based on learning and innovation, due to lack of cooperation and trust among the countries in the region (because of political tensions and perceived or actual power inequalities) and the variable institutional capacities in the countries in the region. While some regional networks/organizations such as SAARC and CANSA exist, their mandate is on joint action rather than cross country learning and are not founded on building trust between individuals through joint identification of problems and issues and processes through which to build an evidence base for deliberation and choice.
138. Option 4 responds to these issues by providing (i) international expertise, which would be difficult for individual national programmes and (ii) forums and other opportunities for cross-learning and sharing of experience among countries in the region. An annual partners’ forum will be organised in each country to ensure cross-learning and there will also be a regional forum, for national implementing partners and experts, which will be hosted in a different country each year, to which Ministers and senior representatives of partner governments and organisations will be invited. Global experts on climate compatible development will participate in the annual regional forums.
139. Responsive to the country political context: Successful delivery of CPGD will require a thorough and practical understanding of politics and political economy and of the complex relationships between ministries and between central and local government levels, which play out differently in each country. The types of institutional and policy response will vary according to the political context, the level and effectiveness of civil society and the political space available for dialogue and deliberation. The national implementing partners and experts will be tasked with analysing and understanding the barriers to policy change and will identify and work with ‘champions of change’ in government and wide society able to influence decision-makers.
Social appraisal
140. Who will benefit? Because climate change amplifies and multiplies existing determinants of vulnerability it will affect the poorest and marginalized worse and first;

both because of their high dependency on climate-sensitive resources; and their lack of access to material, social, political and economic resources that would enable them to adapt to climate change impacts. Effective climate change response will therefore need to address the development deficit that drives vulnerability as well as address the impacts of climate change.
In order to respond to existing gaps in policy formulation, skills of government officials and planners from key departments, ministers in addition to private sector and civil society representatives will be strengthened. Experts will be supported which will help in integrating climate change into planning processes and policy formulation in South
Asian countries.
141. Focus on most vulnerable people and regions . CPGD will encourage governments to focus their actions on the geographical areas where high concentrations of climate vulnerable poor people live in regions that are vulnerable to climate change and who have low adaptive capacity 147 . Selection of states will be based on the nature of climate and disaster risks and exposure to date, numbers of climate vulnerable poor, sensitivity of economic growth and development to climate risks, planning approaches and current capabilities. This includes communities dependent on rainfed agriculture and livestock herding in arid and semi-arid regions of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan; those living in inland and coastal areas subject to flooding (e.g., in Bangladesh and parts of India,
Nepal and Pakistan) and moitain communities in the Himalayas and Hindu Kush mountains.
142. Vulnerability is further exacerbated by social marginalisation caused by gender, caste, ethnicity and other factors. Gender inequality interacts with other forms of social exclusion to underpin and drive inequality and poverty.
148 For women, climate change can amplify existing inequalities, reinforcing the disparity between women and men in their vulnerability to climate change and their capability to cope with it, as a result women and children are exposed to higher levels of climate vulnerability 149 . The programme will ensure that structural barriers to learning excluding women and elderly are addressed. It will further develop understanding of the structural linkages between poverty and climate vulnerability, as the basis for building more robust and systematic approaches to climate resilient and compatible development.
143. Multiple dimensions of vulnerability require integrated policy response.
Climate resilience is brought about through the management and interaction of economic, social and ecological systems, and will not be achieved by stand-alone or single sector approaches. The climate vulnerable poor lack resilience for many reasons that are both significant in their own right and additive. This is why just working through, for example, adaptation strategies for agriculture is unlikely to increase the climate resilience of smallholder farmers and agricultural workers cultivating marginal lands. Climate resilience is more likely to be achieved for all climate vulnerable stakeholder groups through improvements to food, water, energy securities, better wellbeing and social protection and more informed and participative local governance. CPGD will support the construction of integrative policy frameworks that address the structural causes of poverty and climate vulnerability where climate resilience as an objective of public policy is mainstreamed across all key sectors 150 . It will also work to promote green growth employment opportunities for poor people on rural and urban areas.

144. Lack of effective voice . One of the major barriers facing the climate vulnerable poor is their lack of effective voice and influence over policy and delivery processes that affect their livelihood choices. Strong asymmetrical distributions of power, wealth, access and knowledge lead to highly one-sided processes of bargaining and challenge and are central to shaping how rights and resources are to be distributed and the political action that determines policy outcomes.
151 CPGD will encourage governments to establish multi-stakeholder forums, at all levels, where civil society and climate vulnerable poor people’s voices can be heard and they can participate in decision-making 152 . Across
South Asia women’s capacity to engage and be listened to in participatory processes is affected by continued cultural inequalities and it is important that the barriers limiting women’s meaningful public engagement are taken into account.
145. Voice in multi-stakeholder forums . CPGD with support building capacities of decision makers and experts which will include organisations with extensive experience of working with government on climate change and sustainable development. However, it remains a risk that the voices of the climate vulnerable poor will have less effect in multi-stakeholder forums than those of elite groups.
Environmental appraisal
146. The South Asian region is highly vulnerable to natural disasters and is already experiencing the effects of climate change, which especially impacts on marginalised and vulnerable people. CPGD will directly address issues of the fragmented climate change and development policy response and seeks both to improve the climate resilience of poor people and support governments to embark on low carbon growth trajectories. CPGD will seek to influence and change national policy outcomes and financial allocations to climate compatible development and build cross-country links among the countries of South Asia. Most of the activities to be financed under CPGD are environmentally benign or will result in enhanced environmental benefits. However, some programme activities (e.g., innovation testing), which may involve economic empowerment (e.g., agriculture, enterprise development) may have some negative impacts, which will need to be monitored and managed.
E. VALUE FOR MONEY
147. Value for Money measures . CPGD will focus its resources on national and subnational governments and regions where the impacts of climate change are likely to be most severe and where there is the greatest scope for delivering against programme outputs and outcomes most cost-effectively. CPGD will track the following measures to ensure and monitor value for money:
Monitor: Responsibility
Economy Unit costs benchmarked against national and regional norms, including:

Regional- Technical Assistance Support Team
(R-TAST) and National Implementing Partner
(NIP) Costs: Staff and operating costs of the R-
TAST & NIP including travel expenses,
R-TAST/ NIP accommodation and equipment cost

Efficiency
Effectiveness

Implementing the programme in each country;
 Contractors costs: All contractors’ and/or collaborators’ staff and operating costs paid for by the R-TAST & National Implementing
Partners

Workshop costs: All professional development programmes and workshops undertaken under
CPGD

Proportion of outputs delivered to schedule including inception report and six monthly progress report

Proportion of outputs (including tools, innovative technical, financial and organisational approaches) rated as outstanding or good by stakeholders

The unit cost of producing a professionally competent planner (i.e., (i) a planner who has completed the professional development course with accreditation and (ii) trained and mentored in use of a portfolio of appropriate ‘good practice’ tools and evidence for climate change decision-making each year).

Ratio of the cost of producing and disseminating new planning and decision-making tools and the number of countries adopting and using each tool.

Ratio of the cost of producing and disseminating innovative approaches and the number of countries adopting and using each approach.

Unit cost of producing knowledge sharing mechanisms to review results of climate compatible planning between national and subnational governments

Unit cost of producing innovative technical, organisational and financial approaches to planning and implementation

Unit cost of administration and management by management agent/consultancy firm

Unit cost of setting up and running the R-TAST
& National Implementing Partners
 Amount (£ million) of new public and private investment in climate change initiatives and climate compatible development directly
R-TAST and
Independent evaluations
R-TAST and
Independent evaluations

attributable to influence by CPGD .

Ratio of (i) the extent of policy changes in each country (endline compared to baseline) to which
CPGD has directly contributed and (ii) the cost of the CPGD programme in each country.

The ratio of (i) the number of countries in South
Asia accepting and effectively using international climate finance and (ii) the cost of delivering Output 4 in the logframe (improved access to finance).

