Removing a Corrupt President:
The Role of Media, Civil Society
Presentation by
Malou Mangahas
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism
December 2003
The Philippines:
Fast Facts, Figures
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Filipinos like to call their country the Pearl of the Orient Seas. In truth, it is like a
wasteland of dirt and pain, two elements that nurture pearl. Like a string of pearls,
the Philippines is an archipelago with 7,107 islands, stretched across 300,000
square kilometers of land area.
There are 16 administrative regions, 77 provinces, 500 cities and municipalities,
and 30,000 plus barangays or villages.
As of the May 2000 census, there are 76.5 million Filipinos, a population estimated
to reach 80 million in 2001, at an average annual growth rate of 2.1 per cent.
Up to 60 per cent of all Filipinos are below 21 years old. About 7 million work
overseas as contract workers or migrants, many undocumented.
There are 11,500 households and average family size is 3.4 persons. The
government estimates poverty incidence at 28.4 percent, although the Asian
Development Bank places it at 40 per cent.
Simple literacy is very high at 93.9 per cent (1994 data) but functional literacy is
only 81 per cent. By 2000, the average annual family income is estimated at
P144,039, while average annual family expenditure, P118,002. The unemployment
rate is placed at 10.2 percent of the workforce, and the underemployment rate, 15.3
per cent, as of October 2002.
People Power,
Episode 2
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Four days of massive protest rallies capped by the withdrawal of support by
generals of the Armed Forces forced the Philippines’ 13th President, Joseph
Estrada, to step down on January 21, 2003.
Multiple, parallel efforts by media and civil society exposed corruption in the
government and Estrada’s unexplained wealth.
Lawyers helped lawmakers prepare the impeachment complaint filed against
Estrada with the House of Representatives, and joined the prosecution team in
the Senate impeachment tribunal.
Church leaders and businessmen lent moral and material support for the
protest rallies, and openly took the side of the opposition as individuals or
through various associations in the days leading to Estrada's decision to leave
his post. Employers allowed their workers to join the protest rallies.
Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. swore into office then Vice President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, vesting the new government with judicial and
constitutional imprimatur and writing finis to the Estrada presidency.
Of Mansions
and Mistresses
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The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) published six stories and
produced as many television documentaries from May to December 2001 on
Estrada's multple mansions and mistresses.
The first stories met with lukewarm response from leading newspapers and TV
networks until Estrada buddy Luis "Chavit" Singson exposed the million-peso
kickbacks that Estrada collected from illegal gambling and tobacco excise taxes.
The first leads for the stories came from coffee shop talk, white papers and
anonymous tipsters in Manila's vibrant rumor mill
Earlier in January 2001, PCIJ organized a team of six reporters and researchers, all
women, to work on the Estrada stories. The Research plan was pegged on: What
could be documented? What could be verified? What will stick?
Next, the PCIJ Team agreed to focus the research on the following concrete
evidence of unexplained wealth: real estate, houses, corporate assets. Because
Estrada kept a large and intricate network of spouses and friends, the Team also
decided to assign the writers to specific spouses and cronies as their respective
subjects of study.
The Power of Paper
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The Paper Trail on Estrada's estate served as the backbone of the research effort.
Student interns assisted researchers in lining up intermittently at Securities an
Exchange Commission to gather GIS, articles of incorporation, financial
statements, building and other permits, land registration records, statements of
assets and liabilities on the Estrada properties.
The research effort stretched on for six months and cost the PCIJ about P40,000
(about US$800) in photocopying fees. The research team compiled two boxes of
documents on 66 companies that Estrada and his spouses, children and
associates owned and controlled. Reverse search allowed by the SEC then
provided a breakthrough in the research effort..
The enabling environment for the research effort was fairly well established in the
Philippines. Regulatory agencies like the SEC has largely complied with the
transparency clauses of anti-graft laws. The real burden on the research team was
not so much the absence of documents but the tediousness and meticulous care
required in ferreting out the truth.
The research effort became so involved and tedious because of the vastness and
layers of corporate veil that shrouded the Estrada properties.
Resign, Impeach, Oust!
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EDSA People Power 2 had its roots in the latter part of 1999, when civil society groups started to
write off the Estrada presidency as a gross disappointment. The Philippines' 13th president and
the first with non-elite credentials -- a college dropout, he was given to gambling, drink and
women, and spoke tortured English -- Estrada had trumpeted himself as "a man for the poor."
