FAA ASW Runway Safety
Summit
Promoting Runway Safety
The Pilot’s Perspective
First Officer Kent Lewis
Human Factors Working Group
Air Line Pilots Association, International
April 22-23, 2008
Ft Worth, TX

FAA ASW
Runway Safety Summit
Special thanks to:
ALPA Engineering & Air Safety
Pierre Huggins
Terry McVenes
Shawn Pruchnicki

Who Is ALPA?
 Represent 54,000 pilots at 41 Air Lines in
North America
 IFALPA represents over 104,000 pilots at
90 member Associations
 Safety makes up a significant percentage of the operating budget
 Why? “Schedule With Safety” been our motto for 76 years

Looking for Ways to Better
Manage Risks Before They
Become Accidents

ALPA Safety Committee
Project Overview
178 Funded Projects Across 13
Technical Groups
Plus
9 Accident Investigations

Our Roadmap
ALPA Safety Committee
Priorities
Implementation of CNS
Systems
Accident Investigation
& Prevention
Aircraft Design
Pilot Fatigue
Pilot Training & Licensing
Air Traffic Capacity
Initiatives
Runway Safety
Safety Management
Systems
Cargo Safety &
Dangerous Goods
Environment & Energy
Strategies

30 years ago…
 The potential severity of runway incursions was fully realized
 We also faced great risk of:
 CFIT accidents
 Windshear accidents
 Mid-air collisions

Threat: Controlled Flight Into Terrain

Threat: Low Level Windshear

Threat: Mid Air Collision

Evaluating the Risk of
Runway Incursions

Runway Incursion Likelihood
Two commuter aircraft, Quincy, IL, November 11, 1996.

Runway Incursion Incidents in the US
FAA and ICAO Data, 2003 - 2007
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
FAA
ICAO

Runway Incursion Severity
Runway Incursion, B737 & Metro III Collision at LAX
February 1, 1991

Fatal Runway Incursion Accidents in the US, 1990 - 2007
 1990 Atlanta, GA: B727 / Beech A100
 1990 Detroit, MI: DC9 / B727
 1991 Los Angeles, CA: B737 / SW4
 1994 St. Louis, MO: DC9 / C441
 1996 Quincy, IL: Beech 1900 / Beech A90
 2000 Sarasota, FL: C172 / C152
 2006 Lexington, KY: CRJ 100
112 Fatalities

Runway Incursion Incidents in the US
May – September 2007
San Francisco: E-170 / E120….....…..35 feet (est)
Teterboro: P180 / SR22 ...…50 feet (max braking)
Fort Lauderdale: A320 / B757….…...…..…230 feet
New York: CRJ100 / B737….…...….……..650 feet
Teterboro: LJ45 / CL60…………....…...…1200 feet
Los Angeles: B737 / A320 ……….………….37 feet
Washington: LR35……………...... Closed runway
792 Crew and Passengers

Conclusion: Runway Incursion
Risk is Unacceptable

Runway Incursion
Mitigations
 We cannot change the potential severity of an incursion
 We can reduce the likelihood of an incursion through layers of mitigations
 CAST recommendations made in 2002 to reduce frequency of incursions
 Most not yet fully implemented

Highly Effective Mitigations:
 Aircraft Moving Map
 Add traffic to display
 Runway occupancy advisories
 Graphical/text of taxi and clearance limits
 ASDE-X
All great “high tech” solutions

Don’t Judge a Book…

“Modern” Airliner Flight Deck with Steam Gauges

… By It’s Cover!

Flight Deck of
Small General Aviation Aircraft

Intelligent Design
Many airports have exceeded their design capacity and were engineered for a different generation of aircraft.

Hotspots
The challenge is to design
Airports that
Require
Hotspots!

End-around Taxiway
A better design at DTW

End
Around
Taxiway
Atlanta

Low Tech Solutions
Enhanced Runway Markings
Runway Status Lights
Enhanced Airport Lighting
Program
PAINT and LIGHTS

Can You See Me Now?
Before After
Graphics not to scale

Contrast Contrast Contrast

Taxiway Centerline
Enhancement

Enhanced Complex
Intersection

NOTAMS
Has the time come to start over?
 Technology exists to deliver a better product
 Are they Intuitive?
 Are they as effective at communicating critical information as we would like?