Effectiveness of R-TAST & National
Implementing Partners in being influential in policy formulation – measured by outcome mapping to assess degree of influence at regional, national and sub-national level

Value added by innovative approaches measured by ratio of funds leveraged for approach proved for scaling up and replicated by governments in South Asia compared to input cost
148. Summary value for money statement for the preferred option . Option 4 will represent exceptional value for money if CPGD succeeds in influencing even a small part of compatible development policy and practice (adaptation and mitigation) in the region. The cost-benefit analysis indicates that the programme would have to achieve one of the following to justify the investment. Both of these are considered to be achievable by the programme.

Improve the costeffectiveness of the expected £8bn to £12bn annual expenditure on adaptation in South Asia by less than 1/10th of one per cent;

Result in extra climate change adaptation or mitigation expenditure by governments or international investors of £17 to £55 million during the life of the project.

A. DIRECT PROCUREMENT
PROCUREMENT/COMMERCIAL REQUIREMENTS
149. Over the course of the intervention, DFID will directly procure services to:
I. Select a Supplier (regional hub institution) under a services contract that will act as a Regional Technical Assistance Support Team (R-TAST) for the programme;
II. Select National Implementation Partners (NIPs) in each of the 5 countries to implement the programme;
III. Deliver strategic and innovative technical expertise and analysis, or take advantage of opportunities as they arise through a Strategic Innovation Fund
(SIF). This is also likely to involve working with civil society groups in the South
Asia region;
IV. Provide independent Monitoring and Evaluation, financial audit over the lifetime of the programme, and Strategic Communications.
150. The R-TAST will be located in South Asia, and will be required to manage the programme to achieve results and value for money by: sourcing and providing international expertise; building capacity of NIP and other delivery partners; generating policy relevant knowledge and evidence; providing routine monitoring; and facilitating cross learning between the participating countries.
151. The R-TAST will be responsible for supervising, monitoring and managing the work of the NIPs, and will report progress to DFID directly. The NIPs will be located in each of the participating countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan), and will be responsible for delivery. NIPs may also sub-contract work activities, and will be responsible for managing these activities.
152. DFID will select and contract the R-TAST and the National Implementing Partners
(NIPs) in each of the participating countries through a competitive tender. DFID will directly manage the Strategic Innovation Fund, and will consider a mix of instruments including Accountable Grants, MoUs with delivery partners, and contracts for technical services. DFID will also directly manage the Evaluation work.
153. Where DFID undertakes direct commercial procurement, it will do so in accordance with
DFID’s Procurement guidelines, acting in close collaboration with or through PRG as needed. This is likely to be undertaken the Official Journal of European Union (OJEU
–
EC directives on public procurement) procedures.
DELIVERY OPTIONS:
154. A main delivery risk is non-performance of the R-TAST and of the NIPs, and ensuring coordination across the programme. The main advantages of the preferred option are that it allows DFID to assure itself of sourcing the most relevant expertise. The flexibility of separate supplier contracts is that DFID can deal contractually with non-performance

of any one supplier separately without affecting overall programme delivery. Also, the strategic and supervisory role of the R-TAST will help to mitigate this risk. The R-TAST model will help to ensure a coordinated regional approach, ensure flexibility and responsiveness, and maximise opportunities for regional cross-learning. The disadvantages are that the initial procurement processes will have transaction costs for
DFID. The R-TAST will not have accountability for overall delivery, and DFID will need to ensure that adequate performance and financial safeguards are built into the contracts with the NIPs
155. The design and appraisal team considered other delivery options including:
I. Drawing down on DFID’s existing central framework arrangements to implement: the main advantage is reduced transaction costs and time savings of at least 4 months through procurement. As DFID has already undertaken the necessary procurement processes and value for money diligence checks, we would not be required to go through another competitive OJEU process. The main disadvantages are that this precludes other suppliers who may be better placed to deliver this programme over 5 years, NIPs sourced under this route may not have an established presence in the participating country and may lack key relationships required to engage key stakeholders.
II. Entering into a single contract with the R-TAST who then further sub-contracts the
NIPs: This is a viable option and the main advantages are that this minimises transaction costs of procurement for DFID as the R-TAST would be responsible for sub-contracting and undertaking due diligence checks for the NIPs, with DFID participating in processes as required. The R-TAST would also be held accountable for the delivery of the whole programme, including the performance of the NIPs. The disadvantage is that this may be a bit of a stretch for the R-TAST as they may not have the capacity to strategize, implement and monitor across all
5 countries. Also, if DFID decides to terminate the services of the R-TAST due to non-performance, this will have knock-on implications for all of the NIPs and the programme as a whole.
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial advantage for DFID?
156. Competitive tendering.
All procurement by the R-TAST and NIPs will be competitive and will seek commercial advantage for DFID. The firms tendering to become the R-
TAST will be required to provide robust methodologies in their proposals, which describe how they will deliver programme outputs and achieve value for money. The
TORs for the assignment will be written in "performance" terms, which focus on the output of the service required and encourage suppliers to propose innovative and workable solutions. To ensure value for money, all contracts will be output-focussed, with payments linked to achievement of agreed outputs / milestones, careful tendering and monitoring of market prices.
157. The R-TAST will be located in the South Asia Region, and most likely to be based in
Delhi. This is due to issues of security, Duty of Care, ease of travel within the region.

To the extent possible, DFID will consider locating the R-TAST within an existing host institution or within the NIP to drive down the establishment and operating costs, and to ensure that regional capacity built during this programme is not lost once UK funding ceases.
158. The NIPs will be expected to meet the following criteria:

Be located in the participating country

Have relevant technical expertise

Proven experience or similar work, relationships and networks

Financial, procurement and management capability
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
159. High interest likely.
The value of the R-TAST services contract will be determined through competitive bidding but we expect it to be between 8% and 10% of total commitment of £28.5 million. We thus expect high levels of interest for this opportunity from both regional and international firms. There are many private sector companies and non-for-profit organisations capable of providing the services required. The balance of the budget (indicatively between 90% and 92%) will be channelled to national implementing partners for delivery and used by the R-TAST to procure international expertise.
160. Opportunity for new partnerships.
This opportunity will provide competition amongst regional and international bidders and provide the opportunity for the formation of new partnerships/ consortia and networks of national and international suppliers.
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value added and how will we measure and improve this?
161. Key cost drivers.
The most important cost drivers are: the overheads and management costs of National Implementing Partner, fee-rates of consultants, travel expenses, accommodation, venue hire and some equipment costs. Benchmarking with other programmes in country, regionally and globally will be undertaken to ensure that unit costs are competitive.
162. Monitoring cost drivers.
Outputs of the contract will be linked to project outputs. DFID will conduct regular reviews of performance and provide feedback. Appropriate safeguards and sanctions to ensure satisfactory performance will be written into the contract. Payments will be linked to agreed deliverables or achievement of contract outputs.
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
163. Competitive OJEU process.
The services of the R-TAST will be procured through a competitive OJEU process. The R-TAST is likely to further run competitive tenders for international climate change experts as members of a pool of ‘pre-qualified’ consultants
(organisations and/or individuals), who can be called on to support planning and delivery of programme activities, as required;
164. All subsequent procurement of goods and services sub-contracted by the R-PMU and the NIPs will be competitive and will follow DFID’s procurement guidelines..

