Plan
The United States Federal Government should remove Cuba from the State
Department list of state sponsors of terrorism.
1ac
Our argument is that the designation “state sponsor of terrorism” is heavily politicized
and selectively biased- it serves to ideologically distract from direct state terrorism
perpetrated by the United States and its allies. We have several internal links:
1st, the United States labels Cuba as a state sponsor while ignoring its own culpability
in numerous attacks against Cuba. Unrelated matters are used to refuse engagement
and justify Cuba’s continued inclusion on the list.
Bolender, Scholar at Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 13
[Keith, 4-22-13, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “The Terrorist List, and Terrorism as Practiced Against
Cuba,” http://www.coha.org/22355/, accessed 6-25-13, YGS]
On an emotional level, Havana has long drawn attention to the double standard that permits
Washington to label others as a terrorist state, all the while ignoring its own culpability in the multiple
acts of terror that have been responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent Cuban civilians. This
relatively unreported history stretches back to the early months following Castro’s victory over the
Batista regime, when the United States was determined to eliminate the Cuban revolution not only
through economic and political means, but with violence. Operation Mongoose, a program developed by the
State Department under the overarching Cuba Project, coordinated terrorist operations from the period following the
failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 to the October missile crisis 18 months later. During this time State Department
officials provided logistical and material support to violent anti-revolutionary groups carrying out terrorist
activities on the island. The terrors included torturing and murdering students who were teaching
farmers to read and write, blowing up shoppers at Havana’s busiest department stores, bombing
sugar cane plantations and tobacco fields, killing Cuban fishermen and the innumerable attempts to assassinate Fidel
Castro and other top government officials. [3] Historian Arthur Schlesinger reported in his biography of Robert Kennedy that Operation
Mongoose was formulated under the Kennedy administration to bring “the terrors of the earth” to
the Cuban people. [4] It has been called one of the worst cases of state sponsored terrorism of the 20th
century. [5] When Operation Mongoose ended, violent anti-Castro groups based in South Florida, such as Alpha 66 and Omega 7, took over
operations, often with the tacit approval and knowledge of local and federal authorities. In 1971, the village of Boca De Samá on the northeast
coast of Cuba was attacked, leaving two civilians dead and a dozen more injured. Alpha 66 continues to claim credit for this act of terrorism on
their website. [6]
A series of biological agents were purportedly introduced into Cuba in the 1970s,
harming a number of plants and animals. These biological attacks included an outbreak of swine fever that killed a half-million
pigs. Perhaps the worst case was the1981 epidemic of Dengue 2, totally unheard of in Cuba prior to this period. More
than 300,000 people were affected within a six-month period. An estimated 102 children died as a result of the disease.
Cuban-American Eduardo Arocena, former member of Omega 7, testified in 1984 that he travelled to
Cuba in 1980 to “introduce some germs” into the country to “start the chemical war,” —as reported
by The New York Times. [7] One of them was Dengue 2.¶ Havana and Varadero tourist facilities were targeted
during a 1997 bombing campaign, resulting in the death of Italian-Canadian businessman Fabio di Celmo when a bomb exploded
in the lobby of the Hotel Copacabana. Dozens were injured before the explosions ended with the arrests of a group of Salvadorians who later
testified they were being paid to plant the bombs. Claiming responsibility for the campaign was Luis Posada Carriles,
a Cuban-American long known for his violent actions against the Castro regime. He bragged to a The New York Times reporter that the intent of
the bombings was to discourage tourists from visiting the island just as Cuba was opening up the industry following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. [8]¶
In addition to the tourist attacks, former CIA agent, Posada Carriles, is infamously known for
his alleged masterminding of the bombing of Cubana Airlines flight 455 in October 1976, killing all 73
on board. The incident remains the second worst act of air terrorism in the Americas, exceeded only
by the attacks on 9/11. Evidence points to the involvement of Posada Carriles and fellow Cuban Orlando Bosch with organizing the
crime, based on extensive U.S. documentation. [9] Bosch passed away in his Florida residence a few years ago, while Posada Carriles continues
to live unfettered in Miami, despite requests for his extradition from the Cuban and Venezuelan governments. Cuba’s demands for Posada
Carriles to be brought to justice in part rest on former President George Bush Jr.’s own statement in 2003, “Any person, organization, or
government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent, and equally guilty of terrorist crimes.” [10]
The Cuban government was motivated by such acts of terrorism to send intelligence officers to Florida
to infiltrate violent anti-revolutionary organizations. The effort led to the arrest and conviction of five
Cuban nationals in 1998 on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage. Known as the Cuban Five, the
release of these agents, who were attempting to prevent further terrorist attacks on their country,
continues to be a high priority with Havana and adds another layer of complexity to rapprochement
between the two countries. Those close to the Cuban Five episode have always been troubled by the probity of the whole affair and
whether the entire trial was fixed by U.S. legal authorities as well as intelligence officials.¶ Since 1982, an assortment of
rationales has been posited to retain the island’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, mostly
based on expedient political considerations. Initially, it was the country’s support for revolutionary communist organizations
in the third world. When Castro himself renounced backing for insurgents after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, nothing
changed. Two long-standing justifications rest on Cuba’s permission to allow alleged Basque ETA terrorists to take up residence on the island in
the 1980s, and the harbouring of fugitives from American justice. What remains unsaid is the agreement between the then-Spanish
government of Felipe Gonzalez and Cuba to accept members of the separatist ETA Homeland and Freedom organization. [11] Of the fugitives
facing charges in the United States, some have lived in Cuba since the 1970s. While an extradition treaty between Cuba and the United States
that was signed in 1904 has never been abrogated, the treaty is considered non-operative and requests are handled on a case by case basis.
Despite this informal status, the Cuban side declared in 2005 that safe haven would no longer be provided to American fugitives. Cuba
continues to be interested in re-establishing the formal status of the extradition agreement as a means to secure the return of Posada Carriles
and others it considers terrorists residing in the United States.¶ Another pretext for maintaining Cuba on the list is that some members of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel group have been living in Cuba. This argument was considerably weakened last year
when peace talks began in Havana between the Colombian government and the FARC. Undoubtedly, the
most tenuous
rationalization followed the terrorist attacks on 9/11 when the United States claimed Cuba was not
sufficiently supportive of its war on terror, declaring the Castro government had undertaken little
effort to track or seize terrorist assets. A 2004 State Department report asserted that “Cuba continued to actively oppose the
U.S.-led coalition prosecuting the global war on terrorism.” [12] This reasoning has long been undermined by Fidel
Castro’s condemnation of the 2001 attack, pointing to his own country’s experiences in his call to
bolster efforts to eradicate all forms of terrorism.¶ Currently, an unrelated matter has been used to
justify non-engagement and for Cuba’s retention on the U.S. list of terrorist nations. American citizen Alan
Gross was jailed three years ago in Cuba for bringing in illegal telecommunication equipment under a
program financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)–a government organization supportive of regime
change on the island. Obama officials have repeatedly stated no improvement in relations can be achieved
with Gross in jail. Conversely, the Cuban side indicated there might be an opening in the case if
Havana were taken off the list. Chris Van Hollen, Democrat from Maryland, traveled to Havana recently, returning with expressions
of hope for an improved relationship with Cuba under the condition that, “the first step needs to be resolving Alan Gross’s situation.” [13] ¶
There is no sound argument for Cuba’s continued description as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Secretary of State Kerry has in his hands a method to end the moral duplicity and possibly help kick
start engagement. Kerry, an outspoken critic of what he has called “the failed Cuban policy,” publicly
stated his support for the end of travel restrictions and the elimination of the funding for the type of programs in which
Gross was involved. [14] He now has the opportunity to put rhetoric into reality, to demonstrate to Cuba and the rest of Latin America that
United States policy regarding their contentious neighbor to the south is moving into a new, more mature and constructive period.¶ More
Kerry should recommend removal from the list, because it is the morally right thing to do.
Terrorism is a serious, dangerous blight on modern society—it should not be used for purely political
motivations. Both countries have suffered from the scourge, but only one continues to be punished
unjustly by an arbitrary and mendacious designation, which is custom-tailored to serve the political
requirements of the hard-right Cuban-American community in Miami. Cuba’s inclusion on the list of
terrorist states is an outdated rhetorical invention sustained by a decades long antagonism between
importantly,
two opposing ideologies, which all along has impeded efforts to move towards an improvement in
relations. It is time for Cuba to be taken off the list.
2nd, One of the official justifications used for keeping Cuba on the list is a small
number of fugitives from the US living on the island: the classification of individuals
like Assata Shakur as “terrorists” demonstrates that the label isn’t about describing a
particular strategy- it can be attached to anyone who dissents against the status quo.
Pangburn, Editor of Death and Taxes, 2013
[DJ Pangburn, Editor, Death and Taxes Mag, and contributor at VICE, May 2013, VICE, “After Assata
Shakur, We Don't Know What a Terrorist Is Anymore” , http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/callingassata-shakur-a-terrorist-is-a-terrible-idea, accessed 6-25-13, Fontana]
And so we turn again to Assata Shakur.¶ As a former Black Panther, no doubt Shakur was (and still is) politically dissident. She
was also a member of the Black Liberation Army (BLA) and Republic of New Africa, an independent black
nation mapped out in 1969, with citizens in Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and other southern states
home to significant African-American populations. Her activities in the black power movement pushed her into
various forms of activism.¶ Shakur was suspected and tried for a number of crimes, many of which
ended in acquittal or dismissal. The one that stuck, however, was the murder conviction in the New
Jersey Turnpike Shootout in 1973, in which Shakur was present at the roadside murder of State Trooper Werner Foerster. Shakur
didn't fire a weapon at Foerster, and is said to have had her hands up when the shooting occurred.
Nonetheless, she was convicted as an accomplice to murder.¶ In 1979, Shakur escaped from prison, went underground for a
few years, resurfacing in Cuba in 1984, where she was granted political asylum. She believes, and perhaps quite rightly, that because
of politically-motivated government surveillance of her activities in the BLA, she didn't receive a fair
trial.¶ Do the regrettably violent actions of her fellow BLA member, Sundiata Acoli, render Shakur a
terrorist, simply because the BLA used violence in their open hostility to American government? They
called what they did “revolution,” and the federal government itself seems to have drawn a
distinction between that goal and domestic terrorism.¶ It's important to emphasize that the Black
Panthers and the off-shoot BLA were anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, anti-sexist, and generally socialist
in approach, but they were never labeled a terrorist group. The Black Panthers were diverse. Many branches around the
country were into community building like Free Breakfast for Children and anti-poverty programs.¶ There is plenty of literature available on the
Black Panthers and its various leaders and members, so there's really no need here to disprove the idea that they were a terrorist group. Some
members, including those who later formed BLA, may have adopted violent methods over the years, blurring the lines between
activism/dissidence and terrorism. But, on the whole, the Black Panthers were fighting the socio-political and cultural forces that they believed
were stifling African-Americans.¶ “I
have advocated and I still advocate revolutionary changes in the structure
and in the principles that govern the United States,” wrote Shakur in a 1998 letter to the Pope. “I advocate
self-determination for my people and for all oppressed inside the United States. I advocate an end to
capitalist exploitation, the abolition of racist policies, the eradication of sexism, and the elimination of
political repression. If that is a crime, then I am totally guilty.Ӧ According to FBI Special Agent Barbara Woodruff,
speaking to the Washington Post, from 1970 to 1984, the BLA pulled off 32 violent armed confrontations, four bombings, and four hijackings in
the US. Again, during that time, BLA was never labeled a domestic terrorist group, nor was Shakur. Was Shakur at the scene of the murder? Yes,
but she didn't fire a weapon–that distinction goes to Acoli. Does Shakur's conviction make her a terrorist? You decide.¶ Or rather, the FBI does.
Keep in mind that during the '70s Shakur
and the BLA, as well as many other political activist groups, were surveilled and
hounded by COINTELPRO, an FBI program that utilized illegal means and infiltration to disrupt and
subvert political organizations. COINTELPRO was known to have used such tactics as false evidence
and media reports, unwarranted search and seizure operations, and illegal surveillance, amongst
others. ¶ Take the case of Black Panther Elmer “Geronimo” Pratt. In 1972, Pratt was tried and convicted for the kidnap and murder of
Caroline Olsen. He spent 27 years in jail, but had his conviction vacated by the California Superior Court. Why? Prosecutors kept evidence from
the jury that would have led to Pratt's acquittal.¶ Shakur's
addition to the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list seems
like retroactive terrorist labeling, carried out by officials still smarting from Shakur's escape from
prison and justice. Understandable though it is, it comes off as scenery when one considers its implications for
political dissidence. It's a bit like Fox News' attempt to label Bill Ayers, a former leader of the Weather
Underground, a terrorist organization and, by extension, Barack Obama a terrorist sympathizer for
working with him in Chicago.¶ Americans, living in a country founded on a movement against tyranny, should turn a more
critical eye toward Assata Shakur's placement on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist list. They should think hard about the everexpanding definitions of “terrorist” and “terrorism,” and what that means for dissent against the
status quo.¶ The halcyon days of easily identifiable Islamic terrorism are over. Welcome to the new machine: In post-9/11
America, all dissidents are potential terrorists. And if one happens to be an activist or political
dissident in the United States, one should be prepared for the creative ways in which the government
will find a way to label such individuals and groups terrorists.¶ Would King George, were he alive today, have
called the American Revolutionaries–everyone from Thomas Paine to George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson–“terrorists”? Absolutely.
3rd, The designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism reveals the list to be both
over and under inclusive- South African support for terrorism was never condemned,
but ideological enemies of the US are labeled “terrorist sanctuaries”. This obscures
and distracts from direct state terrorism perpetrated or sponsored by the US.
Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 06
[Richard, December 18-20, in Michael Innes, (ed) Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe
Havens (Praeger Security International), “The State and Terrorist Sanctuaries: A Critical Analysis”,
http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1948/BISA-Paper-2006-JacksonFinal.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/25/13, VJ]
Political Bias A related problem for the “terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse is that it has always been
plagued by a certain political bias and selectivity. For example, an analysis of the mainstream terrorism
literature during the cold war demonstrates that terrorism experts regularly identified Iran, Libya,
Cuba, the Soviet Union and many other mainly communist countries as “state sponsors‟ of
“international terrorism‟, but failed to include countries like Israel or South Africa – despite the fact
that South Africa, for example, not only engaged in numerous acts of terrorism against dissidents in
neighbouring states but also sponsored movements like Unita and Renamo who engaged in extensive
terrorism. Similarly, Israeli support for various Christian militants in Lebanon is rarely discussed as
state sponsorship of terrorism, despite the widely accepted evidence of Israeli involvement in the
Sabra and Shatilla massacres, for example. The “terrorist sanctuaries‟ literature from this period also
focused heavily on the assistance provided by states like Libya and Syria to groups like the PLO, but
failed to discuss U.S. support for groups like Unita, the Afghan mujahaddin, anti-Castro groups and the
Contras, despite the fact these groups engaged in numerous acts of terrorism, including planting carbombs in markets, kidnappings, civilian massacres and blowing up civilian airliners.66 Many would
argue that from this perspective, the “terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse has functioned ideologically to
distract from and deny the long history of the West’s direct involvement in state terrorism and its
support and sanctuary for a number of mainly anti-communist terrorist groups. Western involvement
in terrorism has a long but generally ignored history, which includes: the extensive use of official terror
by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the U.S. and other colonial powers in numerous countries
throughout the colonial period;67 U.S. support and sanctuary for a range of right-wing insurgent
groups like the Contras and the Mujahideen during the cold war, many of whom regularly committed
terrorist acts;68 U.S. tolerance of Irish Republican terrorist activity in the U.S.;69 U.S. support for
systematic state terror by numerous right-wing regimes across the world, perhaps most notoriously El
Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia and Iran;70 British support for Loyalist terrorism in Northern
Ireland71 and various other „Islamist‟ groups in Libya and Bosnia, among others;72 Spanish state terror
during the „dirty war‟ against ETA;73 French support for terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the
Rainbow Warrior bombing; Italian sponsorship of right-wing terrorists; and Western support for
accommodation with terrorists following the end of several high profile wars74 – among many other
examples. In short, there is no denying that the discourse has often been used in a highly selective and
hypocritical manner to highlight some acts of terror whilst selectively ignoring others. Arguably, this
political bias continues today: the Taliban forces in Afghanistan are more often described as terrorists
than insurgents, while various warlords, including General Rashid Dostum, are rarely called terrorists,
despite overwhelming evidence of the use of terror and intimidation against civilians by many Afghan
warlords.75 This situation is mirrored in Somalia, where the Islamist Al Itihad Al Islamiya group is
typically described as a terrorist organisation with links to al Qaeda, while U.S.-supported Somali
warlords who also use violence against civilians are exempted from the terrorist label.76 Similarly,
Cuba remains on the State Department‟s list of “state sponsors of terrorism‟ largely because it hosts
a few former ETA members, but continued U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro terrorists,77
former Latin American state terrorists78 and other assorted Asian anticommunist groups79 is
completely ignored. And Iran and Syria‟s sponsorship of Palestinian terrorist groups is the subject of
substantial academic analysis, while Pakistan‟s support for Kashmiri militants rarely featured in the first
few years of the „war on terror‟ – although it is now an increasingly prominent point of contention.80
Most glaringly, and as already mentioned, the state terror of countries like Uzbekistan, Colombia and
Indonesia – and continued tolerance and support for it from the U.S.81 – is simply never discussed in
the mainstream “terrorist sanctuaries‟ literature. The result of these omissions is a discourse that for
whatever reasons appears to many outside observers as biased towards official U.S. views. From a
discourse analytic perspective, it can be argued that the “terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse is always in
danger of promoting a narrow set of partisan interests and discrete political projects. For example, the
discourse describes an almost infinite number of potential “terrorist sanctuaries‟ or “havens‟, each of
which then logically becomes a legitimate target for various kinds of counter-terrorism measures. As
noted above, the literature identifies a large list of potential „terrorist havens‟, including: all failed,
weak or poor states; the widely accepted list of state sponsors of terrorism; a much longer list of passive
state sponsors of terrorism; states with significant Muslim populations; Islamic charities and NGOs;
informal, unregulated banking and economic systems; the media; the internet; diasporas in western
countries; groups and regions characterised by poverty and unemployment; the criminal world; radical
Islamist organisations; mosques and Islamic schools; insurgent and revolutionary movements; and
„extremist‟ ideologies – among others. The identification of these groups and domains as “terrorist
sanctuaries‟ or “havens‟ consequently functions to permit a range of restrictive and coercive actions
against them – all in the name of counter-terrorism. That is, the discourse can be deployed politically
in a variety of ways: domestically for example, it can be used to discipline society, demonise dissent,
control the media, enhance the powers of the security services, centralise executive power, create a
surveillance society and expand state regulation of social life. In addition to this broad legitimating
function, the “terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse can also support a range of discrete political projects
and partisan interests, including: re-targeting the focus of military force from dissident groups and
individuals (which privileges law enforcement) to states (which privileges the powerful militaryindustrial complex); legitimating broader counter-insurgency programmes where the real aims lie in
the maintenance of a particular political-economic order;82 de-legitimising all forms of counterhegemonic or revolutionary struggle, thereby functioning as a means of maintaining the liberal
international order; and selectively justifying projects of regime change,83 economic sanctions,
military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the
isolation of disapproved political movements. In the end, the discourse functions – in its present form –
to permit the extension of state hegemony both internationally and domestically. Far from being an
objective academic analysis therefore, it may serve a number of distinctly ideological purposes.
Moreover, the focus on state-sponsored terrorism rather than direct state terrorism
betrays the state-centric priorities of orthodox terrorism experts. Our affirmative is a
necessary corrective to this silence on state terror.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 7
[Richard, March 3, 2007, International Studies Association, “Terrorism Studies and the Politics
of State Power,”http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1951/ISA-2007-PaperCTS-Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/28/13, AS]
Both past and more recent review exercises of the terrorism studies field have revealed an ¶
embarrassing list of methodological and analytical problems, including: its poor research ¶ methods
and procedures, particularly its over-reliance on secondary information and ¶ general failure to
undertake primary research;4¶ its failure to develop an accepted ¶ definition of terrorism and
subsequent failure to develop rigorous theories and concepts;5¶ the descriptive, narrative and
condemnatory character of much of its output; its ¶ dominance by orthodox international relations
approaches and general lack of interdisciplinarity; its ahistoricity and tendency to treat contemporary
terrorism as a „new‟ ¶ phenomenon that started on September 11, 2001;6¶ its restricted research
focus on a few ¶ topical subjects and its subsequent failure to fully engage with a range of other
important ¶ topics,¶ 7¶ not least the issue of state terrorism;8¶ and its strong prescriptive focus9¶ – among
¶ Others However, a much more serious problem for the field is that it has, for the most ¶ part, adopted
state-centric priorities and perspectives on terrorism. Within the literature, ¶ terrorism is seen as an
illegitimate form of political violence practiced mainly by nonstate actors; moreover, it is viewed as a
kind of asymmetric warfare waged against ¶ (mainly democratic) states and societies. It is also viewed
as posing a serious, even ¶ existential threat to the survival of liberal democratic states, and thus,
extraordinary state ¶ counter-terrorism efforts are considered to be de facto necessary and legitimate. ¶
Importantly, it is assumed that one of the key purposes of terrorism studies is to provide ¶ policyrelevant research to aid the authorities in their counter-terrorism campaign.¶ Partly as a consequence
of its inherent state-centricity, there is a tendency by ¶ many terrorism scholars to uncritically
reproduce a number of accepted assumptions, ¶ narratives and discursive formations, thereby
constructing and maintaining a particular ¶ kind of terrorism “knowledge‟. A series of studies on the
academic and political ¶ discourses of terrorism11 reveals that the field as a whole tends to continuously
reproduce a series of core assumptions, narratives and discursive formations about terrorism which ¶
have subsequently been accepted as „knowledge‟. For example, a great deal of past and ¶ recently
published terrorism research unreflectively takes as its starting point the ¶ assumption that terrorism
can be understood and studied objectively and scientifically ¶ without political bias. As mentioned,
terrorism studies also tends to treat terrorism as ¶ primarily a form of illegitimate non-state political
violence; when state terrorism is ¶ discussed, it is usually limited to descriptions of “state-sponsored
terrorism ” by so-called ¶ “rogue states‟. The deafening silence on the direct use of terrorism by
states within the ¶ literature is underpinned by a strong belief that liberal democratic states in
particular ¶ never engage in terrorism as a matter of policy, only in error or misjudgement.
4th, being listed as a state sponsor of terrorism triggers a number of automatic
sanctions with devastating economic consequences- it requires the US to oppose any
loans to Cuba, financial restrictions prevent normal banking transactions, and dual-use
restrictions prevent importation of critical medical supplies.
Bolender, Scholar at Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 13
[Keith, 4-22-13, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “The Terrorist List, and Terrorism as Practiced Against
Cuba,” http://www.coha.org/22355/, accessed 6-25-13, YGS]
Of all the components to the United States hostile strategy against Cuba, nothing raises the ire of the
Castro government more than its inclusion on the State Department’s list of states that sponsor
terrorism. The designation is seen by Havana as an impediment towards improving relations and as a
cruel hypocrisy that provides political cover for Washington to justify the imposition of economic
penalties along with the perpetuation of anti-revolutionary propaganda.¶ There is an opportunity to
eliminate that stumbling block in the next few weeks, if newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry decides to recommend
Cuba’s deletion from the list to President Obama. Kerry has until the release of the State Department’s annual terror report on April 30 to make
the determination of whether Cuba will remain on the terrorist list. High
ranking Cuban officials are closely watching this
development, indicating the removal could offer an opportunity to re-engage with the United States. [1]¶
The history of Cuba’s controversial inclusion goes back to 1982, the same year Iraq was taken off the list by the Reagan administration.
Besides Cuba, only Sudan, Iran, and Syria continue to be labeled as state sponsors of terrorism. North
Korea was dropped in 2008, while Pakistan, long the home of Osama Bin Laden and recognized as a
haven for Islamic terrorists, has never been considered. Saudi Arabia, where the majority of the 9/11
terrorists came from, is looked upon as a staunch ally of the United States.¶ There are numerous
reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real economic
consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the
World Bank or other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been
using Cuba’s inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for Havana to conduct normal banking
transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments, regardless of which currency is being used.
Furthermore, the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list
(which the Castro government has experienced since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as
prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military dual use,
including hospital equipment. For example, the William Soler children’s hospital in Havana was
labeled a ‘denied hospital’ in 2007 by the State Department, bringing with it serious ramifications.
Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain, resulting in the deaths of
children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions. [2] For Cuba,
these restrictions are additionally damaging as the island continues to suffer from the comprehensive
embargo the United States has imposed since the early 1960s.
This direct violence against the Cuban people is a form of economic terrorism, but is
concealed by both the status quo definitions of terrorism and an ethically bankrupt
form of consequentialism that excuses this violence in the name of national security.
Kauzlarich, professor of sociology @ Southern Illinois, et al, 01
[David, Rick A. Matthews, Ohio University, William J. Miller, professor @ Carthage College, 2001, Critical
Criminology, “Toward A Victimology of State Crime”,
http://jthomasniu.org/class/781/Assigs/kauzvictimology.pdf, accessed 7-1-13, GSK]
Propositions about the victimology of state crime can be developed from this review to help shed light on the larger phenomenon of state
crime victimization, although a caveat is in order because
state crime takes a variety of forms. For instance, it is difficult
to compare the victimology of international economic terrorism against the people of Cuba and Iraq to
institutionalized racism, sexism, and classism, or the suffering of human radiation subjects to unjust criminal
justice system practices. Nevertheless, several general propositions about the victims of state crime may be
formulated based on current and prior research in the area.¶ (1) Victims of State Crime Tend to be among the Least
Socially Powerful Actors¶ Even a cursory examination of state crime reveals large power differences between the victim and
victimizer. The authority of the state extends well beyond crude asymmetries in the ability to control
others, and constitutional and due process protections also vary relative to the power of subjects.¶ State officers,
agencies, and organizations often exploit scarce resources to advance larger agendas through the use of
specialized terminology, scientific knowledge, and information technology. Clearly the victims of the human radiation
experiments, those harmed by environmental degradation, atomic and nuclear weapons tests, and the
COINTELPRO, did not have the resources to marshal commensurate levels of technological,
terminological, or scientific expertise. The state also has the ability to conceal illegalities and
immoralities by privileging concerns about “national security” over humane, fair, and due processes. In
the case of those victimized by criminal justice and the prison experiments, one senses a great deal of dehumanization and
ideology, which allows unjust practices and policies to flourish.¶ Victims of other state crimes – such as civilians in war,
people targeted for genocide, workers, and the homeless – also have less social power than state agencies and officials. Scapegoating,
stereotyping, profiling, and typifying people belonging to these groups is far easier for the state
because of broad asymmetries in power. It is therefore not surprising that galvanizing support for unethical and
illegal practices and policies against these groups is not difficult for the state. As a result, the likelihood of the legitimation of a crisis
or substantial social protest movements is diminished. It also militates against conceptualizing unjust state actions as
crime. One can see evidence of this process at work in the cases of economic and domestic terrorism and
the support of terrorism abroad.¶ More broadly, there seems to be a positive relationship between the
unequal distribution of power and the level and frequency of state crime, both domestically and internationally. Clearly,
social power is unevenly distributed among states as well, providing further opportunities for state crime.¶ The United States has more
control over the definition, enforcement, and prosecution of state crime than most countries. The World
Court, the United Nations’ Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund are likely to support
U.S. interests. With few exceptions, peripheral and semi-peripheral states are less likely to have any victimization
by the U.S. acknowledged and redressed. There is a direct link between U.S. supported and enforced sanctions against Iraq and
the death of innocent Iraqi children because of starvation. Sanctions against the Cuban people have also resulted in
social and physical harms.¶ Authority-subject relationships (Turk 1969) in an international context help
explain how these harms are marginalized in popular U.S. discourses:¶ The claims-making and legitimation exercises
of the authority (the U.S. state) are seldom met with organized opposition by subjects. If there is a sizeable movement against
U.S. policy and practice, citizens might either be unaware of its existence or may perceive opposition as the work of
radicals disconnected with reality (Iraqi politicians, Castro, prisoners’ rights, welfare rights, and anti-nuclear weapons groups).
Social harms and higher immoralities might therefore be overlooked, or even worse, supported because of the
apparent lack of overt conflict over the policy or practice. This makes it appear as though the harms are actually necessary,
fair, and consensus-based.¶ U.S. public support of the Gulf War is most illustrative of this point. ¶ (2) Victimizers Generally Fail
to Recognize and Understand the Nature, Extent, and Harmfulness of Institutional Policies. If Suffering and Harm
are Acknowledged, It Is often Neutralized within the Context of a Sense of “Entitlement”¶ The most important
difference between victimizers and their victims is the power to exert their will. Victimizers often do not acknowledge the degree
to which their policies have caused harm while assessing the effectiveness of their policies to bring about
desired change, maintain hegemony, or promote other forms of dominance. Unjust and deleterious domestic and
international policies can also be downplayed by neutralizing reasonable categorical imperatives (e.g. do no
harm) by employing bankrupt consequentialism, perhaps guided by ethnocentric paternalism. Following
Sykes and Matza¶ (1957), others have found evidence of this at work in the wider problem of elite deviance. Denying responsibility,
dehumanizing the powerless for purposes of exploitation, and appealing to higher loyalties (i.e. the capitalist political economy and national
security) are often employed in the victimology of state crime. Specialized vocabularies may also be used to aide in the
dehumanization.¶ Tifft and Markham (1991) have noted that the way policy makers neutralize the destructive and harmful effects of their
policies is similar to the manner batterers view their victims. Noting
the long history of U.S. abuses in¶ Latin and Central
America, they argue that:¶ U.S. policy makers have consciously decided (1) that the U.S. is entitled to control
Central America and that the peoples of Central America are obligated to acquiesce in this power exercise; (2) that
violence is permissible, and policy makers can live with themselves and conclude that they are
ethical/moral persons and that these policies are ethical/moral even if they involve violence; (3) that the
use of violence, intimidation, and threat of violence will produce the desired effect or minimize a more negative
one; and (4) that the policy of violence and control will not unduly endanger the United States, and the country will
neither sustain physical harm nor suffer legal, economic, or political consequences that will outweigh the benefits achieved through this
violence (Tifft and Markham¶ 1991: 125–126).¶ Similarly, Cohen (1996) has documented how governments construct offi-cial responses to
allegations of human rights violations. Cohen (1996: 522) contends that the forms of denial on the part of governmental officials to such
allegations typically include one of the following: “a literal denial (nothing happened); interpretive denial (what happened is really something
else); and implicatory denial (what happened is justified).” ¶ At the domestic level, few
policy makers have recognized that the
cumulative effects of the policies supportive of institutionalized racism and structural inequality have
caused considerable harm to various minority groups and women. Often times, the victims are viewed as
undeserving or unworthy of the social, political, or economic rights bestowed to others.¶ (3) Victims of State Crime are
often Blamed for Their Suffering¶ Victim blaming is unfortunately a common reaction to those most wounded by state crime. The
poor, minorities, the homeless, and women become targets of criticism because of the false belief in the ease of achieving vertical
intergenerational mobility in the U.S., even in the face of overwhelming structural odds. Prisoners and those
accused of crimes are
less likely to be treated sympathetically because their assigned master status solipsistically leads to a
marginalization of their human worth, morality, and potential. Subjects in the prisoner experiments were viewed as less
deserving of informed consent at best and expendable at worst.¶ Harms caused by economic terrorism and the support
of anti-democratic governments can be neutralized by popular audiences (and victimizers) as a part of the
United States’ interests in national security or the previously mentioned technique of neutralization, “appealing to higher
loyalties.” The harms caused by sanctions in Cuba and Iraq are good examples because, while they are easy to see,
there is a tendency to assume victim responsibility on the part of citizens because they have not
waged successful civil insurrections against their oppressors.¶ (4) Victims of State Crime Must
Generally Rely on the Victimizer, an Associated Institution, or Civil Social Movements for Redress¶ Theoretically,
the U.S. criminal justice system carries out the criminalization process in the name of the state, not the particular victim. The “people” are
identified as the abstracted victim. What
happens, however, when “the people” or a group of peoples are victimized by
the body who holds dominion over them and the law? What institutionalized justice process is available to the victim?¶
Often times, as in the case of the prisoner and plutonium experiments, and some instances of racial and gender discrimination, reparations may
come about in civil court, and often involve the efforts of special interest groups, people in social movements, and of course private attorneys.
In other cases, appeal
may be made to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, through the United Nations General
Assembly, or the International Court of Justice. The opportunities for international redress of domestic
victimi-zation, to some extent, depend on the primary state’s membership status.¶ For example, the United States
did not ratify the Genocide Convention for decades because it sought to limit “foreign intrusion” into what were defined as domestic affairs.
Citizens victimized in countries with tenuous or marginal standing in the international community as it pertains to human rights may therefore
find little in the way of assistance.¶ The most potentially dangerous act that could ever by undertaken by a state, the use of nuclear weapons,
has recently been criminalized through this latter avenue. Six billion people still live under the nuclear threat, but at least one organization of
legitimate authority, the World Court, has conceptualized the entire world population as potential victims of state crime by declaring the use
and threat to use nuclear weapons illegal under international law (see Kramer and Kauzlarich 1999). More often than not, however,
international organizations like the U.N. have been slow to enforce existing laws or to punish nationstates that are powerful. For example, each year, the U.N. General Assembly has voted to condemn the U.S.
embargo on Cuba, but no official action has been taken by the U.N. to end it. In short, there is little hope of formal
intervention on the part of the international community when the offending state is powerful like the U.S. On another level, U.S.
opposition to international agreements because of the state’s fear of the loss of sovereignty (no matter
how slight) also thwart the materializing of democratic and restorative justice. ¶ In any case, the process of helping
victims or even ending the victimization of state crime is very different than in cases of traditional or white-collar crime. This stems from
problems related to the identification of the actors, organizations, and institutional forces responsible for state crime, if the policy, actions, or
(5) Victims of State Crime Are Easy
Targets for Repeated Victimization¶ The manner in which victims of state crime are harmed may
omissions are even recognized as unethical, harmful, criminal, or worthy of resistance.¶
change over time; however, the harm incurred by most victims of state crime does not decrease – rather it merely
takes another form. Additionally, some victims are continually victimized by the same organization. Examples include women, minorities, the
poor, workers, and those living in less developed countries, in much the same manner as some victims of traditional street crime (e.g., domestic
violence and child abuse) who are targeted for repeat victimization.¶ In the cases of the poor, there have been few genuine attempts to
alleviate the structural conditions that create abject poverty (Bohm 1993). Women have faced institutional sexism and the “glass ceiling” in
spite of superficial efforts designed to give them equal status in society. Minorities have long been the targets of overt and institutionalized
racism. While some have argued that affirmative action policies have eliminated the effects of racism, institutionalized racism persists in spite
of the progress which has been made. Native Americans have been repeatedly victimized throughout U.S. history, and remain one of the most
repressed minority groups in our society (Churchill¶ 1995).¶ Another example is the repeated victimization of the plutonium subjects and their
families, who continued to be treated unethically by state agencies for decades. Several years after the deaths of many of the plutonium
subjects, the families were sent a letter from the Atomic Energy Commission, which exhumed the bodies for additional research:¶ The purpose
of the exhumation was to examine the remains in order to determine ...residual radioactivity from past medical treatment, and that the
subjects had an unknown mixture of radioactive isotopes (Advisory Committee on Human. Radiation Experiments 1995: 260).¶ Two willful lies
are told in this memo: (1) that the subjects were treated, and (2) that they had received an unknown quantity of radiation. The truth is this: (a)
the subjects were guinea pigs not expected to react favorably to the injections, and (b) internal records clearly showed how much plutonium
had been injected into their veins (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). Rowland provides further evidence of higher immorality when he wrote to his
colleagues about the exhumation project:¶ Please note that outside the Center ... we will never use the word plutonium in regard to these
cases. “These individuals are of interest to us because they may have received a radioactive material at some time is the kind of statement to
(6) Illegal State Policies and Practices, while Committed
Manifestations of the Attempt to Achieve Organizational,
Bureaucratic, or Institutional Goals¶ A recurrent theme has been that the harms caused by the state are due to the actions of
be made, if we need to say anything at all” (Markey¶ Report 1986: 27).¶
by Individuals and Groups of Individuals, Are
individuals or groups of individuals who are pursuing the larger goals of their respective organizations. These larger institutional goals may or
may not be consistent with the goals of particular individuals. Rather
than viewing the harm to the victims of state
crime as the result of a few people engaging in immoral, unethical, and/or illegal behavior, it is more
instructive to conceptualize state crime as the product of organizational pressures to achieve organizational
goals. Many forms of state crime persist for long periods of time (e.g., Iran-Contra, the economic embargo
against Cuba, institutionalized discrimination in the criminal justice system), and are carried out by many different actors. If
the unethical, immoral, and/or illegal behavior in question were the result of a handful of people, then one would presume that either the
activities would desist once those people left the organization or that there would be other people waiting to fill those roles.¶ Since
many
different people filling various roles, one can only presume that either there
are a lot of immoral people who come into positions of power to carry out the immoral or unethical behavior, or that there is
something about the organizational culture itself which fosters such immorality. In the best case, the
organization itself has a problem screening out immoral/unethical decision-makers. In the worst case,
the organizational climate itself fosters, facilitates, or encourages such behavior (e.g., see Braithwaite 1989: Ermann and
Lundman 1996).¶ Also, to reduce state crimes to the individual level is to ignore the social, political, and
historical contexts which shape the nature, form, and goals of state agencies. Even a cursory examination of the
various forms of state crime reveals that these larger contexts are macrologically linked to state crime
victimization and offending. Sometimes these contexts are exigent, such as when cold war hysteria provided motivation for illegal
and unethical human radiation experiments, weapons testing, and environmental degradation. Other times, the crimes may be
politically and geographically contextualized (i.e., Cuba’s proximity to the U.S.). The state, therefore, may be
state crimes persist over time with
instrumental in creating and sustaining the conditions that account for the persistence of institutional harms caused by its agencies.
The impact is state terrorism, one of the greatest sources of human suffering in
history. Empirically, this has vastly outweighed the violence done by non-state actors.
Jackson et al 10
[Richard, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political
Violence and Reader in Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Eamon Murphy is Professor of History and
International Relations at Curtin University of Technology in Western Australia, and Scott Poynting is
Professor in Sociology, Manchester Metropolitan University, “Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory
and Practice, p. 1 ]
By all accounts, state terrorism has been one of the greatest sources of human suffering and
destruction of the past five centuries. Employing extreme forms of exemplary violence against ordinary
people and specific groups in order to engender political submission to newly formed nation states,
transfer populations, and generate labour in conquered colonial territories, imperial powers and early
modem states killed literally tens of millions of people and destroyed entire civilizations and peoples
across the Americas, the Asia-Pacific, the subcontinent, the Middle East, and Africa. Later, during the
twentieth century, modem states were responsible for the deaths of 170 million to 200 million people
outside of war (Rummel 1994), a great many of them murdered during notorious campaigns of state
terrorism such as Stalin's great terror, Mao's Great Leap Forward, and Kampuchea's return to Year Zero,
and the rule of various dictatorial regimes in Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Uganda, Somalia, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq and dozens of other countries. During the great wars of the twentieth century, millions of
civilians were killed in atomic attacks and 'terror bombing' campaigns designed specifically to
undermine morale and intimidate into submission — a case of randomly killing some people in order to
influence others, which is the essence of the terrorist strategy (Grosscup 2006). Disturbingly, state
terrorism remains as one of the single greatest threats to human and societal security and well- being
today. Certainly, in comparison to the terrorism perpetrated by non-state insurgent groups, the few
thousand deaths and injuries caused by 'terrorism from below' every year pales into relative
insignificance besides the hundreds of thousands of people killed, kidnapped, 'disappeared', injured,
tortured, raped, abused, intimidated, and threatened by state agents and their proxies in dozens of
countries across the globe in places like Chechnya, Kashmir, Palestine, Iraq, Colombia, Zimbabwe,
Darfur, Congo, Somalia, Uzbekistan, China and elsewhere. Even more disturbingly, government-directed
campaigns of counter-terrorism in the past few decades have frequently descended into state
terrorism by failing to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, responding highly
disproportionately to acts of insurgent violence, and aiming to terrify or intimidate the wider
population or particular communities into submission (Goodin 2006: 69—73). Consequently, the victims
of state counter-terrorism have always vastly outnumbered the deaths caused by non-state or
insurgent terrorism, including in the ongoing global war on terrorism.
Silence on state terror reifies these state-centric perspectives and diverts attention
from direct state violence. This definitional control over legitimate forms of violence
is the condition of possibility for state terrorism to occur.
Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 09
[Richard, March 18th, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 1 Issue 3, “The ghosts of state terror:
knowledge, politics and terrorism studies”, p 385-356, accessed 6/27/13, VJ]
In contrast to first-order critique, second-order critique involves the adoption of a critical standpoint
outside of the discourse. In this case, based on an understanding of discourse as socially productive or
constitutive, and fully cognisant of the knowledge–power nexus, a second-order critique attempts to
expose the political functions and ideological consequences of the particular forms of representation
enunciated by the discourse. In this case, we want to try and understand what some of the political
effects and consequences of the silences of state terrorism are. A number of such effects can be
identified. First, the discourse naturalises a particular understanding of what terrorism is, namely, a
form of illegitimate non-state violence. Such an understanding of terrorism functions to restrict the
scholarly viewpoint to one set of actors and to particular kinds of actions, and functions to distract and
obscure other actors and actions which should be named and studied as ‘terrorism’. It also narrows
the possibilities for understanding terrorism within alternative paradigms, such as from the perspective
of gender terrorism (Sharlach 2008). In other words, it has a restrictive and distorting effect within the
field of knowledge which gives the impression that terrorism studies is more of a narrow extension of
counter-insurgency or national security studies than an open and inclusive domain of research into all
forms and aspects of terrorism. Consequently, Silke (2001) concludes that terrorism studies ‘is largely
driven by policy concerns’ and ‘largely limited to government agendas’ (p. 2). In addition, the broader
academic, social, and cultural influence of terrorism studies (through the authority and legitimacy
provided by ‘terrorism experts’ to the media and as policy advisers, for example), means that this
restrictive viewpoint is diffused to the broader society, which in turn generates its own ideological
effects. Specifically, the distorted focus on non-state terrorism functions to reify state perspectives
and priorities, and reinforce a state-centric, problem-solving paradigm of politics in which ‘terrorism’
is viewed as an identifiable social or individual problem in need of solving by the state, and not as a
practice of state power, for example. From this perspective, it functions to maintain the legitimacy of
state uses of violence and delegitimise all forms of non-state violence (which has its own ideological
effects and is problematic in a number of obvious ways). This fundamental belief in the instrumental
rationality of political violence as an effective and legitimate tool of the state is open to a great many
criticisms, not least that it provides the normative basis from which non-state terrorist groups
frequently justify their own (often well-intentioned) violence (Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005, Burke
2008). There is from this viewpoint an ethical imperative to try and undermine the widespread
acceptance that political violence is a mostly legitimate and effective option in resolving conflict – for
either state or non-state actors. Political violence is in fact, a moral and physical disaster in the vast
majority of cases. From an ethical-normative perspective, such a restricted understanding of terrorism
also functions to obscure and silence the voices and perspectives of those who live in conditions of
daily terror from the random and arbitrary violence of their own governments, some of whom are
supported by Western states. At the present juncture, it also functions to silence the voices of those
who experience Western policies – directly, as in those tortured in the war on terror, and indirectly, as
in those suffering under Western-supported regimes – as a form of terrorism. That is, it deflects and
diverts attention from the much greater state terrorism which blights the lives of tens of millions of
people around the world today. Related to these broader normative and ideological effects, the
treatment of state terrorism within the discourse – the silences on it and the narrow construction of
‘state-sponsored terrorism’ – also functions to position state terrorism (should it even exist within the
dominant framework) as seemingly less important than non-state terrorism, and as confined to the
actions that states take in support of non-state terrorism. This also distorts the field of knowledge and
political practice by suggesting that the sponsorship of Palestinian groups by Iran for example, is an
infinitely more serious and dangerous problem than the fact that millions of Colombians, Uzbeks,
Zimbabweans, and so on, are daily terrorised by death squads, state torture, and serious human rights
abuses. Within this discursive terrain, it can also function to provide legitimacy to Western policies such
as sanctions, coercive diplomacy, and pre-emptive war against politically determined ‘state-sponsors of
terrorism’ which may be terroristic themselves, and which ignore the involvement in state-sponsorship
by Western states. From a political-normative viewpoint, the silence on state terrorism, and in
particular the argument of many terrorism scholars that state actions can never be defined as
‘terrorism’, actually functions to furnish states with a rhetorical justification for using what may
actually be terroristic forms of violence against their opponents and citizens without fear of
condemnation. In effect, it provides them with greater leeway for applying terror-based forms of
violence against civilians, a leeway exploited by many states such as Israel, Russia, China, Uzbekistan,
Zimbabwe, and others who try to intimidate groups with the application of massive and
disproportionate state violence. From this perspective, a discourse which occludes and obscures the
very possibility of state terrorism can be considered part of the conditions that actually makes state
terrorism possible. In addition, the silence on state terrorism within the field also functions to
undermine the political struggle of human rights activists against the use of terror by states by
disallowing the delegitimising power and resources that come from describing state actions as
‘terrorism’. It is pertinent to note in this context that the world’s leading states have continually rejected
any and all attempts to legally define and proscribe a category of actions which would be called ‘state
terrorism’, arguing instead that such actions are already covered by other laws such as the laws of war
(Becker 2006). The silence on state terrorism has another political effect, namely, the way in which it
has functioned, and continues to function, to distract from and deny the long history of Western
involvement in terrorism, thereby constructing Western foreign policy as essentially benign – rather
than aimed at reifying existing structures of power and domination in the international system, for
example. That is, by preventing the effective criticism of particular Western policies it works to
maintain the dangerous myth of Western exceptionalism. This sense of exceptionalism and the
supportive discourse of terrorism studies permits Western states and their allies to pursue a range of
discrete political projects and partisan interests aimed at maintaining international dominance. For
example, by reinforcing the notion that non-state terrorism is a much greater threat and problem than
state terrorism and by obscuring the ways in which counterterrorism can morph into state terrorism,
the discourse functions to legitimise the current war on terror and its associated policies of military
intervention, extraordinary rendition, reinforcement of the national security state, and the like. More
specifically, the discourse can provide legitimacy to broader counter-insurgency or counterterrorism
programmes where the actual aims lie in the maintenance of a particular political–economic order
such as is occurring in Colombia at present (Stokes 2006). Importantly, the silence on state terrorism
also functions to de-legitimise all forms of violent counter-hegemonic or revolutionary struggle (by
maintaining the notion that state violence is automatically legitimate and all non-state violence is
inherently illegitimate), thereby maintaining the liberal international order and many oppressive
international power structures (also Duffield 2001). Lastly, the discourse can be used to selectively
justify particular projects of regime change,13 economic sanctions, military base expansion, military
occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the isolation of disapproved political
movements such as Hamas or Hezbollah. In the end, the discourse functions to permit the reification
and extension of state hegemony both internationally and domestically, and perhaps more
importantly, the belief in the instrumental rationality of violence as an effective tool of politics. Despite
the intentions of terrorism scholars therefore, who may feel that they engage in objective academic
analysis of a clearly defined phenomenon, the discourse actually serves a number of distinctly political
purposes and has several important ideological consequences for society.
Terrorism is a social construction, not a brute fact- it doesn’t exist outside of the
definitions we ascribe to it. Our aff is an intervention into the status quo discursive
practices that have defined terrorism in a politicized and state-centric way.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 8
[Richard, 2008, “An Argument for Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 2: Number 2,
pg N/A, AS]
Much more significantly however, terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon
which can be defined in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself. It lacks a clear
ontological status—which actually makes an objective definition impossible. As two leading figures in
the field put it, "The nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act…
can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance".[25] The bombing of civilians for
example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it may be the unintentional consequence of a
military operation during war.¶ The reality is that terrorism is a social fact rather than a brute fact.
Although acts of violence are experienced as brute facts, the wider cultural-political meaning of those
acts as "terrorism" for example, is decided through symbolic labelling, social agreement and a range of
inter-subjective practices. That is, as a phenomenon, terrorism is constituted by and through the
discursive practices which make it a concrete reality for politicians, law enforcement officials, the
media, the public, academics and so on. We can identify a number of processes by which certain acts
and individuals are constructed as "terrorism" and "terrorists", including:¶ · The labelling of certain
acts and groups as such by authoritative actors, such as the annual State Department reports;¶ · The
legal definitions contained within criminal and international law;¶ · The compiling of statistics on
terrorism by the CIA, RAND, and various academics and think-tanks;¶ · The ascriptions of different groups
and acts as "terrorist" in the media;¶ · And the like.¶ Actions and actors are constituted and
reconstituted as terrorism in a continuous flow of social and political discourse. Moreover, analyses of
these discourses reveal significant variation and instabilities between and within institutions, as well
as shifts over time in the way terrorism is discursively constructed and delineated.[26] For example,
before the late 1960s, there was virtually no "terrorism" spoken of by politicians, the media or
academics; there were instead numerous references to "bombings", "kidnappings", "assassinations",
"hijackings" and so on.[ 27] The current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the
media is in fact, a very recent invention. Similarly, in the 1980s, the Afghan Mujahidin were described as
"freedom fighters"[28] before they were later reconstructed as "Islamic terrorists". Numerous other
groups and states have experienced the same kind of discursive transformation from "terrorist" or
"state-sponsor of terrorism" to "freedom fighter", "political leader" or "ally in the War on Terror".¶ In an
important sense, terrorism does not exist outside of the definitions and practices that seek to enclose
it. In the same way that "races" do not exist objectively as a meaningful way of assigning identities and
behavioural characteristics to individuals, but classifications of humankind do, so too "terrorism" does
not exist as a kind of essential marker—even if classifications of different forms of political violence
do.[29] A pertinent illustration of the ontological instability of the terrorism label is the observation that
there are no less than four recognised "terrorists" who have gone on to win the Nobel Peace Prize:
Menachim Begin, Sean McBride, Nelson Mandela and Yassir Arafat.[30] In other words, even within the
confines of contemporary terrorism discourse, "once a terrorist, is not always a terrorist".[31] It
depends upon the current political context and the dominant discourses which determine and
constitute it.¶ It is for this reason, among others, that some scholars argue that the term should be
avoided or eschewed altogether in academic research. These scholars suggest that the appropriate
focus of study is not the terrorism that exists out there "in reality", but the discourses of terrorism and
the discursive practices that construct terrorism as a political and cultural subject.[32] Another set of
scholars argue more prosaically that terrorism is a political-cultural label and an act of de-legitimisation,
and that no group ever accepts its designation as "terrorist". They suggest that as a concept, "terrorism"
has been greatly abused by political interests and has too many negative cultural and political
connotations to retain any real analytical value. While these are cogent and challenging arguments, I do
not accept that this means we should abandon the attempt to carefully and consistently determine
which acts should be considered terrorist, or that we cannot agree on a set of fairly clear identifying
criteria which can be employed for research purposes.
Potential 1ac Replacement cards
[Slightly Different version of Jackson 9 evidence already in 1ac]The dominant practices
in the field are oriented towards a focus on an idealist “problem-solving theory” to
assist the state in combating terrorism using terrorism legitimizing state violence
especially in the context of economic interests such as the imposition of sanctions to
politically isolate a “state sponsor of terrorism.”
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,,
p.77-80, AS)
In the first place, it can be argued that terrorism studies fulfils an obvious¶ ideological function because,
as Jeroen Gunning (2007a) has convincingly¶ shown, the dominant ‘knowledge’ of the field is an ideal
type of ‘problemsolving¶ theory’. According to Robert Cox, problem-solving theory ‘takes the¶ world as
it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the¶ institutions into which they are
organised, as the given framework for action’,¶ and then works to ‘make these relationships and
institutions work smoothly by¶ dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’ (Cox, 1981: 128–
129). In¶ this instance, problem-solving theories of terrorism do not question the extent to¶ which the
status quo and the dominant actors within it – the hierarchies and operation¶ of power and the
inequalities and injustices thus generated – could be implicated¶ in the very ‘problem’ of terrorism
itself or the many other forms of violence¶ which it is inextricably bound up with.¶ The problem-solving
character of the field is illustrated most prosaically by¶ the ubiquitous efforts of virtually every
terrorism studies scholar to provide¶ research that is ‘policy relevant’ and which will assist the state in
its efforts to¶ defeat terrorism, and by the widespread tendency to uncritically accept the¶ state’s
categorisations, definitions, dichotomies, and demonisations (see Toros and Gunning, this volume).
Andrew Silke’s study concluded that a great deal¶ of the field’s output is driven by policy concerns and is
limited to addressing¶ government agendas (Silke, 2004d: 58). This characteristic is not at all¶ surprising
given that terrorism studies’ origins lie in counter-insurgency studies,¶ security studies, and neo-realist
approaches to international relations at the¶ height of the cold war (Burnett and Whyte, 2005: 11–13). In
fact, the first major¶ review of the field concluded that much of its early output appeared to be
‘counterinsurgency¶ masquerading as political science’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988:¶ 182). More
recently, the events of 11 September 2001 galvanised a whole new¶ generation of scholars who were
understandably eager to offer their skills in the¶ cause of preventing further such attacks and ‘solving’
the terrorism ‘problem’.¶ They therefore had little reason to question the dominant orientation of the
field¶ towards assisting state security or the underlying assumptions this necessarily¶ entails.¶ The desire
to assist governments in their efforts to control the destructive¶ effects of non-state terrorism is not
necessarily problematic in and of itself; nor¶ does it imply any bad faith on the part of individual scholars
(Horgan and Boyle,¶ 2008). In fact, the prevention of violence against civilians is a highly laudable¶
aspiration. However, when virtually the entire academic field collectively adopts¶ state priorities and
aims, and when it tailors its research towards assisting state¶ agencies in fighting terrorism (as defined
by state institutions), it means that¶ terrorism studies functions ideologically as an intellectual arm of
the state and is¶ aligned with its broader hegemonic project.¶ The field’s problem-solving, stateoriented and therefore ideological character¶ is also illustrated by the way in which the field’s
‘knowledge’ functions to delegitimise¶ any kind of non-state violence while simultaneously reifying
and legitimising¶ the state’s employment of violence; and the way it constructs terrorism as¶ a social
problem to be solved by the state but never as a problem of state violence¶ itself. From this viewpoint,
the silence regarding state terrorism within the discourse¶ (Jackson, 2008b), and in particular the
argument of many terrorism studies¶ scholars that state actions should not be defined as ‘terrorism’,
actually functions¶ to furnish states with an authoritative academic justification for using what may¶
actually be terroristic forms of violence against their opponents and citizens. In¶ effect, it provides them with
greater leeway when applying terror-based forms of¶ violence against civilians, a leeway exploited by a great many states who intimidate¶
groups and individuals with the application of massive and disproportionate¶ state violence. In other words, by occluding and obscuring the
very possibility of¶ state terrorism, and as a field with academic and political authority,
the discourse ¶ of terrorism studies can
be considered part of the conditions that actually make state terrorism possible . Furthermore, the
discourse is deeply ideological in the way in which its core¶ assumptions, narratives, and knowledgeproducing practices function to legitimise¶ existing power structures and particular hegemonic political
practices in¶ society. For instance, the primary focus on the ‘problem’ of non-state terrorism¶ functions
to distract from and deny the long history of Western involvement in terrorism (see Blakeley,
forthcoming), thereby constructing Western foreign policy as essentially benign – rather than aimed
primarily at reifying existing¶ structures of power and domination in the international system, for example.¶ That is, by
deflecting criticism of particular Western policies, the discourse¶ works to maintain the potentially dangerous myth – the accepted common
This¶ sense of exceptionalism in turn
permits Western states and their allies to pursue¶ a range of discrete and often illiberal political
projects and partisan interests¶ aimed at maintaining dominance in a hegemonic liberal international
order.¶ Specifically, by reinforcing the dominant ‘knowledge’ that non-state terrorism is¶ a much greater security threat than state terrorism
and by obscuring the ways in¶ which counterterrorism itself can morph into state terrorism (see Jackson,¶
forthcoming), the discourse functions to legitimise the current global war on¶ terror and its associated policies of
military intervention and regime change,¶ extraordinary rendition, military expansion to new regions, military assistance¶
programmes (often to repressive regimes), the imposition of sanctions, the¶ isolation of oppositional political
movements, and the like (see, among many¶ others, Stokes and Raphael, forthcoming; El Fadl, 2002; Mahajan, 2002, 2003;¶
sense¶ among Western scholars and Western publics – of Western exceptionalism.
Callinicos, 2003). More directly, the discourse provides legitimacy to broader¶ counter-insurgency or counterterrorism programmes in strategic
regions where¶ the actual underlying aims clearly reside in the maintenance of a particular¶ political-economic order – such as is occurring in
the dominant terrorism discourse can and has
been used¶ by political elites to justify and promote a whole range of political projects, such as:¶
expanding and strengthening the institutions of national security and the military-industrial¶ complex; the
construction of extensive surveillance and social control¶ systems; the normalisation of security
procedures across all areas of social life;¶ expanding the powers and jurisdiction of state security
agencies and the executive¶ branch, in large part by normalising a state of exception; controlling wider
social¶ and political dissent, restricting human rights, and setting the parameters for acceptable ¶ public
debate; and altering the legal system – among others (see, among many¶ others, Mueller, 2006; Lustick, 2006; Cole, 2007, 2003;
Jackson, 2007c; Scraton,¶ 2002).¶ Lastly, we must note that powerful economic interests – particularly those¶
linked to the security sector, such as private security firms, defence industries,¶ and pharmaceutical
companies, among others – all benefit materially and politically¶ from the primary narratives of the
Colombia at the present time¶ (see Stokes, 2006). At the domestic level,
terrorism studies discourse. For example,¶ the accepted ‘knowledge’ that non-state terrorism poses a catastrophic threat to¶ Western society
has in part resulted in contracts worth many millions of dollars¶ to private security companies for site security at airports and government
buildings,¶ while pharmaceutical companies have been contracted to provide millions¶ of vaccines and decontamination material in case of
there are a clear set of identifiable political-economic and¶ elite
interests that are served by the discourse.¶
In sum, it seems clear that the discourse functions to encourage the reification¶ and extension of state
hegemony both internationally and domestically, and directly serves a range of political and economic
interests. Perhaps more import-¶ antly, the discourse reinforces the widely accepted belief in the
instrumental¶ rationality of violence as an effective tool of politics (Burke. 2008), particularly as it
relates to counterterrorism. As such, it can be argued that the discourse and knowledge practices of
terrorism studies function as a kind of disciplinary and hegemonic truth regime designed to reify
existing structures of power and dominance. Despite the intentions of individual terrorism scholars
bioterrorism (see Mueller,¶ 2006). In other words,
therefore, who may¶ believe that they are engaged in objective academic analysis of a clearly defined¶
phenomenon, the broader discourse which they reproduce and legitimise actually¶ serves distinctly
political purposes and has clear ideological consequences for¶ society.
Assata Shakur, former Black Panther and member of the Black Liberation Army living
in Cuba, 2000
[Interview with Paul Davidson, visited Cuba many times with IFCO/Pastors for Peace and with British
solidarity brigades, November 6, http://www.fantompowa.net/Flame/assata_interview.htm Accessed:
7/1/13]
Q. I'd like to sort of pull this back to Cuba....The reasoning behind the debate about whether or not to
pass a law allowing the sale of food and medicine to Cuba is because the United States has laws
imposing unilateral sanctions against trade with what are defined [by the US government] as "terrorist
nations". Cuba is on the list of "terrorist nations", not because it has put bombs on civilian airlines that
exploded in mid-air -- that's what has been done TO Cuba; there was the one incident of shooting down
the airplane of the Cuban-American terrorist organization that was flying over Cuba. But the most
important reason that has been given for a number of years now about why Cuba is on that list, why
the US calls it a "terrorist" nation, is because Cuba gives political asylum to individuals who the US calls
"terrorists". And the US government has demanded that Assata and others like herself who have been
given political asylum be returned to the United States. The question that has been raised often is, Are
you worried that Cuba will turn you back over to the US government in order to resolve this problem?
And if you don't think that Cuba will do that, what does that mean to you?
A. I think first of all, I trust Cuba as a principled country. Cuba's strength is that it has been steadfast in
its commitment to the principles of liberation, freedom, of resistance to the kind of institutionalized
terrorism that the United States government does every day. The US has attacked countries like
Grenada, Panama, Libya....the list of victims of US terrorism is almost infinite. And the US
government's participation in torture, whether in El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile....is well-documented
and widely known.
I believe Cuba's strength has been its denouncing that kind of terrorism, torture. It does this politically
not only by [providing asylum for] exiles [from terrorist regimes] but also fighting in the context of the
United Nations Organization, in world organizations, in denouncing all kinds of terrorist torture in
governmental policies. All of the maneuvers by the US government to keep the blockade alive is a
manipulation by the US government because "Cuba poses a threat". The real reason Cuba poses a
threat has nothing to do with my being here or anyone else being here. It's because Cuba is an
example of a country that is actively fighting against imperialist domination and insists on its own
right to self-determination and sovereignty. The US government's most acute fear is that other
countries are going to follow the Cuban example. They want everybody to know that if you follow this
example we will attack you in every way that we can. That is the reality as I see it about the blockade
and why it is being continued.
****
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 8
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, The Ghosts of
State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and Terrorism Studies, March,
http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/2/9/0/pages252900/p252900
-6.php, p. 6-8, Accessed 7/1/13 AS)
In fact, much of the state sponsorship literature is devoted to analysing and describing those states
viewed as the main sponsors of terrorism, the groups they support, and the kinds of ¶ assistance they
provide. The state sponsors identified in the literature more often than not ¶ coincide with the U.S.
State Department’s annual list of state sponsors of international ¶ terrorism, which typically includes
countries with which the U.S. has previously had serious ¶ conflicts, such as Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Sudan, Libya, and Iraq.4 ¶ One
of the most important aspects of this discourse is the way in which the key ¶ narratives still focus on
non-state groups and actions as primary and states as secondary ¶ sponsors and supporters. In other words, there
is an implicit sense that states do not commit ¶ terrorism directly, but they may support non-state
groups that do. Certainly, there is little ¶ acknowledgement that state actions such as the use of strategic
bombing, particular forms of ¶ governance, repression, and counter-terrorism, or the practice of
torture for example, can ¶ sometimes constitute acts of terrorism. Moreover, within this literature
there is another ¶ important silence, namely, the silence on Western democratic sponsorship of nonstate ¶ terrorism: out of dozens of mainstream books and papers which discussed the state ¶
sponsorship of terrorism, I found only one or two acknowledgements of U.S. sponsorship of ¶ antiCastro or Contra terrorism, British sponsorship of loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland, ¶ ¶ 4 Another more
recent narrative within this literature is that ?passive state sponsorship? provides support for ¶ terrorists ? that inaction is just as significant as
action. Daniel Byman for example, argues that ?At times, the ¶ greatest contribution a state can make to a terrorist?s cause is by not policing a
border, turning a blind eye to ¶ fundraising, or even tolerating terrorist efforts to build their organizations, conduct operations, and survive? ¶
(Byman 2005, p. III). ¶ 6 ¶ ¶ Italian sponsorship of right-wing terrorism, Israeli sponsorship of Christian militia terrorism ¶ in Lebanon, and other
such documented cases.
¶ Beyond these ghostly traces of state terror however, a discourse analysis of the
field ¶ reveals that the most notable aspect of the state terrorism discourse is its near complete ¶
absence; there is almost a total silence on the subject within most books, articles, papers, and ¶
writings in the terrorism studies field today. In the vast majority of the more than 100 texts I ¶ examined, the terms ?state
terrorism? or ?state terror? did not even appear, much less form the ¶ basis for any kind of sustained analyses or discussion. This basic finding,
that there is a ¶ profound silence on state terrorism within the field, is supported by a broader set of findings. ¶ Andrew Silke for example,
found that only 12 or less than two percent of articles from 1990 ¶ to 1999 in the core terrorism studies journals focused on state terrorism
(Silke 2004, p. 206), ¶ a finding that echoes Schmid and Jongman?s authoritative survey of the field which ¶ concluded that ?There is a
conspicuous absence of literature that addresses itself to the much ¶ more serious problem of state terrorism? (Schmid and Jongman 1988, pp.
179-80). Similarly, ¶ it has been noted that only 12 of the 768 pages in the Encyclopaedia of World Terrorism ¶ (1997) examined state terrorism
in any form (quoted in Goodin, 2006, p. 55). Along the same ¶ lines, an analysis of John Thakrah?s popular Dictionary of Terrorism
demonstrates that ¶ reference to, and discussion of, state terrorism makes up less than 8 out of 308 pages ¶ (Thakrah 2004). Extraordinarily,
Thakrah?s entry on ?History of Terrorism? does not mention ¶ a single example of state terrorism (Ibid, pp. 114-120). My own examination of
conference ¶ paper titles and abstracts found that of 113 papers related to terrorism presented at the 2007 ¶ ISA annual convention, only one
focused on any aspect of state terrorism; and of 95 papers ¶ on terrorism at the 2007 APSA annual convention, only 4 focused on aspects of
state ¶ terrorism. We might also note that the wider terrorism studies field does not include statistics ¶ on state terrorism in any of its
recognised data bases, most notably the highly influential ¶ RAND database (see Burnett and Whyte 2005, RAND 2006). ¶ In addition to this
silence on the broader subject of state terrorism, we can detect a ¶ series of other silences. In particular, there
is within the
terrorism literature virtually no ¶ mention or analysis of Western state terrorism, the terror of
strategic bombing, the terror of ¶ democratic state torture, Western sponsorship of mostly right-wing
terrorist groups, Israeli ¶ state terrorism, and the terrorism of Western allies during the Cold War and the war on terror ¶ ? among
others. In much contemporary terrorism studies publications, there is an ongoing ¶ silence on the terrorism of state-sponsored death squads in
Iraq, the terrorism of Western-¶ backed warlords in Afghanistan, and the state terror of Western allies such as Uzbekistan, ¶ Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, Egypt, and the like. ¶ In large part, the silence on state terrorism in the discourse is due to the frequent ¶ practice by terrorism
scholars of defining terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state ¶ violence, thereby excluding states a priori from being able to employ
terrorism at all. Bruce ¶ Hoffman, for example, argues that terrorism involves violence ?perpetrated by a subnational ¶ group or non-state
This is in keeping with the U.S. State ¶ Department’s highly influential definition
of terrorism, a definition employed by a significant ¶ proportion of terrorism scholars today, which conceives of terrorism as
entity? (Hoffman 1998, p. 43).
“premeditated, ¶ politically motivated violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets by
subnational ¶ groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (quoted in Martin ¶
2003, p. 33). For the many scholars who adopt this definition, terrorism is both largely ¶ indistinguishable
from insurgency, militancy, guerrilla warfare, and the like, and more ¶ importantly, states are a priori
and by definition excluded as actors who can practice ¶ terrorism. For these scholars, state violence that is intended
to cause terror and intimidate ¶ 7 ¶ ¶ may be described as repression, oppression, human rights abuses, war crimes and the like, but ¶ never as
?terrorism?.
Topicality/Inherency
Inherency
No plans are in place to remove Cuba from the terror list
Smith, Cuba Project’s Senior Fellow and Director, 13
[Wayne, director of the University of Havana exchange program at Johns Hopkins, former associate at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5-2-13, Center for International Policy: Cuba Report,
“The Shame and Harm of Keeping Cuba on the Terrorist List,”
http://cipcubareport.wordpress.com/2013/05/02/the-shame-and-harm-of-keeping-cuba-on-theterrorist-list/, accessed 6-26-13, YGS]
A State Department spokesman stated on May 1 that Washington has no plans to remove Cuba from
the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Hopefully, wiser heads will prevail and it will soon be removed.
As CIP’s reports over the past decade have pointed out, there is not a shred of evidence that Cuba is
involved in terrorist activities.¶ In November 2004 CIP noted that, “the State Department’s reasons for
keeping Cuba [on the list] do not withstand the most elementary scrutiny.” That remains the case
today, especially given that Cuba is hosting peace talks between Colombian rebels and that country’s
government. While there are still some members of the Basque organization (ETA) living in Cuba,
none are involved in terrorist activities – indeed, on January 10, 2011 ETA declared a permanent ceasefire.¶ As for the public renunciation of terrorism, Cuba has done so on a number of occasions, including
most recently when it sent condolences both to the American people and the U.S. government over
the bombings in Boston. And years ago Cuba signed all UN denunciations of terrorism.¶ Keeping Cuba
on the terrorism list undermines the list’s validity and usefulness. As Juliette Kayyem of the Boston
Globe put it on April 29, “to treat a nation as a terrorist threat when it is not, we so dilute the term
that it matters little to the countries we hope to isolate.” After waiting many years for an
administration to do the right thing, many of us hoped the Obama administration would remove Cuba
from the list. We are still hoping.
Topicality- Terrorism List => Sanctions
Presence on the terrorism list triggers automatic sanctions and financial penalties.
Peed, litigation specialist, 5
[Matthew J., March 2005, Duke Law Journal, “Blacklisting as Foreign Policy: The Politics and Law of
Listing Terror States,” p. 1321-1323, JSTOR, accessed 6-25-13, YGS]
Among the various weapons in America's antiterrorist arsenal, ¶ one of the most intriguing and enduring is the
State Department's list ¶ of state sponsors of terrorism. Conceived in the heady days of the ¶ 1970s,1 the list is a mostly static
group of seven countries designated ¶ each year by the secretary of state.2 Although it has remained ¶ virtually unchanged from 1993,3 the list
commands more attention ¶ each year.4 A who's who of rogue states, the
release of the list along ¶ with the State Department's
the ¶ ire of the condemned and the relief of the overlooked.5 Perhaps for
its promise of clarity and certainty, the list exudes a rhetorical power ¶ invoked by groups as diverse as
observers of international politics6 ¶ and producers of popular television shows.7 With this increased ¶
annual terrorism report engenders
attention have come new questions about the legitimacy of such a ¶ blacklist,8 however, and the designation itself has been called more a ¶
question than an answer.9 ¶ Nevertheless, Congress continues
to imbue the list with ¶ increasingly substantive
legal implications.10 These implications ¶ typically function as automatic triggers, kicking in whenever the
¶ secretary of state places a country on the list.11 Such legal linkages ¶ might be appropriate were the
secretary of state free from political ¶ pressures when determining which countries sponsor terror. In
fact, ¶ however, the decision to place a country on the list is profoundly ¶ affected by necessary
political compromises.12 The proliferation of ¶ automatic consequences that it triggers raises the risk that the list
will leave a trail of political consequences in fields of law traditionally ¶ guarded from such
considerations. This has happened in at least one area. In 1996, Congress passed ¶ the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ¶ (AEDPA).13 The act abrogated the sovereign immunity of countries ¶ on the terrorism list,
and only of countries on the terrorism list, for ¶ certain crimes.14 As a result, several countries have
become embroiled ¶ in suits in U.S. courts, while others guilty of similar crimes remain ¶ immune.15
Ironically, the more consequences that flow from inclusion ¶ on the list, the more politically
calculating the secretary of state must ¶ be in crafting it. This further undermines the objectivity and ¶
legitimacy of the list. These constraints on the secretary's discretion ¶ not only lead to inequitable
consequences in the courtroom, they ¶ ultimately breed ossification in the list. This threatens its utility
and ¶ relevance in the political arena as well.
The list carries severe economic repercussions—prevents financial aid, trade, and
sovereign immunity, and medicine exchange
Peed, litigation specialist, 5
[Matthew J., March 2005, Duke Law Journal, “Blacklisting as Foreign Policy: The Politics and Law of
Listing Terror States,” p. 1327-1328, JSTOR, accessed 6-25-13, YGS]
For most of its tenure, the terrorism list was limited in its effects ¶ to the core diplomatic areas of trade sanctions and aid restrictions. ¶ More
recently, however, Congress has begun to link the terrorism list ¶ to more substantive legal classifications
significantly removed from ¶ the diplomatic realm. The most significant enhancement of the list's ¶
consequences occurred with the passage of the AEDPA. The ¶ AEDPA references the terrorism list in several ways. First,
the act ¶ makes it a crime for individuals to engage in financial transactions ¶ with countries on the
list.42 Second, it requires the U.S. to withhold ¶ FAA assistance even from countries that give foreign
aid, loans, or ¶ subsidies to countries on the list.43 Third, the act orders the U.S. ¶ missions to several
international financial institutions to use the ¶ "voice and vote" of the U.S. to oppose any loan to terrorist-list ¶
countries.44 This provision applies to U.S. representatives at the ¶ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World ¶
Bank), the International Development Association, the International ¶ Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Bank, the Asian Development ¶ Bank,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the ¶ African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and any ¶ fund
created after the statute's enactment.45 ¶ Although these provisions significantly increased the list's ¶ penalties, each follows the
general
principle of the terrorism list - no ¶ aid or trade for terrorism-list countries. The AEDPA went further, ¶
however, enhancing the terrorism list's import beyond these ¶ economic pressures. It did so by amending
the Foreign Sovereign¶ Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)46 to allow U.S. citizens to sue ¶ countries on the list
for acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, and ¶ terrorism.47 Previously, the FSIA shielded even terrorist-list countries ¶
from suit for any action other than those falling into a narrow ¶ exception for commercial activity.48 After the amendment, however, ¶
countries on the terrorism list could be sued for certain specified acts ¶ committed while the country
was on the list, while nonblacklisted ¶ countries retained their sovereign immunity from litigation for
the ¶ same acts. 49 C. Post-September 11th Legislation ¶ The legislative response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks has
further ¶ added to the terrorism list's legal implications. For example, a ¶ provision of the USA PATRIOT Act50 effectively
equates nationals ¶ of terror-list countries with criminals.51 The statute makes it a crime ¶ for any "restricted person"
to transport or receive any biological ¶ toxin.52 The statutory definition of "restricted persons" includes only ¶
persons convicted for serious crimes, fugitives of justice, drug users, ¶ the mentally ill, and aliens from countries on the
terrorism list.53 ¶ These aliens are also singled out for more special attention in the ¶ Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Act of 2002.54 The Act ¶ prohibits aliens from states on the terrorism list from
receiving ¶ immigrant visas unless the secretary of state, in consultation with the ¶ Attorney General,
makes a specific finding that the alien does not ¶ pose a threat to national security.55 ¶
The terror list triggers a wide range of sanctions which impose financial restrictions,
prevent exports to Cuba, and prohibit economic assistance
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 13
[5-30-13, US Department of the State, “Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview,”
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209985.htm#, accessed 6-27-13, PR]
To designate a country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that the
government of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Once a
country is designated, it remains a State Sponsor of Terrorism until the designation is rescinded in
accordance with statutory criteria. A wide range of sanctions are imposed as a result of a State
Sponsor of Terrorism designation, including: A ban on arms-related exports and sales; Controls over
exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could
significantly enhance the designated country’s military capability or ability to support terrorism;
Prohibitions on economic assistance; and Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.
Presence on the terror list causes trade penalties, prohibits foreign aid and support in
IFIs, and strict licensing restrictions for exports of almost all items.
Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 5
[Mark, 5-12-05, CRS Report for Congress, “Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List,”
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47003.pdf, accessed 6-27-13, PR]
Under various provisions of law, certain trade benefits, most foreign aid, support in the international
financial institutions, and other benefits are restricted or denied to countries named as state sponsors
of international terrorism. Under the authority of Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act,
validated licenses are required for exports of virtually all items to countries on the terrorism list,
except items specially allowed by public law, such as informational materials, humanitarian
assistance, and food and medicine. Being listed as a sponsor of international terrorism also restricts
bilateral assistance in annual foreign assistance appropriations acts, as required most recently in Section 527 of the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-447, Division D). Section 502 of the Trade Act of
1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2462) makes a country ineligible for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) if it is on the Section 6(j) terrorism
list. Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2371) also prohibits assistance authorized under the act to the
government of a country that “has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” Likewise, Section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act (P.L. 96-629; 22 U.S.C. 2780) prohibits the export or other provision of munitions to a country if the government “has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism.”1
AT: Extra Topicality
The penalties of the terror list fall into 4 categories, all of which prohibit economic
engagement.
Office of the coordinator for counterterrorism, 13
[5-30-13, US Department of the State, “Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism,”
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm, accessed 6-27-13, PR]
Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken
together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities
include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls
over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. Designation under
the above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that penalize persons and
countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are four countries designated
under these authorities: Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria.
The terror listing in and of itself deters investment and forms the justification for
constantly proliferating sanctions- delisting is necessary for economic engagement.
Stephens, the executive director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, 2001
[Sarah, Dec 1., Latin America Working Group and Center for International Policy, “A Call for Cuba's
Removal from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism”,
http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Cuba/lawg_cip_dec_2011.pdf, chip]
My second point is that this really bad U.S. policy. When we treat Cuba as a state that sponsors terror –
when it is not –we waste our tax dollars and undermine the credibility of our efforts against genuine
threats. We also alarm and anger our allies. They object to the reach of our sanctions across borders.
This forms the basis of their complaints against the U.S. embargo when the U.N. condemns our
sanctions every year. All of this is likely to get worse, not better, as our enforcement of anti-terror and
anti-mone ylaundering laws become more aggressive. Already, these enforcement trends are causing
foreign banks with interests in the U.S. to terminate their banking relationships with Cuba. They are
deciding that the risk of doing business with Cuba that could trip them up with U.S. authorities is
greater than the benefit of maintaining those relationships. They are cutting ties as a matter of
business discretion, not U.S. law. Britain’s ambassador to Cuba told me in a meeting last June that the
reach of our sanctions make it impossible for many small and medium sized businesses in the U.K. to
make legal investments or legal transactions because of the risks involved. That’s a loss for Cuba and a
loss for British firms and workers. This is serious business, but it sometimes reveals itself in farcical ways.
Clif Burns at the Export Law Blog reported recently on this incident. An obscure office inside the S.E.C.
wrote the United Parcel Service and challenged the fact that they delivered packages to Cuba because it
is subject to economic sanctions and export controls. UPS wrote them back explaining they were
allowed to deliver packages that contained lawful deliveries. The complexity and reach of our laws, at
times, exceeds the ability of our enforcement agencies to apply them rationally. Cuba’s presence on the
state sponsors’ list is emblematic of our political dilemma. The definition of a self-licking ice cream
cone is this: it is a process or thing that offers few benefits and exists primarily to justify its own
existence. Cuba’s designation is perfect for the hardliners in Congress to block otherwise rational
policy changes or initiatives – because, after all, U.S. law says we’d be helping a state sponsor of
terror. Let me give you three examples. Congressman David Rivera uses it to justify trying to stop
Repsol and Cuba from drilling together for oil. He said his legislation to block drilling was necessary to –
and I quote – “ensure that Florida taxpayers are not made to pay for an environmental disaster caused
by a terrorist regime.” When Senators Menendez and Rubio sought to stop President Obama from
increasing the number of airports allowed to serve the Cuban market, their legislation sought to
prevent the expansion of direct flights to state sponsors of terrorism.
Cuba Doesn’t Support Terror/Should Be Removed
Now is a key window of opportunity to promote economic engagement by delisting
Cuba as a state sponsor of terror- all justifications for their listing are false or
outdated.
Metzker, reporter @ IPS interpress service, 2013
[Jared Metzker, 6/13/13, “U.S.: CRITICS OF U.S.-CUBA POLICY DISMAYED AT ISLAND'S RE-LISTING AS
'TERROR SPONSOR'”, Interpress Service, lexis, chip]
Experts here are stepping up calls for the U.S. government to remove Cuba from an official list of
"state sponsors of terrorism", arguing that the country's presence on the list is anachronistic and makes
neither legal nor political sense. The calls come just weeks after the U.S. State Department, which oversees the "state sponsors"
list, released an annual report on terrorism. Its section regarding Cuba varied only slightly from that of the previous year, disappointing those
who had hoped for a step in the direction of normalisation of U.S.-Cuba relations. "At
a time when the U.S. is best positioned
to help facilitate change in the island and to take advantage of the changes inside the country, this
continued inclusion is actually an obstacle to taking advantage of that window of opportunity," Tomas
Bilbao, executive director of the Cuba Study Group, said Tuesday at a panel discussion at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), a think tank here. Bilbao noted the continued influence of a "shrinking minority" of anti-Cuba hardliners in the United States who
fervently oppose Cuba's removal from the list, as well as a lack of political will on the part of U.S. policymakers to square off with that minority.
Nonetheless, he asserted that
the time is ripe for the United States to take Cuba off the list and prioritise
helping the Cuban people over harming the Cuban regime . President Barack Obama's administration has overseen
some notable policy shifts, such as a relaxation of laws restricting travel by U.S. citizens with family in Cuba. Certain realities have also been
changing within Cuba, including the abdication of Fidel Castro from power, which make friendlier policies toward the island nation more
feasible. Sarah Stephens, executive director of the Centre for Democracy in the Americas, a U.S. organization that promotes reconciliation with
Cuba, told IPS that delisting
Cuba now would "enable the U.S. to support Cuba's drive to update its
economic model, make it easier to facilitate trade and easier for Cuba to access high technology
items". "Doing so," she said, "would in turn help Cubans lead more prosperous and independent lives." Debating Cuba's qualifications Cuba
has been on the State Department list since 1982, but some analysts maintain that the country did not
fit the definition of a state sponsor of terror even then. In order to fit that legal definition, a country must have
"repeatedly provided support for international terrorism". According to Robert L. Muse, a specialist on the legality of U.S. policy toward Cuba,
there are currently three ostensible reasons for Cuba's inclusion in the most recent list: that it has allowed Basque separatists to reside within
its borders, that it has dealings with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and that it harbors fugitives wanted for crimes
committed in the United States. Muse, who spoke Tuesday at CSIS, claimed the first two reasons were void because the countries concerned
actually condone Cuba's relationship with their adversaries. Cuba
is currently host to negotiations between FARC and
the Colombian government, and Spanish leaders prefer that Basque rebels remain in Cuba - and out of
Spain. These interactions with rebel groups, in Muse's opinion, "can hardly be a basis even for
criticism". It is only the third justification, that Cuba harbors U.S. fugitives, which he said "could fairly bear description as a reason" for
keeping Cuba on the list.
Cuba’s presence on the list of states sponsoring terrorism is outdated, hypocritical,
manipulative,
Bolander, research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 13
[Keith, 5/31, The Guardian, “Cuba is hardly a 'state sponsor of terror'”,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/31/cuba-us-terror-sponsors-list, accessed
6/24/13, VJ]
While an attentive US audience watched President Obama outline his plan to wind down America's long war on terror last week, officials in Havana
were shaking their heads in bewilderment and anger over how the issue of terrorism continues to be
cynically manipulated against the island nation. What raised their ire was the recent announcement that
Cuba would remain on the State Department's controversial list of states that sponsor terrorism. The long-awaited annual
report on international terrorism from the State Department was released Thursday, and confirmed what officials had already indicated – that Cuba is staying on
the list along with Iran, Sudan and Syria. State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell confirmed the administration "has no current plans to remove Cuba". The
decision came as a disappointment for those who were expecting new Secretary of State John Kerry, a long-time
critic of America's counter-productive policy against the Castro government, might recommend Cuba's
removal. The fact he hasn't demonstrates how difficult it is to change the dynamics of the antagonistic relationship between these two ideological adversaries.