Senior civil society leaders, however, advised the initially small circle of five NGOs to first
gather solid evidence so the charges would stick. Failing this, the groups agreed that "even if
we don't succeed, we could at least expose the issues and let people know." In time, bigger
groups like the influential Makati Business Club joined in.
Thus, when civil society leaders decided in November 2000 to gather all anti-Estrada groups
within one umbrella coalition, KOMPIL 2, three modes of getting Estrada out of the presidency
were adopted, representing the divergent points of view of the coalition members.
Consensus was achieved on what was called a RIO (Resign, Impeach, Oust) strategy. Consensus
was achieved as well on the sequence of protest calls KOMPIL will carry -- first "Estrada Resign,"
then "Impeach Estrada," and finally, "Oust Estrada."
The groups failed, however, to achieve unity on the more contentious matter of "program of
government," or what should happen after Estrada is ousted.
On parallel track, Vice President Gloria Arroyo formed her "Constitutional Transition
Committee" and assigned its members to keep in constant communication with KOMPIL 2
leaders.
Churches & Traders
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The role of the churches -- Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Islamic -- that supported the
anti-Estrada campaign cannot be over-emphasized. Church leaders from all denominations
harnessed their moral influence on members, ministers, nuns and priests, administrators
of church-run schools with command over students and teachers, to pack in the crowd at
the EDSA shrine for four days straight.
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In like manner, Estrada counted on his loyal allies in the Iglesia ni Cristo -- a minority
church of about 4 million adult members and virtually the only real voting bloc in the
Philippines -- to pack in the crowd at the pro-Estrada rallies around the presidential palace,
and later, against Mrs Arroyo.
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Business leaders are yet another equally important silent partner in EDSA People Power 2,
as they were in EDSA People Power 1. Protest movements entail huge budgets and
overheads, a burden that unavoidably falls always on businessmen. EDSA People Power 2
cost tens of millions of pesos to mount. The overhead expenses and campaign collateral
(i.e. streamers, T-shirts, food, printing of pamphlets, transportation, sound system rental),
entailed big costs. Residents of affluent villages enlisted women and children in food
brigades to cook and serve meals for tens of thousands, an expense that cannot be billed in
pesos and cents.
An Interplay of Actors, Issues
* A vibrant interplay of the right actors acting on the right issues at the right
time made EDSA People Power 2 possible. In large measure, too, the Filipinos'
unique, historical experiences with their political leaders, and the policy and
social environment also enabled the effort.
* Mounting a people power revolt is a fast, furious process that involves leaders
and masses forging swift consensus on minimum common ground, and under
pressure of limited time and resources.
* The coalition members moved fast on the issues that united them, and thought
it wise to skip the issues that divided them. Confronted by the question of who
to install after Estrada, the constitutional successor, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, became the inevitable but not compelling answer.
* By December 2000, Arroyo had organized a Constitutional Transition
Committee of her closest advisers. The Committee consulted with the NGOs on
"political and social programs" but made no commitments on what program of
government Mrs Arroyo will implement once she takes power.
People Power Scenarios
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As the impeachment trial of Estrada commenced in November 2000, KOMPIL
embarked on "scenario-building efforts." They set a 30-day deadline for the trial
to unfold, before launching their civil disobedience plans.
KOMPIL anticipated any one of three likely scenarios could result from the trial:
– Estrada would be exonerated;
– Estrada would be convicted "by a mere stroke of a miracle;" or
– The trial could stretch well beyond the congressional elections
scheduled in May 2001.
For all three scenarios, KOMPIL achieved general consensus to launch civil
disobedience actions, as would be appropriate to individual groups. For
instance, workers strikes or any combination of acts of civil disobedience were
discussed. In the meantime, some NGO leaders started back-channel talks with
certain military officers.
KOMPIL’s contacts in the military imposed a condition for them to jump ship to
the anti-Estrada side -- a big crowd or a big event to demonstrate that the people
had lost faith in Estrada, a signal motive fore the Armed Forces to withdraw
support.
Civil Society’s Dilemma:
Get In or Stay Out of Government?
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In the aftermath of People Power 2, one question caught civil society groups
off-guard: Should their leaders serve in the Arroyo government, following
their effort to help oust Estrada? KOMPIL 2 leaders decided to join
government service, resulting in transition problems for their NGOs.