165. DFID will run restricted tenders for the National Implementing Partners in each of the participating countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan) in close consultation with national governments. Following design and appraisal, our judgement is there are limited organisations in each country with the capability and mandate, and that are trusted by government to perform this role. If a UN agency is best placed to play the role of National Implementing Partner in any country, the restricted tender process may not be required.
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life of the intervention?
166. Performance based contract.
DFID will enter into a performance-based contract with the Regional TAST (R-TAST, which will require an Inception Report detailing the delivery strategy for the programme and a work plan linked to expected results and outputs (from the log frame), with measurable indicators, for each output. The suppliers will submit six-monthly reports providing (i) summaries of progress against the work plan deliverables and log frame outputs, and (ii) the workplan and deliverables for the next six months. DFID will hold regular review meetings and interactions with the supplier to ensure satisfactory performance.
167. Monitoring & evaluation.
The R-TAST will play a strategic, supervisory and monitoring role towards the National Implementing Partners, and will report directly to DFID. In order to ensure delivery and value for money, the R-TAST will develop a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework during the Inception Phase. This will ensure the R-TAST takes ownership of key performance indicators and service level agreements, which will be agreed in advance with DFID and partner countries, and will form the basis not only for management of the programme by the supplier but also for performance-based management of the supplier by DFID. Regular trilateral meetings will be held with partners and suppliers, especially in the contracts early stages.
168. During the start-up inception phase, DFID will also consider key incentives to drive performance in delivery partners to deliver outputs to time, accuracy and planned unit costs. For instance, the contract with the R-
TAST and the NIPS will include a ‘break point’) at the mid-term review (Year 3) which will incentivise performance. Third party verification of the achievement of outputs and an independent procurement audit will take place prior to the MTR in Year 3 and at the end of the programme in Year 5 .
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate forecasting?
169. Programme cost.
The UK will make available ICF resources of up to £28.5 million, to finance the full costs of implementing the programme over 5 years (January 2013 to
December 2018). DFID will provide this as 100% grant finance. .
170. DFID will provide this through the following funding mechanisms:

a. Supplier Contract with the Regional TAST Programme Management Unit to deliver the programme (~
£2.5 m); b. Supplier Contracts with each of the individual National Implementing Partners
(India: £12m; Afghanistan:£3m; Bangladesh:£3 m; Nepal: £3 m; Pakistan: £3m) c. Strategic Innovation Fund (£1m), directly managed by DFID. This will include a mix of MoUs with delivery partners, contracts and Accountable Grant with civil society organisations and technical experts for innovative work, or policy relevant analysis. d. Supplier Contracts to provide independent monitoring and evaluation services, and for other strategic communications work (£0.85m)
Budget Head
Table 11- Programme Costs
Year*/ £ millions
Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4
Total %
Yr5
Output 1: Skills and systems
Output 2: Tools for decisionmakers
0.70
0.46
1.70
1.11
1.78
1.16
1.78
1.16
1.78 7.74
1.16 5.06
27.14
17.75
Output 3: Innovative approaches
Output 4: Access to finance
0.69
0.42
1.70
1.04
1.77
1.09
1.77
1.09
1.77
1.09
7.71
4.72
27.04
16.55
Regional Technical Assistance
Support Team & National
Implementing Partners (including
M&E)
0.51 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.44 2.43
8.54
DFID Monitoring and evaluation
Total
0.17
2.95
0.17
6.20
0.17
6.46
0.17
6.48
0.17 0.85
6.41 28.50
2.97
100.00
171. Spending modality. The total programme allocation of £28.5 million will be channelled to the Regional Technical Assistance Support Team (R-TAST) appointed to implement the programme, subject to its performance and fund requirements. The R-TAST will monitor overall progress against its logical framework and build the capacity of sub-contracted
National Consultant/ organisations to report against key performance indicators (KPIs).
172. Disbursement schedule DFID expects to disburse expenditure evenly across the five years of the project as set out in Table 12 below. This budget is based on projected annual activity plans, but will be revisited during the inception start-up phase and during annual reviews. We do not anticipate cost overruns, but there is some risk of the programme running into FY 2018-19 if there are delays in operationalizing the programme across the partner countries, or due to partner capacity constraints. DFID will closely track disbursement rates and future payments will be made on the basis of need, spending performance, and progress.

Source of funding
Table 12: Sources of funding
(£ million, Cash Prices)
Year 1 Year 2 Year Year 4 Year 5 Total %
Programme resource
Programme capital
Technical
Cooperation
TOTAL
-
-
3.00
2.95
-
-
5.80
6.20
-
-
6.10
6.46
-
-
6.45
6.48
-
-
-
-
7.15 28.50
6.41 28.50
-
-
100
100
* Calendar years
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
173.
Funds will be drawn against the Asia Regional Team’s programme resources budget from the ICF. The UK’s funds will be on a 100% grant basis and fully programme funded.
174. Keeping ICAI and NAO guidance in view, the programme has been conceptualised with sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency (financial and results) in mind. The Regional
TAST in consultation with DFID and with partner implementation agencies, will develop a sustainability plan in Year 3 of the programme .
C. How will funds be paid out?
175. How funds will be paid out. DFID will provide funds to the (R-TAST) monthly, in arrears, against invoices supported by financial reports and forecasts.
176. For the Strategic Innovation Fund (SIF), DFID will make payments to civil society organisations through Accountable Grant arrangements or through contracts.
Payments will be made on a reimbursement basis (quarterly or six-monthly) against receipt of a detailed statement of expenditure according to the agreed workplan. An assessment of overall progress and financial spend will be undertaken during annual reviews.
177. Any unused balance from the Grant Account (e.g. resulting from less-than-predicted uptake of the funds) will be returned to HMG at the end of the programme.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
178. Financial risk and fraud have been judged as medium-low. The key risks are around the work sub-contracted and managed by the R-TAST. DFID will manage these risks by undertaking full financial, procurement and management capability assessments of the
R-TAST and the NIPs during the competitive selection process. The R-TAST and NIPs will be assessed against the following criteria: (i) proven experience in managing programme of similar size and complexity; (ii) robust financial and procurement systems that meet DFID’s requirements; and (iii) proven systems to ensure compliance of subcontracted work.

179. The RTAST will be required to follow DFID’s Procurement Guidelines for all the work that it sub-contracts. DFID will also put in place safeguards to minimise the risk of fraud and financial misappropriation
– for instance, by participating in procurement selection processes, undertaking independent financial checks and spot checks to verify progress, and closely reviewing national partner results against their workplans.
180. For the Accountable Grants, managed directly by DFID, standard checks and balances will be undertaken by DFID in accordance with our guidance and procedures. Partner
NGOs’ accounts will be audited each year during the annual programme audit (see
Paragraph 184 below).
181. DFID will review fiduciary risk at 6 monthly and annual reviews, and take appropriate and timely action as required.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
FINANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MANAGEMENT AGENT
182. Reporting.
The R-TAST will provide costed annual work plans, for approval every six months, which will include reports against the logical framework and agreed results, and monthly financial reports. Expenditure will be monitored / validated against financial and progress reports, which will be submitted within 15 calendar days of the end of each period. The R-TAST will submit quarterly financial statements to DFID and a forecast for the next quarter, which can be used for financial planning.
183. Assets.
The UK’s Grant funds will not be used to procure any capital assets under this programme. However, some essential office-equipment may be required to be purchased to support programme operations. Where this is deemed essential, the R-
TAST will agree procurement requirements in advance with DFID. The R-TAST and its
National Implementing Partners will maintain asset registers. DFID Monitoring Missions will verify the assets and DFID will decide on the disposal of assets at the end of the programme.
184. Auditing.
The R-TAST will appoint an international audit firm, acceptable to DFID, to conduct annual audits of its programme accounts and those of National Implementing
Partners. All audit reports will be submitted to DFID within 3 months of the end of the financial year. DFID also reserves the right to appoint its own auditors, if deemed necessary for any part of this Grant.
185. Accounting.
Expenditure will be monitored, reported and accounted for on an annual basis, and will form part of the Annual Review cycle. The DFID team will be responsible for ensuring that all procedures for financial reporting, accounting and audit are fully complied with. DFID may also undertake separate financial review to assess the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which grantees have used DFID resources in discharging their functions under the grant.
FINANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS
186. Contractual requirements.
All contracts will clearly set out the scope of activities to be funded, the expected results, the budget and schedule of payments, and guidance on inventories and unspent funds.