A “real challenge” for future growth

Training, SOPs, & Education
Screen Capture from ALPA Web Site www.alpa.org

Investigation

Beyond Probable Cause…”Probability” of
Cause, maybe?
 We know Who did What.
 Why did system not support expert operators?
 System must be resilient to random errors made by expert operators.

SHEL Model
We are the Liveware in the middle, surrounded by a system or “SHEL”

S = Software
Transfer of information between the human and supporting systems
 Philosophy
 Policy
 Procedures
 Checklists
 Publications
 Regulatory requirements
 Information systems

H = Hardware
Physical and mental interactions between the person and machine or equipment
 Systems management
 Autoflight, Powerplants, Air conditioning,
Pressurization, Flight Controls, aircraft configuration, Com/Nav/Ident radio(s)
 Information displays
 Flight, nav, weather, traffic, performance
 Flight deck design and limitations
 Restricted vision
 Synthetic vision

E = Environment
Internal Factors
 Personal comfort
 Temperature
 Glare
 Noise
External Factors
 Day/night
 Visibility
 Weather
 Lights
 Signs
 Markings
 Runway condition

L = Liveware
The nature of humans (physiology) and interactions between humans (psychology).
 Voice communications
 Phraseology
 Speech content/rate
 Language barriers
 Read & hear back
 Crew briefings
 Crew interactions
 Labor relations
 Non-verbal cues

Physiological
 General health
 Nutrition
 Visual detection and acuity
 Stress
 Fatigue level
 Arousal level

Psychological
 Mental capabilities
 Perceptions
 Information processing
 Attention span
 Workload
 Motivation
 Time compressed decision making
 Knowledge (including training)
 Attitude
 Personality
 Situational
Assessment
 Concurrent task management
 Prospective memory

SHEL Model
The interface or edge between each component of the system is not clean and smooth, but rather jagged and fuzzy. This is another area where hazard and error exist.

Safety Improvements Wanted
Runway Incursions
Require all runways crossings be authorized only by a specific clearance. A-00-67
Require runway crossing clearances be issued only after the previous runway has been crossed. A-00-68

ALPA White Paper on
Runway Incursions
WWW.ALPA.ORG

Priority Action Items
AMM with own-ship display
RWSL
THL
Enhanced airport markings
Perimeter taxiways
Improve SOP for aircraft ground ops
Improve ATC ground movement training
Provide ATC with better technology
Improve automation and visual aids at airports

Safety Enhancement
Collaborations
AC 120-74A SOP for Ground Ops
On-Line Pilot Education – 12,000 course completions
FAA/ALPA DVD – “Was That for Us?”
AC 150/5340-1J Painting and Markings
RIIEP
WWW.ALPA.ORG

ALPA Runway Safety Website
 ALPA Hold Short for Runway Safety http://www.alpa.org
Safety/Security tab

Another Runway Safety Issue
RUNWAY EXCURSIONS
Air France, August 2005
Toronto Runway 24L

Runway Safety Areas
 Non-compliance
 Schedule
 Declared Distances
 When is a runway not a runway
 Need information more accessible to pilots
 All charts should show useable lengths
 No exceptions! Not 200, not 400, not 600!
Runway Safety Areas need to be at least
(!!!) 1,000’long!!!
 EMAS

EMAS – One option

ALPA Position on EMAS
“Air carrier airports should upgrade all runway safety areas. Where upgrades that meet minimum standards of AC
150/5300-13 or ICAO ANNEX 14 Section
3.4 are not feasible, Engineered Materials
Arresting Systems (EMAS) should be installed.”

Runway Safety –
A Puzzling Issue…

Which Will Be Solved
When We Work Together
Moving
Map
Display
Runway
Status
Lights
Surface
Movement Radar
Perimeter Taxiways
Training &
Communications Visual Aids

A Call For Action
 We have the knowledge and the means to eradicate the incursion problem
 Do we have the political will, and will we expend the necessary resources to do so?

THANK YOU for your commitment to the continuous improvement of aviation safety.
Together we are making a difference