Cuba was originally included on the list in 1982, replacing a then-friendly Iraq. The designation levies comprehensive economic
punishments against Havana as part of the overall strategy of regime change that includes a decades-long economic
embargo, unrelenting propaganda, extra-territorial application of American laws. For its part, Cuba calls its
continued inclusion on the list "shameful" and pandering to a small community of former Cuban
citizens who now live in Florida. Cuba also asserts that the US has actually undertaken actions on the
island that have resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians. An official of the country's foreign relations department, MINREX,
who asked to remain anonymous, complained: "It is ridiculous that the United States continues to include Cuba on an
arbitrary list of states that sponsor terrorism, while it is Cuba that has suffered so much from
terrorism – originating from the United States." The so-called terrorism against Cuba began shortly after the triumph of the
Revolution in 1959. In the early 1960s a covert CIA program known as Operation Mongoose led to the killing of
teachers, farmers, government officials and the destruction of agricultural and non-military industrial
targets. Other incidents involved attacks on villages, biological terrorism including the introduction of
Dengue 2 that resulted in the deaths of more than 100 children in 1981, and a 1997 bombing
campaign against tourist facilities in Havana and Varadero that killed Canadian-Italian tourist Fabio Di Celmo and injured dozens. The most
infamous act of terrorism occurred with the bombing of Cubana Airlines in 1976, killing all 72 on
board. One of the two recognized masterminds, former CIA agent Luis Posada Carriles, has a long history of
suspected terrorist activities against his former homeland; at one point bragging to the New York Times of his involvement in the hotel bombings. Posada
continues to live a quiet life in Miami, considered a hero among many of the first generation exiles whose anti-revolutionary fervor has yet to
diminish. The other architect of the Cubana Airlines bombing, Orlando Bosch, died peacefully in Miami a few years ago. As a result of these terrorist activities, the
Cuban government sent intelligence officers to Florida in the 1990s to infiltrate Cuban-American organizations in an effort to thwart further acts. The agents, known
While Cuba's status as a state sponsor of terrorism
remains unchanged, other countries that might be considered more deserving, such as North Korea and
Pakistan, aren't on the list. What makes it all the more galling for the Castro government are the
arguments the United States has advanced to justify Cuba's inclusion – the most egregious stemming
from the charge Cuba was not sufficiently supportive of the US war on terror or the invasion of Iraq,
and was unwilling to help track or seize assets allegedly held by terrorists. A 2004 State Department report asserted
that "Cuba continued to actively oppose the US-led coalition prosecuting the global war on terrorism." In reality, the Cuban side has
consistently denounced all forms of terrorism, including the recent Boston Marathon bombings that brought quick condolences from the
as the Cuban Five, were uncovered by the FBI and are serving long prison terms.
island leadership. Other rationales over the past 30 years to keep Cuba on the list have ranged from its support for left-wing rebels in Latin America, its relationship
with the former Soviet Union, treatment of political prisoners and allowing members from alleged terrorist organizations such as Columbia's FARC and Spain's
separatist Basque movement ETA to reside on the island. Even when those issues were resolved, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union more than 20 years
ago, Cuba found its unmerited designation had not changed. One long standing reason, that Havana permits refugees from American justice to find safe haven on
the island, was re-invigorated with a ruling that was timed almost perfectly with the announcement that Cuba would not be taken off the terrorist list. Assata
Shakur, accused of killing a New Jersey state trooper 40 years ago, was suddenly labeled as a most wanted terrorist by the FBI, with a $2m price tag on her head.
Shakur, who fled to Cuba in 1979 and was given political asylum, has consistently maintained her innocence. Categorizing Shakur as a terrorist could potentially
endanger her life from those wanting to collect the bounty, and has led State Department officials to utilize her changed status as justification to keep Cuba on the
list. There
is no legitimate reason to use the arbitrary terrorism list as a political weapon against Cuba.
To continue to do so simply exposes the State Department to charges of hypocrisy and manipulation
of a serious threat based solely on ideological differences. Most importantly, it gives insult to all those
who have been actual victims of terrorism.
There is no evidence of Cuban terrorist support- only reversed policy can allow the
United States to engage in Latin America
Williams, Los Angeles Times international affairs writer, 2013
(Carol J., May 3rd, LA Times, “Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors”,
http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list20130502,0,2494970.story, 6/24/13) chip
Cuba’s communist leadership was quick to send condolences to the victims of the Boston Marathon
bombings and to reiterate to Washington that it “rejects and condemns unequivocally all acts of
terrorism.” Once a key supplier of arms and training to leftist rebels in Latin America, the Castro regime
long ago disentangled itself from the Cold War-era confrontations. Havana now hosts peace talks
between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia that it once supported and the U.S.-allied
government the insurgents battled for years. Havana still gives refuge to a few fugitive radicals from the
Black Panthers and Basque insurgents, and two years ago a Cuban court convicted 64-year-old
development specialist Alan Gross on spying charges for attempting to install satellite equipment
without government permission. But nothing that Cuba has done suggests its government is plotting
harm against Americans, national security experts say. And they criticize as counterproductive the
State Department’s decision, disclosed this week, to keep Cuba on its list of “state sponsors of
terrorism.” “We ought to reserve that term for nations that actually use the apparatus of statehood to
support the targeting of U.S. interests and civilians,” said Juliette Kayyem, a former assistant secretary
for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security and now writing and lecturing on
national security in the Boston area. “Yes, Cuba does a lot of bad things that we don’t like, but it
doesn’t rise to anything on the level of a terrorist threat.” On Wednesday, State Department
spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration “has no current plans to remove Cuba” from the list
to be released later this month. The island nation that has been under a U.S. trade and travel embargo
since shortly after revolutionary leader Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 is in the company of only
Iran, Syria and Sudan in being branded with the “state sponsor” label. Kayyem laments the “diluting” of
the terrorist designation based on political or ideological disputes. “We work with a lot of countries we
don’t like, but the imprimatur of ‘terrorism’ has a ring to it in a way that can be harmful to us,” she
said. Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the
mutual threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade
and financial restrictions that comes along with the “state sponsor” censure, Kayyem said. “There are
some real operational impediments when we have a system that begins with ‘no’ rather than ‘why
not?’ ” she said of the legally encumbered contacts between Havana and Washington. Politicians who
have pushed for a continued hard line against Cuba cheered their victory in getting the Obama
administration to keep Cuba on the list. U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a South Florida Republican whose
efforts to isolate and punish the Castro regime have been a central plank of her election strategy
throughout her 24 years in Congress, hailed the State Department decision as “reaffirming the threat
that the Castro regime represents.” Arash Aramesh, a national security analyst at Stanford Law School,
blamed the continued branding of Cuba as a terrorism sponsor on politicians “pandering for a certain
political base.” He also said President Obama and Secretary of State John F. Kerry have failed to make a
priority of removing the impediment to better relations with Cuba. “As much as I’d like to see the
Castro regime gone and an open and free Cuba, it takes away from the State Department’s credibility
when they include countries on the list that aren’t even close” to threatening Americans, Aramesh
said.
The list is locked in Cold War politics—Cuba’s inclusion is no longer relevant
Stephens, Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, 11
[Sarah, 8-24-2011, Huffington Post, “Get Cuba off the List of State Sponsors of Terror,”
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sarah-stephens/get-cuba-off-the-list-of-_b_935191.html, accessed 625-13, YGS]
It is both untrue and a travesty to paint Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism as the United States
government did in its annual report on the subject last week.¶ For twenty-nine years, Cuba has
appeared on the list, which comes with considerable economic and diplomatic costs. It disqualifies
Cuba from economic assistance, punishes Cuba for engaging in legal trade and financial transactions,
and deprives Cuba of access to modern technology by way of exports, to name but a few.¶ Most of all,
the list stigmatizes Cuba - not everywhere, but certainly in the United States and elsewhere in the
world where our country's word is respected and the terrorist label stings and stays.¶ Terror exists in
the world; both the U.S. and Cuba have experienced it, and the purpose of the list is to get perpetrators
to stop and enlist other nations in a global effort to get them to do so.¶ This activity took on special
meaning for the U.S. after September 11, 2001, but it also should have come with a greater
responsibility to use the list seriously and not use it to play domestic politics on a higher and more
fraught stage.¶ Other nations listed in the State Department's Country Report on Terrorism, including
Iran and Syria, are said to provide "financial, material, and logistical support" for terror groups. Iran is
cited for arming the Taliban in Afghanistan and supporting militants in Iraq who kill American forces;
Syria for supplying terrorist groups in Lebanon and Palestinian militants aligned against Israel.¶ So why
is Cuba on the list?¶ As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, Cuba did support
revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa in the 1980s, but stopped
supporting insurgencies in 1992 after the fall of the Soviet Union.¶ Since then, as the Council on
Foreign Relations said last year, "intelligence experts have been hard pressed to find evidence that
Cuba currently provides weapons or military training to terrorist groups. In 1998, a comprehensive
review by the U.S. intelligence community concluded that Cuba does not pose a threat to U.S.
national security, which implies that Cuba no longer sponsors terrorism.... In the 2008, Country Reports
on Terrorism, the State Department reported that Cuba 'no longer actively supports armed struggle in
Latin America and other parts of the world."¶ At this stage, the case for Cuba's inclusion is flimsy to
non-existent.¶ The State Department reports, for example, that Cuba denounces U.S.
counterterrorism policies, and has not "severed ties with elements from the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and recent media reports indicate some current and former members of the
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) continue to reside in Cuba. Available information suggested that
the Cuban government maintained limited contact with FARC members, but there was no evidence of
direct financial or ongoing material support. In March, the Cuban government allowed Spanish Police to
travel to Cuba to confirm the presence of suspected ETA members."¶ If this is the core of the problem,
what do Spain and Colombia think? Former President Jimmy Carter put that question directly to those
countries' ambassadors to Cuba when he visited the island in March of 2011. This is what President
Carter said in his trip report:¶ We raised a question about the terrorist list, and the Ambassadors from
Spain and Colombia said they were not concerned about the presence of members of FARC, ETA, and
ELN in Cuba. Indeed, they maintained that this enhances their ability to deal more effectively with these
groups. In fact, ETA members are there at the request of the Spanish government (our emphasis).¶
President Carter, as Peter Kornbluh reported in the Nation, also told the press that U.S. and Cuban
intelligence were currently "cooperating" in counterterrorism efforts against Al Qaeda.¶ In other
words, as Wayne Smith, former Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana writes, "there is
absolutely nothing in this year's report which would in any way suggest that Cuba is a 'state sponsor
of terrorism.'" In fact, there are national interest arguments for removing the designation, and
acknowledging Cuba's cooperation. As Smith says, "That the U.S. continues to keep it on the list despite
this total lack of evidence simply diminishes our own credibility."¶
Cuba is backing away from terrorist support but remains on the list of state sponsors
of terrorism due to US political motives
Richter, LA Times, 13
[Paul, 5/30, LA Times citing US Dept. of State report,
“Cuba still on U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism”,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/30/world/la-fg-terror-list-20130531, accessed 6/24/13, VJ]
WASHINGTON — Cuba further distanced itself from terrorist activities last year but the U.S. government still
considers it a state sponsor of terrorism along with Syria, Iran and Sudan, according to the State
Department's annual report. The report for 2012, released Thursday, says the government in Cuba last year
reduced support for Basque separatists in Southern Europe, joined a regional group that seeks to block
terrorism financing, and sponsored peace talks between Colombia and an armed rebel group. The
report finds "no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary training to
terrorist groups." Countries listed by the State Department as state sponsors of terrorism face
economic and political sanctions, including U.S. opposition to any aid from the International Monetary
Fund and other major financial institutions. The report says there was a sharp uptick in Iran's sponsorship of terrorism around the world,
including attacks or attempted attacks in India, Thailand, Georgia and Kenya. Critics contend that Cuba's inclusion on the list is not justified
and reflects the views of members of Congress who are fiercely opposed to the communist leaders in
Havana. State Department officials are not considering delisting Cuba, which has been under a U.S. economic embargo since 1962. " The report
makes it clear that the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba is a state sponsor of
terrorism," said Geoff Thale, program director at the Washington Office on Latin America, a liberal advocacy group. "Cuba is clearly on the
terrorist list for political reasons." Cuba still shelters about two dozen members of the separatist group Basque Homeland and Freedom, or ETA,
one of the groups on the terrorist list, according to the report. But Havana has been reducing its support for the group and no longer provides it with travel
documents, the report says. Cuba also has provided haven for members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, another organization on the
terrorist list. But in November, Cuba began hosting peace talks between the Colombian government and the rebels. Washington had faulted Cuba for doing too little
to prevent money laundering and international terrorist financing. But last year Cuba joined the Financial Action Task Force of South America, an intergovernmental
group that seeks to enforce U.S.-supported standards on such illicit activities. Cuba's
shift reflects changes in the country's
leadership and a preoccupation with domestic economic problems, analysts say. The State Department added three groups
to the list: Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid of Indonesia, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades of Lebanon and the Arabian peninsula and the Haqqani network of Afghanistan and
Pakistan. It removed one group from the list, the Mujahedin Khalq, or MEK, an Iranian opposition group based primarily in Iraq.
Cuba has categorically condemned terrorism and has offered to cooperate on antiterrorism—the US has ignored all requests
Smith, professor at the Johns Hopkins, Muse, international law attorney, Baker,
established the U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, 4
[Wayne S., Robert L., Glenn, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not Be on the
Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed 6/25/13,
VJ]
At the conference, Wayne Smith pointed out that while Under Secretary Bolton states flatly that Castro
“continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to further revolutionary objectives,” he cannot point to
a single statement of Castro’s endorsing terrorism. Incredibly, in his pronouncement on March 30 of
2004, Bolton again cites a statement supposedly made by Castro in Iran back in mid-2001, to the effect
that: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with one another, can bring America to its knees.” Even if Castro
had said that, it is not an endorsement of terrorism. But the fact is, and has been well known since
Bolton first made the allegation back on May 6 of 2002, Castro never said it. As CIP reported in July of
2002 (see CIP Special Report on Cuba and Bioweapons: Groundless Allegations Squander U.S. Credibility
on Terrorism, July 12, 2002), the statement does not appear in any of the transcripts of Castro’s
statements, nor, with one highly questionable exception, in any of the reports of wire services based
in Iran. Nor can it be found in the files of the BBC or in the U.S. government’s Foreign Broadcasts
Information Service. The single exception was a mysterious Agence France Presse story dated May 10,
2001, i.e., just after Castro’s visit to Iran. But AFP cannot produce the text on which the story was
based nor explain where the quote came from. There is some suspicion that it was a CIA plant. But,
however it got into the AFP story, the quote was a phony. Bolton continues to cite it anyway. 7 On the
other side of the ledger, there are myriad Cuban statements condemning terrorism. As reported in
CIP’s IPR of November 2002, within hours of the September 11 attacks, the Cuban government issued
a statement condemning the attacks and ruing the loss of human lives. It went on to express solidarity
with the American people.18 That weekend, thousands in Cuba marched “in solidarity with the
American people during the national tragedy through with they are living.”19 And in his speech on
September 22, 2001, Castro categorically condemned all forms of terrorism as an “ethically
indefensible phenomenon which must be eradicated.” And he vowed that, “The territory of Cuba will
never be used for terrorist actions against the American people…”20 Subsequently, the Cuban
government offered to sign an agreement with the United States to cooperate in efforts against
terrorism. The Bush administration ignored the offer. We should ask ourselves, Smith concluded,
whether ignoring Cuba’s offer really makes sense? We have no evidence that Cuba is supporting
terrorism in any way. It publicly condemns terrorism and offers to cooperate with us, all other
governments and the United Nations in the campaign against it. Might it not be sensible to explore
that possibility?
Cuba categorically condemns terrorism—there is no evidence to the contrary
Smith, U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs, 7
[Wayne S., August 6, National Interest, “Take Cuba Off The Terrorist List”,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733, accessed
6/25/13, VJ]
After 25 years, Cuba remains on the State Department's annual list of state sponsors of terrorism for
reasons that do not withstand the most perfunctory examination. There is, for example, the oftrepeated charge that Cuba endorses terrorism as a tactic. Former Undersecretary of State John Bolton,
for one, claimed in March of 2004 that Fidel Castro "continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to
further revolutionary objectives." The charge is simply not true, and neither Bolton nor anyone else
has been able to point to a single statement of Castro's endorsing terrorism. On the contrary, there
are myriad Cuban statements condemning it. Within hours of the 9/11 attack, for example, the Cuban
government issued a statement condemning the attacks and ruing the loss of life. Late in September,
Castro categorically condemned all forms of terrorism as an "ethically indefensible phenomenon
which must be eradicated." He vowed that, "the territory of Cuba will never be used for terrorist
actions against the American people."
By the same standards that we include Cuba on SST Canada and most politicians
should be included on the list
Goldberg, National correspondent for The Atlantic, 12
[Jeffrey, 1-17-12, The Atlantic, “It's Time to Remove Cuba From the State-Sponsor-of-Terrorism List,”
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/its-time-to-remove-cuba-from-the-statesponsor-of-terrorism-list/251489/, accessed 6-29-13, PR]
According to the State Department's 2010 report on state sponsors of terrorism, "Cuba continued to
denounce U.S. counterterrorism efforts throughout the world, portraying them as a pretext to extend
U.S. influence and power." Cuba is a sponsor of terrorism, in other words, because it is critical of
America's war on terrorism. By this definition, many of America's elected officials are sponsors of
terrorism. The report goes on, "Cuba has been used as a transit point by third-country nationals
looking to enter illegally into the United States." By this definition, Canada is also a sponsor of
terrorism. And what are the Cubans doing about this problem? "The Government of Cuba is aware of the border integrity and transnational
security concerns posed by such transit and investigated third country migrant smuggling and related criminal activities." Oh, and by the way,
the Cubans also "allowed representatives of the Transportation Security Administration to conduct a series of airport security visits throughout
the island." A very clever cooptation by a terrorist state, apparently. The
department's 2009 report acknowledged that
Cuba "publicly condemned acts of terrorism by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates," but still made the point
that the government in Havana was "critical of the U.S. approach to combating international
terrorism."
Cuba should not be on the SST list-not harboring terrorists, no biological weapons, and
massive Cuban support for anti-terror measures
Smith, Former Chief of Mission of the US Interests Section in Havana, et al 4 (Wayne,
currently a JHU professor and US-Cuba relations author, Robert Muse, attorney specializing in issues
relating to Cuba, and Glenn Baker, Director of the U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November
2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not Be on the Terrorist List”,
http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed 6/25/13, KR)
Cuba was placed on the list of terrorist nations in March of 1982 on bogus grounds (see below).
Twenty-two¶ years later, the State Department’s reasons for keeping it there do not withstand the
most elementary scrutiny.¶ Cuba does not, for example, endorse¶ terrorism as a policy. On the
contrary,¶ it has condemned it in all its manifestations, has signed all twelve UN anti-terrorist
resolutions and offered to sign¶ agreements with the United States to¶ cooperate in combating
terrorism, an¶ offer the Bush administration ignores.¶ Nor is it harboring Basque and Colombian
terrorists. Members of ETA are in Cuba, yes, but with¶ the full knowledge of the Spanish government.
And as for¶ the Colombian government, far from accusing Cuba of harboring Colombian guerrillas, it
stresses that the Cuban government is playing a helpful role in efforts to bring peace to¶ Colombia
and that “there is no information...that Cuba is in¶ any way linked to terrorist activities in Colombia
today.”¶ 1¶ It is also true that there are American fugitives from justice in Cuba. But even under our own
legislation, that does¶ not constitute grounds for declaring Cuba to be a terrorist¶ state. And if Cuba
does not regularly extradite those fleeing¶ American justice, the United States has not in more than
45¶ years extradited a single Cuban, including known terrorists¶ guilty of multiple murders. Indeed, the
United States has not¶ even answered Cuba’s extradition requests.¶ In March of 2004, Under Secretary of
State John Bolton¶ accused Cuba of moving ahead with a developmental effort¶ to produce biological
weapons. Cuba heatedly denies the charge and has invited anyone who wishes¶ to come and see for
themselves. Various U.S. delegations to Cuba led by CDI have seen no evidence at all to¶ suggest that
Cuba is in fact developing biological weapons. The charge that it is doing so appears to be a politically
motivated statement by Mr. Bolton based on fragmentary intelligence that is ambiguous at best.¶ The
central question we should ask here is how can U.S.¶ interests possibly be served by putting forward
these spurious allegations against Cuba, by insisting that it is a terrorist¶ state when it obviously is not,
and by rebuffing its offers to¶ cooperate in the struggle against terrorism? Does this not¶ undermine our
own credibility and cast doubt on our seriousness of purpose?
The general consensus is that Cuba is not an SST
Krohnke, Former law professor at University of Minnesota, 6/7/13 (Duane, now an
independent legal commentator, June 7, 2013, “U.S.’ Absurd Designation of Cuba as a ‘State Sponsor of
Terrorism,’” dwkcommentaries, http://dwkcommentaries.com/2013/06/07/u-s-absurd-designation-ofcuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/, accessed 6/29/13, KR)
In summary, the U.S. designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” is absurd. This conclusion
is shared, in less colorful language, at least by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Council on
Foreign Relations, the Center for Democracy in the Americas, the Center for International Policy, the
Latin American Working Group, former President Jimmy Carter, The Atlantic magazine’s noted national
correspondent (Jeffrey Goldberg) and a retired U.S. Army Brigadier General (John Adams).
Not surprisingly the Cuban government comes to the same conclusion. It said last year, “the only
reason Cuba is kept on this list is exposed as an attempt to justify the U.S. blockade of our country, as
well as the adoption of new measures to limit our financial and commercial transactions, to strangle the
Cuban economy and impose a regime which responds to U.S. interests.”
Even the State Department admits that Cuba has not sponsored terrorists
Krohnke, Former law professor at University of Minnesota, 6/7/13 (Duane, now an
independent legal commentator, June 7, 2013, “U.S.’ Absurd Designation of Cuba as a ‘State Sponsor of
Terrorism,’” dwkcommentaries, http://dwkcommentaries.com/2013/06/07/u-s-absurd-designation-ofcuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/, accessed 6/29/13, KR)
The following is the complete asserted justification for the Department’s designation of Cuba for
2012:¶ “Cuba was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982. Reports in 2012 suggested that
the Cuban government was trying to distance itself from Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
members living on the island by employing tactics such as not providing services including travel
documents to some of them. The Government of Cuba continued to provide safe haven to
approximately two dozen ETA members.¶ In past years, some members of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) were allowed safe haven in Cuba and safe passage through Cuba. In
November, the Government of Cuba began hosting peace talks between the FARC and Government of
Colombia.¶ There was no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary
training to terrorist groups.¶ The Cuban government continued to harbor fugitives wanted in the United
States. The Cuban government also provided support such as housing, food ration books, and medical
care for these individuals.¶ The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has identified Cuba as having
strategic anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism deficiencies. In 2012, Cuba
became a member of the Financial Action Task Force of South America against Money Laundering, a
FATF-style regional body. With this action, Cuba has committed to adopting and implementing the
FATF Recommendations.”¶ Rebuttal of State Department’s Rationale¶ On its face this alleged
justification proves the exact opposite: Cuba is not a state sponsor of terrorism.¶ Indeed, this and
earlier U.S. reports admit that “Cuba no longer supports armed struggle in Latin America and other
parts of the world” (1996, 1997, 1998, 2008, 2009), that there was no evidence that Cuba had
sponsored specific acts of terrorism (1996, 1997) and that there “was no indication that the Cuban
government provided weapons or paramilitary training to terrorist groups” (2011, 2012). Similar
admissions were made in the U.S. reports for 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2010. Some also reported that in
2001(after 9/11) Cuba “signed all 12 UN counterterrorism conventions as well as the Ibero-American
declaration on terrorism” (2001, 2002, 2003).¶ I also note that the latest report in its Western
Hemisphere Overview says that in “2012, the majority of terrorist attacks within the Hemisphere were
committed by the . . . [FARC]. The threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most
countries in the Western Hemisphere.” There is no mention of Cuba in this overview.¶ Nor is there any
mention of Cuba in the latest report’s “Strategic Assessment” that puts all of its discussion into a
worldwide context.¶ All of this rebuttal so far is based only on what the State Department has said about
this designation since 1996.¶ In addition, the Cuban government has taken the following actions that
strengthen the rebuttal of the designation and that, to my knowledge, the U.S. has not disputed:¶ First,
Cuba publicly has stated that Its “territory has never been and never will be utilized to harbor
terrorists of any origin, nor for the organization, financing or perpetration of acts of terrorism against
any country in the world, including the [U.S.]. . . . The Cuban government unequivocally rejects and
condemns any act of terrorism, anywhere, under any circumstances and whatever the alleged
motivation might be.Ӧ Second, in 2002, the government of Cuba proposed to the U.S. the adoption of
a bilateral agreement to confront terrorism, an offer which it reiterated in 2012, without having
received any response from the U.S.¶ Third, Cuban President Raul Castro on July 26, 2012 (the 59th
anniversary of the Cuban Revolution) reiterated his country’s willingness to engage in negotiations with
the U.S. as equals. He said no topic was off limits, including U.S. concerns about democracy, freedom of
the press and human rights in Cuba so as long as the U.S. was prepared to hear Cuba’s own complaints.
In response the U.S. repeated its prior position: before there could be meaningful talks, Cuba had to
institute democratic reforms, respect human rights and release Alan Gross, an American detained in
Cuba.
Cuba isn’t a state sponsor of terrorism and the US is worse
Glaser, editor of antiwar.com 3/1/13 (John, March 1, 2013, “US: Cuba is a State Sponsor of
Terrorism,” http://news.antiwar.com/2013/03/01/us-cuba-is-a-state-sponsor-ofterrorism/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AntiwarNews+%28
News+From+Antiwar.com%29, accessed 6/27/13, KR)
The United States is grasping at straws in justifying the continued economic embargo on Cuba by
claiming the country is in a category with Iran, Sudan, and Syria as officially recognized state sponsors
of terrorism.¶ Washington, of course, refuses to provide any evidence of this, even as the charge of
Cuba’s “support for acts of international terrorism” is increasingly questioned.¶ Responding to press
reports that Obama’s new Secretary of State John Kerry was considering lifting the harsh economic
sanctions on Cuba, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland such rumors are false.¶ “This
department has no current plans to remove Cuba from the state sponsor of terrorism list,” said Nuland.
“We review this every year, and at the current moment we — when the last review was done in 2012 –
didn’t see cause to remove them.”¶ Cuba has elicited particular ire from Washington ever since the
Eisenhower administration, a byproduct of Cold War justifications for US grand strategy, which seeks to
maintain hegemony and crush economic, geo-political, or ideological defiance.¶ The claim of being a
state sponsor of terrorism is a mere pretext, a blanket accusation Washington applies to any
government it doesn’t like (and one that ignores America’s own history of supporting and carrying out
international terrorism). A State Department report last year found that Cuba’s ties to so-called
terrorist groups are tenuous at best.
Cuba is not a sponsor of terror-every possible warrant is mirrored by another state not
on the list.
Goldberg, Bloomberg writer, 12 (Jeffrey, 1/16/12, Bloomberg,
“Don’t Lump Cuba With Iran on U.S. Terror List: Jeffrey Goldberg”,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-17/don-t-lump-cuba-with-iran-on-terror-list-commentaryby-jeffrey-goldberg.html, KR)
Here is some of what we know about Cuba. Cuba is an impoverished autocracy. Its superannuated
leaders are gradually opening their country’s economy. Cuba is reducing the size of its military, it has
condemned al-Qaeda and it poses no national-security threat to the U.S. No serious intelligence
analyst believes that Cuba is still funding or arming foreign insurgencies. ¶ But Cuba is on the list. So
what, exactly, has it done to merit inclusion? ¶ Criticism Equals Terrorism ¶ According to the State
Department’s 2010 report on state sponsors of terrorism, “Cuba continued to denounce U.S.
counterterrorism efforts throughout the world, portraying them as a pretext to extend U.S. influence
and power.” ¶ Cuba is a sponsor of terrorism, in other words, because it is critical of America’s war on
terrorism. By this definition, many of America’s elected officials are sponsors of terrorism. ¶ The report
goes on, “Cuba has been used as a transit point by third-country nationals looking to enter illegally into
the United States.” By this definition, Canada is also a sponsor of terrorism. ¶ And what are the Cubans
doing about this problem? “The Government of Cuba is aware of the border integrity and transnational
security concerns posed by such transit and investigated third country migrant smuggling and related
criminal activities.” ¶ Oh, and by the way, the Cubans also “allowed representatives of the
Transportation Security Administration to conduct a series of airport security visits throughout the
island.” A very clever cooptation by a terrorist state, apparently. ¶ The department’s 2009 report
acknowledged that Cuba “publicly condemned acts of terrorism by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates,” but still
made the point that the government in Havana was “critical of the U.S. approach to combating
international terrorism.” ¶ And it detailed another of Cuba’s treacheries: “The government of Cuba has
long assisted members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation
Army of Colombia (ELN), and Spain’s Basque Homeland and Freedom Organization (ETA), some having
arrived in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Colombia and Spain.” ¶
I asked Julia E. Sweig, the Latin America expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, what to make of this
claim. She said, “Cuba hosted peace talks at the request of a succession of Colombian governments.
But Norway hosted the PLO during the run-up to the Oslo peace process. Did this make Norway a
state sponsor of terror?”
Cuba does NOT sponsor terrorism
Metzker, writer, 13
(Jared Metzker, writer, 6-13-13, “U.S.: CRITICS OF U.S.-CUBA POLICY DISMAYED AT ISLAND'S RE-LISTING
AS 'TERROR SPONSOR”, Global Information Network, accessed 6-24-13, Proquest//Fontana)
Cuba has been on the State Department list since 1982, but some analysts maintain that the country did not fit the
definition of a state sponsor of terror even then. In order to fit that legal definition, a country must have
"repeatedly provided support for international terrorism". According to Robert L. Muse, a specialist on the legality of
U.S. policy toward Cuba, there are currently three ostensible reasons for Cuba's inclusion in the most recent
list: that it has allowed Basque separatists to reside within its borders, that it has dealings with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and that it harbors fugitives wanted for crimes committed in the
United States. Muse, who spoke Tuesday at CSIS, claimed the first two reasons were void because the countries
concerned actually condone Cuba's relationship with their adversaries. Cuba is currently host to
negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government, and Spanish leaders prefer that Basque rebels remain in
Cuba - and out of Spain. These interactions with rebel groups, in Muse's opinion, "can hardly be a basis even
for criticism". It is only the third justification, that Cuba harbors U.S. fugitives, which he said "could fairly bear description as a reason" for
keeping Cuba on the list. Cuba has harbored a number of fugitives seeking refuge from the U.S. justice
system. The most prominent is Assata Shakur, an African-American poet and participant in 1970s black liberation movements
who was allegedly involved in the killing of a police officer. She was convicted for the murder but escaped and in 1984
gained political asylum in Cuba, where she has remained ever since. Early last month, Shakur became the first woman
to be added to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Most Wanted Terrorist list. But Muse notes that this
designation was "arbitrary and capricious", as neither she nor any other fugitive residing in Cuba has
been accused, let alone convicted, of international terrorism.
Cuba shouldn’t be one the list – top officials and documents prove
Wylie, Ph.D in Political Science, 2004
(Lana Wylie, Ph.D in Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2004 , “PERCEPTIONS AND
FOREIGN POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CANADIAN AND AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CUBA”
Canadian Foreign Policy, Volume 11, issue 3, , P. Proquest, Fontana )
These accusations and Cuba's inclusion on the list of sponsors of terrorism are inconsistent with most
American and international technical or analysis-based government and independent agency reports.
According to these estimates, Cuba does not pose a terrorist threat and, when pressed for specifics, even the
American government officials that issued the various accusations are hard pressed to come up with
significant or recent evidence of such a danger. Many government documents that address terrorism
omit any mention of the Cuban threat even though its place on the list suggests it is one of the most serious offenders. For
example, though the State Department document entitled "Patterns of Global Terrorism" lists Cuba in its
state-sponsored terrorism section, it does not discuss any threat posed by Cuba in the section that
details the specific terrorist threats in Latin America. This section devotes significant space to discussing the threats posed
by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela; none of which are on the list of seven states
highlighted by the State Department as the most serious threats. Paul Pillar, the former deputy chief of the CIA Counterterrorist Center wrote
the following about Cuba's inclusion on the list: "Cuba's remaining links with terrorism consist of providing a home for a handful of members of
the Basque Fatherland and Liberty group (ETA) and other fugitives, and providing some accommodations to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia and National Liberation Army... The Castro regime's post-cold war retrenchment has been so extensive that it is doing nothing either
in terrorism or other military or external activities that would appear to qualify it for its pariah status." (Pillar 2001: 161) When
pressed,
Michael Sheehan, the Acting Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, also admitted that Cuba's inclusion
on the list was questionable. He stated, "It is true, in fact, that Cuba and several other states on that
list could take what we would consider not difficult steps to move them off the list of statesponsorship." (USDS 1999) Thus, the inclusion of Cuba on the list has little to do with the seriousness of
the terrorist threat emanating from the island.13
Evidence of Cuba’s support for terrorism is flimsy to non-existent: keeping them on
the list destroys US credibility.
Stevens, the executive director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas (CDA),
2011
(Sarah Stevens, “Get Cuba off the List of State Sponsors of Terror”, 8/29/11, Hindu Stan Times,
newswire, lexis) chip
India, Aug. 29 -- It is both untrue and a travesty to paint Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism as the United States
government did in its annual report on the subject last week. For twenty-nine years, Cuba has appeared on the list, which
comes with considerable economic and diplomatic costs. It disqualifies Cuba from economic
assistance, punishes Cuba for engaging in legal trade and financial transactions, and deprives Cuba of
access to modern technology by way of exports, to name but a few. Most of all, the list stigmatizes Cuba - not
everywhere, but certainly in the United States and elsewhere in the world where our country's word is
respected and the terrorist label stings and stays. Terror exists in the world; both the U.S. and Cuba have experienced it, and
the purpose of the list is to get perpetrators to stop and enlist other nations in a global effort to get them to do so. This activity took on special
meaning for the U.S. after September 11, 2001, but it also should have come with a greater responsibility to use the list seriously and not use it
to play domestic politics on a higher and more fraught stage. Other nations listed in the State Department's Country Report on
Terrorism,including Iran and Syria, are said to provide "financial, material, and logisticalsupport" for terror groups. Iran is cited for arming the
Taliban in Afghanistan and supporting militants in Iraq who kill American forces; Syria for supplying terrorist groups in Lebanon and Palestinian
militants aligned against Israel. So why is Cuba on the list? As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports,
Cuba did support
revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa in the 1980s, but stopped
supporting insurgencies in 1992 after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since then, as the Council on Foreign Relations said last year,
"intelligence experts have been hard pressed to find evidence that Cuba currently provides weapons
or military training to terrorist groups. In 1998, a comprehensive review by the U.S. intelligence community concluded that
Cuba does not pose a threat to U.S. national security, which implies that Cuba no longer sponsors
terrorism.... In the 2008, Country Reports on Terrorism, the State Department reported that Cuba 'no longer actively supports armed
struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world." At this stage, the case for Cuba's inclusion is flimsy to nonexistent.
The State Department reports, for example, that Cuba denounces U.S. counterterrorism policies, and has not "severed ties with
elements from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and recent media reports indicate some current and former members of
the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) continue to reside in Cuba.Available information suggested that the
Cuban government
maintained limited contact with FARC members, but there was no evidence of direct financial or ongoing
material support. In March, the Cuban government allowed Spanish Police to travel to Cuba to confirm
the presence of suspected ETA members." If this is the core of the problem, what do Spain and Colombia think? Former
President Jimmy Carter put that question directly to those countries' ambassadors to Cuba when he visited the island in March of 2011. This is
what President Carter said in his trip report: We raised a question about the terrorist list, and the Ambassadors from Spain and Colombia said
they were not concerned about the presence of members of FARC, ETA, and ELN in Cuba. Indeed, they maintained that this enhances their
ability to deal more effectively with these groups. In fact, ETA members are there at the request of the Spanish government (our emphasis).
President Carter, as Peter Kornbluh reported in the Nation, also told the press that U.S.
and Cuban intelligence were currently
"cooperating" in counterterrorism efforts against Al Qaeda. In other words, as Wayne Smith, former Chief of the U.S.
Interests Section in Havana writes, "there is absolutely nothing in this year's report which would in any way suggest that Cuba is a 'state
sponsor of terrorism.'" In fact, there are national interest arguments for removing the designation, and acknowledging Cuba's cooperation. As
Smith says, "That the
U.S. continues to keep it on the list despite this total lack of evidence simply
diminishes our own credibility." There is a process for getting Cuba off the list. One option, as CRS writes, is for the president to
submit a report to Congress that says the listed government has changed policies, stopped supporting acts of terrorism, and provides
assurances that it will not do so in the future. We
don't know whether Cuba, given the politicized nature of this
process, wants to offer this guarantee, but doing so would certainly test the Obama administration's
commitment to running an honest war against terrorism. We'd like to give the administration the benefit of the doubt,
and we'd like to see the machinery start to run to remove Cuba from the list. Here in the U.S., we will soon commemorate the
tenth anniversary of the attacks of 9/11, a good opportunity for us to demonstrate by our deeds and
our words that we take the cause against terrorism seriously and responsibly. Cuba acted with honor on that
awful September day. Its government condemned the attacks quickly and it offered medical assistance to
the victims and to give U.S. planes access to Cuban airspace and airports when they could not land
here -- offers our government did not accept. These deeds -- and the clear factual record -- show Cuba deserves
better than the continued painting it receives from our anti-terrorism brush. It's time to get Cuba off
the list.
Cuba has reversed terrorism policy and no longer actively supports terrorist activities
Bloch, COHA Research Associate, 2009
(Brandon Bloch, 9/14/09, “WASHINGTON'S DOUBLE STANDARD ON CUBA (PART I): CUBA AS A "STATE
SPONSOR OF TERRORISM"”, states new service, lexis) chip
Cuba has remained on the State Department's terrorism blacklist since March 1, 1982, when it was
added at a time of allegations that the Castro regime had been funding and training armed
revolutionaries throughout Latin America and Africa. However, in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Fidel Castro renounced his government's previous policy of supporting terrorist organizations.
Since that time, Cuba is not known to have provided financial or logistical support to any such groups,
which makes it inexcusable that Cuba remains hostilely branded by Washington, especially in light of
the recent removals of Libya and North Korea from the terrorism list. Despite the serious problems
posed by the Cuban government's suppression of democratic freedoms, Cuba cannot convincibly be
compared to Iran or Syria as an alleged terrorist-backing state, or, for that matter, also China, Lybia and
North Korea. The Case for Cuba's Inclusion: a Self-Defeating Argument Each year by April 30, the State
Department is mandated to present to Congress a thorough report on the terrorist activities that have
occurred throughout the world, with several paragraphs devoted to each country designated a State
Sponsor of Terrorism. The following description was given of Cuba in the "Country Reports on Terrorism
2008": Although Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the
world, the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists. Members of ETA,
the FARC, and the ELN remained in Cuba during 2008, some having arrived in Cuba in connection with
peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. Cuban authorities continued to
publicly defend the FARC. However, on July 6, 2008, former Cuban President Fidel Castro called on the
FARC to release the hostages they were holding without preconditions. He has also condemned the
FARC's mistreatment of captives and of their abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the
armed conflict. The United States has no evidence of terrorist-related money laundering or terrorist
financing activities in Cuba, although Cuba has one of the world's most secretive and non-transparent
national banking systems. Cuba has no financial intelligence unit. Cuba's Law 93 Against Acts of
Terrorism provides the government authority to track, block, or seize terrorist assets. The Cuban
government continued to permit some U.S. fugitives-including members of U.S. militant groups such as
the Boricua Popular, or Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army to live legally in Cuba. In keeping
with its public declaration, the government has not provided safe haven to any new U.S. fugitives
wanted for terrorism since 2006. Ironically, this very explanation precisely explains why Cuba should
not be listed as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The first sentence states that Cuba no longer "actively"
supports terrorism, a clear contradiction to the State Department's contention that countries on the
list "have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." The contention that Cuba's
banking system is "secret and non-transparent" does little to call into question the reality that the
U.S. intelligence agencies have not produced a single piece of credible evidence proving that Cuba is
financing terrorists. In fact, there is ample evidence that the Cuban government has taken significant
measures against terrorism. Law 93, enacted in December 2001, provides a legal basis for Cuba's
counterterrorism policy, and although not stated in this report, Cuba is a signatory to all twelve of the
U.N. conventions and protocols against terrorism. The State Department's allegations that Cuba
"continued to publicly defend" the Colombian terrorist network FARC do not hold up against Fidel
Castro's State Department-acknowledged public rebuke of its tactics. Additionally, in 2005, Fidel Castro
declared to end his practice of offering refuge to fugitives of U.S. justice, including fugitives wanted for
terrorism, representing a clear shift from Cuba's Cold War policies. In September 2006, the Cuban
government upheld Castro's declaration by deporting an American man who had kidnapped his son and
flown him to Cuba, the only recent case in which a U.S. fugitive has sought safe haven in Cuba. One of
the State Department's principal arguments in the report is that because Cuba "continued to provide a
safe haven" to Colombian and Basque terrorists, it is a "State Sponsor of Terrorism." This claim at first
did not appear in the draft that the relevant State Department agency sent to Congress for its
preliminary review by the legislative body. After Miami-area members of Congress had furiously reacted
to the State Department's actions in not listing Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the review was
hastily recalled by the State Department, where it bowed to the House. The State Department took this
action even though the Basque and Colombian terrorists had been given refuge on Cuban territory at
the request of the Spanish and Colombian governments respectively, in order to expedite a pending
hostage release that they requested on humanitarian grounds. However, while nobody denies that
there are members of foreign terrorist organizations living in Cuba, a remnant of Cuba's previous
involvement in occasionally arming international revolutionaries, there has been no credible evidence
for years that Cuba currently supports or condones the activities of these groups. These ex-guerrillas
certainly are not known to conduct terrorist activities or launch terrorist attacks out of Cuba, and in
fact, as the State Department report states that in fear, some "have arrived in Cuba in connection
with peace negotiations." In 2002 and 2003, the government of Colombia publicly announced that
peace negotiations were being held with the ELN rebel group in Cuba, and it sought the "continued
mediation" of Cuba in these talks. Colombia, Cuba, and the U.N. have recognized six rounds of
negotiations with the rebels since 2005. Moreover, the Council on Foreign Relations reports that the
FARC and ELN have a presence in many capitals throughout Europe and Latin America. Thus, the
presence of such guerrillas in Cuba cannot be used to constitute Cuba as a supporter of international
terrorism. The other common argument for Cuba being posted on the state terrorism list, persistently
reiterated over the past decade, is the government's providing hospitality for an estimated 70 fugitives
of U.S. justice, some connected with U.S.-based terrorist organizations. In particular, the Cuban
government provides refuge to Joanne Chesimard, who was a member of the Black Liberation Army
wanted for the 1973 murder of a New Jersey State Trooper and viewed as notorious by U.S. authorities.
She is among other wanted fugitives connected to Black and Puerto Rican liberation movements. Cuba
has refused the vast majority of U.S. requests that these fugitives be turned over, on the grounds that
"political" fugitives would not receive a fair trial in the U.S. However, in most of these situations, to use
the above cases as arguments for Cuba's designation as a terrorist state would be seen by some as
reeking with hypocrisy. The U.S. is itself holding several fugitives of Cuban justice, most significantly
Luis Posada Carriles, an anti-Castro terrorist implicated in the bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane in
1976, as well as a series of 1997 bombings in Havana, and an assassination attempt on Fidel Castro in
2000. Washington has refused repeated Cuban and Venezuelan requests for the extradition of Posada
Carriles, claiming that he would face torture in these countries, despite assurances otherwise. The
Posada Carriles case strikingly contradicts Washington's usual anti-terrorism stance and appears to
violate UN Security Council Resolution 1373, a product of the U.S. War on Terror, which states that
"claims of political motivation" cannot be used as grounds for "refusing the extradition requests of
alleged terrorists." The U.S. also has refused to extradite Orlando Bosch, another terrorist accused of
masterminding the 1976 Cuban aircraft bombing. In response to Washington's demands for the release
of the U.S. fugitives, the Cuban government demands the release of five alleged Cuban spies currently
imprisoned in the U.S. and whose punishments have been deemed by a number of human rights groups
as excessively harsh, who were the victims of significant bias during their heavily politicized trial. This
situation was exacerbated in June, when the Supreme Court declined to review the decision of a federal
appeals court that had upheld the initial trial in Miami as fair. Thus, Cuba's retention of U.S. fugitives is
a result of the reciprocal hostilities between the two governments, and does not necessarily indicate
that Cuba supports international terrorism. Moreover, Mexico and El Salvador are both known to be
holding several fugitives of U.S. justice. In January 2004, the Washington Times reported the cases of
several Mexicans wanted for violent crimes committed in the Southwestern U.S., stating that Mexico
City authorities have refused U.S. requests for the extradition of these suspects. Such evidence adds to
the hypocrisy of Cuba's unique designation as a terrorist state. Significantly, the most bellicose language
employed against Cuba in previous State Department reports has been removed from this year's
Country Reports on Terrorism. Under the Bush administration, the State Department, using ritualized
rhetoric, repeatedly accused Cuba of refusing to cooperate with the U.S.-led War on Terror. While the
State Department would use these examples as primary evidence that Cuba was a State Sponsor of
Terrorism, this is in fact an entirely spurious conclusion. Cuba could not have been expected to
forthrightly back Washington's counterterrorism initiatives, given the legacy of enmity between these
countries and Washington's perennial attempts to destabilize the Cuban government. President Bush's
assumption that every country in the world must support the American-led response to terrorism, and
that not to do so by following its model, necessarily determines whether a country should be
considered a terrorist state, points to an extremely arrogant stance that fortunately has been
somewhat mitigated by the Obama Administration. The Miami Herald noted that the Obama
administration, by removing the most outlandish of the allegations from the Bush era, may have taken a
definitive step leading to the removal of Cuba from the list altogether.
Cuba is not a sponsor of terrorism
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
Cuba was placed on the list of terrorist nations in March of 1982 on bogus grounds (see below). Twenty-two years later, the State
Department’s reasons for keeping it there do not withstand the most elementary scrutiny . Cuba does
not, for example, endorse terrorism as a policy. On the contrary, it has condemned it in all its
manifestations, has signed all twelve UN anti-terrorist resolutions and offered to sign agreements
with the United States to cooperate in combating terrorism, an offer the Bush administration ignores.
Nor is it harboring Basque and Colombian terrorists. Members of ETA are in Cuba, yes, but with the
full knowledge of the Spanish government. And as for the Colombian government, far from accusing
Cuba of harboring Colombian guerrillas, it stresses that the Cuban government is playing a helpful role
in efforts to bring peace to Colombia and that “there is no information…that Cuba is in any way linked
to terrorist activities in Colombia today.”1 It is also true that there are American fugitives from justice
in Cuba. But even under our own legislation, that does not constitute grounds for declaring Cuba to be
a terrorist state. And if Cuba does not regularly extradite those fleeing American justice, the United
States has not in more than 45 years extradited a single Cuban, including known terrorists guilty of
multiple murders. Indeed, the United States has not even answered Cuba’s extradition requests.
Cuba doesn’t sponsor terrorism – most cited evidence is bunk – in fact, Cuba has
condemned terrorism and offered to help the US
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
At the conference, Wayne Smith pointed out that while Under Secretary Bolton states flatly that Castro “continues to view terror as a
legitimate tactic to further revolutionary objectives,” he
cannot point to a single statement of Castro’s endorsing
terrorism. Incredibly, in his pronouncement on March 30 of 2004, Bolton again cites a statement supposedly made by Castro in Iran back in
mid-2001, to the effect that: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with one another, can bring America to its knees.”
Even if Castro had said that, it is not an endorsement of terrorism. But the fact is, and has been well
known since Bolton first made the allegation back on May 6 of 2002, Castro never said it . As CIP reported in
July of 2002 (see CIP Special Report on Cuba and Bioweapons: Groundless Allegations Squander U.S. Credibility on Terrorism, July 12, 2002),
the statement does not appear in any of the transcripts of Castro’s statements, nor, with one highly
questionable exception, in any of the reports of wire services based in Iran. Nor can it be found in the
files of the BBC or in the U.S. government’s Foreign Broadcasts Information Service. The single exception was
a mysterious Agence France Presse story dated May 10, 2001, i.e., just after Castro’s visit to Iran. But AFP cannot produce the text
on which the story was based nor explain where the quote came from. There is some suspicion that it
was a CIA plant. But, however it got into the AFP story, the quote was a phony Bolton continues to cite it anyway. 7 On the other side of
the ledger, there are myriad Cuban statements condemning terrorism. As reported in CIP’s IPR of November 2002,
within hours of the September 11 attacks, the Cuban government issued a statement condemning
the attacks and ruing the
loss of human lives. It went on to express solidarity with the American people.18 That weekend, thousands in
Cuba marched “in solidarity with the American people during the national tragedy through with they are living.”19 And in his speech on
September 22, 2001, Castro categorically
condemned all forms of terrorism as an “ethically indefensible
phenomenon which must be eradicated.” And he vowed that, “The territory of Cuba will never be
used for terrorist actions against the American people…”20 Subsequently, the Cuban government offered to sign an
agreement with the United States to cooperate in efforts against terrorism. The Bush administration ignored the offer. We should ask
ourselves, Smith concluded, whether ignoring Cuba’s offer really makes sense? We have no evidence
that Cuba is supporting terrorism in any way. It publicly condemns terrorism and offers to cooperate
with us, all other governments and the United Nations in the campaign against it. Might it not be sensible to
explore that possibility? Ambassador James Jones noted that the Cuba policy group he had chaired at the Center for National Policy had called
for principled engagement with Cuba. Discussing the possibilities for cooperating in the fight against terrorism would certainly be included in
that, along with discussion of the disagreements between us, if the recommendations were ever acted upon. Jones said that while he
personally had reservations about the Cuban government and whether its policies benefited the Cuban people, the report prepared for the
Center for National Policy had called for dialogue with that government and full respect for Cuban sovereignty. We
accomplish
nothing positive by trying to ignore or threaten the Cuban government. And certainly, he said, the
United States should not be putting forward false charges against Cuba or any other country. We only
undermine our own credibility and seriousness of purpose by doing so.
Over the year – various state department claims of Cuban sponsored terrorism has
been proven false – Chile proves
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
Cuba continues to appear on the State Department’s annual list of state sponsors of terrorism for
reasons that continue to be highly questionable. Over the years, however, the professionals in the State Department who
prepare the list have become more cautious in their accusations, perhaps because their wilder charges have been publicly pointed out over and
over again. Some years back, for example, they alluded to “the
strong possibility that in the mid-1990s, the Cuban
government harbored…terrorists wanted for murder in Chile.”3 It was necessary only to walk across
the street to the Chilean Embassy, however, to find that this was not true. As CIP reported in its IPR of November
2002, the Chilean government had investigated the matter thoroughly, even 3 sending a group of Chilean senators to
Cuba. The latter had returned satisfied with Cuban explanations and convinced that Cuba had not harbored any of the
Chilean terrorists.
Real Justification = Hostility to US Heg
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror is a cold war relic that seeks to
maintain and economic, geopolitical, and ideological dominance
Glaser, staff writer, ‘13
[John, 5/1, AntiWar, “US: Cuba is a State Sponsor of Terrorism Washington refuses to lift the harsh
economic embargo on Cuba”, http://news.antiwar.com/2013/03/01/us-cuba-is-a-state-sponsor-ofterrorism/
Accessed 6/25/13, VJ]
The United States is grasping at straws in justifying the continued economic embargo on Cuba by
claiming the country is in a category with Iran, Sudan, and Syria as officially recognized state sponsors
of terrorism. Washington, of course, refuses to provide any evidence of this, even as the charge of Cuba’s
“support for acts of international terrorism” is increasingly questioned. Responding to press reports that Obama’s new Secretary of State John Kerry
was considering lifting the harsh economic sanctions on Cuba, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland such rumors are false. “This department
has no current plans to remove Cuba from the state sponsor of terrorism list,” said Nuland. “We review this every
year, and at the current moment we — when the last review was done in 2012 –didn’t see cause to remove them.” Cuba has elicited particular ire
from Washington ever since the Eisenhower administration, a byproduct of Cold War justifications for US grand
strategy, which seeks to maintain hegemony and crush economic, geo-political, or ideological
defiance. The claim of being a state sponsor of terrorism is a mere pretext, a blanket accusation
Washington applies to any government it doesn’t like (and one that ignores America’s own history of
supporting and carrying out international terrorism). A State Department report last year found that Cuba’s
ties to so-called terrorist groups are tenuous at best. Cuba has repeatedly reached out Washington, as President
Raul Castro did last summer, insisting that Cuba “is willing to mend fences with bitter Cold War foe the United States and sit down to
discuss anything, as long as it is a conversation between equals,” The Associated Press reported. “Any day they want, the table is set.
This has already been said through diplomatic channels,” Castro said. “If they want to talk, we will talk.” But the Obama administration has
refused, intent on continuing to isolate Cuba and maintain the embargo.
AT: ETA/FARC
Cuba is not involved in the support of terrorist activities
Smith, U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs, 7
[Wayne S., August 6, National Interest, “Take Cuba Off The Terrorist List”,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733, accessed
6/25/13, VJ]
One may have a twinge of sympathy for the analysts who craft the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Their instructions are to write and publish a report every year saying that Cuba is such a sponsor. But
what about evidence? In years past, the analysts seemed to handle that dilemma by using unverified
and highly questionable reports. As monitoring efforts have increased over the past few years and the
specious conclusions pointed out, the analysts seem to have turned to a new tactic-non-sequitors that
do not prove that Cuba sponsors terrorism. This year's report, for example, complained that "Cuba did
not attempt to track, block, or seize terrorist assets, although the authority to do so is contained in
Cuba's Law 93 against acts of terrorism, as well as Instruction 19 of the Superintendent of the Cuban
Central Bank." But any decent lawyer would respond to that by asking "what assets?" There is no
evidence at all that Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has any assets in Cuba. And so, there
is nothing to seize. The only thing the statement makes clear is that Cuba does have laws on the books
against acts of terrorism. How, one might ask, does that square with the report's assertion that it is a
terrorist state? And as it does every year, last year's report mentions the presence in Cuba of members
of the Basque ETA guerrilla organization, and the Colombian FARC and ELN. In past years, the State
Department tried to suggest that they were in Cuba against the wishes of their respective
governments and had sinister objectives. But that suggestion was shot down year after year by
representatives of the Spanish and Colombian governments. This year, no such allegations are made. It
is acknowledged that they are living in Cuba legally. Further, the report states that: "There is no
information concerning terrorist activities of these or other organizations on Cuban territory. . . . The
United States is not aware of specific terrorist enclaves in the country." If they are there legally and are
not involved in terrorist activities, then how does their presence in any way lead to the conclusion that
Cuba sponsors terrorism?
Terrorist groups in Cuba are there by international agreements and peace processes
Smith, U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs, 5
[Wayne S. May 7, Sun Sentinel, “Is Cuba A Sponsor Of Terrorism? Is U.s.?”, http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2005-05-07/news/0505060577_1_cuba-posada-s-lawyer-terrorism, accessed 6/25/13, VJ]
The report also charges that in 2004, "Cuba continued to provide limited support to designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as well as a safe haven for terrorists." In fact, however, the report
only mentions Basque members of ETA who continue to reside in Cuba and members of the
Colombian groups FARC and ELN, to whom Cuba, according to the report, provides sanctuary and
some degree of support. No other terrorist organizations are mentioned; hence, we must assume that
ETA, FARC and the ELN represent the department's entire case. And even here, the evidence is
unconvincing. The report mentions a request from the Aznar government in November 2003 not to give
the ETA members sanctuary, but when I discussed the matter with the Spanish embassies in
Washington and Havana last year, I was told that the Spanish government had no concerns about ETA
members residing in Cuba. They are there as the result of earlier agreements. Spain had no evidence
that any are involved in terrorist activities and regards the question of their presence in Cuba as a
matter strictly between the Spanish and Cuban governments which is being handled satisfactorily. In
the same way, while there are members of the FARC and ELN in Havana, conversations with the
Colombian embassies in Washington and Havana last year indicated that they are there with the
acquiescence of the Colombian government, which continues to see Cuba's efforts to broker a peace
process in Colombia as "helpful and constructive."
Cuba isn’t supporting terrorist organizations—they’re brokering peace processes
Smith, professor at the Johns Hopkins, Muse, international law attorney, Baker,
established the U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, 4
[Wayne S., Robert L., Glenn, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not Be on the
Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed 6/25/13,
VJ]
Wayne Smith at this point noted that this year’s State Department report complains not only of
American fugitives in Cuba, but claims that Cuba is hosting several foreign terrorists. It only mentions,
however, members of ETA, the Basque separatist organization, and members of the Colombian groups
ELN and FARC. If it had information on others, we can be sure it would mention them; hence, we must
assume that these few Basque and Colombians are the only so-called “foreign terrorists” involved in
the State Department complaint. But that then turns the whole thing into a non-issue, for, as noted
above, Colombian government spokesmen as early as two years ago said they had no evidence
whatever that Cuba was in any way linked to terrorist activities in Colombia. CIP’s conversations this
year with the Colombian embassies in Washington and Havana indicate that still to be the case. Further,
while there are ELN and FARC members in Havana, they are there with the acquiescence of the
Colombian government, which continues to see Cuba’s efforts to broker the peace process in
Colombia as “helpful and constructive.” Much was made in the Cuban exile press a couple of years ago
about the arrest in Colombia of Niall Connolly and three other members of the Irish Republican Army
on suspicion of providing explosives to the FARC. This was seen as significant since Connolly had been
the Sinn Fein representative in Cuba some years earlier. This must, said the exiles, point to a link
between Cuba and guerrilla activities in Colombia. But no. Colombian authorities found no evidence
that the three were providing explosives or training to the FARC or had committed any offense other
than possession of false documents. They were therefore freed (having already been detained longer
than would have been the sentence for having false documents).17 In conversations with the Spanish
embassies in Washington and Havana this year, CIP found them not in the least concerned about the
ETA members resident in Cuba. They are there, said the Spanish, as the result of an earlier agreement
among Spain, Panama and Cuba. The Spanish have no information that any are involved in terrorist
activities and regard the matter of their presence in Cuba as a matter between the Cuban and Spanish
governments. Thus, there would seem to be no real evidence that Cuba is in fact “harboring foreign
terrorists.” The same, however, cannot be said of the United States. It is harboring exile terrorists, the
most notorious probably being Orlando Bosch The Justice Department has evidence of his involvement
in some thirty cases of violence and terrorist acts in the U.S. and Latin America. Imprisoned in Venezuela
in 1976 for masterminding the downing of a Cubana airliner with the death of all its passengers, Bosch
some years later was mysteriously released and returned, without a visa, to Miami. The Justice
Department wanted to deport him – or failing that, to hold him in custody. But he was set free in 1990
by the administration of George H.W. Bush after intense lobbying by South Florida political leaders such
as Ileana Ros- Lehtinen and Jeb Bush.
AT: FARC
The designation of FARC as a terror group is based solely on ideological bias-only
repudiating this designation solves Columbian civil war
Brittain, Professor at Acadia University, 10 (James, November 28, 2010, Fight Back News, “Is
the FARC-EP (Really) a Terrorist Organization?”, http://www.fightbacknews.org/2010/11/28/farc-epreally-terrorist-organization, accessed 6/25/13, KR)
All this begs the question as to why so many state officials perpetuate the FARC-EP as a threat to the
interests of the US, Canada, and the EU. The answer lies in the fact that the insurgency poses a potential
harm not to the national security of citizens, but rather to the geopolitical interests of the
aforementioned states and their economic allies. The FARC-EP proposes a socialized economy based on
public ownership, which counters the (failed) neoliberal development strategies of contemporary
capital. Former Colombian Army Colonel Carlos Velasquez, a U.S. security–not an NGO do-gooder–put it
to me more succinctly in a conversation last year: “Of course the FARC haven’t lost their ideology. That’s
why they’re still dangerous” (quoted in Adam Isacson. 2005. “The End of the FARC's "Retreat"?”)¶ Hence,
it is their praxis that makes the FARC-EP a threat: the insurgency does not subscribe to apolitical acts of
violence to instill fear in the lives of the general masses, but rather structural targets–state forces and
corporate infrastructure – in its quest to radically alter Colombian society for the betterment of the
general population, not the continuity of the minority in power.¶ Contrary to dominant media outlets,
numerous countries around the world have refused to recognize the FARC-EP as an international
terrorist organization, as they see the struggle for peace with social justice in Colombia as an internal
necessity (see ANNCOL. 2004. “Duro revés para Uribe Vélez en la cita Americana de Defensa”). Dating
back to 2004, numerous Latin American governments opposed the United States’ call for a
multinational defense initiative to combat the FARC-EP (see Kintto Lucas. 2004. “Defense Ministers
Reject Intervention in Colombia”). In recent years numerous researchers, scholars, and politicians have
supported the call for the FARC-EP to be declared a legitimate force fighting against a corrupt
Colombian state (Alberto Cruz. 2008. “Ante-room to Peace: Recognizing the FARC as Belligerents”; Bill
Weinburg. 2008. “FARC: "terrorists" or "belligerents"?”; Wolf, Paul. 2008. “Bolivar’s Sword: Venezuela’s
Recognition of the Colombian Insurgency”).¶ Ecuador is an example of this: in January of 2008, Maria
Isabel Salvador, who was then Foreign Minister, argued that the FARC-EP should not be depicted as a
terrorist organization. This sentiment was backed by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who
announced that the FARC-EP are far from a terrorist force but rather are a real army, which occupies
Colombian territory and shares in a Bolivarian vision for Latin America (Xinhua. 2008. “Ecuador
Designates Colombian Rebels as ‘Irregulars’.”). Mexican deputy Ricardo Cantu Garza, too, promoted the
recognition of the FARC-EP as a belligerent force legitimately fighting against a corrupt and unequal
sociopolitical system (Mathaba. 2008. “Mexico Deputy Supports Chavez’ Proposal about the FARC and
ELN”). Even prominent US attorney Paul Wolf argued:¶ “The FARC-EP are a belligerent army of
national liberation, as evidenced by their sustained military campaign and sovereignty over a large part
of Colombian territory, and their conduct of hostilities by organized troops kept under military
discipline and complying with the laws and customs of war, at least to the same extent as other parties
to the conflict. Members of the FARC-EP are therefore entitled to the rights of belligerents under
international law … there is no rule of international law prohibiting revolution, and, if a revolution
succeeds, there is nothing in international law prohibiting the acceptance of the outcome, even though
it was achieved by force.” (Paul Wolf. 2008. “FARC Not a Terrorist Group”).¶ In short, administrations
from Mexico, Ecuador, and Venezuela have opted to use language of belligerent or irregular forces to
more accurately depict the FARC-EP’s domestic and geo-political stance. From Copenhagen to Caracas,
numerous state officials have rejected claims and/or renounced the FARC-EP to be a terrorist
organization and have pushed others to do the same so a peace process can begin to resolve five
decades of civil war (Helen Pidd. 2007. “T-shirt Sellers not Guilty in Terrorism Case”; Marta Harnecker,
Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution: Hugo Chávez Talks to Marta Harnecker. New York, NY:
Monthly Review Press, 2005). Characterizations depicting the FARC-EP as a foreign terrorist
organization must be reexamined and any actors in solidarity with this organization should not be the
subject of slander, detention, threats, or torture for simply believing otherwise.
FARC members are in Cuba to resolve disputes and Castro has condemned their
abuses
Krohnke, Former law professor at University of Minnesota, 6/7/13 (Duane, now an
independent legal commentator, June 7, 2013, “U.S.’ Absurd Designation of Cuba as a ‘State Sponsor of
Terrorism,’” dwkcommentaries, http://dwkcommentaries.com/2013/06/07/u-s-absurd-designation-ofcuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/, accessed 6/29/13, KR)
Most of the reasons for the speciousness of the charges regarding ETA also apply to the charges
regarding the Colombian group, FARC.¶ In addition, the 2008 report said in July of that year “former
Cuban President Fidel Castro called on the FARC to release the hostages they were holding without
preconditions. He has also condemned the FARC’s mistreatment of captives and of their abduction of
civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict.Ӧ There is no indication in the State
Department’s reports of the number of FARC members allegedly in Cuba, but some may be there in
connection with peace negotiations with Colombia (2009 report).¶ Moreover, in March 2011 the
Colombian Ambassador to Cuba told former U.S. President Jimmy Carter that Colombia was “not
concerned about the presence of members of FARC . . . in Cuba.” Indeed, the Ambassador maintained
that this enhances their ability to deal more effectively with FARC.¶ The Cuban connection for Colombia
and the FARC resulted in a September 2012 statement by Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Relations about the
then recently-announced peace talks between Colombia’s government and the FARC. It stated that Cuba
“has a historical commitment to peace in Colombia and efforts to put an end to [her] . . . political, social
and military conflicts.” To that end, the Cuban Government “has made constructive efforts to . . .
search for a negotiated solution, always responding to a request from the parties involved and without
the slightest influence in their respective positions.” The statement continued. For over a year, at the
express request of the Government of Colombia and the FARC, “the Cuban government supported the
. . . exploratory talks leading to a peace process,” and as a “guarantor” Cuba participated in these
talks. “The Cuban government will continue to . . . [provide its] good offices in favor of this effort, to the
extent that the Government of Colombia and the FARC . . . so request.Ӧ As a result, as the latest State
Department report admits, in November 2012 Cuba has been hosting peace negotiations in Havana
between the Colombian government and the FARC seeking to end their long civil war. Colombia’s
president said that support for such negotiations by Cuba and Venezuela has been crucial in helping the
two sides to reach agreement on conducting the negotiations.¶ Late last month (May 2013), the two
sides announced an agreement to distribute land to small farmers and undertake development projects
that would improve rural education and infrastructure that will not take effect until a final peace
agreement is reached.
Even the State Department admits FARC members are in Cuba for peace talks
Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 9 (Mark, 7/14/09, Congressional Research ServiceLatin America: Terrorism Issues, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128377.pdf, accessed
6/26/13, KR)
The language in the State Department's most recent terrorism report issue in April 2009 is much more
tempered than in past versions of the annual report. The report begins by noting that "Cuba no longer
actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world." While the report
maintains that the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists, such as
members of the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and Colombia's Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), it notes that some were in Cuba in
connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. The report states
that Cuba continued to publicly defend the FARC- but also notes that in July 2008 Fidel Castro called on
the FARC to release the hostages they were holding without preconditions, and condemned the
FARC's mistreatment of captives and their abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the
armed conflict.
FARC members are in Cuba for peace processes and becoming less violent
BBC 6/11/13 (Writers, 6/11/13, “Colombian peace talks resume in Cuba”,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22853611, accessed 6/26/13, KR)
The talks restarted in Havana, Cuba, on Tuesday, a fortnight after the two sides reached agreement on
land reform. They are discussing how the Farc will join in politics if a deal is reached to end the five
decades of conflict. Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos has said he wants the talks to be wrapped
up by the end of the year. On 26 May, negotiators announced that after half a year of talks, they had
struck a deal on agrarian reform, the first of six issues on their agenda. On Tuesday, the two sides
started discussing how the rebels can lay down arms and become a political force. The government's
lead negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, said that this phase would focus on "establishing rules which
will allow the transition of the Farc to an unarmed political force".
Cuba not sponsoring terrorism in Columbia – Commander of Colombia’s armed forces
concedes
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
The State Department had also alleged that Cuba was supporting terrorism in Colombia, only to have
General Fernando Tapias, the commander of Colombia’s armed forces, state before the House
Committee on International Relations on April 24 of 2002 that: “There is no information…that Cuba is
in any way linked to terrorist activities in Colombia today. Indeed Cuban authorities are buttressing
the peace movement.”4
Columbia admits that there is no link between Cuba and guerilla activities – they are
actually helping with negotiations
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
Wayne Smith at this point noted that this year’s State Department report complains not only of American fugitives in Cuba, but claims that
Cuba is hosting several foreign terrorists. It only mentions, however, members of ETA, the Basque separatist organization, and members of the
Colombian groups ELN and FARC. If it had information on others, we can be sure it would mention them; hence, we
must assume that
these few Basque and Colombians are the only so-called “foreign terrorists” involved in the State
Department complaint. But that then turns the whole thing into a non-issue, for, as noted above,
Colombian government spokesmen as early as two years ago said they had no evidence whatever that
Cuba was in any way linked to terrorist activities in Colombia. CIP’s conversations this year with the
Colombian embassies in Washington and Havana indicate that still to be the case. Further, while there
are ELN and FARC members in Havana, they are there with the acquiescence of the Colombian
government, which continues to see Cuba’s efforts to broker the peace process in Colombia as
“helpful and constructive.” Much was made in the Cuban exile press a couple of years ago about the arrest in Colombia of Niall
Connolly and three other members of the Irish Republican Army on suspicion of providing explosives to the FARC. This was seen as significant
since Connolly had been the Sinn Fein representative in Cuba some years earlier. This
must, said the exiles, point to a link
between Cuba and guerrilla activities in Colombia. But no. Colombian authorities found no evidence
that the three were providing explosives or training to the FARC or had committed any offense other
than possession of false documents. They were therefore freed (having already been detained longer than would
have been the sentence for having false documents).17
FARC members are in Cuba with Columbia’s permission and Cuba is trying to broker a
deal, not harboring terrorists
Smith, Former Chief of Mission of the US Interests Section in Havana, et al 4 (Wayne,
currently a JHU professor and US-Cuba relations author, Robert Muse, attorney specializing in issues
relating to Cuba, and Glenn Baker, Director of the U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November
2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not Be on the Terrorist List”,
http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed 6/25/13, KR)
ProjectCIP’s conversations this year with the Colombian embassies in Washington and Havana indicate
that still to be¶ the case. Further, while there are ELN and FARC members¶ in Havana, they are there
with the acquiescence of the Colombian government, which continues to see Cuba’s efforts¶ to
broker the peace process in Colombia as “helpful and¶ constructive.”¶ Much was made in the Cuban
exile press a couple of¶ years ago about the arrest in Colombia of Niall Connolly¶ and three other
members of the Irish Republican Army on¶ suspicion of providing explosives to the FARC. This was¶
seen as significant since Connolly had been the Sinn Fein¶ representative in Cuba some years earlier. This
must, said¶ the exiles, point to a link between Cuba and guerrilla activities in Colombia. But no.
Colombian authorities found no¶ evidence that the three were providing explosives or training¶ to
the FARC or had committed any offense other than pos-¶ session of false documents. They were
therefore freed (hav-¶ ing already been detained longer than would have been the¶ sentence for having
false documents)
FARC is a guerilla organization but not a terror group
-careful, one line makes a minor ptx link claim
Kayyem, Public policy lecturer at Harvard, 4/29/13 (Juliette, 4/29/13, Boston Globe, “Diluting
the terror watch lists”, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/04/28/making-terror-lists-mattercuba-not-state-sponsor-terrorism/X2NW0rfYm5A2eJT5VZEuHI/story.html, accessed 6/25/13, KR)
Cuba seems to be on the list because, as previous State Department assessments have determined, it
supports revolutionary movements in Latin America and gives direct support in terms of training and
arms to “guerrilla groups” and, note the turn of phrase here, their “terrorist operations.” Cuba’s
support includes safe haven to members of Columbia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces, known as FARC,
which has waged an insurgency there but is now engaged in peace negotiations. ¶ None of this has to
do with the United States and its direct safety and security. Sure, the FARC and other guerrilla groups
have destabilized the region, but that has nothing to do with terrorist threats to the United States. ¶
The state sponsor list is no longer about terrorism. Pakistan, for example, is not on it. Domestic politics,
not terror, explain Cuba’s status as our neighborly pariah. The continuing isolation of Cuba is
inexplicable in modern times.
FARC isn’t a terrorist organization-they don’t attack international targets
Brittain, Professor at Acadia University, 10 (James, November 28, 2010, Fight Back News, “Is the
FARC-EP (Really) a Terrorist Organization?”, http://www.fightbacknews.org/2010/11/28/farc-ep-reallyterrorist-organization, accessed 6/25/13, KR)
In light of the recent activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) throughout sectors of the
social justice and peace movement within the United States, it is increasingly apparent that even those
interested in solidarity with sociopolitical organizations struggling with issues of marginalization and
equity are viewed as a domestic threat or, at the very least, a target of national significance. For
example, longtime peace and justice activists have been subpoenaed by the FBI as a result of their
work, which critiques the economic and militaristic involvement of their government and military in
Colombia.¶ In many respects, prominent state officials (and popular media outlets) have succeeded in
demonizing the struggle of impoverished peasants, marginalized workers, and political dissidents in
this Latin American country as terroristic (and then attempt to link international solidarity as acts of
assisting terrorism), especially those belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –
People’s Army (FARC-EP). Yet what all these mechanisms fail to exhibit (or understand) is that the
resistance movement in Colombia is a national struggle of emancipation that structurally exists to
change the societal conditions within its own country’s borders.¶ To try and classify the FARC-EP as a
threat to the United States is preposterous due to the fact that the insurgency has been engaged in a
half-century of struggle that has solely remained in the confines of Colombian territory and has been
directed at the dominant class therein. Garry Leech, editor of Colombia Journal, has suggested that
“while there is little doubt regarding the global reach of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, there is
no evidence that the FARC is anything but one of the armed actors in Colombia’s long and tragic
domestic conflict” (see Killing Peace: Colombia’s Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Intervention. New York,
NY: Information Network of the Americas, 2002, p.86). Even conservative analysts like Peter Chalk have
come to recognize that “the FARC-EP cannot be considered an international terrorist organization akin
to al-Qaeda, for it does not demonstrate the intent nor desire to engage in a transnational terrorist
campaign against antagonists” (see Trends in Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. Washington, DC: Rand, 2006. p.11n.1).¶ The FARC-EP “are subnational
actors that direct their political violence against domestic operations” (Michael Kenney. From Pablo to
Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation.
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007. p. 251 n.37). Noting this is important,
considering that external forces beyond Colombia’s borders have been systematically involved in
military operations against the FARC-EP, yet the insurgency has sustained a principle of selfdetermination based on the need for Colombians to structurally change the inequitable conditions in
their country and not target other nations in the periphery (even when those nations have targeted the
guerrillas).
AT: Harbors Fugitives
Fugitives in Cuba cannot be extradited due to an American treaty, and should be
irrelevant to state sponsored terrorism anyway
Smith, U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs, 7
[Wayne S., August 6, National Interest, “Take Cuba Off The Terrorist List”,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733, accessed
6/25/13, VJ] This year's report repeats its annual complaint that Cuba permits American fugitives to
live in Cuba and is not responsive to U.S. extradition requests. True, there are American fugitives in
Cuba. Most are hijackers who came in the 1970s and have lived in Cuba since then. There are a few
others, probably seven or eight, wanted for crimes committed in the United States. It is also true that
Cuba has not responded positively to U.S. extradition requests. But two things must be noted about
that. First, for all practical purposes, the 1904 extradition treaty is simply no longer operative,
principally because the United States has not honored a single Cuba request for extradition since
1959. Second, most of the "crimes" committed in the U.S. were of a political nature, and Article VI of
the treaty excludes the extradition of those whose crimes were of a "political character."
Furthermore, as Robert Muse, an international lawyer, noted in a 2004 report, none of the U.S.
fugitives in Cuba provides a basis for declaring Cuba to be a "state sponsor of terrorism." Legal
authority to make such a designation is found in Section 6(j) of the 1979 Export Administration Act,
which says that it must be demonstrated that the fugitives have committed "terrorist" acts and that
those acts were "international" in character. Muse states that he has been unable to identify a single
U.S. fugitive in Cuba who meets those twofold criteria. Thus, they are extraneous to the definition of
Cuba as a "state sponsor of terrorism." In sum, as CIP has noted in its responses over the past few
years, the annual reports present not a shred of evidence to confirm that Cuba is in fact a terrorist state.
Non-extradition does not justify an SST designation, Cuba only refuses to extradite
political criminals, and the US is worse
Smith, Former Chief of Mission of the US Interests Section in Havana, et al 4 (Wayne,
currently a JHU professor and US-Cuba relations author, Robert Muse, attorney specializing in issues
relating to Cuba, and Glenn Baker, Director of the U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November
2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not Be on the Terrorist List”,
http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed 6/25/13, KR)
At the October 21, 2004 conference, Bob Muse, a specialist in international law, opened his discussion
by noting¶ that the fact that there are American fugitives from justice in¶ Cuba does not give the U.S.
grounds for declaring Cuba to¶ be a terrorist state. There are many countries that have not¶ signed
extradition treaties with the United States - Indonesia, The People’s Republic of China, Kuwait,
Vietnam, and¶ Cambodia, to name only a few. They do not normally extradite fugitives to the United
States. Yet, none of those countries are on the State Department’s list of terrorist-sponsoring
nations.¶ So there is obviously no ¶ requirement¶ that countries that¶ do not extradite fugitives to the
United States be listed as¶ terrorist sponsoring countries. But can it nevertheless be a¶ valid reason for
inclusion on the list? The answer, as a¶ matter of U.S. law, is, no. Legal authority to designate a¶ terrorist
sponsoring country is found in section 6(j) of the¶ 1979 Export Administration Act, which authorizes the¶
Secretary of State to determine that a country has “re-¶ peatedly provided support for international
terrorism.”¶ Such a determination is prerequisite to inclusion on the¶ State Department’s list of terroristsupporting countries.¶ The fact that certain fugitives from U.S. justice are per-¶ mitted to reside in
Cuba does not ¶ definitionally¶ constitute¶ “repeated provision of support for international
terrorism,”¶ as required by section 6(j). Not unless¶ two further elements¶ could both be
demonstrated: (i) that the fugitives in question¶ had committed “terrorist” acts and, (ii) that those
acts were¶ “international” in character.¶ 7¶ Muse said he had been unable to identify a single U.S.¶
fugitive in Cuba who meets the twofold criteria of having¶ committed a terrorist act that was
international in nature.¶ Thus, Cuba’s inclusion on the State Department list of te rorist sponsoring
nations is invalid insofar as it rests on the¶ fact that there are American fugitives residing there.¶ Further,
the problem has another dimension. Under a¶ 1904 bilateral extradition treaty, non-political criminals
are¶ to be extradited on a reciprocal basis.¶ 8¶ However, U.S.¶ breaches of the treaty have put it into a
state of suspension -¶ that is, Cuba has refused to extradite U.S. citizens as a direct response to the U.S.
treatment of ¶ its¶ requests for Cu-¶ ban citizens to be returned to Cuba. And its position is fully¶
consistent with international law.¶ 9¶ On January 7, 1959 Cuba sought, by diplomatic mea-¶ sures, the
extradition of a number of Cubans who had fled¶ to the U.S. following the collapse of the Batista
government¶ Conference panelists Wayne S. Smith, Cynthia McClintock and Robert Muse.¶ 5¶ one week
before. The men sought included embezzlers from¶ the Cuban national treasury, torturers and plain
gangsters.¶ Over the next few months, and then over the years, Cuba¶ made dozens of other
extradition requests, always accompanied by supporting evidence. It has never received a¶ response to
a single one of those requests.¶ As a result, a senior Cuban foreign ministry official commented recently
that the U.S. has no “moral right” to ask¶ Cuba to extradite anyone, whether they are political fugitives
or ordinary criminals.¶ 10¶ In fact, however, Cuba has extradited a number of non-¶ political fugitives to
the U.S. As the State Department’s most¶ recent report says:¶ “Dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice
have taken¶ refuge on the island. In a few cases, the Cuban¶ Government has rendered fugitives from
U.S.¶ justice to U.S. authorities.¶ 11¶ The report goes on to make the odd¶ comment that ¶ The salient
feature of Cuba’s¶ behavior in this arena, however, is its refusal to¶ render to U.S. justice any fugitive
whose crime¶ is judged by Cuba to be political.¶ ”(Emphasis¶ Added).¶ That comment calls into question
whether the State De-¶ partment has even read the old extradition treaty and is aware¶ that it explicitly
prohibits the extradition of persons whose¶ crimes are of a “political character.”¶ How many “political”
fugitives from U.S. justice are ac-¶ tually in Cuba? The number varies from source to source,¶ but one of
the most reliable is the Council on Foreign Rela-¶ tions, which says there are eight U.S. nationals residing
there¶ whose crimes may be deemed “political.” Joanne Chesimard¶ is the one person in this category
actually named in the State¶ Department’s most recent annual report. For that reason,¶ her case is
worth examining in some detail.¶ Chesimard was a member of the Black Panther Party.¶ 12¶ She was
convicted in 1973 of killing a New Jersey state¶ trooper. In 1979 she escaped prison and has been in
Cuba¶ since then.¶ Joanne Chesimard was described recently by a Cuban¶ official as someone whose
case was investigated and found¶ to merit treatment as a political offense. As a result of that¶
determination, Cuba’s position is that she is not extraditable.¶ Is Cuba legally justified in taking this
position? As de-¶ plorable as the killing of Trooper Werner Foerster was, the¶ answer is yes.¶ The 1904
Extradition Treaty between the U.S. and Cuba¶ states, at Article VI: “A fugitive criminal shall not be¶
surrendered if the offense in respect of which his sur-¶ render is demanded be of a political character...If
any ques-¶ tion shall arise as to whether a case comes within the provi-¶ sions of this article, the decision
of the authorities of the gov-¶ ernment on which the demand for surrender is made...shall¶ be final.”¶ The
political offense exception of the 1904 U.S./Cuba¶ Extradition Treaty is found in most bilateral
extradition trea-¶ ties.¶ 13¶ For example, until 1987 when the U.S. and the United¶ Kingdom amended
their joint extradition treaty, members of¶ the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were often determined by¶
U.S. courts to be exempt from extradition under the political¶ offenses exception of an earlier treaty.¶
14¶ Would a U.S. court find Joanne Chesimard exempt from¶ extradition under the political offense
exception of the 1904¶ treaty? Federal case law suggests it would.¶ The historical development of the
political offense ex-¶ ception is grounded in a belief that individuals have a “right¶ to resort to political
activism to foster political change.”¶ 15¶ Violent political action is especially covered by the excep-¶ tion.¶
16¶ We can deplore Chesimard’s crime while at the same¶ time conceding that Cuba’s treatment of
Chesimard as a¶ political fugitive has a sound legal basis in the international¶ law of treaties in
general and in U.S. jurisprudence in par-¶ ticular.
Cuba is not an SST-no new fugitives and they aren’t terrorists anyway
Krohnke, Former law professor at University of Minnesota, 6/7/13 (Duane, now an
independent legal commentator, June 7, 2013, “U.S.’ Absurd Designation of Cuba as a ‘State Sponsor of
Terrorism,’” dwkcommentaries, http://dwkcommentaries.com/2013/06/07/u-s-absurd-designation-ofcuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/, accessed 6/29/13, KR)
There apparently were or are over 70 individuals living in Cuba who are fugitives from criminal charges
in U.S. relating to violent acts in the 1970′s purportedly committed to advance political causes, but
pursuant to a 2005 Cuban government statement, no additional U.S. fugitives have been permitted on
the island. In a few instances Cuba has extradited such fugitives to the U.S. (2001, 2003, 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).¶ One of the U.S. fugitives, William Potts, recently has asked to return and face
trial in the U.S. In 1984, he hijacked a Piedmont Airlines passenger plane with 56 people aboard in the
U.S. and forced it to go to Cuba. There as a Black Panther and self-styled revolutionary, he dreamed of
receiving military training in Cuba that he could use against the U.S. government. This did not happen.