187. Importance of financial management for partners.
Since programme funds will be channelled by DFID directly to partner organisations, procedures at that level will also be an important part of the overall financial management of the programme. DFID and the R-TAST will undertake full diligence checks and fiduciary assessments of partners identified, and closely monitor expenditure controls.
188. DFID and RTAST will ensure that partner organisations’ have adequate procurement and financial capacity, that controls are working, and that financial administration and procedures, including procurement systems, are sound. This monitoring will include checks to ensure that partners:;

properly maintain books of accounts;

have appropriate and transparent procurement policies;

spend funds on the purpose for which they were given;

duly authorise expenditure at the level of the competent authority and according to instructions and contractual requirements;
 reconcile balances in the organisation’s bank accounts;

reflect in their financial statements a true and fair view of the project activity;

maintain appropriate and transparent audit trails;

maintain and record original documentation, including receipts and invoices as required;

submit annual audit reports.
189. Auditing.
The Finance Manager within the R-TAST will keep detailed records on each sub-contract, which will be available for inspection or auditing by DFID on request
190. For Accountable Grants with civil society or other organisations, annual audit statements are required to be submitted to DFID for expenditure in the financial year.

A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
191. Progress against the strategic objectives of the overall programme will be subject to oversight by DFID (supported by the R-TAST, and in consultation with the NIPs) on a sixmonthly basis. This will be based on workplans and milestones, agreed during the programme inception (start-up) phase. The DFID Task Team will closely monitor the expected results related to the programme over 5 years. In addition, overall progress on all elements of the programme will be presented and discussed at the annual review meetings to help maintain a comprehensive approach to programme delivery across all partner countries in South Asia, and to ensure consistency with the rest of our portfolio.
Figure 6. Organisation Chart
DFID Lead Adviser
Energy Climate &
Growth Unit
Advisory Group
Regional
Technical
Assistance
Support
Team ((R-
TAST)
INDIA
PSC
NEPAL
PSC
AFGHANISTAN BANGLADESH
PSC* PSC
National
Implementing
Partner
National
Implementing
Partner
National
Implementing
Partner **
National
Implementing
Partner
PAKISTAN
PSC
National
Implementing
Partner
National consultants
National consultants
National consultants
National consultants
National consultants
* Programme Steering Committee (PSC) or a similar arrangement by which government will provide guidance and advice and ensure effective linkages with other programmes.
** In India, the R-TAST is likely to perform the role of the National Implementing Partner.
192. Regional Technical Assistance Team (R-TAST) .
DFID will appoint a Supplier, selected through international competition following EU/OJEU procedures. The Supplier will establish a Regional TAST to implement the programme. The R-TAST will be based in
India, and may be co-located with the NIP in India (see Figure 6
– Organisation Chart).
193. Programme coordinator . The Regional TAST will be headed by a Programme
Coordinator, S/he will be a senior professional with proven experience in (i) managing complex, multi-country programmes; (ii) working effectively at a senior level in governments, donors, the private sector and civil society; (iii) planning and implementing climate change and related programmes; and (iv) with excellent relationship management, facilitation and programme management skills.

194. Coordinator’s role . The Programme Coordinator’s main duties will be to (1) manage the programme to ensure it delivers its results and demonstrates value for money; (2) facilitate and support the emergence of initiatives to promote integrated planning and delivery in the five countries, including monitoring the performance of partners in country;
(3) give strategic shape to the programme, quality assure the NIP workplans and support them to deliver; (4) maintain effective relationships with government policy makers, officials and other stakeholders; and (5) promote and facilitate learning across the region.
The Programme Coordinator will be supported by a Financial Manager, a Programme
Manager, Finance and Procurement staff, a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) specialist and essential support staff. Where specific technical expertise is required for programme delivery, the Programme Coordinator will be required to source this through a competitive process.
195. The Programme Coordinator will convene an Advisory Group from the region to provide strategic advice to the programme, expand relationships and networks within each of the countries, and promote cross-learning across the region. It will comprise senior policy advisers with a thorough understanding of the political economy of climate decisionmaking in each country, scientific advisers and a representative of other regional climate resilience initiatives.
196. National Implementing Partner . The Programme will be implemented in each county by a ‘National Implementing Partner, which will be an organisation with extensive experience of working with government on climate change and sustainable development. National
Implementing Partner will be selected by DFID through a restricted tendering process, in close consultation with government, and could include UN agencies, international or national NGOs and foundations. Each of the NIPs will report progress directly to the
Regional TAST Programme Coordinator.
197. Programme steering committees . In each country a Programme Steering Committee will be established to play an advisory and steering role to the programme in-country. In
India, this is likely to be the existing Steering Committee (PSC) chaired by the Secretary,
Ministry of Environment and Forests, which coordinates all donor activities. Similar committees will be used, where possible, in other countries.
198. Within DFID , the programme will be led by the A2 Adviser (Task Team Leader), and managed by the A2 Programme Manager in the Energy, Climate and Growth Unit (ECGU,
Delhi), with inputs from the private sector team, FCO’s regional offices, and Climate
Adviser s based in DFID’s country offices in South Asia. The ECGU will also liaise closely with DFID’s Research and Evidence Division, and with Climate Environment Department to support lesson learning, and read-across to other similar planned work. The R-TAST
Programme Coordinator will report to the DFID Task Team Leader.
Decision Making and Delivery of activities
199. Programme activities to be undertaken in each country will be decided jointly by the R-
TAST Programme Coordinator, with the agreement of the Government, and in consultation with the National Implementing Partner. The process will include formulation of detailed annual workplans which will be developed and discussed at six-monthly intervals. The budget and overall workplans will also be discussed and agreed with DFID

at these reviews. The National Implementing Partner will be responsible for the delivery and supervision of all activities in country and will sub-contracts goods and services procured in-country. International or regional consultants will be contracted by the R-
TAST from a pre-qualified pool of leading experts selected through an open tendering process.
200. The R-TAST Programme Coordinator will be required to work closely with National
Implementation Partners in the region, and undertake regular visits (quarterly) . During these visits, discussions will be held with the National Implementing Partner; key stakeholders in government, private sector and civil society; and, where appropriate, with the DFID country office and other donors. The Programme Coordinator will visit projects financed by the programme and will maintain close contact with other ICF programmes and the DFID-funded CKDN in order to maximise synergies and avoid duplication. An annual partners’ forum will be organised in each country to ensure cross-learning and there will also be a regional forum for all National Implementing Partners, which will be hosted in a different country each year, to which senior representatives of partner governments and organisations will be invited.
201. Transparency: DFID will follow standard guidelines under the UK’s Transparency initiative in making data and programme documentation publicly available. This includes working with our delivery partners to: make available detailed, timely and accurate information about the programmes on DFID’s website; ensure that key information is published in English and with summary information in major local languages, in a way that is accessible to citizens in the countries which the programme covers; and provide opportunities for those directly affected by the programme to provide feedback on performance.
B. RISKS
202. Medium risk . The key risks in implementing CPGD are shown in Table 13 and Figure 7.
The overall risk is Medium.
Risk
Table 13: Key risks and mitigation strategies
Pre-programme Mitigation strategy
Probability Impact
1. Public and private finance is not readily available to finance delivery and scaling-up of green growth and climate resilience investments.
2 Governments and development partners no longer prioritise climate compatible development.
L
L
H/M/L
H
H
Overall a low probability risk but could be an issue in Afghanistan and possibly in other countries. The programme will actively engage with policy makers, officials and private financing organisations to understand and, where possible, help address any bottlenecks. It will also engage with political parties so that likely future decisionmakers understand the need for investment to tackle climate change.
Risk Owner: R-PMU and DFID
Low in Bangladesh, and Nepal, but could be a risk in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where awareness of climate change is generally less and governments may be driven by the need to prioritise other investments (e.g., in security and related costs). In some states of India (e.g., Bihar) this could be a