The second-liners in a number of NGOs have not been fully prepared to take
on leadership roles abandoned by the Arroyo appointees. The question
continues to hound civil society groups: can NGO leaders serve best inside
or outside government service?
The day after victory, civil society leaders faced two equally urgent tasks.
First, to consolidate the coalition. Second, to help run the government. In the
meantime, KOMPIL leaders also had to rush back to the life and work they
had, before the revolt beckoned.
Thirty months hence, from 50 to 70 leaders and members of civil society
groups in KOMPIL 2 are now in government service. Variably, they work in
operations, policy planning and review, executive staff units in various
departments, or sit on the boards of government financial institutions and
corporations.
Windfall:
A few good results
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Civil society’s presence in government has yielded some positive, if
tactical, results.:
• Mrs Arroyo consults senior civil society leaders in the Cabinet
on such policy issues as the peace talks with separatist Muslim
rebels but it is not clear how much and how often they have
prevailed in the testy debates that often hobble policy-making in
the Philippines.
• In a government bank where civil society leaders sit as board
members, “a culture of dialogue” has been fostered between
management and labor, resolving extended rows over pay and
welfare issues.
• Civil society leaders appointed to the social services sector
have achieved a lot in the area of delivering basic services to
slumdwellers and indigent communities, drawing in to the
Arroyo side part of the large poor constituency of ousted
President Estrada.
Fallout: Weaker NGOs,
Divided Civil Society
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Civil society’s decision to join government service has dissipated
the shallow bench of NGO leaders, exacting a serious toll on the
quality of leadership and cogency of issues of civil society.
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The Filipino public, by tradition very exacting in their expectations
of civil society, remains ambivalent toward the new hybrid force of
former civil society leaders who are now civil servants -- not quite
activists anymore but not quite politicians and government
bureaucrats as yet.
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Civil society has been split by the question on whether to support
or criticize Mrs. Arroyo, and on what issues. Her decision to turn
back on a promise not to run for president in May 2004 has
dissolved a new coalition of NGOs. Only 2 of 32 NGO leaders who
met in August 2003 decided to join her election campaign.
Politics Hobbles the Court
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EDSA People Power 2 has dragged down the Supreme Court -- the
singular institution that has consistently enjoyed positive public
approval rating and the ultimate arbiter of conflict in the Philippines - and made it vulnerable to political criticism.
Ousted President Estrada had filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of the decision of Supreme Court Justice Hilario
Davide to swear in Mrs Arroyo as president. In a vote of 13-0 the high
court threw out the petition, as well as a motion for reconsideration
filed by Estrada’s lawyers.
In 2003, members of the House of Representatives filed an
impeachment complaint against the Supreme Court justices, for their
role in installing Mrs Arroyo. This did not prosper. A second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.
passed with the vote of 88 lawmakers in October 2003. It alleged
misuse of the Judicial Development Fund on repair and construction
of the justices summer villas in northern Baguio City.
The Perils of People Power
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People Power revolts have challenged the viability of the constitutional
and legal processes for changing leaders. In its decision on the Estrada
petition questioning the validity of the Arroyo government, the Supreme
Court had to make fine, feeble, distinctions between EDSA 1 and 2.
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The high court ruled: “EDSA 1 involves the exercise of the people power
of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA 2 is an
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected
the Office of the President. EDSA 1 is extra-constitutional… EDSA 2 is intraconstitutional. EDSA 1 presented a political question; EDSA 2 involves
legal questions.”
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A justice, in a separate opinion, raised concern about “the use of people
power to create a vacancy in the presidency,” citing that, “there is
nothing in the Constitution to legitimize the ouster of an incumbent
President through means that are unconstitutional or extraconstitutional.”
‘Short-cuts’ Weaken Institutions?
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EDSA 1 and 2 may have illustrated the Filipinos’ penchant for
“shortcuts” and for “short-circuiting due processes.”
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The two people power episodes in the Philippines– the first
against a repressive president, the second against a corrupt
president – were in fact the triumph of “street politics” over due
process, according to a political analyst.
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Filipinos resort to short-cuts precisely because most of them are
poor, “ disempowered or unpempowered.”
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After people power revolts, the question that must dominate the
public agenda is how to strengthen democratic institutions.
Intermittent political squabbles that follow people power
episodes render institutions as mere nominal structures
constantly beholden to party politics.