Instead he was tried and convicted in Cuba and served a 13.5 years in a Cuban prison plus 1.5 years of
supervised release for the hijacking.¶ None of these fugitives apparently is affiliated with U.S.designated foreign terrorist organizations. The issue of whether or not they will be extradited to the
U.S. is an appropriate issue for bilateral negotiations between the two countries. But, in my opinion, it is
not a legitimate basis for designating Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.”
Not extraditing criminals is not a reason for inclusion on the list
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
At the October 21, 2004 conference, Bob Muse, a specialist in international law, opened his discussion by noting that the fact that there
are American fugitives from justice in Cuba does not give the U.S. grounds for declaring Cuba to be a
terrorist state. There are many countries that have not signed extradition treaties with the United
States - Indonesia, The People’s Republic of China, Kuwait, Vietnam, and Cambodia, to name only a few. They do not normally extradite
fugitives to the United States. Yet, none of those countries are on the State Department’s list of terroristsponsoring nations. So there is obviously no requirement that countries that do not extradite fugitives to the United States be listed as
terrorist sponsoring countries. But can it nevertheless be a valid reason for inclusion on the list? The answer, as
a matter of U.S. law, is, no. Legal authority to designate a terrorist sponsoring country is found in
section 6(j) of the 1979 Export Administration Act, which authorizes the Secretary of State to
determine that a country has “repeatedly provided support for international terrorism.” Such a
determination is prerequisite to inclusion on the State Department’s list of terrorist-supporting countries. The fact that certain
fugitives from U.S. justice are permitted to reside in Cuba does not definitionally constitute “repeated
provision of support for international terrorism,” as required by section 6(j). Not unlesstwo further elements could both be
demonstrated: (i) that the fugitives in question had committed “terrorist” acts and, (ii) that those acts were “international” in character. 7
Muse said he had been unable to identify a single U.S. fugitive in Cuba who meets the twofold criteria
of having committed a terrorist act that was international in nature. Thus, Cuba’s inclusion on the
State Department list of terrorist sponsoring nations is invalid insofar as it rests on the fact that there
are American fugitives residing there.
Cuba is not only operating within its legal rights by not turning over political fugitives
– tis required to do so by international law
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
Further, the problem has another dimension. Under a 1904 bilateral extradition treaty, non-political criminals are to be
extradited on a reciprocal basis. 8 However, U.S. breaches of the treaty have put it into a state of
suspension - that is, Cuba has refused to extradite U.S. citizens as a direct response to the U.S.
treatment of its requests for Cuban citizens to be returned to Cuba. And its position is fully consistent
with international law.9 On January 7, 1959 Cuba sought, by diplomatic measures, the extradition of a number of Cubans who had
fled to the U.S. following the collapse of the Batista government one week before. The men sought included embezzlers from 5 the Cuban
national treasury, torturers and plain gangsters. Over the next few months, and then over the years, Cuba
made dozens of other
extradition requests, always accompanied by supporting evidence. It has never received a response to
a single one of those requests. As a result, a senior Cuban foreign ministry official commented recently that the U.S. has no
“moral right” to ask Cuba to extradite anyone, whether they are political fugitives or ordinary
criminals.10 In fact, however, Cuba has extradited a number of nonpolitical fugitives to the U.S. As the
State Department’s most recent report says: “Dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice have taken refuge
on the island. In a few cases, the Cuban Government has rendered fugitives from U.S. justice to U.S.
authorities.11 The report goes on to make the odd comment that The salient feature of Cuba’s behavior in this arena, however, is its
refusal to render to U.S. justice any fugitive whose crime is judged by Cuba to be political.”(Emphasis Added). That comment calls into
question whether the State Department has even read the old extradition treaty and is aware that it
explicitly prohibits the extradition of persons whose crimes are of a “political character.”
AT: Money Laundering
AML/CFT deficiencies are illegitimate grounds for declaring Cuba an SST-they have a
plan and other countries with deficiencies aren’t on the list
Krohnke, Former law professor at University of Minnesota, 6/7/13 (Duane, now an
independent legal commentator, June 7, 2013, “U.S.’ Absurd Designation of Cuba as a ‘State Sponsor of
Terrorism,’” dwkcommentaries, http://dwkcommentaries.com/2013/06/07/u-s-absurd-designation-ofcuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/, accessed 6/29/13, KR)
The other asserted ground in the latest U.S. report for the designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of
Terrorism” was new for 2011 and is reiterated (in modified form) for 2012. It is Cuba’s having been
identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) [2] as “having strategic AML/CFT [Anti-Money
Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism] deficiencies.”¶ Last year’s U.S. criticism of Cuba on
this issue went on to say, “Despite sustained and consistent overtures, Cuba has refused to substantively
engage directly with the FATF. It has not committed to FATF standards and it is not a member of a FATFstyle regional body.Ӧ In 2012, however, Cuba joined such a regional body (the Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD)), and FATF recently said Cuba has “developed
an action plan with the FATF” with “written high-level political commitment to address the identified
deficiencies.”¶ The State Department’s recent report comes close to admitting this significant change in
2012. In short, the U.S. admits that Cuba is addressing its alleged financial system deficiencies.¶
Moreover, as of February 2013, Cuba is not on the FATF’s list of “bad guys” (my phrase). The two at the
bottom of that list are Iran and North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), for which FATF
calls for all states to apply counter-measures. The other 13 on this list are ones that have strategic
AML/CFT deficiencies, but have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or have not
committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies: Ecuador, Ethiopia,
Indonesia, Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sao Tome and Principe, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, Vietnam
and Yemen.¶ But all of these facts about Cuba’s financial system, in my opinion, do not support
designating Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.” If it were, then 13 countries on the “bad guy” list
should be added to the U.S. list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” (Of the 15 countries on the “bad guy”
list, only Iran and Syria are now U.S.-designated “State Sponsors of Terrorism.”)¶ Moreover, as noted
above, the U.S. terrorism reports have indicated there was no evidence of Cuban financing of terrorism
in the covered years. In addition, some of the reports reference Cuban laws permitting the tracking,
blocking, or seizing terrorist assets (Cuba’s Law 93 Against Acts of Terrorism and Instruction 19 of the
Superintendent of the Cuban Central Bank) (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). In addition, in its response to last
year’s U.S. report, Cuba has asserted that it “regularly provides precise, truthful information to the
appropriate United Nations bodies charged with addressing these issues and others related to
confronting terrorism.”¶ The whole FATF issue raised in the U.S. terrorism report, in my opinion, is a “red
herring.”
AT: Assata Shakur/Joanne Chesimard
Cuba’s harboring of Joanne Chesimard is legally grounded and required by an
AMERICAN treaty
Smith, professor at the Johns Hopkins, Muse, international law attorney, Baker,
established the U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, 4
[Wayne S., Robert L., Glenn, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not Be on the
Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed 6/25/13,
VJ]
In fact, however, Cuba has extradited a number of nonpolitical fugitives to the U.S. As the State
Department’s most recent report says: “Dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice have taken refuge on the
island. In a few cases, the Cuban Government has rendered fugitives from U.S. justice to U.S.
authorities.11 The report goes on to make the odd comment that The salient feature of Cuba’s
behavior in this arena, however, is its refusal to render to U.S. justice any fugitive whose crime is
judged by Cuba to be political.”(Emphasis Added). That comment calls into question whether the State
Department has even read the old extradition treaty and is aware that it explicitly prohibits the
extradition of persons whose crimes are of a “political character.” How many “political” fugitives from
U.S. justice are actually in Cuba? The number varies from source to source, but one of the most reliable
is the Council on Foreign Relations, which says there are eight U.S. nationals residing there whose crimes
may be deemed “political.” Joanne Chesimard is the one person in this category actually named in the
State Department’s most recent annual report. For that reason, her case is worth examining in some
detail. Chesimard was a member of the Black Panther Party. 12 She was convicted in 1973 of killing a
New Jersey state trooper. In 1979 she escaped prison and has been in Cuba since then. Joanne
Chesimard was described recently by a Cuban official as someone whose case was investigated and
found to merit treatment as a political offense. As a result of that determination, Cuba’s position is
that she is not extraditable. Is Cuba legally justified in taking this position? As deplorable as the killing
of Trooper Werner Foerster was, the answer is yes. The 1904 Extradition Treaty between the U.S. and
Cuba states, at Article VI: “A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense in respect of
which his surrender is demanded be of a political character…If any question shall arise as to whether a
case comes within the provisions of this article, the decision of the authorities of the government on
which the demand for surrender is made…shall be final.” The political offense exception of the 1904
U.S./Cuba Extradition Treaty is found in most bilateral extradition treaties. 13 For example, until 1987
when the U.S. and the United Kingdom amended their joint extradition treaty, members of the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) were often determined by U.S. courts to be exempt from extradition under the
political offenses exception of an earlier treaty.14 Would a U.S. court find Joanne Chesimard exempt
from extradition under the political offense exception of the 1904 treaty? Federal case law suggests it
would. The historical development of the political offense exception is grounded in a belief that
individuals have a “right to resort to political activism to foster political change.”15 Violent political
action is especially covered by the exception. 16 We can deplore Chesimard’s crime while at the same
time conceding that Cuba’s treatment of Chesimard as a political fugitive has a sound legal basis in the
international law of treaties in general and in U.S. jurisprudence in particular. A troubling truth
emerges from all this, Muse noted: Noncooperation between the U.S. and Cuba in surrendering fugitives
serves neither side’s interests. Efforts to resuscitate the 1904 Extradition Treaty should begin as soon as
circumstances permit.
Not turning over Shakur (Chesimard) is completely legal – even if she is guilty – she’s a
political fugitive
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
How many “political” fugitives from U.S. justice are actually in Cuba? The number varies from source to source, but one of the most reliable is
the Council on Foreign Relations, which says there are eight U.S. nationals residing there whose crimes may be deemed “political.” Joanne
Chesimard is the one person in this category actually named in the State Department’s most recent annual report. For that reason, her case is
worth examining in some detail. Chesimard was a
member of the Black Panther Party. 12 She was convicted in
1973 of killing a New Jersey state trooper. In 1979 she escaped prison and has been in Cuba since
then. Joanne Chesimard was described recently by a Cuban official as someone whose case was investigated and found to merit treatment as
a political offense. As a result of that determination, Cuba’s position is that she is not extraditable. Is Cuba
legally justified in taking this position? As deplorable as the killing of Trooper Werner Foerster was,
the answer is yes. The 1904 Extradition Treaty between the U.S. and Cuba states, at Article VI: “A
fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense in respect of which his surrender is demanded
be of a political character…If any question shall arise as to whether a case comes within the provisions
of this article, the decision of the authorities of the government on which the demand for surrender is
made…shall be final.” The political offense exception of the 1904 U.S./Cuba Extradition Treaty is found in most
bilateral extradition treaties.13 For example, until 1987 when the U.S. and the United Kingdom amended their joint extradition
treaty, members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were often determined by U.S. courts to be exempt from extradition under the political
offenses exception of an earlier treaty.14 Would a U.S. court find Joanne Chesimard exempt from extradition under the political offense
exception of the 1904 treaty? Federal case law suggests it would. The
historical development of the political offense
exception is grounded in a belief that individuals have a “right to resort to political activism to foster
political change.”15 Violent political action is especially covered by the exception.16 We can deplore Chesimard’s crime
while at the same time conceding that Cuba’s treatment of Chesimard as a political fugitive has a
sound legal basis in the international law of treaties in general and in U.S. jurisprudence in particular.
A troubling truth emerges from all this, Muse noted: Noncooperation between the U.S. and Cuba in surrendering fugitives serves neither side’s
interests. Efforts to resuscitate the 1904 Extradition Treaty should begin as soon as circumstances permit. (Note: Muse’s remarks reported
above are taken from an excellent paper prepared by him, Is Cuba’s Refusal to Turn Over Fugitives From U.S. Justice a Valid Basis for that
Country’s Designation as a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism”? which is available on the CIP website, http://ciponline.org/ cuba.
Shakur is innocent
Puyear, Social Activist, 13
[Eugene Puryear, an American social activist with the Party for Socialism and Liberation, 5-4-13,
Liberation, “Assata Shakur: Understanding the politics behind the FBI's new attack”,
http://www.pslweb.org/liberationnews/news/assata-shakur-understanding-the-politics.html, Accessed
6-25-13, Fontana]
Shakur was falsely convicted of having killed an officer on May 2, 1973. While driving on the New Jersey Turnpike, Assata, Zayd
Shakur, and Sundiata Acoli were stopped by state troopers, allegedly for having a “faulty taillight.” A shootout ensued where one state trooper
killed Zayd Shakur, and another trooper, Werner Foerster, ended up dead. Shakur
was charged with both murders, despite
the fact that the other trooper, James Harper, admitted he killed Zayd Shakur.¶ Assata had been, following
police instructions, standing with her hands in the air, when she was shot by Trooper Harper more
than once, including a bullet to the back. Trooper Harper lied and said he had seen Shakur reach for a
gun, a claim he later recanted. He also claimed she had been in a firing position, something a surgeon
who examined her said was “anatomically impossible." The same surgeon said it was “anatomically
necessary” for her arms to have been raised for her to receive the bullet wounds she did. Tests done by
the police found that Shakur had not fired a gun, and no physical or medical evidence was presented
by the prosecution to back up their claim that she had fired a gun at Trooper Harper.¶ While she was in trial
proceedings, the state attempted to pin six other serious crimes on her, alleging she had carried out bank robberies, kidnappings and
attempted killings. She was acquitted three times, two were dismissed and one resulted in a hung jury.¶ Shukur
was put on trial in a
county where because of pre-trial publicity 70 percent of people thought she was guilty, and she was
judged by an all-white jury. Without any physical evidence to present, the prosecution had to rely totally on false
statements and innuendo aimed at playing on the prejudices of the jury pool against Black people,
political radicals, and Black revolutionaries in particular. Finally, after years behind bars, the state secured her conviction
for the Turnpike shooting.¶
Shakur is innocent and her trial reflected structural racism
Washington Jr. , Associate Professor of Journalism at Temple, 13
[Linn Washington Jr., Law degree@ Yale, Associate Professor of Journalism at Temple, 5-17-13,
CounterPunch , “FBI Twists History ‘Terror’ War Gets Stupider as Shakur is Added to the List” ,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/05/17/terror-war-gets-stupider-as-shakur-is-added-to-the-list/,
accessed, 6-25-13, Fontana]
The murder convictions of Wright and Shakur, each evidenced systemic flaws within the U.S. criminal
justice system that remain evident today. Neither Wright nor Shakur, for example, actually committed
the murders producing their murder convictions, according to forensic evidence and other facts provided by
law enforcement at the time of the trials.¶ Shakur’s original trial lawyer, Rutgers University criminal justice professor Lennox Hinds, said
during a recent Democracy Now! interview, that his client was “shot in the back” while her “hands were in the air.”
This rendered her incapable of firing a gun, evidence that the trial jury brushed-off and law enforcement authorities today
bury when portraying Shakur as a brutal murderer.¶ “So, the allegation by the state police that she took an officer’s
gun and shot him, executed him in cold blood, is not only false, but it is designed to inflame,” Hinds said,
noting that no gunpowder residue “was found on her clothing or on her hand,” further undercutting claims of her
shooting Trooper Werner Foerster.¶ The structural injustices corroding the Shakur trial involved an all-white jury
where five of those jurors had conflict-of-interest connections to NJ state troopers (including two
close relatives and a girlfriend) and the trial judge slashing funding for defense experts sought to
highlight that forensic evidence of innocence according to a recent statement from the National
Lawyers Guild opposing Shakur’s terror listing.¶ Those injustices also included the trial judge’s
repeatedly holding Hinds in contempt, and after the trial, an attempt by the NJ body certifying lawyers to revoke Hinds’ law
license because he had criticized that murder trial as a “legalized lynching” by a “kangaroo court.”¶ The institutionalized injustice evident in
Shakur’s trial is a rights robbing reality with an infamous history in NJ and across America.¶ The July 1797 hanging in Woodbury, NJ, a few miles
south of Philadelphia, of a black man convicted of murder prompted harsh contemporaneous criticism that assailed alleged proof of guilt
“being found entirely on presumption.” The condemned man, Abraham Johnstone, issued a stirring retort on the day of his execution in which
he claimed he was the victim of perjury, which he argued was rampant in American courts. Johnstone stated in his retort that he had been
framed by persons seeking to steal his home.
Labeling Shakur as a “terrorist” is just a vindictive lash out of an empire against a rebel
element
Puyear, Social Activist, 13
[Eugene Puryear, an American social activist with the Party for Socialism and Liberation, 5-4-13,
Liberation, “Assata Shakur: Understanding the politics behind the FBI's new attack”,
http://www.pslweb.org/liberationnews/news/assata-shakur-understanding-the-politics.html, Accessed
6-25-13, Fontana]
On May 2, the Federal Bureau of Investigation suddenly announced that they had placed Assata Shakur on its “Most Wanted Terrorists” list,
making her the first woman to be so designated. The state of New Jersey also raised the bounty on her head to $2 million. These government
actions came on the 40th anniversary of the shoot-out in which police allege that Shakur killed an officer.¶ It
is clear that these are
the vindictive attempts of the Empire still outraged that a rebel could escape, survive outside its
reach, and continue to expose its long history of exploitation and oppression. The recent provocations
are part of a long-term smear campaign by the U.S. government to erase her revolutionary legacy.¶
The FBI's accusations target Shakur as an individual, but the labeling of her as a terrorist is an attack
on all revolutionaries.¶ Shakur has been living in exile in Cuba for the last 29 years. So what changed in the recent days and weeks to
now put her on the "Most Wanted Terrorists" list? The FBI presented no evidence against her and revealed no
terrorist plots. Assata's real crime, FBI spokesman Aaron Ford said, was that from Cuba she continues
to "maintain and promote her ... ideology" and "provides anti-U.S. government speeches espousing
the Black Liberation Army message"—an ideology and message that the U.S. government has declared
"terrorism."¶ In other words, President Obama's and Eric Holder's FBI is charging Shakur with a political crime, the
advocacy of revolutionary politics and Black liberation as “terroristic” and “criminal.” According to the
outrageous "War on Terror" legal doctrines currently employed in Washington, she could be targeted
for assassination. In addition, the designation of Shakur as a terrorist helps them justify the targeting of
socialist Cuba as a "state sponsor of terrorism."¶ The defense of Assata Shakur is therefore part and
parcel of a general defense of the right to espouse revolutionary politics, of Black liberation and of
free speech more generally.
Classifying Shakur as a “terrorist” is just an attempt by the state to repress potential
symbols of resistance
Puyear, Social Activist, 13
[Eugene Puryear, an American social activist with the Party for Socialism and Liberation, 5-4-13,
Liberation, “Assata Shakur: Understanding the politics behind the FBI's new attack”,
http://www.pslweb.org/liberationnews/news/assata-shakur-understanding-the-politics.html, Accessed
6-25-13, Fontana]
Ominously, by criminalizing Assata Shakur, the government has also taken a step towards criminalizing
the broader movement in support of political prisoners. Many political prisoners in this country have
also been alleged to be members of the Black Liberation Army. If Shakur is a terrorist simply for giving speeches in
support of the BLA, what about those convicted of crimes alleged to have taken place while they were members? Will political prisoner support
groups now be targeted as "supporters of terrorism” or “terrorists” themselves?¶ The
new attacks on Shakur aim to have a
chilling effect on those who seek to express their support for political prisoners. This is especially true
when one considers that drone strikes and indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay are the typical
U.S. responses to those accused of terrorism.¶ The placement of Assata Shakur on the Most Wanted
Terrorist list is another example that the U.S. government, and the capitalist class it represents, will go
to any length to intimidate, repress and defeat potential threats.¶ Because Shakur remains a symbol of
resistance, and is unrepentant in her politics, the government will never stop their attempts to smear,
kidnap or kill her. But millions of people know the truth. Her legacy cannot be whitewashed or dismissed; it cannot be distorted. So even
though she is in Cuba, the government remains afraid of her example. They know that while decades have passed, the conditions still exist to
give birth to a million Assata Shakurs.
Placing Shakur on the list is just another step in expanding the war on terror onto
domestic dissidents
Washington Jr. , Associate Professor of Journalism at Temple, 13
[Linn Washington Jr., Law degree@ Yale, Associate Professor of Journalism at Temple, 5-17-13,
CounterPunch , “FBI Twists History ‘Terror’ War Gets Stupider as Shakur is Added to the List” ,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/05/17/terror-war-gets-stupider-as-shakur-is-added-to-the-list/,
accessed, 6-25-13, Fontana]
While the failed extradition of George Wright has faded from news headlines, the placement of Shakur on the “Wanted
Terrorist” list – triggering the prospect of a her kidnapping or, these days, of a drone strike – has fanned
protests nationwide from demonstrations to a letter sent to President Obama asking that he overturn the FBI action, which has been signed by
over 60 activists, academics, ministers and concerned citizens including actor Danny Glover.¶ That letter to Obama demanded that the FBI
provide proof to document its claim that Shakur has used her asylum in Cuba to “promote” terrorist ideology.¶ That letter scored the FBI for
equating “radical beliefs favoring fundamental social and economic change with terror.”¶ Supporters of Shakur contend her terrorist
listing moves dangerously beyond relentless revenge rooted in the FBI’s illegal COINTELPRO covert
war to crush black civil rights and militant activists during the late 1960s and early 1970s (including Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr.). A U.S. Senate investigating committee in 1975 blasted COINTELPRO’s blatant attacks
on constitutionally protected activities during an attempt by the FBI to sustain America’s racist status
quo.¶ Shakur supporters see that terror listing as another step in expanding the Terror War’s assault
on domestic dissidents and erosions of civil liberties including the First Amendment right to criticize
government. Supporters also see the listing as a weapon in right-wing efforts to blunt Obama
Classifying Shakur as a terrorist is an unjustifiable and dangerous expansion of the
term used to draw attention away from the real terrorists in America such as Carriles
and the FBI COINTELPRO program
Washington Jr. , Associate Professor of Journalism at Temple, 13
[Linn Washington Jr., Law degree@ Yale, Associate Professor of Journalism at Temple, 5-17-13,
CounterPunch , “FBI Twists History ‘Terror’ War Gets Stupider as Shakur is Added to the List” ,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/05/17/terror-war-gets-stupider-as-shakur-is-added-to-the-list/,
accessed, 6-25-13, Fontana]
Administration discussions about removing Cuba from the federal government’s list of nations allegedly involved in sponsoring terrorism.¶
Michael Ratner, president emeritus of the Center for Constitutional Rights, said the
federal government is “stretching” its
legal definition of terrorism when applying that tag to Shakur. Ratner, during a media interview, asserted Shakur
was “wrongfully convicted” for that fatal incident that he said began with racial profiling by NJ State
Police. NJ troopers were one of the first law enforcement agencies in America exposed in media
coverage and lawsuits for officially sanctioned profile targeting of non-whites.¶ The same U.S.
government that Ratner said is “choosing to ignore” the legal fact that the Cuban government has an
“absolute right” to repeatedly deny U.S. extradition requests for Shakur has always given sanctuary to
wanted anti-Castro terrorists, including the CIA-trained Luis Posada Carriles who bombed a Cuban
airliner in 1976 killing 73 people.¶ Robert Saleem Holbrook is one of nearly 500 Pennsylvania inmates serving controversial lifesentences for fatal crimes committed while under 18, many who like Holbrook, were minor accomplices not the actual murderers. Holbrook
recently wrote an article criticizing the terrorist listing of Shakur.¶ “If
anyone is a terrorist, it is the agents who were
responsible for a campaign of assassinations, false imprisonments, illegal wiretaps and a host of other
illegal acts that emerged from COINTELPRO,” Holbrook wrote. “Assata Shakur is a freedom fighter.”¶
Bruce Dixon, co-founder of the news analysis website Black Agenda Report, criticized the failure of “nationally noted” black leaders (like the
NAACP and the Congressional Black Caucus) to criticize the FBI/NJ State Police action against Shakur, for which Dixon also criticized President
Obama and U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder.¶ If
criticism of U.S. policies is “all it takes to be a terrorist,” Dixon
wrote in a commentary on BAR, “many thousands of today’s yesterday’s and tomorrow’s black and
non-black political activists inside the U.S. are “terrorists” as well.”
Even is Shakur is guilty – she’s not a terrorist
Obejas, M.F.A from Warren Wilson College, 13
[Achy Obejas, M.F.A from Warren Wilson College, 5-8-13, WBEZ91.5, “Why Assata Shakur was suddenly
promoted to terrorist” , http://www.wbez.org/blogs/achy-obejas/2013-05/why-assata-shakur-wassuddenly-promoted-terrorist-107093//acessed 6-26-13, Fontana]
But just one quick look at the rest of the FBI terrorists list—a collection of bombers and international
kidnappers and conspirators—makes clear just how out of place Shakur and her alleged crimes are in
such company. As a warning, the FBI laughably says Shakur “may wear her hair in a variety of styles and dress in African tribal clothing.”¶
For the record, this is the FBI’s own definition of terrorism: “The unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.Ӧ If you believe Shakur did what she was
convicted of, then she’s a vicious but common criminal—and nothing more. It’s not imperative to be
sympathetic to Shakur’s politics to see the disconnect between what she’s been tried and convicted of
doing and her new designation.¶ And nothing in the FBI’s own description of her crimes suggests
Shakur has done anything to merit reconsideration. Her new listing merely recounts her previous history: In 1977, Shakur
was convicted of first degree murder of a police officer after a shootout on the New Jersey Turnpike. She was sentenced to life in prison. Two
years later, she escaped, eventually turning up in Cuba.
The actions Shakur engaged in while the BLA did not constitute terrorism
Fletcher, Senior Scholar for the Institute for Policy Studies in DC, 13
[Bill Fletcher, Senior Scholar for the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC., 5-10-13, “She’s No
Terrorist: The Bizarre Move By The FBI Against Assata Shakur” , ZNET,
http://www.zcommunications.org/she-s-no-terrorist-the-bizarre-move-by-the-fbi-against-assata-shakurby-bill-fletcher, accessed 6-26-13, Fontana]
Independent of any organization in the USA and living in a country that has been victimized by terrorist acts by US-supported Cuban exile
groups, Assata Shakur has been the ‘poster child’ for segments of the political Right in the USA, including but not limited to those in the Cuban
exile community. Elements
of the law enforcement community as well as those who wish to freeze any
discussion of normalized relations between the USA and Cuba have periodically seized upon the image
of Assata Shakur in order to suggest that not only is she a terrorist but that the Cuban government is aiding and abetting terrorism. This
begs at least one question: has there ever been a connection between Assata Shakur and terrorism? ¶
The simple answer is “no,” but that answer necessitates further explanation. Assata Shakur, like many other activists in the 1960s—
including but not limited to African Americans—witnessed the active infiltration and repression of liberal, progressive and radical movements
by the US government.
Through programs such as the notorious COINTELPRO (the FBI’s Counter Intelligence Program),
an active effort was undertaken by various branches of the US government to disrupt and suppress a
wide variety of social justice movements and organizations. This disruption and suppression included
the use of murder, such as the infamous drugging and killing of Chicago Panther leaders Fred
Hampton and Mark Clark by the Chicago Police. ¶ It was in this environment of severe repression that certain elements
within the Black Freedom Movement concluded that a military organization needed to be built to both defend against attacks from the
government (and from non-governmental right-wing organizations) as well as prepare for what many people thought was a pending revolution.
Assata Shakur has never denied having been a member of
the Black Liberation Army. She has also never denied being a revolutionary. She has a very well
developed critique of US capitalism, imperialism and racism. In no case has anything ever associated
with terrorism been alleged against her. Just to be clear, the armed actions that were taken never
conformed to any approximation of the notion of “terrorism,” i.e., the use of military/violent actions against civilians in
order to advance a political agenda.¶ The label of “terrorist” in this case then has nothing do with actual
terrorism. Assata never targeted civilians; her political beliefs and practice never suggested actions be
taken against non-combatants. Yet the label of terrorist, particularly in the post-9/11 world is a very
convenient means of stirring fear and irrationality among many people and, in effect, of getting a
segment of the public to simply stop thinking. Label someone a “terrorist” and all sorts of actions can
be justified, including targeted killings whether through drones or renegade bounty hunters.
Assata Shakur was part of that section of the movement. ¶
Defining Shakur as a terrorist is just a ploy to keep Cuba on the terror list
Puyear, Social Activist, 13
[Eugene Puryear, an American social activist with the Party for Socialism and Liberation, 5-4-13,
Liberation, “Assata Shakur: Understanding the politics behind the FBI's new attack”,
http://www.pslweb.org/liberationnews/news/assata-shakur-understanding-the-politics.html, Accessed
6-25-13, Fontana]
Terrorism double-standard and potential of assassination¶ Being placed on this Most Wanted Terrorist list means that
hypothetically Shakur could be targeted for assassination. The legal white paper released by the
Obama administration around the confirmation of CIA Director John Brennan stated that the United
States would pay no attention to another nation’s sovereignty in choosing targets who they deem to
be “terrorists.” The massive expansion of the security powers and the methods used in the “War on
Terror” are being fashioned to target revolutionary militants.¶ Placing Shakur on the Most Wanted
Terrorists list is also a significant attack on Cuba. On May 1, 2013, the United States refused to remove
Cuba from the "State Sponsors of Terrorism" list. The next day, Assata became a "Most Wanted
Terrorist." By claiming that Cuba supports “terrorism” and is harboring a “terrorist,” the government
provides itself with a pretext to continue the illegal blockade of Cuba and starve the revolution of
trade.¶ Further, the United States does absolutely nothing to apprehend, convict or punish in any way
the violent anti-Cuba groups who routinely and openly boast from U.S. soil of planning terrorist
attacks on Cuba. Despite having killed thousands of Cubans, none of these organizations or individuals
have ever been placed on America’s list of "Most Wanted Terrorists."¶ For instance, Luis Posada Carriles, a
former CIA operative who currently walks free in Miami, publicly admitted to The New York Times that he had
engaged in a campaign of fatal hotel bombings in Cuba. In 1976, Posada was a key figure in the bombing
of a Cuban airliner where 73 people perished. In 2000, Posada was caught attempting to set up a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro as he
spoke to university students in Panama. If successful, the attack would have killed hundreds.
Adding Shakur to the terror list is just an attempt derail normalized relations with
Cuba
Fletcher, Senior Scholar for the Institute for Policy Studies in DC, 13
[Bill Fletcher, Senior Scholar for the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC., 5-10-13, ZNET, “She’s
No Terrorist: The Bizarre Move By The FBI Against Assata Shakur” ,
http://www.zcommunications.org/she-s-no-terrorist-the-bizarre-move-by-the-fbi-against-assata-shakurby-bill-fletcher, accessed 6-26-13, Fontana]
In the aftermath of the reelection of President Obama whispers started to be heard suggesting that
there might be efforts to take Cuba off the list of countries that support terrorism. There were other whispers
that further suggested that there may be efforts aimed at normalizing relations with Cuba. The frenzy in connection with Assata
Shakur is precisely the sort of step that those who wish to derail such efforts could either implement
or celebrate. ¶ Since the 1959 overthrow of the US-supported Batista regime by the July 26th Movement (led by Fidel Castro), supporters
of the old regime as well as elements who fell out with the Castro-aligned leadership, have cooperated with the US government in
destabilization and anti-government activities. Such efforts have ranged from guerrilla activities within Cuba to clear examples of terrorism,
such as those associated with the notorious Luis Posada Carriles (e.g., the bombing of a Cuban civilian airplane killing all the passengers). ¶
The hatred of the Cuban revolutionary government by this element (and their friends in the USA) has
its root in not only the stated commitment of the Cuban government to socialism, but also the
demographics of the Cuban Revolution. Cuba’s revolution was not only on the Left, but it was also
very black and brown. Given the history of US domination of the Western Hemisphere and the absolute fear of movements arising
from the descendants of former slaves and those of the indigenous peoples, the Cuban Revolution was a nightmare for much of the ruling elite
in the USA. ¶ Thus,
there is a battle that has been underway for some time within the US establishment as
to how to handle the existence of Cuba. A small, vocal and actually narrowing constituency in the USA, largely based in Miami
and New Jersey, aligned with various politicians in both political parties, are trying everything that they can to forestall any hope for the
normalization of relations. Instead they
wish to see a continuation of the illegal and immoral US blockade of the
island with the aim of bringing it to its knees.¶ ¶ …which brings us back to Assata…¶ It is in this context
that the peculiar and threatening announcement of the placing of Assata Shakur on the terrorist list
and the increase in the bounty can be better understood. Leaving aside for a moment that the
combination of these announcements represents a threat to Assata’s life; that it violates Cuba’s law;
and that people could be killed if bounty hunters attempt to seize Assata. The reality is that this
disingenuous action by the FBI and their political supporters potentially boxes in those who wish to
see a change-for-the-better in US/Cuban relations. ¶ In that regard, the case against Assata Shakur is
nothing more than a cynical pawn to move a more diabolical agenda. For that reason, silence in the face of this
travesty is unacceptable. President Obama and Attorney General Holder must take immediate steps to reverse these actions. ¶ The bottom
line is that the USA needs to keep its hands off of Assata, and while so doing, get on with the business
of normalizing relations with Cuba rather than playing Cold War games.
AT: Basque Separatists/ETA
Spain is fine with the ETA in Cuba – they don’t even claim they’re terrorists
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
In conversations with the Spanish embassies in Washington and Havana this year, CIP found them not
in the least concerned about the ETA members resident in Cuba. They are there, said the Spanish, as
the result of an earlier agreement among Spain, Panama and Cuba. The Spanish have no information
that any are involved in terrorist activities and regard the matter of their presence in Cuba as a matter
between the Cuban and Spanish governments.
ETA members in Cuba are inactive and Spain is unconcerned
Krohnke, Former law professor at University of Minnesota, 6/7/13 (Duane, now an
independent legal commentator, June 7, 2013, “U.S.’ Absurd Designation of Cuba as a ‘State Sponsor of
Terrorism,’” dwkcommentaries, http://dwkcommentaries.com/2013/06/07/u-s-absurd-designation-ofcuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/, accessed 6/29/13, KR)
There are only 20 to 24 ETA members in Cuba, and by now they must be older people who have not
participated in any terrorist activities in Spain for many years. They are “side-line sitters.”¶ Moreover,
the 2011 and 2012 reports state that Cuba is “trying to distance itself” from the ETA members on the
island and is not providing certain services to them.¶ Earlier U.S. reports also reflect the limited nature of
this charge. Of the 20 to 24 members, some may be there in connection with peace negotiations with
Spain (2009). In May 2003, Cuba publicly asserted that the “presence of ETA members in Cuba arose
from a request for assistance by Spain and Panama and that the issue is a bilateral matter between
Cuba and Spain” (2003). In March 2010 Cuba “allowed Spanish Police to travel to Cuba to confirm the
presence of suspected ETA members” (2010).¶ Moreover, in March 2011 the Spanish Ambassador to
Cuba told former U.S. President Jimmy Carter that Spain was “not concerned about the presence of
members of . . . ETA . . . in Cuba.” Indeed, the Ambassador maintained that this enhances his country’s
ability to deal more effectively with ETA. In fact, the Ambassador added, some ETA members are there
at the request of the Spanish government.¶ The last two U.S. reports say that Cuba is providing “safe
haven” to the ETA members, but their separate chapters on the legitimate international problem of
terrorist safe havens have no mention whatsoever of Cuba.
AT: Bioweapons
Cuba is unlikely to be developing bioweapons—inspections reveal complete
transparency in the industry
Smith, professor at the Johns Hopkins, Muse, international law attorney, Baker,
established the U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, 4
[Wayne S., Robert L., Glenn, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not Be on the
Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed 6/25/13,
VJ]
Glenn Baker, of the Center for Defense Information, reported that since Under Secretary Bolton’s
statement in May of 2002 regarding a “limited offensive biological warfare research and development
effort” in Cuba, CDI has traveled to the island three times to find out more about the Cuban
biotechnology sector, including a trip in October 2004 in conjunction with the Center for International
Policy. On these trips, scientists and bioweapons experts have found no evidence of a Cuban
biowarfare (BW) effort. They did find a remarkable degree of openness on the part of the Cuban
government to open up its scientific centers to external visits. They also found an advanced vaccine
and pharmaceutical industry that makes sense in the context of Cuba’s commitment to national
health care, disease prevention, and earning hard currency in the international market. Of course, it is
extremely difficult to prove a negative, that Cuba does not have a BW effort. The CDI delegations did not
go everywhere and look in every broom closet, nor were their visits “inspections” with the elements of
surprise and confrontation which that word implies. Also, any country with a pharmaceutical industry
has the capability to develop biowarfare agents. In addition, the ambiguous nature of bioweapons,
which can be produced in dual-use facilities that also have legitimate functions, makes their existence
extremely difficult to prove. But the Cuban government’s general openness on this issue, and
willingness to host repeated site visits, indicates Cuba’s interest in addressing these allegations head
on in an effort to put them to rest Baker noted that two days after Secretary Bolton’s May 2002
statement, Baker met with a representative of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington as part of the
regular work of CDI’s Cuba Project. He asked how Cuba would respond to a request to bring a group of
experts down to learn more about these charges. Soon thereafter CDI was extended an open invitation:
come down when you want, bring whomever you want, and go wherever you want. CDI chose nine
facilities of interest and spent more than 30 hours touring them, ranging from the flagship Center for
Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB) to “La Fabriquita,” a low-tech processing center for
nutritional supplements made from shark cartilage, run by the military. (The latter was the only place
the visitors were prevented from videotaping, a decision that was reversed during the October 2004
visit.) The visitors were frequently asked if they wanted to look elsewhere, or if they wanted to break
the seals on doors and look behind them (sometimes they did). They were asked if there was
anywhere they’d like to go in addition to the nine facilities. They talked with midlevel staff members.
They videotaped and photographed. What emerged was a picture of an advanced, state-funded
biotechnology sector with an impressive array of products and a fairly deep pipeline of new ones in
development. (California- based CancerVax recently received an exception to the U.S. trade embargo to
license three experimental cancer vaccines developed in Cuba, based on their life-saving potential.) The
Cuban pharmaceutical sector is oriented more toward public health, and less toward profit, than ours,
although it aspires to make inroads on the global market. Every Cuban is immunized against 13
diseases, and millions of cheap doses of vaccines such as hepatitis-B are exported to the developing
world. Some centers appeared to be well-funded, while others showed signs of the economic strains
predominant in Cuba. Following that trip, CDI published Cuban Biotechnology: A First-Hand Report,21
an illustrated 50-page assessment. Among its conclusions: “Given the nature and range of international
contacts and joint ventures, the relatively open system, and the attitude and approach of the staff to
their work, it would be very unlikely that there is any work on biological weapons at any of the
facilities visited,” according to Terence Taylor, who served as a commissioner and chief inspector for
the U.N.’s Special Commission to Iraq. “While Cuba certainly has the capability to develop and
produce chemical and biological weapons, nothing we saw or heard led us to the conclusion that they
are proceeding on this path,” wrote retired [General] Charles Wilhelm, whose region of responsibility
included Cuba when he was commander of U.S. Southern Command.
Overwhelming lack of evidence of bioweapons
Smith, U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs, 7
[Wayne S., August 6, National Interest, “Take Cuba Off The Terrorist List”,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733, accessed
6/25/13, VJ]
Back in 2004, Bolton said that the Bush administration was "concerned that Cuba is developing a
limited biological weapons effort . . . and believes Cuba remains a terrorist and biological warfare
threat to the United States." Bolton's charges caused a stir. Over the past three years, however, they
have widely come to be seen as politically motivated and groundless. Certainly neither he nor anyone
else has been able to put forward any evidence to support the charges. The Department of State no
longer even makes them. Further, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) sent several delegations to
Cuba to investigate and in one case was accompanied by CIP. They were allowed to go anywhere they
wished and see anything requested. Their conclusions were perhaps best summed up by retired
General Charles Wilhelm, the former commander of SOUTHCOM, who accompanied one of the
delegations. "While Cuba certainly has the capability to develop and produce chemical and biological
weapons, nothing we saw or heard led us to the conclusion that they were proceeding on this path."
Wilhelm's conclusions were practically echoed by a National Intelligence Estimate conducted in the
summer of 2004 and reported in The New York Times on September 18, 2004. It said that "the
Intelligence Community continues to believe that Cuba has the technical capability [emphasis added] to
pursue some aspects of an offensive biological weapons program." It made no claim, however, that
Cuba was pursuing such a program. In sum, unless accompanied by new evidence, any charges that
Cuba poses a biological warfare threat to the United States must be seen as baseless. Further, it
should be noted that sending delegations to Cuba to investigate and discuss the matter with the
Cubans showed that scientific exchanges, on a regular and ongoing basis, are clearly the best way to
create transparency and build confidence in one another's positions. We need more such exchanges,
not fewer, and yet the Bush Administration has taken counterproductive steps to impede them.
Is not creating a biological weapon
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
In March of 2004, Under Secretary of State John Bolton accused Cuba of moving ahead with a
developmental effort to produce biological weapons. Cuba heatedly denies the charge and has invited
anyone who wishes to come and see for themselves. Various U.S. delegations to Cuba led by CDI have
seen no evidence at all to suggest that Cuba is in fact developing biological weapons. The charge that
it is doing so appears to be a politically motivated statement by Mr. Bolton based on fragmentary
intelligence that is ambiguous at best.
No Cuban bioweapon programs – Bolton doesn’t know his shit, even if there was one,
it isn’t offense, but created to defend against a perceived US biological attack
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
Thus, formulations in the State Department’s annual report have become more cautious, more carefully worded. Under Secretary of
State John Bolton, however, has displayed no such caution in his remarks. In May of 2002, he alleged that: “The
United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and
development effort.” And on March 30 of 2004, he asserted that: “The administration believes that
Cuba remains a terrorist and BW threat to the United States.”5 Bolton has insisted that the Department of State fully
supports his position and that in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June of 2002, Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research Carl Ford, Jr. repeated his allegations word for word. Well, not really. First of all, one must ask why Mr. Bolton did not
go to the hearings in June of 2002 to testify in his own behalf, or was not allowed to go? The hearings, after all, had been called specifically to
question what was behind his allegations. Rather than Bolton, Mr. Ford was sent to testify, but offered no evidence to back up the suggestion
that Cuba was working to develop biological weapons.
On the contrary, he admitted that “all our information is
indirect…we never tried to suggest that we have the evidence, the smoking gun.” He went on the
state, “I certainly see no indications that there is a first strike capability or effort to attack the United
States.” Rather, Ford hypothesized, if the Cubans were indeed interested in biological weapons, it could be in
order to defend themselves against what they perceived – on the basis of questionable evidence – to
be a U.S. offensive biowarfare threat. Senator Lincoln Chafee (R-RI) asked if that was the case, what was the United States doing
to reassure the Cubans that we had no offensive BW program and no first-strike intentions toward them? Surely, after all, we did not want any
such misperception to encourage them to develop their own biological weapons. Mr. Ford said he was the wrong person to ask because the
question dealt with policy rather than intelligence. He did not say who the right person might be, nor, strangely, was there any follow-up to this
line of questioning.6 In
this and in a number of other ways, Mr. Bolton’s charges raise more questions about
the U.S. position than the Cuban one. Bolton demanded, for example, that Cuba comply fully with the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), of which it is a member, yet he failed to present any evidence that Cuba is not currently in
compliance. What Bolton left unsaid, however, is that in July 2001 the United States had rejected a
draft protocol negotiated by member states of the BWC that would have established a system of
declarations and on-site inspections to check compliance with the treaty. In fact, Bolton had
personally led the opposition to the draft BWC protocol, on the grounds that it was not intrusive
enough to detect violations yet was so intrusive that it would threaten valuable trade secrets of the
U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Is there not something basically contradictory in
expressing doubts about another nation’s compliance while at the same time opposing the means of
verifying that compliance?
Careful examination of Cuban biotech facilities proves no bio weapons development –
experts agree
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
Glenn Baker, of the Center for Defense Information, reported that since Under Secretary Bolton’s statement in May of 2002 regarding a
“limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort” in Cuba, CDI
has traveled to the island three times to
find out more about the Cuban biotechnology sector, including a trip in October 2004 in conjunction with the Center for
International Policy. On these trips, scientists and bioweapons experts have found no evidence of a Cuban
biowarfare (BW) effort. They did find a remarkable degree of openness on the part of the Cuban
government to open up its scientific centers to external visits. They also found an advanced vaccine
and pharmaceutical industry that makes sense in the context of Cuba’s commitment to national
health care, disease prevention, and earning hard currency in the international market. Of course, it is
extremely difficult to prove a negative, that Cuba does not have a BW effort. The CDI delegations did not go everywhere and look in every
broom closet, nor were their visits “inspections” with the elements of surprise and confrontation which that word implies. Also, any country
with a pharmaceutical industry has the capability to develop biowarfare agents. In addition, the ambiguous nature of bioweapons, which can be
produced in dual-use facilities that also have legitimate functions, makes their existence extremely difficult to prove. But
the Cuban
government’s general openness on this issue, and willingness to host repeated site visits, indicates
Cuba’s interest in addressing these allegations head on in an effort to put them to rest. Baker noted that
two days after Secretary Bolton’s May 2002 statement, Baker met with a representative of the Cuban Interests
Section in Washington as part of the regular work of CDI’s Cuba Project. He asked how Cuba would
respond to a request to bring a group of experts down to learn more about these charges. Soon
thereafter CDI was extended an open invitation: come down when you want, bring whomever you
want, and go wherever you want. CDI chose nine facilities of interest and spent more than 30 hours
touring them, ranging from the flagship Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB) to “La
Fabriquita,” a low-tech processing center for nutritional supplements made from shark cartilage, run
by the military. (The latter was the only place the visitors were prevented from videotaping, a decision that was reversed during the
October 2004 visit.) The visitors were frequently asked if they wanted to look elsewhere, or if they wanted
to break the seals on doors and look behind them (sometimes they did). They were asked if there was
anywhere they’d like to go in addition to the nine facilities. They talked with midlevel staff members.
They videotaped and photographed. What emerged was a picture of an advanced, state-funded
biotechnology sector with an impressive array of products and a fairly deep pipeline of new ones in
development. (California-based CancerVax recently received an exception to the U.S. trade embargo to license three experimental cancer
vaccines developed in Cuba, based on their life-saving potential.) The Cuban pharmaceutical sector is oriented more toward public health, and
less toward profit, than ours, although it aspires to make inroads on the global market. Every Cuban is immunized against 13 diseases, and
millions of cheap doses of vaccines such as hepatitis-B are exported to the developing world. Some centers appeared to be well-funded, while
others showed signs of the economic strains predominant in Cuba. Following that trip, CDI published Cuban Biotechnology: A First-Hand Report,
21 an illustrated 50-page assessment.
Among its conclusions: “Given the nature and range of international
contacts and joint ventures, the relatively open system, and the attitude and approach of the staff to
their work, it would be very unlikely that there is any work on biological weapons at any of the
facilities visited,” according to Terence Taylor, who served as a commissioner and chief inspector for
the U.N.’s Special Commission to Iraq. “While Cuba certainly has the capability to develop and
produce chemical and biological weapons, nothing we saw or heard led us to the conclusion that they
are proceeding on this path,” wrote retired Gen. Charles Wilhelm, whose region of responsibility
included Cuba when he was commander of U.S. Southern Command. “I would personally consider it
irresponsible to issue charges based on unrevealed evidence without also attempting to arrange for
the direct, reassuring access that the Cubans are apparently offering,” reported Dr. John Steinbruner of the
National Academy of Sciences Bioweapons Working Group. “Scientist-to-scientist interactions cut through to true
purposes, and cut through allegations made by nonscientists for political purposes,” wrote The Hon. Philip
E. Coyle, former assistant secretary of defense and chief weapons tester for the Pentagon. Scientific exchanges, on a regular and ongoing
basis, would seem to be one of the best ways to create transparency and build confidence in the rapidly-evolving biotechnology field. Scientists
can’t “blow smoke” in each others’ faces and get away with it, making a clandestine weapons program difficult to hide from a resident visiting
scholar. CDI’s next biotech-oriented trip, in November 2003, included key members of the National Academy of Sciences seeking to establish a
framework for such regularized cooperation. Many believe that current U.S. policy, which blocks almost all Cuban scientists from entering the
United States and has increasingly denied licenses to American scientists to travel to Cuba, works against our national interests. The October
2004 trip sought to add to the knowledge database about Cuban biotech centers by visiting four new and two previously visited sites. The new
sites visited: • National Center for Biopreparations (BIOCEN) • National Center for the Production of Laboratory Animals (CENPALAB) • New
vaccine facility of the Finlay Institute • Luis Diaz Soto Military Hospital They
also asked for a return visit to the National
Center for Agricultural and Livestock Health (CENSA), because of concerns by a member of the
previous delegation that the layout of the labs was inconsistent with their stated purpose, and that
the research work shown appeared to be staged. This second visit was again almost completely taken up with an oral
presentation, and the vast center’s empty hallways and labs still do not square with the broad array of activities and products depicted in the
Power Point presentations. This does not imply malfeasance, and more likely represents diminished funding ,
but this center might warrant a more indepth visit in the future. The delegation was taken again to La Fabriquita, the shark cartilage processing
plant run by the military across the street from the Luis Diaz Soto Hospital. (The Cuban military has become increasingly involved in economic
pursuits as a re- 9 sult of budget and troop cuts of more than 50 percent since 1989.) This time, the officers invited the visitors to roll video,
perhaps perceiving that the restriction on taping there during the previous trip created the appearance of trying to hide something. This facility
has been described in exile-sourced articles as an ominous fortified germ warfare center where “military biotechnicians reportedly experiment
on cadavers, hospital patients and live animals with anthrax, brucellosis, equine encephalitis, dengue fever, hepatitis, tetanus and a variety of
other bacterial agents.”22 But what
the delegation saw, as in 2002, was a low-tech processing center, with a
short mesh fence and minimal security, where workers removed cartilage from shark carcasses . It is dried
on racks (along with aloe vera extract, another of La Fabriquita’s products) and milled to a 63 micron powder (weaponized agents must be
milled below 12 microns). The
powder is then shipped out, put in capsules, and marketed under the name
“Cartilade-C.” This kind of discrepancy between what is written about Cuba and the reality on the
ground is common, and argues for caution in intelligence assessments. Two weeks before the October visit,
evidence of such caution emerged. The New York Times reported that a new National Intelligence Estimate downgrading allegations on Cuban
bioweapons had been conducted23 . Representing the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community, the report reflects more stringent
standards adopted in the wake of intelligence failures associated with the misreporting of WMD in Iraq. It does say “the IC continues to believe
that Cuba has the technical capability to pursue some aspects of an offensive biological weapons program.” It also continues to express concern
about Cuba’s sharing of dual-use technology with countries such as Iran24 . But
it does not claim Cuba has a biological
weapons effort. This new assessment was welcome news on the eve of the CIP-CDI trip, and helped
make the case that openness and transparency serve to build confidence.
CTS Advantage
Definition of Terrorism Politicized
US Supports Cuban Exile Terrorists
If we are going to assert that Cuba is a ‘state sponsor of terror,’ we should also be
reflexive of our own practices of sponsoring terrorism such as the funding of antiCastro organizations and the millions who have been killed through state terrorism.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 7
[Richard, March 3, 2007, International Studies Association, “Terrorism Studies and the Politics
of State Power,”http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1951/ISA-2007-PaperCTS-Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/28/13, AS]
Finally, the notion that terrorism is a form of political violence practiced primarily ¶ by non-state actors is
similarly belied by the evidence. The simple fact is that if terrorism ¶ refers to violence directed towards
or threatened against civilians which is designed to ¶ instill terror or intimidate a population for
political reasons – an entirely uncontroversial ¶ definition of terrorism and one which is commonly
adopted within the literature – then ¶ state terrorism is arguably of much greater significance than
dissident or non-state ¶ terrorism. States after all, have killed, tortured and intimidated hundreds of
millions of ¶ people23 over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places
like Colombia, Haiti, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Uzbekistan,24 Kashmir, Palestine, ¶ Chechnya, Tibet,
North Korea, Indonesia, Iraq, the Philippines and elsewhere. ¶ Moreover, contrary to the dominant
discourse, the involvement of Western ¶ democracies in terrorism has a long but generally ignored
history, which includes: the ¶ extensive use of official terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the
U.S. and other ¶ colonial powers in numerous countries throughout the colonial period;25 the practices
of ¶ strategic bombing during and since World War II;26 U.S. support and sanctuary for a ¶ range of rightwing terrorist groups like the Contras, the Mujahideen and anti-Castro ¶ groups27 during the Cold War,
many of whom regularly committed terrorist acts;28 U.S. ¶ tolerance of Irish Republican terrorist
activity in the U.S.;29 U.S. support for systematic ¶ state terror by numerous right-wing regimes across
the world, perhaps most notoriously ¶ El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia and Iran;30 British
support for Loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland31 and various other „Islamist‟ groups in Libya and
Bosnia, ¶ among other;32 Spanish state terror during the dirty war against ETA;33 French support ¶ for
terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the Rainbow Warrior bombing; Italian ¶ sponsorship of rightwing terrorists; and Western support for accommodation with ¶ terrorists following the end of several
high profile wars34¶ – among many other examples. ¶ Western support for terrorism continues today in
the form of U.S. military and political ¶ support for various warlords who employ terror against civilians
in places like In short, there is a great deal of research which contradicts the primary narratives ¶ and
understandings of terrorism studies and demonstrates that much of the primary¶ assumptions and
knowledge of the field is overly simplistic, misconceived, incorrect or¶ Afghanistan and Somalia, such as
the Afghan warlord, General Dostum,35 and continued ¶ U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro
terrorists,36 former Latin American state ¶ terrorists37 and other assorted Asian anticommunist
groups.38 heavily biased.39 The point is not to establish an alternative final truth about terrorism, ¶
but simply to draw attention to the inherent instabilities of the dominant narratives.40 A ¶ key
question which follows is how these assumptions and narratives have come be ¶ accepted as established
knowledge and commonsense when they are in fact so contested,¶ and why they continue to hold such
sway over the field.
Cuba’s presence on the state sponsor of terror list is unwarranted and masks acts of
terrorism against Cuba that the US has allowed to occur
Goodman, producer for NBC Nightly News, 13
[Sandy, 6/5, Huffington Post, “Who's the State Sponsor of Terrorism, Cuba or the US?”,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sandy-goodman/whos-the-state-terrorist-_b_3390842.html, accessed
6/24/13, VJ]
President Obama may be determined to repeal George W. Bush's global war on terrorism. But that didn't stop
the State Department from declaring last week, on the flimsiest of evidence, that Cuba is a state sponsor of
terrorism for the 30th straight year. This, despite the department's admission that there's " no
indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or training to terrorist groups." The department also
points out that Cuba has now joined an international compact against terrorist-financing, and is trying to
broker an end to the 49-year-old civil war between Colombia's FARC guerrillas, whom Cuba once supported, and
their government, a U.S. ally. The hardest evidence State could offer to back up its listing was that Cuba has continued to provide safe haven to two dozen Spanish
Basque separatists and some fugitives wanted in the United States. By contrast, the U.S. accused Iran, another on its terrorism sponsor
list, of such misconduct as bombings carried out in two countries and and attempted in a third, training
and equipping Afghan Taliban and Iraqi militants, and masterminding a plot to murder the Saudi
ambassador to Washington. "Regardless of what got Cuba on the list in the the 1980s, there's no recent
evidence of Cuba's being involved in any international terrorist activities," Philip Peters told me. Peters is a long-time expert on Cuban
affairs who heads the new Cuba Research Center. The U.S. government tried to strengthen its case against Cuba a month ago, when the FBI announced that a sixty-five-year-old grandmother
who calls herself Assata Shakur and was once named Joanne Chesimard became the first woman ever put on its ten most wanted terrorists list. Shakur/Chesimard was arrested in May 1973,
after a shootout on the New Jersey Turnpike, with two other members of the Black Liberation Army, a group responsible for murders and robberies. One policeman was killed, as was a male
BLA member. Shakur/Chesimard, who was wounded, and the other man, were arrested. He was convicted as the killer and is serving life. A second policeman, who was wounded, accused her
of shooting him but later admitted he'd lied and had never even seen her with a gun. FBI crime lab tests revealed no gunpowder residue on her fingers, and none of her fingerprints on any
weapon. Nevertheless, she was convicted of first degree murder and seven other felonies under a New Jersey law that makes someone found guilty of aiding and abetting crimes guilty of the
crimes themselves. Black radicals broke Shakur/Chesimard out of prison in 1979 and she's been living in Cuba since 1984. In announcing her placement on the terrorist list last month, 40 years
after her conviction, an FBI spokesman called her "a domestic terrorist who murdered a law enforcement officer execution-style" and "a danger to the American government" because of
speeches he said she still makes urging revolution and anti-U.S. terrorism. Her lawyers dispute not only her guilt but her being called a terrorist. One, Evelyn Williams, charges she's "the only
person convicted of a single domestic crime" labelled a terrorist and put on the list, "thereby nullifying the very definition of 'terrorism'." Shakur/Chesimard shares the list with eight men
accused of bombings, murders, airline hijacking and hostage-taking, all committed overseas, and one animal rights extremist charged with bombing two California companies. In contrast, her
entry lists her crime as being "wanted for escaping from prison in Clinton, N.J. while serving a life sentence for murder." Cuba expert Philip Peters speculates that putting her on the FBI list may
the U.S. is hardly in a position to complain about Cuban
terrorism because our government has gone out of its way to protect murderous anti-Castro
terrorists. Among many examples, the worst are Luis Posada and the late Orlando Bosch, two ex-CIA
men given safe haven in this country, despite their involvement in large-scale murders and many
other terrorist crimes. Both spent years in Venezuelan jails for masterminding the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner that killed 73 people. Both had long terrorist histories.
Bosch, who died two years ago, headed an exile group that claimed responsibility for 11 bombing attacks against
be "a reason to keep Cuba on as a state sponsor of terrorism." Actually,
Cuban properties. The Justice Department accused him of more than 30 acts of sabotage
and he was jailed for
four years in this country. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh described Bosch as "an unrepentant terrorist." He was ordered deported in 1988. But at the urging of Jeb Bush, then a Florida
businessman and later the state's governor, his father, President George H.W. Bush, overruled the deportation order, allowing Bosch to spend his last 21 years as a free man in Miami. He died
at 84. Posada, 85, remains alive and free in Miami. Two employees of his private detective agency confessed to the airline bombing and said he put them up to it. He denied it. He escaped jail
in 1985 and, despite his record, was rehired by the CIA to help supply the Nicaraguan Contras. Authorities say Posada was responsible for dozens of terrorist bombings. He boasted to the New
York Times that he planned the 1997 bombings of seven Havana hotels and restaurants that killed an Italian tourist and injured 11 other people, but later denied it. He was jailed in Panama for
four years after a failed plot to assassinate the visiting Fidel Castro. Posada has been in the U.S. since his illegal entry in 2005. A judge wanted to deport him but refused to send him to
Venezuela or Cuba, the only countries willing to accept him (so they could try him). The judge said he'd be tortured if sent to either. Today, cleared of all charges, he's a hero to many CubanAmericans. There are much worse defects in U.S.-Cuba policy than the fact that the island is on our terrorist lists. Our 53-year-old trade embargo is a miserable failure. Travel restrictions make
Cuba the only country our government won't allow most Americans to visit. Our far-too-lax immigration rules uniquely for Cubans are ridiculously outdated. But nothing is as hypocritical and
We claim to be fighting a global war on terrorism. But our government has
given aid, comfort and safe haven from justice to some of the world's worst terrorists.
morally reprehensible as our terrorism policy.
The US has a long history of harboring Cuban terrorists
Smith, U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs, 7
[Wayne S., August 6, National Interest, “Take Cuba Off The Terrorist List”,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733, accessed
6/25/13, VJ]
And it is not only that we have no evidence that Cuba is a terrorist state. Our Cuba policy actually
obstructs our own efforts against terrorism. As President Bush has said over and over again, anyone
who shelters terrorists is a terrorist. But the fact is that we are sheltering a whole series of outright
terrorists in Miami. The most recent arrival is the notorious Luis Posada Carriles, accused of being one
of the masterminds of the bombing of a Cubana airliner in 1976 that killed 73 innocent people,
including the Cuban junior fencing team. He was in a Venezuelan prison awaiting trial on that charge
when he escaped in 1985. He went to Central America, where for a time he worked for Oliver North in
the Contra operation against Nicaragua. Subsequently, in a 1998 interview with The New York Times, he
bragged of ordering the bombing of a number of tourist hotels in Havana, which led to the death of an
Italian tourist and the wounding of several other people. And then in 2000, he was arrested in Panama
and later convicted of "endangering public safety" because of his involvement in a plot to assassinate
Fidel Castro by blowing up a public auditorium where Castro was to speak before an audience of some
1,500. In 2004, Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) and her two congressional colleagues,
Lincoln (R-FL) and Mario Diaz Balart (R-FL), appealed to then-President Mireya Moscoso to pardon him,
along with three others involved in the plot: Guillermo Novo, convicted of the 1976 murder in
Washington of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier (though his conviction was later overturned); Gaspar
Jimenez, who spent six years in prison in Mexico for trying to kidnap a Cuban diplomat and killing his
bodyguard in the process; and Pedro Remon, who had pleaded guilty in 1986 of trying to blow up the
Cuban Mission to the United Nations. In August of 2004, in one of her last acts as President of Panama,
Moscoso pardoned them all. Jimenez, Remon and Novo, who were all American citizens, immediately
flew back to Miami and received a hero's welcome. Posada, who has Venezuelan citizenship, decided
to bide his time in Honduras for a few months, but then, as we shall see below, quietly entered the U.S.
in March. Nor was this the first time Ros-Lehtinen had acted to free terrorists. Orlando Bosch, another
mastermind of the 1976 bombing of the Cubana airliner, was released from Venezuelan prison under
mysterious circumstances in 1987 and returned to Miami without a visa in 1988. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service began proceedings to deport him, and as the associate attorney general argued
at the time: "The security of this nation is affected by its ability to urge credibly other nations to refuse
aid and shelter to terrorists. We could not shelter Dr. Bosch and maintain that credibility." But shelter
him we did. Urged on by Ros-Lehtinen and Jeb Bush-then managing her election campaign-George H.W.
Bush pardoned Bosch, who has lived freely ever since in Miami. Posada returned to Miami in March.
Everyone knew he was there, but the federal government made no effort to apprehend him, or even
to acknowledge his presence, until May, when he gave a press conference and forced their hand. He
was then arrested, but rather than charging him with acts of terrorism, he was simply charged with
illegal entry and sent off to El Paso for an administrative immigration hearing, a complete farce. He was
ordered deported, but, as the U.S. authorities already knew, there were no countries willing to take
him except Venezuela, which had already requested his extradition for the 1976 bombing of the Cubana
airliner. The federal judge, on nothing more than the opinion of a long-time associate of Posada's,
ruled that he could not be extradited to Venezuela for fear that he would be tortured there. Never
mind that the Venezuelan government had given assurances that he would be held under the most
transparent circumstances. To hold him longer, but to avoid any charge of terrorism, the government
then came up with a charge of giving false statements on his application of entry. Another sham,
which finally ended on May 8, 2007, when Judge Kathleen Cardone, seeing clearly that skullduggery was
afoot, charged the government with bad faith and "engaging in fraud, deceit and trickery." (That's the
Bush administration she's talking about!) That being the case, she said, "this court is left with no choice
but to dismiss the indictment." Posada was then freed and returned to Miami. Some three months
have now passed and the Bush Administration has given no indication that it intends to take any further
action against Posada. What it should do is clear. Venezuela has asked for his extradition. We have an
extradition treaty with Venezuela. Under that treaty, and others, we must either extradite him to
Venezuela or we must indict him for acts of terrorism and try him in the United States. If we do not,
we will be in blatant violation of international treaties and will be seen as openly sheltering another
terrorist. Unfortunately, at the moment it seems that is exactly what the Bush Administration intends to
do. If so, it will seriously undermine the credibility of our own stance against terrorism-taking us back
to the idea that "one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter!" That is no way to win the war
against terrorism.
The US pardoned and harbors numerous Cuban exile terrorists
Smith, U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs, 5
[Wayne S. May 7, Sun Sentinel, “Is Cuba A Sponsor Of Terrorism? Is U.s.?”, http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2005-05-07/news/0505060577_1_cuba-posada-s-lawyer-terrorism, accessed 6/25/13, VJ]
The State Department's just-issued report on state sponsors of terrorism offers nothing new. In the
case of Cuba, it simply repeats the same tired old charges without offering any hard or specific
evidence. It states, for example, that "Cuba continued to actively oppose the U.S.-led coalition
prosecuting the global war on terrorism." But "oppose" how? Cuba offered to sign agreements with
the U.S. for joint actions against terrorism. The U.S. ignored the offer. If the State Department means
that Cuba is opposed to the war in Iraq, that is true. But so are half of the American people and the
majority of other governments in the world. Displaying real chutzpah, the report goes on to say that:
"The Cuban government claims, despite the absence of evidence, that it is a principal victim of
terrorism sponsored by Cuban-Americans in the United States." Lack of evidence? There was abundant
evidence that Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles masterminded the bombing of the Cubana
airliner back in 1976, resulting in the loss of 73 innocent lives, including a young Cuban fencing team.
Bosch now lives a free man in Miami, having been pardoned by President George H.W. Bush against
the advice of his Justice Department. Posada has just come back to Miami to ask for asylum, after
having been pardoned from prison by the outgoing president of Panama. (He and three other Cuban
exiles were in prison there on charges related to the accusation that they were in Panama to assassinate
President Fidel Castro, there for an international meeting.) There is also evidence, some of it in the form
of a 1998 New York Times interview that Posada gave to Annie Bardach, that he was directing a
bombing campaign against tourist hotels in Havana, a campaign that in 1997 resulted in the death of
an Italian tourist and the wounding of several innocent people. And this is but the tip of the iceberg.
There is voluminous evidence of Cuban exile terrorist acts against Cuba. Most of the perpetrators are
living openly and freely in Miami, their actions seemingly condoned by the U.S. government. Indeed, if
one looks closely at the matter of exile terrorism against Cuba, the U.S. government itself may be seen
as a "state sponsor of terrorism." And if it allows Posada to remain in the U.S., there will be new
evidence to that effect. In an obvious effort to confuse the issue, on May 2, Assistant Secretary of State
Roger Noriega said that he didn't know if Posada was in the U.S. This, despite the fact that Posada's
lawyer on April 11 stated that he was in the U.S. and requested asylum for him to remain.
America has a legacy of state sponsored terror against Cuba—the CIA has lead
countless operations, trained terrorists, and protected fugitives
Agee, former CIA agent, 03
[Phillip, August 8-10, Counterpunch, “Terrorism and Civil Society as Instruments of US Policy in Cuba”,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/08/08/terrorism-and-civil-society-as-instruments-of-us-policy-incuba/, accessed 6/25/13, VJ]
Condemnation of Cuba was immediate, strong and practically global last month for the imprisonment
of 75 political dissidents and for the summary execution of 3 ferry hijackers. Prominent among the
critics were past friends of Cuba of recognized international stature. As I read the hundreds of
denunciations that came through my mail, it was easy to see how enemies of the revolution seized on
those issues to condemn Cuba for violations of human rights. They had a field day. Deliberate or
careless confusion between the political dissidents and the hijackers, two entirely unrelated matters,
was also easy because the events happened at the same time. A Vatican publication went so far as to
describe the hijackers as dissidents when in fact they were terrorists. But others of usual good faith
toward Cuba also jumped on the bandwagon of condemnation treating the two issues as one. The
remarks that follow address the human rights issues in both cases. With respect to the imprisonment of
75 civil society activists, the main victim has been history, for these people were central to current
U.S. government efforts to overthrow the Cuban government and destroy the work of the revolution.
Indeed regime change, as overthrowing governments has come to be known, has been the continuing
U.S. goal in Cuba since the earliest days of the revolutionary government. Programs to achieve this
goal have included propaganda to denigrate the revolution, diplomatic and commercial isolation, trade
embargo, terrorism and military support to counter-revolutionaries, the Bay of Pigs invasion,
assassination plots against Fidel Castro and other leaders, biological and chemical warfare, and, more
recently, efforts to foment an internal political opposition masquerading as an independent civil
society. Terrorism Warren Hinkle and William Turner, in The Fish is Red, easily the best book on the
CIA’s war against Cuba during the first 20 years of the revolution, tell the story of the CIA’s efforts to
save the life of one of their Batista Cubans. It was March 1959, less than three months after the
revolutionary movement triumphed. The Deputy Chief of the CIA’s main Batista secret police force had
been captured, tried and condemned to a firing squad. The Agency had set up the unit in 1956 and
called it the Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities or BRAC for its initials in Spanish. With
CIA training, equipment and money it became arguably the worst of Batista’s torture and murder
organizations, spreading its terror across the whole of the political opposition, not just the
communists. The Deputy Chief of BRAC, one Jose Castano Quevedo, had been trained in the United
States and was the BRAC liaison man with the CIA Station in the U.S. Embassy. On learning of his
sentence, the Agency Chief of Station sent a journalist collaborator named Andrew St. George to Che
Guevara, then in charge of the revolutionary tribunals, to plead for Castano’s life. After hearing out St.
George for much of a day, Che told him to tell the CIA chief that Castano was going to die, if not because
he was an executioner of Batista, then because he was an agent of the CIA. St. George headed from
Che’s headquarters in the Cabana fortress to the seaside U.S. Embassy on the Malecon to deliver the
message. On hearing Che’s words the CIA Chief responded solemnly, "This is a declaration of war."
Indeed, the CIA lost many more of its Cuban agents during those early days and in the unconventional
war years that followed. Today when I drive out 31st avenue on the way to the airport, just before
turning left at the Marianao military hospital, I pass on the left a large, multi-storey white police station
that occupies an entire city block. The style looks like 1920′s fake castle, resulting in a kind of giant
White Castle hamburger joint. High walls surround the building on the side streets, and on top of the
walls at the corners are guard posts, now unoccupied, like those overlooking workout yards in prisons.
Next door, separated from the castle by 110th street, is a fairly large two-story green house with barred
windows and other security protection. I don’t know its use today, but before it was the dreaded BRAC
Headquarters, one of the CIA’s more infamous legacies in Cuba. The same month as the BRAC Deputy
was executed, President Eisenhower, on the 10th of March 1959, presided over a meeting of his
National Security Council at which they discussed how to replace the government in Cuba. It was the
beginning of a continuous policy of regime change that every administration since Eisenhower has
continued. As I read of the arrests of the 75 dissidents, 44 years to the month after the BRAC Deputy’s
execution, and saw the U.S. government’s outrage over their trials and sentences, one phrase from
Washington came to mind that united American reactions in 1959 with events in 2003: "Hey! Those are
OUR GUYS the bastards are screwing!" A year later I was in training at a secret CIA base in Virginia when,
in March 1960, Eisenhower signed off on the project that would become the Bay of Pigs invasion. We
were learning the tricks of the spy trade including telephone tapping, bugging, weapons handling,
martial arts, explosives, and sabotage. That same month the CIA, in its efforts to deny arms to Cuba
prior to the coming exile invasion, blew up a French freighter, Le Coubre, as it was unloading a shipment
of weapons from Belgium at a Havana wharf. More than 100 died in the blast and in fighting the fire
afterwards. I see the rudder and other scrap from Le Coubre, now a monument to those who died, every
time I drive along the port avenue passing Havana’s main railway station In April the following year, two
days before the Bay of Pigs invasion started, a CIA sabotage operation burned down El Encanto,
Havana’s largest department store where I had shopped on my first here visit in 1957. It was never
rebuilt. Now each time I drive up Galiano in Centro Habana on my way for a meal in Chinatown, I pass Fe
del Valle Park, the block where El Encanto stood, named for a woman killed in the blaze. Some who
signed statements condemning Cuba for the dissidents’ trials and the executions of the hijackers know
perfectly well the history of U.S. aggression against Cuba since 1959: the murder, terrorism, sabotage
and destruction that has cost nearly 3500 lives and left more than 2000 disabled. Those who don’t
know can find it in Jane Franklin’s classic historical chronology The Cuban Revolution and the United
States. One of the best sum-ups of the U.S. terrorist war against Cuba in the 1960′s came from Richard
Helms, the former CIA Director, when testifying in 1975 before the Senate Committee investigating
the CIA’s attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. In admitting to "invasions of Cuba which we were
constantly running under government aegis," he added: We had task forces that that were striking at
Cuba constantly. We were attempting to blow up power plants. We were attempting to ruin sugar
mills. We were attempting to do all kinds of things in this period. This was a matter of American
government policy. During the same hearing Senator Christopher Dodd commented to Helms: It is likely
that at the very moment that President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent
in Paris and giving him an assassination device to use against Castro. [Note: the officer worked for
Desmond Fitzgerald, a friend of Robert Kennedy and at the time overall chief of the CIA's operations
against Cuba, and the agent was Rolando Cubela, a Cuban army Comandante with regular access to Fidel
Castro whose CIA codename was AMLASH.] Helms responded: I believe it was a hypodermic syringe they
had given him. It was something called Blackleaf Number 40 and this was in response to AMLASH’s
request that he be provided with some sort of a device providing he could kill Castro….I’m sorry that he
didn’t give him a pistol. It would have made the whole thing a whole lot simpler and less exotic. Review
the history and you will find that no U.S. administration since Eisenhower has renounced the use of
state terrorism against Cuba, and terrorism against Cuba has never stopped. True, Kennedy undertook
to Khrushchev that the U.S. would not invade Cuba, which ended the 1962 missile crisis, and his
commitment was ratified by succeeding administrations. But the Soviet Union disappeared in 1991 and
the commitment with it. Cuban exile terrorist groups, mostly based in Miami and owing their skills to
the CIA, have continued attacks through the years. Whether or not they have been operating on their
own or under CIA direction, U.S. authorities have tolerated them. As recently as April 2003 the SunSentinel of Ft. Lauderdale reported, with accompanying photographs, exile guerrilla training outside
Miami by the F-4 Commandos, one of several terrorist groups currently based there, along with remarks
by the FBI spokeswoman that Cuban exile activities in Miami are not an FBI priority. Abundant details on
exile terrorist activities can be found with a web search including their connections with the paramilitary
arm of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). Reports abound of the arrest in Panama in
November 2000 of a group of 4 exile terrorists led by Luis Posada Carriles, a man with impeccable CIA
credentials. They were planning the assassination of Fidel Castro who was there for a conference.
Posada’s resume includes planning the Cubana airliner bombing in 1976 that killed all 73 people
aboard; employment by the CIA in El Salvador in 1980′s re-supply operations for the contra terrorists
in Nicaragua; and organizing in 1997 10 bombings of hotels and other tourist sites in Havana, one of
which killed an Italian tourist. A year later he admitted to the New York Times that CANF directors in
Miami had financed the hotel bombings. Through the years Posada freely traveled in and out of the
United States. Another of the CIA’s untouchable terrorists is Orlando Bosch, a pediatrician turned
terrorist. As mastermind along with Carriles of the 1976 Cubana airliner bombing, Bosch was arrested
with Carriles a week after the bombing and spent 11 years in a Venezuelan jail undergoing 3 trials for
the crime. He was acquitted in each trial, released in August 1987, and arrested on his return to Miami
in February 1988 for parole violation after a previous conviction for terrorist acts. In 1989 the Justice
Department ordered his deportation as a terrorist citing FBI and CIA reports that Bosch had carried out
30 acts of sabotage from 1961 to 1968 and was involved in a plot to kill the Cuban Ambassador to
Argentina in 1975. After lobbying on Bosch’s behalf by Miami Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a
Cuban American with close ties to CANF, and by Jeb Bush, Ros-Lehtinen’s campaign manager prior to his
election as governor, the elder President Bush, who was CIA Director at the time of the Cubana airliner
bombing, ordered the Justice Department in 1990 to rescind the deportation order. Bosch was released
from custody and has freely walked the streets of Miami ever since. Seeing the obvious, that the U.S.
government was not taking action to stop Miami-based terrorism, the Cubans opted in the 1990′s to
send their own intelligence officers to Florida under cover as exiles to provide warnings on coming
terrorist actions. There they infiltrated some of the exile groups and were reporting back to Havana,
including information on planned illegal over-flights of Cuba by Brothers to the Rescue. Still, the Cuban
government hoped that the U.S. could be convinced to take action against Miami-based terrorists. So in
1998 Cuba delivered to the FBI voluminous information they had collected on U.S.-based terrorist
activities against Cuba. But instead of taking action against the terrorists, the FBI then arrested 10
members of a Cuban intelligence network whose job was to infiltrate the terrorist organizations. Later
the 5 Cuban intelligence officers running the network were tried in Miami, where conviction was
guaranteed, for conspiracy to commit espionage and for not having registered as agents of a foreign
power. They had never asked for nor received a classified government document or classified
information of any kind, yet they were given draconian sentences, one of them two life terms. The
inhuman treatment of these unbending prisoners ordered by Washington, designed to destroy them
mentally and physically and turn them against Cuba, sets world records for sordid, deranged
punishment. Demand for their freedom is the main political topic in Cuba today. Most recently, in
declaring an unending war against terrorism following the September 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda and
prior to the war against Iraq, President Bush declared that no weapons in U.S. possession are banned
from use, presumably including terrorism. But rather than starting his anti-terrorist war in Miami,
where his theft of the White House was assured and his election to a second term may depend, he
started the series of pre-emptive wars we have watched on television, first Afghanistan and then Iraq,
and now he threatens Syria, Iran and others on his list of nations that supposedly promote terrorism.
Cuba, of course, is wrongfully on that list, but people here take this seriously as a preliminary pretext
for U.S. military action against this country.
The US has continued to provide safe haven to terrorists of Cuba
Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Muse, attorney, 2004
Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, Robert Muse, attorney
whose practice is devoted exclusively to public and private international law, and Glenn Baker, Director,
U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November 2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not
Be on the Terrorist List”, http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed
6/27/13, Fontana
Thus, there would seem to be no real evidence that Cuba is in fact “harboring foreign terrorists.” The same, however, cannot be
said of the United States. It is harboring exile terrorists, the most notorious probably being Orlando
Bosch. The Justice Department has evidence of his involvement in some thirty cases of violence and terrorist acts in the U.S. and Latin
America. Imprisoned in Venezuela in 1976 for masterminding the downing of a Cubana airliner with the
death of all its passengers, Bosch some years later was mysteriously released and returned, without a
visa, to Miami. The Justice Department wanted to deport him – or failing that, to hold him in custody. But he was set free in
1990 by the administration of George H.W. Bush after intense lobbying by South Florida political
leaders such as Ileana RosLehtinen and Jeb Bush. On July 20 of 1990, The New York Times editorialized, “The release from
jail of Orlando Bosch is a startling example of political justice. The Justice Department, under no legal compulsion but conspicuous political
pressure, has let him out, winning cheers from local politicians—and squandering American credibility on issues of terrorism.” Bosch
continues to live freely in Miami, having never renounced violence as a method. He is but one of many
exile terrorists living freely there. And now there are three more. Last August, under strange and suspicious circumstances,
outgoing Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned four Cuban exile terrorists then in Panamanian prisons: Luis Posada Carriles, Pedro
Remon, Guillermo Novo and Gaspar Jimenez. All had long records of involvement in terrorist activities. Jimenez, for example, was convicted of
killing a Cuban fishing technician in Mexico in 1976. He escaped from prison and still has an outstanding sentence of 12 years hanging over his
head.
Novo, Remon and Jimenez flew immediately to Miami, where they were given a heroes’ welcome
at the airport. U.S. authorities raised no objections of any kind. Carriles, apparently fearing extradition efforts on the
part of Venezuela, remained out of sight in Central America. Speculation, however, is that he also will soon be back in
Miami – the established haven for exile terrorists.
The US is harboring multiple Cuban terrorists
Smith, Former Chief of Mission of the US Interests Section in Havana, et al 4 (Wayne,
currently a JHU professor and US-Cuba relations author, Robert Muse, attorney specializing in issues
relating to Cuba, and Glenn Baker, Director of the U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project, November
2004, International Policy Report, “Cuba Should Not Be on the Terrorist List”,
http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, accessed 6/25/13, KR)
Thus, there would seem to be no real evidence that Cuba¶ is in fact “harboring foreign terrorists.” The
same, however,¶ cannot be said of the United States. It ¶ is ¶ harboring exile¶ terrorists, the most
notorious probably being Orlando Bosch.¶ The Justice Department has evidence of his involvement
in¶ some thirty cases of violence and terrorist acts in the U.S.¶ and Latin America. Imprisoned in
Venezuela in 1976 for¶ masterminding the downing of a Cubana airliner with the¶ death of all its
passengers, Bosch some years later was mysteriously released and returned, without a visa, to
Miami.¶ The Justice Department wanted to deport him – or failing¶ that, to hold him in custody. But he
was set free in 1990 by¶ the administration of George H.W. Bush after intense lob-¶ bying by South
Florida political leaders such as Ileana Ros-¶ Lehtinen and Jeb Bush.¶ On July 20 of 1990, ¶ The New York
Times ¶ editorialized,¶ “The release from jail of Orlando Bosch is a startling example of political justice.
The Justice Department, under no legal compulsion but conspicuous political pressure, has let¶ him out,
winning cheers from local politicians—and squandering American credibility on issues of terrorism.”¶
Bosch continues to live freely in Miami, having never renounced violence as a method. He is but one
of many exile¶ terrorists living freely there. And now there are three more.¶ Last August, under strange
and suspicious circumstances,¶ outgoing Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned¶ four Cuban
exile terrorists then in Panamanian prisons: Luis¶ Posada Carriles, Pedro Remon, Guillermo Novo and
Gaspar¶ Jimenez. All had long records of involvement in terrorist ac-¶ tivities. Jimenez, for example, was
convicted of killing a Cuban fishing technician in Mexico in 1976. He escaped from¶ prison and still has
an outstanding sentence of 12 years hang-¶ ing over his head. Novo, Remon and Jimenez flew immedi¶ ately to Miami, where they were given a heroes’ welcome at¶ the airport. U.S. authorities raised no
objections of any kind.
Western Support for Terror Ignored
Terrorism is only understood as non-state violence concealing the use of terror by
Western democratic states as a matter of policy.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,,
p.70, AS)
In the vast majority of texts I examined, the central concept of the field –¶ terrorism – is conceptualised
and understood solely or primarily as a form of¶ illegitimate non-state political violence. The
construction of terrorism as a¶ form of non-state violence is sustained by two common conceptual
practices.¶ First, a surprising number of scholars, including some leading scholars, adopt¶ an actor-based
definition of terrorism in which the nature of the actor determines¶ the character of the violence. For
example, Bruce Hoffman, a leading¶ figure in the field, argues that terrorism involves violence
‘perpetrated by¶ a subnational group or non-state entity’ (B. Hoffman, 1998: 43). This is in¶ keeping with
the US State Department’s highly influential definition of terrorism¶ as ‘premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetuated against¶ noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents, usually¶ intended to influence an audience’ (quoted in Martin, 2003: 33).¶ A second and more
common practice among scholars involves defining¶ terrorism as a strategy of political violence which
any actor can employ, including¶ states, but then failing to examine the vast amount of terrorism
perpetrated by¶ states in any systematic manner. Walter Laqueur, arguably one of the founders of¶
terrorism studies, is emblematic of this practice: he openly accepts that states¶ practice ‘terrorism from
above’ and have killed many more people and caused far¶ more material and social destruction than
‘terrorism from below’, but then argues¶ that this is simply not the terrorism he wishes to examine
(Laqueur, 1977: 6).¶ Most texts in the field however, do not contain any such acknowledgement; they¶
simply proceed to examine only the terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors (see¶ also, Raphael, this
volume; Silke, 2004d). A recent introductory text for example,¶ typical of the burgeoning terrorism
literature published today, does not contain a¶ single mention of state terrorism (Sloan, 2006).¶ An
important consequence of these conceptual practices is that terrorism¶ comes to be understood and
studied solely as a form of violence carried out by¶ non-state groups, and terrorism by states remains
unstudied and mostly invisible¶ (see Jackson, 2008a). When state terrorism is discussed, it is usually
limited to¶ descriptions of ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ by so-called ‘rogue states’ (Jackson,¶ 2007b).