3. Macro-economic and political stability adversely impacts on delivery of programmes.
4. Decision-makers unwilling and/or un able to adopt and use new systems for planning and budgeting.
M
M
5. Decision-makers and other key stakeholders trained and mentored/supported in the use of ‘good practice’ tools and evidence unwilling and/or unable to use them.
M
6. Public, private sector and civil society organisations unwilling and/or unable to adopt innovations and scale-up.
7. Public, private sector and civil society organisations unwilling and/or able to use new financial mechanisms.
L
M
L
M
M
M
M medium risk but in others (e.g., Maharastra) the risk is low. The programme will actively engage with policy makers, officials and political parties, which should mitigate this risk. Other ICF investments (e.g., SACRA and Communications
Asia) will have active media campaigns to increase public awareness of climate change and pressure on governments.
Risk Owner: R-PMU and DFID
Low in India but could the medium in other countries in the region. However, it is unlikely to preclude investment in climate changes. Macroeconomic issues and political instability are unlikely to affect all countries, or regions within countries, at the same time so the impact overall is judged to be low.
Risk Owner: R-PMU and DFID
This is an issue in all countries. It will be mitigated through the professional development programme on Integrating Climate Change into Development
Planning and Delivery , which will reach 500 key officials and all countries, and support in developing and implementing new or improved systems. The programme will create a cadre of medium to senior level officials who understand and the importance of improved planning and budgeting systems. The probability of this risk occurring is likely to fall significantly over the life of the programme.
Risk Owner: R-PMU, National Implementing
Partners
As Risk 4. In addition, the programme will establish good links with the ICF-financed SACRA programme (South Asia Climate Resilience
Alliance), which can provide further training and exposure to the use of such tools, if required. The probability of this risk occurring is likely to fall significantly over the life of the programme.
Risk Owners: R-PMU, National Implementing
Partners
Very low probability risk. Both the private sector and civil society are already innovating in climate change-related ways and scaling-up good initiatives. They will be actively involved in the programme through Outputs 2 to 4.
Risk Owner: R-PMU
Medium probability risk. Both the private sector and civil society are scaling up promising initiatives and there is a demand for finance. The main issues are likely to be around developing effective financing mechanisms for the diversity of possible types of organisations seeking finance in different countries. Addressing this problem is a key aim of the programme (Output 4).
Risk Owner: R-PMU

HIGH
Figure 7: Risk Matrix Summary
IMPACT
MEDIUM LOW
C. CONDITIONALITIES
203. All DFID funds will be disbursed as Technical Assistance, and DFID’s procedures on procurement will apply. There is no financial aid component for this programme.
D. MONITORING AND EVALUATION
204. A comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework will be designed by the
R-TAST during the Inception stage (first 6 months) and will be used to assess the impact and outcomes of the programme over its lifetime. The M&E plan will also develop annual results and milestones, including “quick wins” to incentivise performance by the national implementing partners.
205. This M&E Framework will take into account approaches at the partner country level, and will harmonize reporting requirements as much as possible to improve reporting efficiency. Once the framework is in place, the baselines will be set, for each partner country and agreed with the National Implementing Partners and by the Steering
Committees.
206. M&E at two levels . Monitoring and evaluation will take place at two levels: as an internal management process and independently for and by DFID.
Monitoring
207. Six monthly reports . The Programme Coordinator will produce six-monthly reports that will be submitted to DFID. Annual output-to-purpose reviews (OPR) will be undertaken by
DFID and/or independent reviewers. The annual reviews will independently assess progress against outputs and targets described in the logical framework and workplans.
Review teams will seek feedback from key stakeholders and will visit at least two countries each year and discussions with the Programme Advisory Group.

208. Annual reviews . Led by DFID or independent experts commissioned by DFID, will involve consultations with the R-TAST, Project Steering Committees, and the National
Implementing Partners. Discussions with delivery partners and field visits will be used to take stock of overall progress against planned results, and agree forward strategic priorities. During annual reviews, DFID will also closely review capacity of the R-PMU and other delivery partners to manage the programme, assess risks and develop contingency plans and mitigation measures as appropriate.
209. The annual review at the end of Year 3 will be the Mid-Term Review (MTR) and will be preceded by an independent evaluation mission commissioned by the R-TASTon behalf of DFID, which will assess, in detail, progress against planned results, agree forward strategic priorities and work plans, identify key lessons and risks, and consider what changes are needed to maximise the likelihood that long term outcome indicators are achieved.
210. Project Completion Review (PCR).
An independent end of programme review will be held in Year 5. In the final year of the programme to assess overall performance, sustainability and impact.
211. Break points . A six-month Inception Phase will lead to an agreed work programme for months 7 to 18. There will be break-points at the end of the Inception Period and at the
Mid-Term Review (2015), when DFID may withdraw if it is not satisfied that the programme is likely to achieve its objectives.
Annual Output to Purpose
Review
Inception Review
(Month 6)
Table 13: Monitoring and Reporting
Action
National Implementation
Partners annual workplans and progress reporting to R-TAST and DFID
R-TAST reports to DFID (based on reports from National
Implementing partners)
Method
National Implementation Partners prepare annual workplans, and sixmonthly annual progress
(performance and financial)
Six-monthly progress reports including (i) a narrative report, (ii) analysis of progress against logical framework outputs and key performance indicators, and (iii) expenditure report, with workplan and budget for next six months.
Review of reports and expenditure surveys, discussions with the PMU and National Implementing
Partner, key stakeholders in at least two countries and with the
Advisory Group.
Review of progress and of revised logical framework and detailed workplan and budget for Months 7-
18.
As for OPR with input from an independent evaluation team.
MTR – end year 3
End-of-Programme Review
Year 5
By who/when
National Implementation
Partner
Programme Coordinator/
R-TAST – within 15 days of the end of the period.
DFID and/or independent reviewers
DFID, possibly involving independent reviewers
DFID and an independent evaluation team, possibly with independent reviewers.

212. Commissioned reviews and evaluations . The R-TAST, together with National
Implementation Partners, will also commission reviews and evaluations of key aspects of the programme, as required. These will include, but not necessarily be limited to: (i) an evaluation of the outcomes of the professional development programme; and (ii) evaluations of innovative approaches developed under Output 3; and (iii) budget and expenditure reviews and surveys of private sector financial flows to assess the extent to which public and private sector finance has been leveraged for low carbon and climate resilient development by the programme.
Evaluation
213. An independent evaluation (commissioned and managed by DFID) will also be undertaken in the final year to assess outcomes and impact. The main objectives are to:

Unpack the results chain , and assess the theory of change , considering how these sets of interlinked interventions have led to impacts for people in the region (social, environmental, economic); and identify ways that this can be sustained;
 Rigorously assess the programme’s potential to achieve transformational change (at scale), the resulting benefits (outcomes and impacts level) and how.

Provide a realistic chain of attribution (where possible), as well as capture factors entirely independent of the programme;

Assess VfM - whether that funds have been used effectively and efficiently to deliver results;

Assess, compare and contrast innovative approaches to delivery (e.g. across national implementing partners)

Identify lessons of what works, what doesn’t and why; and, identify good practice and regional, global public goods that build on knowledge and fill evidence gaps as identified in the business case.
214. The evaluation at this scale is needed for a programme of this nature to generate evidences and knowledge for use by key stakeholders and decision makers. The detailed methodology (quantitative and qualitative), stakeholder engagement and communication strategy will be worked out in detail during inception phase along with the work plan in a
Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) approach paper.
Methodology
215. The project logframe and theory of change will act as the reference point. The evaluation will link with HQ on their evolving work on ICF indicators and methodology. The M&E approach paper will also incorporate a set of indices to measure the quality of the crosscutting issues. This is likely to include, but is not limited to: identifying co-benefits of regional cooperation approaches (cross-country, multi-sectoral, socio-economic levels); impacts on women and other vulnerable communities; building trust, shared analysis and common understanding; leveraging private sector investment; and better climate compatible policies.
216. The evaluation process will be led by DFID, and its approach and methodology will be developed during the inception phase of the programme. DFID will contract out the evaluation to independent, technical experts and will draw up a full terms of reference for this and move to contract by Year 3 of the programme (to align with the mid-term reporting). The evaluation process will be completed by the end of the programme.