Further, the subsequent silence on the direct use of terrorism by state¶ actors within the terrorism
studies literature underpins a mostly unspoken belief¶ that Western liberal democratic states in
particular never engage in terrorism as¶ a matter of policy, but only occasionally in error or
misjudgement (see Blakeley,¶ 2008). It is also frequently argued that violence by states is de facto
legitimate,¶ and therefore cannot be terrorism.¶
The West has a largely ignored violent history of sponsoring terror—critique is
necessary to opening up new forms of knowledge that include western terrorism
Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 09
[Richard, March 18th, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 1 Issue 3, “The ghosts of state terror:
knowledge,
politics and terrorism studies”, p 385-356, accessed 6/27/13, VJ]
Similarly, Western involvement in terrorism has a long but generally ignored history, which includes:
the extensive use of official terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the US and other colonial
powers as a form of governance and social control in numerous countries throughout the colonial
period;9 the ‘terror bombings’ of civilians during the Second World War and other campaigns; US and
Western support and sanctuary for a range of right-wing insurgent groups during the cold war such as
anti-Castro groups, the Contras, Unita, the Mujahideen, and others – groups which regularly
committed terrorist acts including planting car bombs in markets, kidnappings, assassinations, civilian
massacres, and blowing up civilian airliners;10 Israel’s extensive use of state terrorism in the form of
torture, extra-judicial assassination, and collective punishments against Palestinian populations in
surrounding countries and within the occupied territories; Israeli sponsorship of Christian militia groups
in Lebanon who engaged in numerous acts of terror during the 1980s, including the notorious Sabra and
Shatilla refugee camp massacres; US tolerance of Irish Republican terrorist activity in the US (Byman
2005, pp. 21–27); US and Western support for systematic state terror by numerous right-wing regimes
across the world, perhaps most notoriously El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia, and Iran – often
under the cover of ‘counterterrorism’ programmes (Herman 1982, Herman and O’Sullivan 1989, Gareau
2004); US use of terrorism during counter-insurgency operations such as ‘Operation Phoenix’ in
Vietnam, and in counter-revolutionary campaigns in Latin America such as ‘Operation Condor’
(McSherry 2002); British support for Loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland (Sluka 2000c) and various
other ‘Islamist’ groups in Libya and Bosnia, among others;11 Spanish state terror during the so-called
‘dirty war’ against ETA (Aretxaga 2000); French terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the Rainbow
Warrior bombing; Italian state sponsorship of right-wing terrorists who carried out so-called ‘black flag
operations’, such as terrorist bombings, designed to implicate left-wing groups from the late 1960s to
the early 1980s; Western support for Afghan (Gareau 2004, pp. 199–200) and Somali warlords today;
the provision of continuing sanctuary to anti-Castro terrorists (Barker 2002, p. 75, Sanchez 2004),
former Latin American state terrorists (Grann 2001), and various Asian anti-Communist terrorist
groups12 in the US today; toleration and support for Pakistan, despite its continued sponsorship of
Kashmiri terrorist groups (Dell 2002, p. 37); continuing US and Western support for Colombian state
terrorism (Stokes 2004); the extensive use of, and sponsorship of, torture and extraordinary rendition
(Grey 2006) in the war on terror today; the toleration (or passive sponsorship) of death squad activity in
occupied Iraq today (Dreyfus 2005, Hersh 2005); among many other examples. The most important
point to note about this extensive list of examples is that even if we were to restrict our understanding
of terrorism to the actions typically employed by non-state actors and we did not include broader
forms of governance or state practices during war, we would still have to conclude that states engage
in a tremendous amount of terrorism, most of which is never subject to systematic evaluation in the
broader terrorism studies literature. Similarly, even by Western democratic measures and
understandings of ‘state sponsorship of terrorism’, it is clear that Western sponsorship of terrorism is
as long-running and extensive as many of the cases described in the US State Department’s annual list
of offending nations. In short, using the very same social scientific modes of analysis, terminology, and
empirical categories that are employed by terrorism studies scholars reveals that states, including
Western democratic states, employ terrorism too. The puzzle therefore is why are such obvious cases
of terrorism so rarely studied by terrorism scholars? The purpose of a first-order critique is not
necessarily to establish the full and final truth about terrorism and the role of states in it. Rather, firstorder critique aims to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the
biases and imbalances in the field, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and
studying the subject – other ways of knowing – are possible. In this case, I have attempted to destabilise
dominant understandings of terrorism as solely an activity of non-state actors and reveal how states,
including Western democratic states currently involved in fighting a ‘war on terrorism’, regularly employ
the tactic of terrorism themselves. This critique destabilises the dominant knowledge and practice of
terrorism scholars who primarily focus on examples of non-state terrorism as an object of study or
limit their analysis of state sponsors of terrorism to non-Western states. This kind of critical
destabilisation is crucial for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of questions and seek new
forms of knowledge.
Experts systematically ignore US violence projected under the cover of counter
terrorism – Columbia, Turkey, Israel all prove.
Raphael, Lecturer in International Relations at Kingston University London, 9
(Sam, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.58-60, AS)
Alongside the problem of sourcing lies the problem of silencing. Key actors and¶ campaigns of terrorism
are systematically ignored by the core experts, particularly,¶ in the context of this chapter, those which
have received ideological or¶ material support from Washington. And this is true despite the fact that such¶ examples
clearly fit the consensus definition employed by the majority of experts¶ whereby terrorism is:¶ 1 violence (or the threat thereof); which is¶ 2
instrumental, as opposed to aimless; and conducted for¶ 3 political (i.e. non-personal) ends; in order to¶ 4 influence an audience wider than
the immediate target(s), generally through the¶ creation of fear; achieved through¶ 5 the deliberate and systematic violation of the
established norms surrounding¶ the use of force.7¶ This definition clearly encompasses state as well as non-state acts of terror and¶ could
The use of¶ violence targeted against noncombatants in
order to influence a wider audience has¶ long been a hallmark of ‘counterterrorism’ supported by the
US. For example, the¶ use of terrorism by pro-US security forces in Central America was systematic
and¶ was documented as such at the time. Amnesty International (1984: 155–156), for¶ example,
received ‘regular, often daily reports identifying El Salvador’s regular¶ security and military units as
responsible for the torture, “disappearance” and¶ killing of non-combatant civilians from all sectors of
Salvadoran society’. The use¶ of disappearance and torture was widespread throughout pro-US states in
the¶ region during the 1980s, often carried out by security forces trained and armed by¶ US forces (see
Blum, 1995). Such tactics are clearly terrorist in nature, given the¶ fact that ‘it is a strategy designed
primarily to induce extreme fear in a target population.¶ It is a strategy of terrorism and is understood
as such by the populations of¶ targeted societies’ (Stohl, 2006: 10). None of this was discussed at the
time by the¶ core experts and there has only been the odd, brief acknowledgement of this¶ record since
(see for example, Wilkinson, 2002: 68).¶ Likewise, expert discussion of state assassinations of foreign
dissidents – a¶ tactic clearly considered terroristic – has been restricted solely to those governments¶
identified as terrorist-sponsoring by the US government. Thus, the Soviet¶ Union and other Communist countries have
easily be applied to many aspects of US-led ‘counterterrorism’.
‘used the weapon of international terrorism¶ as a means of silencing and intimidating exiled dissidents and hunting¶ down those alleged to
have betrayed the Party’ (Wilkinson, 1984: 293). Syria has¶ 58 S. Raphael¶ University of Exeter¶ arranged for the assassination of enemies and
‘allies’ alike (Alexander, 1986: 6),¶ whilst Iraq, Iran, and Libya have also engaged in such activities (B. Jenkins, 1985:¶ 11; Laqueur, 1999: 178–
179). However, there is little or no discussion of, for¶ instance, apartheid South Africa’s extensive assassination campaign which was¶
‘exercised quite openly by the apartheid government, especially against leaders of¶ the liberation movements who were not based in South
Africa but abroad’¶ (K. O’Brien, 2001: 108). Neither was there any analysis of the multinational¶ Operation Condor which¶ became the most
sinister state-sponsored terrorist network in the Western¶ Hemisphere, if not the world. Those targeted went far beyond members of¶ the
militant Southern Cone guerrilla movements . . . they included civilian¶ political figures from the region, and Latin American exile leaders living
in¶ Europe and the United States.¶ (Kornbluh, 2003: 324)¶ A similar
silence has greeted the clear use of terrorism by
US-supported¶ ‘counterterrorist’ forces operating in the post-cold war era, notably in Colombia,¶
Turkey, and Israel. Thus, the use of terrorism by Colombian paramilitary groups¶ receives little attention when compared to analyses of
the left wing guerrilla¶ movements, despite the fact that they have consistently been responsible for¶ over 70 per cent of all terrorist attacks in
the country (State Department, 2000).¶ In contrast, the RAND database, maintained in part by Hoffman and Jenkins,¶ attributes to the
guerrillas more than twice the number of fatalities than it does to¶ the paramilitaries, which were apparently responsible for only 12 per cent
of¶ incidents between 1998 and 2004.8 Where such violence is acknowledged, any¶ discussion is exceedingly brief (see for example, Laqueur’s
(1999: 189) passing¶ reference to the ‘activities of counterinsurgency gangs’), and crucially, collaboration¶ between these groups and
Colombian security forces is rarely mentioned¶ at all. This collusion has been extensively documented, with Human Rights¶ Watch, for
instance, clear that there exists ‘abundant, detailed and compelling¶ evidence that certain Colombian army brigades and police detachments
continue¶ to promote, work with, support, profit from, and tolerate paramilitary groups,¶ treating them as a force allied to and compatible
with their own’ (Human Rights¶ Watch, 2001: 1).¶ Likewise, the
systematic use of terrorism by Turkish
‘counterterrorist’ forces¶ throughout the 1990s, and US complicity in this has been extensively
documented¶ (see van Bruinessen, 1996; Gabelnick et al., 1999), but receives little to¶ no treatment by
the core literature. In a similar vein, Israel’s extensive use of targeted¶ killings, often directed against noncombatants and clearly
employed as a¶ strategy for installing fear in a wider target population, is largely ignored by the¶ experts. Evidence regarding the use of this
strategy is widespread and exists in¶ relation to Israeli actions during its occupation of Lebanon, during the first and¶ second intifadas, and
during the Oslo Peace Process (see Fisk, 1992: 559–578;¶ Human Rights Watch, 1993; B. Morris, 1999: 591–592; Byman, 2006).¶ The US in the
global South 59¶ University of Exeter¶ Overall, and in parallel with the silences regarding these forms of terrorism,
the¶ literature fails
to acknowledge and analyse the role that the US has played in supporting¶ these ‘counterterror’
campaigns. US support for aggressive ‘counterterror’¶ campaigns throughout the South and its
complicity in many instances of state terrorism¶ which result, either through the training of host
security forces in assassination¶ and torture techniques or through the waiver of human rights
conditionalities¶ in order to continue the funding of abusive militaries, has been well-documented¶
elsewhere (see Klare and Kornbluh, 1989; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Stokes¶ and Raphael,
forthcoming).
Ignores/Obscures State Violence
The practices which construct terrorism as solely non-state violence are wrong.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,,
p.75, AS)
In the first instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclusively¶ as a form of nonstate violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism¶ is a violent tactic in the same way that
ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense¶ to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded
from employing the tactic¶ of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians
are¶ likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an¶ audience is an act
of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state¶ actors or by agents acting on behalf of the
state (see Jackson, 2008a). It can therefore¶ be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed
towards or threatened¶ against civilians which is designed to instil terror or intimidate a population
for¶ political reasons – a relatively uncontroversial definition within the field and¶ wider society – then
states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as¶ I and many others have documented
elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson,¶ 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly
vast scale over¶ the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like¶
Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and elsewhere.¶ Moreover, the
deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western¶ democratic states during the colonial
period, in the ‘terror bombing’ of World¶ War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counterinsurgency and proinsurgency¶ campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups¶ and
during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well¶ documented (see, among
many others, Gareau, 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup,¶ 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakeley, 2006, forthcoming;
Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985;¶ Gabelnick et al., 1999; Herman, 1982; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2002;
Klare,¶ 1989; Minter, 1994; Stokes, 2005, 2006; McSherry, 2002).
No Objective Definition
The term terrorism has been manipulated by the government and media to serve their
own interests with no respect to academic integrity.
Silke, Director of Terrorism Studies at the University of East London, 9
(Andrew, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p. 36, AS)
This state of affairs is partly a consequence of the serious – and arguably¶ irresolvable – problems
which remain with the term ‘terrorism’ itself. There is¶ still no wide agreement within academic circles
on what exactly is meant by¶ ‘terrorism’, and indeed the recent emergence of ‘Critical Terrorism
Studies’ is¶ partly a reflection of this. The question as to what constitutes terrorism, and who¶ is a
terrorist, is deeply problematic. There is still no precise and agreed definition¶ of terrorism, and some
writers have concluded that ‘it is unlikely that any¶ definition will ever be generally agreed upon’
(Shafritz et al., 1991). It is not my¶ intention here to get side-tracked in a definitional debate, but rather
to stress that¶ the use of the term fluctuates and ‘terrorism’ means different things to different¶ people.
As Gearty (1991: 6) has noted:¶ The major difficulty is that identifying a terrorist is not simply a matter
of¶ ticking off items on a checklist of violent attributes. The label itself is¶ inevitably value-laden. Its
meaning is moulded by government, the media and¶ in popular usage, not by academic departments.
The word resonates with¶ moral opprobrium and as such is, as far as the authorities and others are
concerned,¶ far too useful an insult to be pinned down and controlled. The manipulators¶ of language
are no respecters of academic integrity, and, simply to keep¶ up, political scientists who believe a
definition is possible have had to broaden¶ their attempts so extensively that the exercise becomes
rather pointless.¶ Combining a massively growing wider literature to serious problems and debates¶ over
what ‘terrorism’ actually is, is a recipe for confusion and acrimony. Nevertheless,¶ in an effort to help
provide a framework for understanding the literature,¶ this chapter represents the latest in a series of
articles by the author which have¶ reviewed some aspects of research on terrorism (Silke, 2001, 2004c,
2006).
Terrorist discourse is heavily politicized and shaped by state-centric perspectives—
reclaiming the meaning from hegemons and imperialists enables deconstruction of
the status quo discourse.
Haque, writer for countercurrents.com, 11
[M. Mohibul, July 2nd, Counter Currents, “Deconstruction Of Discourse On Terrorism”,
http://www.countercurrents.org/haque020711.htm, accessed 6/30/13, VJ]
The term “terrorism “is one about whose meaning the scholars in academia or officials in government
circle have quarreled perhaps more than any other concept in the recent past. Indeed there are many
other ideas and concepts upon which there is disagreement among the scholars and governments but
the implications of that disagreement are not so dangerously felt. Terrorism has become a global
scourge and there is a pressing need to formulate policies and programs to control its origin and
growth. Under these circumstances, at least a universally acceptable working definition of terrorism is
necessary. However, neither there is such a definition nor is likely to be in near future. In fact, the
absence of an objective definition of terrorism is more by design than by accident. The intellectual
dishonesty in the academic fraternity and the double standard of the national governments are
responsible for this problem. Terrorism is an act of politically or ideologically motivated violence
against common men or women. It may be committed by an individual, group, organization or state.
However, it is unfortunate that the discourse on terrorism has been hijacked by powerful nations of
the world who never want that their acts of unwarranted violence should be discussed in the context
of terrorism. This is more evident in the aftermath of September 11 terrorist attacks on the United
States. The so- called global war on terror declared and being fought by the United States and handful of
its allies has tried to mislead that in the present circumstances terrorism is the monopoly of non-state
actors alone. Thus the killing of innocent people by the organizations like Al-Qaeda is terrorism and
slaughter of innocent citizens of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Kosovo by imperialist alliance is not
terrorism at all. It is unfortunate that without a modicum of remorse it is argued that if with the handful
of terrorists, thousands of innocent citizens of sovereign nations die, it can be condoned as collateral
damage. Ironically, USA-the mightiest power on earth with the help of its ambitious allies in
imperialist plunder of the resources in militarily weak nations decides and determines the context and
paradigm in which its foreign policy should be discussed. It is this double standard and flamboyant
style of the major powers to approach terrorism that has prevented the international community
from arriving on a universally accepted definition. In fact, assaulting innocent people from any
nationality or belonging to any religious, ethnic or ideological persuasion either by the national armies
wearing uniform and carrying flags or by clandestine organizations like Al-Qaeda must be treated as
terrorism and accordingly dealt with. The undeniable fact is that we do not have an officially adopted
and universally accepted definition of terrorism yet the data and statistics on terrorism are prepared by
states and generally accepted even by ‘ independent scholars’ in academic circles. This is the best
example of intellectuals becoming “experts in legitimation” (using Gramsci’s term). The statistics on
terrorism are hardly questioned and seldom scrutinized. In fact, the paradigm of approaching
terrorism needs to be questioned first. For doing so the discourse on terrorism must be
deconstructed. The undue emphasis given on non-state terrorism and almost completely ignoring the
acts of terror committed by states is responsible for misleading data and statistics as well as the
definitional dilemma relating to terrorism. Terrorism must be defined and determined on the basis of
the acts committed rather than the actors involved. The crude fact about terrorism is that even the nonstate terrorism cannot sustain without the support from the states. It is a well known fact that CIA, ISI,
KGB, Mosad and several other agencies maintained by states have committed more acts of terror than
those perpetrated by the dreaded terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and LTTE etc. Moreover, the
states are known to have indulged in committing acts of violence and intimidation against their own
citizens. After all, the term terrorism originated from the French word “terrorisme” which was used to
describe the acts of terror of the post revolution French state i.e. the ‘Reign of Terror’. To suspend the
discussion it can be said that the discourse on terrorism is highly motivated and monopolistic in
nature which needs to be deconstructed. The deconstruction of the discourse on terrorism is not
possible unless it is liberated from the sinister grip of hegemons and imperialists.
Terrorism research is unreliable even though it claims to be objective.
Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisalion and Contemporary
Political Violence, 9
(Marie Breen, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.195-6, AS)
This immediately raises issues regarding the ‘objectivity’ of research on political¶ violence and terror,
and the relationship of the researcher’s subjective position,¶ understandings, and insights to the
research initiation, process, and outcome.¶ In common with Gunning and Toros (this volume), it is asserted here that¶
research, like theory, is from somewhere and for someone (Cox, 1981: 128), and¶ therefore, that claims to objectivity and value-freedom are
the very invisibility and irrelevance of the subjective implied in the claim ¶ to
objectivity obscures a key element in the reader’s ability to interpret research,¶ namely, the subjective
position of the researcher or author. This element is rarely¶ as crucial as it is in research on political
violence and terror. The contemporary¶ researcher operates in a climate where comprehensive
processes of ‘othering’ and¶ demonising the ‘terrorist’ research subject operate. No researcher can
remain¶ immune to contextual influences such as this.¶ So what are the implications of the ubiquity of
highly problematic.¶ Indeed,
this ‘othering’ and demonisation¶ for the conduct of research on terror? In such circumstances, the claim
to¶ objectivity is unsustainable. Indeed, research on violence and harm is invariably¶ conducted within a
powerful emotional force-field created and sustained by violence¶ and the reaction to it. The researcher
must negotiate this force-field, using¶ their own subjective map of the world, and their subjective
understanding of the¶ violence and the actors being studied. The development of empathy with those¶
being studied, an issue that is taken up below, presents particular challenges.¶ Research on political
violence and terror (or, following Cox, any research) cannot ¶ therefore lay legitimate claim to
objectivity in any circumstances. ¶ Surveys of existing research on terrorism throw up a number of perennial¶ criticisms. In 1988,
Schmid and Jongman pointed to serious concerns with the¶ methodologies used by researchers to gather data and further concern about the¶
level of analysis that data was subjected to. Silke’s (2001) review, which examined¶ research published between 1995 and 2000, found a
‘terrorist
research’ had not improved. It was still largely incapable of¶ explaining ‘terrorist’ events or of
predicting the likelihood and impact of such¶ events in the future (see Silke in this volume for an update on this
paucity of primary data,¶ a dearth of fieldwork involving face to face interviews, and that, from a practical¶ perspective,
assessment).¶ After the attacks of 2001 on the World Trade Center, terrorism research¶ proliferated, but, according to Ranstorp (2006b), this
increase in quantity did¶ not bring with it a concomitant improvement in quality. Old problems of overreliance¶ on media, government, and
other secondary sources continued. The most¶ enduring of criticisms of the field is the accusation of the dearth of primary¶ research and the
resultant derivative nature of many research findings. This
lack¶ of, or aversion to, primary research and over-reliance
on a limited number of¶ sources has made for a certain narrowing and convergence of views in the
field,¶ and the tendency towards over-reliance on state sources has made for a marked¶ degree of
state-centricity. Thus, primary research is crucial, since it can expose the¶ gaps in understanding, and
the cultural and political biases and misinterpretations¶ in government, intelligence, and media
accounts. As Nordstrom (1998) has¶ pointed out, the experiences of those close to political violence ‘are frequentlyworlds apart from the
images of political violence (mis)portrayed in public media,¶ formal military texts, the literature, and war museums . . .’, and this discrepancy¶
facilitates the growth of a mythology, which not only mystifies violence, but can¶ disastrously misguide policy and practice. Mahmood (1996:
521) also emphasises¶ how ‘face-to-face
knowledge can contribute to greater accuracy in judicial and¶
legislative decisions regarding terrorism’ in an atmosphere where a fantasy world¶ about the threat of
terrorism is manufactured by the media and is extant in public¶ opinion. Primary data is a crucial
reality-check therefore, notwithstanding the necessity of corroboration and critical engagement with
such data.
Orthodox Terror Studies Bad
No Objective Definition
Objectivity only serves as a tool to sustain the status quo of biased terrorism studies
which reify existing power structures. We endorse a critical approach to reject this
objective stance.
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.91-2 AS)
Accepting that theory and knowledge are always rooted in their historical context and serve particular interests clearly places Critical Theorists
in direct opposition to the traditional realist position that politics can and must be studied from a neutral objective standpoint. Indeed, it not
only questions the very possibility of situating oneself outside the social world, but also asks the fundamental question of who benefits from a
theory that advocates an objective neutral standpoint. Failure
to reflect on the historicity, constructedness and
institutional interests of social science has the effect of upholding and reifying the status quo (Wyn Jones,
1999: 131–132; Horkheimer, 1992; Cox, 1986). By claiming to be objective, traditional theory obscures the power
relations, partisan interests, and context-specific perspectives that underpin its conceptual framework
and methodology. Existing power structures are posited as natural, legitimate, and immutable (Linklater,
2001: 26), while scientific findings are presented as ‘transcend[ing] history’ and ‘universally valid’ (Cox, 1986: 247). The result is the
reproduction of the status quo and its ‘asymmetries of power, wealth, and opportunity’ (Linklater, 2001: 26;
see also Horkheimer, 1992: 196–197, 204–206; Wyn Jones, 1999: 19–20). Or, as Sara Roy noted in the concrete context of studying the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict,
because objectivity ‘[aims] to create balance or equity where none in fact exists’, the
result is the ‘displacing [of] any kind of sustained attention to [local] realities and their damaging
impact’ and a ‘political gamesmanship where the stronger party .. . dominates’ (Roy, 2007: xv). Turning specifically to the study of terrorism,
mainstream terrorism research has overall adopted a traditional or ‘problem-solving’ approach, taking ‘the world as it finds it‘(Cox, 1986: 208;
for application to terrorism studies, see Gunning, 2007a). By
failing to question existing power structures and its own
indebtedness to these structures, traditional terrorism studies has essentially served to sustain the
status quo, reducing politics to the management of social order without much thought for
emancipation – internal critics and dissenters notwithstanding. Its purpose has been essentially conservative and
conformist, and critiques from within have typically focused on specific policies, rather than
concerning themselves with how existing power structures came about and how they have helped to
shape both the problem and prevailing knowledge about it (for a detailed critique, see the Part I in this volume). In
methodological terms, the starting point for a Critical Theory-inspired approach to terrorism should thus begin with a ‘first-order critique’
(Jackson, 2007a; see also Milliken, 1999) of traditional terrorism’s core claims and normative values, comparing the claims made regarding
values or facts against the evidence, on traditional theory’s own terms and norms (see also Hutchings, 2001: 88; Wyn Jones, 1999: 160–161).
Following the Welsh School, the
task here is to challenge ‘the prevailing hegemonic security discourse’ as it
applies to terrorism, and to question the views that ‘serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the
prevailing world order’ with the help of ‘expert knowledge’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 160). Is terrorism indeed the threat that it is portrayed
as being? Is it always Exploring a critical theory approach 91 University of Exeter carried out by non-state actors or do states, including liberal
democratic ones, at times engage in similar practices? Do states necessarily increase the security of their citizens and, more broadly, of human
beings? Do particular counterterrorism strategies, for instance deterrence and collective punishment, indeed enhance security, and if so, whose
and at what cost to others? Do negotiations necessarily encourage further terrorism by legitimising those who turn to terrorism?
Deepening thus leads us to engage with the ‘what and whom theory is for’ question and from where
it emanates, ultimately bringing us to reject the notion of an idealised objective stance . But it does not stop
here. For the next crucial (and more daunting) step is to go beyond critique, and following Hutchings, ‘[develop] new conceptual frameworks’
and ‘offer alternative explanations’ (Hutchings, 2001: 88–89).
The belief that terrorism can be objectively defined ignores the fact that terrorism is a
phenomenon which cannot be identified by the characteristics inherent to the
violence itself.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,,
p.75-6, AS)
The assumption that terrorism can be objectively defined and studied is also¶ highly questionable
and far more complex than this. It can be argued that terrorism¶ is not a causally coherent, freestanding phenomenon which can be identified in¶ terms of characteristics inherent to the violence
itself (see Jackson, 2008a). In the¶ first instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act
itself. One¶ and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’¶
(Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing¶ the act. The killing of civilians,
for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist¶ act; it could perhaps be the unintentional
consequence of a military operation¶ during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a
brute fact, and like¶ ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers.¶
That is, ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through an identifiable set of discursive¶ practices – such as the
categorisation and collection of data by academics and¶ security officials, and the codification of certain
actions in law – which thus make¶ it a contingent ‘reality’ for politicians, law enforcement officials, the
media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by¶ scholars,
politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late¶ 1960s, there was virtually no
‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or¶ academics; instead, acts of political violence were
described simply as ‘bombings’,¶ ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika
and¶ Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, terrorism does not exist outside of the¶ definitions and
practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism¶ studies field.
Terrorism scholars have neglected the definitional debate of what terrorism is
negatively implicating the way our policies deal with terrorists.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 8
[Richard, 2008, “An Argument for Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 2: Number 2,
pg N/A, AS]
It has become something of a cliché to note that there are over 200 definitions of terrorism in
existence within broader terrorism studies literature; that many terrorism scholars have given up on
the definitional debate and use the term unreflectively; and that such a state of affairs hampers
theoretical progress and skews terrorism research in unhelpful ways. However, the significance and
consequences of the definitional debate go far beyond such narrow academic confines, important as
they are to the field. Rather, the issue of definition is central to the way in which the Global War on
Terror is prosecuted by the authorities both domestically and overseas. It also affects the way in
which terrorism is understood and dealt with as a criminal act under international and domestic law.
In the academic and cultural realms, the definition of terrorism has important implications for the way
knowledge and commonsense about the subject is constructed and reproduced socially. Furthermore,
it has substantial indirect consequences for individuals and groups labelled as terrorists – who may
then be legally subject to torture, rendition and internment without trial – and for the "suspect
communities" they belong to.
Those who define terrorism use their definition in terms of their own interests
skewing the reliability of terrorism studies and the effectiveness of terrorism policy.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 8
[Richard, 2008, “An Argument for Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 2: Number 2,
pg N/A, AS]
I have already noted that the definitional debate in terrorism studies has reached something of a
stalemate. Not only is there no agreed definition among scholars, but an analysis of 490 articles
published in the leading terrorism studies journals between 1990 and 1999 revealed that only eight, or
1.6 percent of them, could be regarded as conceptually-oriented papers.[2] This suggests that many
scholars have largely given up on the challenging theoretical debates surrounding the central concept
of the field. An examination of broader terrorism studies literature suggests four main approaches and
practices towards the definition and conceptualisation of terrorism.[3] Arguably the most frequent
practice—particularly amongst scholars who are newly arrived to the subject—is to simply use the term
without defining it, on the misguided assumption that it is widely understood and accepted. Such an
approach is problematic for a number of very obvious reasons, not least because terrorism is a highly
emotive and divisive concept which different scholars and societies have often understood in very
different ways.¶ A second approach, confined mainly to political leaders and security officials, but also to
a surprising number of researchers and media pundits, is to define terrorism as an ideology or
movement. Although groups specializing solely in terror do sometimes form, they are extremely rare
and typically remain highly unstable and ephemeral. There are very few such groups operating today.
In reality, most terrorism occurs in the context of wider political struggles in which the use of terror is
one strategy among other more routine forms of contentious action.[4] As Charles Tilly puts it, "Properly
understood, terror is a strategy, not a creed. Terrorists range across a wide spectrum of organizations,
circumstances, and beliefs."[5]¶ Third, it is not uncommon to see researchers adopt an actor-based
definition in the literature, whereby terrorism is defined as a particular form of political violence
committed by non-state actors who attack civilians. Bruce Hoffman, for example, argues that terrorism
involves violence "perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity."[6] This is in keeping with
the U.S. State Department's highly influential definition of terrorism, which conceives of terrorism as
"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."[7] For scholars
who adopt this definition, terrorism is largely indistinguishable from insurgency, militancy, guerrilla
warfare and the like. More importantly, inherent to this approach is an assumption that while states
may commit atrocities, engage in political repression or torture opponents, this nonetheless does not
constitute terrorism, in large part because states have the sovereign right to use force.[8] From this
perspective, definitions of terrorism hinge on questions of legitimacy and sovereignty and the nature of
the actor who employs the violence. As I will argue below, actor-based approaches to the definition of
terrorism are both analytically untenable and politically suspect.¶ Lastly, and most commonly among
the leading scholars in the field, terrorism is defined as a violent strategy or tactic that actors employ
in pursuit of particular political goals. That is, terrorism is defined and understood by the nature and
characteristics of the act itself, rather than the nature of actor, and is conceived as a particular kind of
political action directed towards certain strategic goals rather than as a broad ideology or movement.
Louise Richardson for example, defines terrorism as "politically motivated violence directed against non
combatants or symbolic targets which is designed to communicate a message to a broader audience."[9]
Crucially, such a definitional approach accepts that states are also actors who can and frequently do
adopt strategies of terrorism and commit terrorist acts. This is a useful formulation that provides the
basis for the identifying criteria I present below.¶ Partly due to these definitional approaches, research
on terrorism in the broader field has been characterised by a number of unfortunate tendencies. An
initial tendency widely noted by some critics of the field is the selection bias of much terrorism
research. In this case, the terrorism label is applied almost solely to non-state groups opposed to
Western interests. It is usually not applied to those groups supported by Western states – even when
they commit identical acts of civilian-directed violence such as hijackings, bombings, kidnappings and
assassinations.[10] Thus, while left-wing groups have always received an inordinate amount of
attention in terrorism studies literature, right-wing groups like the Contras, anti-Castro groups, USand South African-supported movements in Angola and Mozambique, various Afghan factions,
numerous Latin American death squads, and today a number of Iraqi death squads, have remained
scandalously understudied. Although this is in part the result of the definitional practices noted above,
it is also the result of an understandable but avoidable ideological bias amongst many Western
scholars who adopt the interests of their own governments.
State-Centric Perspective/Obscures State Violence
Terrorism studies are inextricably linked to serving the state’s interests.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 7
[Richard, March 3, 2007, International Studies Association, “Terrorism Studies and the Politics
of State Power,”http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1951/ISA-2007-PaperCTS-Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/28/13, AS]
In short, the knowledge practices of terrorism studies function as a kind of ¶ disciplinary and
hegemonic truth regime designed to reify existing structures of power. ¶ At the very least, the
dominant knowledge of the field is an ideal type of „problemsolving theory‟.¶ 52 As Robert Cox argues,
problem-solving theory „takes the world as it ¶ finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships
and the institutions into which ¶ they are organised, as the given framework for action‟, and then works
to „make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular ¶
sources of trouble‟.53 It does not question the extent to which the status quo – the ¶ hierarchies and
operation of power and the inequalities and injustices thus generated – is ¶ implicated in the
„problem‟ of terrorism and other forms of subaltern violence. Moreover, ¶ through the use of social
scientific language and modes of inquiry, political assumptions ¶ about terrorism are masqueraded as
technical issues and sides are taken on terrorism‟s ¶ major ethical and political questions.¶ In the end,
these characteristics of the terrorism studies field, in particular its state ¶ centricity and problem-solving
orientation, have important analytical and normative ¶ implications. Analytically, it narrows the
potential range of research subjects, encourages ¶ conformity in outlook and method, and obstructs
vigorous, wide-ranging debate, ¶ particularly regarding the causes of non-state terrorism and the use
of terrorism by liberal ¶ democratic states and their allies. Constrained from moving beyond the narrow
statecentric paradigm within which it functions, the possibilities for theoretical and empirical ¶
innovation and advancement are curtailed. ¶ Perhaps more importantly, from a normative perspective it
means that terrorism ¶ studies is a largely co-opted field of research that is deeply enmeshed with the
actual ¶ practices of counter-terrorism and the exercise of state power.¶ 54 Disturbingly, it means ¶ that
terrorism studies is complicit in a range of state projects, many of which are not only ¶ counterproductive but oppressive in and of themselves, such as increased surveillance, ¶ profiling, shoot-to-kill
policies and creeping restrictions on civil liberties. It also ¶ identifies the field with a number of recent
state policies of dubious moral legitimacy, ¶ such as regime change, rendition, torture and extrajudicial
assassination. Terrorism ¶ studies provides both the intellectual justification for such counter-terrorist
policies, and ¶ the broader academic legitimacy which the state can call upon to convince the public of
¶ the rightness of its policies. As a consequence, terrorism studies must bear some moral ¶ responsibility
for the conspicuous abuses of previous counter-terrorism campaigns and ¶ the current war on terror.
The state-centric orientation of terrorism studies guarantees replication of the same
scholarship as it reflects dominant values of society and encloses researchers in a
circular and static system of information which marginalizes any criticism.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,,
p.80-,81 AS)
First, it can be argued that the core terrorism studies ‘knowledge’ persists and is continually
reproduced because its nature and form reflect (and simultaneously construct) dominant values and
existing cultural narratives. On the one hand, it provides a coherent and familiar discursive frame for
internal policy debate; it confirms state perspectives and approaches and simplifies a set of complex
challenges to an identifiable ‘problem’. For the wider public, the narratives of the discourse construct a broad common sense
understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism, or a ‘grid of intelligibility’ through which to interpret and make sense of events and actions.
This is another of its key hegemonic or ideological effects, as this common sense ‘knowledge’
predisposes the public to accept and acquiesce to particular kinds of counterterrorism policies. On the
other hand, the terrorism studies discourse draws on a series of powerful cultural frames and existing discursive structures, making it ideal for
the generation of public legitimacy and the construction of political boundaries (see Oliverio, 1997). For example, as Zulaika and Douglass’s
(1996) ground-breaking anthropological study demonstrated, the construction of the fanatical, dangerous terrorist reflects the ‘wild man’ figure
of Western cultural imagination. Similarly, the field’s construction of the threat posed by suicide bombers and WMD-terrorism taps into
culturally defined taboos of suicide and the fear of poison, while the notion that Western states never commit terrorism but only respond to it
reinforces the widespread belief in Western exceptionalism. Second, the
discourse maintains its dominance through a
self-perpetuating set of knowledge-generating practices. For example, based on an examination 80 R.
Jackson University of Exeter of thirty-two prominent terrorism studies experts, Edna Reid describes the
research process among these scholars as a closed, circular, and static system of information and
investigation which tends to accept dominant ‘myths’ about terrorism without strong empirical
investigation for long periods before empirical research disproves them (Reid, 1993: 28). The circular nature of the knowledge process can
be further illustrated by noting how some terrorism scholars provide expert testimony to special commissions, such as the Bremer Commission
and the 9/11 Commission, and then reference the commission reports in order to legitimise their own knowledge claims in later publications.7
In a related process of exclusion, a recent analysis concluded that terrorism ‘experts’ who do not
maintain a strong pro-Western bias in their work soon become marginalised in the field and are
denied access to policymakers and major conferences (Ilardi, 2004: 222). Lastly, the persistence and dominance of the
core terrorism studies ‘knowledge’ is a consequence of the ‘embedded’ or ‘organic’ nature of many terrorism experts and scholars; that is,
the extent to which terrorism scholars are directly linked to state institutions and sources of power in
ways that make it difficult to distinguish between the state and academic spheres (see Herman and O’Sullivan,
1989; George, 1991a; Burnett and Whyte, 2005). Crucial here has been the influence of the RAND Corporation, a non-profit research
foundation founded by the United States Air Force with deep ties to the American military and political establishments, as well as private
security and military companies. Some RAND scholars have been influential in both constructing the accepted knowledge of the terrorism
studies field and in communicating it to policymakers and the wider public for several decades now. Senior officials in several US
administrations have held positions in RAND, and as with other foundations and think tanks, there is a revolving door of personnel between
RAND and the state. For example, Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld are both former RAND administrators (Burnett and Whyte, 2005: 8).
Moreover, RAND scholars have been influential in establishing other influential terrorism research centres, such as the St Andrews Centre for
Studies in Terrorism and Political Violence, and have been involved in the running of both Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism. In fact, RAND scholars author a significant proportion of the articles published in these two popular journals (Silke,
2004c: 194). In other words, it can be
argued that the leading terrorism studies scholars now constitute an
influential and exclusive ‘epistemic community’ – a network of ‘specialists with a common world view about cause and
effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type of policies to which they should be
applied’ (Stone, 1996: 86). From a Gramscian perspective, the leading terrorism studies scholars can be understood as ‘organic intellectuals’
connected institutionally, financially and ideologically to the state. From this perspective, the
state-centric orientation of the
field and its continuing reproduction of the guiding myths is a natural and thoroughly unsurprising
consequence of its position within society’s existing power structure.
Failing to provide a sustained analysis of state terrorism – the field affirms a proWestern bias allowing for that violence from above to occur.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 8
[Richard, 2008, “An Argument for Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 2: Number 2,
pg N/A, AS]
A more serious issue is that the field has been widely criticised for its failure to provide sustained
analysis (and moral condemnation) of state terrorism. Indicative of the almost exclusive focus on
"terrorism from below" as opposed to "terrorism from above" is the finding that only 12, or less than
two percent, of articles from 1990 to 1999 in the core terrorism studies journals focused on state
terrorism,[ 11] and that only 12 of the 768 pages in the Encyclopaedia of World Terrorism (1997)
examined state terrorism in any form.[12] In part, this is due to the not infrequent practice noted
above of defining terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence.¶ However, there are also many
prominent scholars who accept that, objectively, terrorism is a strategy of political violence that any
actor can employ, including states, yet simply refuse to examine cases of state terrorism in their
research. Walter Laqueur, arguably one of the founders of terrorism studies, is emblematic of this
practice: he openly accepts that states have killed many more people and caused far more material and
social destruction than "terrorism from below", but then argues that this is simply not the type of
terrorism he wishes to examine.[13] It is perfectly understandable that scholars would wish to focus on
particular subjects, but when an entire field neglects what is a very important dimension of the
phenomenon, it raises troubling questions about the ideological orientation and political objectivity of
the overall field.¶ Clearly, there are reasons for concern over this state of affairs. From a politicalnormative perspective, the field appears biased towards Western state interests and complicit in the
terroristic practices Western states have regularly employed over the past two hundred years.[14] The
well-documented use of political terror by Western states during the colonial period, the "terror
bombing" during World War II and other conflicts, cold war counter-insurgency and pro-insurgency
campaigns, the active sponsorship of right-wing non-state terrorist groups and the widespread use of
torture during certain counter-terrorism campaigns, among others, are only the most prominent
examples of the kind of terrorism that many Western states have employed. The failure to analyse state
terrorism or to condemn it in the same morally assured terms as non-state terrorism appears to many
observers as pro-Western bias and a toleration of certain forms of state-practiced terrorism.[15]
This exemption from states as terrorist actors has allowed states to inflict greater
number of casualties than the non-state actors themselves proving a need for critical
theory within terrorism studies.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 8
[Richard, 2008, “An Argument for Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 2: Number 2,
pg N/A, AS]
In addition, it represents a breakdown of scholarly procedure and a self-imposed intellectual blindness.
It is intellectually unsustainable to argue that states cannot practice terrorism against their own
people and against other states. For example, such an approach would argue that a car bomb
detonated on a city street by clandestine state agents is not an act of terrorism, but an identical attack
by non-state actors is. Or that the kidnap, torture and murder of a civilian by agents of the state are not
terrorist acts, but the same act by a non-state group is terrorism. Accepting that terrorism can only
really be described according to the nature and quality of the particular act of violence—rather than the
purported legitimacy of the actor who commits it [16]—has a number of serious consequences and
implications.¶ In the first place, the acceptance that states are not exempted from employing terrorism
raises serious questions about the broader focus of the field and the empirical foundations it is based
on. That is, while non-state terrorists have killed tens of thousands and caused significant damage
during the past century and a half, the acceptance that "states can be terrorists, too" [17] reveals that
some individual states have been responsible for more terrorism than all non-state terrorist groups
put together. A conservative estimate of state-instigated mass murder, forcible starvations and
genocide against civilians for example, suggests that governments have been responsible for 170-200
millions deaths in the twentieth century alone.[18] Even if only a small proportion of these deaths can
be strictly defined as state terrorism, the few hundred deaths caused every year by non-state
terrorists pales beside the massive death, destruction and de-stabilisation caused by some states.
Moreover, a great many states continue to employ terrorism on a considerable scale against their
people today in places like Colombia, Haiti, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Pakistan, Uzbekistan,[19]
Egypt, Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, Tibet, North Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere. And
yet, the broader terrorism studies field does not include statistics on state terrorism in any of its
recognised databases, nor does it expend any real effort trying to understand the nature, causes,
strategies and outcomes of state terrorism.[20]¶ A serious analytical breakdown occurs when an entire
field largely fails to examine what is arguably the most serious aspect of the subject. It would be
comparable to an imaginary situation in which criminologists focused most of their research on antisocial behaviour and burglaries, and failed to study in any systematic way the extent and causes of
domestic violence, rape, murder, sexual abuse or other serious crimes.¶ Another important consequence
of accepting state terrorism as "terrorism" (and not just "repression") is the need to re-conceptualise
some of the accepted truisms in the field regarding the nature of terrorist behaviour. It is not the case
for example, that terrorism is solely the 'weapon of the weak'; it can also be true that "the stronger the
state, the stronger the temptation to rule through a regime of terror".[21] In fact, an objective look at
the history of terrorism would suggest that strong actors have used terror far more frequently than
weak ones. Moreover, it is clear that contrary to popular beliefs, terrorism can be employed during war
as well as during peace. For example, when states bomb civilian targets of no military value for the sole
purpose of terrorising a population into surrender—a case of frightening one group of people in order to
produce a political change in another—they are clearly committing a terrorist act.[22] Similarly, counterterrorism itself can become terrorism under certain conditions:¶ · When it fails to distinguish between
the innocent and the guilty;¶ · When it is highly disproportionate;¶ · When it aims to terrify or intimidate
the wider population or a particular community into submission;¶ · When it is co-opted to serve a
political agenda.[23]¶ Ultimately, there are important ethical-normative implications for the notion
that states employ terrorism too, often under the guise of "counter-terrorism". In the current climate,
virtually every state and international organisation has adopted new anti-terrorism legislation, and
military force—including "strategic bombing"—is frequently being used as a tool of counter-terrorism.
At the very least, scholars should be highly suspicious of any and all attempts by states to define
terrorism in ways that conveniently absolve what they or their agents do from being considered
terrorism. They should refuse to accede to the common practice of exempting state officials from
charges of terrorism, if for no other reason than that:¶ There is something morally suspicious, however,
about people making laws that apply to everyone else accept [sic] themselves. The sheer fact that
politicians have entered into a mutual-protection pact not to prosecute one another as 'terrorists'
cannot change any logical or deontological facts of the matter. If what they do is otherwise
indistinguishable from what is done by non-state actors that we would deem to be terroristic, then the
acts of the state officials doing the same thing would be morally wrong for just the same reasons.[24]
Field Coopted
The close relationship between core experts and political institutions in the US makes
it necessary for a “critical turn” in terrorism studies that exposes the flaws within
current terrorism research.
Raphael, Lecturer in International Relations at Kingston University
London, 9
(Sam, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.63-64, AS)
In sum, core terrorism experts tend to legitimate US-led and US-supported¶ counterterrorism policies
through insulating them from critique and openly¶ supporting them. This function does not apply in all
cases, but there is no doubt¶ that it is served in a systematic fashion throughout the literature. And given
the close relationship between these experts and state power in the US already¶ discussed, it is a
function of huge significance for the formulation of counterterrorism¶ policy in Washington.
Conclusion¶ As mentioned, the analysis presented in this chapter forms part of a wider project¶
examining the research output from the core figures within terrorism studies¶ (Raphael, forthcoming),
and in a paper of this length the examples provided are¶ necessarily illustrative. However, suffice it to
say that the problematic features of¶ the literature described here are at play throughout the field, in a
variety of¶ specific contexts. If nothing else, this fact points to the need for a ‘critical turn’ in¶ terrorism
studies. As the US continues to lead a worldwide ‘war on terror’¶ throughout the global South with
profound consequences for the human security¶ of populations in this region, it is vital to continue to
investigate the role of¶ ‘independent, objective’ academic experts in the policymaking process.
Furthermore,¶ and crucially, it is necessary to continue to subject their output to critical¶ analysis in
order to reveal the ways in which expert ‘knowledge’ on terrorism,¶ considered to originate outside of
politics, in fact relies upon the claims and¶ analyses of deeply political actors and institutions.¶ A
‘critical’ study of terrorism should also work to expose the silences present¶ in current mainstream
research, particularly regarding the terroristic nature of¶ many aspects of US-led and US-supported
‘counterterrorist’ policy. Once¶ exposed, there is an urgent need to engage in substantial, rigorous
research on¶ the subjects silenced thus far. It is vitally important to understand how practices¶ and
policies in past and current ‘wars on terror’ utilise terrorism as a strategy of¶ political violence,
whether directly by the US itself (for example, in Iraq) or¶ more often by its state allies (in Colombia,
Turkey, the Occupied Territories,¶ and elsewhere). In sum, there exists a clear research agenda for
‘critical terrorism¶ studies’ which will be of great importance in coming years: to reveal the¶ ideological
function served by much core terrorism research and to challenge¶ this through undertaking rigorous
research into major instances of terrorism in¶ the modern world; instances which have thus far been
almost wholly ignored.
It is time for a more critical approach to terrorism to challenge the cooption and
weaknesses within the field.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,,
p.82 AS)
The analysis of the terrorism studies field presented in this chapter clearly has some important analytical and normative implications. In the
first instance, it suggests that the
field has a number of serious analytical weaknesses in terms of its broader
ontological, epistemological, and methodological approaches, as well as its highly-restricted research
focus, conformity in outlook, acceptance and reproduction of dubious ‘knowledge’, and obvious
political bias towards Western states and interests. This state of affairs places major obstacles in the way of theoretical
and empirical innovation, the articulation of new questions and approaches and the contestation of dominant knowledge claims. More
prosaically, it
is rather worrying that the field’s ‘knowledge’ presently forms one of the bases of
policymaking deliberations and public debate about how to respond to acts of terrorism. Perhaps more
importantly, an ethical-normative perspective suggests that terrorism studies is a largely (but not completely) co-opted field
of research that is deeply enmeshed with the exercise of state power and the actual practices of counterterrorism.
That is, it provides both a specific set of intellectual justifications for counterterrorist and security policies, and a broader academic legitimacy
for the state.8 This
is disturbing, because it means that the field is in some small ways at least, complicit in
some of the counterterrorism practices employed in the war on terrorism and in places like Colombia
and Israel that are morally questionable, such as increased surveillance, profiling, shoot-to-kill policies, collective punishments,
creeping restrictions on civil liberties, regime change, support for repressive governments, rendition, torture, and extrajudicial assassination. In
the end, the
analysis presented here strongly suggests that it is time (again) for a more ‘critical’ approach
to the study of political terrorism. More specifically, it suggests that there is an urgent need for further
sustained review and reflection regarding the dominant knowledge and knowledge-generating
practices of terrorism research, and the need to adopt an alternative set of ontological, epistemological, methodological, and
ethical-normative commitments (see Jackson, Gunning and Breen Smyth, this volume). The open and determined adherence to these core
commitments by all terrorism scholars would, I believe, go some way towards rectifying the key problems and challenges highlighted in this
chapter.
Indict: Terror ‘Experts’
Terrorism studies is a co-opted field of research dominated by government interests,
pseudo-academia, and privileged frauds. We must engage critically with those who
produce this scholarship in order to interrogate unverifiable information posing as
empirical fact.
Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric¶ Threat Studies at the
Swedish National Defence College, 9
(Magnus, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p. 25-31, AS)
Over the last three decades, terrorism studies have been criticized for the¶ event-driven nature of
research efforts and its policy-driven character. The¶ problem of perceived ‘embedded’ terrorism
expertise existed well before 9/11,¶ but the subsequent dramatic policy focus on terrorism has
contributed to even¶ more attention being paid to the nexus between policymakers in the corridors of¶
power and terrorism expertise. As correctly argued by those advocating a critical¶ terrorism studies
approach, there is a danger that terrorism studies ‘is a largely¶ co-opted field of research that is deeply
enmeshed with the actual practices of¶ counterterrorism and the exercise of state power’ (Jackson,
2007e: 245). There¶ is a critical issue to bear in mind, namely, that terrorism research may be perceived¶
to be co-opted by government interests and the associated risks of¶ becoming an uncritical
mouthpiece of state interests, rather than speaking truth¶ to power (Gunning, 2007b: 240). It is critical
to maintain an independent and¶ non-operational role as a researcher in relation to the highly
contentious term¶ ‘terrorism’ and its essence as a subject matter.¶ The various sensational revelations
of terrorist plots, many of which are still¶ unverifiable through documentation, are illustrative of the
problematic relationship¶ between terrorism research and policymakers. The claims by Rohan
Gunaratna that¶ the 11 September 2001 hijackers planned to hijack a plane and crash it into Big Ben¶ and
the House of Commons is illustrative of many unsubstantiated claims by terrorism¶ experts allegedly
based on privileged government access that go unchallenged¶ (CNN, 2002). This and other unverifiable
claims, often highly publicized at the¶ time of revelation, can often be confused with scientific fact and
migrate into socalled¶ ‘knowledge’. It is starkly illustrative of the corrosive problem of ‘embedded¶
expertise’ that provides those critical of the field with ample ammunition to conduct¶ assaults on the
science. As poignantly argued by A. Jones, the problem with this is¶ that ‘researcher-policy maker
relations often devolve into “slightly incestuous echotalk”’¶ (Jones, 2007), where policymakers and
researchers are mutually reinforcing¶ each others’ claims as authoritative. Identification of boundaries is
in the interest of¶ both the terrorism researcher and policymakers. However, the post-9/11 milieu has¶
produced even greater dangers of a new breed of ‘embedded expertise’ that exploits¶ crevices in the
undergrowth of terrorism studies field that provide them with¶ enough grip to push forward effectively
various duplicitous agendas under the guise¶ of ‘honest’ social scientific projects. As acknowledged by
John Horgan, ‘the unfortunate popularity of the study of terrorism has drawn a lot of opportunists
who do¶ not do serious work’ (Horgan, 2008: 58) The art of masquerading evidence in terrorism
research¶ As Bruce Hoffman poignantly pointed out in a Foreign Affairs article, criticism 2008). In
particular, Hoffman invoked the damning critique made thirty years¶ ago by Professor Michael Howard,
who charged that terrorism studies had ‘been¶ responsible for more incompetent and unnecessary
books than any other outside .. .¶ of sociology. It attracts phoneys and amateurs as a candle attracts
moths’ (ibid.).¶ Howard’s assessment can be considered as true today as it was thirty¶ years ago. A major
global strategic surprise event like 9/11 is bound to attract¶ unscrupulous characters, pseudoacademics alongside outright fraudsters, often¶ masquerading behind a thin facade of privileged
access to secret sources, often¶ unverifiable in contravention to standard academic praxis. In most
cases, this¶ type of rumor intelligence (RUMINT) masquerading as scientific evidence lacks¶ any
acceptable academic rigor. Additionally, journalistic speculation or even¶ inaccuracies in reporting events
as they unfold, move effortlessly from fiction¶ to becoming established facts. Rarely are these empirical
facts investigated or¶ challenged with enough effort. Even rarer are those instances when these well
established¶ facts are investigated to further develop a greater degree of granularity¶ in both detail and
context. This becomes especially troublesome as these¶ established ‘empirical’ facts become
continuously reused in other academic contexts to fit ready-made assumptions and arguments.
Blurring boundaries between¶ journalism and academic expertise, facts or fiction obfuscate the
reliability of¶ data and erode serious terrorism research based on rigorous theory-building¶ and the use
of sound methodologies. Good journalism and interesting reporting¶ should not be confused with
academic rigor or scientific standards.¶ Within terrorism studies, there are sometimes no bounds to the
ingenuity of¶ experts, and at times, outright deception and fraud. Perhaps the most celebrated¶ and
outrageous case is that of the Frenchman, Alexis Debat, who managed to rise¶ from being a journalist reporter to the position
of Director of the Terrorism and¶ National Security Program at the Nixon Center in Washington DC, as well as¶ contributing editor to The
National Interest. In an extensive exposé by the French¶ news media Rue 89 in June 2007, it was revealed that Debat had made up several¶
bogus interviews with former US President Bill Clinton, former US Secretary of¶ State Colin Powell, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg,
Microsoft founder¶ Bill Gates, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and former UN¶ Secretary-General Kofi Annan, for the
French magazine, Politique internationale¶ (B. Ross, 2007).¶ After resigning from ABC News as a terrorism consultant, after it was discovered¶
he did not hold a PhD from Sorbonne University as he had claimed on his¶ résumé, a series of other claims also proved fraudulent, such as:
being a former¶ advisor to the French Ministry of Defence on Transatlantic Affairs; having been¶ Director of the Scientific Committee for the
Institut Montaigne (Paris); ‘working¶ on the largest manuscript ever written on the history of the Central Intelligence¶ Agency’; and working
with RAND, among many other cases (Bourcier and¶ Lesnes, 2007).¶ This ‘mythomaniac analyst’ case, as dubbed by Rue 89, casts a dark
shadow¶ over the terrorism studies field. The fact that Alexis Debat went unchallenged for¶ over five years in terms of faking interviews and
rising to prestigious academic¶ about the field of terrorism studies is ‘neither new nor unjustified’ (B. Hoffman, positions without postgraduate
research qualifications illustrates the case that there¶ is a real absence of critical rigor in questioning expertise and the way in which¶ work is
conducted and verified in a scientifically acceptable fashion. It would be¶ easy to disregard the Debat case as the exception rather than a trend
that negatively¶ exposes terrorism studies to criticism. Unfortunately, he is far from alone.¶ Another illuminating case is that of Evan
Kohlmann, who authored Al-Qaida’s¶ Jihad in Europe: The Afghan–Bosnian Network (2004). Considering himself an¶ academic and a ‘microhistorian’ (Mills, 2008), Kohlmann skillfully mastered the¶ ‘art of court diving’, volunteering to become an expert witness for the prosecution¶
where he gains access to all discovery material, which in turn, through snowballing¶ is reused in his analysis elsewhere. There is, of course,
nothing innately¶ wrong with this practice. However, as underscored by David Miller, Kohlmann¶ has risen almost without a trace. With no
expertise beyond an undergraduate¶ law degree and an internship at a dubious think-tank, he has become a consultant¶ to the US department
of defence, the department of justice, the FBI, the¶ Crown Prosecution Service, and Scotland Yard’s SO-15 Counter Terrorism¶ Command.¶
(Crace, 2008)¶ Subsequently, without any PhD degree in a cognate social science subject or few¶ publications in any peer-reviewed scholarly
journals, Kohlmann managed to¶ testify as an expert witness in at least ten federal terrorism trials in the US and in¶ six criminal (terrorism)
cases in Europe. In one terrorist trial, Kohlmann was put¶ forward as an expert witness on the Bangladeshi Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami¶ in
USA v. Aref and Hossain (Northern District of New York, 2006). However¶ under cross examination it transpired that he had never written any
papers¶ on the party, nor been interviewed about the group. He had never been to¶ Bangladesh, could not name the country’s Prime Minister
nor the name of¶ the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami.¶ (Mills, 2008)¶ Similarly, Kohlmann, who speaks some basic Arabic but has never been to¶
Afghanistan or Pakistan, appeared before the first Guantanamo military commission¶ in the case of Salim Hamdan (Bin Laden’s chauffeur) in
2008. In this case,¶ Kohlmann testified that the Office of Military Commission (OMC) had commissioned¶ him to produce a seven-part, ninetyminute video about the evolution of¶ al-Qaeda containing a select collage of violent images which he edited, produced,¶ and narrated himself
and which was shown at the trial and is planned to¶ be shown in subsequent Guantanamo military commissions. Handsomely paid¶ $45,000
for the film and his testimony, Kohlmann admitted that the OMC had¶ changed his proposed name of the film from the “Rise of al-Qaeda” to
“The¶ al-Qaeda Plan” in order to draw closer comparison to “The Nazi Plan’’, a¶ Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11 27¶ University of Exeter¶
famous documentary movie produced during the Nuremburg trials by the¶ US-led prosecution team.¶ (Muhammad Ally, 2008)¶ The fact that
the prosecution needs to rely on what they themselves describe as a¶ ‘self-made al-Qaeda expert’ as one of their principal witnesses,
undermines¶ severely the credibility of the proceedings and makes mockery of the principle of¶ scientific expertise. Furthermore, it should
bewilder most observers that a ‘selfmade¶ al-Qaeda expert’ becomes the custodian in the portrayal of the evolution of¶ al-Qaeda, rather than
seasoned scholars with superior knowledge and decades of¶ experience in the region. Probably the answer is simply a financially-driven
pliability¶ to stay on message for the prosecution that would not easily exist with a¶ reputable academic with his or her hard-earned
reputation at stake.¶ A principal problem with charlatans and self-proclaimed terrorism expertise in¶ a court of law setting is that ‘calling
expert witnesses in legal cases is predicated¶ on the assumption that the evidence given will be objective and factually correct –¶ governed by
the principle of professional, scientific neutrality’ (Crace, 2008). The¶ court records show contradictory evidence, as only a handful of selfproclaimed¶ experts become ‘hired guns’ for the prosecution without regard for any scientific¶ rigor or principles of impartiality.¶ One of the
most celebrated self-proclaimed al-Qaeda terrorism experts in the¶ post 9/11-period is Sri Lankan-born Rohan Gunaratna, author of Inside al
Qaeda,¶ who was paid $53,700 as the principal prosecution witness in USA v. Hassoun,¶ Jayyousi and Padilla at the United District Court in
Florida June/July 2007.¶ Dubbed by the British Observer as ‘probably the least reliable expert on¶ al-Qaeda’ (Bright, 2003), Gunaratna was
thoroughly exposed by the Australian¶ newspaper, The Age, as making dubious and incorrect claims about his numerous¶ affiliations (Hughes,
2003). Additionally, questions have been raised as to the¶ reasons why Gunaratna continues to downplay his role as a former researcher at¶ St
Andrews University when he otherwise engages in self-promotion about his¶ affiliations.¶ Gunaratna’s cavalier attitude and mockery of rigor in
academic research and¶ scholarship was evidently displayed during his testimony at the trial in 2007. His¶ testimony under oath claimed that it
was academically acceptable to use classified¶ sources that could not be identified or substantiated, because ‘if you name¶ that source, the
next week that source will be killed. So sometimes you cannot¶ identify a source . . . sometimes there is no opportunity for citations’ (USA v.¶
Adham Amin Hassoun, Kifah Wael Jayyousi, Jose Padilla, 2007a: 82–83).¶ At the same time, Gunaratna acknowledged under cross-examination
by the¶ defence lawyers that sound research and scholarship relied on three characteristics:¶ ‘accuracy, impartiality, honesty’ (ibid.: 99–100).
The problem with¶ Gunaratna’s approach to evidence through interviews is threefold, as explicitly¶ documented by the 2007 court testimony:
(1) it leaves scope to believe some¶ interviews were fabricated; (2) that he cannot locate them in time nor (broadly¶ without compromising
security) place; and (3) that the circumstances of his¶ 28 M. Ranstorp¶ University of Exeter¶ interviews were dubious at times, as they involved
tortured and imprisoned¶ terrorist suspects before their cases had gone through any court of law.¶ Contrary to the claim on the jacket of
Inside al Qaeda (a title ‘borrowed’¶ from Bruce Hoffman’s 1998 book, Inside Terrorism) where Gunaratna claims¶ he worked on al-Qaeda for
over five years prior to 9/11, it is clear that he began¶ working on the issue of Bin Laden and al-Qaeda in earnest only a few months¶ prior to
August 2001, when he published an article in Jane’s Intelligence Review¶ (Gunaratna, 2001). For four years prior to 9/11, he was a
postgraduate research¶ student at St Andrews University working on a thesis about Diaspora groups¶ which did not include any analysis of
militant Islamist movements; nor did he¶ during this time period claim any specialized expertise on Islam, the Middle¶ East, or Bin Laden. As
pointed out by Peter Cronau¶ a Sri Lankan, Gunaratna cut his teeth working for the Sri Lankan government¶ from 1984 to 1994 researching
and writing about the bloody Tamil¶ separatist conflict. Much of what he now writes he sees through the prism of¶ that conflict.¶ (Cronau,
2003: 202)¶ Without Arabic or Urdu language skills, Gunaratna claims to have visited the¶ Middle East region extensively in the past and to
have interviewed terrorists.¶ However, as admitted during the Padilla trial, he first visited Israel in 1999 or¶ 2000 and had never been to
Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Yemen, despite¶ the fact that he claims to have interviewed 200 terrorists for the book. When¶ pressed about
this in the 2007 Padilla trial, he admitted they were actually not¶ hardcore terrorists but rather ‘sympathizers.’¶ Another major revealing
discrepancy relates to Gunaratna’s belief that a¶ majority of interviews with these terrorists cited as anonymous sources in undisclosed¶
locations could be judged acceptable within sound and rigorous scholarly¶ standards. When pressed by the defense lawyers on the witness
stand, ‘a huge¶ number of sources in your book cannot be checked by other authorities unless¶ they have inside information from you?’ –
Gunaratna simply replied: ‘I agree’¶ (USA v. Adham Amin Hassoun, Kifah Wael Jayyousi, Jose Padilla, 2007a:¶ 158–159). The fact is that there is
no information at all about these sources¶ which would allow for some form of corroboration.¶ Under oath in testimony riddled with
contradictions and exaggerations,¶ Gunaratna revealed that he did not follow robust ethical codes of conduct or¶ concern for protecting
human subjects when interviewing terrorists. Specifically,¶ Gunaratna claims to have ‘debriefed’ terrorists in detention facilities without¶ them
having court proceedings and to have interviewed detainees who had been¶ tortured while in detention (ibid.: 178–179), sometimes for
research purposes and¶ at other times being ‘engaged in some projects for various governments’ (USA v.¶ Adham Amin Hassoun, Kifah Wael
Jayyousi, Jose Padilla, 2007b: 110–111). In¶ particular, Gunaratna has repeatedly used alleged CIA interrogation reports of¶ captured senior alQaeda operatives held in secret detention facilities, such as¶ Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11 29¶ University of Exeter¶ Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, as a source for scholarly articles, even though the¶ detainee was subjected to ‘hundreds of different (interrogation) techniques in
just¶ a two-week period soon after his capture’ (Mayer, 2008) in 2003. It is doubtful¶ that Gunaratna can produce these documents – if they
exist at all. Moreover, this¶ kind of unethical behavior and murky water seriously undermines not only the¶ credibility of Gunaratna, but also
casts a dark cloud over the entire terrorism¶ studies community as to the general perception of their ethical codes of conduct¶ during
interviews. Critically, the terrorism research community ought to ponder¶ why it is comfortable in using information gathered under torture.¶
Gunaratna also admitted that he worked very closely with a number of¶ intelligence services. As underscored by him in court testimony, ‘you
cannot¶ become a terrorism specialist unless you have access to government collectors’¶ (USA v. Adham Amin Hassoun, Kifah Wael Jayyousi,
Jose Padilla, 2007a:¶ 181–182). It is very clear that Gunaratna has never heeded or heard of the famous¶ advice by Schmid and Jongman that
researchers should not confuse their roles:¶ ‘his role is not to “fight” the terrorist fire; rather than a “firefighter’’, he should be¶ a student of
combustion’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 179). As an ‘embedded¶ academic’, Gunaratna admitted that there was no way of verifying
intelligence¶ information compared to information that had gone through a court of law (USA¶ v. Adham Amin Hassoun, Kifah Wael Jayyousi,
Jose Padilla, 2007a: 182–183).¶ Yet Gunaratna has repeatedly shown poor academic judgment, publishing an¶ article in Playboy magazine, as
well as in the number of many poorly substantiated¶ claims best exemplified by his contested testimony during the 9/11¶ Commission Hearing
when a senior CIA official came out contradicting his¶ claims (Carr, 2003). This is not to acknowledge that Gunaratna does offer some¶ useful
analysis; however, the principal problem remains that it is virtually¶ impossible to decipher what is fact or fiction from his research claims or to
triangulate¶ his sources. Less than scientific conduct has sullied and overshadowed¶ more substantive and scientifically more rigorous research
efforts. In fact, the¶ absence of scientific criticism of Gunaratna within the terrorism studies community¶ is not only ethically and scientifically
indefensible, but also illustrative of the¶ fact that the orthodox terrorism studies community is still relatively embryonic¶ and underdeveloped.
It also vividly shows that a world of mutually reinforced¶ camaraderie is often valued over scientific scrutiny of methods, theory, and data.¶ It
is also indicative that the terrorism research community frequently adopts a¶ common worldview, as it does not readily critique those who
produce arguments¶ that support accepted knowledge. In essence, this invisible college has lost track¶ of the fact that ‘strong research deals
with events critically, evaluates all potential¶ alternatives and arrives at a conclusion that is methodologically and empirically¶ sound’ (D. Jones,
2006).¶ Some
of the aforementioned ‘self-anointed’ terrorist experts are part of a growing phalanx of
what some have called ‘terrorologists’ (see George, 1991a;¶ Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989) ‘who sell a
toxic brew of cultural stereotypes and pop psychology packaged in pseudo-academic jargon’ (Ahmad,
2008). They¶ represent a minority within the terrorism studies field, but have had major¶ 30 M. Ranstorp¶
University of Exeter¶ visibility from media appearances and for their flagrant disregard for standard¶
scholarly and ethical codes of conduct. In some way, they have had an inverse¶ positive effect in
highlighting the crucial importance of ethical codes of conduct¶ when dealing with a complex social and
behavioral science such as terrorism¶ research. They also underscore that the terrorism studies field
has low or no barriers¶ of entry, unlike other social science areas where there is a high degree of¶
professionalisation and clearly regulated barriers of entry. As such, it is critical¶ that more established
and more credible terrorism scholars assume a greater¶ responsibility for the integrity of research
findings; they need to engage more¶ critically with colleagues who violate research standards, as they
would never let¶ their undergraduate students get away with this type of masquerading of evidence.¶
It is incumbent upon them that they challenge and expose dubious research¶ agendas and findings
rather than, as now, silently sweeping it under the carpet in¶ a bandwagon fashion.
Mainstream media uses fear mongering and generalizations to further Western state
power and counter insurgent agendas
Miller, professor at the University of Bath, and Mills, PhD candidate at the University
of Strathclyde, 09
[David, Tom, 11/25/09, Routledge, “The terror experts and the mainstream media: the expert nexus and
its dominance in the news media”, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17539150903306113,
accessed 6/26/13, VJ]
Terrorism experts are ubiquitous in mainstream media coverage of political violence. They provide
commentary and analysis and are used as a resource especially to fill news space in the absence of hard
information. But before the 1970s, there were very few academics who studied ‘terrorism’. War, revolution, political violence, social
movements, and counterinsurgency were all topics of some note in the social sciences – but not terrorism. Of course, ‘terrorism studies’
is not sharply divorced from such previous work. It emerges as an academic specialism from these topics and in particular from
the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, itself only forged in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to
decolonisation and the rise of the United States as a global superpower (Maechling 1988, Schlesinger 1978). The
ideas prominent in orthodox terrorism studies, and often the theorists themselves, have strong roots in counterinsurgency doctrine and
practice (Klare 1988, McClintock 1992). Orthodox
terrorism experts are, in other words, ideologically committed
and practically engaged in supporting Western state power. Of course, the defenders of the orthodoxy
deny this characterisation of their craft (Horgan and Boyle 2008), but as we will show, it is hard to draw any
evidentially based alternative conclusion. This paper reports the first findings of a study of the phenomenon of terrorism
expertise. 1 It focuses in particular on the relationship between the experts and the mainstream media
rather than on their relations with policy processes, the private sector, think-tanks and other private
institutes, the legal system, or directly with government, police or armed groups. These will be the subjects of
later work. Our analysis of the media is largely quantitative and is not intended to rehearse arguments about how and why the patterns that
emerge exist. Rather, we are interested here in questions about the relative status of the experts featured in the media, as compared with
other measures of their expertise such as citation or publication analysis. We
see terrorism knowledge not as some
ideologically neutral expertise on a natural phenomenon, but as being created to reflect the priorities
and values of certain social interests. The very existence of ‘terrorism experts’ promotes the idea that
the surface similarities between acts of violence provide a solid foundation for generalisations about
‘terrorism’, whatever the political or social context. We use the term ‘terrorologist’ to designate those writers whose main work is focused
explicitly on ‘terrorism’, as opposed to those active in area studies or in examining some other dimension or macro levels in which ‘terrorism’
might play a part (Herman and O’Sullivan 1989).
The form in which the mainstream media discursively constructs terrorism is fueled by
orthodox experts—they are merely expressions of the ideological needs of the state
Miller, professor at the University of Bath, and Mills, PhD candidate at the University
of Strathclyde, 09
[David, Tom, 11/25/09, Routledge, “The terror experts and the mainstream media: the expert nexus and
its dominance in the news media”, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17539150903306113,
accessed 6/26/13, VJ]
What does this analysis tell us? First, that the production of academic work and of media coverage of
terrorism has exponentially increased since 11 September 2001. Second, that those most cited in the
academic literature are not those most cited in the media. Indeed, many of the experts examined,
though they had written widely on terrorism, have not been as prominent as their number or rate of
citation of their publications would suggest. Third, the terror experts that are most prominent in the
media are disproportionately linked to corporate and state institutions (as opposed to just being
academic experts) and are overwhelmingly signed up to the ‘orthodox’ view on terrorism. This
obviously suggests a strong orientation by the mainstream media towards official definitions and shows
definitively that those who argue that the ‘terrorists’ effectively get their message across are wrong.
Fourth, the core of the network of orthodox experts is strongly connected and has been instrumental
in spreading the web of institutes and research centres across the world, where they now form a
nexus dominating the world of terrorism expertise, in relation to the mainstream media (as we show
here). Other research has shown that this nexus also dominates the terrorism literature. However, our
work indicates that though they have a dominant position and are arbiters for access to the main
journals, they are not the most highly ranked in terms of either numbers of publications or – most
notably – in terms of citations, the measure indicating the extent to which their work is cited across the
social sciences. Perhaps this signifies a waning of the centrality of the ‘invisible college’. Further analysis
of time-series data will answer this question. Lastly, the findings suggest that any theory that connected
the military–industrial complex with academic terrorism institutions and with the mainstream media
would not be short of data to substantiate the view that both the mainstream media and the terror
experts are well integrated into state and corporate ideological management processes. It is important
to recognise, in other words, that the terror experts are not simply expressions of the ideological
needs of state and corporate actors, but are actually a functional part of the governing nexus. In this
context, the characterisation by James Petras (2004) that although the orthodox experts are mostly ‘far
from the killing fields’ their ‘spirit’ is ‘there, on the front lines and in the torture chambers’, does not
seem so wide off the mark.
No Barrier to Entry/Terror Expert Indict
Anyone can become a terrorist expert over-night saturating the field of terrorism
studies with invalid theories fragmenting our knowledge.
Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric¶ Threat Studies at the
Swedish National Defence College, 9
(Magnus, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p. 14-15, AS)
Another exceptionally perceptive explanation offered to account for the¶ absence of introspective
critiques within the terrorism studies field is made by¶ Lisa Stampnitzky. Convincingly, she argues that
this absence is due to the fact¶ there are no barriers of entry to the terrorism studies field and ‘that a
high proportion of those writing on the topic have no significant background in the topic’
(Stampnitzky, 2007a). Unlike area studies or more professionally specialized social scientific disciplines
where there is greater rigor in peer-review practices and professionalized barriers of entry, any
retrained Soviet specialist or international relations generalist can in theory and practice become a
specialized terrorism ‘expert’ overnight. As outlined by Andrew Silke, there were 490 articles in the
two core terrorism studies journals in the period 1990–9 with 83 percent written by one-time authors
(Silke, 2003). The transitory nature of the field of terrorism studies can provide the seeds of¶ intellectual
vitality. However, it can also be a major drawback as very few onetime¶ contributors are ambitious
enough to critique the field of study or command¶ enough knowledge to do so. The case made by
Stampnitzky about no or low¶ barriers of entry into terrorism studies is supported by Avishai Gordon’s
study¶ that suggests that ‘core journals in terrorism studies had significantly higher¶ rates of
contributions from non-academic authors than journals in political¶ science or communication studies’
(Gordon, 2001). Hence, even journalists, like¶ Peter Bergen, without PhD or social scientific training in
methodology or theory but with privileged access from the terror frontlines, have become the new
form of ‘pseudo-academic’ terrorism expert. As noted by Stampnitzky,¶ terrorism expertise is
constructed and negotiated in an interstitial space¶ between academia, the state, and the media. The
boundaries of legitimate¶ knowledge and expertise are particularly open to challenges from selfproclaimed¶ experts from the media and political fields, and this has had¶ significant consequences for
the sort of expert discourses that tend to be¶ produced and disseminated. The terrorism studies field
relies on peer-review as a means of quality control, but suffers from the very absence that drives
academic knowledge forward – against-the-grain theories and rigorous intellectual debates and
critiques¶ among scholars. Much of the literature does not engage with alternative¶ schools of thought
or theory-building. The majority of debate is currently occurring¶ in book review sections and rarely
encompasses rigorous critique of the¶ validity of theories or methodology. However, even where
articles are peer reviewed,¶ the peers reviewing may lack the expertise, as so much ‘terrorism¶
knowledge’ is fragmented. Few terrorism experts are really qualified to authoritatively¶ comment on
the internal structures of different terrorist groups across¶ different contexts. However, as pointed out
by Ken Booth: ‘diversity and debate¶ is not therefore a problem for Terrorism Studies, but a sign of life’
(Booth, 2008:¶ 67). It is essentially in the post-9/11 era that these types of essential and major¶ academic
debates have been surfacing with widely different schools of thought.¶ Many of these debates have
been sparked as a response to the construction of¶ databases and from these have emerged analyses
that go against the grain of¶ widely-held assumptions and challenge the main orthodoxy.
No Primary Sources
Terrorist research utilizes mainly secondary sources thus current studies generate no
new information but serve to only complement established conclusions.
Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric¶ Threat Studies at the
Swedish National Defence College, 9
(Magnus, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p. 17, AS)
Evidence-based research should be at the core of terrorism research. As argued¶ by Sageman: ‘there is
no substitute for careful scrutiny of primary sources, field¶ research, and analysis of court documents (in
which suspected terrorists challenge¶ government claims)’ (ibid.). The pre-9/11 literature on terrorism
has been criticized¶ for its over-reliance on recycled secondary sources and for academics being¶
ensconced in ivory towers, instead of field research and talking to actual terrorists.¶ As Andrew Silke
showed, only roughly eleven percent of articles published in the¶ period 1990–9 contained significant
amounts of primary source interviews; the¶ majority of articles relied exclusively on secondary sources
(Silke, 2003). A principal¶ problem with relying only on secondary material is naturally that no new¶
information is generated, thereby complementing existing knowledge rather than¶ pushing the
research envelope in new directions. At the same time, terrorism¶ researchers ought to be cautious
about the scientific limits of relying on, and¶ drawing over-generalised conclusions from, interviews with
terrorists or former¶ terrorists, especially when matched from different contexts, different degrees of¶
involvement, and under different interview conditions. Some useful and limited¶ insights can be made as
long as the methodology is sound, as illustrated by John¶ Horgan’s interviews (since 2006) with twentyeight former terrorists spanning¶ thirteen organizations (including five extremist Islamist groups) about
why they¶ left the groups (Ripley, 2008). Similarly, Jeroen Gunning’s use of interviews in¶ shedding
further light on Hamas’s inner workings and the ideological framework¶ of its members is another useful
illustration of where primary research can unearth¶ new and significant knowledge (Gunning, 2007c).
Event-Driven
Terrorism research resembles a game in which children are rushing after a ball
without a strategy. The failure to create comprehensive terrorist studies rests upon an
orthodox disregard for developing definitional theories in favor of an event-driven
approach.
Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric¶ Threat Studies at the
Swedish National Defence College, 9
(Magnus, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p. 18, AS)
After 9/11, the shift of terrorism studies to center stage is visible in many¶ ways. Scattered disciplinary
expertise across departments in universities is often¶ knitted together to create new centers of terrorism
expertise, degree programs, or¶ on-line degrees (Attwood, 2007). This trend, however, is problematic
since there¶ are few evaluation mechanisms or comparative reviews about the quality and¶ methods
of teaching terrorism studies within the field itself. As such, the orthodoxy¶ of terrorism studies often
prevails, as students are consuming a digest of¶ the same standard introductory texts that rarely
challenge conventional wisdom¶ or provide new analytical angles or challenging perspectives. In the
long-term,¶ this paucity will stymie the intellectual vibrancy of the terrorism studies field. In¶ short, there
is no ‘gold standard’ of what constitutes the appropriate pathway to¶ terrorism studies.¶ The steady
proliferation of terrorism publications after 9/11 has not necessarily¶ increased a balanced analytical
focus. According to Andrew Silke, excessive¶ focus on suicide terrorism has contributed to skewing the
research focus on¶ certain issues at the peril of ignoring other forms of terrorism and in different¶
historical, political, and social contexts other than the contemporary Arab world¶ or south Asia (Silke,
2004c). Conceptual issues such as the definitional debate¶ and the history of terrorism continue to be
largely ignored. A key problem is that¶ current terrorism research efforts can be compared to a game of
children’s football¶ where all the players are rushing after the ball (the latest terrorism trends) ¶
without a strategy, rather than marking different players or utilizing different¶ areas of the pitch.¶
Although recent years have seen some major leaps in the quantity, and to¶ some extent, quality of
research output, terrorism studies research suffers from¶ serious shortcomings as it needs to further
develop theoretically and methodologically.¶ As authoritatively argued by terrorism studies doyenne
Martha Crenshaw,¶ the problem is that the field¶ is probably still plagued by the enduring challenges
posed by a lack of¶ definition (what terrorism constitutes); the inability to build a cohesive¶ integrated
and cumulative theory (built around larger data-sets and over¶ longer time periods) and the eventdriven character of much research.
Inflated Threat- WMDs
The research agenda has become excessively concerned with Al-Qaeda, suicidebombing and WMD’s that studies fail to take into account the polymorphous nature of
terrorist organizations causing a re-iteration of the same assumptions which guts any
hope of an effective theoretical analysis of terrorism.
Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric¶ Threat Studies at the
Swedish National Defence College, 9
(Magnus, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p.23-24, AS)
By contrast, in 2007 alone, almost half of all articles (thirty-nine of eighty)¶ were devoted to al-Qaeda or
a 9/11-related topic such as martyrdom, suicidebombings,¶ or Muslim extremism. In fact, some have
argued that the research¶ agenda has disproportionately inflated the focus on certain topics such as¶
al-Qaeda, suicide-bombing, and the threat of WMD (chemical, biological, radiological,¶ nuclear, and
explosive weapons (CBRNE)) terrorism. And yet, few studies¶ exist on the polymorphous nature of alQaeda that capture the way different layers¶ are structured and connected to each other and the way
the regional and local affiliations¶ interact with core al-Qaeda elements and to different conflict zones
(see¶ Byman, 2007; Baaker and Boer, 2007). While it is true that ‘terrorism exists as a¶ rhizome, it is
inherently nomadic’ (Anselmi et al., 2004), this has meant that¶ al-Qaeda means simultaneously
everything and nothing – a catch-all phrase for¶ trying to describe complexity and anything unknown.
Similarly, as argued by Gary¶ Ackerman, the WMD studies literature has reached something of an
‘interpretative¶ impasse’, in which terrorism researchers reiterate the same stale assumptions and¶ mix
different CBRN agents indiscriminately with each other and without regard¶ for the specificity of
context (Ackerman, 2005).¶ The analytical overexposure on al-Qaeda-related topics is matched by a¶
paucity of work on the history of terrorism and theoretical/conceptual aspects.¶ Only six articles were
published on aspects relating to terrorism prior to the¶ 1960s in the period 2000–7, which illustrates the
tendency of terrorism studies¶ ‘towards a-historicity, presuming that “terrorism” began on 11
September 2001¶ and ignoring the historical experiences of numerous countries and the already¶
burgeoning literature on “terrorism” published prior to 2001’ (Breen Smyth,¶ 2007: 260). Similarly,
there were only seven articles on definitional aspects in¶ this same time period, whereas there were only
one or two articles addressing¶ major theoretical dimensions in understanding terrorism. David Leheny is
one of¶ the few academics who have argued that Constructivism, through the role of¶ symbolism,
strategic signaling, and social movement theory, could be a useful¶ vehicle to more closely connect the
sphere of international relations theory with terrorism studies (Leheny, 2002: 57–70). Alexander
Spencer argues that the two¶ core journals in terrorism studies do not ‘contain articles that are directly
concerned¶ about applying international relations (IR) theory to terrorism and a brief¶ look at six leading
IR theory journals seems to confirm this trend’ (Spencer,¶ 2006: 181). At the same time, he points out
that international terrorism is part of¶ the discipline of international relations (ibid.). This theoretical
lacuna has meant¶ that few terrorism researchers have applied any theoretical approach explicitly¶ or
robustly and, similarly, methods are sparingly discussed or applied rigorously¶ in most studies on
terrorism. In other words, there is little self-conscious,¶ sophisticated engagement with theoretical
developments elsewhere and even¶ less rigorous application of explicitly visible methodologies by the
terrorism¶ research community as a whole.¶ As perceptively pointed out by Jeroen Gunning, this
theoretical paucity can be¶ explained by the fact that many ‘who publish elsewhere do not wish to be
identified¶ with “terrorism studies” ’ (Gunning, 2007a: 380). Very few heavyweight IR¶ scholars or
Middle East studies specialists elect to publish in any of the two core¶ terrorism studies journals. As
argued by Gunning, the reasons may be the contested¶ nature of the concept itself and the belief –
widespread outside ‘terrorism¶ studies’ – that ‘terrorism studies’ is a ‘theoretically barren’ and
ideologically¶ compromised field (ibid.: 381). In other words, it can probably be attributed to¶ the fact
that many non-specialists are turned off by the political bias and analytical¶ shallowness on offer (see
also Raphael, this volume), as they often complain¶ that similar empirical tapestries are woven together
without much reference to¶ other literature, critical debates, or interviews in the field with actual
terrorists.¶ A principal reason for the absence of overarching theories and methods is that¶ terrorism is
characterized by contradictory assumptions underpinning different¶ levels of units of analysis and
across different disciplines within social sciences.¶ It is situated awkwardly between the often clashing
ontologies and epistemologies¶ that are used by different subjects and disciplines. As underscored by
Vallis,¶ Yang and Abbass’s extensive review of the social science literature on terrorism,¶ some of the
findings of research into the political, social and cultural bases of¶ terrorism is contradictory. That is to
say, political science views of terrorism¶ as a form of instrumental rational choice contradict
psychological and social¶ explanations of terrorism that view terrorism as a ‘product’ rather than
choice.¶ (Vallis et al., 2007)¶ An important conclusion derived from this research review is that a
multidisciplinary¶ analysis is critically needed and that integration of ‘the group, individual¶ and societal
levels’ offers a robust approach, while focus on terrorism decisionmaking¶ ‘processes’ and rational
choice theories ‘offered the highest level of¶ prediction and causal explanation’ (ibid.; see also Gunning
in this volume).
The terrorist threat is exaggerated as is the threat of a state sponsoring terrorism yet
the US continues to engage in unproductive studies and counterproductive
approaches to understand and stop terror which makes the critical destabilization of
conventional terrorism studies necessary to pursuing more effective alternatives.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,,
p.76-7, AS)
Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that the threat of terrorism to¶ Western or
international security is vastly over-exaggerated (see Jackson, 2007c;¶ Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a
number of scholars have convincingly argued¶ that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of
mass destruction is in fact,¶ miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states¶
would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously¶ questioned the
notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through¶ reasoned argument that the
continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are¶ much greater than any differences. In particular,
they show how the assertion that¶ the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is
largely unsupported¶ by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion¶ that ‘new
terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians.¶ Third, considering the key narratives about
the origins and causes of terrorism,¶ studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of
a ‘terrorist¶ personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in¶ terrorism
(Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide¶ bombers are primarily driven
by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’¶ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see
Sageman, 2004).¶ More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on¶ the
broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and,¶ specifically, the link
between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide¶ Terrorism for example, which compiled a
database on every case of suicide terrorism¶ from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that
‘there is little connection¶ between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the¶
world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key findings of the study include:¶ only about half of the
suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group¶ or individual characteristics with Islamic
fundamentalism; the leading practitioners¶ of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil
Tigers, who committed¶ seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be¶
found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks¶ can be shown to be
part of a broader political and military campaign which has a¶ secular and strategic goal, namely, to end
what is perceived as foreign occupation¶ (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s findings are
supported by other¶ studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom,¶
2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005).¶ Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest
that force-based¶ approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive,¶ 76
R. Jackson¶ University of Exeter¶ but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human
rights (see¶ Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made¶ against the
use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004;¶ Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number
of studies which are highly critical of the¶ efficacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see,
among many¶ others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006).¶ In sum, much of what is accepted as
unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism¶ studies is actually of dubious provenance. In a major review
of the field, Andrew¶ Silke has described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach¶
extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004b: 20). However,¶ the purpose of the first
order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to¶ establish the real and final ‘truth’ about
terrorism. Rather, first order critique aims¶ simply to destabilise dominant understandings and
accepted knowledge, expose¶ the biases and imbalances in the field, and suggest that other ways of
understanding,¶ conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are¶ possible.
This kind of critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space¶ needed to ask new kinds of
analytical and normative questions and to pursue¶ alternative intellectual and political projects.
“Islamic” Terrorism
Terrorist studies are excessively focused on religious extremism or psychological
abnormality instead of more pertinent criteria such as political, cultural, and
sociological factors.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,,
p.72-3, AS)
A surprising number of terrorism studies texts promote the view that the roots and¶ causes of
terrorism lie in individual psychological abnormality, and religious or¶ ideological extremism
engendered through processes of ‘radicalisation’. Although¶ theories of individual psychopathology
among terrorists have fallen out of favour¶ among most leading scholars in recent years, the notion that
terrorist behaviour is¶ rooted in the personality defects of individuals remains close to the surface of
most¶ texts, not least in the notion that weak-minded, uneducated, or emotionally vulnerable¶ young
Muslims fall prey to indoctrination and brainwashing – so-called ‘radicalisation’¶ – by terrorist recruiters
operating through madrasahs, radical mosques,¶ or extremist internet sites (see Haqqani, 2002). Related
to this, it is not uncommon¶ to find texts which argue that ‘Islamic’ suicide bombers are primarily
young men¶ driven by sexual frustration and impotence. In a much-cited text on contemporary¶
‘religious terrorism’ for example, Mark Juergensmeyer states that ‘the young¶ bachelor self-martyrs in
the Hamas movement .. . expect that the blasts that kill¶ them will propel them to a bed in heaven where
the most delicious acts of¶ sexual consummation will be theirs for the taking’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000:
201). In¶ any case, such narratives construct the accepted knowledge that terrorists are¶ different and
abnormal and, more importantly, that their actions are rooted in their¶ personalities rather than other
factors related to their political situation, strategic¶ calculation or experiences of oppression and
humiliation. During the cold war, many terrorism studies texts suggested that the roots and¶ causes of
terrorism lay within communist ideology and the direct involvement of¶ the Soviet Union (see Raphael,
this volume). Claire Sterling’s (1981) popular¶ book, The Terror Network, for example, posited the
existence of a global terrorist¶ network sponsored by the Soviets that was behind many of the
revolutionary¶ and anti-colonial movements. As Sam Raphael illustrates in this volume, a great¶ many of
the leading terrorism studies scholars at the time subscribed to the¶ ‘Soviet network theory’ of
terrorism.¶ In many ways, the cold war focus on left-wing ideology was replaced by what¶ is now a vast
and growing literature on the religious origins of terrorism, particularly¶ as it relates to Islam (see
Jackson, 2007a). Based on David Rapoport’s (1984)¶ initial formulation of ‘religious terrorism’, the
discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’¶ argues that the roots and causes of much of the al-Qaeda-related
terrorism today¶ can be found in ‘Islamic extremism’. Walter Laqueur for example, suggests that¶ while
there is ‘no Muslim or Arab monopoly in the field of religious fanaticism . . .¶ the frequency of Muslimand Arab-inspired terrorism is still striking’ (Laqueur,¶ 1999: 129). Similarly, a prominent
counterterrorism think tank publication argues¶ that ‘in the Islamic world one cannot differentiate
between the political violence of¶ Islamic groups and their popular support derived from religion . . . the
present¶ terrorism on the part of the Arab and Muslim world is Islamic in nature’ (Paz,¶ 1998, emphasis
added). Marc Sageman argues in relation to al-Qaeda: ‘Salafi¶ ideology determines its mission, sets its
goals, and guides its tactics’ (Sageman,¶ 2004: 1). In sum, and similar to narratives of individual deviance,
these narratives¶ construct the widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that contemporary terrorism is primarily¶
rooted in and caused by religious extremism and fanaticism, and not in rational¶ calculation or other
political, cultural, and sociological factors.
Solvency
Terrorism Discourse Shapes Reality
US governmental control over terror discourse allows it to continue terror atrocities,
while those who criticize it are regularly discredited. It has become mainstream, not
just within the media, but also among intellectual circles. This has resulted in a
situation where the left doesn’t question the legitimacy of US violence, but merely
critique the method it is carried out.
Chomsky, Institute Professor and Professor (Emeritus) in the Department of Linguistics
& Philosophy at MIT, 03
Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor and Professor (Emeritus) in the Department of Linguistics &
Philosophy at MIT, 2003, “Commentary: moral truisms, empirical evidence, and foreign policy” , Review
of International Studies (2003), 29, P. 605–620, http://mail.chomsky.info/articles/200310--.pdf,
accessed 6-27-13, Fontana
Whether attacking ‘soft targets’ is right or wrong, terrorism or a noble cause, depends on who is the
agent, at least if moral truisms are deemed irrelevant, along with unwanted facts that have been
‘disappeared’. Kinsley was breaking no new ground. At the critical end of the spectrum of elite
discussion, doves opposed terror because it was failing and urged Washington to adopt more efficient
means to return Nicaragua to ‘the Central American mode’ and compel it to observe ‘regional
standards’: the standards of Washington’s terror states El Salvador and Guatemala, then engaged in
large-scale slaughter, torture, and destruction. All of this passed without comment within the
mainstream. Is there even a remote possibility that it might be recalled as the ‘war on terror’ is
redeclared, along with the virtual destruction of Nicaragua and much of the rest of Central America
during the first phase’? Could anyone even recall who the enemy was in Central America? To their
credit, some do: the School of the Americas (since renamed), which trains Latin American officers,
proudly proclaims that ‘liberation theology’ in Latin America ‘was defeated with the assistance of the
U.S. Army’.38 The chilling reference will be understood at once by those who care about moral truism
and fact. Herring and Robinson quote Daniel Hallin’s statement that there was ‘a real political contest
over the framing of the Central America story’ in the media. As they observe, the crucial question is how
the contest was framed. The matter has been studied.39 There was a roughly even split between
‘hawks’ and ‘doves’, all agreeing that the ‘Central American mode’ must be supported and that
Nicaragua must be compelled to adhere to it, but differing on the means. The doves I have just cited. Nicaragua
was of course not the first target of US terror aimed at ‘regime change’. Another well-known and
instructive example is Cuba. From the declassified record, we learn that plans for regime change were
in the works within months after Castro took power in January 1959, and were formally adopted in secret in March 1960,
with full awareness of the strong Cuban support for the targeted government and the virtual irrelevance, at the time, of meaningful Cold War
issues.40 By then, US terrorist operations were already underway.
In May 1959, the CIA began arming anti-Castro guerrillas
the Winter of 1959–1960, there was a significant increase in CIA-supervised bombing
and incendiary raids piloted by exiled Cubans’ based in the US.42 Cuba provided extensive details of
such attacks to the Security Council in July 1960, though no action was taken in the face of vigorous
US denials – falsehoods, as the internal record now reveals.43 The international terrorist programme
was sharply escalated by Kennedy. After the Bay of Pigs invasion was beaten back, Kennedy ‘asked his brother, Attorney-General
Robert Kennedy, to lead the top-level interagency group that oversaw Operation Mongoose, a programme of paramilitary
operations, economic warfare, and sabotage he launched in late 1961 to visit the “terrors of the
earth” on Fidel Castro and, more prosaically, to topple him’.44 The reasons are explained in the internal record.
inside Cuba.41 ‘During
Washington planners warned in early 1964 that ‘the very existence of [Castro’s] regime . . . represents a successful defiance of the US, a
negation of our whole hemispheric policy of almost a century and a half’ – based on subordination to US will.45 Three years earlier the CIA had
concluded that ‘The extensive influence of “Castroism” is not a function of Cuban power’; ‘Castro’s shadow looms large because social and
economic conditions throughout Latin America invite opposition to ruling authority and encourage agitation for radical change.’46 Shortly
before, Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger had transmitted to the incoming President the report of his Latin American Mission, which warned
of ‘the spread of the Castro idea of taking matters into one’s own hands’. That is a grave danger, Schlesinger elaborated shortly after, when
‘The distribution of land and other forms of national wealth greatly favors the propertied classes . . . [and] The poor and underprivileged,
stimulated by the example of the Cuban revolution, are now demanding opportunities for a decent living.’ Russia was mentioned: as a source of
economic aid and a model of rapid industrialisation.47 A similar pattern is commonly found when ‘public diplomacy’ is discounted and the
internal planning record examined: Guatemala in 1954, to take an example then prominently in the minds of planners. Kennedy’s terrorist
programme was intensified in August–September 1962, including speedboat strafing attacks on a Cuban seaside hotel ‘where Soviet military
technicians were known to congregate, killing a score of Russians and Cubans’; attacks on British and Cuban cargo ships; contaminating sugar
shipments; and other atrocities and sabotage, mostly carried out by Cuban exile organisations permitted to operate freely in Florida with
extensive CIA support, sometimes direct participation.48 These actions were a significant, perhaps primary, factor leading to the missile
crisis.49 Kennedy
resumed the international terrorist operations after the crisis ended; ten days before his
assassination, he authorised new actions.50 Terrorist operations peaked in the late 1970s, and continued from US soil into the
late 1990s.51 Cuba’s crimes became still more immense when it served as the instrument of the USSR’s crusade to dominate the world in 1975,
Washington proclaimed. ‘If Soviet necolonialism succeeds’ in Angola, UN Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan thundered, ‘the world will not
be the same in the aftermath. Europe’s oil routes will be under Soviet control as will the strategic South Atlantic, with the next target on the
Kremlin’s list being Brazil.’ Washington’s fury was caused by another Cuban act of ‘successful defiance’. When a
US-backed South African invasion was coming close to conquering newly-independent Angola, Cuba sent troops on its own initiative, scarcely
even notifying Russia, and beat back the invaders. In reaction, Piero Gleijeses observes, ‘Kissinger did his best to smash the one movement that
represented any hope for the future of Angola,’ the MPLA. And though the MPLA ‘bears a grave responsibility for its country’s plight’ in later
years, it was ‘the relentless hostility of the United States [that] forced it into an unhealthy dependence on the Soviet bloc and encouraged
South Africa to launch devastating military raids in the 1980s’, which reversed the gains in the early years of independence and drove the
country to ruin, along with Mozambique, another remarkable illustration of international terrorism – if not worse – relying on the crucial
support of those who are now waging the second phase of the ‘war on terror’.52 The
terrorist attacks against Cuba have been
devastating to a poor society in the shadow of the dominant superpower, particularly when combined
with the effects of economic warfare – which became even harsher after the collapse of the Soviet
pretext. All of this is another illustration of the continuity that Stokes discusses.53 In October 2002, a summit meeting took place in Havana
on the fortieth anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis, attended by key participants from Russia, the US, and Cuba. Startling information was
revealed: the world was saved from possibly terminal nuclear war by a Russian submarine commander who countermanded an order to fire
nuclear-armed missiles when the subs were under attack by US destroyers at the tensest moment of the missile crisis – ‘the most dangerous
moment in human history’, Arthur Schlesinger observed, realistically. The current Iraq crisis ‘was a recurrent theme at the meeting’, the press
reported, ‘with many participants accusing Bush of ignoring history . . . [saying] they had come to make sure it does not happen again, and to
offer lessons for today’s crises, most notably President George W. Bush’s deliberations about whether to strike Iraq.’54 The ‘age
of
terror’, ‘international terrorism’, and ‘regime change’ were the leading themes of the day as the summit
took place. The shocking revelations were scarcely reported; the background entirely ignored. Similarly,
the record of those currently at the helm in Washington – mostly recycled from the Reagan-Bush
administrations – is regularly ignored. That is remarkable: whatever one’s attitude towards the ‘age of
terror,’ elementary sanity would seem to dictate that the record of those leading the ‘war on terror’
during its first phase should be a prominent concern. Occasional allusions to the record are either
ignored or lead to interesting reactions, among them, attribution of idiotic claims either to an
anonymous ‘left’ or to enemies chosen in the manner that Herring and Robinson describe. The practice is so routine that
illustrations can be selected virtually at random. To take one illustration from a serious source at the liberal-left extreme, Benjamin Barber
writes that ‘unless we are willing to join the America-bashing zanies who see no difference between the United States and Iraq, who insist
America, too, is a “terrorist” state, we must acknowledge the president’s preemptive unilateralism as our own.’55 Perhaps
there is
someone in the world who sees no difference between the US and Iraq. Those who recognise that
America is a terrorist state (not a ‘terrorist’ state) are simply repeating well-established truths that do
not vanish because they are doctrinally inadmissible56; the familiar cases just noted, for example.
Consider the idea that ‘we must acknowledge the president’s preemptive unilateralism as our own’;
more accurately, preventive unilateralism, since no credible threat is considered necessary under the
proclaimed doctrine. Must others do so for themselves as well? If so, what happens to the world? If not,
why not? If raised, the question receives a simple answer: what we do is right and just, a refrain not
unfamiliar in history
The US is the largest terrorist state, a rogue state – but its control over status squo
terror discourse ensures it will never be labeled as such. The left can’t escape the
hegemonic definitions and frames of discourse, meaning pragmatism fails; we must
form a radical resistance to ALL terror by contesting the discourse that frames the U.S.
as victims of terror, not terrorists and sponsors of terror.
Herman, Professor Emeritus @ Wharton, and Peterson, independent journalist, 01
[Edward S. Herman, Professor Emeritus of Finance at the Wharton School, and David Peterson,
independent journalist, 10-18-2001, ZNET, “Who Terrorizes Whom?”,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/HER110A.html, accessed 6/26/13, Fontana]
One of the marks of exceptional hegemonic power is the ability to define words and get issues framed
in accord with your own political agenda. This is notorious at this moment in history as regards
"terrorism" and "antiterrorism."¶ Since the September 11 attacks, two truths have been indisputable and universally reported.
One is that the hijacker bombings of the World Trade Center and Pentagon were atrocities of a monumental and spectacular scale (and media
coverage of that day's events alone may have generated more words and graphic images than any other single event in recent history). A
second truth is that the bombings were willful acts of terrorism, accepting the basic and widely agreed-upon definition of terrorism as "the use
of force or the threat of force against civilian populations to achieve political objectives." And let us also recognize that "sponsorship of
terrorism" means organizing, and/or underwriting and providing a "safe harbor" to state or nonstate agents who terrorize.¶ But
there is a
third indisputable truth, although much less understood, let alone universally reported: namely, that
from the 1950s the United States itself has been heavily engaged in terrorism, and has sponsored,
underwritten, and protected other terrorist states and individual terrorists. In fact, as the greatest and
now sole superpower, the United States has also been the world's greatest terrorist and sponsor of
terror. Right now this country is supporting a genocidal terrorist operation against Iraq via "sanctions
of mass destruction" and regular bombing attacks to achieve its political objectives; it is underwriting
the army and paramilitary forces in Colombia, who openly terrorize the civilian population; and it
continues to give virtually unconditional support to an Israeli state that has been using force to achieve
its political objectives for decades. The United States has terrorized or sponsored terror in Nicaragua,
Brazil, Uruguay, Cuba, Guatemala, Indonesia/East Timor, Zaire, Angola, South Africa, and elsewhere.
And it stands alone in both using and brandishing the threat to use nuclear weapons. It has for many
years provided a safe harbor to the Cuban refugee terror network, and it has done the same for a
whole string of terrorists in flight from, among other places, El Salvador, Haiti, Vietnam, and even Nazi
Germany (see Christopher Simpson's Blowback).¶ Even in its response to the September 11 terrorist events the
United States resorted instantly to its own terrorism. Ignoring legal niceties--despite its supposed devotion to
the "rule of law"- -the United States immediately began to threaten to "take out" states harboring
terrorists, threatened the Afghans with bombing--itself an act of terrorism--and by such threats succeeded in blocking the
flow of food supplies to a starving population, which is yet another act of terrorism, and a major one. (A spokesman for Oxfam International
stationed in Islamabad recently stated that "Prior to this crisis, the World Food Program, with the help of Oxfam and other groups, was feeding
3.7 million [Afghan] people. But with the onset of the bombing campaign, this has stopped as the aid workers have been force to withdraw. The
airdrops will--at their very best--feed 130,000 people," or only 3.5 percent of those facing winter and starvation). On
October 7 the
United States then began to bomb this impoverished country--not just a further act of terrorism, but
the crime of aggression.¶ All serious observers recognize that the U.S. actions against Afghanistan have and will cause many, many
more deaths than the 6,000 killed in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. But U.S. power and self-righteousness,
broadcast and justified to the whole world by a subservient media machine, assure that what the
United States does will neither be called terrorism, nor aggression, nor elicit indignation remotely
comparable to that expressed over the events of September 11--however well its actions fit the
definitions. The same bias extends to other Western countries, diminishing in scope and intensity from Britain to the others, and
weakening further in the Third World. In the Middle East, for most of the population the bias disappears and U.S. terrorism is called by its right
name, although the U.S.-dependent governments toe their master's line, if nervously. In
these more remote areas the press
speaks a different language, calling the United States a "rogue state par excellence repeatedly defying
international rulings whether by the World Court or by U.N. resolutions when they have not suited its
interests" and a "bandit sheriff" (The Hindu, India), and speaking of this as an "age of Euro-American
tyranny" with tyrants who are merely "civilized and advanced terrorists" (Ausaf, Pakistan).¶ But another sad
fact is that in this country, and Britain as well, even the Left has trouble escaping the hegemonic
definitions and frames. Leftists here regularly discuss the terrorism issue starting from the premise
that the United States is against terrorism and that the issue is how the U.S. government can best deal
with the problem. They are worried that the United States will go about solving the problem too aggressively, will seek vengeance, not
justice. So they propose lawful routes, such as resort to the United Nations and International Court of Justice; and they urge seeking
cooperation from the Arab states to crush terrorists within their own states. They discuss how bin Laden money routes can be cut off. Some of
them even propose that the United States and its allies intervene not to bomb, but to build a new society in Afghanistan, engage in "nationbuilding", as the popular phrase puts it, in the spirit of the Kosovo "new humanitarian" intervention.¶ While
some of these
proposals are meritorious, we haven't seen any that discuss how a "coalition of the willing" might be
formed to bring the United States under control, to force it to stop using and threatening violence, to
compel it and its British ally to cease terrorizing Iraq, and to make it stop supporting terrorist states like
Colombia, Turkey, Indonesia, and Israel. Or to make U.S. funding of its terrorist operations more
difficult! The hegemon defines the main part of the agenda--who terrorizes--and the debate is over
how he and his allies should deal with those he identifies as terrorist.¶ A good illustration of this Left
accommodationism is displayed in the "New Agenda to Combat Terrorism," recently issued by the Institute for Policy Studies and
Interhemispheric Resource Center in their Foreign Policy in Focus series. Nowhere
in this document is it suggested that the
United States is itself a terrorist state, sponsor of terrorism, or safe harbor of terrorists, although it is
acknowledged that this country has supported "repressive regimes." "Repressive" is softer and less
invidious than "terrorist." The report refers to the "destructive and counterproductive economic
sanctions on Iraq," but doesn't suggest that this constitutes terrorism. In fact, "destructive" sounds like
buildings knocked down and fails to capture the fact of a million or more human casualties. The recent
publicity given the U.S.'s deliberate destruction of the Iraqi water supply also suggests something more than "destructive and
counterproductive" is needed to properly describe U.S. policy toward that country (Thomas Nagy, "The Secret Behind the Sanctions: How the
U.S. Intentionally Destroyed Iraq's Water Supply," The Progressive, September 2001). Nowhere does the IPS/IRC document mention Colombia,
Turkey or Indonesia, where the United States is currently supporting "repressive regimes."¶ This
practice of leaning over
backwards to downplay the U.S. terrorist role merges into serious misreadings of ongoing events: for
example, the New Agenda claims that one effect of September 11 was that "defense policy was redefined as defending America and Americans
rather than as force projection." This takes as gospel official propaganda claims, when in fact September 11 has given the proponents of force
projection just the excuse they need to project force, which they are doing under the guise of antiterrorism. As John Pilger notes, "The ultimate
goal is not the capture of a fanatic, which would be no more than a media circus, but the acceleration of western imperial power" (New
Statesman, Oct. 15, 2001). And discussing the Bush administration's non-negotiable demands on the Taliban, Delhi University professor
Nirmalangshu Mukherji points out that "it is hard to believe that thousands are going to be killed and maimed, entire nations devastated,
regional conflicts allowed to take ugly turns, the rest of the world held in fear--all because the dead body of a single, essentially unworthy
person is given such high value." On the contrary, she proposes, as does Pilger, that "in the name of fighting global terrorism, the US is basically
interested in using the opportunity to establish [a] permanent military presence in the area" that is notable for its geo-political importance
("Offers of Peace," Oct. 16, 2001).¶ Calling for "reorienting U.S. policy along the lines of respecting human rights," the New Agenda report states
that "the unnecessary projection of U.S. military abroad, represented by the archipeligo of overseas military bases, often serves as a physical
reminder of U.S. political and military support for repressive regimes." This claim that such bases are "unnecessary" completely ignores their
ongoing important role in facilitating the global expansion of U.S. business, and, amazingly, ignores the fact that the United States is right now
in the process of building new ones in "repressive" states like Uzbekistan, with 7,000 political prisoners and in the midst of a low-intensity war
against Islamic insurgents ("U.S. Indicates New Military Partnership With Uzbekistan," Wall Street Journal, Oct. 15, 2001). Such bases are only
"unnecessary" to analysts who are unable or unwilling to confront the reality of a powerful imperialism in fine working order and in a new
phase of expansion. These
analysts seem to believe that the United States can easily, perhaps with Left
advice, be dissuaded from being an imperialist power!¶ The reasons for this Left accommodation to
what we must call the Superterrorist's antiterrorist agenda are mainly twofold. One is the power of
hegemonic ideas, so that even leftists are swept along with the general understanding that the United
States is fighting terrorism and is only a victim of terrorism. Some swallow the New Imperialist premise that the United
States is the proper vehicle for reconstructing the world, which it should do in a gentler and kinder fashion. Thus Richard Falk takes this for
granted in declaring the U.S. attack on Afghanistan "the first truly just war since World War II" (The Nation, Oct. 29, 2001), although claiming
that its justice "is in danger of being negated by the injustice of improper means and excessive ends." Though writing in the liberal Nation
magazine, it never occurs to Falk that the rightwing Republican regime of Bush and Cheney, so close to the oil industry and military-industrial
complex, might have an agenda incompatible with a just war. Apart from this, as the attack was itself a violation of international law, and was
from its start killing civilians by bombs directly and via its important contribution to the already endemic mass starvation, Falk makes the war
"just" despite the fact that its justice was already negated at the time he made his claim. (By Falk's logic, an Iraqi attack on the United States
would also be a highly just war, though its justice might be endangered by dubious means and excessive ends.) This is imperialist apologetics
carried to the limit.¶ The
other reason for leftist accommodation is pragmatic. Thanks to the effectiveness of
the U.S. propaganda system, U.S. citizens by and large are caught within the epistemic bind of NOT
KNOWING THAT THEY DO NOT KNOW. Thus, leftists understand that people will have difficulty
understanding what they are talking about if they start their discussions of controlling terrorism with
an agenda on how to control Superterrorist's terrorism. If one wants to be listened to quickly and possibly influence the
course of policy right now--and be far safer personally and professionally--it is better to take the conventional view of terrorism as a premise
and discuss what the United States should do about it. Maybe this way one can help curb extremist responses.¶ On
the other hand, by
taking it as the starting premise that the United States is only a victim of terrorism, one loses the
opportunity to educate people to a fundamental truth about terrorism and even implicitly denies that
truth in order to be practical. We find that we can't do that. After one of us (Herman) authored books entitled The Washington
Connection and Third World Fascism (with Noam Chomsky) and The Real Terror Network, the latter featuring the gigantic
U.S.-sponsored terror network that emerged in the years after 1950, and after following U.S. policy
for years thereafter in which terrorism has been very prominent, he (and we) consider the notion of the
United States as an antiterrorist state a sick joke.¶ We believe it is of the utmost importance to contest
the hegemonic agenda that makes the U.S. and its allies only the victims of terror, not terrorists and
sponsors of terror. This is a matter of establishing basic truth, but also providing the long- run basis for
systemic change that will help solve the problem of "terrorism," however defined. Others see things
differently, and very good articles have been written in the pragmatic mode. But we want to call attention to the fact that there is a cost to
using that mode, and those that work in it should do this understanding what they are taking for granted and its costs. Given the current
trajectory of world events, we believe that we
need a greater focus on ALL the terrorists and sponsors of terror,
and less pragmatism.
How we use labels such as “terror” and “terrorism” shapes our conception of reality.
Brecher et al., Advisor @ Edgehill University Research Ethics and Governance
Committee, 10
[Bob, Discourses and Practices of Terrorism: Interrogating Terror, p. 2-3, PR]
What we call things and what they are is intimately connected, which is why 'the act of naming things
is always a highly charged process that can have serious political and social consequences*.5 Consider
for example Tony Blair's response to the London bombings of 7 July 2005. He insisted that the UK's
foreign policy, and specifically its co-invasion and occupation of Iraq, was entirely unrelated to those
acts of terror: If it is the plight of Palestinians that drives them, why, every time it looks as if Israel and
Palestine arc making progress, docs the same ideology perpetrate an outrage that turns hope back
into despair? If it is Afghanistan that motivates them, why blow up innocent Afghans on their way to their first ever election? If it is Iraq
that motivates them, why is the same ideology killing Iraqis by terror in defiance of an elected Iraqi government?6 We need to see how
his underlying (misunderstanding of 'terrorism' — his naming of certain actions, and thus of the
agents who carry them out - allows him to persuade his hearers that the questions he is asking cannot
but be rhetorical. They invite one answer: "Because they're crazy.' He is inveigling us into believing that his question about innocent
Afghans can have no rational answer and that those concerned are fundamentally different, and do not conform to the rational norms of
civilization. 'Their' terrorism is not comparable to 'our' well intended political interventions. This
simplification,
misrepresentation, and re-presentation of what the world is like echoes this call to arms against the
democratic opposition to the notorious military junta in power in Argentina from 1976—1983 by
Admiral Masscra. a member of the ruling triumvirate. He too insisted that "we* are fighting a war for
freedom and against tyranny ... a war against those who favor death and by those of us who favor life
... We are fighting against nihilists, against agents of destruction whose only objective is destruction itself, although they disguise this with
social crusades.7 One
might query precisely which social crusades are a disguise, given that all military
campaigns proceed hand in hand with crusades for social reform, religious or otherwise. This book
refuses to take any of these words — "terror", "terrorism' or "terroristic' — for granted. Instead it
views them as elements of a dominant, though by no means universal, hegemonic formation. It seeks
to lay bare the political and discursive practices which enable such actions to be undertaken, and
which become further entrenched as a result of such actions. It investigates the pre-presentations of
our worlds, which (seek to) alter our very conceptualizations of what is real.
Discourse of terror creates the image of terrorist as the other—our rhetoric allows
them to be dehumanized while being placed outside of the law
Cetti et al., PhD at the University of East London, 10
[Fran, 4-30-10, Discourses and Practices of Terrorism: Interrogating Terror, p. 58, PR]
Since the emergence of the twenty-first century's so-called war on terror,2 European asylum legislation and policies have increasingly been
framed within an 'existential domain ... that distributes and organizes fear by interrelating discrete phenomena in ways that allow connotations
of insecurity to be circulated among them*.1 The
discourse of terror, indeed, appears to have sealed transnational
crime, terrorism and asylum into what may be described as a hermetic security continuum. In an effort to
discern how such a situation has arisen, my investigation begins at the borders of the European Union, for it is here that the lull force of
European security measures is most directly manifest, in both rhetoric and practice. The
border is where the dynamic of
inclusion/exclusion that lies at the heart of the discourse of terror is created through everyday
procedures and processes that identify and categorize 'alien' sources of insecurity, and, by so doing,
transform highly vulnerable individuals into a collective force of danger. Yet, although the discourse of
terror has emerged as a new legitimation of Europe's security regime, the region's asylum and
immigration policies — its border controls — have long been enmeshed, at an institutional, political
and rhetorical level, with security concerns. Thus when the discourse of terror began to infect the
asylum process, it entered "an already heavily pre-constructed domain of insecurity'.4 As the figure of the
'Islamic terrorist' has emerged discursively centre-stage, it seems to have slipped onto the template of an already dehumanized 'alien' — one
that the "asylum seeker'5 (or forced migrant) already occupies. Meanwhile,
the image of the terrorist has in turn
intensified the perception of the threatening nature of the 'alien'/'outsider' at the border. Hence the
border has become simultaneously an intermediary space where, as Arendt comments, the "right to
have rights'6 — that is, 'the right of every individual to belong to humanity*7 — is formulated, and a
no-man's land of illegality created where those denied the right to cross 'legally' are criminalized,
dehumanized and, finally, placed outside the law. It is here that the opposing characteristics of the national (legal) citizen
versus the global (illegal) 'alien* arc constructed and assigned. Effectively silenced by their perceived — and increasingly objective — status as
"outlaws', the "asylum seeker', problcmatized as a security concern, becomes a blank sheet onto
The classification of a terrorist is used as a political tool to evoke fear towards cultures
and to justify violence and denying groups human rights in order to uphold our
cultural views
Cetti et al., PhD at the University of East London, 10
[Fran, 4-30-10, Discourses and Practices of Terrorism: Interrogating Terror, p. 59, PR]
Today's discourse of terror was first unleashed by the events of 9/11. However, it was in the making some time
earlier, when exponents of what Robin calls the "liberalism of terror' set out an interpretative framework that would come
to dominate the post-9/11 era: a focus on questions of culture and identity, free of political and
historical context, leading to 'a de politicized, anti-historical approach to ... terror*.* The motivation
of modern terrorism is interpreted as a response to the psychological and cultural disruptions of
modernity and globalization, driving individuals into the embrace of a religious fundamentalism seen
as deeply antagonistic to liberal democracy. This explanation, now a part of the "common-sense'
understanding of terror, fits seamlessly into a narrative of national security, because "for political fear
to arouse us, the object of fear must belong to the realm of politics and yet somehow, in the minds of
the fearful, stand apart from it' and must take on the aspect of "an intractable, ongoing threat',9 not
only to bodily safety, but to culture, values and identity. The "cultural clash' thesis — Huntington's picture of a world
composed of inimical cultural blocs10 — crystallized the central tenets of the "liberalism of terror', providing a template for state security
services to advance what were in fact longstanding legislative and policy agendas, and justifying a 'war on terror' without foreseeable end.
More recently, as Kundnani comments, the "cultural clash' thesis, facing mounting challenges to its intellectual legitimacy, has yielded ground
to a redefinition of the 'war on terror' as a "cold war against Islamism, [which is] defined as a totalitarian political movement analogous to
fascism and Stalinism. Europe is the new front line in this battle ...*." Thus,
the new argument runs, violations of human
rights are a necessary consequence of defending liberal freedoms.12 Both variants of the argument
are routinely used to justify a war without legal, temporal or geographical boundaries, dependent for
its successful prosecution on the vast extension of state powers. As early as 2001, for example, the British
government set aside its commitment to Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights expressly to ease the passage through
Parliament of its successive anti-terrorism packages. Some political commentators have marked this as the beginning of a shift in
governance throughout the European Union, presaging the birth of a "security state in which "the rule of
law is routinely displaced by states of emergency [Agamben's "states of exception'] and scapegoats among the
population are increasingly subject to extra-judicial state violence'.13 Indeed, Upton believes that the
British government, for example, is attempting to place the country on "a war footing against the
'"other", the alien in our society'.14 Whether this claim can be fully substantiated or not, it is clear from the day-to-day
experiences of individuals seeking asylum in the core states of the European Union that the inimical effect of the "war on terror' narrative is
particularly potent when the target belongs to an already vulnerable group, most especially one that is laden with the ideological baggage of
the 'illegal alien*.
The discourse of the state sponsored terrorism list stems from cold war ideologies—it
has been used to justify aggressive invasions and interventions
Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 06
[Richard, December 18-20, in Michael Innes, (ed) Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe
Havens (Praeger Security International), “The State and Terrorist Sanctuaries: A Critical Analysis”,
http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1948/BISA-Paper-2006-JacksonFinal.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/25/13, VJ]
It is important to note that discourses do not emerge from a vacuum. Rather, they build upon and are
shaped by existing discourses and narratives. In this sense, discourses have discernible histories or
genealogies and build upon the discursive foundations laid down by previous texts.
The genealogy of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse, unsurprisingly, lies first and foremost in the
language and knowledge of terrorism studies – a field which has a long history and which has grown
extremely large and gained genuine authority in recent years, particularly since the September 11
terrorist attacks.6 The terrorism studies literature provides a great many of the central assumptions,
labels, concepts, terms and narratives of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse. Importantly, through
processes like testifying before Congressional Commissions, publications and media appearances, the
language and knowledge of terrorism studies has been transmitted directly to policymakers.7 For
example, notable terrorism studies scholars like Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur,
Jessica Stern, Paul Wilkinson, Brian Jenkins, Magnus Ranstorp, Rohan Gunaratna and Daniel Byman have
given testimony on terrorist activities and „terrorist sanctuaries‟ to the recent Bremer and 9-11
Commissions.8
A second genealogical root of the discourse lies in Western counter-insurgency doctrine during the
cold war, which in turn exhibited clear discursive continuities with colonial „pacification‟ doctrines.9
During this phase, terrorism and insurgency were treated largely as being synonymous,10 and a great
many countries experiencing civil war such as Vietnam, Guatemala and the Philippines were described
by western policymakers as „terrorist havens.‟ Furthermore, it was frequently argued that
communism itself provided ideological support and justification for terrorism, thereby acting as an
„ideological haven.‟11 A number of terrorism scholars at this time suggested that the Soviet Union was
the primary sponsor and supporter of a global „terrorist network.‟ Claire Sterling‟s popular and deeply
alarmist book, The Terror Network,12 promoted this view, and was highly praised by Reagan, Alexander
Haig, William Casey, and other senior Administration officials, who frequently used Sterling‟s narratives
in their own speeches.13 It was in the 1980s however, that the language and assumptions of the
broader terrorism discourse really took root in Western policy circles. President Reagan frequently
referred to „state-sponsored terrorism‟ and along with other Western allies, employed the language
of „terrorist sanctuaries‟ to justify a range of aggressive foreign policies. For example, Reagan justified
the invasion of Grenada on the grounds that „It was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major
military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy.‟14 Following Reagan, George Bush Sr and
Bill Clinton continued to employ the language of „international terrorism‟, „terrorist sanctuaries‟ and
„state sponsors of terrorism‟ to justify a range of foreign policies, including the 1991 Gulf War,
sanctions against Iraq and Iran, the „war on drugs‟ in Latin America and the missile attacks on Sudan
and Afghanistan in 1998.15 In short, by the time of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the discursive
foundations of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse were well established: policymakers and the wider
public were well-versed in, and fully understood, the language of „terrorist sanctuaries,‟ „terrorist
havens‟ and „state sponsors of terrorism.‟ Since then, senior policymakers and academics have
elaborated a whole series of specific narratives about the nature of „terrorist sanctuaries‟, the states
and groups that support them, the kinds of regions they inhabit, the financial systems they exploit,
the extremist ideologies they depend on and the threat they pose to the world.
Solvency: Critical Theory/Discourse Analysis Good
A critical theory approach could destabilize the established notions posited by
traditional scholars.
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.p.92-3 AS)
One consequence of this is that, in contrast to post-structuralist studies, a Critical Theory approach
does not necessarily limit us to examining the ‘discourse of terrorism’ – important though that is – but
permits the study of a form of violence that can be called ‘terrorism’. It can accept that there is a
category of violence formed by its repetition, to be understood within a particular socio-historical
context which could, currently, be loosely described as: a violent means aimed at triggering political
change by affecting a larger audience than its immediate target, and which is broadly deemed
illegitimate (for example by targeting what are perceived to be non-combatants). This category is not
immutable and evolves along with social and historical processes. For instance, in the case of non-state
actors targeting non-combatant citizens, it only makes sense as a category if those targeted distinguish
between combatants and non-combatants and believe the latter to be illegitimate targets, whose
protection is the state’s duty and whose death is therefore not just fear-inducing but seen as delegitimising the state (and eliciting escalating repressive responses). Thus, a Critical Theory approach, by
looking beyond the ‘discourse of terrorism’ and studying this category of political violence that kills
and maims thousands the world over, can also engage traditional scholars on their own terms, since it
does not reject the category of ‘terrorist violence’ wholesale. However, crucially, Critical Theory
incorporates traditional theory critically and self-reflexively. If, following Horkheimer, Critical Theory
should be ‘suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as
these are understood in the present order, and refuses to take them as nonscientific presuppositions
about which one can do nothing’ (Horkheimer 1992: 207), a Critical Theory approach to terrorism must
always remain suspicious of the very terms it uses, historicise and deconstruct them, and uncover the
interests they serve. Far from simply replacing one form of essentialism with another, it thus steers a
way between positivism and post-structuralism, retaining categories of regularity while remaining
aware of their contingency and political effect, and thus constantly seeking to interrogate and
destabilise them. This is particularly pertinent in the case of terrorism studies where whether an
organisation is labelled ‘terrorist’ is deeply dependent on political interests, and rigid us/them
distinctions hinder both understanding and resolution (see Bhatia, 2005; Toros, 2008a). It also has
serious consequences for the use of databases or comparative studies which uncritically group together
incidents labelled as ‘terrorist.’
Critical theory has the capacity to denaturalize the state and its opposition
overcoming the state-centric bias allowing us to see the social and historical
underpinnings that show terrorism is not objective, value-free, and historically
unbound.
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.p.94- 95, AS)
A Critical Theory approach to terrorism would similarly scrutinise non-state actors in terms of their contribution to improving the security of
humans. Non-state actors, particularly those involved in nationalist projects, display many of the same characteristics as state actors in their
pursuit of state power, and thus their violence at times resembles state violence. The left-wing FARC in Colombia and the separatist Kurdish PKK
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Turkey, for example, have both been accused of severe human rights violations against civilians who are often at
the mercy of both state and non-state violence (Chernick, 2007; Ergil, 2007). Thus,
the shift from the security of the state to
that of human beings means that a Critical Theory approach has a normative framework from which
to critique both state and non-state actors on the basis of whether they contribute to the security and
freedom of human beings and end their suffering (see also Linklater, 2007). A central task of a Critical Theoryinspired terrorism studies is thus to ‘denaturalise’ both the state and its opposition and to explore
how both may have contributed to the terrorist threat. This would help overcome the state-centric
bias that has often marred the study of terrorism, breaking down us/them and terrorism/
counterterrorism dichotomies. Violent counterterrorism would no longer necessarily be viewed as a
legitimate response to the violence of an inevitably illegitimate opposition, allowing the study of terrorism to
move beyond what seems at times a ‘how to’ guide for states engaged in counterterrorism (Booth, 2007: 404). Crucially, it would also act as a
safeguard against the automatic legitimation or glorification of opposition violence simply because it is in opposition, since the emancipation of
human beings, rather than the success of a state or counter-state project, is the normative benchmark. Such
a critique involves, as we
meticulous analysis of the socio-historic context within which terrorism
emerged. Drilling down in the deepening move is thus like discovering a continent of ice below the tip
of an iceberg. It means taking the neat, above-surface picture of terrorism offered by much traditional research and uncovering not only
layers upon layers of ice under the water, but also the sources of water that feed the iceberg and help it remain afloat. It enables us to
see the ideological as well as social and historical underpinnings that show that there is no such thing
as a value-free, historically unbound ‘terrorism’, let alone an ‘objective’ study thereof. It nonetheless allows
shall examine more closely later, a
us to retain categories and properties – although always historically bound, value-laden, and politically implicated – allowing for the study of a
particular category of political violence. Finally, it
makes us question the ultimate referent of our work, challenging
the state-centrism that has dominated the field of terrorism studies so far, rejecting the state as the
sole referent object in favour of multiple referents ultimately grounded in the constant of humanity.
Each of these moves calls in turn for a broadening of terrorism research, to which we now turn.
Critical terrorism studies serve to contextualize terrorism instead of engaging
terrorists solely when they perpetrate violence allowing for a dynamic model of
terrorism that is more comprehensive and accurate.
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.96-98, AS)
First, context places terrorism in its temporal historical location, restoring a past and a future to terrorism. Traditional approaches to
terrorism tend to engage with the group (usually non-state) only when they begin to perpetrate violence,
ignoring the often long previous life of the movement. Thus, the PKK in Turkey is often only studied
after it turned to armed struggle in 1984, ignoring its formative nonviolent beginnings (from 1978 onwards),
not to mention decades of Kurdish activism and revolts against incorporation into the Turkish republic. Similarly, groups engaged in
terrorist violence drop off the map of terrorism scholars (along with that of the media and political actors) when
they stop using terrorism. A classic example are the Italian Red Brigades, whose activities have been widely studied using their
disbandment in the late 1980s as cut-off point. A sudden interest in what happened to the insurgents and their supporters emerged only in
1999, when the ‘New-Red Brigades’ assassinated a government adviser. Thus,
putting context – and its corollary, time – at the
centre of the study of terrorism means closely examining what preceded the violence and what
succeeded it. Second, an emphasis on context serves to de-exceptionalise terrorism and reembed it
within the wider social practices of which it forms but a part. In this sense, it resembles the move within Welsh School
critical security studies to include ‘nonmilitary issues on the security agenda’. It links the study of (non-state) terrorism to an
analysis of other forms of protest and contentious politics, whether violent or not. It encourages
researchers to analyse acts of state terrorism in the context of other forms of repression and social
control. It places acts that are labelled terrorist within the broader context of social practices, enabling
researchers to see perpetrators of terrorism as part of a wider social movement (even if the links are tenuous),
influenced by societal dynamics and broader intellectual debates, and moving in and out of terrorism (cf. also Gunning, this volume, 2007a:
378–379). Third, a focus on context crucially restores to actors their multiple identities . The IRA, for example,
cannot be merely understood as a ‘terrorist group’ once engaged in a battle with the British state. It also existed/exists at a community 96 H.
Toros and J. Gunning University of Exeter level within Ireland, in competition with other social movements and political parties, engaged in both
violent and non-violent activities, and it existed at an international level with links to the Irish Diaspora in the United States and elsewhere,
international social movements (only some of which employed what have been labelled terrorist tactics), and states (including, but not
exclusively, so-called ‘rogue states’ such as Libya). All these elements constituted the IRA, and to regard it merely as a ‘terrorist actor’ fighting
the state reduces our understanding of the group. Similarly, someone fighting on behalf of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in
Mindanao is not simply an insurgent but often also a farmer, embedded in a local community. Or he may be a local official and thus technically
accountable to the Philippine government, the MILF’s opponent, or have fought for other insurgent groups, depending on their strength in his
area (Toros, 2008b). Re-embedding acts of terrorism and those who perpetrate them in their temporal context discredits the absolutism and
essentialism of the commonly used phrase ‘once a terrorist, always a terrorist’. Re-embedding
them in their social context,
moreover, discredits the use of the label ‘terrorist’ to describe groups or human beings altogether –
leading us, the authors, to reserve the term strictly for describing specific acts . Labelling a group or
person as ‘terrorist’ limits our understanding of them as only the perpetrators of terrorist acts, erasing
their other identities, their political motivations and goals, their non-terrorist activities, and the
possibility of transformation (Bhatia, 2005; Gunning, 2007a, this volume; Toros, 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming). Fourth, an
emphasis on context also allows for the recognition that terrorist tactics evolve. Terrorism has indeed mutated
even if one merely takes into consideration its contemporary form, just as communities, the state, and the international system have. The strict
hierarchical organisations of the 1960s continue to exist, but have been flanked by lone bombers such as Timothy McVeigh and more horizontal
networks such as al-Qaeda. The heavier emphasis on guerrilla tactics and rural bases of the 1950s and 1960s has been superseded by a greater
emphasis on urban targets, notwithstanding the continued existence of rural guerrilla dynamics in Sri Lanka and Colombia, for instance. Rather
than having to create new categories, such as the heavily criticised notion of ‘new terrorism’, placing terrorism within its context allows for a
framework which recognises that terrorism and its practitioners change along with other social processes, political structures, and technologies.
Finally, a
focus on context pushes the scholar to move beyond traditional theory’s notion of the
atomised individual and its corollary, the rational choice actor, to a more holistic and dynamic model
of embedded individuals, which recognises how individuals both shape and are shaped by larger
communities, social processes, and group dynamics, economic and political structures, and ideologies
(see also Gunning, this volume). This move mirrors Kratochwil’s call, in the context of critical international relations theory, for a shift from the
notion of homo economicus to homo sociologicus (Kratochwil, 2007: 44–45). This
involves a move away from the
economistic, self-centred, instrumental rationality – which, though dominant in traditional social science is but one,
historically Exploring a critical theory approach 97 University of Exeter and culturally specific type of rationality – to a framework which
recognises alternative types of rationality, such as altruistic or end-oriented rationalities (cf. Ferree, 1992).
Studying terrorism in the context of broader social reality helps us change our
relationship with the phenomenon itself allowing for a de-exoticization of terrorist
acts.
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.98-99, AS)
For the study of terrorism this means examining contemporary terrorism as¶ embedded in other
processes, including, for example, democratisation, modernisation,¶ globalisation, the increasing
challenge by non-state actors to the nationstate,¶ and the deepening North–South divide and its related
migrations (see also¶ Linklater, 2005a, 2007). This means embedding terrorism studies in developments¶
in cognate theories, such as democratisation studies, social movement theory,¶ social psychology,
conflict theory, or migration studies (Gunning, 2007a, 2007c;¶ Toros, forthcoming; Egerton,
forthcoming). It also means that studying terrorism¶ can tell us something about these broader
processes, and vice versa. How have the¶ ideational and structural developments underpinning the
emergence of modern¶ states and the international system contributed to making terrorist tactics
attractive¶ (O’Sullivan, 1986), and what do the emergence of the latter say about the modern¶ state and
the international system? What has made the rise of loosely connected¶ networks such as al-Qaeda
possible and what does this tell us about transnationalism,¶ the transformation of global identities, the
nature of modernity and postmodernity,¶ changing social forces, and the like? What does the evolution
of the¶ Italian Red Brigades, ETA, or Hamas say about the processes of state-building and¶
modernisation?¶ At heart, this is a call for, at least initially, more interdisciplinarity, just as the¶ Institute
for Social Research in Frankfurt under Horkheimer expanded to¶ become profoundly interdisciplinary
(with the aim of eventually breaking down¶ barriers between disciplines; see Wyn Jones, 1999: 22–23).
While heeding¶ Booth’s warning of the dangers of a lowest-common-denominator approach to¶
interdisciplinarity (Booth, 2008: 70), Critical Theory offers both a clarion call¶ and a ready framework
for engaging with cognate disciplines and gathering¶ fragmentary insights, particularly from those who
may be wary of traditional¶ 98 H. Toros and J. Gunning¶ University of Exeter¶ terrorism studies’
perceived political bias and lack of self-reflexivity and¶ theoretical rigour (see also Gunning, 2007a,
2007b).¶ Thus, a broadened understanding of terrorism – one which includes a focus¶ on state terrorism,
counterterrorism, and structural violence; re-embeds terrorism¶ within the social practices (violent and
non-violent) which precede, surround¶ and succeed the ‘terrorist’ act; and restores multiple identities to
groups and¶ (socially-embedded) individuals – confronts scholars with the whole breadth of¶ that
submerged iceberg discovered through the deepening move. It confronts us¶ with the need to move
past the current obsession with the violent, spectacular act¶ itself – which risks exoticising the act
(Breen Smyth, 2008c) – to examine that¶ violence as part of the processes that move and transform
social reality more¶ broadly. It is arguably a far more complex and confusing task than that which¶
traditional terrorism scholars have concentrated on thus far, as it asks us to go¶ outside our disciplines to
confront an intricate web of social, economic, and¶ political relations which constitute this broader
understanding of terrorism. More¶ than that, it requires a change in our relationship with the
phenomenon itself.¶ For, by embedding our inquiries in a network of social and political relations of¶
which we ourselves are a part, terrorism becomes less ‘othered’ as the ways in¶ which we are more or
less implicated in it become more manifest.
A critical approach would recognize the emancipatory impulse of terrorism
undermining traditional theory which places its faith in instrumental rationality.
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.100-101, AS)
Finding the source of emancipation in the context of terrorism is not easy.¶ Who are the ‘oppressed and
marginalized’ that Critical Theory must be partisan¶ to (Wyn Jones, 1999)? Is it those killed and scarred by terrorist violence, those¶ maimed
and tortured by counterterrorism, those who resort to violence because¶ they believe they have no ‘feasible alternative’, or those who, on the
contrary,¶ continue to shun terrorist violence despite oppression and tyranny? On what¶ basis can one make such a judgement? Can such a
one does not have to¶ choose between
those victimised by one side and those victimised by the other.¶ This can be done by understanding
emancipation as emancipation for all, from¶ all forms of violence: direct, structural, or cultural, state
or non-state; or alternatively,¶ as the creation of those political, social and economic conditions under¶ which political goals can be
legitimately and effectively pursued without¶ recourse to terrorism.¶ Making the notion of emancipation central to the
study of terrorism introduces¶ an explicit normative commitment. Andrew Linklater summed this up, combining¶
judgement be made at all?¶ We argue that such a choice does not need to be made –
Horkheimer’s productivist focus on class with Habermas’s subsequent communicative¶ turn which emphasises the importance of dialogue and
creating¶ cross-national speech communities:¶ To increase the spheres of social interaction that are governed by dialogue¶ and consent rather
than power and force [emancipation from direct violence];¶ to expand the number of human beings who have access to a speech¶ community
that has the potential to become universal [lending voice to the¶ voiceless]; and to create the socioeconomic preconditions of effective, as¶
opposed to nominal, involvement for all members of that community¶ [emancipation from structural violence and structures of inequality].¶
(Linklater, 2001: 31; emphases and brackets added)¶ One
could object to this particular summary, although it has the
advantage of¶ combining a commitment to emancipation from violence in all its forms as well¶ as
structures of inequality – rather than simply a condemnation of non-state¶ violence without
consideration of state violence and structures of inequality. It¶ also simultaneously highlights the
importance of dialogue, political participation¶ and being heard – without, crucially, ignoring the need
for concrete structural¶ economic and political changes to make dialogue more symmetric and
egalitarian¶ (Linklater, 2001: 30; see also Wyn Jones, 1999: 75–76). But whichever definition¶ 100 H.
Toros and J. Gunning¶ University of Exeter¶ one settles on, a Critical Theory approach inherently
involves a commitment to a¶ particular normative agenda. Making this explicit is important, both for
clarifying¶ the normative framework against which existing theories and practices are¶ inevitably judged,
and for the research to become more transparent.¶ A second issue is that from a Critical Theory
perspective the means for¶ achieving emancipation are just as, if not more, important than the goals
pursued.¶ Terrorism itself has been understood by its practitioners as a means of emancipation¶ from
oppression (also Gunning, 2007a: 386). However, if emancipation is not¶ only an endpoint but mainly a
process, one cannot, as Booth and Wyn Jones convincingly¶ argue, separate the means from the end.
Rather, ‘[w]hat is required . . . is¶ a model of analysis that recognizes . . . that ends and means are not
somehow casually¶ related but are mutually implicated’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 131–132; see also¶ Booth,
2005: 273). Critical Theory, after all, is at heart a critique of the dominance¶ of instrumental reason in
traditional theory, which places the consideration of ends¶ outside the realm of investigation and
distinguishes sharply between fact and¶ value. This is precisely what underpins realism’s claim that
politics is amoral and¶ liberalism’s claim that ends should be a private concern.¶ Against this dualism,
Booth argues for the adoption of a Gandhian nondualistic¶ vision, ‘fusing ends and means in a manner
whereby one’s ideals are¶ evident in how one acts, not only in what one hopes to achieve’ (Booth, 2005:¶
273). Such a framework not only turns the notion of ‘emancipatory terrorism’ into a ‘contradiction in
terms’ (Booth, 2008), but challenges the legitimacy of¶ violent (counter)terrorism, repression, human
rights violations, structural violence, and the like.¶ At the same time, where terrorism has been
embarked upon as a means of¶ emancipation, whether from oppression or to further emancipatory
projects, the¶ emancipatory impulse behind the violence should be recognised by Critical¶ Theoryinspired scholars, just as the immanent possibilities for transformation¶ among those engaged in
terrorism, state or non-state, should be actively sought¶ for. Here it is vital to move beyond the often
static framework of traditional¶ scholars and consider the possibilities for transformation of people
within organisations¶ engaged in terrorism (Gunning, 2004, 2007c; Toros, forthcoming).¶ From such a
perspective, arguably one of the tragedies of the Israeli–Palestinian¶ conflict was the assassination of
Ismail Abu Shannab, one of Hamas’s leaders in¶ Gaza, who had been one of the central forces behind the
articulation of an alternative¶ paradigm within Hamas which could eventually accommodate a two-state¶
solution (Gunning, 2007c: 236–237, 2008).
Critical scholars do not maintain a separation between their research and the political
allowing them to transform the status quo in an emancipatory direction.
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.106, AS)
More fundamentally, praxis should be informed by the Critical Theory¶ insight that subject and object
are mutually implicated, and that research affects¶ both (Whitworth, 2001; Breen Smyth, 2005). Thus,
who we are, what motivates¶ us, the way we interact with those we interview, the types of questions
we ask¶ and the way we handle our and our interviewees’ emotions, profoundly affect¶ research.
Similarly, what types of knowledge we create and spread, and how¶ these affect those we study
through the way they influence policies and public¶ opinion, should be a central praxeological concern.
This is particularly pertinent¶ to terrorism studies given that who or what is called terrorist or suspect
has very¶ serious real-life implications. Thus, contrary to the more positivist among traditional¶
scholars, who maintain an artificial separation between their research and¶ the political, the aim of
Critical Theory scholars is to understand our role in¶ existing power structures and explicitly use this
understanding to work towards¶ transforming the status quo in an emancipatory direction.
Critical theory ontologically and epistemologically offers a new framework for
conceptualizing terrorism that challenges hegemonic discourses in favor of
emancipatory alternatives.
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.106-7, AS)
We have shown various ways in which Critical Theory offers a rich, theoretically grounded¶ framework
for conceptualising and studying terrorism. It provides both¶ a way to critique existing terrorism studies,
and a call for providing new conceptual¶ frameworks, new explanations, and new foci of study. In the
words of¶ Booth, it offers an ontology, an epistemology, and an orientation toward praxis¶ (Booth,
2005).¶ Ontologically, it rejects the notion of an objective social science as a¶ hegemonic project to
sustain the status quo and calls for exposing the ideological¶ assumptions and material interests
behind social science. It alerts us to¶ the historicity of the status quo, the inevitability of
transformation, and the need¶ to consider the status quo’s implication in creating the conditions out
of which¶ terrorism has emerged. It simultaneously provides a minimal foundationalist¶ position which
avoids ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’ (Gunning,¶ 2007b), and enables us to study both the
political usages of the discourse of¶ 106 H. Toros and J. Gunning¶ University of Exeter¶ ‘terrorism’ and a
historically contextualised form of violence. By replacing the¶ state with human beings as the ultimate
referent to be secured, the normative¶ moorings of research are fundamentally changed, making
human emancipation¶ and an end to avoidable human suffering the central concern of any research¶
enterprise.¶ Epistemologically, a Critical Theory approach encourages us to broaden the¶ focus of
terrorism research to include both state and non-state terrorism, counterterrorism,¶ and structural
violence. It encourages us to place context at the¶ heart of the investigation, restoring a past and a
future to terrorism, allowing the¶ concept to evolve along with the world, and embedding
(counter)terrorism¶ within its wider socio-historical context of social movements, political, societal¶ and
economic structures, non-violent social practices, and the like. Rejecting¶ traditional theory’s
‘fetishization of parts’, it embeds terrorism in broader social¶ and political theory through a call for
greater interdisciplinarity and re-linking¶ terrorism to the broader social processes of which it is part.¶
Finally, in its orientation toward praxis, it vindicates a normative emancipatory¶ commitment which can
be understood in this context as the aim of transforming¶ terrorist violence – not by any means, but
through means that are compatible with¶ the ridding of direct, structural, and cultural violence. As part
of this praxeological¶ dimension, a Critical Theory approach calls for engaging the silenced and the¶
suffering (though not without critical distancing), sustaining counter-hegemonic¶ discourses and
communities, and working with both suspect communities and¶ policy-makers contributing to the
transformation of both (and expecting to be transformed¶ oneself in the process). Underpinning this
orientation is a notion of emancipation¶ as process, involving genuine dialogue with those considered
‘other’ –¶ including members of organisations involved in violence (whether state or nonstate)¶ – rather
than as predetermined endpoint. It demands that we seek the fissures¶ and contradictions through
which counter-hegemonic discourses emerge and that¶ we engage with victims, perpetrators,
policymakers, and policy-takers to articulate,¶ and contribute towards, the emergence of
emancipatory alternatives. Most¶ fundamentally, it demands the recognition of a common humanity –
one in which¶ we are all capable of violence and pain, but also, crucially, of imagining a better¶ future.
Terrorist studies need to be criticized otherwise power structures will be reified and
imperial projects will be justified.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 7
[Richard, March 3, 2007, International Studies Association, “Terrorism Studies and the Politics
of State Power,”http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1951/ISA-2007-PaperCTS-Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/28/13, AS]
Abstract:¶ An analysis of the terrorism studies field reveals a number of methodological, theoretical ¶
and ethical-normative problems. One of its more serious problems is its tendency to ¶ uncritically
reproduce a number of highly questionable narratives and assumptions about ¶ terrorism as a
phenomenon and counterterrorism as state response. For example, a great ¶ deal of past and recently
published terrorism research unreflectively assumes that: nonstate terrorism poses an existential threat
to modern societies; there is a „new terrorism‟ ¶ that is religiously motivated, willing to employ weapons
of mass destruction, and aimed ¶ primarily at causing mass casualties; the roots of terrorism lie in
individual psychological ¶ abnormality and religious extremism; and coercive-based counterterrorism is
an effective ¶ response to non-state terrorism. This paper argues that these misconceptions are not ¶
simply errors based on poor research. Rather, these broadly accepted understandings –¶ this terrorism
„knowledge‟ – also work politically to reify and reproduce state power. In ¶ particular, this
„scientifically‟ generated terrorism „knowledge‟ frequently functions to, ¶ among others: de-legitimise
resistance by non-state actors; justify domestic political ¶ projects unconnected to terrorism, such as
social surveillance; bolster the power and ¶ priorities of the agencies of state security; benefit powerful
economic actors linked to the ¶ security sector, such as private security firms, defence industries, and
pharmaceutical ¶ companies; control wider social and political dissent and set the parameters for ¶
acceptable political debate; and provide intellectual justification for foreign imperial ¶ projects.
However, academic research is never without political and normative ¶ consequence; knowledge is
always for somebody and for something. This paper argues ¶ that given the current situation in the
field, there is an urgent need for an explicitly¶ „critical‟ terrorism studies
Critical Terrorism scholarship will resolve the state-centricity and normative problems
of orthodox terrorism research.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 7
[Richard, March 3, 2007, International Studies Association, “Terrorism Studies and the Politics
of State Power,”http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1951/ISA-2007-PaperCTS-Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/28/13, AS]
In this paper, I briefly touch on some of the key criticisms that have been levelled ¶ at the field of
terrorism studies. In particular, I focus on what is arguably one of the most ¶ serious problems facing
the field, namely, its state-centricity and the way it functions ¶ politically to reify state power. Its close
identification with state priorities and ¶ perspectives, its uncritical reproduction of accepted
narratives and terrorism „knowledge‟, ¶ its conformity and totalising certainty and its inbuilt
commitment to providing counterterrorist policy relevant research, poses major analytical and
normative problems for the ¶ field. Analytically, it narrows the potential range of research subjects,
encourages ¶ conformity in outlook and method, and obstructs vigorous, wide-ranging debate, ¶
particularly regarding the causes of non-state terrorism. Normatively, it identifies an ¶ entire field and
scholarly community with the reproduction of state power and the ¶ promotion of particular kinds of
political projects and forms of state action of dubious ¶ efficacy or moral legitimacy. In short, it functions
to construct the field of terrorism ¶ studies as an arm of state security. ¶ For these reasons, I argue that
there is an urgent need for an explicitly „critical ¶ terrorism studies‟. A „critical terrorism studies‟ (CTS)
would be distinctive due to its ¶ willingness to challenge accepted knowledge and commonsense about
terrorism and its¶ acute awareness of the power-knowledge relationship in terrorism-related research.
As a ¶ consequence, CTS scholarship would be characterised by a critical reflexivity regarding ¶ the
academic production and uses of terrorism-related research, the adoption of a broader ¶ research
focus that includes the use of terrorism by state actors, an acknowledgement of the
interdependencies between state policy and non-state terrorism and an openly¶ normative,
emancipatory praxis in regards to counter-terrorism.
CTS is an orientation that distances itself from prevailing ideologies in order to
destabilize them.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 7
[Richard, March 3, 2007, International Studies Association, “Terrorism Studies and the Politics
of State Power,”http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1951/ISA-2007-PaperCTS-Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/28/13, AS]
In the broadest sense, critical terrorism studies (CTS) refers to self-consciously critical ¶ terrorismrelated research which adopts a sceptical attitude towards state-centric ¶ understandings of terrorism
and which does not take existing terrorism knowledge for ¶ granted but is willing to challenge widely
held assumptions and narratives. In this sense, ¶ rather than a precise theoretical label, CTS is more of
an orientation or critical ¶ perspective that seeks to maintain a certain distance from prevailing
ideologies and ¶ orthodoxies. Beyond this broad orientation however, we would argue that CTS is
founded ¶ upon on a specific set of epistemological, ontological and ethical-normative¶ commitments.
The field constructs terrorism from a gendered and a Eurocentric perspective under
the disguise of objectivity proving a need for the critical terrorism studies’
constructivist approaches.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 7
[Richard, March 3, 2007, International Studies Association, “Terrorism Studies and the Politics
of State Power,”http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1951/ISA-2007-PaperCTS-Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/28/13, AS]
CTS rests upon a number of specific epistemological commitments, including an ¶ understanding of
knowledge as a social process constructed through language, discourse ¶ and inter-subjective practices.
From this perspective, it is understood that terrorism ¶ knowledge always reflects the social-cultural
context within which it emerges, which ¶ means among other things that it is highly gendered and
Eurocentric . CTS understands ¶ that knowledge is always intimately connected to power, that
knowledge is „always for ¶ someone and for some purpose‟ and that „regimes of truth‟ function to
entrench certain ¶ hierarchies of power and exclude alternative, counter-hegemonic forms of
knowledge and ¶ practice. CTS therefore, starts with an acceptance of the basic insecurity of all
knowledge¶ and the impossibility of neutral or objective knowledge about terrorism.55 It also evinces
¶ an acute sensitivity to the ways in which terrorism knowledge can be deployed as a ¶ political
technology in the furtherance of hegemonic projects and directs attention to the ¶ inerests that
underlie knowledge claims. Thus, CTS starts by asking: who is terrorism ¶ knowledge for, and what
functions does it serve in supporting their interests?¶ There are at least three practical consequences of
this broad epistemological ¶ orientation. First, similar to the field of Critical Security Studies (CSS), CTS
begins from ¶ an analysis of the epistemological and ontological claims that make the discipline
possible in the first place,¶ 56 in particular, the false naturalism of traditional theory and the political
content of all terrorism knowledge. More specifically, its research focuses on ¶ uncovering and
understanding the aims of knowledge-production within terrorism ¶ studies, the operation of the
terrorism studies epistemic community and more broadly, the ¶ social and political construction of
terrorism knowledge. Such analysis can be achieved ¶ using deconstructive, narrative, genealogical,
ethnographic and historical analyses, as ¶ well as neo-Gramscian and Constructivist approaches. The
purpose of such research is ¶ not simply descriptive nor is it to establish the „correct‟ or „real truth‟ of
terrorism; rather, ¶ it aims to destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the inherently
contested ¶ and political nature of the discourse. It aims to reveal the politics behind seemingly ¶
neutral knowledge.¶ A second practical consequence for CTS research is a continuous and transparent ¶
critical-normative reflexivity in the knowledge-production process.57 That is, CTS ¶ research
acknowledges the impossibility of neutral or objective terrorism knowledge and ¶ evinces an acute
awareness of the political use to which it can be put, as well as its inbuilt ¶ biases and assumptions. It
thus attempts to avoid the uncritical use of labels, assumptions ¶ and narratives regarding terrorism in
ways that would naturalize them or imply that they ¶ were uncontested. Crucial in this respect is an
appreciation of the inherently gendered and ¶ Eurocentric character of dominant knowledge and
discourse on terrorism. A third consequence for CTS research is methodological and disciplinary ¶
pluralism, in particular, a willingness to adopt post-positivist and non-international ¶ relations-based
methods and approaches. In this sense, CTS refuses to privilege ¶ materialist, rationalist and positivist
approaches to social science over interpretive and ¶ reflectivist approaches.58 Avoiding an
exclusionary commitment to the narrow logic of ¶ traditional social scientific explanation based on linear
notions of cause and effect, CTS¶ accepts that Constructivist and post-structuralist approaches which
subscribe to an ¶ interpretive „logic of understanding‟ can open space for questions and perspectives
that ¶ are foreclosed by positivism and rationalism. This stance is more than methodological; it ¶ is also
political in the sense that it does not treat one model of social science as if it were ¶ the sole bearer of
legitimacy.59
CTS isn’t locked solely within the confines of critique but spills over to broader social
change.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 7
[Richard, March 3, 2007, International Studies Association, “Terrorism Studies and the Politics
of State Power,”http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1951/ISA-2007-PaperCTS-Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/28/13, AS]
In addition to the reasons alluded to above, CTS is openly normative in orientation for the ¶ simple reason that through the identification of
who the „terrorist other‟ actually is – and ¶ it should be remembered that deciding and affirming which individuals and groups may ¶ be rightly
called „terrorists‟ is a routine practice in the field – terrorism studies actually ¶ provides an authoritative judgement about who may
¶ there is no
escaping the ethico-political content of the subject. Rather than projecting or ¶ attempting to maintain
a false neutrality or objectivity, CTS openly adheres to the values ¶ and priorities of universal human
and societal security, rather than traditional, narrowly ¶ defined conceptions of national security in
which the state takes precedence over any¶ other actor. Moreover, in the tradition of Critical Theory, the core
legitimately be killed, tortured, ¶ rendered or incarcerated by the state in the name of counter-terrorism.72 In this sense,
commitment of CTS is ¶ to a broad conception of emancipation, which is understood as the realisation of greater ¶ human freedom and human
potential and improvements in individual and social ¶ actualisation and well-being.¶ In practice, this ethical standpoint necessarily entails
transparency in specifying ¶ one‟s political-normative stance and values, a continuous critical reflexivity regarding the ¶ aims, means and
outcomes of terrorism research, particularly as it intersects with state ¶ counter-terrorism, and an enduring concern with questions of politics
and ethics.
In turn, ¶ this has clear implications for research funding, knowledge production and the ethics
of ¶ research in „suspect communities‟.73 It also entails an enduringly critical stance towards ¶
projects of state counter-terrorism, particularly as they affect human and societal security.¶ CTS recognises that such a stance
involves a delicate and creative balance between ¶ avoiding complicity in oppressive state practices through a continual process of critique, ¶
CTS is determined to go
beyond critique and deconstruction and actively ¶ work to bring about positive social change – in part
through an active engagement with ¶ the political process and the power holders in society. In short,
based on an acceptance of a fundamental prior responsibility to „the ¶ other‟, CTS sees itself as being
engaged in a critical praxis aimed at ending the use of ¶ terror by any and all actors and in promoting
the exploration of non-violent forms of ¶ conflict transformation. Specifically, this entails a willingness to
try and understand and ¶ empathise with the mind-sets, world views and subjectivities of nonWestern „others‟ and ¶ a simultaneous refusal to assume or impute their intentions and values.75 We recognise ¶ that in relation to
whilst simultaneously maintaining access to power in order to affect change.74 From this ¶ perspective,
the „terrorist other‟, this is a taboo stance within Western scholarship. ¶ Moreover, it is a taboo that has been institutionalised in a legal
framework in which ¶ withholding information from the authorities is a crime, in which academics are being ¶ asked to report on their
students76 and in which attempting to understand the ¶ subjectivities of „terrorist‟ suspects could be interpreted as „glorification of
terrorism‟ – a ¶ crime under UK law.77 Nonetheless, we view it as both analytically and ethically ¶ responsible and remain committed to
defending the intellectual and ethical integrity of ¶ such work.¶ In this sense, CTS imbues many of the values, concerns and orientations of
CTS is not ¶ an anti-state or anti-Western
project; neither is it a discourse of complacency or an ¶ appeasement of tyranny.78 Rather, it is a
vigorous anti-terror project based on ¶ fundamental human rights and values and a concern for social
justice, equality and an end ¶ to structural and physical violence and discrimination. It views civilian-directed forms of ¶ violence as
peace ¶ research, conflict resolution and CCS. Contrary to the views of some critics,
inherently illegitimate, regardless of what type of actor commits them, in ¶ what context or to what purpose. It also presupposes that human
agency and human ¶ ingenuity are potentially unlimited, particularly in the pursuit of non-violent solutions to ¶ injustice and violence, and that
there are more humane and effective ways of responding ¶ to terrorism than reflexively engaging in retaliatory and disproportionate
counterviolence.¶ In sum, CTS is both a theoretical commitment and a political orientation.79¶ Theoretically, it
engages in permanent critical exploration of the ontology, epistemology ¶ and praxis of terrorism studies and counter-terrorism practice, and
Politically, it is
committed to an ethical reflexivity in relation to its own ¶ knowledge practices, an „ethos of political
criticism‟80 in relation to the broader field and an emancipatory politics in regards to praxeological
questions raised by counter-terrorism ¶ policy.
seeks ultimately to ¶ introduce alternative interpretations and understandings into an established field of ¶ discourse.
Solvency: Emancipation Framework
We choose to embrace an emancipatory framework as critical terrorist scholars that
frees people from constraints which inhibit actions that people would freely choose to
do.
McDonald, editor of Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific, 9
(Matt,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.111-2, AS)
The (explicit) association of emancipation with the study of international¶ security has been relatively recent and has been advanced most
prominently by¶ the so-called ‘Welsh School’ of critical security studies. Associated with the¶ work of Ken Booth (1991, 1997, 1999, 2005,
2007) and Richard Wyn Jones¶ (1999, 2005) at Aberystwyth University, the Welsh School research agenda¶ emerged out of post-cold war
debates about the meaning of security. More accurately,¶ debates about security that developed in the later years of the cold war¶ tended to
focus on the content of security rather than its meaning: on which¶ issues should or should not be included on states’ security agendas.
While¶ welcoming the attempt to orient security away from the traditional exclusive¶ concern with the
state, militaries, and conflict, Booth and others pointed to a¶ central but surprisingly neglected
question: ‘whose security?’. Booth (1991)¶ suggested that it made sense to think of states as (possible) agents rather
than¶ referents of security – as means rather than ends – and to orient the study of¶ security away from preserving the
territory of the state and towards redressing¶ the suffering of the most vulnerable people in global
politics. In doing so, he¶ suggested that security should ultimately be defined as emancipation.¶ The
key points to note here are that security is oriented towards people rather¶ than states; that the study
of security is at its heart a normative exercise; and that¶ the role of the theorist of security should be
to identify, help develop an understanding¶ of, and attempt to redress instances of political repression
or structural¶ violence. There is much about these core commitments – and the Welsh School¶ Emancipation and critical terrorism
studies 111¶ University of Exeter¶ framework generally – that could usefully inform the developing ‘critical¶ terrorism studies’ research
agenda. ‘Critical terrorism studies’ could certainly be¶ defined in such a way as to emphasise the normative role of theorising; the¶ centrality of
‘emancipation’ as philosophical anchorage; the ultimate emphasis¶ of analysis on the most vulnerable people rather than states; and the
central¶ praxeological goal of locating possibilities for emancipatory change in particular¶ contexts. In pointing to the utility of the Welsh
I then point to¶ the Welsh
School’s attempt to locate emancipation within a cosmopolitan ethical¶ framework emphasising global
community, before exploring the centrality of¶ immanent critique as a means for locating possibilities
for emancipatory change¶ in contemporary political practice. In his earliest statements on the securityemancipation relationship, Ken Booth¶ (1991: 319) defined emancipation as ‘freeing people from those
constraints that¶ stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do’. This broad definition¶ can and
School framework here, I begin¶ by outlining how ‘emancipation’ is defined within this approach.
should be viewed as an initial statement, with subsequent iterations¶ (Booth, 1999: 43–46, 2005: 181–182) focusing on the multiple functions
of emancipation¶ within the critical security framework (as ‘philosophical anchorage’,¶ ‘strategic process’, and ‘a guide for tactical goal
setting’) and increasingly emphasising¶ the need to define emancipation in procedural and dialectical terms. In his¶ most recent attempt to
define emancipation, Booth (2007: 112) conceptualized it¶ as follows:¶ As
a discourse of politics, emancipation seeks the
securing of people from¶ those oppressions that would stop them from carrying out what they would¶
freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others. It provides a¶ three-fold framework for
politics: a philosophical anchorage for knowledge,¶ a theory of progress for society, and a practice of
resistance against oppression.¶ Emancipation is the philosophy, theory, and politics of inventing¶ humanity.
Emancipation serves as a process for instigating change within the existing order
allowing for an alteration in the material distribution of power freeing the
marginalized and oppressed.
McDonald, editor of Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific, 9
(Matt,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,,p.112-4, AS)
This broad definition ultimately stops short of providing a clear idea of what¶ emancipation looks like
in practice or how it might inform our analyses of¶ empirical contexts. This lack of definitional
precision is justified on the basis¶ that emancipation is better conceived as process than endpoint and
that it is¶ better understood in terms of the specificity of particular struggles and dynamics¶ in world
politics than in purely abstract terms (Booth, 1999: 41–46, 2005: 182).¶ On the production-dialogue distinction within critical
theory noted earlier, the¶ Welsh School approach attempts to incorporate both into its definition of emancipation,¶ suggesting the need to
amplify the voices of marginalised actors to¶ speak security as a means for altering material structures of oppression.3 Further,¶ changes
in
material distribution of power and resources are conceived as central¶ to the task of enabling an
appropriate dialogic community to emerge.¶ As such, the Welsh School conception of emancipation
suggests the possibility¶ of a focus on the process through which both marginalised voices can be¶ 112
M. McDonald¶ University of Exeter¶ empowered and heard, and the material conditions of their
marginalisation¶ redressed. While retaining a concern with material inequality and deprivation as a¶ crucial dimension of
emancipation, in this chapter I focus in particular on possibilities¶ for emancipatory change through ‘advances in nonrepressive deliberation’¶
(Apel in Linklater, 2005b: 120–121). This, I would suggest, is especially relevant¶ to ‘critical terrorism studies’ both analytically and normatively.
The centrality of¶ ‘discourses’ of ‘terrorism’ and ‘counterterror’ to the dynamics of this form of¶ political violence certainly underscores the
the process of freeing up space for¶ alternative
voices to be heard is seen here as central to the means through which¶ political violence – whether
defined as ‘terrorist’ or not – is least likely to be¶ pursued.¶ The ethical foundation of emancipation is radically
importance of a focus on communicative¶ action. And closely related to this,
cosmopolitan. Indeed, for¶ the Welsh School the development of its security framework was based upon¶ Booth’s (1991) critique of the limits
of communitarian approaches that¶ privileged states as ethical containers and providers for their citizens. Wyn Jones¶ (1999: 159), meanwhile,
‘critical security studies is for the¶ voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless, and its
purpose is their emancipation’.¶ Such a concern entails a shift of focus in security politics away from
states¶ and elites and towards those most at risk from the effects of a wider range of¶ practices and
least able to have their own voices heard. This is given its fullest¶ philosophical statement in Andrew Linklater’s (1998)
has suggested that
discussion of possibilities¶ for global citizenship, which he subsequently (2005b) relates to the critical¶ security studies project in drawing
linkages between security and global¶ community. At all these levels, the cosmopolitan ethic at the heart of emancipation¶ questions
relatively arbitrary definitions
of ‘national security’, for example, work to exclude the rights and needs of the most vulnerable.¶ As
will be noted, these questions of vulnerability are central to making¶ sense of ‘terrorism’ and how we
might respond to it.¶ The final point to note in illustrating the potential benefits of drawing on the¶ Welsh School research agenda for
ultimately rejects the moral primacy of states, encouraging¶ instead a focus on the ways in which
‘critical terrorism studies’ concerns its method,¶ itself informed by a particular conception of the role of analysts (see Booth, 1997:¶ 115, 2008:
67). In seeking to locate possibilities for emancipatory change in¶ particular contexts, working from a commitment to developing security
praxis,¶ Welsh School theorists emphasise the central critical theoretical tool of immanent¶ critique. Immanent
critique is defined
here as a dialectical method of inquiry that¶ engages with the core commitments of particular
discourses, ideologies, or institutional¶ arrangements on their own terms, in the process locating
possibilities for¶ radical change within a particular existing order. This has two intimately related¶ but distinct
components. The first is the praxeological focus on pointing to possibilities¶ for change within particular contexts. This is particularly prominent
in¶ Booth’s (2007: 250) suggestion that ‘immanent critique involves identifying those¶ features within concrete situations (such as positive
dynamics, agents, key struggles)¶ that have emancipatory possibilities, and then working through the politics¶ Emancipation and critical
the goal of the theorist is that¶
of identifying, empowering, and amplifying silenced voices in particular contexts¶ rather than
articulating one’s own vision to be imposed externally. As Richard¶ Wyn Jones (1999: 76–78) suggests, the focus through
terrorism studies 113¶ University of Exeter¶ (tactics and strategies) to strengthen them.’ As such,
immanent critique should be¶ on ‘concrete utopias’: realisable visions of emancipatory orders grounded within¶ those contexts themselves.
The central focus on immanent critique as a form of¶ praxis might inform the location of possibilities for the resolution of conflicts that¶ give
rise to or are characterised by ‘terrorism’. Indeed, such an approach has been¶ applied to conflict in the Middle East (Bilgin, 2005) and in
Northern Ireland¶ (Ruane and Todd, 2005). The second component of immanent critique addressed here is the analytical¶ focus on fissures,
tensions, and inconsistencies within discourses, ideologies, and¶ institutional arrangements. This dimension is less prominent in Welsh School¶
accounts of immanent critique although, of course, the basis of the critique of¶ traditional theories and practices of security as a whole is that
these approaches¶ fail to live up to their own commitments. For Booth,
the reality of poverty, starvation, disease, human
rights violations, and refugee flows suggests that those¶ actors who have justified their existence of
the basis of providing security (states¶ and their leaders) are not actually ‘doing the job’ they had committed
themselves¶ to for their populations (see also Fierke, 2007: 190–193). Applied to the study of¶ ‘terrorism’, such an approach might
be used to interrogate the extent to which the¶ commitments of ‘counterterrorism’ discourses (for
example, ridding a country/the¶ world of ‘terrorism’) are being realised through the practices that they are¶ invoked
to justify (such as military campaigns) (see Fierke, 2007: 167–185;¶ Krebs and Lobasz, 2007: 450–451). Locating disjunctures here
potentially¶ provides a basis for radical change in dominant means of engaging with the threat¶ posed
by ‘terrorism’, a point I will return to later.
The very capacity for certain voices to define who the terrorists are or what terrorism
is marginalizes the oppressed and legitimizes the oppressors.