217. M&E activities will account for approx. 5% of the programme budget.
E. LOGFRAME
Attached (Annexure 1)

F. REFERENCES
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2011). Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
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20 Alam, K., M. Shamsuddoha, T. Tanner, et al. 2011. The political economy of climate resilient development planning in Bangladesh. IDS
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22 Srinivasan, A. and T. Uchida. 2008. "Mainstreaming and financing adaptation to climate change," in The climate regime beyond 2012.
Reconciling Asian development priorities and global climate interests. Edited by A. Srinivasan, pp. 57-83. Hayama: Institute for Global
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23 IFC (2010), A strategy to engage private sector in climate change adaptation in Bangladesh
24 CPGD will be implemented in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan.
25 IPCC 4 th Assessment Report.
26 United Nations 2011. World population prospects, UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, New York.
27 http://www.ifpri.org/book-49/ourwork/program/south-asia-initiative
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29 IFPRI 2009. Climate Change: Impacts on Agriculture and Costs of Adaptation. Cranfield University 2011. What are the projected impacts of climate change on food crop productivity in Africa and South Asia? DFID Systematic Review.
30 India’s first sub-national administrative level is the state, in Pakistan and Afghanistan the provinces, in Bangladesh the division and in Nepal regions.
31 World Bank 2009. Shared Views on climate change and development.
32 ECA 2009. Shaping Climate Resilient Development. A Framework for decision-making. A report of the Economics of Climate Adaptation
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33 Dilley et al. 2005, Natural Disaster Hotspots: A global Risk Analysis. Disaster Risk Management Series No. 5. Washington, DC: World Bank
34 United Nations 2010. World urbanisation prospects, UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, New York.
35 World Bank 2008a, Mainstreaming Climate Change Mitigation in Cities. Washington, DC: World Bank, Environment Department.
36 CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity). 2003. Inter linkages between Biological Diversity and Climate Change: Advice on the integration of
Biodiversity Considerations in to the implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol.
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Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press
37 World Bank (2010), Responding to Climate Change in South Asia
38 Hall and Sulaiman (2008) .

39 Klein, R., E. L. F. Schipper and S. Dessai. 2005. Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate and development policy: three research questions. Environmental Science & Policy
40 Tackling Wicked Problems: a public policy perspective, Australian Public Service Commission 2007
41 Louis Lebel, Lailai Li, Chayanis Krittasudthacheewa, Muanpong Juntopas, Tatirose Vijitpan, Tomoharu
Uchiyama, and Dusita Krawanchid, Mainstreaming climate change adaptation into development planning, SEI, 2012
42 UNDP-UNEP. 2011. Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change in development planning: A guidance for practioners. United Nations
Development Programme and United Nations Environment Programme Poverty Environment Initiative.
43 Agrawala, S. and M. van Aalst. 2008. Adapting development cooperation to adapt to climate change.
44 World Bank. 2006. Managing climate risk. Integrating adaptation into World Bank Group operations. World Bank.
45 Ayers, J. M. and S. Huq. 2009. The Value of Linking Mitigation and Adaptation: A Case Study of Bangladesh. Environmental Management.
46 Hamin, E. and N. Gurran. 2009. Urban form and climate change: Balancing adaptation and mitigation in the U.S. and Australia. Habitat
International.
47 Swart, R. and F. Raes. 2007. Making integration of adaptation and mitigation work: Mainstreaming into sustainable development policies?.
48 Approaches to Planning for Climate Change – Bridging concepts and practices for low carbon climate resilient development, The Learning
Hub, DFID
49 Agrawala, S. 2004. Adaptation, development assistance and planning: Challenges and opportunities. IDS Bulletin 35(3):50-4.
50 Srinivasan, A. and T. Uchida. 2008. "Mainstreaming and financing adaptation to climate change," in The climate regime beyond 2012.
Reconciling Asian development priorities and global climate interests. Edited by A. Srinivasan, pp. 57-83. Hayama: Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies.
51 Tackling Wicked Problems: a public policy perspective, Australian Public Service Commission 2007
52 IIED/COWI (2009) Joint External Evaluation of the Operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund for Adaptation to Climate Change,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
53 CDKN Global, Lessons from Orissa
54 UNCPEIR reports on Nepal (2011) and Bangladesh (2012).
55 Approaches to Planning for Climate Change – Bridging concepts and practices for low carbon climate resilient development, The Learning
Hub, DFID.
56 Climate and Development knowledge Network (CKDN)-Policy Brief; December 2010.
57 ECA (2009). Shaping Climate Resilient Development. A Framework for decision-making. A report of the Economics of Climate Adaptation
Working Group.
58 Gaventa J and McGee R (2010) Citizen Acyion and National Policy Reform : Making Change Happen. Zed Books.
59 The Caribbean Planning for Adaptation to Global Climate Change (CPACC) project in 12 countries supported vulnerability assessments, adaptation planning and capacity building, which led to increased focus of climate change issues in policy making and enabled more unified regional positions for climate negotiations; resulted in improved early warning capabilities; and the development of national climate change adaptation policies and implementation plans 59 . Lessons highlight the importance of developing leadership and ambition through multistakeholder platforms and strong communication, of the value of flexible, responsive support to build capacity without overloading institutions 59 .
60 See endnote #13.
61 Policy Discourse Analysis, IIED (2011)
62 ADB. 2009a. Building climate resilience in the agriculture sector of Asia and the Pacific. Asian Development Bank.
63 Nkem, J., H. Santoso, D. Murdiyarso, et al. 2007. Using tropical forest ecosystem goods and services for planning climate change adaptation with implications for food security and poverty reduction. SAT eJournal 4(1).
64 Agrawala, S. 2004. Adaptation, development assistance and planning: Challenges and opportunities. IDS Bulletin 35(3):50-4.
65 CDKN Global, Lessons from Orissa
66 UNDP-UNEP. 2011. Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change in development planning: A guidance for practioners. United Nations
Development Programme and United Nations Environment Programme Poverty Environment Initiative.
67 MoEF. 2008. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2008. On-line: http://www.moef.gov.bd/moef.pdf (Accessed 25 July
2011). Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
68 Alam, K., M. Shamsuddoha, T. Tanner, et al. 2011. The political economy of climate resilient development planning in Bangladesh. IDS
Bulletin
69 Alam, K., M. Shamsuddoha, T. Tanner, et al. 2011. The political economy of climate resilient development planning in Bangladesh. IDS
Bulletin
70 MoEF. 2009. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. September 2009. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
71 Srinivasan, A. and T. Uchida. 2008. "Mainstreaming and financing adaptation to climate change," in The climate regime beyond 2012.
Reconciling Asian development priorities and global climate interests. Edited by A. Srinivasan, pp. 57-83. Hayama: Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies.
72 IFC (2010), A strategy to engage private sector in climate change adaptation in Bangladesh
73 Ibid.
74 The 2010 World Development Report accepts IPPC estimates that agricultural yields in the region will fall by 18% by 2050, with serious impacts on food security and poverty. Using different models to estimate the effects on agriculture of climate change, Cline (2007) predicts a reduced agricultural output in India of between 30 and 40%. Gutierez (2009) has a less pessimistic short-run prediction of a decrease in major