McDonald, editor of Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific, 9
(Matt,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,,p.115-6, AS)
Various authors have engaged with the question of how ‘terrorism’ itself is¶ defined in particular institutional contexts; who is privileged in
defining it; and¶ whose ends are served by those definitions (Blakely, 2007a; Tilly, 2004; Jackson,¶ 2007a). This question is important because
of the ways in which the
label ‘terrorism’¶ works as a powerful political signifier, serving to delegitimise
certain forms¶ of action and the actors undertaking them. Norris et al. (2003: 9) suggest that
definitions¶ of ‘terrorism’ in established democracies are likely to favour violence¶ perpetrated by nonstate actors against the state, in part because of the interests of¶ government in delegitimising the
actions of others and re-inscribing the rights of¶ states to act violently themselves. They further suggest
that such a definition is¶ dominant within the research communities of such states, not least because¶
researchers seek, or are reliant upon, government funding for research activity.4 If¶ the invocation of ‘terrorism’ itself serves to legitimise the
use of force (in¶ response or pre-emptively), in
turn creating conditions for counter-violence, then¶ asking
fundamental questions about whose voices are marginalised or empowered¶ in defining ‘terrorism’
opens up space for reflecting upon how violence itself¶ becomes possible.5¶ The concern with who defines
‘terrorism’ of course maps closely on to the¶ question of who defines ‘terrorists’? While definitions of ‘terrorism’ enable and¶ constrain
particular types of practices at a general level of legitimation,
the capacity¶ to label a group as a ‘terrorist’ group often
carries with it particular (often¶ legal) implications. The ‘war on terror’ provides a range of such examples. Jenny¶ Hocking
(2004) points to the ways in which post-2001 anti-terror legislation in¶ Australia allowed the Attorney General to label and ban particular
groups as¶ ‘terrorist’ groups and to detain their members without trial. The Chinese government,¶ meanwhile, was successful in convincing the
US administration to reverse¶ previous policy and label a Uighur separatist group (ETIM) in north-west China¶ as a ‘terrorist’ organisation in an
apparent quid pro quo for Chinese participation¶ in the ‘war on terror’. The US government’s decision was consistently invoked¶ by Chinese
officials in justifying both military action against that group and the¶ sentencing to death of dozens of its members (Foot, 2005: 422–423).
Such policy¶ and political implications have historical antecedents, not least in the decision of¶ Western
governments to accept the South African government’s labelling of the¶ ANC (African National Congress) as a ‘terrorist’ organisation during
apartheid.¶ At all these levels,
the capacity for certain voices to define who ‘terrorists’ are¶ has important and
often direct political implications. There are certainly genuine¶ concerns here that the labelling of
‘terrorists’ either constitutes a legitimation¶ strategy for suppressing political dissent or serves to
narrow the boundaries for¶ political deliberation and debate. An emancipatory framework would conceptualise¶ the
latter – and the general post-2001 tendency to limit ‘inflammatory’ or¶ Emancipation and critical terrorism studies 115¶ University of Exeter¶
‘unpatriotic’ forms of speech – as a danger in itself rather than as a means for¶ redressing the threat of ‘terrorism’ (Burke, 2008: 43; Booth,
2007: 261–264).
Political regimes use terror to stop terrorism instead of operating in an emancipatory
framework which amplifies certain voices central to non-repressive communication.
McDonald, editor of Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific, 9
(Matt,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.117-8, AS)
Another central tension or inconsistency that provides possibilities for¶ emancipatory change concerns the role of liberal, democratic values in
responses¶ to ‘terrorism’.
While political leaders engaged in ‘counterterrorism’ often express¶ a rhetorical
commitment to the defence of democracy and liberal values from terrorism,¶ they have also
frequently participated in actions that serve to undermine¶ democratic institutions and values. Such a
critique is again particularly applicable¶ to the ‘war on terror’ which has seen participant states pursuing restrictive ‘antiterror’¶ legislation, for
example, or engaged in illiberal and illegal detention practices¶ such
as extraordinary rendition flights, the use of torture,
and the long-term¶ incarceration of ‘enemy combatants’ at facilities such as Camp X-Ray in¶
Guantanamo Bay. There are, of course, a range of legal and ethical concerns¶ associated with such practices, not least when viewed
within a liberal ethical¶ framework (Bellamy, 2006). The demand to meet standards set by political¶ leaders themselves (such as the protection
of liberal democratic values) is an¶ important basis for bringing about (emancipatory) change. Adam Roberts (2005)¶ has also suggested in this
context that aside from the obvious moral concerns¶ with such illiberal practices, historically successful campaigns to resolve conflicts¶
characterised by the use of ‘terror’ have generally avoided suspending liberal¶ democratic values and have instead utilised open deliberative
Burke (2008: 40–41) endorses non-violent responses to ‘terrorism’¶ as much
because of their strategic effectiveness as their normative preferability.¶ Here, emancipatory change
becomes simultaneously ethically desirable¶ and politically efficacious.¶ Finally, the idea of the global promotion of
mechanisms.¶ Indeed, Anthony
liberal democracy and freedom¶ through the ‘war on terror’ could be (and indeed has been) contrasted with the¶ willingness of the United
States and its allies to cooperate with illiberal regimes¶ in the fight against terrorism, to the point of sanctioning the repression of¶ domestic
dissident groups in cooperative states. Previous examples of cooperation¶ with the regimes of China and Pakistan suggest themselves here, as
does¶ cooperation with states such as Russia and Malaysia (to name a few). Again,¶ there
is a core tension between a stated
concern with the protection or promotion¶ of democracy on the one hand and the support for political
regimes simply not in¶ the business of democracy on the other. This has certainly made life more difficult¶ for a range
of dissident political groups in these states either through direct¶ support for governmental ‘anti-terror’ practices or the removal of pressure
on¶ these regimes from powerful external actors (see Foot, 2005; Herring, 2008).¶ Emancipation and critical terrorism studies 117¶ University
of Exeter¶ Nevertheless, this tension does provide possibilities for critique and change,¶ evident in increasing pressure
on the Bush administration from Congress to¶ develop or keep in place limits on military cooperation with non-democratic¶ regimes, for
these forms of immanent critique provide a basis for fundamentally¶
destabilising the dominant discourses of ‘counterterror’ that legitimise and¶ increase the likelihood of
violence. More fundamentally, as a form of praxis,¶ immanent critique is based on the commitment to the idea that there are always¶
example (Pessin, 2005).¶ Together,
voices articulating alternatives in any context, no matter how unpromising. The¶ task of the critical theorist then becomes one of amplifying
locating possibilities for emancipation¶ extends beyond a
recognition of tensions and inconsistencies to an examination of¶ the range of ways in which different
actors contest dominant accounts of ‘terrorism’¶ and ‘counterterrorism’, articulate more inclusive and
these voices. As it¶ applies to the study of ‘terrorism’ here,
cosmopolitan visions of¶ community, and suggest alternatives to violence. Non-governmental organisations¶ and minor political parties
regularly articulate such alternatives. Both domestic¶ and international human rights NGOs have highlighted illiberal practices and¶ precisely
drawn attention to the contradictions inherent in governments’ anti-terror¶ campaigns.7 And in conflict situations themselves, grassroots
movements and¶ moderate voices on both sides of conflicts have articulated alternatives to violence,¶ often in cooperation with like-minded
groups and individuals on the ‘other side’¶ (see Maoz, 2004). Pointing
to and amplifying these voices is central to an¶
emancipatory praxis concerned with opening up possibilities for non-repressive¶ communication.
Emancipation is a strategic process of freeing up space to challenge dominant
discourses which silence certain voices.
McDonald, editor of Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific, 9
(Matt,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,
p.119-121, AS)
A fourth and final question suggested here is: what would emancipation look¶ like in the context of approaches to and practices of ‘terrorism’
and ‘counterterrorism’¶ in international politics? This type of question is central for the Welsh¶ School given the commitment to develop
practically engaged and grounded¶ theory (Booth, 1997, 2008). At some level, this can be viewed as a pre-emptive response to one of the most
prominent critiques of critical theory: that the¶ conditions for the realisation of emancipation (such as Habermas’s ‘ideal speech¶ situation’)
This criticism becomes less
devastating if emancipation is conceived as ‘a (strategic) process of freeing up’ rather than ‘a
condition of being¶ freed’. Viewed in such terms, and defined by Wyn Jones (1999: 76–78) as a¶ concern with locating and outlining
‘concrete utopias’, it is easier to address¶ questions about what emancipation might look like in contemporary contexts.¶ Here, analyses
might locate emancipatory practices in the increasing role of (previously marginalised) moderate
voices and political representation of dissident¶ groups and its relationship to diminishing frequency of
‘terrorist’ and ‘counterterrorist’¶ violence (see Burke, 2008: 47). Such processes have been evident in¶ changing relationships
are utopian and almost impossible to recognise analytically much less¶ imagine in practice.
between the Turkish government and Kurdish population¶ in Turkey, and more recently between government and separatist groups in the¶
Indonesian province of Aceh. In both cases, movements towards increased political¶ representation and peace have been intimately related.
Recognising such¶ processes as emancipatory and asking how they came about and how applicable¶ they might be to other contexts must be
central to an emancipatory ‘critical¶ terrorism studies’ agenda concerned with escaping the zero-sum logic of security¶ that legitimises – and
arguably encourages – violence.¶ One example of the myriad NGOs addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict is¶ particularly illustrative of
emancipatory practices and approaches at work in¶ contemporary contexts often taken as paradigmatic of ‘terrorism’ and ‘counterterrorism’.¶
The American-based international NGO, ‘A Different Future’ (ADF),¶ defines its remit as that of
drawing attention to moderate voices advocating nonviolence¶ and pursuing cooperative approaches
to conflict. Specifically, it suggests¶ that its role is that of:¶ helping moderate majorities reclaim the public idea space and regain control¶
over the policy agenda that will determine our collective futures. ADF uses¶ communications experts to amplify the voices of Israelis and
Palestinians¶ who work together. We create new collective voices of Jewish, Christian¶ and Muslim religious leadership, locally, nationally and
these voices can contain the violence that originates within their ¶ cultures more
effectively than force from without.8¶ (A Different Future, no date)¶ The commitments articulated here
are emancipatory. This project is concerned¶ with amplifying voices silenced by dominant discourses
advocating violence; it¶ is committed to opening up space for political dialogue and debate to a wider¶
range of voices; it recognises the importance of locating possibilities for change¶ within particular
contexts rather than imposing them from outside; and it is ultimately¶ suggestive of shared
membership in a global community. This example¶ suggests that rather than constituting an abstract idea never likely to be
internationally. If¶ enabled,
found in¶ political practice, emancipation is in fact practised and advanced in a range of¶ 120 M. McDonald¶ University of Exeter¶ sites, albeit
And to return to the
understanding of emancipation¶ endorsed here, such a commitment to opening up dialogic space for a
wider¶ range of voices to be heard is central to redressing the structures of inequality¶ and deprivation
that both constitute forms of violence and provide conditions in¶ which the specific use of force is
more likely to occur (see Herring, 2008).¶ Of course, a range of other questions suggest themselves beyond the four I¶ have identified
often those hidden from traditional accounts of international relations,¶ security, and ‘terrorism’.
as arising from a central concern with emancipation. In the questions¶ noted – and examples cited of those working with such questions – it is
also¶ important to note that analysts may not self-identify as working within an¶ emancipatory critical theoretical tradition. As Richard Wyn
Jones (2005: 216) has¶ argued persuasively, however, it is difficult to develop critiques of the status quo¶ that are not at some level informed
by an emancipatory impulse. Viewed in this¶ light emancipation can certainly be conceived of as a common concern of those¶ engaging in
emancipation may
be best¶ advanced through the freeing up of space to think, speak, and write differently¶ about what
‘terrorism’ means, how it might be studied, and how to make sense of¶ effective responses to it.
‘small c’ critical approaches to the study of ‘terrorism’ or indeed¶ global security politics. For many in this context,
Impacts
Terrorist Label => Violence
The label of “terrorist” constructs the other as engaged in absolutely illegitimate
violence and incapable of negotiation, creating the kind of absolute antagonism that
precedes genocidal violence.
Barrinha, Professor of IR at University of Coimbra, 11
[Andres, Aug 1st, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 4 Issue 2, “The political importance of labelling:
terrorism and Turkey's discourse on the PKK”, pg 167-168, accessed 6/28/13, VJ]
The usage of the terrorist label could be defined as a powerful contextualised political choice.
Powerful, as it has attached the ‘metaphysical punch’ and ‘disciplinary power’ (Der Derian 1995, pp.
24–25) that anything related to security has, but also because any ‘deployment of language by
politicians is an exercise of power’ (Jackson 2005, p. 3). Contextualised, as the terrorist discourse must
be framed by a broader discourse that contains the constellation of key concepts (national security,
identity, etc.) that define what can and cannot be politically articulated. Political choice, because
terrorism is defined as a phenomenon linked to the practice of violence in order to obtain political
goals, hence, defined within the boundaries of politics. The choice of the terrorist wording is, in that
sense, an acceptance of its political character, and as such, a political utterance. In analysing the
terrorist label in particular contexts, it is essential to understand what is inside of it; that is to
understand who are the actors, institutions and countries that are being brought together under the
same words. This delimitation step is of fundamental importance, not only for the audience to
understand the boundaries and content of the label, but for the conflict analyst to be able to better
understand the limits of the conflict (who, according to the belligerent actors, is or is not part of the
conflict). In a conflict where formally the state fights against a non-governmental entity, a first
distinction that state authorities must make is between the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’. The discourse
must be constructed either in a way that considers the rebel movement mainly as a proxy of an
external actor, or in a way that acknowledges it mainly as an internal issue. In the first case, the
rhetoric will be directed towards the country or countries in support of the rebels. In this case, the
conflict might easily evolve into a regional confrontation. In the second case, the discourse
construction can broadly assume three different levels. The first level is the one in which the rebel
movement is treated in an isolated way: belligerents are not given identity labels or even political ones.
They are taken as a movement looking to destabilise the country or to create some kind of conflict
dynamics that benefits them. They are usually defined as ‘terrorists’, a label that carries ‘a
connotation of absolutely illegitimate violence’ (Guelke 2006, p. 182), and the impossibility of
negotiations (Guelke 2006, p. 211). In the Sri Lankan case, as Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah reveal, state
authorities established a clear boundary between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the
Tamil people, ‘insisting its military campaign was intended to “liberate the Tamils from the LTTE” ’
(2005, p. 93). There was, in this case, a clear distinction between a group and the citizens – the latter
under the state umbrella, the former, enemies that should be destroyed. The second level goes into the
political arena, absorbing the ‘collaborators’, usually legal political parties. In that context, there is
already a broader network in place, in which the rebel movement tries to combine the illegal means (the
use of violence against the state) with legal political participation, such as the Irish Republican Army
(IRA)/Sinn Fein in Ireland (see Bew et al. 2009). These are usually leitmotivs for closing down political
parties, as has frequently happened in Turkey (Ko˘gaciolo˘glu 2004). Finally, the third level goes all the
way to the community. It is more than a rebel movement, more than a political party: it is an ethnic
group, a minority, a whole community challenging the state. The ‘other’ must, in this case, be defined
as inferior, and as damaging to the stability of the state (see de Swaan 1997). It is broadly the same
kind of discourse employed by the Nazis during the Jewish genocide and that has been reproduced in
several different conflicts around the world, from Rwanda to Darfur. It is a type of discourse that tries
to create insurmountable barriers between communities or groups within the same state. There is an
attempt for general popular mobilisation, which, as a consequence, may lead to communal violence
or even genocide (see Shaw 2007). Following a Schmittian approach, it could be argued that, as a
political tool, genocide falls beyond the limits of politics itself, as the enemy is to be destroyed and not
defined. It is the passage from the real enemy to that of the absolute enemy: ‘[i]t is the renunciation
of real enmity that opens the door for the work of annihilation of an absolute enmity’ (Schmitt
2004[1962], p. 67). The issue of labelling, viewed through this prism, is informative regarding the
importance of discourse for the definition of an armed conflict. As genocide claims, due to their
totalising ambitions, do not figure within an acceptable conflict framework, the terrorist label,
whether applied to groups (by the state) or to states (by the groups), is the most radical point in a line
of potential conflict discourses.
State Terrorism Impacts
Counterhegemonic struggle is necessary and functional—now is the opportune
moment to critique the Western metanarrative of terror
Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 09
[Richard, March 18th, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 1 Issue 3, “The ghosts of state terror:
knowledge, politics and terrorism studies”, p 385-356, accessed 6/27/13, VJ]
In the end, however, the puzzle of why state terrorism has been so neglected in the field is less
important than recognising that there are important reasons for ‘bringing the state back into
terrorism studies’ (Blakeley 2007). First, there are obvious analytical reasons for taking state terrorism
seriously, including the imbalances and distortions which a narrow focus on non-state terrorism
introduces. Second, there are normative reasons for studying state terrorism in a rigorous and
systematic manner, notably that such knowledge furnishes a powerful means of holding states to
account for their actions and reinforcing norms of behaviour that exclude the use of violence to
intimidate and terrorise civilians. By any measure, states have been responsible for infinitely more
human suffering and terror than any other actor; the promotion of human security therefore depends
on protecting citizens from the abuses and predations of states. In conclusion, exposing the ideological
effects and political technologies of the discourse has the potential to open up critical space for the
articulation of alternative and potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice. The good
news is that discourses are never completely hegemonic; there is always room for counter-hegemonic
struggle and subversive forms of knowledge. In this case, not only is the discourse inherently unstable
and vulnerable to different forms of critique, but the continual setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan,
ongoing revelations of state torture and rendition by Western forces, and increasing resistance to
government attempts to restrict civil liberties suggest that the present juncture provides an
opportune moment to engage in deliberate and sustained critique of a dominant discourse which
focuses on non-state actors and obscures the much greater terrorism of state actors.
State terrorism outweighs violence by non-state actors.
Mickler 10 (David, teaches in Security, Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies at Murdoch University,
Western Australia, “Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice”, ed. Jackson, Murphy, and
Poynting, p. 28 DAG)
The Darfur case demonstrates vividly that regimes of terror are not only phenomena of history. In
their daily lives, millions of ordinary people across the globe continue to experience politically
motivated repression, violence and terrorism. Such instances are particularly concerning when it is in
fact the institutions of the state which are the source of acute - and indeed intentional - human
suffering. In addition to the basic immorality of such violence, this is a matter of fundamental social,
political, and intellectual importance because of the powerfully destructive capabilities of modern
states, the violation of the posited social contract between citizens and their governments, and also
because of an emerging international consensus that states which abuse the fundamental human rights
or security of their populations should incur a suspension of their assumed sovereign legitimacy and
immunity (ICISS 2001). Using Darfur as a case study, this chapter argues that in addition to more
commonly used legal designations such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, we can
characterize certain forms of state violence as 'terrorism' if those acts conform to the following
constitutive criteria: they are politically motivated, intentional and pre-determined, and they intend
to cause fear and intimidate a wider audience than just the immediate targets, which are primarily
(but not only) civilians (Jackson 2008: 29-30).
In a context in which 'no word in the contemporary American and international political lexicon is more
frequently invoked or more emotionally charged than "terrorist" ' (Selden and So 2004: 3), however,
critics highlight the intellectual anomaly of how - historically and at present - such 'state terrorism' has
been collectively responsible for a vast number of civilian deaths per annum but is generally deemphasized, ignored, or even justified in much of the burgeoning contemporary discourse and
analysis of terrorism (Blakeley 2007; Booth 2008). Indeed, one observation is that 'mainstream social
scientists have failed to recognise the possibility that states ... can and do carry out acts of terrorism'
(Selden and So 2004: 4). Yet, as Sluka has argued convincingly: If we allow the definition [of terrorism]
to include violence by states and agents of states, then we find that the major form of terrorism in the
world today is that practiced by states and their agents and allies, and that, quantitatively, antistate
terrorism pales into relative insignificance compared to it. (Sluka 2000: 1)
Endless War
The core terrorism narrative creates an insatiable war machine which continually
demands new blood- new wars must be constantly found and justified.
Debrix Professor of International Relations at Florida International University 7
(François Debrix is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University in
Miami, “Tabloid Terror”, Page #117-118, NC)
In his essay produced a few days after the 9/11 attacks, Baudrillard writes: “[N]obody seems to have
understood that Good and Evil climb to power at the same time and in the same move.” Baudrillard
goes on: “The triumph of the one does not imply the vanquishing of the other . . . At the bottom, Good
could only defeat Evil by renouncing its claim to be Good.”112 Turning to final/fatal truths (defeating
“evil,” protecting the “good,” revealing the ultimate “what is,” absolutely triumphing over despair) and
making use of total heroic warfare as a preferred technique to reach such truths is a self-defeating
project, Baudrillard intimates. Only by becoming what one never wants to be and what one allegedly
abjects can such a prophecy become realized. “Good” can triumph over “evil” only by renouncing its
claim to be good, as Baudrillard suggests, and the American state/nation can only defeat terror and
terrorism by turning into a terrifying and terrorizing war machine. But, in order to avoid the frightful
revelation that, eventually, if “we” do take this path, “we” may be no different from “them” (and that in
fact “we” are abject and crave abjection) and, moreover, “our” ideologies and moralities may be just as
disruptive and even destructive as “theirs” are said to be,113 “we” must try to postpone this ultimate
realization. In the meantime, to lend credence to the moral superiority (the “good”) of our ideologies
and policies (and to convince “ourselves” that “we” are different, that “we” are not “evil”), “we” seek to
mark the distinction between “us” and “them” through the use of the war machine, through countless
instances of agonal violence. Yet, as was the case with abjection, this sovereign agonal violence brings
“us” ever closer to being undistinguishable from “them.” In these instances of agony that endlessly
seek to postpone the fateful realization that “our” so-called better and superior values may themselves,
sometimes, be “evil” (at least, to some “others”), the aesthetics of combat and destruction are prized
for what they show, that is to say, for the heroism of the deed that they appear to reveal, and nothing
else. Foolishly, “we” believe (often because “we” are told that this is so, that it is what “we” need to
escape loss and despair) that only in those moments can the claim that “we” are “good” and that “they”
are “evil” be demonstrated. This modality of action that advocates sovereignty, victory, and salvation
from “evil” through the glory of war’s theatrical brutality is the most insecure and unsafe strategy that
could ever be selected. Far from (re)securing the state, the nation, or those who believe or have been
told they are “good,” it puts us all on a path toward annihilation. The war machine demands ever
more blood, ever more battles, and ever more deaths. Since the fateful end can never be accepted or
reached (for then, as Baudrillard claims, “we” would have to see that the “good” is indeed not “good” as
such, and perhaps not so distinguishable from “evil”), new wars have to be found and must be justified.
This is exactly the message that American tabloid imperialistic proponents of agonal violence (and not
just statecraft anymore) like Kaplan and Kristol and Ledeen, among others, leave us with. The wars that
have been started by the American war machine after 9/11 and championed by these tabloid
intellectuals of terror and absolute warfare are just the beginning of things to come. They are part and
parcel of an approach to security and sovereignty ad absurdum, one that secretly (or unconsciously
perhaps) recognizes that the “evil” it fights will never be caught, or else the moment of confrontation
between “our good” and “their evil” would take place and reveal not a final triumph of the “good,”
but rather its possible indistinction from “evil.” (Could we perhaps not use this critical insight to make
sense of the decision by the United States’ war makers in the summer to fall of 2002, when it appeared
that they had cornered Bin Laden in some caves in the mountains separating Afghanistan from Pakistan,
around an area called Tora Bora, to turn around and start up a plan to invade Iraq instead?).
Legitimizes Counterterrorism
Conventional terrorism studies have insulated themselves from critique through the
“aura of objectivity” justifying coercive US counterterrorist interventions which
ironically involve utilizing the use of terrorism itself.
Raphael, Lecturer in International Relations at Kingston University London, 9
(Sam, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p. 51, AS)
The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the¶ US state means that it
is critically important to analyse the research output from¶ key experts within the community. This is
particularly the case because of the¶ aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism ‘knowledge’
generated by academic¶ experts. Running throughout the core literature is a positivist assumption,
explicitly¶ stated or otherwise, that the research conducted is apolitical and objective¶ (see for example,
Hoffman, 1992: 27; Wilkinson, 2003). There is little to no¶ reflexivity on behalf of the scholars, who see
themselves as wholly dissociated¶ from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. This
reification of academic¶ knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the¶
US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political¶ actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional
hearings in a¶ manner which privileges their nonpartisan input:¶ Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open¶
session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism¶ in the Middle East. . . . It has been the Terrorism Panel’s
practice, in the¶ interests of objectivity and gathering all the facts, to pair classified briefings¶ and open briefings. . . . This way we garner the
best that the classified world of¶ intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in¶ universities, think tanks, and
other institutions . . .¶ (Saxton, 2000, emphasis added)¶ The
representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent’
and as providing ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’ has significance for its contribution to the policymaking
process in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core¶ experts tend to insulate
the broad direction of US policy from critique. Indeed,¶ as Alexander George noted, it is precisely
because ‘they are trained to clothe¶ their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and
scholarship’ that¶ expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’¶ the
claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77).¶ Given this, it becomes vital to subject the
content of terrorism studies to¶ close scrutiny. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of¶ key figures
within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previous¶ critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979;
Herman,¶ 1982; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky, 1991; George, 1991b;¶ Jackson, 2007g), this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis
of some of the¶ major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions¶ served by much of the research. Rather than
doing so across the board, this¶ chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South¶ which is seen to challenge US
interests. Examining this aspect of research is¶ important, given that the ‘threat’ from this form of terrorism has led the US¶ and its allies to
intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national¶ security, with profound consequences for the human security of people in the¶
region.¶ 50 S. Raphael¶ University of Exeter¶ Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which¶ characterise much of
the field’s research. First,
in the context of anti-US terrorism¶ in the South, many important claims made by
key terrorism experts simply replicate¶ official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated
primarily¶ through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources,¶ combined
with the frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant,¶ not least because official
analyses have often been revealed as presenting a¶ politically-motivated account of the subject. Second,
and partially as a result of¶ this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to insulate from critique¶
those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. In¶ particular, the experts
overwhelmingly ‘silence’ the way terrorism is itself often¶ used as a central strategy within US-led
counterterrorist interventions in the¶ South. That is, ‘counterterrorism’ campaigns executed or
supported by Washington¶ often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002:¶
83; Stohl, 2006: 18–19)These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core¶
figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of¶ work plagued by
substantive problems which together shatter the illusion of¶ ‘objectivity’. Moreover, the research
output can be seen to serve a very particular¶ ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past
thirty years, it has¶ largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an¶
extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the¶ rubric of various
‘war(s) on terror’. After setting out the method by which key¶ experts within the field have been
identified, this chapter will outline the two¶ main problematic features which characterise much of the
research output by¶ these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the¶ US
state.
This discourse causes serial policy failure and justifies counterterrorist operations that
proliferate greater terrorism
Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 06
[Richard, December 18-20, in Michael Innes, (ed) Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe
Havens (Praeger Security International), “The State and Terrorist Sanctuaries: A Critical Analysis”,
http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1948/BISA-Paper-2006-JacksonFinal.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/25/13, VJ]
A final criticism of the “terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse is that it has proved in its prescriptions to be
largely ineffectual and in many cases, counter-productive. In particular, the policy of employing
military force against “terrorist sanctuaries‟ or “havens‟, a reasonable policy within the confines of
the discourse, actually has an astonishing record of failure. For example, Israel has mounted military
strikes and targeted assassination against “terrorist sanctuaries‟ in the Palestinian territories and
surrounding states for over fifty years without any significant reduction in the overall level of terrorism.
The apartheid regime in South Africa adopted a similarly futile policy against its neighbours during the
1980s, carrying out numerous raids, bombings and assassinations. U.S. military strikes on Libya in 1986,
Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 and the use of force in the current war on terror against Afghanistan
and Iraq, have all failed to noticeably reduce the overall number of terrorist attacks against U.S.
interests. More broadly, the use of military force against “terrorist sanctuaries‟ in Colombia, Chechnya,
Kashmir, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Turkey, Spain and elsewhere has in every case failed to appreciably
affect the level of terrorist violence. It could even be argued that the attempts since September 11 to
eliminate “terrorist sanctuaries‟ in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Lebanon in particular, have had the
opposite effect – despite premature claims of success in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban. In
reality, these military interventions have solidified and greatly strengthened various Middle Eastern
insurgent and “terrorist‟ groups, reinforced new militant movements and coalitions in places like Iraq
and Afghanistan, provided new regions of conflict where dissident groups can gain military experience,
and greatly increased overall levels of anti-Western sentiment across the region.84 It is probable that
the price of these policies will be many more years of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an
ongoing terrorist campaign against U.S. interests (and those of its close allies) which will in turn,
demand further military actions against „terrorist sanctuaries‟; such is the circular logic of the
discourse. The main problem of course, is that the discourse focuses on the symptoms and enablers of
dissident terrorism, rather than its underlying causes and poses a palliative remedy rather than a
curative one. From one perspective, it is actually an impediment to dealing with terrorism because it
functions as a closed system of discourse, preventing discussion of the political grievances which
cause individuals and groups to seek out places of sanctuary from where they can launch attacks in the
first place.
Counterterrorism Bad
Counterterrorism fails and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy- their assertions are
tautological, untestable and rely on faith in secret information.
Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 12
(Richard, February 6, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University,
“Does Counter-terrorism work? Or, counter-terrorism as divination…”
http://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2012/02/06/does-counter-terrorism-work-orcounter-terrorism-as-divination/, accessed 7/3/12, CPO)
Imagine that one day Counter-terrorism officers appear on television and announce that to keep evil terrorists at
bay – to protect us from the cancer of terrorism which daily haunts us – every family is required to leave a saucer of milk
out by the nearest fence-post on a Wednesday at dusk, while chanting the words ‘numpty, numpty, noo noo’
precisely seven times. The Counter-terrorist official goes on to assert that this ritual must be done every week, indefinitely,
because it is the only way to keep us safe from terrorism. Of course, most people would consider this to be a
little bit insane, to say the least, and would naturally ask: what evidence or information do you have exactly, Mr Counterterrorist, to suggest that this will remotely work? What is your counter-terrorist theory based on? What is the logic and
evidence you are basing this on?¶ While this is a humorous scenario, it is only slightly alarming that this is actually an accurate
description of how counter-terrorism has come to work in the era of the war on terror. For the past ten years at least,
we have been told that terrorism is a massive, evil force which is inevitable in this day and age – it is only a
matter of when, not if a terrorist attack will take place. Terrorists are everywhere and can strike at any
time and with any weapon. The only way to control terrorism is to spend billions of dollars improving security in public places, increase
surveillance on all people at all times, get rid of legal protections for suspects, make everyone prove their identity, bring in harsh new laws,
dispatch drones to kill hundreds of nameless people in foreign lands, torture suspects for information, kidnap and render people to secret
prisons around the world, encourage people to spy on their neighbours, watch what we talk or read about lest we glorify terrorism, and much
more besides. Moreover, we are told that these security rituals will have to be observed pretty much forever, because the
threat of
terrorism will never end, and we must include counter-terrorism in ever more areas of modern life
because terrorism is spreading.¶ As before, the questions we should ask are: what evidence or information do you
have, Mr Counter-terrorist, to suggest that this will in any way work – that it will actually make us safe from the evil scourge
of terrorism? What is your counter-terrorist theory based on? What logic and evidence are you basing this on?¶ The alarming fact is that most
counter-terrorism today is not based on theories and actual evidence, nor is it rooted in a historical or
theoretical understanding of terrorism as a form of political violence. Significantly, not a single government since
9/11 has conducted a major study to examine whether the measures they have undertaken and the billions
they have spent have either worked effectively to prevent terrorism, provides value for money, or could have been achieved some other
less costly way. In reality, they are spending all that money and undertaking all those measures purely on
faith. At the same time, scholars have also been very lax in studying whether counter-terrorism measures actually work, or how well they
work; there are very few empirically-based studies on the effectiveness of different counter-terrorism
measures. Interestingly, the few studies that have been done have concluded that either they don’t work (this is
the case for security measures such as extra screening at airports, for example; these measures have a displacement effect, which means that
terrorists tend to choose other less well-guarded targets), or importantly, they are
actually counter-productive (this is the case for
measures like targeted killings, for example, which tend to increase the number of recruits for terrorist groups).¶ In fact, most counterterrorism during the last ten years of war on terror, as Joseba Zulaika has so eloquently shown, has been a self-fulfilling
prophesy: actions undertaken which produce the very thing it is designed to destroy. We went to war
against Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, tortured, assassinated and rendered thousands of
suspected terrorists, all to prevent terrorism, while simultaneously knowing that it would most likely
produce more terrorism (as foreign military intervention usually does) – which would then in turn, necessitate more
counter-terrorism. On a smaller scale, FBI agents go out and encourage disaffected individuals to undertake terrorist operations, and
then arrest them before they can undertake their plot – with massive publicity about ‘foiled plots’.¶ Importantly (and a little insanely), the
sequence of events which occurs is then used as proof of the original assertion: ‘See, there are
terrorists in Iraq/Pakistan/Yemen/Somalia, which is why we had to go there to fight them’; ‘See, there are terrorists
within America who want to kill US citizens.’ In other words, we are told that we have to follow the prescriptions of the
counter-terrorist, knowing that it will produce the very terrorism it is designed to counter, which will
then justify further counter-terrorism measures.¶ The interesting thing is that this kind of tautological,
mystical thinking and this kind of self-confirming behavior is what, so anthropologists tell us, characterizes
the thinking and practices of divination and witchcraft. In a sense, counter-terrorists have become
oracles or shamans in our society: they rely on secret knowledge, they tell us how to ritually fight the evil of
terrorism, and they can never be tested or proven wrong. Their predictions and assertions do not require
scientific validation or confirmation; instead, they tell us what to do to prevent terrorism and if no
terrorism occurs, they claim they were therefore right to prescribe such measures. If terrorism does occur,
they can also claim they were right about the danger of terrorism, and that more clearly needs to be
done to counter it. In other words, there is no real (logical or empirical) way to prove a diviner or an oracle
wrong. In the end, all we can do is to keep putting out the milk by the fencepost and chant, ‘numpty, numpty,
noo noo’ while the sun sets on our civil liberties and freedoms…
Epistemology/Method First
Our criticism of their orthodox knowledge production about terrorism is a necessary
precursor to any further research. Reject their non-falsifiable conclusions which fail
basic epistemological standards for social science.
Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the
Swedish National Defence College, 9
(Magnus, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 13-14
GAL)
For almost thirty years the terrorism studies field occupied a marginal position within mainstream academic circles. Only a handful of
academics toiled away individually to provide some social scientific meaning and order out of a catalogue of acute terrorism crisis events as
they unfolded across time and contexts. This intellectual effort was largely preoccupied with immediate events, academics being engulfed in
making sense of evolving trends and in trying to predict what new waves of terrorism would appear on the horizon. Towards these ends,
researchers developed various theories of terrorism. They focused principally on the causes of the phenomenon, the evolution and dynamics of
terrorist groups, and how to deal with it from a state perspective (Maskaliunaite, 2004). Some argued that 'the very fact that the subject of
terrorism is studied from so many different angles may well be an advantage and not a shortcoming of the field* (ibid.). It requires increasingly
interdisciplinary collaboration, as terrorism in the age of globalization and increased complexity can be characterized, in the words of Nancy
Hayden, as a 'wicked problem* (Hayden. 2006). As such, it requires knit ling together a range of disciplinary approaches outside of international
relations and security studies. This
social and behavioral research is inherently difficult to conduct as it is
'socially constructed, culturally specific and changing* (Stohl. 2005: 28). Others scathingly 'characterized the
field of terrorism studies as stagnant, poorly conceptualized, lacking in rigor, and devoid of adequate
theory, data, and methods* (Stampnitzky, 2007a). As Alex Schmid and Berto Jongman lamented back in 1988: "there are
probably few areas in the social science literature in which so much is written on the basis of so little
research' (Schmid and Jongman, 1988).
A principal cause for this critique is the surprisingly few research inventories conducted over the years
designed to fundamentally question theories, assumptions, and knowledge production . This type of
state-of-the-art research inventory is necessary for preparing the next wave of research. My own anthology.
Mapping Terrorism Research (2006a), convinced me that every new researcher entering the field of terrorism studies
ought to produce their own critique and research inventory as a precursor for any further research to fundamentally question established epistemological and methodological approaches . Far too few
self-reflexive books, chapters, or journal articles actually exist taking stock in a unifying sense of the terrorism
studies field to account for what we know; how we know what we know; and what research
questions we ought to focus on in terms of individual and collective research efforts, even fewer exist which address
the theory and methods of studying terrorism. One explanation for this absence pertains to the relative
absence of debate among the orthodox terrorism scholars. This 'invisible college' of terrorism
researchers often recycled empirical information, some with questionable credibility and precision, and
interchanged contexts, frequently without sufficient regard for situational, political, social or security
specificity. As argued by Martha Crenshaw, researchers should try to avoid 'constructing general categories of
terrorist actors that lump together dissimilar motivations, organizations, resources and contexts'
(Crenshaw. 2000: 405). Often disparate evidence is woven together selectively to suit the case without regard
for specific context. Relying on each others' work alongside government and media reports produced
an ever-expanding intellectual quilt that had a tendency to grow in size, but less in layered intellectual
depth. The same mantras or analogies - as exemplified by Brian Jenkins* 'terrorism likes a lot of people
watching not a lot of people dead* (see Jenkins. 1998) - appeared across the terrorism studies literature
without anyone ever critically questioning what it really meant and the social scientific basis or qualitative
quantitative method for getting to this conclusion. This problem has been underscored by Michael Stohl who
accurately pointed towards what:
Popper (1934) might caustically designate as 'wisdom* rather than 'science'. Thus, the assembled
wisdom might be correct but the demarcation between wisdom and science that would allow
proposing the necessary conjectures, collecting the appropriate data and subjecting these conjectures and
data to tests which might arguably demonstrate their falsifiability has not yet met the standards of
social science epistemology.(Stohl, 2005) As complained by Schmid and Jongman. much of the writing in
terrorism studies is 'impressionistic, superficial, and at the same time often also pretentious, venturing farreaching generalizations on the basis of episodal evidence' (Schmid and Jongman. 1988).
Our methodological and epistemological criticisms come first- it’s the only way to
resolve contradictory findings and improve knowledge production.
Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the
Swedish National Defence College, 9
(Magnus, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 32-33,
GAL)
Boundless research horizons have opened up as a result of 9/11, which has moved terrorism studies
from the periphery to center stage. Much rich knowledge exists on various dimensions of terrorism that
needs to be explored in greater analytical depth and through interdisciplinary breadth. Taking
intellectual stock as to the state of the art of terrorism research and where there are problems and
prospects is essential in order to reflect on past achievements and where research needs to head.
Terrorism research has come a long way, but has even further to journey in different directions. The
time has come for more rigorous research inventories and exploration of muliidisciplinary approaches
into terrorism as a complex social and behavioral phenomenon. In turn, this multi-disciplinarity
requires self-reflexivity about methodology, ontology, and epistemology to work. Otherwise, you end
up with mutually contradictory findings with no way of adjudicating between them or resolving them.
More orthodox terrorism studies ought to recognize that vigorous debates, critical self-reflexivity, and
alternative analytical assumptions and approaches do not constitute a threat to knowledge
production, but instead, are essential ingredients for moving the next wave of pioneering research
forward. After all, this is the very essence of the academic enterprise.
2ac Bizness
Geopolitics K of Disads
Just describing a foreign policy situation is to engage in the tacit normalization of a
particular description of the world that has been shaped by hegemonic elites. This
enables people and places to be transformed into abstracted security commodities
subject to invasion, control, and bombing.
Agnew and Corbridge ‘95 (Mastering Space: Hegemony, territory and political economy, John, professor of geography @
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs @ Syracuse, Stuart, Lecturer in Geography @ University of Cambridge, p. )
There are four specific points that follow from these comments on geopolitical discourse and political elites (O’Tuathail and Agnew
1992). First, geopolitical
discourse is not simply a separate activity or the identification of
specific geographical influences upon a particular foreign-policy situation. Just
describing a foreign-policy situation is to engage in geopolitics through the implicit
and tacit normalization of a division and description of the world. To identify and
name a place is to trigger a series of narratives, subjects and understandings. For example,
to designate an area as ‘Islamic’ or ‘Western’ is not only to name it, but also to brand
it in terms of its politics and the type of foreign policy its ‘nature’ demands.
Second, geopolitical discourse involves practical reasoning rather than the
deliberate employment of formal geopolitical models; though these often capture important aspects of dominant spatial representations.
Practical geopolitical reasoning relies on common-sense narratives and distinctions rather than formal models. Defining
areas
as modern or backward, Western or non-Western, civilized or barbarian, and
democratic or despotic have been important binary oppositions around which
modern geopolitical discourse revolves, irrespective of whether its purveyors are
academics (disciplinary or formal geopolitics), practicioners of statecraft (practical geopolitics), or mediapersons involved in representation in popular culture (popular geopolitics).
Third, the geographical knowledge displayed in geopolitical discourse is usually of a
reductive nature. Information about places is filtered and suppressed in order to fit
into a priori geopolitical categories. Geopolitical reasoning operates through the
active simplification of the complex reality of places in favour of controllable
geopolitical abstractions. This is how places and their inhabitants can become
‘security commodities’, readily subject to invasion, control, or bombing.
Fourth, and finally, not all political elites have equal influence over how global politicaleconomic space is represented. Those in authority in the Great Powers or within the hegemonic
state (if there is one) have the power to constitute the dominant geopolitical discourse. This
happens not only through their own practice but also through the active adoption of the dominant geopolitical discourse by both allies
and enemies. Of course, hegemonic representation do not go unchallenged but even challenges often must conform to the ‘terms of
debate’ laid down by the dominant discourse in order to be intelligible or readily understood.
AT: Not Radical Enough/Rejection Ks
The goal of our critique is to provide a realistic alternative to generate
Critical scholars must engage in political institutions in order to prevent orthodox
studies from having a monopoly on policymaking.
Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisalion and Contemporary
Political Violence, 9
(Marie Breen, edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.213-4, AS)
Although critical scholars may wish to distance themselves from certain¶ aspects of government
policy, it is crucial that they remain engaged with policymakers,¶ so that policy is informed by a diverse
range of views, not merely the¶ orthodoxy. Critical scholars cannot complain about government policy
on terrorism¶ if they have not attempted to inform that policy. Even though critical voices¶ may be
disregarded or not taken seriously, critical scholars should not let this¶ prevent them from talking to
policymakers and government, and speaking ‘truth¶ to power’, even though ‘power’ may not listen.¶
Some worry about accepting government funding, and the case study presented¶ here illustrates how
the design of research programmes and the involvement¶ of certain agencies may preclude scholars’
participation. However, this does¶ not mean that all government funding is problematic or that it is not
possible to¶ accept funding from government and retain one’s integrity – and one’s safety.¶ Such
decisions are made on a case-by-case basis: after all, both governments and¶ research fields change over
time.¶ How do we engage with government and remain critical and independent?¶ The answer is the
formation of a community of critical scholars that engages in¶ ongoing debate and consultation with
each other about contemporary issues, and¶ The ethics of research on ‘terrorism’ 213¶ University of
Exeter¶ seeks second opinions and views from each other. Even though we are at an¶ early stage of the
critical turn in terrorism studies, I do not think it is sentimental¶ to say that this community has begun
to form. Such a community is important¶ for withstanding the kind of political attack that some critical
scholars have been¶ subjected to, and paradoxically and happily, such attacks tend to consolidate¶
such communities, although the concomitant risk is that a ghetto mentality might¶ develop.¶ The
difficulties described above notwithstanding, a renewed support for and¶ involvement in primary
research by critical scholars is advocated. Our universities¶ must provide thorough training and
preparation for both new and seasoned¶ scholars proposing to work in dangerous fields, through the
development of curricula,¶ courses, and bibliographies on the subject, and through exposure to scholars¶
experienced in such fieldwork. Scholars with fieldwork experience must¶ follow Sluka’s (1990b) example
and draw the lessons from their fieldwork¶ experience and publish them in order to provide advice and
stimulation for¶ scholars embarking on fieldwork for the first time. Such literature will also open¶ up and
take forward the much-needed debates about ethics and methods in¶ the field.¶ Finally, it is important
to ask who research on terrorism is for. Some critical¶ scholars tend towards a Boothian redefinition of
security, focused on the security¶ and well-being of the individual not the security of the state – security
as emancipation,¶ with all the difficulties of definition that that raises (see also Toros and¶ Gunning, and
McDonald, this volume). Our research ultimately aims at providing¶ a firm knowledge base from which
we can understand the political desperation¶ of those who resort to terroristic methods and pre-empt
such methods¶ through non-violent, political, and diplomatic means, and through widening and¶
deepening political participation both locally and globally. We must also establish¶ the real effect of
contemporary counterterrorist methods, their effects on¶ political attitudes, actual human rights, and
the human rights culture, since many¶ suspect they are counterproductive. These are the contributions
critical scholars¶ can make to ‘solving’ terrorism.
new ideas in order to improve the contemporary study of political terrorism. Their
overly radical rejection prevents dialogue and can never change the terms of the
debate.
Jackson et al, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
((Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Jeroen Gunning is Lecturer in International Politics at
Aberystwyth University and Deputy Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence and co-editor of
the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism, Marie Breen Smyth is Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisalion and Contemporary Political
Violence (CSRV) at Aberystwyth University, and a Reader in International Politics and co-editor of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism,
Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p. 4, AS)
In this broader context, the specific aim of this volume is to bring together an¶ eminent group of scholars
to explore, first, why a new ‘critical’ approach to the¶ study of political terrorism is needed and, second,
what such an approach might¶ entail in terms of its ontology, epistemology, methodology, normative
standpoint,¶ ethics, contribution to policy, its relation to other disciplines, and most¶ importantly, its
future research agenda. We accept that articulating a clear,¶ achievable, and relevant research agenda is
the litmus test of any new approach. It is not enough to simply point out what is lacking in current
research; a clear and realistic alternative must also be provided. In essence, our primary purpose¶ was to make the
case for critical terrorism studies in a much clearer and more¶ developed form than we have up to this point. We hope that the following
chapters¶ will go some way towards this goal, while at the same time opening up and¶ stimulating new questions, issues, debates,
relationships, and collaborations.¶ At the same time, and as the line-up of contributing scholars clearly demonstrates,¶ a central aim of this
project was to put into practice our own call for¶ widening the disciplinary basis of terrorism research and including voices and¶ perspectives
that are frequently missing in the orthodox literature. To this end,¶ we asked scholars from a range of disciplinary and methodological
approaches¶ to contribute, including political science, anthropology, psychology, international¶ relations, area studies, conflict resolution, and
feminist studies, as well¶ as both established and younger researchers, and critical and orthodox scholars.¶ The intention was to enrich and
We believe that such a multi-disciplinary and
methodological¶ interface is essential for generating new ideas and insights.¶ In tandem with these
broader aims, we also recognised a pressing need to¶ engage with the existing terrorism studies field
in a new, more dialogic manner¶ than some of our critically-oriented predecessors. We are fully
cognisant that previous¶ efforts to influence the field have been largely unsuccessful; many of the¶
criticisms made in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly by left-wing scholars and¶ anthropologists, are
still, unfortunately, valid today. In part, this previous failure¶ was the result of a tendency by some
critically-oriented scholars to couch their¶ critique in polemical and therefore alienating terms, and
the fact that many of¶ them originated outside of the field they were criticising. There was also a
certain¶ unwillingness to engage in respectful dialogue with orthodox scholars of terrorism;¶ it often
appeared to be a case of throwing rocks from the sidelines. Acutely¶ aware of the potential for a similarly unhelpful
enliven the analyses with multiple and diverse¶ perspectives.
outcome in this case, we view the¶ call for a critical approach to the study of terrorism as an opportunity for dialogue¶ and debate, conducted
in a respectful manner, and occurring primarily within the¶ central concerns, issues, approaches, and scholarly activities of the broader field.¶
We believe that our efforts to date, including this volume, reflect and express this¶ spirit of inclusive, respectful dialogue.¶ Finally, we should
our intentions in this project are not to¶ bifurcate or splinter the field, establish political
or ideological dividing lines, or¶ create a set of competing intellectual factions. Nor is it our intention
to simply¶ replace an established orthodoxy with a new orthodoxy. Rather, our hope is to¶ generate
real dialogue and debate, open up new questions and areas of research, and re-energise, revitalise
and improve the contemporary study of political terrorism.
make it clear that
Critical theory will always engage institutions as a means to reforming terrorism
studies.
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.101-103, AS)
Similarly, a Critical Theory-inspired scholar cannot write off a government¶ organisation as beyond
reform, simply on the basis that it is currently engaged in¶ anti-emancipatory practices and should,
instead, actively cultivate alliances with¶ those who are working towards transformation from within.
One example can be¶ found in the work of Robert Lambert, the now-retired head of the London¶ Metropolitan Police’s Muslim Contact Unit,
who worked tirelessly to engage¶ Islamic groups in the UK, some of them widely viewed as radical. Another is¶ that of British intelligence
officers who pushed for contacts between top IRA officials and the British government in the 1980s, eventually leading to the 1998¶ Good
Friday Agreement (Mallie and McKittrick, 2001; Powell, 2008); or the¶ call by the Northern Ireland Head of Counterterrorism, Peter Sheridan,
for negotiations¶ with dissident Republicans as a means to bring their violence to an end¶ (Breen Smyth, 2008d).¶ What
emancipation
actually entails can only be truly engaged with when¶ studying specific cases. Although discussing it in
the abstract is necessary to¶ ‘clarify what the broad issues in question are’, it is only ‘when specific,
historical¶ examples are addressed that the discussion of emancipation can proceed to the¶
consideration of particular institutions and forms of life’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 121).¶ This introduces a potential tension
between the universal claims of an emancipatory¶ perspective and local contextualised claims. Although we, the authors, may¶ condemn
violence in a theoretical sense, we recognise that for someone embedded¶ in a particular context, whether it is that of the myriad Israeli
counterterrorism¶ organisations, or the rural hinterland of the Colombian FARC, violence may seem¶ contextually legitimate as the most
compelling means to increase the security of¶ their community. Indeed, we ourselves might have adopted a very different¶ perspective had we
grown up in a Palestinian refugee camp, in an Israeli settlement,¶ or in the Falls or Shankill roads of Belfast (see also Booth, 2008).
Without¶
such an appreciation of context, it would indeed be impossible to understand, for¶ instance, the
popularity of Palestinian suicide bombers at the height of the al-Aqsa¶ Intifada (Gunning, 2007c: 216–220).
How, then, can a Critical Theory-inspired¶ terrorism studies ground its claims regarding what constitutes emancipation in a¶ particular context
convincingly – particularly when faced with situations where¶ real people are suffering and political violence appears to offer a way out?¶ The
standard response is that Critical Theorists must work from within the¶ fissures of existing local practices, which, after all, is the meaning of
immanent¶ critique. However, that answer may also belie the possibility that what ends up¶ being advocated as emancipatory has more to do
A commitment to¶ ending political
violence in a particular context13 may encourage critical scholars¶ to, for example, support the trackthree peace initiatives by Israeli and Palestinian¶ technocrats and academics without a real power base.
In so doing, they may¶ unwittingly contribute to perpetuating violence by being too divorced from the¶
reality ordinary people on the ground experience, and by ignoring the militants¶ and power-brokers on both
with the perspective of the¶ scholar than with the reality or potentialities on the ground.
sides who need to be brought on board to end the¶ violence.¶ This is precisely why post-structuralists condemn Critical Theory for imposing¶
their own totalising project on those they seek to emancipate (Hutchings, 2001:¶ 90; Alker, 2005: 202; Linklater, 2001: 30–31, 42–43). More
broadly, a Critical¶ Theory understanding of terrorism needs to recognise, following Linklater, ‘that¶ some forms of [emancipatory]
universalism have wished to submerge or extinguish¶ the difference of the other’, and thus must be ‘explicitly concerned not only¶ with
tolerating difference but with enlarging human diversity’ (Linklater, 2001:¶ 43, see also 2005b). It is not clear whether a Critical Theory
approach to¶ 102 H. Toros and J. Gunning¶ University of Exeter¶ terrorism can both ‘enlarge human diversity’ and promote emancipation
from¶ political violence if the diversity in question revolves around precisely the use of¶ political violence (see also Gunning, 2007b: 241–242).
This becomes particularly¶ problematic in situations where non-violent political methods of affecting change¶ are believed by participants to
be ineffectual because of a severe power asymmetry.¶ Delegitimising
violence may in such instances make the
individuals and¶ communities one seeks to secure less secure, unless a credible alternative is found¶
that is not just morally attractive but practically feasible – a tall order when power¶ asymmetries are
deeply entrenched, and those advocating non-violent solutions¶ lack any concrete power base.
Critical research involves activities such as fieldwork to engage existing power
structures to force change in the form of feasible alternatives.
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.104 - 106, AS)
Since these emancipatory alternative conceptions are not based in abstract¶ utopias but in feasible
alternatives, it is our duty as scholars and activists to¶ search for these feasible alternatives and
promote them. Research should thus be policy relevant, no doubt, but should also look past the
spheres of government¶ (Gunning, 2007a, 2007b; Booth, 2008). In line with the shift from taking the¶
state as ultimate referent to secure to focusing on the security of human beings,¶ research should
engage not just policymakers but also ‘policy-takers’ (Neufeld,¶ 2001) and, in particular, in the context
of terrorism, those considered by the state¶ as ‘suspect communities’ (Hillyard, 1993; see also Gunning,
2007a: 388–389).¶ Most of all, research ‘must be particularly attuned to listen to what is not being¶
said, and to interpret the hopes and fears and interests of those sectors of society¶ that are silent, if
not actually silenced’ (Booth, 2008: 68) – or without an arena¶ in which to speak.¶ This arguably requires
scholars, where possible, to engage in field research so¶ as to personally access people on the ground –
as those who are silent or silenced¶ cannot, by definition, be heard from a distance. This is particularly
pertinent in¶ societies that rely heavily on oral communication, a feature which is especially¶ prominent
in societies under occupation and among underground organisations¶ (see also Gunning, 2007c: 20–21).
With regard to the study of terrorism, this¶ means engaging with the victims of terrorism, the victims
of counterterrorism, as¶ well as the perpetrators of terrorism and counterterrorism. Such direct
engagement¶ through fieldwork is both encouraged by Linklater’s Habermasian call for dialogue¶ and by
Cox’s admonition to, above all, ‘not base theory on theory but rather¶ on changing practice and
empirical-historical study, which are a proving ground¶ for concepts and hypotheses’ (Cox, 1986: 206;
see also Breen Smyth, this¶ volume).¶ Fieldwork is central to increasing our understanding of local
practices and¶ meanings. Without being on the ground, talking to local actors, observing¶ community
practices, it is difficult to decipher local dynamics and succeed in¶ grasping the local meaning of an act
(Toros, 2008b). One should not stop there,¶ of course, since a critical approach forces one to stand back
from existing power¶ structures. The danger of ‘going native’ is always present – although empathy,¶
from a Critical Theory perspective which recognizes that all subjects have their¶ subjective standpoints, is
not so anathema as it may be for traditional theorists¶ intent on maintaining their neutral, objective
stance. Furthermore, as Booth¶ points out, fieldwork is not the only way to acquire such understanding
as that¶ would at a stroke render historians obsolete (Booth, 2008). When faced with the¶ apparent
impossibility of fieldwork – be it due to security, ethical or other concerns¶ (see Breen Smyth, this
volume) – students of terrorism can always find¶ other ways of conducting their research. However, we
would argue that a Critical¶ Theory approach, with its emphasis on context and lending a voice to the¶
voiceless, means that scholars need to think very seriously about carrying out¶ fieldwork, particularly
given how little traditional studies have fathomed local¶ context (Gunning, 2007a).¶ Field research is also
encouraged by the notion that we, as scholars, can be a¶ locus for emancipation by being part of the
emergence of counter-hegemonic discourses¶ and communities seeking to transform existing
hegemonic discourses and¶ structures, whether state or non-state. Participative action research which
entails¶ Exploring a critical theory approach 105¶ University of Exeter¶ the engagement of the
‘researched’ in the research process by creating research¶ partnerships with activists within ‘suspect
communities’, is one way forward¶ (Breen Smyth, 2004). But so is the creation of emancipatory
partnerships with¶ traditional security communities, to facilitate immanent change. Although both¶
paths bring with them dangers in terms of co-option and the re-emergence of¶ instrumental rationality
as the dominant form of reasoning (see Gunning, 2007b:¶ 240–241), the praxeological imperative
inherent in Critical Theory does not, on¶ our reading, allow us the luxury of non-engagement.
Moreover, there are¶ instances where organic critical scholars have successfully engaged with existing¶
power structures and helped to transform existing practices. The Human Development¶ Reports, the
UN’s ‘Women, Peace, and Security’ resolution, and the¶ spread of the notion of ‘common security’
towards the end of the cold war are¶ cases in point – although all are ‘works-in-progress’ (Murphy, 2007:
127–130;¶ Wyn Jones, 1999: 156–158; Basu, 2008).
AT: Terror Talk/Terrorism Dirty Word
Shouldn’t abandon attempt at analysis of terrorism- the politics of fear is a social fact,
we wish away the orthodox understanding of the term without engaging it.
Sluka, PhD from the University of California at Berkeley, 9
(Jeffrey A., edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.153-154, AS)
Anthropologists have made, and can continue to make, a major contribution to¶ CTS and our
understanding of terrorism by studying it both as an empirical¶ reality and a political and cultural
construction, and by exposing the concept to¶ critical scrutiny and demonstrating the many political,
social, and cultural complexities underlying what is often simply telescoped by authorities and the ¶
media into faceless, evil, irrational ‘terrorism’. Some critics, including Edward¶ Said and Amnesty
International, have argued that the idea of ‘terrorism’ is so¶ subjective and so overwhelmingly
employed as an epithet or term of abuse that¶ it has no intrinsic meaning, and is so dangerous and
harmful in its application by¶ state agencies that it should be abandoned entirely. While there is a
strong¶ argument for this, the practice of terrorism, particularly by state governments, is¶ so real and
fateful in the lives of hundreds of millions of people, and the politics¶ of fear has become so
predominant a reality of our times, there remains a compelling¶ need to study how fear is constructed
and employed as a weapon of¶ political control, intimidation, and coercion.¶ The empirical or
referential root of terrorism is ‘terror’, which is a subjective¶ psychological experience characterised by
intense, overpowering fear. In contrast¶ to simple fear, terror implies a prolonged experience of psychic intimidation¶ resulting not
only from a perception of an immediate threat to personal¶ well-being, but from the expectation or apprehension that the threat will
continue¶ indefinitely into the future. To ‘terrorise’ means to act with the intention of¶ producing a state of terror, of creating fear, or of
overcoming with fear – that is,¶ to seek to dominate or coerce by intimidation. Despite ongoing debate about the¶ definition of ‘terrorism’, the
objective, valid, and reliable definition has, in fact,¶ been established since the 1970s, when it was originally defined as the direct use¶ of
violence against civilians to inspire fear for political purposes – a form of¶ political intimidation and control of individuals, groups, communities,
and populations.¶ Thus, the scientific definition of terrorism is that it is ‘the policy of using¶ acts inspiring great fear as a method of ruling or of
conducting political opposition’¶ (cited in Nagangast, 1994: 114), and it is essential that we understand the¶ political and cultural dynamics of
how this actually works.¶ Anthropologists
stress that people do not act on the basis of what is true ‘in¶
reality’, they act on the basis of what they believe to be true. Thus, their beliefs –¶ even those that are
fantastical – have real effects or consequences. Just as¶ The contribution of anthropology 153¶
University of Exeter¶ Ashley Montagu (1997) has demonstrated that the reality of human biological¶
diversity is mythologised as ‘race’, similarly, the reality of a world marked by¶ ever increasing political
violence and declining human rights, is now being¶ mythologised and dichotomised as either ‘terrorism’
or ‘anti-terrorism’ (President¶ Bush’s ‘for us or against us’). Just as ‘races’ do not exist in reality, but
classifications¶ of humankind do, so too terrorism, at least as presented by elites, the¶ mainstream
media, and much of orthodox terrorism studies is unreal, but the¶ classification of this political violence
as ‘terrorism’ has real and fateful results.¶ Thus, it seems to political anthropologists that the belief in
‘terrorism’ is rapidly¶ emerging as humankind’s most dangerous contemporary myth. Anthropology¶
and critical terrorism studies stand on common ground in the conviction that this¶ myth requires critical deconstruction and active
‘demythification.’
The term ‘terrorism’ needs to be critically appropriated using the following criteria to
eliminate oppressive forms of political violence.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 8
[Richard, 2008, “An Argument for Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 2: Number 2,
pg N/A, AS]
Politically,
there are a number of reasons why we should retain the term "terrorism" and engage in
sustained and rigorous discursive struggle over its constitution and knowledge production. Most obviously, the term
now has widespread political and cultural currency. It is the organising concept for a vast array of powerful political institutions, processes and
practices in contemporary society, and scholars who refuse to employ or engage with it risk marginalising their views and their access to power.
The term also clearly retains a great deal of academic currency. There is now a whole field of research, teaching and advocacy surrounding the
concept of terrorism, with numerous journals, conferences, teaching programmes, think-tanks, research centres, funding opportunities and
advisory posts in existence.
To refuse to employ the term or engage in debates about its definition and
application in research is again, to risk marginalisation and irrelevance within this broader scholarly
context.¶ Most importantly however, there is a compelling normative imperative to retain a term that de-legitimises particular kinds of
violence directed against civilians and which instrumentalises human suffering for the purposes of influencing an audience.[33] Of course, the
normative power of the terrorism label is highly dependent upon its consistent application to all qualifying cases, including cases involving
Western states or their allies.
The selectivity and bias of terrorism scholars and political leaders in the past has
seriously undermined this project by making it appear that the term is reserved solely for enemies of
the West. However, I would argue that this provides a reason for critical engagement rather than
withdrawal and capitulation in the discursive struggle.¶ Although terrorism can never be adequately defined due
to its unstable ontological status, I want to argue that it can, and should, be described according to a set of identifiable
and unique characteristics, which delineate it from other forms of political violence. Furthermore, a review of broader terrorism
studies literature would suggest that the following conception of terrorism has broad support from many leading scholars in the field and could
form the basis of a consensus over how to conceptualise it. Such an approach moreover, has several advantages over most of the existing
approaches I outlined above. I suggest that as a form of political violence, terrorism can be described according to four main characteristics.¶
First, terrorism is an intentional and pre-determined strategy of political violence. This suggests its
rational and instrumental basis. It also implies that any actor (states, groups or individuals) can employ
it in pursuit of strategic goals. More importantly, it implies that actors can abandon its use at any time,
and that being a "terrorist" is not a determinant of future behaviour or an indication of some kind of essential
"evil" nature. "Terrorists" can choose to adopt non-violent strategies instead; they can even become statesmen and peacemakers. Importantly,
it also implies political motivations, as a way of distinguishing terrorism from other forms of violence designed to terrify, such as the
intimidation of communities by organised criminals seeking to obtain financial reward, the terror caused by a serial killer, or the fear caused by
a one-off mass killing. Lastly, it
implies forethought and intentionality, as opposed to the terror induced by
rioting or communal disturbances, for example.¶ Second, the targets of terrorist violence are not
necessarily the victims of the violence, but rather the audiences to the violence. From this perspective,
terrorism is a form of political communication rather than direct military action. An important
distinction here is that terrorism instrumentalises its victims. Unlike the actions of soldiers in war who
seek to directly degrade the material ability of the enemy to continue fighting, the victims of terrorism
are chosen instead for symbolic reasons. An important point here is that states which try to hide their involvement in civiliandirected violence may still be sending a powerful message to the society or social groups they wish to intimidate. The use of disappearances as
a strategy of terrorism for example, sends a message that the state is omnipotent, omnipresent and ruthless in rooting out opponents,[34] as
does kidnap and torture. In other cases,
state terrorism may be both instrumental and direct: killing a union
organiser for example, both weakens the union and sends a message to potential union leaders and the
society they come from.¶ Third, and related to the previous point, terrorism is intended to cause fear
and intimidate. This is the central purpose of the violence and not just the unintended consequence, although it can be argued that there
is a certain kind of intentionality when actors engage in actions they can be sure which will cause terror and intimidate, such as using airpower
to bomb civilian areas. Moreover, the intention to cause fear can usually be deduced from the targets, context and foreseen consequences of
the violence. Bombs in public places or the widespread use of torture against regime opponents for example, are clearly intended to terrify the
wider society.¶ Lastly, terrorism is aimed primarily but not solely at civilians. Here I differ with some scholars in that I
argue that it is often unhelpful to try and maintain civilian-military or combatant-non-combatant distinctions in conceptualising terrorism. I
agree with Goodin in this regard that such distinctions can in fact, be counter-productive, as they allow actors to claim legitimacy for other
forms of equally abhorrent violence.[35] A violent campaign aimed at police officers or off-duty military personnel that was intended to cause
fear and intimidate the wider society or a certain section of society for example, would still constitute terrorism even though it avoided
targeting civilians. Similarly, certain actions during war which were aimed solely at terrorising enemy soldiers and their civilian audience, rather
than for military-strategic reasons, could also be considered terrorism. The use of certain types of militarily ineffective but demoralising
chemical weapons or the bombing of civilian areas in which there were no real strategic targets, for example, would qualify as terrorism.¶
There are a number of clear advantages to employing such a conception of terrorism. In the first
instance, it does not artificially and illogically limit the phenomenon by the nature of the actor (as
some definitions do), but includes state terrorism, gender-based terrorism,[36] and non-state
terrorism. Second, it does not limit the analysis to peace, but also includes the behaviour of actors in
war—the site of a great deal of concentrated political violence. Lastly, as mentioned, it can be argued
that there is already a consensus on these criteria among the leading terrorism scholars, as their definitions
tend to incorporate all these elements. From this perspective, the main issue is not that we do not know what terrorism is or that we cannot
clearly identify it; it is rather that the application of the definition is too often restricted—for whatever reason—to a narrow set of actors that
most often happens to coincide with the current strategic interests of Western powers. During the cold war, most terrorism research focused
on left-wing non-state groups; today, most terrorism research focuses on so-called "Islamist terrorism". This
inconsistent application
both distorts the focus of the field and undermines attempts to restrict and eliminate oppressive
forms of political violence.
Utilizing critical criteria can de-legitimise all forms of terrorism including that inflicted
by the state.
Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 8
[Richard, 2008, “An Argument for Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 2: Number 2,
pg N/A, AS]
In addition to its analytical advantages, the terrorism label could be employed as means to advancing a
progressive political project aimed at protecting marginalised and vulnerable populations from
indiscriminate and oppressive forms of violence. That is, at the most basic level, employing the above
criteria can have the effect of de-legitimising any and all forms of violence that seek to
instrumentalise human suffering for the sole purpose of sending a message to an audience. Related to this,
it also de-legitimises all forms of civilian-directed violence, including the direct targeting of civilians during war.¶ Most importantly, however,
this approach to terrorism brings back states as a subject for analysis and holds them accountable for actions that many recognise as terrorism
but which are rarely acknowledged as terrorism, even by terrorism scholars. This is a critical task, given that the known effects and
consequences of state terrorism —in terms of deaths, human suffering and material, social and political destruction—are far more serious than
non-state terrorism. In this sense, the identifying criteria described above functions to set the limits of legitimate state violence, despite the
frequent attempt to justify terroristic forms of violence by reference to doctrines of state sovereignty and the legitimate use of political
violence.
The criteria can also be used to scrutinise state practices during counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations to ensure that they do not morph into terrorism themselves by failing to
distinguish between the innocent and the guilty or being highly disproportionate, for example. Similarly, it can
be used to evaluate state practices during times of war, identifying those occasions when military actions go beyond strategic necessity to the
use of force for the purpose of intimidating and demoralising civilians.¶ In short, these criteria provide a strict set of criteria for the evaluation
of actions by any and all actors who are in conflict. As such,
they have the potential to strengthen the norms relating to
the limits of political violence, thereby improving human and social security . Importantly, the broad social and
academic consensus, as well as the relevant legal precepts, is already in place for proscribing and de-legitimising actions that fall within the
categories of illegitimate, terrorist violence outlined above.¶ However, in order to make this work in everyday scholarly practice, I would argue
terrorism scholars in particular would need to adhere to a set of core ontological, methodological
and normative commitments. These have been outlined in detail elsewhere,[37] but would include,
among others:¶ · An acute sensitivity to the politics of labelling in the terrorism field and an acceptance
of the insecure ontological status of the term;¶ · Transparency about their own values and political
standpoints, particularly as they relate to the geo-political interests of Western states;¶ · A willingness
to expand their focus of research to include the use of terrorism by states, including Western states
engaged in operations overseas;¶ · Adherence to a set of responsible research ethics, including a
commitment to refusing to cooperate with state counter-terrorism projects that include the use of
torture, illegal practices such as rendition or the victimising of whole "suspect communities";¶ · A
commitment to normative values which reject any and all forms of civilian-directed violence and
which promotes a broad notion of human security.¶ In particular, terrorism scholars must recognise
the cultural-political biases they hold and aim for consistency of application of the criteria set out.
that
Specifically, they must demonstrate a willingness to scrutinise and condemn the actions and intentions of their own states when they cross the
line into terrorism. This is in fact, the biggest problem facing the field in this area. It is not that terrorism scholars do not recognise the use of
terrorism by states; it is rather that they limit the focus of their research largely to non-state groups that are opposed to Western interests and
fail to acknowledge the long history of involvement of their own states or allied states in terrorism.
AT: Just Create a New Definition/Orthodoxy
No critiques – Critical Theory holds their own discourses and practices to their own
proclaimed standards preventing it from imposing a static totalizing project that
subjugates individuals
Toros, the Department of¶ International Politics of Aberystwyth University and
Gunning Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 9
(Harmonie and Jeroen ,edited by Richard Jackson, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda,, p.103-104, AS)
One of the charges against Critical Theory is that its main proponents have been¶ deeply Eurocentric
(Wyn Jones, 1999: 127), contaminating not only the notion of¶ emancipation but also its perceptions of
the individual, religion, the community,¶ and the like. John Hobson similarly charges Cox and the neoGramscian school¶ in international politics, one of the sources of Welsh School Critical Theory, with¶
‘subliminal Eurocentrism’ (Hobson, 2007: 95–99). Because terrorism occurs in¶ conflicts where both
Westernisation and Western double standards are cited as¶ causes, one central task of a Critical Theoryinspired terrorism studies is thus to¶ ‘reveal the post-racist contradictions and double standards that
[Western discourse]¶ consciously and subconsciously smoothes over’ (Hobson, 2007: 116). This can¶ be
done by holding Western discourses and practices – including those of Critical¶ Theorists – up to their
own proclaimed standards following the type of immanent¶ critiques outlined above.¶ But it also
involves the far more difficult task of ‘[a]ccepting the Other in the¶ Self and recognising that the Self is
therefore hybrid’ (Hobson, 2007: 113) –¶ particularly challenging if ‘the Other’ is engaged in terrorism
against ‘us’, or¶ calls into question ‘our’ conception of what it is to be human (by, for instance,¶ Exploring
a critical theory approach 103¶ University of Exeter¶ according religion a more central place, or by
discriminating on the basis of¶ gender). For this to be possible, any form of ‘subliminal Eurocentrism’
which,¶ among other things, denies non-Westerners agency (Hobson, 2007: 97), must be¶ addressed. It
also means subjecting the secular Enlightenment values on which¶ Critical Theory is built to the
scrutiny of dialogue with ‘others’, rather than¶ holding up these values as somehow a priori, and
reflecting on whether any of¶ these have contributed to the phenomenon of terrorism. Here Butler’s
notions of¶ a ‘not-yet arrived universality’ and the need for the ‘labor of translation’ may¶ provide a
useful roadmap (Butler, 1996: 46–49, 52).¶ Thus, although emancipation must be a central component of
a Critical¶ Theory approach to terrorism, its application to terrorist violence cannot be¶ reduced to a
simple condemnation of such violence. It needs to tackle the difficult¶ questions of why such violence
emerged, how it is linked to other forms of¶ violence, and how emancipation from these different
forms of violence marring¶ a specific context can be achieved. It also needs to acknowledge the
potentially¶ emancipatory objectives of violent actors, without discrediting the often arduous¶ and less
public struggle of non-violent actors. Most of all, critical theorists¶ armed with ‘good’ (emancipatory)
intentions must beware of imposing totalising¶ projects that may further subjugate rather than
emancipate. As a process, any¶ emancipatory framework must thus be constantly reviewed,
questioned, and¶ challenged.
AT: Framework
Their “problem-solving” framework is part of the problem- it takes the world as it is
and uncritically accepts prevailing power relationships.
Gunning (Jeroen Gunning; Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham
University, UK) 07
Jeroen, 6-21-07 “Government and Opposition”, Blackwell Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, pp. 363–393 MD
Each of these critiques goes some way to explain the shortcomings in ‘terrorism research’, although the
argument that funding is not available for projects critical of the status quo is perhaps overstated. 30 It
will always be difficult to obtain reliable data on clandestine violence, so that scholars will inevitably
be tempted to draw heavily on secondary sources or build elaborate theories on very little, and often
dubious, information. 31 Equally, given prevailing power structures, the embeddednes of researchers
within them, and the shock that terroristic tactics typically seek to induce, it will arguably always be
tempting to demonize the ‘terrorist other’. However, what most of the critiques overlook is the crucial
fact that, beyond these inherent difficulties, many of the observed shortcomings can be traced back to
the dominance in ‘terrorism research’ of what Robert Cox famously called a ‘problem-solving’
approach: one that ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships
and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’.
The focus on short-term problem-solving leads to over-identification with the state
and legitimizes counterterrorism.
Gunning (Jeroen Gunning; Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham
University, UK) 07
Jeroen, 6-21-07 “Government and Opposition”, Blackwell Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, pp. 363–393 MD
Not only can many of these characteristics be found in more or less diluted form in ‘terrorism research’
41 – a legacy of the field’s origins as a sub-field within ‘traditional’ security and strategic studies – but
these ‘problem-solving’ characteristics can also be shown to contribute directly to its observed
shortcomings. The reported lack of primary data, the dearth of interviews with ‘terrorists’ and the
field’s typical unwillingness to ‘engage subjectively with [the terrorist’s] motives’, 42 is in part fuelled
by the field’s over-identification with the state, and by the adoption of dichotomies that depict
‘terrorism’ as ‘an unredeemable atrocity like no other’, that can only be approached ‘with a heavy dose
of moral indignation’, although other factors, such as security concerns, play a role too. 43 Talking with
‘terrorists’ thus becomes taboo, unless it is done in the context of interrogation. 44
Such a framework also makes it difficult to enquire whether the state has used ‘terroristic’ methods. If
the state is the primary referent, securing its security the main focus and its hegemonic ideology the
accepted framework of analysis, ‘terrorism’, particularly if defined in sharp dichotomies between
legitimate and illegitimate, can only be logically perpetrated by insurgents against the state, not by state
actors themselves. State actors are engaged in counterterrorism, which is logically depicted as
legitimate, or at least, ‘justifiable’ given the ‘terrorist threat’ and the field’s focus on shortterm
‘problem-solving’. Where ‘traditional terrorism studies’ do focus on state terrorism, it is in the context
of the ‘other’: the authoritarian or totalitarian state that is the nemesis if not the actual ‘enemy’ of
the liberal democratic state. 45
Framework is a link: Orthodox terrorism studies maintains its legitimacy by policing
the boundaries of acceptable knowledge and marginalizing any experts without a
strong pro-Western bias.
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism
Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.80-1, GAL)
From a certain perspective, the analysis above presents a genuine puzzle: how does a field based on a
series of 'virulent myths', 'half-truths' and contested claims, and which is so obviously biased towards
Western state priorities, maintain academic credibility and political influence over several decades? In
large part, the answer lies in the position that the field occupies in the existing structures of power, and
in its long-standing knowledge practices.
First, it can be argued that the core terrorism studies 'knowledge' persists and is continually
reproduced because its nature and form reflect (and simultaneously construct) dominant values and
existing cultural narratives. On the one hand, it provides a coherent and familiar discursive frame for
internal policy debate; it confirms state perspectives and approaches and simplifies a set of complex
challenges to an identifiable 'problem'. For the wider public, the narratives of the discourse construct a
broad common sense understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism, or a 'grid of intelligibility'
through which to interpret and make sense of events and actions. This is another of its key hegemonic
or ideological effects, as this common sense 'knowledge' predisposes the public to accept and
acquiesce to particular kinds of counterterrorism policies.
On the other hand, the terrorism studies discourse draws on a series of powerful cultural frames and
existing discursive structures, making it ideal for the generation of public legitimacy and the
construction of political boundaries (see Olivcrio. 1997). For example, as Zulaika and Douglass's (1996)
ground-breaking anthropological study demonstrated, the construction of the fanatical, dangerous
terrorist reflects the 'wild man' figure of Western cultural imagination. Similarly, the field's construction
of the threat posed by suicide bombers and WMD-terrorism taps into culturally defined taboos of
suicide and the fear of poison, while the notion that Western states never commit terrorism but only
respond to it reinforces the widespread belief in Western exceptionalism.
Second, the discourse maintains its dominance through a self-perpetuating set of knowledgegenerating practices. For example, based on an examination of thirty-two prominent terrorism studies
experts, Edna Reid describes the research process among these scholars as a closed, circular, and static
system of information and investigation which tends to accept dominant "myths' about terrorism
without strong empirical investigation for long periods before empirical research disproves them (Reid.
1993: 28). The circular nature of the knowledge process can be further illustrated by noting how some
terrorism scholars provide expert testimony to special commissions, such as the Bremer Commission
and the 9/11 Commission, and then reference the commission reports in order to legitimise their own
knowledge claims in later publications. In a related process of exclusion, a recent analysis concluded
that terrorism "experts" who do not maintain a strong pro-Western bias in their work soon become
marginalised in the field and are denied access to policymakers and major conferences (llardi. 2004;
222).
Their appeal to policy relevance is part of the problem- the field of terrorism studies is
deeply coopted, and there is no distinction between academics and policymakers.
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism
Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.81, GAL)
Lastly, the persistence and dominance of the core terrorism studies "knowledge" is a consequence of
the "embedded" or organic* nature of many terrorism experts and scholars; that is, the extent to
which terrorism scholars are directly linked to state institutions and sources of power in ways that
make it difficult to distinguish between the state and academic spheres (see Herman and O'SuIiivan,
1989; George. 1991a: Burnett and Whyte. 2005). Crucial here has been the influence of the RAND
Corporation, a non-profit research foundation founded by the United States Air Force with deep ties to
the American military and political establishments, as well as private security and military companies.
Some RAND scholars have been influential in both constructing the accepted knowledge of the
terrorism studies field and in communicating it to policymakers and the wider public for several
decades now. Senior officials in several US administrations have held positions in RAND, and as with
other foundations and think tanks, there is a revolving door of personnel between RAND and the state.
For example. Condolee/.za Rice and Donald Rumsfeld are both former RAND administrators (Burnett
and Whyte. 2005: 8). Moreover, RAND scholars have been influential in establishing other influential
terrorism research centres, such as the St Andrews Centre for Studies in Terrorism and Political
Violence, and have been involved in the running of both Terrorism and Polit-ical Violence and Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism. In fact. RANI) scholars author a significant proportion of the articles published in
these two popular journals (Silke, 2004c: 194).
Rejecting their state-centric focus is critical to breaking out of the epistemic
community of orthodox terrorism scholarship which recycles the same narratives and
myths.
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism
Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.81, GAL)
In other words, it can be argued that the leading terrorism studies scholars now constitute an
influential and exclusive 'epistemic community' a network of 'specialists with a common world view
about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political
values about the type of policies to which they should be applied' (Stone. 19%: 86). From a Gramscian
perspective, the leading terrorism studies scholars can be understood as 'organic intellectuals'
connected institutionally, financially and ideologically to the state. From this perspective, the statecentric orientation of the field and its continuing reproduction of the guiding myths is a natural and
thoroughly unsurprising consequence of its position within society's existing power structure.
Their problem-solving approach leaves the status quo’s inequalities and injustices
unquestioned.
Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07
Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume
6 Number 3, pages 1-8) md
A fourth main criticism is that the dominant knowledge of the field is an ideal type of ‘problem-solving
theory’ (Gunning, forthcoming). As Robert Cox argues, problem-solving theory ‘takes the world as it
finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are
organised, as the given framework for action’, and then works to ‘make these relationships and
institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’ (Cox, 1981: 128–
9). It does not question the extent to which the status quo – the hierarchies and operation of power
and the inequalities and injustices thus generated – is implicated in the ‘problem’ of terrorism and
other forms of subaltern violence. Moreover, through the use of social scientific language and modes
of inquiry, political assumptions about terrorism are masqueraded as technical issues and sides are
taken on terrorism’s major ethical and political questions.
AT: Not All Terror Experts Bad
Our critique is about analyzing the discursive effects of the conventional terrorism
narrative at a broader level- it’s not about the conclusions of any particular text or
scholar.
Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, 9
(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism
Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.68-9, GAL)
It is important to note that when we examine a discourse as a broad form of knowledge and practice,
it is never completely uniform, nor is it necessarily entirely coherent or consistent. Rather, it always
has porous borders and often contains numerous exceptions, inconsistencies, and contradictions by
different speakers and texts. Many terrorism studies scholars for example, upon a close reading of their
individual texts, express more nuanced arguments and viewpoints than are necessarily presented here.
In addition, orthodox terrorism scholars sometimes engage in fairly vigorous debates and disagreements
(see Ranstorp. this volume), although these rarely involve questioning fundamental underlying
ontological. epistemological. or methodological assumptions about the primary subject.
The important point is not that each text or scholar can be characterised in the same uniform way or
even that these scholars agree on a broad set of knowledge claims; as suggested, there are ongoing
debates within the field about a great many key issues. Nor is there any suggestion that individual
terrorism studies scholars are engaged in some kind of "bad faith' conspiracy to promote
a particular political agenda or ideological viewpoint (Morgan and Boyle, 2008). It is, rather, that taken
together as a broader discourse and a body of work that presently has political and, importantly,
cultural, currency, the narratives and forms of the discourse function to construct and maintain a
specific understanding of, and approach to, terrorism and counterterrorism and the 'knowledge'
generated in the field has certain academic, political, and social effects.
AT: State Terrorism is covered by Human Rights, etc.
State and non-state terrorism both utilize instrumental violence to spread fear in the
broader population- both should be described with the same term to maintain
analytical consistency.
Jackson et al 10 (Richard, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence and Reader in Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Eamon Murphy is
Professor of History and International Relations at Curtin University of Technology in Western Australia,
and Scott Poynting is Professor in Sociology, Manchester Metropolitan University, “Contemporary State
Terrorism: Theory and Practice, p. 4 DAG)
A third objection suggests that state repressive violence is not terrorism because state agents do not
seek publicity but rather try to hide their involvement - unlike non-state terrorism which is aimed at
maximizing publicity. This argument mistakes publicity for communication. It is communication to an
audience which is one of the key elements of terrorist violence, not necessarily publicity (see Duvall and
Stohl 1988: 239-40). For non-state actors lacking societal penetration, publicity is the easiest way to
communicate, but this is not the case for states whose violence does not necessarily require publicity to
reach its intended audience. In reality, when an individual in a terror state is kidnapped and then
'disappeared', returned following torture or their corpse is left mutilated in a public place, the local
observers know exactly who the intended audience is, what the message is intended to convey, and who
has sent it. The body with its physical marks of violence - or the absence of their bodily presence - serves
as a direct reminder of the presence and power of the state and the need to acquiesce. The lack of
publicity and denial by the state is usually for external audiences in order to maintain international
assistance or for domestic constituents whom the state relies upon for support - such as the white
community in South Africa who were largely unaware of the violence meted out to its nonwhite
population. A fourth objection is that what we have called 'state terrorism’ is already covered by
terms like 'repression' and 'human rights abuses', and that acts of state terrorism are already
circumscribed in international law and do not require new legal or analytical concepts. This is a political
or pragmatic argument which, as we have shown, ignores the fundamental scholarly principle of
including all the cases that fit the criteria in order to retain analytical consistency. Moreover, it ignores
the fact that the same situation applies to non-state 'terrorism': all the acts and activities performed
by non-state terrorists are also already circumscribed in law and there exist a range of useful terms to
describe their actions. It can also be argued that state (and non-state) actions are never solely
'terrorism', 'human rights abuses', or 'repression'. They can be - and by definition always are - both
acts of 'terrorism' and 'human rights abuses' at the same time, and there is no contradiction in
describing them using either term. In the end, we follow Robert Goodin and Ruth Blakeley in suggesting
that terrorism, whether conducted by state or non-state actors, involves a number of specific moral
wrongs (beyond unjustified killing and harm), such as the instrumentalization of human suffering, the
intention to cause widespread fear, and the betrayal of the duty of care towards fellow* citizens (see
Goodin, 2006: 102; Blakeley this volume). For this and other reasons, we argue that the term 'state
terrorism' should be retained as an analytical and political category. A final related objection is that
although states may engage in terrorism which is far more destructive than non-state terrorism, it is
qualitatively different in aims, modes, and outcomes and there is therefore little analytical value in
studying state violence and non-state violence under the same label. In response to this, we would
argue that, given the aetiology of the term 'terrorism' as a descriptor of violent state consolidation,
state terrorism represents the purest and original form of the terrorism phenomenon and therefore
has much to tell us about its causes and effects. Certainly, state terrorism comes closest to generating
real 'terror' among a population and this is what non-state groups also frequently aspire to achieve in
their actions. In practice however, state and non-state actors actually employ many of the very same
strategies - kidnap, extra-judicial killing, bombing, torture and the like - and have similar aims intimidation of an audience to achieve political aims, either revolutionary or conservative. In essence,
state and non-state terrorism utilizes violence instrumentally in identical ways and often for similar
reasons.
AT: No Solvency- Can’t Change Discourse
Even if we can’t totally displace the affs narrative, it’s still worth the fight- abjecting
others abjects us too- terrorizing discourse imposes an unlivable identity on both self
and other.
Debrix, Professor of International Relations at Florida International University, 7
(François Debrix is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University in
Miami, “Tabloid Terror”, Page #155-156, NC)
As always when critical challenges are introduced, a note of caution is necessary. Indeed, it bears
remembering that contemporary dominant tabloid geopolitical discourses of war, terror, and violence
are robust. Far more than the policies, institutions, or agents that they empower and whose fateful
actions they authorize, these geopolitical discourses are strong, persistent, and long-lasting because,
once again, they are seated in everyday culture, in the politics of the mundane or the ordinary, in our
most commonsensical mythological significations, as Barthes famously argued, 40 or in the sort of
ideological/cultural operations that “go without saying.” 41 They also have ways of capturing,
recombining, or even reinventing popular beliefs that defy seemingly evident trends. For example,
despite the growing backlash since 2005 against the war in Iraq, the intensity of the tabloid imperialist
discourse of global expansion of/through war and of limitless utilization of the war machine has not
abated (at least, as of the writing of this chapter). In fact, tabloid imperialism of late has started to turn
its attention towards possible new targets such as Iran, North Korea, or even (as some pundits of
statecraft have argued) “radical Islam” in its entirety. 42 Thus, the failure or collapse of the
contemporary tabloid geopolitical discursive formations of terror cannot be anticipated, wished for,
or taken for granted just because public opinion appears to swing in a different direction (as seemed
to be the case with the overwhelming anti-Bush and anti-Republican party returns of the 2006 midterm
elections in the United States). 43 As tabloid geopolitical discourses of terror seek to spread their
narrative tentacles to ever more zones of intervention (perhaps Iran, perhaps North Korea, perhaps a
global “Islamo-fascism”), the so-called “we” that tabloid geopolitical experts in the United States claim
they wish to protect are not left with too many political and cultural options to live “our” lives. As we
saw in Chapter 3, abjecting others inevitably means abjecting “us” too . In the war on terror and in its
dominant tabloid productions, it is after all not just others who are left with an “uninhabitable
identification,” as Butler would have it. “We,” the supposedly protected and cared-for ones, also have
such an unlivable identity ultimately imposed on us since, as a result of these discourses and
representations of boundless 16656 Conclusion violence and terror, “we” actually end up more
vulnerable than ever. Once again, “we” too are docile bodies (or body parts) that at any moment can be
mobilized for the next war or terror campaign. But this vulnerability or docility is never one that allows
“us” to open up to others, or that permits “us” to apprehend a fragility or precariousness of being that
might rescue everyone, “us” and “them,” from agonal destruction. A few critical thinkers have
recognized that, as the tabloid production and control of war and terror in the public domain of
appearances has become “a major organizing principle of all aspects of [‘our’] daily life, it is all the
more imperative for educators, artists, parents, students, and others to develop a language of critique
and possibility capable of expressing what is new and different in the constantly shifting interface of
politics and culture.” 44 This kind of plea to come up with a different critical language or posture
suggests that, although fighting off tabloid geopolitical impositions may be fruitless in the end, it is
still worth the fight . Perhaps a democracy-to-come will reveal itself as “a language of critique and
possibility” in the course of the struggle. Or perhaps, if nothing else, it is worth trying to oppose
today’s tabloid imperialism and its terrorizing discourses and representations in order to (try to)
remain human, in order to (try to) discover what it might mean for human lives, “us” and “them,” to
be precarious again. Thus, it is by offering a brief reflection on the precariousness of life as a possible
motif of resistance to dominant tabloid geopolitical constructs that I wish to conclude this book.
AT: Obama is Different
The Obama administration still operates within the core narrative of the war on
terror- his policy changes just reflect tactical disagreements.
Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11
Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US
counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page
390–411 md
Although some would argue that these represent major new policy initiatives in the area of
counterterrorism or at least the beginnings of significant change, closer examination does not fully
support this interpretation. For example, the decision to close the Guantanamo Bay detention centre,
apart from the ongoing challenges of actually enacting this policy, was accompanied by the decision to
continue the preventive detention of individuals suspected of being an ongoing threat to American
security, and the continuation of the global terrorist interdiction and arrest programme. Similarly, the
decision to withdraw troops from Iraq was accompanied by the decision to expand the war on terror
in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region. 5 As President Obama stated during the election campaign, ‘the
central front in the war on terror is not Iraq, and it never was. That is why the second goal of my new
strategy will be taking the fight to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Obama, 15 July 2008). In any
event, it is arguable whether a ‘withdrawal’ is an accurate description of the decision to leave 35–50 000
troops in Iraq. It can be argued that these policy decisions indicate disagreement over the strategies
and tactics of the war on terror, not whether the threat of terrorism warrants or is best dealt with by
a ‘war’, or whether the war on terror has failed to achieve any significant gains and should be ended.
In terms of the public language of President Obama, the evidence is even clearer that he publicly accepts
the core narratives of the war on terror and is committed to its continuation, even if he has stopped
using the phrase ‘war on terror’. In Table 1, I have compiled a few illustrative quotations from major
speeches by President Obama over the past 3 years, which relate to the war on terror and national
security; they are a small sample of many dozens of examples where he expresses the existing widely
accepted core narratives. At the most fundamental level, the Obama administration continues to
employ the term ‘war’ in relation to ‘terrorism’ regularly in its public communication, describing acts
of terrorism as ‘acts of war’ (thereby retaining counterterrorism within a war-based framework), for
example. 6 Beyond this, a comparison with the original narratives clearly demonstrates that President
Obama accepts most, if not all of the central narratives of the war on terror, such as the argument
that the 9/11 attacks were unprovoked and completely unrelated to any foreign policy actions by the
United States, the essential justice and necessity of a ‘war’ on terrorism, America’s historic call and
duty to lead the war on terror, the ‘new’ threat posed by WMD terrorism and rogue states and the
need for new tools to fight them, the duty to promote America’s universal values internationally, the
right of pre-emptive action against terrorists, the need to prevent the emergence of terrorist safe
havens in collapsed and failed states, the likelihood of a long war against terrorism and the
inevitability of American victory – among many others. In other words, the ‘war on terror continues to
operate as the dominant framework of the Obama administration’ (Parmar, 2010, p. 15).
Obama remains the guardian of terrorism discourse by not changing his policies
Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11
Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US
counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page
390–411 md
In this situation, where do the possibilities for change in US counterterrorism policy lie? As Stuart Croft
(2006) has ably demonstrated, it is in the space opened up by a sense of crisis or rupture that the
possibility for articulating a ‘new’ political discourse emerges – provided a willing agent, specifically a
norm entrepreneur, is present to engage in a ‘decisive intervention’. Such a crisis can occur as the result
of either a sudden set of unforeseen events (such as an act of political violence) which appear to shatter
existing commonsense perceptions, or gradual change over a long period brought about by sustained
resistance to the dominant discourse. That is, over time counter-hegemonic opposition can destabilise
and deconstruct accepted knowledge, eventually leading to a crisis of credibility and the need for a
new set of narratives. In this instance, it could conceivably be argued that a number of recent crises –
the setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the global financial crisis, for example – could have provided
the discursive opening for such a decisive intervention. The fact that Obama has not exploited these
opportunities to change the dominant discourse reaffirms my argument that despite popular
expectations, he is not a norm entrepreneur determined to change the war on terror, but is rather its
guardian.
Must continue to challenge Obama’s omissions and practice of counterterrorism.
Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11
Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US
counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page
390–411 md
In addition to the stated policies and language of the Obama administration, it is also important to
interrogate the silences and omissions in the Obama administration’s language and practice of
counterterrorism – the things that are not said or done – particularly those things that could provide
evidence of a genuinely new approach to the war on terror. Among a long list of possibilities, it seems
significant that the new administration is not, for example, seeking to reassure the American public
about the terrorist threat. The presentation of all the evidence and arguments which show that the
real risk of terrorism is extremely low by any statistical or empirical measures (see Mueller, 2006)
might reassure the public, but it could also undermine the entire rationale for the war on terror and
open up the possibility of substantively changing policy direction. Nor is the administration engaging in
public debate on, or questioning, US foreign policies which might be provoking violent resistance in
regions like the Middle East, the failures of war-based approaches to political challenges like terrorism,
or the possible lessons from earlier terrorist campaigns. In terms of concrete policy action, the new
administration is also clearly not making moves or signalling its intentions to overturn the Patriot
Acts, give terrorist suspects full legal rights within a criminal justice framework, dismantle or re-task
the DHS away from counterterrorism, open negotiations with al Qaeda and its affiliates, end policies
of military intervention against Islamist groups in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere,
close down its network of forward military bases, end covert military and intelligence
counterterrorism operations or end policies of conditioning aid to developing countries on
counterterrorism cooperation – among many other things.
AT: Redundant Sanctions/Helms Burton Kills Solvency
Helms-Burton doesn’t functionally restrict assistance to Cuba
Feinberg, former Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security
Council, 11
[Richard E., November 2011, “The International Financial Institutions and Cuba: Relations with NonMember States,” Cuba in Transition, Volume: 22, p. 56,
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume22/pdfs/feinberg.pdf, date accessed
6/27/13, YGS]
Interestingly, Helms-Burton requires the U.S. to oppose the admission of Cuba and to punish the IFIs
if¶ they approve loans to Cuba—but it does not explicitly require the U.S. to vote against loans or
other assistance to Cuba. One might suppose that this was¶ the intent of the drafters of the legislation,
but it is an¶ odd omission in light of the clear voting requirements on loans in other IFI-related
legislation.¶ Further, Helms-Burton speaks of “assistance to the¶ Cuban Government.” It does not
directly address IFI¶ assistance to non-governmental entities or private enterprises within Cuba, or to
regional and international institutions or trust funds. ¶ As discussed earlier, the IFIs have developed
mechanisms for engaging with non-members and some of¶ these, for example trust funds managed
by third parties such as the UNDP, would not appear to trigger¶ sanctions under Helms-Burton or
other restrictive¶ U.S. legislation discussed below. Today, if Cuba were to suddenly apply to rejoin the¶
IMF, Helms-Burton would mandate the U.S. Executive Director to vote in the negative. However, the¶
U.S.’s 17 percent voting share would be insufficient¶ to defeat a resolution that requires only a
majority¶ vote. Cuban membership would not, by itself, trigger¶ the Helms-Burton sanctions that
relate not to mere¶ membership but to assistance to the Cuban government. But in the face of strong
U.S. opposition, and¶ fearing that the U.S. Congress might deny future IFI¶ capital replenishments, other
member states and senior management might well shy away from bringing¶ the Cuba case forward to a
vote.
AT: Cuban Ag Disad
Not unique- Cuban food production plummeting now.
Tamayo, Miami Herald staff writer, 13
[Juan O., 5/16/13, The Miami Herald, “Cuban food production drops despite reforms,”
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/16/3401709/cuban-food-production-drops-despite.html,
accessed 6/28/13, YGS]
Cuba saw a steep and unexplained drop in the harvest of vegetables and fruit in the first three months
of the year despite government reforms to increase production in a country that spends more than
$1.5 billion on food imports.¶ The National Statistics Office, known by the Spanish acronym ONE, gave
no reason for the production decline in a report published this week.¶ Overall agricultural production,
not counting sugarcane, dropped by 7.8 percent in the first quarter of this year compared to the first
three months of 2012, ONE reported.¶ But some sectors saw far bigger plunges.¶ Plantains dropped by
44.2 percent, potatoes by 36 percent and citrus by 33.9 percent. The category of “other tubers”
plunged by 58.4 percent. Corn production fell by 22.5 percent, beans by 7 percent and fruit by 13.9
percent, according to the report.
No Link to Politics- Executive Action
Unilateral executive action is normal means
Thale, Washington Office of Latin America program director, and Anderson, Senior
Associate for Cuba at the Latin America Working Group 5/24/13 (Geoff Thale and Mavis
Anderson, 5/24/13, WOLA, “Cuba, the Terrorism Report, and the Terrorist List,”
http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_the_terrorism_report_and_the_terrorist_list, accessed
6/29/13, KR)
Although some aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba—in particular, the embargo and the travel ban—can
only be changed by Congress, there are a number of meaningful actions that the Obama
administration could take without waiting for Congress. Removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors
of Terrorism is one of the most significant of these.
Plan Popular/Political Support
Plan popular with the public-polling data
Canseco, Vice President of Angus Reid Public Opinion, 12 (Mario, Feb 6, 2012, “Most Americans Willing to Re-establish Ties with Cuba”, http://www.angusreid.com/polls/44366/most-americans-willing-to-re-establish-ties-with-cuba/, accessed 6/26/13, KR)
A majority of respondents also wants to lift the travel ban that prevents most Americans from visiting
Cuba.¶ People in the United States are ready to change their country’s interaction with Cuba, a new
Angus Reid Public Opinion poll has found.¶ In the online survey of a representative national sample of
1,008 American adults, three-in-five respondents (62%) agree with the U.S. re-establishing diplomatic
relations with Cuba, while one-in-four (23%) disagree. ¶ Majorities of Independents (67%), Democrats
(64%) and Republicans (56%) agree with re-instituting to bilateral ties.¶ In March 2009, U.S. President
Barack Obama eased travel restrictions to Cuba, and allowed U.S. citizens to travel to the island for
religious and cultural reasons. Most Americans (57%) believe it is time to lift the travel ban that
prevents most Americans from visiting the island.¶ Half of Americans (51%) would lift the trade
embargo with Cuba that has been in place since the 1960s, while three-in-ten (29%) disagree. Most
Democrats (53%) and Independents (55%) support ending the embargo, but Republicans are not as
convinced (46%).¶ The notion of supporting non-governmental groups in Cuba in order to foster protests
against the current regime did not resonate with Americans. Across the country, only 35 per cent of
respondents endorse this course of action.¶ Two-thirds of Hispanics (67%) support re-establishing
diplomatic relations with Cuba, and their views on the travel ban and the trade embargo mirror those
of the entire sample of Americans.
Plan popular with the Cuban-American public
Florida International University 11 (Cuban Research Institute, 9/19/11, “2011 Cuba Poll”,
http://www.diasporaydesarrollo.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=68ad2e41-37b9-47cf-9cef22e5adff6080, accessed 6/26/13, KR)
648 randomly selected Cuban American respondents were polled in Miami Dade County in September
2011. This is the 10th poll in a series of Cuba polls conducted since 1991. Overall results are weighted
to be representative of the Cuban -American community of Miami - Dade County as a whole. Major
Findings 57% favor lifting all restrictions on travel 60% oppose restrictions on family travel 57%
support re - establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba 80% believe that the embargo has “not
worked very well” or “not worked at all” 56%, a majority of respondents, support maintaining the
embargo 39% ready to expand trade and investment in Cuba beyond current levels. Specific group of
18-44 year olds or those who arrived in the U.S. after 1994 expressed the most support in changing
our relationship with Cuba. 70% support engagement via diplomacy 75% support travel 75% support
food and medicine sales 76% of those who arrived after 1994 (two - thirds) are either non-citizens or
non-registered citizens.
Cuban-Americans support the plan-polling and letter to Congress prove
Alfonso, PhD and researcher at Cuban Americans for Engagement, et al 6/11/13 (María
Isabel and 59 other Cuban-American signees listed on the web page, “OPEN LETTER TO:
President Barack H. Obama The Honorable John Kerry, Secretary of State”,
http://lawg.org/action-center/lawg-blog/69-general/1207-cuban-americans-denounce-floridalegislators-position-of-cuba-on-the-terrorist-list, accessed 6/26/13, KR)
We, the undersigned, are Cuban Americans opposed to the statement by three Cuban-American
members of Congress, sent to Secretary of State John Kerry on April 29th, regarding keeping Cuba on
the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. See: http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/pressrelease/bipartisan-congressional-group-asks-administration-keep-cuba-state-sponsor-terrorism. Their
expressed views do not represent those of the majority of Cuban Americans.¶ We feel strongly that
the original reasons for adding Cuba to that list no longer exist. If you apply the criteria described by
former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in taking North Korea off the list in 2008—no support for
terrorism in the last twenty years—the removal of Cuba from this serious tool of U.S. foreign policy is
long overdue. ¶ We also believe that removing Cuba from the terrorist list would advance the process of
other mutually-beneficial bilateral communications between Cuba and the United States. This is of the
utmost importance to the United States. The Boston marathon tragedy highlights the importance of
international cooperation against terrorism. The issue must not be politicized. As proud Americans,
committed to the security of our nation, we urge the State Department to conduct a serious
professional evaluation of Cuba’s presence on this list. Dealing with terrorism requires policy and
leadership divorced from politics and distractions. Removing Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism
list will enable the United States to look at the current challenges and opportunities posed by Cuba. The
island is a country in transition, not a national security threat. Recently Cuba has provided new
opportunities on the island for private enterprise, the removal of travel restrictions, an open market for
housing and cars, among other things. Although we know there is much more to be done, it is
imperative that the United States maintain an open line of communication with Cuba while this
transition continues to evolve. ¶ Thus, we firmly denounce the statement by the three Cuban-American
members of Congress, who have falsely claimed to represent all Cuban Americans. Recent polls in the
Cuban-American community, and in the nation as a whole, demonstrate that current policy is not the
wish or position of the Cuban-American community, or of the American citizenry in general. A
summary of recent polls may be viewed here:
http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Polling_Data_On_Engagement_with_Cuba_02_2012.pdfis
There’s growing momentum for removing the SST designation
Bender, Boston Globe writer, 2/21/13 (Bryan, 2/21/13, Boston Globe, “Talk grows of taking Cuba
off terror list”, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/02/21/cuba-label-terrorist-statelonger-justified-some-officials-say/CmVFXsVC4M1R1WbHE8lb0H/story.html, accessed 6/24/13)
High-level US diplomats have concluded that Cuba should no longer be designated a state sponsor of
terrorism, raising the prospect that Secretary of State John F. Kerry could remove a major obstacle to
restoring relations with the Cold War-era foe, government officials said.¶ Cuba no longer actively
supports terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the FARC, or
former members of Spain’s Basque Fatherland and Liberty, also known as the ETA, according to State
Department findings.¶ And interviews with a series of top administration officials and members of
Congress indicate there is a growing consensus in policy and intelligence circles that Cuba’s support for
terrorist groups has been terminated and the country should be removed from the list — much like the
George W. Bush administration did with North Korea in 2008.¶ Kerry has met in recent days with officials
to review the Cuba policy.¶ The pressure to de-list Cuba as a terrorism sponsor comes as a bipartisan
congressional delegation traveled to Cuba this week to discuss how the two estranged nations might
find ways to lift a US embargo in place for five decades and cooperate on a host of economic,
agricultural, and security matters.
No link-opposition is shrinking and the travel ban relaxation disproves the link
Metzker, Inter Press writer, 6/13/13 (Jared, 6/13/13, Inter Press service, cites Bilbao, executive
director of the Cuba Study Group at CSIS, “Pressure Building for U.S. to Remove Cuba from 'Terror
Sponsor' List”, http://www.globalissues.org/news/2013/06/13/16803, accessed 6/24/13, KR)
Bilbao noted the continued influence of a "shrinking minority" of anti-Cuba hardliners in the United
States who fervently oppose Cuba's removal from the list, as well as a lack of political will on the part of
U.S. policymakers to square off with that minority.3¶ Nonetheless, he asserted that the time is ripe for
the United States to take Cuba off the list and prioritise helping the Cuban people over harming the
Cuban regime.¶ President Barack Obama's administration has overseen some notable policy shifts, such
as a relaxation of laws restricting travel by U.S. citizens with family in Cuba. Certain realities have also
been changing within Cuba, including the abdication of Fidel Castro from power, which make friendlier
policies toward the island nation more feasible.
There’s massive but quiet support for the aff
EFE staff writers 3/7/13 (Agencia EFE, Spanish international news agency, 3/7/2013, Published in
Los Angeles Herald Tribune, “U.S. Urged to Drop Cuba from Terror List,”
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=703430&CategoryId=14510, accessed 6/25/13, KR)
The United States should remove Cuba from its list of countries that sponsor terrorism as a gesture of
goodwill so that progress can be made on a broad range of matters of bilateral interest, political and
academic leaders said on Thursday. “There is no evidence that Cuba is sponsoring terrorist groups,” Rep.
Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) said during a forum organized by the Washington Office on Latin America.
McGovern, who recently met for more than two hours with Cuban President Raul Castro, on Thursday
urged the Barack Obama administration to seize the moment to improve relations with Cuba. When
asked by Efe about how many Democrats and Republicans in Congress support that request, McGovern
said that there is a “growing consensus” and that “if there were a secret vote, it would be
overwhelming” in terms of its support for removing Cuba from the list. Also speaking at the WOLA
event was Wayne Smith, former Chief of Mission at the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba, who said that the
United States is the one who is “isolated” in the international community because of its measures
against the island. Ambassador Anthony Quainton, who was involved in Cuba’s original designation as
a State Sponsor of Terrorism, said that “the time has come, for our mutual interests, to remove Cuba
from the list.”
The plan is popular-Florida legislators are softening on Cuba
Thale and Boggs, Director and Officer at the Washington Office on Latin America,
3/28/13 (Geoff Thale, Program Director at WOLA and Clay Boggs, Program Officer at WOLA, March 28,
2013, “Three Harbingers of Change in U.S. Cuba Policy”,
http://www.wola.org/commentary/three_harbingers_of_change_in_us_cuba_policy, accessed 6/25/13,
KR)
The U.S. embargo has been in place for more than 50 years, so sometimes it is difficult to believe that it
will ever end. But there are signs that change is coming. Here are three recent developments that are
indicative of where U.S. Cuba policy is headed:¶ Rep. Kathy Castor announced on March 27 that she is
opposed to the embargo, saying to the Tampa Bay Business Journal that “It is time for the U.S. to
modernize its relationship with Cuba, lift the embargo and end restrictions on Americans' rights to
travel to Cuba.” Rep. Castor is not the first member of Congress to oppose the embargo, but she is the
first member of Congress from Florida to do so. Together with the election of Rep. Joe García (the first
pro-engagement Cuban-American member of Congress) and President Obama’s stellar performance
among Cuban Americans in November 2012, Rep. Castor’s announcement is an indication of where
Florida politics are going.¶ Yoani Sánchez recently visited the United States. For years, the Cuban
government refused to allow Cuban blogger Yoani Sánchez to travel abroad. Sánchez, who has won
numerous international awards for her journalism, was previously unable to claim her awards because
of government restrictions. Cuba’s migration reforms, which removed the loathed “exit visa” and
(mostly) normalized travel abroad for Cubans citizens, allowed Sánchez to travel to the United States,
Brazil, and ten other countries. (Several other well-known dissidents have begun to travel abroad, as
well). Her presence in the United States was a testament to the changes occurring in Cuba. In
Washington, she spoke to a packed crowd at the conservative Cato Institute, where she criticized the
Cuban government for restrictions on freedom of speech, but also criticized the U.S. government for
maintaining the embargo, which, she said, gave the Cuban government a powerful excuse for its own
shortcomings. Sánchez also met with conservative Cuban-American legislators Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL)
and Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), who share her criticisms of the Cuban government but who have in
the past shunned Sánchez for her position on the U.S. embargo.
Plan popular-Council on the Americas supports and they have clout
Taylor, Washington Times writer, 2/21/13 (Guy, 2/21/13, Washington Times, “Political calculus
keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors”, http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wncuba-us-terror-list-20130502,0,2494970.story, accessed 6/25/13, KR)
The Obama administration should — and has the legal authority to — use its executive power to begin
lifting the decades-old embargo on trade with Cuba, according to two papers this week issued by an
influential Latin America think tank and a leading Cuban exile group.¶ The New York-based Council on
the Americas and the Washington-based Cuba Study Group both call on the White House to ease the
60-year-old embargo in order to promote free market activity on the communist island.¶ The State
Department so far has declined to comment on the documents, but one official described the Council
on the Americas as “influential” and told The Washington Times that the State Department does
“appreciate their views.”¶ Circulation of the white papers came the same week that a delegation of U.S.
lawmakers, headed by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont Democrat, met with Cuban President Raul Castro
in an unsuccessful attempt to secure the release of Maryland contractor Alan Gross, who has been
imprisoned in Cuba since 2009.¶ Mr. Gross is accused of illegally bringing communications equipment to
Cuba as part of a democracy-building program supported by the U.S. Agency for International
Development. His detention remains a source of friction between Washington and Havana.¶ State
Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland categorically denied a Boston Globe report Thursday which
suggested that newly confirmed Secretary of State John F. Kerry may be seriously considering removing
Havana from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism as a first step to improved relations.¶ Citing
interviews with “a series of top administration officials and members of Congress,” the newspaper
reported that “there is a growing consensus in policy and intelligence circles that Cuba’s support for
terrorist groups has been terminated and the country should be removed from the list — much like the
George W. Bush administration did with North Korea in 2008.”
AT: Politics- Cuba Lobby
Steps are being taken toward rapprochement, but incremental gains are tenuous—
normalization has become more politically popular
Haren, staff writer, 13
[Paul, 6-21-13, The Vancouver Sun, “Analysis: Cuba, U.S. take steps toward rapproachment but
complicated road lies ahead,”
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Analysis+Cuba+take+steps+toward+rapprochement+complicated
/8561879/story.html, accessed 6-29-13, YGS]
HAVANA, Cuba — They’ve
hardly become allies, but Cuba and the U.S. have taken some baby steps toward
rapprochement in recent weeks that have people on this island and in Washington wondering if a breakthrough in relations could be just
over the horizon.¶ Skeptics caution the Cold War enemies have been here many times before, only to fall
back into old recriminations but there are signs that views might be shifting on both sides of the
Florida Straits.¶ The countries have held talks in the past week on resuming direct mail service, and announced a July 17 meeting on
migration issues. A U.S. federal judge in May allowed a convicted Cuban intelligence agent to return to the island. Cuba informed the family of
jailed U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross this month it would let an American doctor examine him, although the visit has apparently not
yet happened. Cuban President Raul Castro has also ushered in a series of economic and social changes, including making it easier for Cubans to
travel off the island.¶ Under
the radar, diplomats on both sides describe a sea change in the tone of their
dealings.¶ Only last year, Cuban state television was broadcasting grainy footage of American diplomats meeting with dissidents on Havana
streets and publicly accusing them of being CIA frontmen. Today, U.S. diplomats in Havana and Cuban Foreign Ministry officials have easy
contact, even sharing home phone numbers.¶ Josefina
Vidal, Cuba’s top diplomat for North American affairs,
recently travelled to Washington and met twice with State Department officials, a visit that came
right before the announcements of resumptions in the two sets of bilateral talks that had been
suspended for more than two years. Washington has also granted visas to prominent Cuban officials, including the daughter of
Cuba’s president.¶ “These recent steps indicate a desire on both sides to try to move forward, but also a
recognition on both sides of just how difficult it is to make real progress,” said Robert Pastor, a
professor of international relations at American University and former national security adviser on Latin America during
the Carter administration. “These are tiny, incremental gains, and the prospects of going backwards are
equally high.Ӧ Among the things that have changed, John Kerry has taken over as U.S. secretary of state after being an outspoken critic of
Washington’s policy on Cuba while in the Senate. U.S. President Barack Obama no longer has re-election concerns while dealing with the
Cuban-American electorate in Florida, where there are also indications of a warming attitude to negotiating with Cuba.¶ Castro,
meanwhile, is striving to overhaul the island’s Marxist economy with a dose of limited free-market
capitalism and may feel a need for more open relations with the U.S. While direct American investment
is still barred on the island, a rise in visits and money transfers by Cuban-Americans since Obama relaxed restrictions has been a
boon for Cuba’s cash-starved economy. Under the table, Cuban-Americans are also helping relatives on the island start private businesses and
refurbish homes bought under Castro’s limited free-market reforms.¶ Several prominent Cuban dissidents have been allowed to travel recently
due to Castro’s changes. The trips have been applauded by Washington, and also may have lessened Havana’s worries about the threat posed
by dissidents.¶ Likewise, a U.S. federal judge’s decision to allow Cuban spy Rene Gonzalez to return home was met with only muted criticism
inside the United States, perhaps emboldening U.S. diplomats to seek further openings with Cuba.¶ To be sure, there
is still far more
that separates the long-time antagonists than unites them.¶ The State Department has kept Cuba on a
list of state sponsors of terrorism and another that calls into question Havana’s commitment to fighting human trafficking. The
Obama administration continues to demand democratic change on an island ruled for more than a half century by Castro and his brother Fidel.¶
Cuba also continues to denounce Washington’s 51-year-old economic embargo.¶ Then there is Gross, 64, the a
Maryland native who was arrested in 2009 and is serving a 15-year jail sentence for bringing communications equipment to the island illegally.
His case has scuttled efforts at engagement in the past, and could do so again, U.S. officials say privately. Cuba has indicated it wants to trade
Gross for four Cuban agents serving long jail terms in the U.S., which Washington has said it won’t consider.¶ Ted Henken, a professor of Latin
American studies at Baruch College in New York who helped organize a recent U.S. tour by Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, said the
Obama administration is too concerned with upsetting Cuban-American politicians and has missed
opportunities to engage with Cuba at a crucial time in its history.¶ “I think that a lot more would need to happen for
this to amount to momentum leading to any kind of major diplomatic breakthrough,” he said. “Obama should be bolder and more audacious.”¶
Even these limited moves have sparked fierce criticism by those long opposed to engagement. Cuban-American congressman Mario Diaz Balart,
a Florida Republican, called the recent overtures “disturbing.”¶ “Rather than attempting to legitimize the Cuban people’s oppressors, the
administration should demand that the regime stop harbouring fugitives from U.S. justice, release all political prisoners and American
humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross, end the brutal, escalating repression against the Cuban people, and respect basic human rights,” he said.¶
Another Cuban-American politician from Florida, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, scolded Obama for seeking “dialogue with the dictatorship.”¶
Despite that rhetoric, many experts think Obama would face less political fallout at home if he chose
engagement because younger Cuban-Americans seem more open to improved ties than those who fled
immediately after the 1959 revolution.¶ Of 10 Cuban-Americans interview recently at the popular Miami
restaurant Versailles, a de facto headquarters of the exile community, only two said they were opposed to the U.S.
holding migration talks. Several said they hoped for much more movement.¶ Jose Gonzalez, 55, a shippingindustry supervisor who was born in Cuba and came to the U.S. at age 12, said he now favours an end to the embargo and the resumption of
formal diplomatic ties. “There was a reason that existed but it doesn’t any more,” he said.¶ Santiago Portal, 65, an engineer who moved to the
U.S. 45 years ago, said more dialogue would be good. “The more exchange of all types the closer Cuba will be to democracy,” he said.¶ Those
opinions dove-tail with a 2011 poll by Florida International University of 648 randomly selected
Cuban-Americans in Miami-Dade County that showed 58 per cent favoured re-establishing diplomatic
relations with Cuba. That was a considerable increase from a survey in 1993, when 80 per cent of
people polled said they did not support trade or diplomatic relations with Cuba.¶ “In general, there is
an open attitude, certainly toward re-establishing diplomatic relations,” said Jorge Duany, director of
the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University. “Short of perhaps lifting the embargo, there seems
to be increasing support for some sort of understanding with the Cuban government.”
No link – The Cuban Lobby doesn’t have powerful influence over policy
Wylie, Ph.D in Political Science, 2004
(Lana Wylie, Ph.D in Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2004 , “PERCEPTIONS AND
FOREIGN POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CANADIAN AND AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CUBA”
Canadian Foreign Policy, Volume 11, issue 3, , P. Proquest, Fontana )
What then explains the inclusion of Cuba on this list of the state sponsors and the frequent speculation about Castro's terrorist activities? The
political clout of the Cuban American community is partially responsible for this designation. Indeed, this
large ethnic group has become one of the most electorally powerful groups in American politics, consistently voting as a bloc, managing to sway
the outcome of elections in Florida, which, as the 2000 election proved, is a crucial swing state in national elections. Furthermore, they are
represented by a well-connected interest group that has access to many prominent Washington officials, including the President and Congress
members. Yet, the Cuban
American National Foundation (CANF) is not all-powerful. Even though CANF has
a comparatively large influence over policy formation, many of the government officials interviewed
in Washington and in Havana said that the community's influence is often exaggerated, that the
power over this policy remains firmly in the hands of Washington policymakers. Washington chooses
when to consult with the community. H For example, an official who had worked in the Carter
administration explained that, although the Cuban Americans were regularly consulted by the
administration before decisions were made, Carter's people did not consult with the community when
they knew that the Cuban Americans would oppose their decision.15
Elian Gonzalez affair proves – congress doesn’t listen the CANF
Wylie, Ph.D in Political Science, 2004
(Lana Wylie, Ph.D in Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2004 , “PERCEPTIONS AND
FOREIGN POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CANADIAN AND AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CUBA”
Canadian Foreign Policy, Volume 11, issue 3, , P. Proquest, Fontana )
The Clinton administration's return of Elian Gonzalez, the Cuban boy who was the centre of an
international incident for months, is a more recent and public example of the government going
against the expressed wishes of the community. Though the American public was divided over whether
the boy should be returned to Cuba, a large majority believed he should be allowed to return to Cuba
with his father.16 Interestingly, Republicans and Democrats were, in most cases, equally critical of the
Cuban American community. For example, a CBS News poll found that 61 percent of Democrats and 61 percent of
Republicans thought that the Cuban American community in Miami was not acting in the boy's best
interests.17¶ The community lost credibility with Americans and influence on Capitol Hill because of
this incident. The publicity surrounding Elian Gonzalez altered many people's perceptions of Cuba, Cubans, and Cuban Americans. First, it
served to humanize Cubans. Americans identified with Elian's father, Juan Miguel Gonzalez and his family in Cuba. People remarked that they
"seemed just like us" and reported that they felt empathy for Juan Miguel. Additionally, many people questioned their perception of life in
Cuba after Elian's father refused an offer to remain in the US. Lastly, during the custody fight, the Cuban American community often appeared
overly emotional and sometimes irrational. Thus,
the custody battle called into question some long held
perceptions - that the Cuban American community's view of Cuba is correct; that Cubans are
"different" from Americans; and that life in Cuba is as bad as many Cuban Americans report. It
encouraged a growing skepticism of the community and their capacity for objectivity . (Lane 2001)
The CNAF’s political influence is slowly declining – they can no longer affect policy
Wylie, Ph.D in Political Science, 2004
(Lana Wylie, Ph.D in Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2004 , “PERCEPTIONS AND
FOREIGN POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CANADIAN AND AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CUBA”
Canadian Foreign Policy, Volume 11, issue 3, , P. Proquest, Fontana )
Additionally, divisions within the community are increasing, further weakening the lobby group . Surveys taken
in 2003 indicate that more than half of all Cuban immigrants believe that the US approach toward Cuba has
failed to improve the lives of people in Cuba. A majority also believes that exiles should be talking to the Cuban government
and approved of a meeting between the two groups held in April of 2003. (Canedy 2003) The Miami Herald reports that polls taken of Cuban
Americans in Florida during 2003 show "a major shift towards moderation by Cuban exiles". (Elliot and De Valle 2003) This
shift reflects
the generational change within the community and the opinions of more recent immigrants that left
Cuba for Florida for economic, as opposed to political, reasons. Cuban-Americans born in the US and
the newer arrivals are less ideologically opposed to the Castro regime and thus not as committed to
isolation. The New York Times reports that the change in attitude within the community was also "a concerted
effort by some exile groups to improve the image of Cuban Americans after a nationally televised
struggle over the young shipwreck survivor Elian Gonzalez." (Canedy 2003) In addition, the once solidly
Republican Cuban American lobby group is also beginning to reflect the divisions within the wider
community. They are no longer united behind Republican candidates. For example, Joe Garcia, the Executive
Director of the Cuban American National Foundation from 2000 to 2004, campaigned for the Democrats in the 2004 Presidential election,
revealing that moderate members of the community have even penetrated the Cuban American leadership.
These divisions have
lessened their influence, as the lobby has been unable to sway policymakers on a number of recent
issues. For example, CANF failed to stop the 2002 movement within Congress that favoured easing
restrictions on trade and travel with Cuba. (CANF 2002b) Consequently, despite their impact on the 2000
presidential elections, this lobby is losing influence in Washington.
Add-Ons
 US Cuba Normalization
Cuba has met all the criteria, now is the time to remove them from the list – this is a
critical first step to break down cold war mentality
McKenna, professor and chair of political science at the University of Prince Edward
Island , 4-23-13
(Peter McKenna, professor and chair of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island , 4-2313, The Guardian, “It's time to take Cuba off the terror list”,
http://www.theguardian.pe.ca/Opinion/Letter-to-editor/2013-04-23/article-3225471/Its-time-to-takeCuba-off-the-terror-list/1, accessed 6/27/13, JF)
In some ways, the U.S.-Cuba relationship — even under the presidency of Barack Obama — is still
locked in a Cold War time-warp. For a host of illogical reasons, including Havana's 2009 imprisonment of Alan Gross, a
subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development who acted illegally in the country, Washington can't seem to bring itself to
break diplomatic bread with the Cuban government. But there is some chatter in the halls of the U.S. State Department that newly-minted
Secretary of State John Kerry is
seriously contemplating removing Cuba from an arbitrary list of countries
that export or promote terrorism. By law, he has to make that determination, and recommendation
to the president, before the Department publishes its annual report on terrorism on April 30. By
keeping Cuba on that list, it prevents dual-use military technology — which could include advanced
medical equipment — from reaching the Island. It also compels Washington to vigorously oppose any
loans to Cuba from international financial institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.
Interestingly, Secretary Kerry has a record of endorsing moderation in Washington's irrational and punitive Cuba policy-including his unease
with millions of U.S. dollars for secretive democracy-building programs in Cuba. He no doubt believes that the time is ripe for the U.S. (including
the political situation in south Florida) to work toward normalizing its relations with the Cuban government. Cuba has been on the terror list
since it was first pulled together back in1982. At that time, the reason for doing so was based on Havana's material support for revolutionary
movements and guerrillas in various Latin American countries throughout the 1960s and 1970s. That support
no longer exists
today. And in the case of Cuba's ties to the struggling Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
and Spain's Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) movement, there is no evidence that it has provided
them with arms or paramilitary training. In fact, the Cubans have recently sought to curtail their
relationship with ETA members residing on the island. Further, they are now playing an important
mediation role in seeking to resolve the long-standing internal conflict between the FARC and the
Colombian government. No matter how you slice it, the rational for not delisting Cuba is pretty thin.
But as a recent editorial in the Los Angeles Times opined: "By all accounts, Cuba remains on the list — alongside Iran, Sudan
and Syria — because it disagrees with the United States' approach to fighting international terrorism,
not because it supports terrorism." It's worth mentioning that the Cuban government strongly renounced the
terror attacks of 2001, offered to send medical supplies and health care professionals in their aftermath, and acquiesced in
Washington's plan to house suspected terrorists at its Guantanamo Bay naval facility. Havana has now
unequivocally condemned the deadly Boston Marathon bombings and rejected all forms of terrorism. Surely if
North Korea could be removed from the bad-boy list in 2008 by the former George W. Bush
administration — and that Pakistan has never made it onto the list even though it had sheltered
Osama bin Laden for years — it is long overdue to scratch Cuba's name off. And the Cubans have
certainly strengthened their case for doing so under the leadership of Raúl Castro, who has introduced
fundamental economic and social reforms, permitted Cubans to travel freely abroad (including vocal
dissidents), opened a constructive dialogue with the Catholic Church, and released dozens of political
prisoners. Many countries in Latin America, which hold the Cuban government in high regard, have urged the Obama administration to
mend its diplomatic fences with the Cubans. Any gesture to remove Havana from this highly politicized list would go some way toward restoring
Washington's credibility and standing in the Americas. Removing
Cuba from the terror list would also reassure the
Cubans and go some way toward resetting the U.S.-Cuba relationship on a proper diplomatic footing.
This symbolically important step, in conjunction with a series of other confidence-building measures
(such as the release of Gross), might eventually lead to the lifting of the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba.
Such a move would obviously be in the best interests of Cuba, the U.S. and the wider international community. So let's hope that Secretary
Kerry makes theright call and drops Cuba from the nonsensical blacklist.
Cuba doesn’t belong on the list—blocks broader cooperation
Trujillo, works for Latin America Working Group, ‘11
[Katherine, 12/9, LAWG, “Remove Cuba from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism”,
http://www.lawg.org/action-center/lawg-blog/69/952, Accessed 6/25/13, VJ]
Last week, the Latin America Working Group partnered with the Center for International Policy to host a conference examining Cuba’s placement on the State
Department’s list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Along with Mavis Anderson from LAWG, speakers included renowned Cuba experts Wayne Smith (Center for
International Policy), Robert Muse (Muse and Associates), Carlos Alzugaray (University of Havana), Sarah Stephens (Center for Democracy in the Americas), and
Arturo Lopez-Levy (University of Denver). Each panelist spoke critically of this designation, which has served to hurt Cubans rather than affect political changes in
Cuba, or combat real terrorist threats. “Cuba’s
inclusion on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism without any
evidence is a sham that needs immediate correction. It is a misuse of this list as a foreign policy tool
and places obstacles in the way of the development of a sane and post-Cold War policy toward Cuba,”
said Mavis Anderson. Cuba was put on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism on March 1st, 1982, and remains there with only three other countries: Iran, Sudan,
and Syria. In
contrast, North Korea, a country with one of the lowest-ranking human rights records in the
world, was removed from the list in October 2008. And Libya, under Col. Gadaffi, was removed on
May 15th, 2006. The panelists provided historical context of this designation and discussed its economic and political consequences. For instance, by being
on this list, hardliners in Congress have blocked various positive policy changes under the rubric that the
law states the United States cannot engage with state sponsors of terror. Moreover, many Cuban exiles are able to
make spurious legal claims against Cuba simply because it is on the terror list. “Officially labeling Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
means that the U.S. government can take hold of Cuban assets to meet alleged compensation
demands,” said Bob Muse. In 2007 alone, there were four judgments that totaled $850 million and with Cuba designated on the terror list, more cases will
“continue to roll in,” said Muse. With the arrest of Alan Gross, who has been imprisoned in Cuba for the past two years after bringing illegal communications
equipment to the island, it is more important now than ever before to remove Cuba from this list—to remove the excuses for U.S.’s inability to negotiate Mr. Gross’
release. By
removing Cuba from this list, the United States could explore many new avenues of discussion
with Cuba. Although removing this designation won’t be easy, it is certainly necessary. As Sarah Stephens, executive director of the Center for Democracy in
the Americas aptly put it, “We should no longer allow this untruth to be the foundation stone for blocking
reforms and changing U.S. policy toward Cuba.” To read the presentations of the panelists, click here .
Removal of Cuba is the starting point to solving—the Cold War is no longer relevant
Sealing, practiced attorney and author of numerous policy publications, 4
[Keith E., member of the Board of Directors of the Association of American Law Schools Section on
Balance in Legal Education, 2004-2005, Cuba & Democratization: Should Sanctions Be Lifted?, “Cuba is
no Longer a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’: Why the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Sanction Failed,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1259986, p. 146, accessed 6-26-13, YGS]
I will argue that removing Cuba from the flawed FSIA scheme by no¶ longer designating it as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism would be a logical first¶ step in a plan to eventually lift all sanctions, secure a
better life for the¶ Cuban people, and ease hemispheric tensions left over from the Cold War.¶ This
later point is of particular relevance as the old paradigm of the United¶ States versus the Soviet Union
and China, with Cuba as the Soviet Union's¶ western hemispheric puppet, has been replaced. The new
paradigm is of a¶ shadowy world of terrorist supporter states, primarily in the Middle East, ¶ plus an
increasingly unstable North Korean regime. To use the colloquial¶ term, Cuba is simply "off the radar,"
and its denomination as a State Sponsor¶ of Terrorism is simply a Cold War holdover.
Removal is the first step to normalizing relations with Cuba
Clement, Cuba intern at the Cuba Project, 13
[Joshua, April 2013, Center for International Policy Conference Report, “Rapprochement with Cuba,”
http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/0413_RapprochementCuba_TampaConference.
pdf, 6-26-13, YGS]
If the U.S. is to avoid being a pariah in its own hemisphere, the executive branch must be the first to ¶
promote a policy between the two countries that is based on cooperation and a respect for human ¶
rights. President Obama can start by removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. As ¶
Colonel Wilkerson made clear in his lecture, the Cuban government is not promoting revolution or ¶
contributing to terrorist organizations. Removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list would
¶ make it more difficult for elected officials, such as Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, Mario Diaz-Balart and Bob
¶ Menendez to block normalizing relations with Cuba.
Decisions over the removal act as a litmus test for improving US-Cuba relations
Fox News Latino 13
[3-23-13, “US Decision on Cuba Terror-Designation Coming Soon,” Fox News,
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/03/23/us-decesion-on-cuba-terror-designation-comingsoon/, accessed 6/27/13, YGS]
Havana – Whether it will usher in a long-stalled detente or slam the door on rapprochement, perhaps
until the scheduled end of the Castro era in 2018, a routine bit of beltway bureaucracy could have a big
impact on U.S. relations with Cuba.¶ U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry must decide within a few weeks
whether to advocate that President Barack Obama should take Cuba off a list of state sponsors of
terrorism, a collection of Washington foes that also includes Iran, Syria and Sudan.¶ Cuban officials
have long seen the terror designation as unjustified and told visiting American delegations privately in
recent weeks that they view Kerry's recommendation as a litmus test for improved ties. They also
hinted the decision could affect discussions over the release of jailed U.S. subcontractor Alan Gross,
whose detention in 2009 torpedoed hopes of a diplomatic thaw.
US Cuba Normalization Good
Normalization is inevitable, but eliminating trade restrictions now is key to preventing
economic collapse and regional instability
Ashby, Council on Hemispheric Affairs senior research fellow, 13
[Dr. Timothy, 3-29-13, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing
Relations with the United States – The Importance of Trading with State-Owned Enterprises,”
http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/, accessed 6-39-13, YGS]
The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy makers.
Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may
accelerate or retard the process. The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is likely to undermine
the already dysfunctional Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid.
This could bring social chaos, especially among the island’s disaffected youth. Such an outcome would
generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and regional security. To maintain Cuba’s social and
economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to
unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned.¶ The collapse of
Cuba’s tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring countries. It
certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy
which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including
31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests
regarding Cuba as follows:¶ • Avoid one or more mass migrations;¶ • Prevent Cuba from becoming
another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere;¶ • Prevent Cuba
from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade;¶ • Avoid Cuba becoming
a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm
the United States. [2]¶ All of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social
conditions within Cuba.¶ U.S. policy specifically supports “a market-oriented economic system” [3]
toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin, whether from the
island’s potentially booming private sector–including 300,000 agricultural producers–or State-Owned
Enterprises (“SOEs”). [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to U.S. interests. Regardless of over 400,000
entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when Cuba’s private
sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban
workers. [5] A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in
current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and
products. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic
stability and fostering the growth of a middle class–both of which are essential for the foundation of
democratic institutions. Two-way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs.
US-Cuba relations fosters new agricultural markets, biotech and medicine, tourism,
and skilled labor exchange and prevents narcotrafficking and Middle Eastern oil
dependency
Foundation For Normalization of US-Cuba Relations, a nonprofit organization devoted
to provide realistic information about the advantages normalized relations, 13
[6-27-13, “Advantages of Normal Relations” , The Foundation for the Normalization of U.S./Cuba
Relations, http://fornorm.com/advantages.php, accessed 6/27/13, YGS]
Advantages of Normal Relations¶ Our two people have much to offer each other, and much to
contribute to the quality of life in both of our countries. However, we believe that the current
relationship is outmoded and in need of a fair and comprehensive review. We are a source of
information on new opportunities in many areas, including the following: Agriculture¶ Increased
bilateral trade in agricultural products will offer new markets for American farmers and ranchers, and
make Cuba’s unique products available to American consumers.¶ Technology & Medicine¶ America’s
cutting-edge technology and medical advances could help the Cuban people and the U.S. could take
advantage of Cuba’s world-recognized healthcare and biotechnology expertise.¶ Energy Resources¶ We
can decrease our dependency on Middle-Eastern oil by providing U.S. companies with opportunities
to tap into Cuba’s increasingly abundant oil and gas reserves and its potential for the production of
sugar cane biofuel.¶ Tourism¶ Respecting the fundamental right of people of both countries to travel
freely would provide an influx of tourist revenue, people contact, and cultural enrichment.¶
Narcotrafficking¶ Establishing joint mechanisms would help prevent narcotraffickers from using Cuba’s
territory as a transshipment point to America, in accordance with Cuba’s expressed desire to fully
cooperate with U.S. authorities in this regard.¶ Sports¶ Allowing the unfettered participation of Cuban
athletes and sports teams in activities taking place in the U.S. and vice-versa would delight sports fans of
both nations and promote mutual understanding.¶ Education¶ Sharing the considerable educational
opportunities offered by our countries would be a boon to students and teachers on both sides of the
straits and allow learning from the best of what each side has to offer, including, for example, Cuba’s
advances in medical education and preventive medicine.¶ The Arts¶ Significant enrichment would
follow from the free exchange of America’s best entertainment and Cuba’s rich cultural offerings,
including its widely diffused music and world-class ballet.¶ Human Relations and Labor Market¶ Great joy
would come to divided families by ending decades of painful and cruel separation. And Cuba’s highly
educated workforce would offer a tremendous opportunity for American enterprises.
US-Cuban relations are vital to preventing oil spills and marine ecological crises in the
Gulf, Caribbean, and Atlantic
Pinon, Interim Director @ Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy,
and Muse, Washington DC-based lawyer experienced in Cuban issues, 10
[Jorge R. and Robert L., May 2010, Brookings, “Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why U.S.-Cuba
Environmental Cooperation is Critical,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/5/18%20oil%20spill%20cuba%20pinon
/0518_oil_spill_cuba_pinon, Issue Brief No. 2, p. 1-2, accessed 6-27-13, YGS]
As Cuba continues to develop its deepwater oil and ¶ natural gas reserves, the consequence to the
United ¶ States of a similar mishap occurring in Cuban waters ¶ moves from the theoretical to the
actual. The sobering fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of ¶ miles of American coastline and do
profound harm ¶ to important marine habitats demands cooperative ¶ and proactive planning by
Washington and Havana ¶ to minimize or avoid such a calamity. Also important ¶ is the planning
necessary to prevent and, if necessary, ¶ respond to incidents arising from this country’s oil ¶ industry
that, through the action of currents and ¶ wind, threaten Cuban waters and shorelines.¶ While Washington is working to
prevent future disasters in U.S. waters like the Deepwater Horizon, ¶ its current policies foreclose the ability to
respond ¶ effectively to future oil disasters—whether that ¶ disaster is caused by companies at work in Cuban ¶ waters,
or is the result of companies operating in ¶ U.S. waters.¶ Context¶ in April 2009, the Brookings institution released a ¶ comprehensive report on
United states—Cuba relations Cuba: a new Policy of Critical of Critical and ¶ Constructive engagement timed to serve as a resource ¶ for
policymakers in the new Administration. The ¶ report, which reflected consensus among a diverse ¶ group of experts on U.S.-Cuba relations,
was notable ¶ for its menu of executive Branch actions that could, ¶ over time, facilitate the restoration of normal relations between the United
States and Cuba through ¶ a series of confidence-building exercises in areas of ¶ clear mutual interest. The emphasis was on identifying
unobjectionable, practical and realizable areas of ¶ cooperation between the two countries.¶ Among the initiatives recommended to the new ¶
Obama Administration were:¶ • “Open a dialogue between the United States ¶ and Cuba, particularly on issues of mutual ¶ concern, including
migration, counter-narcotics, environment, health, and security. • Develop agreements and assistance with the ¶ government of Cuba for
disaster relief and environmental stewardship.Ӧ shortly after releasing its report, Brookings
and the ¶ Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF) co-hosted ¶ a new era for U.S.-Cuba Relations on Marine and ¶ Coastal Resources
Conservation, a conference highlighting the importance and value of environmental ¶ cooperation
between Cuba and the United States. ¶ EDF has particular expertise in this area because it ¶ has been
working with Cuban scientists and environmental officials for over a decade to protect coral ¶ reefs,
marine life and coastal areas in their country. ¶ The joint Brookings/EDF conference identified areas ¶
of potential bilateral collaboration aimed at protecting shared marine and coastal ecosystems in the
Gulf ¶ of Mexico, Caribbean sea and the Atlantic ocean. ¶ The importance of cooperation on
environmental issues stressed at the conference is particularly relevant ¶ now in light of events like
the Deepwater Horizon oil ¶ spill and the basic facts of geography and their relation to threats to
contiguous U.S. and Cuban marine ¶ areas. Cuba sits at the intersection of the Atlantic ¶ ocean,
Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico and thus ¶ shares marine waters with the United States, areas ¶
where oil and gas deposits are about to be explored.¶ Preserving that country’s marine biodiversity is ¶
critically important because it constitutes the natural heritage of the Cuban people. The health of ¶ Cuba’s ocean environment is
likewise important ¶ to the economies of coastal communities in the ¶ United States where significant numbers of fish ¶ species
that spawn in Cuban waters are carried by ¶ prevailing currents into U.S. waters and caught by ¶ commercial and recreational fishermen. Florida
and ¶ the southeastern United States are situated in the ¶ downstream of those currents, which bring snapper, ¶ grouper, tuna, swordfish (as
well as manatee and sea ¶ turtles) to U.S. waters, but can serve equally as vectors of Cuban spilled oil.
US-Cuba Relations Solve War on Drugs
US-Cuba relations solve drug trafficking-reducing barriers to cooperation is key
Lee, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 9 (Rensselaer, July 2009,
American Diplomacy, “Cuba, Drugs, and Us-Cuba Relations”,
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0709/comm/lee_cuba.html, KR)
Now on the foreign policy front: Looking back in time, narcotics-trafficking was a focal point of conflict in
U.S.-Cuban relations for most of the pre-1990 years, except for a brief period during the Carter
administration. The focus gradually shifted to cooperation in the 1990s, as the Cuban leadership
ostensibly severed connections to the international drug trade. Cooperation and information-sharing
between the two countries have netted a few high profile seizures, arrests, and extraditions, but all of
this has occurred rather episodically, without an umbrella agreement on counter-narcotics
cooperation (although Cuba has concluded such agreements with many other countries inside and
outside the hemisphere).¶ Such an agreed framework could set the stage for a more substantive level
of engagement on drugs. For example, we could train and equip Cuban Border Guards and Interior
Ministry operatives, we could conduct joint naval patrols with Cuba in the western Caribbean, we
could coordinate investigation of regional trafficking networks and suspicious financial transactions
through Cuban banks and commercial entities, and we could station DEA and FBI contingents in the
U.S. Interests Section in Havana. We could also negotiate a ship-rider agreement with the Cuban
authorities, and possibly even the right to pursue drug-laden vessels and aircraft seeking safe haven in
Cuban territory.¶ How far Havana and Washington would be willing to proceed in these directions is
unclear, since the political barriers on both sides are formidable. Yet the prospects for more
productive collaboration against the hemispheric drug threat seem a lot more promising today than in
the past. In any event, failure to exploit Cuba's law enforcement and intelligence assets to good
advantage leaves a major gap in U.S. defenses against drug trafficking through the Caribbean.
Interdiction successes in Mexico seem likely to augment this flow down the road, a further reason to
closely monitor trafficking trends in a Caribbean country only 90 miles from U.S. shores. The drug threat
from Cuba seems destined to increase as the Castro regime's revolutionary order loses its hold and
appeal, as the island's economic ties with the outside world continue to expand, and as criminallyinclined Cuban nationals seek alliances with South American and Mexican drug kingpins. Such an
outcome is hardly in the best interests of the United States and other countries in the hemisphere.
Latin American Relations
US-Cuba relations are key to broader Latin American engagement
Lobe, writer at Inter Press Service, 9 (Jim, 1/14/2009, Inter Press, “US-CUBA: Obama Urged to
Take Bold Steps Toward Normalisation”, http://www.globalissues.org/news/2009/01/14/304, accessed
6/29/13, KR)
But as a symbol of Obama's oft-stated willingness to engage -- rather than isolate -- traditional foreign
adversaries, Cuba, which has been treated by Washington as an enemy state virtually since the elder
Castro entered Havana 50 years and two weeks ago, could serve as a major touchstone, particularly for
the rest of Latin America.¶ 'Obama can't change the tone in U.S.-Latin America relations while
continuing the same basic policy toward Cuba,' said Dan Erickson, a specialist with the Inter-American
Dialogue (IAD) think tank and author of a new book on the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, 'The Cuba
Wars'.¶ 'Ultimately, Cuba by itself is not that important to U.S. Latin America policy, but it has become
an obstacle to better relations with other key Latin America countries, like Brazil and Venezuela, that
have repeatedly called for the U.S. to open up to Cuba,' he said.¶ Erickson noted that Brazilian President
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva last month 'took the trouble of holding a whole Latin American summit for the
purpose of inviting Cuba, since it has been excluded [by the U.S.] from the Organisation of American
States (OAS).'¶ In her testimony, Clinton said the new administration would 'return to a policy of
vigorous engagement throughout Latin America,' and stressed Brazil's importance, in particular, as a
partner Washington needed to actively engage.
Cuba’s being kept on the list is a slap in Havana’s face—the accusation is no longer
justified and removal is key to improving relations
Franks, Reuters journalist, 13
[Jeff, 5-31-13, Reuters, “Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list ‘shameful,’”
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/uk-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUKBRE94U04Y20130531, accessed
6-26-13, YGS]
In what has become an annual ritual, the United States on Thursday kept Cuba on its list of "state
sponsors of terrorism" and Havana reacted angrily, calling it a "shameful decision" based in politics,
not reality.¶ Cuba said in a statement that the U.S. government was pandering to the Cuban exile
community in Miami against its own interests and the wishes of the American people.¶ "It hopes to
please an anti-Cuban group, growing smaller all the time, which tries to maintain a policy that now has
no support and doesn't even represent the national interests of the United States," said the
statement issued by Cuba's foreign ministry.¶ Iran, Sudan and Syria also are on the list, which is
published annually by the U.S. State Department. Cuba has been on it since 1982.¶ The terrorism
designation comes with a number of sanctions, including a prohibition on U.S. economic assistance
and financial restrictions that create problems for Cuba in international commerce, already made
difficult by a U.S. trade embargo imposed against the island since 1962.¶ The State Department's
explanation for Cuba's inclusion on the list discounted most of the reasons from previous years and
said "there was no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary training
to terrorist groups."¶ In the past, the report fingered Cuba for harbouring rebels from the Marxist-led
FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and members of Basque separatist groups.¶ This
year, it noted that Cuba is sponsoring peace talks between the FARC and the Colombian government
and has moved to distance itself from the Basques.¶ Washington's primary accusation was that Cuba
harbours and provides aid to fugitives from U.S. justice. Cuba does not deny that it has fugitives from
the United States, but said none had been accused of terrorism.¶ Robert Muse, a Washington attorney
who specializes in Cuba issues, said there is no legal basis for designating Cuba as a terrorist sponsor
because of the presence of the fugitives.¶ He said they remain on the island because the Washington
has refused to honour a longstanding extradition treaty with Cuba.¶ Earlier this month, the FBI placed
one of the fugitives, Joanne Chesimard, on its most wanted terrorist list 40 years after she was
convicted of killing a New Jersey state trooper. Chesimard, a former member of a black militant group,
has been in Cuba since 1984.¶ Cuba rejected the notion that she or anyone else on the island was
involved in terrorist activities.¶ "The territory of Cuba has never been used and never will be to harbour
terrorists of any origin, nor to organize, finance or perpetrate acts of terrorism against any country in
the world, including the United States," it said.¶ Geoff Thale, program director at the Washington Office
on Latin America think tank, said President Barack Obama can take Cuba off the terrorist list at any
time and should do so because it is "clear that the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba
is a state sponsor of terrorism."¶ Removing Cuba from the list would improve relations with Cuba and
all of Latin America, which sees U.S. policy toward Cuba "as a reflection of U.S. attitudes toward the
region as a whole," Thale said.
Delisting solves relations with Cuba and the rest of Latin America
Thale, Washington Office of Latin America program director, and Anderson, Senior
Associate for Cuba at the Latin America Working Group 5/24/13 (Geoff Thale and Mavis
Anderson, 5/24/13, WOLA, “Cuba, the Terrorism Report, and the Terrorist List,”
http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_the_terrorism_report_and_the_terrorist_list, accessed
6/29/13, KR)
Delisting Cuba would be an important step in the right direction: it would send a message to the Cuban
government that the United States wants to improve the relationship. It could help set the stage for
the kind of dialogue and negotiations that are needed to address many issues of common concern,
including securing the release of USAID contractor Alan Gross, who is currently serving a 15-year
sentence in Cuba. Delisting Cuba would also send an important and long-awaited message to Latin
American governments from across the political spectrum. Both publicly and privately, Latin American
governments have made it clear to the Obama administration that U.S. policy toward Cuba needs to
change.¶ If the administration needed an additional reason to take Cuba off the terrorist list, Cuba’s
constructive role in the Colombian peace talks provides an excellent justification for doing the right
thing. Peace talks between the Colombian government (a stalwart U.S. ally and the recipient of
hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. assistance) and the FARC (the Colombian guerilla organization,
which the United States has designated a terrorist organization) are currently taking place in Havana.
The talks are making real progress.¶ Cuba’s role in the peace talks illustrates just how much times have
changed. In the 1980s, Cuba supported guerilla groups who were trying to overthrow conservative
governments, and the Reagan administration put Cuba on the terrorist list in 1982. But in 1992, Fidel
Castro announced that Cuba’s support for armed revolution was a thing of the past, and now Cuba is
encouraging one of the few remaining guerilla groups in the region to make peace with a conservative
government. The Obama administration should acknowledge this profound shift by taking Cuba off the
terrorist list.
None of the original reasons for Cuba being listed are still true. Failure to recognize
changed behavior creates Latin American backlash and kills US influence in the region
LA Times 5/13/13
[“Cross Cuba off the blacklist”, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/13/opinion/la-ed-cuba-terroristlist-20130313, 6/24/13, chip]
Washington has for three decades kept Cuba on a list of countries that sponsor terrorism, even
though it has long since changed the behavior that earned it that distinction. By all accounts, Cuba
remains on the list — alongside Iran, Sudan and Syria — because it disagrees with the United States'
approach to fighting international terrorism, not because it supports terrorism. That's hardly a
sensible standard. The State Department says it has no plans to remove Cuba from the list. But Sen.
Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), who recently led a bipartisan congressional delegation to Havana, is urging
President Obama to consider a range of policy changes toward Cuba, including delisting it, which would
not require congressional approval. Designation as a state sponsor of terrorism carries heavy
sanctions, including financial restrictions and a ban on defense exports and sales. None of the reasons
that landed Cuba on the list in 1982 still exist. A 2012 report by the State Department found that
Havana no longer provides weapons or paramilitary training to Marxist rebels in Latin America or
Africa. In fact, Cuba is currently hosting peace talks between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia and President Juan Manuel Santos' government. And Cuban officials condemned the 9/11
attacks on the United States. Moreover, keeping Cuba on the list undermines Washington's credibility
in Latin America. During last year's Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, presidents from
the hemisphere expressed frustration that the U.S. remains frozen in its relations with Cuba, enforcing
an embargo that dates to the Kennedy administration. Cuba is not a model state. The government often
fails to observe human rights. Its imprisonment of Alan Gross, a subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for
International Development who was sentenced to a 15-year jail term in 2009 after bringing
communications equipment into the country, has prompted repeated visits to the island by U.S. officials
seeking to secure his release. The list, however, is reserved not for human rights violators but for
countries that export or support terrorism. Clinging to that designation when the evidence for it has
passed fails to recognize Cuba's progress and reinforces doubts about America's willingness to play
fair in the region.
Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorist list sends a signal of inconsistency and prevents
improvement in US-Latin America relations.
Bloch, COHA Research Associate, 2009
(Brandon Bloch, 9/14/09, “WASHINGTON'S DOUBLE STANDARD ON CUBA (PART I): CUBA AS A "STATE
SPONSOR OF TERRORISM"”, states new service, lexis) chip
The recent lifting of Cuba's suspension from membership in the Organization of American States
indicates that Washington's domination of the Inter-American system has passed. The preconditions set
by the OAS for Cuba's readmission were far weaker than those Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
originally had demanded, demonstrating the power of regional consensus among Latin American
leaders, which marked their initial step away from the repudiated policies of the Obama administration.
The controversy surrounding the readmission of Cuba to the OAS also shows that Havana will be the
most critical point of contention amidst hopes for improved U.S.-Latin America ties. If the new
administration decides to rapidly move toward normalized relations with Cuba, it will vastly improve the
U.S.'s standing in the region; but if Washington insists on maintaining the traditional hostilities it has
for decades fielded against Havana, it will almost certainly find itself politically isolated among the
increasingly autonomous and frequently left-leaning Latin American states. Consistently apparent in
Washington's policy toward Cuba is its liet motif of holding irrational double standards: the U.S.
habitually acts toward the island nation with spite and reflexive antagonism, in a manner inconsistent
with U.S. policies toward more formidable and economically powerful, although even more
nondemocratic, states than Cuba. This attitude is clearly manifested in Cuba's continued inclusion on
the State Department's annual list of "State Sponsors of Terrorism." This is an amorphous indictment
against the Castro government grounded in Washington's habitual acquiescence to the anti-Castro lobby
run from Miami. The State Department's failure to remove Cuba from its most recently compiled list of
"terrorism" sponsors marks yet another sign of the inconsistencies and false starts being displayed by
the Obama administration's recent Cuba initiatives. It must be judged as a serious setback to the
possible future normalization of relations between the two ancient foes.
Latin American Relations Good
Latin American relations good – key to adaption to climate change, illegal
immigration, nuclear proliferation, and the US economy.
Curran, Staff Writer @ Huffington Post Business, 10
(John, 5/26/10, Huffington Post “Gulf Oil Spill Jobs: Cleanup Efforts Create Mini Job Boom”,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/26/gulf-oil-spill-jobs-clean_n_589898.html, accessed
6/30/13, AS)
Historically, the United States and Latin America have rarely developed a genuine and sustained
partnership to address regional—let alone global—challenges. Mutual distrust is partly to blame. Also,
the LAC countries were often not ready to make stable commitments. The United States had other
preoccupations and did not make hemispheric partnership a priority. Problems and solutions were seen
from Washington as country-specific and were managed mostly on a country-bycountry basis through
bilateral channels. Meanwhile, multilateral forums—such as the Organization of American States and
the summits of hemispheric leaders—ran out of steam, became mired in confrontation, or remained
underresourced. If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its
neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a
partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue
to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the
risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through
isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts
based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue
unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of
the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable
opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources.
Latin American relations key to proliferation, terrorism, climate change, and drug
policy.
Bachelet and Hills et al, co-chairs¶ of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum¶ Inter-American
Dialogue, 12
[Michelle and Carla A., 4/6/12, Sol M. Linowitz Forum Inter-American Dialogue, “Remaking the
Relationship¶ the United states and Latin
america,”http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, accessed
7/1/13, AS]
In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other Latin ¶ American nations are assuming
enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues. Several for which
US and Latin ¶ American cooperation could become increasingly important include: ¶
lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the ¶ opportunity to participate more actively in
non-proliferation efforts .¶ Although US and Latin American interests do not always converge ¶ on non-proliferation questions, they
align on some related goals . For ¶ example, the main proliferation challenges today are found in developing and unstable parts of the world,
as well as in the leakage—or transfer ¶ of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that context, south-south
connections are crucial . Brazil could play a pivotal role .¶ ¶ Many countries in the region give priority to
climate change challenges .¶ This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic .¶
The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide climate concerns ¶ gives Brazil and five other South
American nations a special role to play .¶ Mexico already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and ¶ is active in
global policy debates . Brazil organized the first-ever global ¶ environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20 . Mexico ¶ hosted
the second international meeting on climate change in Cancún in ¶ 2010 . The United States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate ¶
change policy . Still, it should support coordination on the presumption ¶ of shared interests on a critical policy challenge Latin Americans are
taking more active leadership on drug policy in the ¶ hemisphere and could become increasingly influential in global discussions of drug
strategies .
Although the United States and Latin America ¶ are often at odds on drug policy, they have
mutual interests and goals ¶ that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective
approach to the problem .¶ Even as Latin America expands its global reach and presence, it is important
that the United States and the region increase their attention to reshaping regional institutions to
better align them with current realities and ¶ challenges and to make them more effective . The
hemisphere’s institutional ¶ architecture is in great flux, and there is growing need for decisions about ¶
priorities and objectives.
Latin American relations re-invigorate US’ economy and climate change efforts.
Bachelet and Hills et al, co-chairs¶ of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum¶ Inter-American
Dialogue, 12
[Michelle and Carla A., 4/6/12, Sol M. Linowitz Forum Inter-American Dialogue, “Remaking the
Relationship¶ the United states and Latin
america,”http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, accessed
7/1/13, AS]
Expanded trade, investment, and energy cooperation offer the greatest promise for robust US-Latin
American relations. Independent of ¶ government policies, these areas have seen tremendous growth
and development, driven chiefly by the private sector. The US government needs to ¶ better appreciate
the rising importance of Latin America—with its expanding markets for US exports, burgeoning
opportunities for US investments, ¶ enormous reserves of energy and minerals, and continuing supply
of ¶ needed labor—for the longer term performance of the US economy .¶ With Brazil and many other
Latin American economies thriving and showing promise for sustained rapid growth and rising incomes,
the search for ¶ economic opportunities has become the main force shaping relationships in ¶ the
hemisphere . Intensive economic engagement by the United States may ¶ be the best foundation for
wider partnerships across many issues as well as ¶ the best way to energize currently listless US relations with the region.¶
What Latin America’s largely middle and upper middle income countries—¶ and their increasingly middle class populations—most want and
need from ¶ the United States is access to its $16-trillion-a-year economy, which is more ¶ than three times the region’s economies combined.
Most Latin American ¶ nations experienced quicker recovery from the financial crisis than did ¶ the United States, and they are growing at a
faster pace. Nonetheless, they ¶ depend on US capital for investment, US markets for their exports, and US ¶ technology and managerial
innovation to lift productivity . They also rely on ¶ the steady remittances from their citizens in the United States .¶ The United States currently
buys about 40 percent of Latin America’s ¶ exports and an even higher percentage of its manufactured products . It remains the first or second
commercial partner for nearly every country ¶ in the region . And it provides nearly 40 percent of foreign investment and ¶ upwards of 90
percent of the $60 billion or so in remittance income that ¶ goes to Latin America .¶ US
economic preeminence in Latin
America has, however, waned in recent ¶ years . Just a decade ago, 55 percent of the region’s imports
originated in the ¶ United States . Today, the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin ¶
America’s imports . China and Europe have made huge inroads . China’s ¶ share of trade in Brazil, Chile,
and Peru has surpassed that of the United ¶ States; it is a close second in Argentina and Colombia .
Furthermore, Latin ¶ American nations now trade much more among themselves . Argentina, for ¶
example, may soon replace the United States as Brazil’s second largest trading partner, just behind
China . ¶ Still, these changes must be put in perspective . Even as the US share of the ¶ Latin American
market has diminished, its exports to the region have been ¶ rising at an impressive pace . They have
more than doubled since 2000, growing an average of nearly 9 percent a year, 2 percent higher than US
exports ¶ worldwide . US trade should expand even faster in the coming period as Latin ¶ America’s
growth continues to be strong . But the United States will have to ¶ work harder and harder to
compete for the region’s markets and resources .¶ While Latin America has been diversifying its
international economic ties, ¶ the region’s expanding economies have become more critical to US
economic growth and stability . Today the United States exports more to Latin ¶ America than it does
to Europe; twice as much to Mexico than it does to ¶ China; and more to Chile and Colombia than it does
to Russia .¶ Even a cursory examination of the numbers points to how much the United ¶ States
depends on the region for oil and minerals . Latin America accounts ¶ for a third of US oil imports . Mexico is the secondbiggest supplier after ¶ Canada . Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia sit among the top dozen, and ¶ imports from Brazil are poised to rise sharply
with its recent offshore discoveries . Within a decade, Brazil and Mexico may be two of the three largest suppliers of oil to the United States .
The potential for heightened energy ¶ cooperation in the Americas is huge, with wide-ranging
ramifications for ¶ economic well-being and climate change
Oil Spill Coop Add-On
Cuban oil spills spillover to American shorelines making co-op key.
Muse and Pinon, Brookings Institute, 10
[Robert and JR, 5/18/10, Brookings Institute, “Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why U.S.-Cuba
Environmental Cooperation is Critical,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/05/18-oilspill-cuba-pinon, accessed 6.30.2013, AS]
Introduction: The sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform and the resulting discharge of millions of gallons of crude oil into the sea
demonstrated graphically the challenge of environmental protection in the ocean waters shared by Cuba and the United States. ¶ While the
quest for deepwater drilling of oil and gas may slow as a result of the latest calamity, it is unlikely to stop. It came as little surprise, for example,
that Repsol recently announced plans to move forward with exploratory oil drilling in Cuban territorial waters later this year.¶ As Cuba
continues to develop its deepwater oil and natural gas reserves, the consequence to the United States of a similar mishap occurring in Cuban
waters moves from the theoretical to the actual. The
sobering fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of miles of
American coastline and do profound harm to important marine habitats demands cooperative and
proactive planning by Washington and Havana to minimize or avoid such a calamity. Also important is
the planning necessary to prevent and, if necessary, respond to incidents arising from this country’s
oil industry that, through the action of currents and wind, threaten Cuban waters and shorelines. ¶
While Washington is working to prevent future disasters in U.S. waters like the Deepwater Horizon, its current policies foreclose
the ability to respond effectively to future oil disasters—whether that disaster is caused by companies
at work in Cuban waters, or is the result of companies operating in U.S. waters.
Oil spil co-op is key to maintain marine biodiversity.
Muse and Pinon, Brookings Institute, 10
[Robert and JR, 5/18/10, Brookings Institute, “Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why U.S.-Cuba
Environmental Cooperation is Critical,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/05/18-oilspill-cuba-pinon, accessed 6.30.2013, AS]
Preserving that country’s marine biodiversity is ¶ critically important because it constitutes the natural
heritage of the Cuban people. The health of ¶ Cuba’s ocean environment is likewise important ¶ to the
economies of coastal communities in the ¶ United states where significant numbers of fish ¶ species that spawn in Cuban waters are carried by ¶ prevailing currents into U.s. waters and
caught by ¶ commercial and recreational fishermen. florida and ¶ the southeastern United states are situated in the ¶ downstream of those currents, which bring snapper, ¶ grouper, tuna, swordfish (as well as manatee and sea ¶
The United states geological survey estimates that ¶ Cuba’s
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), which ¶ includes the gulf of Mexico north Cuba fold and ¶ Thrust Belt, has over
five billion barrels of oil and ¶ 8.6 billion cubic feet of natural gas undiscovered ¶ reserves.2¶ Like the United states, the size of
Cuba’s ¶ oil and gas reserves is both economically fortuitous ¶ and a measure of the threat it poses to the
marine ¶ environment. ¶ in addition to spain’s Repsol, over the next few ¶ years international oil companies such as norway’s ¶ statoil-hydro, Brazil’s Petrobras and others will ¶ be conducting
exploratory work off Cuba’s north ¶ coast. it is only a matter of time before production ¶ begins in earnest and the
environmental risks rise ¶ exponentially.
turtles) to U.S. waters, but can serve equally as vectors of Cuban spilled oil. ¶
Oil spill cooperation is key to prevent devastating oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico
Marsie- hazen, Howard University Fellow at Environmental Defense Fund, 12
(Rahel, September 11, 2012, Environmental Defense Fund, “Bridging the Gulf Report: Preparing for
Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration in Cuba,” http://blogs.edf.org/edfish/2012/09/11/bridging-the-gulfreport-preparing-for-offshore-oil-and-gas-exploration-in-cuba/, accessed 7/1/12, AS)
The Environmental Defense Fund recently released a report called Bridging the Gulf, in which we
concluded that "current U.S. foreign policy on Cuba creates a conspicuous blind spot" that is
detrimental to the interests of both countries. A failure to cooperate on oil spill planning, prevention,
and response in the Gulf of Mexico could result in devastating environmental and economic impacts
on a scale greater than the 2010 BP oil disaster .¶ Recently, I witnessed a potential bright spot in US-Cuba relations that
could lead to real and meaningful cooperation in protecting Cuban and American shores from future oil spills.¶ As the Venezuelan state oil
company PDVSA was preparing to drill off of Cuba's northwest coast in August, U.S. and Cuban negotiators met in Mexico City to discuss how to
work together to prevent and respond to future oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. The meeting was the fourth in a series of
landmark talks hosted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and included officials from Mexico, Jamaica, Bahamas, and other
countries in the region. I was among the handful of industry and environmental representatives invited to attend.¶ I was struck by the candid
back-and-forth discussions on the risks involved in deep water oil drilling and by the constructive exchanges between delegates from Cuba and
the United States. I came away convinced that negotiators from both countries are operating in good faith and are committed to making
progress on this issue.¶ That being said, more needs to be done.¶ Attendees agreed that the BP oil disaster was a wake-up call and
that failure to heed the lessons learned from it would be an inexcusable and costly mistake. Chief among those lessons is that oil spills do not
observe political boundaries and, as such, joint planning among all countries in the region is critical. The event also taught us that sufficient
public and private resources must be available to contain and clean-up oil pollution as soon as
possible. In fact, the scale of response needed for the BP spill was unprecedented-6,500 vessels, 125 planes, 48,000 responders, and
equipment resourced globally.¶ Several presenters in Mexico City emphasized that full and timely access to private sector equipment and
response personnel, wherever they are located, is fundamental to responding effectively to future oil spills.¶ This lesson is particularly relevant
to the current U.S.-Cuba talks.¶ If
a major oil spill were to occur in Cuban waters anytime soon, the U.S. Coast
Guard-as incident commander-would be able to marshal the resources needed to address oil pollution
after it enters our waters. The agency has neither the authority nor the mandate, however, to support
response and clean-up activities in Cuban waters. Furthermore, the Cuban government would be hamstrung in its ability to
solicit direct help from private sector oil spill response companies in the United States. Currently, only a few American companies
are licensed by the U.S. government to work in Cuba (actual names and numbers of license holders are not a matter of
public record).¶ The Obama Administration could solve this problem by directing the Treasury Department to adopt a new category of general
licenses to allow U.S. individuals from qualified oil services and equipment companies to travel to Cuba and provide technical expertise in the
event of an oil disaster. The
Administration should also direct the Commerce Department to pre-approve
licenses for the temporary export of U.S. equipment, vessels, and technology to Cuba for use during a
significant oil spill.¶ The U.S. and Cuba have laid an unprecedented foundation for cooperation on offshore oil safety and environmental
protection. They should continue their talks in earnest and produce a written agreement on joint planning, preparedness and response as soon
as possible.
Cuban waters are a marine biodiversity hotspot.
Rader et al, Ph. D Biology, UNC, 12
[Douglas N, Emily A. Peterson, Intern at the Environmental Defense Fund, Daniel J Whittle, Senior Attorney and Cuba Program Director.
Environmental Defense Fund, 8/29/12, Environmental Defense Fund, “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶
Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba,” http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging_the_Gulf-2012.pdf, accessed
7/1/13, AS]
Situated at the convergence point of the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean Sea, ¶ Cuba is a
biological crown jewel that boasts the largest marine biodiversity in the Caribbean. ¶ The country’s expanses of mangrove
forests, wetlands, seagrass meadows, and coral reefs ¶ provide critical spawning areas, feeding grounds, and shelter for a wide array of marine animals, ¶ plants, and organisms.¶ Its location within the
Caribbean makes Cuba a prime migratory corridor and wintering site, ¶ particularly given its positioning along the Mississippi and East Atlantic
flyways. Cuba provides ¶ crucial refueling habitat for 284 bird species that breed in the United States , including
warblers, ¶ orioles and other song birds, shore birds and wading birds, and raptorial birds.2¶ Cuba’s network ¶ of wetlands provide extremely important habitat for waterbird species—including flamingos, ¶ ibises, cormorants,
egrets, and spoonbills—that form in record concentrations not found ¶ elsewhere throughout the Caribbean.3¶ One of these wetlands, the Zapata Swamp on Cuba’s ¶ southern coast, encompasses over a million acres and
The popular media has often, and mistakenly, characterized
Cuba’s prized natural environment as “an accidental Eden,” made possible through coincidences “of
geography and history.”4¶ Such a perspective fails to recognize or credit the affirmative and, in many cases, progressive ¶ environmental policies and programs that Cuba has adopted over the last 20
represents one of the largest protected ¶ areas in the entire Caribbean region.¶
years. In the mid-1990s, Cuba began adopting a suite of environmental laws and regulations that established ¶ environmental protection and sustainability as top policy priorities.¶ Among these are strong new laws on coastal
zone conservation and management and the ¶ protection of biodiversity and important natural areas. In 1996, the government set aside the ¶ Jardines de la Reina (Gardens of the Queen) as a largely no-take fishery reserve, now
The famed archipelago off ¶ Cuba’s southern coast—home to thriving populations of giant
is regarded as one of the world’s most intact coral reef ecosystems.5¶ The ¶ government
the largest ¶ and one of the most important marine parks in the Caribbean.
grouper, sharks, sea turtles, and ¶ American crocodiles—
has now pledged to protect a full 25 percent of its insular shelf as marine parks or ¶ reserves, and appears primed to meet this objective.6¶ Despite the apparent commitment of Cuban officials to build a body of environmental
These threats range from global challenges — such
as climate change, which is ¶ causing ocean acidification, rising seas, and intensifying storms — to more local
problems, ¶ including management of liquid and solid wastes, soil erosion, deforestation, and pressure to ¶ develop pristine coastal areas for tourism and other economic sectors. ¶ Furthermore,
laws, ¶ policies, and regulations, the country’s environment is not immune to natural and manmade ¶ pressures.
the extent of scientific understanding is still limited in many parts of Cuba ¶ due to inadequate financial and technical resources. While Cuban scientists themselves are ¶ industrious and world-class, scientific institutions are often
under-funded and equipped with ¶ limited technology. As consequence,
there is a lack of thorough baseline science on marine ¶ ecosystems in
Cuba, even in the deep waters off Cuba’s North Coast where exploratory drilling ¶ is currently
underway.