crop yield of 4.5 to 9% by 2039, worsening to 25% or more in the longer term without adequate adaptation. The DFID Synthesis study by
Cranfield estimates an 8% reduction in yields. See endnotes 3-6 to Strategic Case.
75 Oxfam (2011). Review of Climate Change Adaptation Practices in South Asia . Oxford.
76 DFID Learning Hub (2011): Approaches to Planning for Climate Change and CDKN (2011) Moving Forward on Climate Change planning – lessons from Orissa.
Policy Brief.
77 Australian Public Service Commission (2009). Tackling Wicked Problems. Canberra.
78 GEF (2010) Review of the Global Environment Facility Earth Fund. GEF Evaluation Office.
79 See For CIFs - http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org
, for CKDN - www.cdkn.org
, and UN CPEIR - http://www.unpei.org/
80 ICAI (2011) DFID’s Programme on Climate Change in Bangladesh, Report No3 (Independent Commission on Aid Impact)
81 DFID evaluation Department Country Programme Evaluations on Bangladesh (2006), Nepal (2007), Pakistan (2008) and Afghanistan (2009).
82 Event organised to provide input to Bridging Paper: Approaches to Planning for Climate Change – Bridging concepts and practices for low carbon climate resilient development, The Learning Hub, DFID
83 GEF (2010) Review of the Global Environment Facility Earth Fund. GEF Evaluation Office.
84 Oxfam (2011). Review of Climate Change Adaptation Practices in South Asia . Oxford.
85 IIED/COWI (2009). Joint External Evaluation of the Operation of Least Developed Countries Fund for Adaptation to Climate Change. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen.
86 Joint external evaluation of the operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund for adaptation to climate change, IIED & COWI, Evaluation
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, September 2009
87 Rwanda and Bangladesh have created clear links between their National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPAs) and Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in order to facilitate the mainstreaming of adaptation to climate change. In the Rwanda NAPA, the process of selecting priority adaptation activities was closely linked to the various national and sectoral policies of Rwanda as it took into account the urgent and immediate needs established in its PRSP, its economic development and poverty reduction strategy (EDPRS) and other development programmes. Furthermore, for each high-priority project identified or selected, links between the objectives of these projects and key development strategies of Rwanda (including the Rwanda Vision 2020, the Rwanda PRSP and other relevant national and sectoral policies) are provided. Such explicit links helped in facilitating the integration of the identified high-priority adaptation projects into overarching development frameworks. IBangladesh PRSP highlights how a national policy framework can provide the basis for mainstreaming climate change adaptation programmes, such as the NAPA and the comprehensive disaster management programme. The PRSP has 19 policy matrices that were developed to operationalise the strategy. One of this matrix’s key targets is to “factor vulnerability impacts, and adaptation to climate change into disaster management and risk reduction plans, programmes, policies and projects”. This, together with an acknowledgement of the NAPA as a national implementation programme, helped to ensure policy coherence for adaptation activities. The
Republic of Kiribati is another country making efforts to mainstream adaptation into its national development policies. It has implemented two national adaptation processes: the NAPA and the Kiribati adaptation programme (KAP). While the NAPA gives attention to urgent and immediate adaptation needs, the KAP focuses on long-term planning for climate change adaptation. Lessons learnt from both of these initiatives were used to plan the national response to climate change.
88 Tackling Wicked Problems: a public policy perspective, Australian Public Service Commission 2007
89 Gaventa J and McGee R (2010) Citizen Action and National Policy Reform,: Making Change Happen. Zed Books.
90 Australian Public Service Commission (2009). Tackling Wicked Problems. Canberra.
91 Gaventa J and McGee R (2010) Citizen Action and National Policy Reform,: Making Change Happen. Zed Books.
92 Approaches to Planning for Climate Change – Bridging concepts and practices for low carbon climate resilient development, The Learning
Hub, DFID
93 Climate and Development knowledge Network-Policy Brief; December 2010
94 Walling.j.L., Continuing the Legacy of Participatory Planning in Climate Change Adaptation Planning Initiatives in the Caribbean
95 D. Alejandro, Lessons learned CARIBBEAN: PLANNING FOR ADAPTATION TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (CPACC), Climate Change Discussion
Paper, Environment Department, The World Bank, September, 2002
96 ECA(2009) Shaping Climate Resilient Development. A Framework for decision-making. A report of the Economics of Climate Adaptation
Working Group.
97 D. Alejandro (2002), Lessons learned Caribbean planning for adaptation to Global Climate Change (CPACC): Climate Change Discussion Paper,
Environment Department, The World Bank.
98 CKDN (2010) Moving Forward on climate change planning – lessons from Orissa, Policy Brief.
99 Michael Greenstone & Rema Hanna, 2011. "Environmental Regulations, Air and Water Pollution, and Infant Mortality in India," NBER
Working Papers 17210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
100 The 2010 World Development Report accepts IPPC estimates that agricultural yields in the region will fall by 18% by 2050, with serious impacts on food security and poverty. Using different models to estimate the effects on agriculture of climate change, Cline (2007) predicts a reduced agricultural output in India of between 30 and 40%. Gutierez (2009) has a less pessimistic short-run prediction of a decrease in major

crop yield of 4.5 to 9% by 2039, worsening to 25% or more in the longer term without adequate adaptation. The DFID Synthesis study by
Cranfield estimates an 8% reduction in yields. See endnotes 3-6 to Strategic Case.
101 Oxfam (2011). Review of Climate Change Adaptation Practices in South Asia . Oxford.
102 DFID Learning Hub (2011): Approaches to Planning for Climate Change and CDKN (2011) Moving Forward on Climate Change planning – lessons from Orissa.
Policy Brief.
103 Australian Public Service Commission (2009). Tackling Wicked Problems. Canberra.
104 GEF (2010) Review of the Global Environment Facility Earth Fund. GEF Evaluation Office.
105 See For CIFs - http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org
, for CKDN - www.cdkn.org
, and UN CPEIR - http://www.unpei.org/
106 ICAI (2011) DFID’s Programme on Climate Change in Bangladesh, Report No3 (Independent Commission on Aid Impact)
107 DFID evaluation Department Country Programme Evaluations on Bangladesh (2006), Nepal (2007), Pakistan (2008) and Afghanistan (2009).
108 GEF (2010) Review of the Global Environment Facility Earth Fund. GEF Evaluation Office.
109 DFID Learning Hub (2011) Bridging Paper: Approaches to Planning for Climate Change – Bridging concepts and practices for low carbon climate resilient development, The Learning Hub, DFID.
110 Oxfam (2011). Review of Climate Change Adaptation Practices in South Asia . Oxford.
111 IIED/COWI (2009). Joint External Evaluation of the Operation of Least Developed Countries Fund for Adaptation to Climate Change. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen.
112 Australian Public Service Commission (2009). Tackling Wicked Problems. Canberra.
113 Gaventa J and McGee R (2010) Citizen Action and National Policy Reform,: Making Change Happen. Zed Books.
114 Australian Public Service Commission (2009). Tackling Wicked Problems. Canberra.
115 Gaventa J and McGee R (2010) Citizen Action and National Policy Reform,: Making Change Happen. Zed Books.
116 ECA(2009) Shaping Climate Resilient Development. A Framework for decision-making. A report of the Economics of Climate Adaptation
Working Group.
117 D. Alejandro (2002), Lessons learned Caribbean planning for adaptation to Global Climate Change (CPACC): Climate Change Discussion
Paper, Environment Department, The World Bank.
118 CKDN (2010) Moving Forward on climate change planning – lessons from Orissa, Policy Brief.
119 Michael Greenstone & Rema Hanna, 2011. "Environmental Regulations, Air and Water Pollution, and Infant Mortality in India," NBER
Working Papers 17210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
120 Rwanda and Bangladesh have created clear links between their National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPAs) and Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in order to facilitate the mainstreaming of adaptation to climate change. In the Rwanda NAPA, the process of selecting priority adaptation activities was closely linked to the various national and sectoral policies of Rwanda as it took into account the urgent and immediate needs established in its PRSP, its economic development and poverty reduction strategy (EDPRS) and other development programmes. Furthermore, for each high-priority project identified or selected, links between the objectives of these projects and key development strategies of Rwanda (including the Rwanda Vision 2020, the Rwanda PRSP and other relevant national and sectoral policies) are provided. Such explicit links helped in facilitating the integration of the identified high-priority adaptation projects into overarching development frameworks. Bangladesh PRSP highlights how a national policy framework can provide the basis for mainstreaming climate change adaptation programmes, such as the NAPA and the comprehensive disaster management programme. The PRSP has 19 policy matrices that were developed to operationalise the strategy. One of this matrix’s key targets is to “factor vulnerability impacts, and adaptation to climate change into disaster management and risk reduction plans, programmes, policies and projects”. This, together with an acknowledgement of the NAPA as a national implementation programme, helped to ensure policy coherence for adaptation activities. The
Republic of Kiribati is another country making efforts to mainstream adaptation into its national development policies. It has implemented two national adaptation processes: the NAPA and the Kiribati adaptation programme (KAP). While the NAPA gives attention to urgent and immediate adaptation needs, the KAP focuses on long-term planning for climate change adaptation. Lessons learnt from both of these initiatives were used to plan the national response to climate change.
121 Lessons from Joint external evaluation of the operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund for adaptation to climate change, IIED &
COWI, Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, September 2009 - has been the importance of linking funding with the planning process and of political ownership – linking the climate planning process with the wider development priorities of the country
122 D.
Alejandro, Lessons learned CARIBBEAN: PLANNING FOR ADAPTATION TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (CPACC), Climate Change Discussion
Paper, Environment Department, The World Bank, September, 2002 - Lessons highlight the importance of developing political leadership and ambition through multi-stakeholder platforms and strong communication, of the value of flexible, responsive support to build capacity without overloading institutions
123 Linking budgetary frameworks to planning processes and using common frameworks flexibly across different scales can help ensure integrated planning. Bangladesh is generating important lessons in setting up an architecture for climate planning and implementation through bringing donors together behind one plan – the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, with their own climate fund and a multi donor trust fund to support it.
124 Climate and Development knowledge Network-Policy Brief; December 2010- Bolivia’s approach to building links between local and national institutions to ensure cross-scale scrutiny of the poverty reduction strategy process provides interesting lessons for climate compatible development planning. It built links between local and national institutions, it ensured a participatory approach that engaged both national and local needs, it gained political support, and it stimulated evidence-based planning
125 Lessons from Approaches to Planning for Climate Change – Bridging concepts and practices for low carbon climate resilient development,
The Learning Hub, DFID - LAPAs potentially represent a tangible process for integrating global, national and local planning and budgeting processes in support of local practical priorities for policies or project interventions that respond to the impacts of climate change and build adaptive capacity