A spill would tank marine and coastal habitats.
Rader et al, Ph. D Biology, UNC, 12
[Douglas N, Emily A. Peterson, Intern at the Environmental Defense Fund, Daniel J Whittle, Senior Attorney and Cuba Program Director.
Environmental Defense Fund, 8/29/12, Environmental Defense Fund, “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶
Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba,” http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging_the_Gulf-2012.pdf, accessed
7/1/13, AS]
If a spill were to occur in Cuban waters, marine and coastal resources of the United States, Cuba, ¶ and
the Bahamas could be placed at significant risk. Fisheries, coastal tourism, recreation, and ¶ other natural resources-based
enterprises and activities in the region could experience adverse ¶ Noel Lopez Fernandez¶ Mangrove forests, coral reefs, and sea grass beds in
Cuba and the United States are at risk from major oil ¶ spills in the Gulf of Mexico.14 Bridging the Gulf¶ impacts on the scale of weeks to years,
or even decades. Multiple factors—including the type ¶ and amount of oil spilled, the environment in which the oil spilled, and prevailing
weather and ¶ ocean current conditions—would play key factors in determining the extent and gravity of a ¶ spill’s impact.45¶ In
Cuba,
marine and coastal habitats could suffer substantial long-term harm which could ¶ degrade, in turn,
entire populations and habitats downstream in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. ¶ According to Dr. John W. Tunnell, Jr.,
associate director of the Harte Research Institute and an ¶ expert on the Gulf of Mexico marine environment, the primary three habitats at risk
on Cuba’s ¶ North Coast near the area where exploration is occurring are coral reefs, seagrass beds, and lush ¶ mangrove forests.46 These
habitats are found throughout the region, but in greatest abundance ¶ in the Archipelago Sabana-Camaguey and the Archipelago Los
Colorados, where they provide ¶ breeding, nursery, and feeding habitats for commercial fish species, including grouper, snapper, ¶ and
grunts.¶ If chemical dispersants were used as part of the clean-up effort, they could reduce impacts ¶ on fauna for which oiling per se is the
greatest threat (e.g. birds) but also add additional toxicity, ¶ as well as alter the transport and ecological fate of oil constituents moving through
Dispersed oil could have greater ¶ deleterious effect
on Cuba’s coral reefs, which are fragile, slow-growing, and have low resilience ¶ to physical and
chemical stresses.47 Like salt marshes, coastal mangrove swamps are also ¶ difficult to clean up in the aftermath of an oil spill, and
mangroves can die within a week to ¶ several months as a result of oil exposure.48 Reduced from their formerly healthy, vibrant state, ¶ such
important habitats could lose their ability to support the fisheries and marine life that ¶ depend on
them.¶ Oil toxicity and physical contamination can also have profound effects on individual ¶
organisms. The news media often draw attention to charismatic marine life, such as dolphins ¶ and sea
turtles, which are closer to shore and can experience heavy oil coating during a spill. ¶ However, less visible
the water ¶ column and then into the air or back towards the bottom.
organisms such as surface-floating larvae, mid-depth “scattering layer” ¶ organisms, and benthic organisms—including coral reefs, but also
soft-sediment communities—are equally, if not more, vulnerable. A significant spill in Cuba’s waters could impact larval ¶ populations of
lobster, grouper, snapper, and other reef fishes that traditionally mature in the waters of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and south Atlantic, as well as
those that have key spawning ¶ grounds in the Gulf itself (including Atlantic bluefin tuna).¶ The
ecological linkages between
Cuba and the United States are brought into clear focus ¶ when considering the environmental
resources that would be at stake in those two countries ¶ in the event of a spill. In the same way that
Cuban officials expressed serious concern about ¶ potential impacts to Cuban waters from the BP
Deepwater Horizon spill, Floridians are deeply ¶ worried about potential damages to their communities
and natural environment. Migratory ¶ species that normally travel freely between Cuban and U.S. territory — including bluefin tuna,
¶ whale sharks, and birds along the East Coast flyaway — could suffer from oil exposure during ¶ a significant spill incident.¶ One problematic
limitation in evaluating natural resources at risk in Cuba’s waters—and the ¶ subsequent risk to the U.S. environment—is the lack of sufficient
baseline scientific knowledge. ¶ Detailed geological and environmental conditions are not fully understood in many parts of ¶ theCaribbean.49
For example, petroleum-eating microbes exist in high concentrations in the ¶ U.S. Gulf of Mexico and may help mitigate environmental
damages during spills and natural ¶ seepages, although the ecological cascades unleashed by altered biomass, dissolved oxygen, ¶
andacidification patterns remain unknown. It is not known if such oil-eating bacteria also ¶ existin substantial numbers in Cuban waters and
would possibly modulate damages to natural ¶ resources there.
Oil spills will have major implications on US/Cuban economies
Rader et al, Ph. D Biology, UNC, 12
[Douglas N, Emily A. Peterson, Intern at the Environmental Defense Fund, Daniel J Whittle, Senior Attorney and Cuba Program Director.
Environmental Defense Fund, 8/29/12, Environmental Defense Fund, “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶
Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba,” http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging_the_Gulf-2012.pdf, accessed
7/1/13, AS]
The intertwined relationship between coastal economies and the local environment illustrates ¶ that
the economic implications of a major deepwater spill in Cuba could be substantial, with ¶ far-reaching impacts on tourism as
well as commercial and recreational fishing. In Florida, over ¶ 86.5 million tourists visited the state in 2011 and generated over $67 billion in direct economic ¶ impact.50 Tourism represents Florida’s top industry and accounts for
Florida also boasts one of the most productive commercial fisheries in the
country, and its ¶ recreational saltwater fishery has an economic impact of $5.7 billion, while
supporting over ¶ 54,000 jobs.52 As demonstrated during the Deepwater Horizon disaster, publicity surrounding ¶ a spill can ignite public fears and decimate tourism and seafood consumption
even in areas ¶ spared of oil exposure.¶ An oil spill could threaten fisheries and tourism in Cuba as much as in Florida. Top tourist ¶
23 percent of the state’s ¶ sales tax revenue.51¶
areas along Cuba’s North Coast—including Cayo Paraiso and Cayo Levisa—are known for their ¶ pristine beaches and attractive snorkeling opportunities. Following Havana, the resort town of ¶ Varadero is the second most
popular destination on the island for foreign travelers. Varadero’s ¶ extensive beaches receive one million international visitors annually and could experience ¶ devastating physical and financial impacts in the event of a spill.
Cayo Coco, located on ¶ the Sabana Camaguey Archipelago on the northern shore of Cuba, is another prime tourist ¶ destination also directly vulnerable to a potential spill. With its crystal waters and pristine ¶ white sand
In 2011, tourism attracted 2.7 million visitors and 2.5 billion in income
to Cuba, which ¶ represents a 12.8 percent increase in revenue from the previous year.53 Given that the
tourism ¶ industry is perceived as the engine of Cuba’s economic growth, the island would have much ¶
tolose if a highly-publicized oil spill impacted its shores
beaches, Cayo Coco is home to a host of all-inclusive luxury resorts.¶
Kills List Credibility
Inclusion of Cuba on the list dilutes the credibility of the term “terrorist”—immediate
removal solves relations
Kayyem, national security columnist at The Boston Globe, 13
[Juliette, 4-29-13, was the Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs at the Department of
Homeland Security, The Boston Globe, “Diluting the terror watch lists,”
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/04/28/making-terror-lists-matter-cuba-not-state-sponsorterrorism/X2NW0rfYm5A2eJT5VZEuHI/story.html, accessed 6-25-13, YGS]
The state sponsor list is not just name-calling, though there is an element of shaming in the public condemnation.
Countries are subject to strict sanctions, including a ban on arms-related sales, controls over
commercial exports, and prohibitions of economic assistance.¶ ¶ Cuba seems to be on the list because,
as previous State Department assessments have determined, it supports revolutionary movements in Latin America and
gives direct support in terms of training and arms to “guerrilla groups” and, note the turn of phrase here, their “terrorist
operations.” Cuba’s support includes safe haven to members of Columbia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces, known as
FARC, which has waged an insurgency there but is now engaged in peace negotiations. ¶ ¶ None of this
has to do with the United States and its direct safety and security. Sure, the FARC and other guerrilla groups have
destabilized the region, but that has nothing to do with terrorist threats to the United States.¶ ¶ The state sponsor list is no longer
about terrorism. Pakistan, for example, is not on it. Domestic politics, not terror, explain Cuba’s status
as our neighborly pariah. The continuing isolation of Cuba is inexplicable in modern times.¶ ¶ It is no
longer legitimate to simply claim that the electoral map — with a powerful anti-Castro lobby based in
Florida — is a sufficient explanation, as if only the politically naive would think otherwise. Even if such
blatantly political justifications were valid, the Cuban-American community is actually quite divided
about overtures to a nation whose progress and fiscal security can benefit the entire region. ¶ ¶ The
Boston Globe’s Bryan Bender reported this year that Secretary of State John Kerry was reviewing the
policy, hoping to thaw relations with Cuba and make the terrorist state sponsor list be about
terrorism. It’s not clear if Kerry’s views will prevail.¶ ¶ Today, however, the necessity to remove Cuba
from the list is immediate. We need to rationalize these terror lists, whether they designate individuals or countries.
The term “state sponsor of terrorism” means nothing if Cuba is on the list: It simply says we kind of
don’t like you and will find any reason to make it hurt. An over-inclusive list, as we are seeing in the
Boston case, can be as damaging as an under-inclusive one.¶ ¶ The Obama administration can make a
powerful symbolic statement about Cuba and begin a slow thaw that starts with freeing the island
nation from the same designation we give to Syria or Iran. Alone, that is enough. But the United States can also make a
significant safety statement about terrorism generally: States that support those who pose a direct threat to the United States will suffer.
Unfortunately, if the United States continues to use one of the most powerful tools in its national
security apparatus — a figurative arsenal of sanctions — to treat a nation as a terrorist threat when it
is not, we so dilute the term that it matters little to the countries that we hope to isolate.¶ ¶ Cuba is a lot of things, but it is not a
direct national security challenge to the United States or its citizens. If Cuba remains on that exclusive list this week, we will do more damage to
ourselves than any Castro brother ever did.
Leaving Cuba on the terror list for political reasons facilitates mistrust, blocks reform,
and hurts credibility
Rausnitz, editor for FierceMarkets, 13
[Zach, 6/13, FierceMarkets, “Cuba's inclusion on State Sponsors of Terrorism list bad for U.S., panelists
say”, http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/author/zrausnitz, accessed 6/24/13, VJ]
Cuba remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism for political reasons only, and there are
downsides for the United States in leaving it there, panelists said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event June 11.
Retaining Cuba on the list "feeds into and prolongs this climate of mistrust which the Obama
administration claimed it wanted to overcome," said Tomás Bilbao, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Cuba Study
Group, which promotes human rights and the rule of law in Cuba. But the country could undergo some reform in the coming
years, and the continued inclusion of Cuba on the list "is an obstacle to taking advantage of that
window of opportunity" to influence changes, Bilbao said. Cuba's inclusion on the list also costs the United States
credibility and drains some of the meaning from designating a country as a state sponsor of terrorism,
said Robert Muse, a Cuba expert who also spoke on the panel. He called the refusal to de-list Cuba "arbitrary and capricious."
Cuba has moved away from cold war confrontation—they remain on the list due to
political pandering
Williams, Senior International Affairs Writer, 13
[Carol J., 5/3, LA Times, “Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors”,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/03/world/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502, Accessed
6/25/13, VJ]
Cuba’s communist leadership was quick to send condolences to the victims of the Boston Marathon
bombings and to reiterate to Washington that it “rejects and condemns unequivocally all acts of terrorism.”
Once a key supplier of arms and training to leftist rebels in Latin America, the Castro regime long ago disentangled itself from the
Cold War-era confrontations. Havana now hosts peace talks between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia that
it once supported and the U.S.-allied government the insurgents battled for years. Havana still gives refuge to a few fugitive radicals from the Black
Panthers and Basque insurgents, and two years ago a Cuban court convicted 64-year-old development specialist Alan Gross on spying charges for attempting to
install satellite equipment without government permission. But nothing
that Cuba has done suggests its government is
plotting harm against Americans, national security experts say. And they criticize as
counterproductive the State Department’s decision, disclosed this week, to keep Cuba on its list of “state sponsors of terrorism.”
“We ought to reserve that term for nations that actually use the apparatus of statehood to support
the targeting of U.S. interests and civilians,” said Juliette Kayyem, a former assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the
Department of Homeland Security and now writing and lecturing on national security in the Boston area. “Yes, Cuba does a lot of bad things that we don’t like, but it
doesn’t rise to anything on the level of a terrorist threat.” On Wednesday, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration “has no current
plans to remove Cuba” from the list to be released later this month. The island nation that has been under a U.S. trade and travel embargo since shortly after
revolutionary leader Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 is in the company of only Iran, Syria and Sudan in being branded with the “state sponsor” label.
Kayyem laments the “diluting” of the terrorist designation based on political or ideological disputes.
“We work with a lot of countries we don’t like, but the imprimatur of ‘terrorism’ has a ring to it in a
way that can be harmful to us,” she said. Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the mutual
threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade and financial restrictions that comes along with the “state sponsor”
censure, Kayyem said. “There
are some real operational impediments when we have a system that begins with
‘no’ rather than ‘why not?’ ” she said of the legally encumbered contacts between Havana and Washington. Politicians who have
pushed for a continued hard line against Cuba cheered their victory in getting the Obama administration to keep Cuba on the list. U.S.
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a South Florida Republican whose efforts to isolate and punish the Castro regime have been a central plank of her election strategy
throughout her 24 years in Congress, hailed
the State Department decision as “reaffirming the threat that the Castro
regime represents.” Arash Aramesh, a national security analyst at Stanford Law School, blamed the
continued branding of Cuba as a terrorism sponsor on politicians “pandering for a certain political
base.” He also said President Obama and Secretary of State John F. Kerry have failed to make a priority of removing the impediment to better relations with
Cuba. “As much as I’d like to see the Castro regime gone and an open and free Cuba, it takes away from the State Department’s credibility when they include
countries on the list that aren’t even close” to threatening Americans, Aramesh said. Political considerations also factor into excluding countries from the “state
sponsor” list, he said, pointing to Pakistan as a prime example. Although Islamabad “very clearly supports terrorist and insurgent organizations,” he said, the U.S.
government has long refused to provoke its ally in the region with the official censure. The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the longcontentious relationship between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of power to his younger brother, Raul,
modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before they could leave their
country for foreign travel
Cuba’s designation hurts US credibility, Latin American relations, and counter terror
operations
Adams, retired Brigadier General, Jones, The Hill, ‘13
[John, David W., The Hill, “Is Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism? Let’s get real, State Department”,
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/217483-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-lets-get-real-statedepartment, accessed 6/25/13, VJ]
In 1979, the U.S. State Department began designating countries that “have repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism” as State Sponsors of Terrorism. Today, four countries are on the list: Iran, Syria, Sudan and …
Cuba. Seriously, Cuba? Countries not on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list include: Yemen, Lebanon, Pakistan, North
Korea (the Department of State removed North Korea from the list in 2008) and Libya (removed from the list in 2006). Cuba was added to the list in 1982, due to its support for
communist rebels in Africa and Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. Having just returned from an extensive research trip to Cuba, where we met with embassy officials from key European
There
is little, if any, evidence that Cuba provides support for terrorism, and the evidence further shows that
they haven’t for more than 20 years. After the Cold War ended, many in the intelligence community
concluded that Cuba was no longer a national security threat to the United States. The 2008 U.S. State
Country Report on Terrorism stated that Cuba “no longer actively supports armed struggles in Latin
America and other parts of the world.” The same report further states, “The United States has no evidence of
terrorist-related money laundering or terrorist financing activities in Cuba.” The 2009 report stated: “There was no evidence of
and Latin American countries, the U.S. Interests Section and Cuban government officials, we have concluded that it is simply illogical and counterproductive to keep Cuba on the list.
direct financial support for terrorist organizations by Cuba in 2009.” The 2010 State Department report stated: “The Cuban government and official media publicly condemned acts of terrorism
Does keeping Cuba on the list make any sense, more than two decades after the events
cited in the original listing? So why does the State Department retain Cuba on the list? The rationale seems to be that “the Cuban government continued to provide
by al-Qa’ida and affiliates.”
safe haven to several terrorists,” according to the 2008 Country Report on Terrorism. Let’s look at the evidence. First, the State Department alleges that Cuba offers safe haven to terrorists
from Spain. The fact is that a handful of former members of the Basque Homeland and Freedom organization — more commonly known by the acronym ETA for the Spanish translation — live
in Cuba in accordance with a decades-old bilateral agreement with the Spanish government. Spain has stated public appreciation for Cuba’s willingness to host these individuals and has
maintained that this enhances their ability to deal more effectively with the group. The Spanish police even maintain a small presence in Cuba. Second, the State Department alleges that
members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) Columbian rebel groups maintain a presence in Cuba. The fact is, Cuba hasn’t
supported ELN for more than 20 years. Moreover, the Colombian government publicly stated that Cuba has played a useful role in facilitating peace talks with the rebels, according to a 2007
Congressional Research Service report. The 2010 State Department report itself echoes the 2009 report, that “there was no evidence of direct financial or ongoing material support” for FARC.
In addition to the lack of evidence to support the listing, there are convincing reasons why Cuba
should be removed: Cuban presence on the list damages U.S. credibility with almost all of our key
allies and puts us at odds with every country in Latin America, who view the listing as capricious and
politically motivated. It impedes our ability to work with allies to facilitate contacts with rebel
groups, such as FARC, that are aimed at reconciliation. U.S. policy cripples efforts to cooperate with
Cuba on important American national security issues, including transnational human, drug and
weapons smuggling, as well as environmental disasters. American policy hurts our businesses and
workers by providing a rationale to continue the job-killing embargo on trade with Cuba. Most of all,
retaining Cuba on the State Department’s list undermines American efforts in the broader — and very
real — fight against terrorism. For all these reasons, it is time for the United States to end our counterproductive
and hypocritical policy and remove Cuba from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list.
Cuba’s inclusion on the list is unnecessary and destroys the purpose of the list – we
must remove it at once
Kayyem, Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs at the Department of
Homeland Security , 13
(Juliette Kayyem, Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs at the Department of Homeland
Security, 4-29-13, “Diluting the terror watch lists” , The Boston Globe,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/04/28/making-terror-lists-matter-cuba-not-state-sponsorterrorism/X2NW0rfYm5A2eJT5VZEuHI/story.html//Fontana)
This week, another terrorism watch list will be announced, known as the state sponsors of terrorism list. It is a formal designation that began in
December 1979 and serves as the State Department’s ranking of countries that “repeatedly provide . . . support for acts of international
terrorism.” Nations currently on the list include Iran, Sudan, and Syria. It also includes Cuba. Whatever
historical complaints or
ideological rifts the United States may have with its close neighbor, Cuba should be off the state
sponsor list. It is time to take our terror designations seriously. The state sponsor list is not just name-calling, though
there is an element of shaming in the public condemnation. Countries are subject to strict sanctions, including a ban on
arms-related sales, controls over commercial exports, and prohibitions of economic assistance. Cuba
seems to be on the list because, as previous State Department assessments have determined, it supports revolutionary
movements in Latin America and gives direct support in terms of training and arms to “guerrilla groups” and, note the turn of
phrase here, their “terrorist operations.” Cuba’s support includes safe haven to members of Columbia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces, known as
None of this has to do with the United
States and its direct safety and security. Sure, the FARC and other guerrilla groups have destabilized the region, but that
has nothing to do with terrorist threats to the United States. The state sponsor list is no longer about
terrorism. Pakistan, for example, is not on it. Domestic politics, not terror, explain Cuba’s status as our
neighborly pariah. The continuing isolation of Cuba is inexplicable in modern times. It is no longer legitimate to simply
claim that the electoral map — with a powerful anti-Castro lobby based in Florida — is a sufficient
explanation, as if only the politically naive would think otherwise. Even if such blatantly political justifications were
valid, the Cuban-American community is actually quite divided about overtures to a nation whose
progress and fiscal security can benefit the entire region. The Boston Globe’s Bryan Bender reported this year that
FARC, which has waged an insurgency there but is now engaged in peace negotiations.
Secretary of State John Kerry was reviewing the policy, hoping to thaw relations with Cuba and make the terrorist state sponsor list be about
terrorism. It’s not clear if Kerry’s views will prevail. Today, however, the
necessity to remove Cuba from the list is
immediate. We need to rationalize these terror lists, whether they designate individuals or countries.
The term “state sponsor of terrorism” means nothing if Cuba is on the list: It simply says we kind of
don’t like you and will find any reason to make it hurt. An over-inclusive list, as we are seeing in the Boston case, can be
as damaging as an under-inclusive one. The Obama administration can make a powerful symbolic statement
about Cuba and begin a slow thaw that starts with freeing the island nation from the same
designation we give to Syria or Iran. Alone, that is enough. But the United States can also make a significant safety statement
about terrorism generally: States that support those who pose a direct threat to the United States will suffer. Unfortunately, if the United
States continues to use one of the most powerful tools in its national security apparatus — a
figurative arsenal of sanctions — to treat a nation as a terrorist threat when it is not, we so dilute the
term that it matters little to the countries that we hope to isolate. Cuba is a lot of things, but it is not
a direct national security challenge to the United States or its citizens. If Cuba remains on that exclusive list this week, we will
do more damage to ourselves than any Castro brother ever did.
Cuba doesn’t sponsor terrorism-their presence on the SST list undermines the
credibility of anti-terror efforts and US leadership
Lopez-Levy, Lecturer at the University of Denver, 5/7/13 (Arturo, 5/7/2013, “It's Time to
Delist Cuba”, http://www.fpif.org/articles/its_time_to_delist_cuba, accessed 6/26/13, KR)
State Department reports from the last decade have provided no substantive evidence to justify
keeping Cuba on the list. In fact, the country’s inclusion is based on dubious allegations. The reports
allege that Cuba has provided medical treatment and refuge for terrorist groups from the FARC in
Colombia to the ETA in Spain. However, the reports do not acknowledge that the governments of both
countries have expressed appreciation for Cuba’s cooperation in this arena.¶ The reports mention
some fugitives from American justice who live in Cuba, but neglect to say that the United States
stopped honoring the 1904 extradition agreement between the two countries in early 1959. Cuba has
sent back most U.S. fugitives and has generally recognized the validity of U.S. courts, but has
occasionally offered asylum to people it considers victims of "political persecution," including former
Black Panther Assata Shakur, accused of killing a New Jersey highway trooper in 1973. ¶ Shakur’s asylum
in Cuba has precedent in international law, as well as in decisions by U.S. Courts not to equate all
violent political acts to terrorism. Her case constitutes a reason to raise the issue diplomatically and
negotiate a new bilateral extradition treaty, but it is not sufficient motive to keep Cuba on the list. It is
no coincidence that those Cuban-American politicians who demand that Cuba unilaterally return these
few U.S. fugitives are the same ones who have advocated providing refuge for anti-Castro terrorists
like Luis Posada Carriles—who in 1976 was responsible for a bomb that took 73 lives (including the
Cuban national fencing team) on a Cuban civilian plane. Posada lives freely in Miami. ¶ The Bush
administration removed North Korea from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 2008 as part of a
larger diplomatic strategy to shut down the country's nuclear program. Former Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice explained the thinking behind that decision in No Higher Honor, her recently published
memoirs. The list, she wrote, was supposed to single out "countries that supply a terrorist organization
with training, logistics, or material or financial support. Technically, the North Koreans should have
already been removed from the list much earlier; there had not been, at the time, any known terrorist
incident involving Pyongyang for two decades.” Using Rice’s same substantive criterion for determining
whether a country belongs on the list (no terror incident involving the country in question for twenty
years), it is very difficult to argue that Cuba should be there.¶ Confronted with this double standard and
the lack of evidence for keeping Cuba on the list, some defenders of the Obama administration’s
decision to keep Cuba on the list simply reply that Cuba is not as important economically or strategically
as South Florida is electorally. Yet these self-proclaimed political realists miss an important reality. The
Cuban-American community, including the majority of those who oppose Castro, has changed. For most
Cubans who came to the United States in the last two decades, the inclusion of their country of origin
in the terrorism list is not only unfair, but also an obstacle to promoting changes on the island that
could take place through exchanges between Cuba and the United States.¶ Defenders of including
Cuba on the list point to Cuba’s imprisonment of Alan Gross, an American citizen who was arrested for
his participation in a United States Agency for International Development regime change program on
the island. They also claim that Cuba violates human rights and point to an increase of short-term
detentions of Castro’s opponents during the last year.¶ Yet these actions have nothing to do with the
congressional mandate to create a list of States Sponsors of Terrorism under the 1979 Exports
Administration Act. Mixing these unrelated issues only demonstrates that the list has become a
pretext to punish the Cuban government. This situation feeds into the Cuban government’s narrative
that its revolution is under siege, and that because the island is a victim of U.S. double standards and
hostility, it has to adopt emergency measures. Using the list in this way is therefore not only
inconsistent, but also counterproductive.¶ If the goal is to provide anti-Castro militants a venue for
psychological catharsis, there are other ways for them to vent their frustrations. The State Department
already has a mechanism for reporting human rights violations all over the world. The UN Human Rights
Council is in the process of evaluating Cuba this year, and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has
indicated that the Gross arrest is unfair.¶ The misuse of an otherwise effective foreign policy tool should
give pause to responsible members of Congress and the Washington intelligence community. First, it
dilutes America’s multilateral anti-terrorist efforts by taking eyes and dollars away from where the
real threats are. Second, it sends the wrong message to countries such as Iran and Syria and the
groups they sponsor by diminishing both the substantive and political impact of being listed. Third, it
weakens the case for monitoring countries such as Iran, whose presence on the list is more easily
justified. In short, including Cuba undermines the credibility of the list itself, and has a corrosive effect
on U.S. leadership in world.
The SST list lacks any legitimacy with Cuba in it, removing Cuba is huge political tool to
give countries the incentive to not sponsor terrorists
Kayyem, Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs at the Department of
Homeland Security, 13
[Juliette, 4-29-13, The Boston Globe, “Diluting the terror watch lists,”
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/04/28/making-terror-lists-matter-cuba-not-state-sponsorterrorism/X2NW0rfYm5A2eJT5VZEuHI/story.html, accessed 6-27-13, PR]
The state sponsor list is not just name-calling, though there is an element of shaming in the public
condemnation. Countries are subject to strict sanctions, including a ban on arms-related sales,
controls over commercial exports, and prohibitions of economic assistance. Cuba seems to be on the list because,
as previous State Department assessments have determined, it supports revolutionary movements in Latin America and gives direct support in
terms of training and arms to “guerrilla groups” and, note the turn of phrase here, their “terrorist operations.” Cuba’s support includes safe
haven to members of Columbia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces, known as FARC, which has waged an insurgency there but is now engaged in
peace negotiations. It is no longer legitimate to simply claim that the electoral map — with a powerful anti-Castro lobby based in Florida — is a
sufficient explanation, as if only the politically naive would think otherwise. Even if such blatantly political justifications were valid, the CubanAmerican community is actually quite divided about overtures to a nation whose progress and fiscal security can benefit the entire region. The
Boston Globe’s Bryan Bender reported this year that Secretary of State John Kerry was reviewing the policy, hoping to thaw relations with Cuba
and make the terrorist state sponsor list be about terrorism. It’s not clear if Kerry’s views will prevail. Today,
however, the necessity
to remove Cuba from the list is immediate. We need to rationalize these terror lists, whether they
designate individuals or countries. The term “state sponsor of terrorism” means nothing if Cuba is on
the list: It simply says we kind of don’t like you and will find any reason to make it hurt. An over-inclusive
list, as we are seeing in the Boston case, can be as damaging as an under-inclusive one. The Obama administration can make a
powerful symbolic statement about Cuba and begin a slow thaw that starts with freeing the island
nation from the same designation we give to Syria or Iran. Alone, that is enough. But the United
States can also make a significant safety statement about terrorism generally: States that support
those who pose a direct threat to the United States will suffer. Unfortunately, if the United States
continues to use one of the most powerful tools in its national security apparatus — a figurative
arsenal of sanctions — to treat a nation as a terrorist threat when it is not, we so dilute the term that
it matters little to the countries that we hope to isolate. Related Coverage of Marathon bombings None of this has to do
with the United States and its direct safety and security. Sure, the FARC and other guerrilla groups have destabilized the region, but that has
nothing to do with terrorist threats to the United States. The
term ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ means nothing if Cuba
is on the list. The state sponsor list is no longer about terrorism. Pakistan, for example, is not on it.
Domestic politics, not terror, explain Cuba’s status as our neighborly pariah. The continuing isolation
of Cuba is inexplicable in modern times.
Cuba’s presence on SST undermines its legitimacy
Goldberg, National correspondent for The Atlantic, 12
[Jeffrey, 1-17-12, The Atlantic, “It's Time to Remove Cuba From the State-Sponsor-of-Terrorism List,”
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/its-time-to-remove-cuba-from-the-statesponsor-of-terrorism-list/251489/, accessed 6-29-13, PR]
It's been curious to me for some time that Cuba,
a country that does not sponsor terror groups, is listed by the
U.S. as a state sponsor of terror. Cuba's inclusion (there are three other countries on the list, Iran, Syria and Sudan)
undermines the seriousness of the list. Cuba is on the list, of course, because Castro-haters in the U.S.
want it to be on the list, but it is not intellectually or analytically honest to include Havana. The State
Department realizes this, of course, which is why its description of Cuba's "terrorist" activities is
written the way it is. From my Bloomberg View column this week: When I asked a senior government official about Cuba's inclusion,
the official seemed to acknowledge the ridiculousness of the situation: "We've heard the criticisms about particular countries that are on the
list and shouldn't be and others that aren't but should be." The official went on, "At
the end of the day, though, the fact that
the United States has a list that underscores that some countries rely on terrorism as an instrument of
policy is critically important. Maybe there could be more effective ways of focusing our
condemnation, but for dealing with the real malefactors - think Iran or Syria - that designation is
important and helps galvanize the international community to action. It also helps create a bar for
those who would still like to conduct business as usual with them." In other words, Cuba is a fake
malefactor. Our relationship with Cuba is dysfunctional already; this list just makes it worse, and it
undermines our claim to seriousness in the fight against actual terrorism.
Trade
The list imposes severe economic penalties, damaging trade relationships
Laverty, Center for Democracy in the Americas consultant, 11
[Collin, 11-4-11, “Cuba’s New Resolve: Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, Center for
Democracy in the Americas, p. 32-33, accessed 6-26-13, YGS]
Unfortunately, along with several laudable policy changes, President Obama ¶ continues to enforce
harsh aspects of the embargo with surprising vigor. He ¶ has kept Cuba on the list of State Sponsors of
Terrorism (a designation made ¶ by President Reagan and before U.S. foreign policy was forced to
confront ¶ rogue states that back violent extremism). The inaccurate terrorist description imposes
sanctions that penalize Cuba economically. The president also ¶ renewed Cuba’s status under the
Trading with the Enemies Act, the statutory ¶ foundation of U.S. sanctions and, despite its grave
problems, maintained the ¶ USAID Democracy Program intact. Further, the administration has been
especially active in penalizing ¶ multinational financial institutions for facilitating transactions with
Cuba, ¶ enforcement activities that have a chilling effect on Cuba’s commerce and ¶ which damage
U.S. trade relations with our allies.
FSIA Exception
The FSIA legal process is flawed and inconsistent—results in public misconceptions
and policy failure
Peed, litigation specialist, 5
[Matthew J., March 2005, Duke Law Journal, “Blacklisting as Foreign Policy: The Politics and Law of
Listing Terror States,” p. 1336-1337, JSTOR, accessed 6-25-13, YGS]
Because only seven countries can currently be sued under the ¶ terrorism exception, a tremendous
temptation exists for victims of ¶ terrorist attacks and their lawyers to search for any conceivable ¶
connection to one of the designated states.105 This temptation is ¶ strengthened by the possibility of
multimillion-dollar default ¶ judgments106 and the sense of vindication that comes from holding ¶
someone accountable for unspeakable horrors inflicted against one's ¶ loved ones.107 While state
sponsors of terrorism should certainly be ¶ held accountable, the fact that virtually all of these states fail
to offer ¶ defenses greatly increases the incentive for questionable claims.108 ¶ This incentive can
result in claims that truly stretch the bounds of ¶ plausibility.109 ¶ Because many foreign states do not
defend these suits, there is ¶ no adversarial testing of evidence, and the plaintiffs need only ¶
convince a judge that the evidence is "satisfactory" to obtain a default ¶ judgment.110 This raises the
potential for erroneous rulings that distort the public's perception of events and create legal and
diplomatic ¶ hurdles should U.S. policy toward the country shift. In one case, for ¶ example, the
plaintiffs managed to "prove," in just two days of ¶ uncontested testimony, what the Bush administration
still has not ¶ been able to demonstrate: a conclusive link between Iraq and the ¶ events of September
11, 2001. m The timing of the ruling, during a ¶ period of intense public debate over a recently launched
war, was ¶ especially troublesome. Anyone unfamiliar with the nature of default ¶ judgments, or who
simply read a headline reporting the outcome of ¶ the case, could easily misinterpret the ruling as a
judicial endorsement ¶ of Iraq's complicity in the 2001 terrorist attacks.112 Such ¶ misperceptions risk
allowing the executive to cloak its policy ¶ arguments in the "neutral colors of judicial action."113
Peed, litigation specialist, 5
[Matthew J., March 2005, Duke Law Journal, “Blacklisting as Foreign Policy: The Politics and Law of
Listing Terror States,” p. 1329-1335, JSTOR, accessed 6-25-13, YGS]
Political jockeying has plagued the terrorism list; its history is ¶ replete with moves of questionable
sincerity, creating classifications ¶ that are out of step with countries' practices.60 Nevertheless, as Part I
¶ indicates, the consequences of the terrorism list continue to expand as ¶ Congress employs the list as a
ready-made vehicle for counterterrorist ¶ initiatives. This creates its own problems in the political
sphere, but it ¶ is especially incongruous with judicial principles such as consistency, ¶ transparency,
and equality.61 Given the tremendous political and ¶ diplomatic pressures surrounding the designation
of a state as a ¶ sponsor of terrorism, the trend toward increasing the legal and ¶ judicial effects of the
designation beyond the realm of foreign policy ¶ is therefore increasingly problematic. ¶ In particular,
Congress's decision to amend the FSIA to allow ¶ suits against state sponsors of terrorism has received
heavy criticism. ¶ Although the aims of the AEDPA's amendment of the FSIA were to compensate victims and deter terrorism
countries,62 many ¶ commentators have argued that it has done neither.63 Others have ¶ noted that foreign-policy-bylitigation illegitimately grants judges and ¶ plaintiffs' attorneys a power that should reside in the
political ¶ branches.64 For example, by awarding damages out of the frozen ¶ assets of terrorist-list
countries, judges limit the president's ability to ¶ use those assets to diplomatic ends.65 There is also
the potential for ¶ political friction caused by the pronouncement of judgments on ¶ foreign states, and
political embarrassment when those states retaliate ¶ with similar trials arising from American actions.6 Although many of these criticisms
apply generally to suits against ¶ foreign nations, the
AEDPA presents several problems related solely ¶ to the use of
the terrorism list in a judicial context, where principles of ¶ equality and uniformity should prevail.67
First, by tying the subject ¶ matter jurisdiction of federal courts to the decision of the secretary of ¶
state, the statute invites foreign policy entanglement in the judicial ¶ process. Second, by using
political criteria to determine which nations ¶ may be sued, the AEDPA fosters inconsistent treatment
of similarly ¶ situated plaintiffs and defendants.68 Third, by only allowing suits ¶ against specific
countries, the statute encourages plaintiffs to stretch ¶ the bounds of plausibility in their pleadings to
catch a state-sponsor of ¶ terrorism, warping the judicial process.6 A. Inconsistent Treatment of Defendants ¶
Historically, sovereign nations were considered immune from the ¶ jurisdiction of the domestic courts of other sovereign nations. ¶ Whether
expressed as a principle of right under international law,70 or ¶ as merely a national exercise of comity and reciprocity,71 the effect ¶ was to
shield foreign nations from the ignominy of being haled into ¶ court before their equals. This long-standing custom came under ¶ pressure in
the twentieth century, however, as contacts between ¶ nations increased exponentially and state-controlled industries greatly ¶ expanded into
the commercial sphere.72 This created a competitive ¶ disadvantage and the potential for injustice for private parties, ¶ because nationalized
enterprises could hide behind the sovereign ¶ immunity defense in commercial or contractual disputes.73 As a result, ¶ a new "restrictive
theory" of sovereign immunity emerged74 and had a degree of success in the courts.75 This theory considered nations to be ¶ immune from
suits arising from public acts (jure imperil), but not ¶ those arising from private or commercial acts (jure gestionis).16 The ¶ State Department,
in a legal opinion that would come to be known as ¶ the "Tate Letter," adopted the restrictive theory in 1952.77 ¶ Although the Tate Letter
acknowledged that such a shift in ¶ executive policy "cannot control the courts,"78 the difficulty of ¶ navigating this public/private distinction
eventually led courts to ¶ request "suggestions of immunity" from the secretary of state on a ¶ case-by-case basis.79 These suggestions, filed
with courts by the ¶ secretary of state, were almost universally followed by courts in their ¶ immunity rulings.80 Because of political pressures
facing the State ¶ Department, these suggestions sometimes produced embarrassing ¶ immunity determinations that sacrificed commercial
interests to ¶ diplomatic goodwill and left courts without objective rules of law for ¶ determining immunity.81 This inconsistency greatly
frustrated jurists, ¶ sometimes prompting scathing opinions.82 ¶ In response to these developments, Congress passed FSIA, ¶ codifying the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity expressed in ¶ the Tate Letter.83 FSIA's express purpose was to replace the "considerable
uncertainty"84 of immunity decisions with "uniformity" ¶ by shifting responsibility for them from the foreign policy apparatus ¶ of the State
Department to the judiciary.85 Doing so, Congress felt, ¶ would "assure litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on ¶ purely legal
grounds."86 ¶ In light of this purpose, the
AEDPA's incorporation of the state ¶ sponsors of terrorism list into the
FSIA is a significant departure from ¶ the purpose of the Act. It resurrects the State Department's
ability to ¶ introduce highly political considerations into determinations of ¶ sovereign immunity,
raising the very concerns Congress sought to ¶ avoid.87 Although the provision ostensibly focuses on the most ¶ abhorrent
crimes of the most stigmatized regimes, producing less ¶ embarrassing results than the case-by-case executive determinations ¶ of old, its
tendency to undermine judicially appropriate principles ¶ such as objectivity and uniformity is no less real. As
the heart of the ¶ U.S.
foreign policy apparatus, the State Department must balance ¶ competing and often contradictory
policy goals. Decisions over which ¶ countries to put on the list, no less than decisions to file
"suggestions ¶ of immunity," are fraught with political considerations.88 As a result, ¶ major allies are
often spared inclusion despite their ties to terrorists,89 ¶ while longtime enemies remain on the list
despite scant evidence of ¶ state support of terrorism.90 ¶ B. Inconsistent Treatment of Victims ¶ While disparate
treatment of equally abhorrent regimes might ¶ not garner much sympathy, there is another problem with using the list of
state sponsors of terrorism as part of a legal regime: the ¶ potential for creating unprincipled distinctions
between similarly ¶ situated plaintiff-victims.91 Because the terrorism list is both over- and ¶
underinclusive - that is, it retains unfriendly states no longer engaged ¶ in terrorism while omitting
allies that are - victims of state violence ¶ have unequal access to courts of justice. Ironically, a defendant, ¶
Libya, was the first to raise this argument as an equal protection ¶ challenge to the state-sponsored terrorism classification.92 "[F]rom the ¶
plaintiffs point of view," Libya argued, "it is of no moment that the ¶ alleged torturer was a Saudi Arabian jail guard ... or a Libyan jail ¶
guard."93 As a constitutional argument, this challenge went nowhere. ¶ Because no fundamental right or suspect classification was ¶
implicated, the court dismissed the argument after applying rational ¶ basis review to the terror-list classification and finding that the list ¶
rationally related to the goal of preventing terrorism.94 This ¶ conclusion is undoubtedly correct as a matter of constitutional ¶ doctrine. As a
broader critique of the state sponsors of terrorism ¶ exception to the FSIA, however, Libya's rather self-serving argument ¶ merits attention. ¶
Because the state sponsors of terrorism list is the only window ¶ for judicial scrutiny of the
noncommercial, extraterritorial acts of ¶ states,95 victims of nonlist states remain without a remedy
under U.S. ¶ law, no matter how egregious the states' crimes may be.96 This ¶ discrepancy leads to
disparities between victims that are difficult to justify. For example, while victims of slave labor camps
in Nazi ¶ Germany cannot recover damages under the FSIA,97 a plaintiff was ¶ able to receive a $7
million judgment against Cuba for the emotional ¶ trauma of being tricked into marrying a spy.98 This
disparity is ¶ particularly poignant given the paucity of evidence that Cuba still ¶ engages in statesponsored terrorism." It also highlights one of the ¶ strongest arguments against restricting the FSIA's exceptions to those ¶ states on
the list: if the point of the list is to deter state acts of ¶ terrorism, why not allow recovery against all nations for terrorist ¶ acts? There
seems to be no good reason to provide a cause of action ¶ for nonterrorism-related acts against terrorlist countries, particularly ¶ ones that may have shed their terrorist ways, while preserving the ¶
immunity of nonlisted countries, even for acts of torture or ¶ terrorism.100
The FSIA qualifications of determining terrorist’s states are based on foreign policy
and diplomatic interest. False qualification only damages anti-terrorism credibility and
prevents legitimate litigation of terrorist attacks.
Hennessy, Associate @ Arnold & Porter LLP, 2011
[Sean Hennessy, “Note: in re the foreign sovereign immunities act: how the 9/11 litigation shows the
shortcomings of FSIA as a tool in the war on global terrorism”, Georgetown Journal of International Law,
42 Geo. J. Int'l L. 855, lexis, chip]
There are many problems with the current system for designating state sponsors of terrorism. First and foremost, the current system
where the executive branch, through the designation of state sponsors of terrorism, controls the jurisdictional grant under FSIA is
inconsistent with the legislative purpose of FSIA as originally enacted in 1976. The legislative history, as
contained in the House Report for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, makes it clear that Congress wanted to vest
decisions regarding a foreign state's sovereign immunity in the judiciary where these decisions will be
based upon "purely legal grounds and under procedures that ensure due process," sheltered from the
influence of foreign policy and diplomatic concerns. n51 By [*864] linking the jurisdictional grant to the list of state sponsors of terrorism when
the terrorism exception was enacted in 1996, Congress effectively transferred control over sovereign immunity determinations back to the
executive branch, a move that directly contradicts its legislative intent in 1976. The current system where the executive branch controls the
jurisdictional grant under the terrorism exception is heavily influenced by foreign policy and diplomatic implications. This
has led to
inconsistent decisions about which nations appear on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, unequal
treatment of victims of terrorist acts, and a significant weakening of the terrorism exception as a tool
in deterring international terrorism. The influence of foreign policy and diplomacy on the decisions about which states to list as
sponsors of terrorism is well highlighted in the Report of the National Commission on Terrorism (NCT) chaired by former ambassador L. Paul
Bremer III. n52 The NCT was a ten-member, bipartisan committee mandated by Congress to examine America's laws, policies, and practices for
preventing and punishing terrorism. n53 At the time the NCT published its report in 2000 there were seven nations designated as state
sponsors of terrorism, n54 but the commission critically noted several key exclusions from the list. In particular, NCT
identified
Afghanistan and Pakistan as two states with significant ties to international terrorist organizations
that should be added to the list of state sponsors. n55 Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have strong ties
to international terrorist organizations, many of which are designated by the United States as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(FTOs). n56 These countries are not the only key exclusions. Other prominent scholars and commentators have argued that
Saudi Arabia and China should be [*865] added to the list. n57 However, these two countries are likely
excluded from the list based upon foreign policy and diplomatic considerations. n58 The influence of foreign
policy and diplomacy on the composition of the list becomes clear when viewing some of the countries included on the current list and a recent
removal from the list. Most notably,
Cuba has remained on the list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982
despite the opinion among experts that Cuba does not sponsor terrorism, a lack of evidence of
material support to terrorist organizations, and a belief that Cuba does not pose a national security
threat to the United States . n59 Many experts believe that Cuba's listing is designed to exert diplomatic pressure to force regime
change. North Korea was a longstanding member of the list of state sponsors until it was removed in
October 2008. n60 North Korea remained on the list despite the State Department's own acknowledgement that North Korea was
not known to have sponsored any terrorism acts since 1987 and many experts believed the listing was
a diplomatic bargaining chip to pressure Pyongang to engage in nuclear negotiations. n61 This belief was
confirmed when the Bush administration removed North Korea from the list to salvage a fragile nuclear deal in October 2008. n62 Another
major problem with the current system for listing state [*866] sponsors of terrorism is
it results in the disparate treatment of
victims of terrorism. n63 Currently, the list of state sponsors of terrorism consists of four states while
many terrorist attacks on U.S. victims are funded and supported by states that do not appear on the
list. n64 Because FSIA provides the exclusive remedy for the non-commercial, extraterritorial acts of states, these victims are left without a
judicial remedy against foreign state sponsors of terrorism. n65 There is no more striking example of the disparity in
treatment than the litigation brought by the victims of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This litigation
could not be brought under the terrorism exception because Saudi Arabia was not one of the seven
nations designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the attack or as a result of the attack. n66 Instead this
litigation was brought under one of FSIA's other enumerated exceptions, the non-commercial tort exception. n67 This naturally raises several
questions. First, if the most significant terrorist attack in U.S. history is not covered by FSIA's terrorism exception, just how effective is the
exception at achieving its dual purposes of [1] compensating victims of terrorist attacks and [2] deterring the sponsorship of international
terrorism? Second, should jurisdiction under the terrorism exception be linked to the state sponsor list at all, or is there a more appropriate
way to determine jurisdiction?
The FSIA creates tensions between the US and states sponsored “terrorists”—it cedes
foreign policy decisions to the Courts
Curavic, corporate associate at Fried Frank, 10
[Danica, 4-1-10, “Compensating Victims of Terrorism or Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy? The Unintended
Consequences of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Terrorism Provisions,” Cornell International
Law Journal, Volume: 43, p. 384-5, YGS]
Syria’s decision to opt out of the Metropolitan’s Beyond Babylon¶ exhibit is just one example of the 2008
FSIA amendments’ unforeseen and¶ unintended consequences. Rather than providing a new weapon
against¶ terrorism or a means to compensate victims of terrorist acts, the FSIA’s¶ terrorism exception
aggravates already strained relations between the¶ United States and foreign nations that have
historically sponsored terrorism directly or indirectly.23 Therefore, to meet its goal of furthering
diplomatic relations through cross-cultural exchange, the U.S. government must¶ take strides toward
unifying American foreign policy.¶ Currently, the courts play a prominent role under the FSIA’s
terrorism¶ provisions, arguably usurping the executive’s constitutional power to effectively conduct
foreign affairs.24 The Constitution does not grant the executive branch exclusive control over foreign
policy or national security;¶ however, many commentators argue that the president should exercise
primary authority in this volatile field.25 At a minimum, the Supreme Court¶ has consistently held that
the authority to shape foreign policy rests with¶ the legislature and executive.26 Although the political
branches may in¶ some sense share control over foreign affairs, it is the executive that is¶ responsible
for maintaining diplomatic relations and plays the principal¶ role in forming and executing foreign
policy.27 The view that, when the¶ two branches conflict, executive considerations should generally
trump¶ congressional considerations originated in the Founding Era.28 Given that¶ the Obama
administration is focused on re-energizing American alliances29— indeed, President Obama has
already made strides toward¶ rebuilding ties with Syria30— the continued operation of the FSIA’s
terrorism provisions should be critically reassessed.
[Fried Frank is an international law firm]
The FSIA doesn’t resolve terror or diplomacy—a critical approach is needed to renew
severed relations
Curavic, corporate associate at Fried Frank, 10
[Danica, 4-1-10, “Compensating Victims of Terrorism or Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy? The Unintended
Consequences of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Terrorism Provisions,” Cornell International
Law Journal, Volume: 43, p. 400-401, YGS]
The ASP study calls into question the feasibility of acquiring data that¶ could ever factually support
the arguments of proponents of the current¶ statutory framework who believe that the threat of suit
and civil liability¶ will likely discourage continued state-sponsored terrorism.172 Indeed,¶ threat of
civil suit is but one of a number of sanctions imposed on countries designated as state sponsors of
terrorism; perhaps the threat of¶ “prohibitions on economic assistance” is what is truly deterring
countries¶ from supporting terrorism.173 Iran and Syria, two of the four countries¶ against which
individuals can bring suit under the FSIA, still engage in¶ state-sponsored terrorism.174 Moreover, even
if active state-sponsored terrorism is at an all time low, overall rates of global terrorism remain high,¶
which begs the question: is the designation process reaching all the foreign¶ sovereigns that engage
in, directly or indirectly, state-sponsored¶ terrorism?175¶ Although the aim of the FSIA’s terrorism
exception is honorable, its¶ backward-looking focus presents American diplomatic efforts as
twofaced.176 No one can deny that the victims of terrorist acts deserve justice¶ and an opportunity to
receive amends; however, given the cost and length¶ of litigating FSIA cases and the low likelihood of
being able to satisfy judgments, the political branches should reevaluate the continued utility of the
terrorism provisions. Furthermore, given the questionable deterrent effect¶ of the provisions, the
struggle against global terrorism may be better served¶ by a different tactical approach, or at the
least, by the synchronization of¶ U.S. foreign policy objectives. A meaningful and critical inspection
will¶ lead to a more successful avenue of redress for victims of terrorism and¶ stronger diplomatic
relations with currently disenfranchised states.
The FSIA severely limits cultural exchange—cooperation with a state sponsor key to
combatting terror
Curavic, corporate associate at Fried Frank, 10
[Danica, 4-1-10, “Compensating Victims of Terrorism or Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy? The Unintended
Consequences of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Terrorism Provisions,” Cornell International
Law Journal, Volume: 43, p. 402-404, YGS]
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States has emerged as the¶ world’s sole hegemonic
power.188 However, America’s image within the¶ international community has since plummeted.189
Although cultural¶ diplomacy played a role in shaping U.S. foreign policy for over half a century,
recent presidential administrations have abandoned the lessons of the¶ Cold War, favoring more
visible sources of strength or hard power.190¶ With the advent of global terrorism, however, scholars
urge political leaders to build a new system of diplomatic alliances to combat extremism and¶ engage
in cultural diplomacy with countries that traditionally share less¶ cultural and historic ties to the United
States.191¶ Museums provide the perfect setting for cultural diplomacy. Indeed,¶ museums have fully
embraced the importance of “two-way” cultural diplomacy. By engaging in diverse cross-cultural
exchange, museums provide¶ Americans with the opportunity to learn about less familiar cultures
through the visual arts.192 Accordingly, cultural diplomacy’s promise of¶ international support through
cooperation is furthered each time an American sees a piece of art and understands or identifies with
the culture that¶ produced it.193 For example, the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s 2008¶ Beyond Babylon
offered viewers a vision of the ancient Near East in terms¶ familiar to the modern American:
globalization and diversity.194 However,¶ the overall effect of the exhibition was undermined by Syria’s
decision not¶ to participate:¶ [T]he Metropolitan’s inability to borrow objects from Syria for an
exhibition¶ indicates the danger [the FSIA] legislation and litigation pose to cultural¶ exchange.
American citizens have been deprived of the opportunity of¶ appreciating and learning from
archaeological artifacts and works of art¶ from one of the world’s oldest civilizations. The actions in
question therefore pose a serious threat to cultural exchange and cultural diplomacy,¶ which are
extremely important in building understanding among¶ peoples.195¶ Furthermore, cultural exchange
allows American academics and¶ archaeologists to study important artifacts, to publish their findings,
and¶ to translate their meaning to society at large.196 The University of Chicago’s Oriental Institute, a
party of interest in Rubin, discovered clay tablets¶ in Iran in 1933, and with the permission of the Iranian
government is still¶ studying the significance of the artifacts.197 Each year, as archaeologists¶ decipher
the ancient writing on the tablets, they discover more about the¶ sophistication of daily life in Ancient
Persia.198 However, with the Rubin¶ plaintiffs seeking attachment, the cultural exchange and comity
that developed between the Oriental Institute and Iran for over half a century has¶ been placed on hold
indefinitely.199 Diplomatic ties with Syria, a designated state sponsor of terror, are¶ precisely the type
that could benefit from increased cross-cultural¶ exchange.200 The U.S. government, however, must
make greater strides¶ toward providing a lasting support system for public diplomacy before¶ American
museums can effectively engage in cultural diplomacy.201 Indeed, until the FSIA terror provisions are
revised, or at least until attachment of cultural property is unquestionably barred, Cuba, Iran, Sudan,¶
and Syria are unlikely to participate in cultural exchanges with American¶ institutions, severely
limiting the potential reach and effectiveness of cultural diplomacy.202 The emergence of global
terrorism as an international¶ security threat has recharged scholarly debate about the need to
reassert¶ America’s soft power through cultural diplomacy.203 Perhaps through the¶ exchange of art,
ideological schisms may slowly be bridged and diplomatic¶ ties forged between the United States and
countries both officially designated as state sponsors of terrorism, and unofficially recognized as
supporting terrorist organizations.
Delegation of authority back to the executive is necessary to further diplomatic
relations and combat terrorism
Curavic, corporate associate at Fried Frank, 10
[Danica, 4-1-10, “Compensating Victims of Terrorism or Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy? The Unintended
Consequences of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Terrorism Provisions,” Cornell International
Law Journal, Volume: 43, p. 405-407, YGS]
Politicians and scholars continue to heavily debate the appropriate¶ response to the threat of global terrorism.213 Generally, advocates
of
the¶ FSIA’s current scheme advance two major benefits, aside from providing¶ victims redress, which stem from allowing
victims of terrorism to sue state¶ sponsors. First, because the FSIA provides the potential for substantial ¶ monetary
damages, suits brought against state sponsors of terrorism may¶ deter future support of terrorist
organizations, or at the very least, impair¶ the state’s ability to devote resources to the funding of terrorist activity.214¶ Second,
proponents argue that the private cause of action created under¶ the FSIA allows the U.S. government to
remain neutral and continue to¶ participate in diplomatic discourse with sovereigns suspected of terrorist¶ activity
while allowing private citizens to expose those sovereigns before¶ the international community.215 Both benefits, however, fail to
appreciate¶ an unintended consequence of allowing victims of terrorism to sue state¶ sponsors— namely, the FSIA’s effect on
international cultural exchange.¶ Furthermore, it is disingenuous to suggest that the executive may
continue¶ to effectively engage in diplomacy and “save face” because it is not directly¶ involved in
FSIA suits. Indeed, considering that Congress created the terrorism exception,216 and the judiciary oversees actions brought¶ thereon,217
it is difficult to argue that the U.S. government is not very¶ much directly involved. Other scholars, while not directly endorsing the FSIA’s
terrorism provisions, have suggested loopholes and ambiguities that can be read into the¶ statute that may
prevent the attachment of cultural objects.218 Such interpretive gambling, however, did not persuade
Syria to loan objects to the¶ Metropolitan for an influential exhibit.219 Although the Metropolitan¶ obtained a grant
of immunity from the State Department for the promised¶ cultural property, both Syria and the Metropolitan decided to
avoid any¶ risk by simply not going forward with Syria’s participation.220 End-running the statute, moreover, does not
answer the underlying foreign policy¶ issues raised by granting victims of terrorism jurisdiction to
bring actions¶ against foreign sovereigns.221 Furthermore, recall that generally the FSIA¶ is a jurisdictionstripping statute.222 The terrorism exception is but one of¶ the enumerated instances under which
states are prevented from raising¶ the defense of sovereign immunity.223 Essentially, therefore, those
scholars seeking to find a middle-ground between endorsing and opposing the¶ terrorism provisions would
further muddy the FSIA’s already complicated¶ framework by asking courts to read exceptions into
exceptions.¶ Congress passed the FSIA in an attempt to clarify and simplify the¶ process of granting or denying claims of sovereign
immunity by shifting¶ such determinations from the executive to the judiciary.224 However, by¶ creating and in 2008 expanding the terrorism
provisions, Congress
has¶ effectively usurped an area of control historically reserved for the executive¶
branch.225 Indeed, President Obama has not embraced the statutory¶ framework in place, likely understanding that allowing victims of
terrorist¶ acts to sue foreign sovereigns presents U.S. diplomatic efforts as twofaced.226 Naturally, states will question the
sincerity of executive rhetoric,¶ for example, wanting to rebuild ties with Syria, when American courts are¶ entering multi-million
dollar judgments against them in their sovereign¶ capacity.227¶ Given the exception’s minimal compensatory and deterrent
impact,¶ and substantial diplomatic costs,228 its continued use should be seriously¶ reassessed. Accordingly, Congress should
repeal the FSIA terrorism exception and return to the historic system whereby the executive branch dictated sovereign immunity
determinations on a case-by-case basis.229¶ Alternatively, if the current system remains, Congress
should create a provision
that delegates authority to the President to waive the terrorism¶ exception’s applicability to any
designated state sponsor of terrorism if he¶ determines that waiver will promote the security and
diplomatic interests¶ of the United States.230 Perhaps, after meaningfully scrutinizing the current statutory system, the
political branches may still structure an effective¶ framework by which victims of terrorism may obtain redress without frustrating the goals of
cultural diplomacy. Regardless of whether victim compensation is feasible,
if the United States hopes to effectively combat
the¶ threat of global terrorism, American foreign policy should focus on coordinating the efforts of private actors,
engaging in cultural exchange, and¶ rebuilding a network of alliances through diplomatic relations.231
FSIA allows countries on the terrorism list to be sued in US courts and be held liable
for multi-million dollar judgements.
Bahr, writer @ George Mason Law Review, 2008
[Elizabeth L., June, LexisNexis, “Is The Gavel Mightier Than The Sword? Fighting Terrorism In American
Courts: The Problematic Implications Of Using The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act To Compensate
Military Victims Of Americas War On Terror?”, 6/25/13, chip]
The AEDPA amendment added an additional exception to FSIA, under which a foreign state is
determined to have automatically waived its sovereign immunity if it is found to have committed or
sponsored certain acts of terrorism. n115 The Terrorism Exception states: A foreign state shall not be
immune from jurisdiction of the courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . not
otherwise covered by [the commercial activity exception], in which money damages are sought against a
foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources . . . for such an act if
such act or provision of material [*1134] support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her officer, employment, or agency . . . . n116 A
significant prerequisite to a foreign state being sued under FSIA, however, is that the state must be
designated by the State Department, under the authority of the President, as an official state sponsor
of terrorism at the time the act occurred. n117 The designation of countries on the terror list,
however, is "profoundly affected by . . . political compromises." n118 The fact that only states on this
terror list can be sued under the Terrorism Exception means that many countries that are or could be
guilty of similar acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens remain immune from prosecution in U.S. courts.
n119 The consequence of this "foreign policy entanglement in the judicial process" is the possibility that
"by only allowing suit against specific countries, [Terrorism Exception] . . . plaintiffs [are encouraged] to
stretch the bounds of plausibility in their pleadings to catch a state-sponsor of terrorism, warping the
judicial process." n120 This qualifier to the Terrorism Exception helps explain why it was the country of
Sudan that the families of the USS Cole victims brought a suit against for the deaths of the U.S. sailors,
even though the suicide bombing occurred in Yemen by Yemeni nationals. Because Yemen is not a
designated state sponsor of terrorism, the [*1135] families had to bring a claim against one of the
countries on the list if they wanted to recover monetary damages. The first case to be tried under FSIA's
original § 1605(a)(7) amendment awarded the plaintiffs a windfall judgment -- nearly $ 50 million in
compensatory damages and $ 137 million in punitive damages. n121 The case arose after the Cuban Air
Force shot down two planes belonging to a Florida-based Cuban exile group, Brothers to the Rescue, in
what the court called an "outrageous contempt for international law and basic human rights." n122
The families of the four men who were killed claimed the attack was a terrorist act sponsored by the
Cuban government. n123 In Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, the court held that the "unprovoked firing of
deadly rockets at defenseless, unarmed civilian aircraft undoubtedly comes within [§ 1605 (a)(7)]'s
meaning of 'extrajudicial killing,'" n124 and that "the Cuban Air Force was acting as an agent of Cuba,"
which had "been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism." n125 Cuba did not appear to defend the
judgment, and the windfall damages award was given to the families after they "established their
'claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the court,'" the necessary standard of
evidence for a default judgment under FSIA § 1608(e). n126 The court in Alejandre insisted that
"punitive damages are . . . an appropriate remedy in international law" and serve to "punish truly
reprehensible conduct," as well as "deter others from committing similar acts." n127 [*1136] The
success of the Alejandre plaintiffs encouraged other victims of terrorism to initiate similar suits. n128
Some of the cases have resulted in multi-million dollar judgments for single plaintiffs against state
sponsors of terrorism, and to date, "U.S. courts have awarded . . . more than [$ 16 billion] in judgments
against State sponsors of terrorism under the terrorism exception to the FSIA." n129
The FSIA terrorism exception allows Cuba’s assets to be frozen to satisfy judgments in
US courts.
Bahr, writer @ George Mason Law Review, 2008
[Elizabeth L., June, LexisNexis, “Is The Gavel Mightier Than The Sword? Fighting Terrorism In American
Courts: The Problematic Implications Of Using The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act To Compensate
Military Victims Of Americas War On Terror?”, 6/25/13, chip]
After the enactment of the AEDPA amendment to FSIA, American victims of terrorism were still having
a difficult time obtaining monetary judgments against terrorists and terror-sponsoring states. When
the first suits under the Terrorism Exception were brought against Iran and Cuba, n179 the claimants
sought to satisfy their multi-million dollar judgments by attaching the states' diplomatic and consular
property, as well as the states' frozen assets located in the United States that had been seized by the
State Department after the foreign state was officially listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. n180
Because such attachments would violate the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, n181 the Clinton
Administration vehemently opposed them, arguing that:
The United States has international treaty obligations to protect . . . diplomatic . . . properties, that the
blocked assets of foreign states provide useful diplomatic leverage and should remain available for
future use, that the attachment of the blocked assets by early claimants under the FSIA exception would
mean that nothing would be left to compensate future claimants, and that the attachment of both kinds
of assets would expose U.S. assets to reciprocal action in certain foreign States. n182
Congress responded to these arguments by saying the President was prohibiting claimants from
receiving their just payments due to actions of executive stonewalling, and insisted that President
Clinton "has chosen to protect terrorist assets over the rights of American citizens seeking justice." n183
Private litigants continued to lobby Congress to enable them to collect judgments from state sponsors of
terrorism. As a result, in 1998, Congress again amended the Terrorism Exception in an effort to make it
easier for plaintiffs to recover monetary judgments received in cases against foreign states. n184 By
enacting the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Congress
provided that "victims who obtained judgments against terrorist States could attach both the terrorist
[*1145] state's frozen assets and their diplomatic and consular property." n185 Congress did,
however, respect the executive's authority in the realm of international affairs, and gave the President
the authority to waive such attachments in the interest of national security. n186 With that caveat,
President Clinton signed the bill into law, and immediately invoked his waiver. n187 In explaining why he
invoked the waiver provision, President Clinton stated:
I am concerned . . . [that i]f this section were to result in attachment and execution against foreign
embassy properties, it would encroach on my authority under the Constitution to "receive Ambassadors
and other public ministers." Moreover, if applied to foreign diplomatic or consular property, [this Act]
would place the United States in breach of its international treaty obligations . . . [and would erode] the
principle that diplomatic property must be protected regardless of bilateral relations. . . . [Additionally,
the Act] would also effectively eliminate use of blocked assets of terrorist States in the national security
interests of the United States, including denying an important source of leverage. n188
The amount of assets a state sponsor of terrorism has seized in the United States, however, is a finite
amount; as of September 2007, the total amount of blocked terrorist assets in the United States was $
309.5 million, and the total amount of non-blocked terrorism assets was $ 102 million. n189 Although a
few FSIA Terrorism Exception claimants have received their judgments, every judgment paid from
frozen funds simply lowers the account for the next litigant; as a result, the more judgments actually
rendered, the less likely it is that the next litigant in line will get anything at all. n190 Lobbyists
continued to pressure Congress, demanding that the U.S. government allow terrorism victims to "have
their day in court," and to make sure the "state sponsors of such horrific acts . . . be made to pay for
their crimes." n191 As a result, Congress continued to enact more legislation to try to get the judgments
paid. In 2000, Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking [*1146] and Violence Protections Act
("VTVPA") of 2002. n192 This act sought to pay portions of some selected judgments out of U.S. funds.
n193 The act directed the U.S. Treasury to pay a portion of the compensatory judgments against Cuba
and Iran out of those states' frozen assets. n194 One judgment that paid out to a successful claimant
against Cuba depleted Cuba's frozen assets in the United States by half. n195 For the compensatory
judgments against Iran, the Act dictated that the damages be made from appropriated funds, and that
"the United States would then be obligated to seek reimbursement for those payments from Iran." n196
With single plaintiffs receiving over half of a terrorist state's frozen assets in one judgment, and with
the U.S. Treasury paying millions of dollars to a handful of claimants that had been victims of
terrorism, some felt that the Terrorism Exception's main purpose -- to deter states from sponsoring
terrorism -- was being completely undermined. n197 Although the victims of terrorism should be
compensated, having U.S. tax dollars paying million dollar compensatory and punitive civil judgments
against Iran "seemed to . . . contradict one of the major justifications for enacting the terrorist state
exception to the FSIA in the first place, namely, to force terrorist States to pay a price for their actions
and to deter them from engaging in such acts in the future." n198 [*1147]
2. FSIA Judgments Under the 2008 Terrorism Exception Amendment
The recently passed 2008 Senate amendment to FSIA's Terrorism Exception again changes the way
successful FSIA judgments are paid out so that -- despite having a finite amount of frozen terrorism
assets located in the United States -- more successful plaintiffs and their attorneys can collect on their
multi-million, and at times multi-billion, dollar judgments. n199 The new FSIA Terrorism Exception
makes collecting FSIA judgments easier for plaintiffs by amending the current legislation in two major
ways: (1) by allowing plaintiffs to have access to funds collected under the 1984 Victims of Crime Act
("VOCA"); n200 and (2) by allowing "for the seizure of hidden commercial assets belonging to the
terrorist state so that the victims of terrorism can be justly compensated." n201 Both of these scenarios,
however, can potentially create tremendous problems.
VOCA was passed in 1984 to authorize the creation of an International Terrorism Victim Expense
Reimbursement Program ("ITVERP"), "so that victims of acts of international terrorism that occur
outside the United States may receive reimbursement for 'expenses associated with that victimization.'"
n202 After 9/11, however, the USA PATRIOT Act n203 amended VOCA to set up a $ 50 million
Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve, available only for victim assistance or compensation related to acts of
terrorism or mass violence. n204 "At no point may the Reserve exceed $ 50 million." n205 The [*1148]
Reserve "creates a regime under which the Federal Government quickly can bring resources to bear
(without using tax dollars) for emergency assistance in the wake of terrorist violence." n206 The obvious
problem with this change, therefore, is that if the VOCA fund is not legally allowed to exceed $ 50
million in a given year, and most FSIA terrorism judgments are generally multi-million dollar judgments,
there is no way the VOCA fund can both exist as an Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve fund and pay out
the multitude of remaining FSIA judgments.
The Act also allows "for the seizure of hidden commercial assets belonging to the terrorist state so
that the victims of terrorism can be justly compensated." n207 Though this terminology sounds
somewhat opaque, recent statements by some plaintiffs' attorneys bringing claims under FSIA's
Terrorism Exception have shed more light on how this change allows plaintiffs broader access to funds
for their judgments. After Libya was ordered in January 2008 to pay a $ 6 billion judgment to seven
American victims of a 1989 plane bombing over Niger, n208 the plaintiffs' attorneys insisted that "if
Libya does not pay up," the attorneys will be able to "get a court order to obtain [the judgment
money] from American companies with which Libya is now doing business." n209 In defending the
magnitude of the award, one of the attorneys insisted that the $ 6 billion judgment "proves that the rule
of law will always prevail over state-sponsored terrorism." n210
FSIA labeling justifies US courts to assign ridiculous judgments on Cuban assets. Even
joint ventures in Cuba are at risk to seizure of assets and property
Muse, Partner @ Stein Mitchell Muse & Cipollone LLC, 2001
[Robert, Dec 1., Latin America Working Group and Center for International Policy, “Adverse
Consequences of Court Judgments Against Cuba”,
http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Cuba/lawg_cip_dec_2011.pdf, 6/25/13, chip]
Like the Weiniger/McCarthy cases, the new court awards have their origins in Miami law firms filing
what are, demonstrably, false claims in pursuit of large contingency fees based on a third or more of
any court award. In every case the judgments are awarded by default because Cuba does not file a
response. However, those awards are so utterly without legal basis under controlling statutory law as
to cause Cuba to simply refuse to pay them (with consequences I will discuss in a moment), if they are
raised by the U.S. in a normalization of relations context. In addition, the Miami court awards are also
offensive, on principle and in practice, to every Cuban on the island, because, if paid, they would divert
funds from public projects—this fact also argues strongly against Cuba paying the awards, again with
consequences I will address in a moment. The cases began with Weiniger and McCarthy a couple of
years ago. Those cases involved the deaths of two men during the Bay of Pigs invasion. Who the first
Pete Willard bombed and strafed Cuba in a B-26 painted in Cuban Air Force colors before being shot
down and killed when he brandished a pistol and a grenade as he tried to get to the beach where the
invasion force was trapped. The second landed a dinghy in Cuba loaded with incendiary bombs that
were to be detonated in Havana during the landings at Playa Giron. He was shot as a saboteur. The
Weiniger/McCarthy cases are bad enough in the minds of Cubans because they involved hostile acts
against Cuba, but at least they involved the deaths of American citizens. The new judgments that I will
describe in a moment—and those to come—do not. Instead they involve the deaths of Cuban citizens
who most often opposed the present Cuban government, usually violently. As I implied before, however
Cubans may feel about their government, this is something they believe that the U.S. has no business
interfering in—and they will doubtless punish any Cuban public figure who would spend national assets
in paying such judgments, hence the probable resistance of any government in Cuba—present or
future—to paying the awards coming from Dade County courts. But, a refusal by Cuba to pay the U.S.
court awards will leave every agency or instrumentality of the Cuban government (and any private
entity in a joint venture or contractual relationship with Cuba or one of its agencies and
instrumentalities—i.e. Cuba Tobacco) at risk of someday having any of its property that enters the U.S.
attached in execution of those awards. (E.g. Cubana Airline‟s planes; ships; cigars; bank accounts set up
to pay for U.S. exports, etc., etc.).1 At some point companies will want to import many products of
Cuban origin into the United States. Changes in 2008 to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act give
judgment creditors against Cuba greatly enhanced new attachment remedies against property in
which a Cuban agency or instrumentality has any interest—even if a third party (e.g. foreign joint
venture partners) has an interest in that property. The vulnerability of Cuban assets to constant
property seizures in the U.S. could go further in its consequences than simply putting Cuban assets
that enter the U.S. at risk, they could also well operate as a powerful disincentive for Cuba to ever
normalize its relations with the U.S. For several reasons claims settlements have been described as the
“sine qua non of normalized relations between two countries.” Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4
Cl. Ct. 237, 245 (1983), aff’d, 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1986). So, to the extent the judgments are viewed
by the U.S. as unresolved claims of U.S. citizens against Cuba, their unsuccessful espousal by the
Department of State could well abort the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba.
FSIA can’t Deter Terror
The FSIA has fundamental flaws—ineffective and politically-driven
Sealing, practiced attorney and author of numerous policy publications, 4
[Keith E., member of the Board of Directors of the Association of American Law Schools Section on
Balance in Legal Education, 2004-2005, Cuba & Democratization: Should Sanctions Be Lifted?, “Cuba is
no Longer a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’: Why the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Sanction Failed,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1259986, p. 155, accessed 6-26-13, YGS]
Regardless of whether the FSIA is applied to Cuba or to any other¶ country, the FSIA is flawed both
from a diplomatic and a constitutional¶ standpoint.¶ From a diplomatic standpoint, the Act has many
flaws. First, although it¶ could be argued that the recent concessions by Libya, both in regard to the¶ Pan
Am bombing and the weapons of mass destruction program, arguably¶ demonstrate the FSIA's success,
it does not appear that the FSIA has done¶ much to change any given nation's behavior. Second, as
actions by the State¶ Department have indicated, plaintiffs' access to the courts under the FSIA is¶ not
the preferred choice in attempting to bring foreign sovereigns in line.¶ Third, although massive
judgments against foreign countries make¶ headlines, they do not generally result in any money
being collected from¶ those countries, since these countries tend to have few assets in the United¶
States and, in light of point two, above, the Executive Branch takes the¶ necessary steps to keep blocked
assets within the country available for¶ diplomatic leverage rather than for tort settlements. Fourth,
because the list¶ of State Sponsors of Terrorism is politically driven, states that belong on the¶ list are
kept off the list and are, thus, immune to suit under the FSIA. Let's¶ look briefly at some of those states.
FSIA fails-can’t access the money
Sealing, Professor at Widener Law 4 (Keith, Spring 2004, Transnational Law and Contemporary
Problems, Vol. 14:143, 159-160, “Cuba is No Longer a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’”, KR)
What I hope to have shown is that whether the goal is to bring down the Castro regime or to bring it into
compliance with international norms, whether you believe that it is appropriate to call Cuba a State
Sponsor of Terrorism or rather look upon it as a now-toothless former State Sponsor of Terrorism, in
short, regardless of your viewpoint on Cuba and Castro, the FSIA has failed for practical and diplomatic
reasons and is unconstitutional to boot. The diplomatic suppression of terrorism is a job for the
Executive Branch, not the federal courts and plaintiff’s lawyers. The blocked assets of State Sponsors of
Terrorism located in the United States constitute vital diplomatic leverage; victims should be
compensated by other means (and those means have been developed) rather than with these funds. As
I indicated at the outset, I do not intend to comment on the overall array of boycotts and sanctions
against Castro’s Cuba, but rather just one: the FSIA. I have argued that it is a flawed diplomatic tool,
that it has severe constitutional infirmities that have not been carefully explored by the lower courts
and that have never been put before the Supreme Court, and that, in any case, the sanction has not
managed to put any money in the hands of plaintiffs/victims, or-except possibly in the case of Libya
but certainly not in the case of Cuba-resulted in any discernible changes in policy. I shall leave it to the
Cuba experts to decide the proper role of the United States in improving the lot of the Cuban people,
but I respectfully submit that the FSIA has failed to generate any positive effect in that regard.
FSIA fails-no diplomatic effect
Sealing, Professor at Widener Law 4 (Keith, Spring 2004, Transnational Law and Contemporary
Problems, Vol. 14:143, 159-160, “Cuba is No Longer a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’”, KR)
Regardless of whether the FSIA is applied to Cuba or to any other country, the FSIA is flawed from both
a diplomatic and a constitutional standpoint. From a diplomatic standpoint, the Act has many flaws.
First, although it could be argued that the recent concessions by Libya, both in regard to the Pan Am
bombing and the weapons of mass destruction program, arguably demonstrate the FSIA’s success, it
does not appear that the FSIA has done much to change any given nation’s behavior. Second, as
actions by State Department have indicated, plaintiffs’ access to the courts under the FSIA is not the
preferred choice in attempting to bring foreign sovereigns in line. Third, although massive judgments
against foreign countries make headlines, they do not generally result in any money being collected
from those countries, since these countries tend to have few assets in the United States and, in light of
point two, above, the Executive Branch takes the necessary steps to keep blocked assets within the
country available for diplomatic leverage rather than for tort settlements. Fourth, because the list of
State Sponsors of Terrorism is politically driven, states that belong on the list are kept off the list and
are, thus, immune to suit under the FSIA. Let’s look briefly at some of those states.
FSIA Violates SOP, I Law
The FSIA is constitutionally corrupt—results in resentment
Sealing, practiced attorney and author of numerous policy publications, 4
[Keith E., member of the Board of Directors of the Association of American Law Schools Section on
Balance in Legal Education, 2004-2005, Cuba & Democratization: Should Sanctions Be Lifted?, “Cuba is
no Longer a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’: Why the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Sanction Failed,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1259986, p. 158, accessed 6-26-13, YGS]
Another flaw of the FSIA is that entities that are not sovereign states but¶ nevertheless might merit
inclusion, such as Palestine or the PLO77 cannot be¶ included on the list. Finally, the FSIA pushes the
limits of international law,¶ creating ill-will as part of America's "new unilateralism,"78¶ From a
constitutional perspective, I have argued elsewhere that the FSIA¶ violates due process by holding that,
where there is subject matter¶ jurisdiction and proper service of process, there is no need to
demonstrate¶ that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant state.79 This is¶ particularly
troublesome in situations in which the terrorism in question is¶ not directed at U.S. citizens or
interests or aimed at changing American¶ foreign policy.¶ It has also been suggested that the FSIA
violates the doctrine of¶ separation of powers by vesting in the State Department, a part of the¶
Executive Branch, the power to create or destroy jurisdiction of the lower¶ courts (by adding to or
deleting from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism).¶ This power violates the constitutional mandate
that Congress determines the scope of the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts,80 and—at least
where¶ the FSIA has been amended after certain terrorist acts in order to assure that¶ the sovereigns
accused of sponsoring the acts could be sued in federal court—¶ the FSIA operates as a bill of attainder
or ex post facto law.81
IFI Loans to Cuba Good
Cuba sorely requires IFI assistance
Feinberg, former Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security
Council, 11
[Richard E., November 2011, “The International Financial Institutions and Cuba: Relations with NonMember States,” Cuba in Transition, Volume: 22, p. 50-51,
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume22/pdfs/feinberg.pdf, date accessed
6/27/13, YGS]
As Cuba enters its arduous process of economic reform, it could benefit tremendously from the
accumulated expertise housed in the international financial institutions. On a wide range of tough
issues¶ facing Cuban policymakers, the IMF and World¶ Bank can bring to bear knowledge of past
experiences¶ from around the globe as well as their capacity to analyze specific country circumstances
in the context of¶ today’s global economy. True, Cuba can turn to individual governments, private
consulting firms, and¶ academic economists for advice, and their voices can¶ be valuable additives to
enrich policy debates, but¶ none can match the scope and depth of IFI expertise.17 The IFIs are also
well equipped to provide the¶ large-scale training and capacity-building that Cuba¶ sorely requires.¶ It
is not a matter of mechanically applying the Chinese, Vietnamese, Singaporean, South Korean,
Brazilian, Chilean or other “models” to Cuba. It is well¶ understood within the economics profession
and the¶ IFIs that whatever “lessons” can be culled from history must be carefully adjusted to the
peculiar conditions of each country. Every nation has its own history, culture, location, comparative
advantages, and¶ governance structures. For example, Cuba has developed its human capital, through
superior education¶ and health programs, gaining its own dynamic comparative advantages such that
it is exporting the services of large numbers of skilled professionals. At the¶ same time, debates on the
island sometimes exaggerate “Cuban exceptionalism,” as though certain widely observed economic
rules and relationships do not¶ apply and Cuba has nothing to learn from the rest of¶ the world.18
Neither a cookie-cutter one-size-fits-all imposition of a foreign model, nor a blind refusal to¶ learn from
the successes and failures of other countries, makes good sense.
The IMF is key to Cuban reforms—won’t be hampered by political groups
Feinberg, former Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security
Council, 11
[Richard E., November 2011, “The International Financial Institutions and Cuba: Relations with NonMember States,” Cuba in Transition, Volume: 22, p. 53-54,
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume22/pdfs/feinberg.pdf, date accessed
6/27/13, YGS]
In an informal discussion in June 2011 in Havana¶ with the author, a leading Cuban economist suggested
ten topics that, among others, would make for interesting IFI studies (not necessarily in order of
importance): ¶ • Comparative development strategies including¶ assessing the experiences of Vietnam
and Eastern¶ Europe ¶ • Monetary and financial solutions • Salaries and incentives ¶ • Productivity ¶ •
International commerce, exports and supply¶ chains ¶ • The transformation of state-owned
enterprises¶ into non-agricultural cooperatives ¶ • Micro-enterprises ¶ • Financing social welfare ¶ •
Diasporas and development ¶ • Institutions, laws and regulations. ¶ By responding to such a list, the IFIs
could begin a¶ constructive, step-by-step dialogue with leading Cuban economists and policymakers.
In a preliminary¶ reaction, World Bank economists familiar with the¶ Cuban economy agreed that
these were all important¶ topics.¶ In addition, training of mid-level technical personnel¶ will be vital to
energizing Cuban government institutions at all levels, national, provincial, and municipal.¶ The IMF’s
regional technical assistance centers for¶ the Caribbean (in Barbados), and for Central America and the
Dominican Republic (in Guatemala),¶ could serve as established and well-equipped venues.¶ These
centers have resident experts and also draw on¶ expertise from IMF headquarters and the IMF Institute.
The Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance¶ Center (CARTAC) focuses its capacity-building¶
technical assistance and policy advice on topics that¶ will be of urgent interest to a reform-minded
Cuba:¶ macroeconomic analysis, tax and customs administration, public financial management,
economic statistics, and financial sector and capital markets regulation and supervision. Of particular
relevance,¶ CARTAC promotes the use of internationally accepted concepts and statistical
methodologies, helping countries to develop compilation and dissemination procedures in line with
international standards¶ and codes of good practices.28 Located in Barbados and Guatemala, these
technical¶ assistance centers could be ideal cost-effective and¶ politically neutral venues for offering
seminars and¶ workshops to Cubans, avoiding at the outset a visible¶ IMF presence in Havana or a
potentially controversial Cuban presence in Washington, DC. Such¶ events could either be exclusive to
Cubans or, more¶ discreetly, could be scheduled for regional members¶ while allowing Cuban
participation. In the Cuban¶ case, a separate trust fund might be established for¶ the training of Cuban
nationals.