126 Walling.j.L., Continuing the Legacy of Participatory Planning in Climate Change Adaptation Planning Initiatives in the Caribbean - The
Caribbean Planning for Adaptation to Global Climate Change (CPACC) project focused in providing Knowledge, tools and capacity to twelve
Caribbean countries to cope with the adverse effects of global climate change. The project supported vulnerability assessments, adaptation planning and capacity building, which led to increased focus of climate change issues at the policy-making level. CPACC enabled more unified regional positions for climate negotiations; resulted in a significant increase in monitoring and early warning capabilities; and the development of national climate change adaptation policies and implementation plans.
127 World Resources Institute paper (Roots of resilience: Growing the wealth of the poor, World Resources Institute, 2008) suggests that design of well evidenced development initiative can create economic, social, and environmental resilience that cushion the impacts of climate change, and help provide needed social stability.
128 Climate Fiscal Frameworks: Guidance for improving effectiveness of climate finance at the country level - Linking climate finance to national planning and budgeting processes allows for large volumes of finance to flow quickly and effectively. At the same time, linking external finance with national public financial management systems can also provide further support for on-going reforms to strengthen transparency and accountability
129 Climate fiscal framework would help ensure that all sources of climate finance are effectively utilized for priority low emission and climate resilient investments, while also supporting national development priorities.
130 UNDP analysis of Durban Climate Conference , December 2012 - To access Green Climate Fund countries require to demonstrate efforts moving towards a programmatic approach to financing, focused on sector-level activities rather than project level interventions as well as readiness to identify and strengthen national and local institutional arrangements to manage climate finance
131 United Nation’s High-Level Advisory Group on Finance (AGF) use of the concept of leveraging (AGF, 2010), and has derived a methodology for calculating the potential leverage ratio of public interventions to stimulate private investment in addressing climate change. It calculates an average leverage factor of 3x for private investment in mitigation activities (AGF Workstream 7, 2010). This leverage factor is derived from an array of public financing instruments at the disposal of donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) and the leverage ratios associated with the varying instruments (recognising that the amount of private investment leveraged by public funding instruments varies considerably according to the barrier being addressed, location, instrument used, and project specific characteristics). Non-concessional debt have a leverage factor in 2-5x range; Debt financed via grant (concessional) funds can leverage between 1:8 and 1:10; Equity and guarantees financed via grants can lead to a leverage of 1:20; MDBs in projects with private sponsors can leverage about 1:8 to 1:10 times debt and equity; leverage ratio for carbon offset financing is 1:4.6 to 1:9.
132 World Bank (2010). Economics of adaptation to climate change. Synthesis Report.
133 ACCRA Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance http://community.eldis.org/accra/
134 Burton et al (2002); Klein (2008)
135 for example, REDD+ initiatives in Nepal (IIED 2011 Policy Discourse Analysis for Nepal).
136 Ranger and Garbett-Shiels 2011
137 See the synthesis of Policy Discourse Analyses paper that accompanies Alliance proposal.
138 There is a strong convergence between the actions required to get climate resilience mainstreamed into the public policy areas central to social and development and the priorities identified for accelerating progress towards the MDG targets identified at the recent MDG Summit
(Greeling 2010)
139 Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2010); Bahadur et al. (2010).
140 Bryan (2002); Smith and Stern (2011)
141 Smith and Stern (2011)
142 Australian Public Services Commission (2007); see also for example Bassett et al (2000)
143 Ibid
144 Klein (2008).
145 For example, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990); Funtowicz, and Ravetz(1993). Farrell et al (2001); Jasanoff and Wynne (1998).
146 COWI/IIED (2009). Also, in Bangladesh, over $128 million has been proposed for funding, but as yet only $18 million has been approved from the website Climate Funds Update (Site last updated in June 2011). The funding includes both, CC adaptation and mitigation activities.
147 These people include the tribal and dalit communities in India and Nepal, madeshi people of tropical lowland Nepal, extremely poor people living in environmentally difficult areas of Bangladesh (e.g. river/coastal islands or chars; areas affected by seasonal hunger – monga), the rural populations in southern Punjab, and the northern Sindh provinces in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The State with the highest rate of undernutrition in India, Madhya Pradesh, also has one of the highest concentrations of extremely poor and socially excluded tribal and dalit people.
148 Research in South Asia shows when subsistence farmers produce less, children, especially girls, are taken out of school and women and girls meals are reduced first (See: Human Development Report 2007/2008, Chapter 2). Under-nutrition is closely associated with gender inequality.
An IFPRI study in 2003 showed that under-nutrition in South Asia is correlated with gender inequality (Smith et al 2003). This was supported by the 2009 Global Hunger Index, which shows that most South Asian countries fall in the bottom 25% of countries in terms of both hunger and gender inequality and have higher rates of gender-based violence.
149 Sterrett C. (2011) Review of climate change adaptation practices in South Asia. Oxfam Research Report, Melbourne, Australia
150 Shepherd, A. (2011) Tackling chronic poverty The policy implications of research on chronic poverty and poverty dynamics. Chronic Poverty Research Centre.

151 Menocal A. (2011) Understanding pro-poor growth: a role for political economy analysis. Developing Alternatives Vol 14(1):3-11
152 Mohanty, R. (2007). Gendered subjects, the state and participatory spaces: the politics of domesticating participation in rural India. In
Cornwall, A and and Schattan Coehlo V (eds) Spaces for change: the politics of citizen participation in new democratic arenas. Zed Books,
London.