Teacher Salary Schedules
February 10, 2012
By: Robert Butler
WASB Staff Counsel
Co-Director of Legal Services
bbutler@wasb.org
1-877-705-4422 (phone)
1-608-512-1703 (direct phone)
1-608-257-8386 (fax)
By: Barry Forbes
WASB Staff Counsel
Co-Director of Legal Services
bforbes@wasb.org
1-877-705-4422 (phone)
1-608-512-1707 (direct phone)
1-608-257-8386 (fax)



Wisconsin Act 10 and its Impact on Compensation Systems
Discussion of Total Base Wage Calculation
Compensation Systems
◦ Traditional Salary Schedule
◦ Alternative Compensation Systems
 Considerations Prior to Adoption
 Representative Systems
 Characteristics and Themes
 Options to Consider
Salary +
Benefits
QEO set
floor
Total
Package
Need to Shift
from
Collective
Bargaining and
QEO
to
Base wages and
CPI
Desire for
increased
compensation
District ability
to provide
increases
Extra
Compensation
Base
Compensation
Fringe Benefits
Available
Funding

Collective Bargaining Changes (effective June 29, 2011)
◦ Prohibits bargaining collectively with respect to any condition of
employment except wages, which includes only total base wages and
excludes any other compensation, such as overtime, premium pay,
merit pay, performance pay, supplemental compensation, pay
schedules, and automatic pay progressions.
◦ Limited to bargaining over a percentage of a total base wage increase no
greater than the percentage change in the consumer price index.

Collective Bargaining Changes
◦ Unless approved by referendum, the law prohibits any increase in base
wages that exceeds the total base wages for authorized positions 180
days before the expiration of the previous collective bargaining
agreement by a greater percentage than the increase in the consumer
price index (CPI). If a local governmental unit (including a school
district) wishes to increase the total base wages of its general municipal
employees in an amount that exceeds these CPI limits, it must adopt a
resolution to that effect.
◦ The resolution must specify the amount by which the proposed total base
wages increase will exceed the CPI limit, and may not take effect unless
approved in a referendum.
◦ For school districts, the referendum would occur in April for collective
bargaining agreements that begin in July of that year.

Bargaining Prohibited If Decrease or No Change in CPI
[111.70(4)(mb)]. If there is a decrease or no change in the CPI, a
municipal employer is prohibited from bargaining for any change in total
base wages for authorized positions in the proposed bargaining agreement
from the total base wages180 days before the expiration of the previous
bargaining agreement. (This provision repeals and recreates a provision in
2011 Wisconsin Act 10.) [Also see Section 9132(1d), below.]

CPI Change Information from WERC and DOR [111.70(4)(mbb)]:
For purposes of complying with prohibited subjects of bargaining
provisions, the WERC shall provide, upon request, to a municipal
employer or to any representative of a collective bargaining unit containing
a general municipal employee, the CPI change (obtained from the
department of revenue (DOR)) during any 12-month period.

As of February 10, 2012 WERC has not issued Rules for
Defining Total Base Wages.
http://werc.wi.gov/selected_press_releases_and_werc_world_articles.htm#cpi_calculation_r
ules_developments

“On August 31, 2011, Governor Walker approved the request
of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission to
develop administrative rules as to:
◦ (1) the method for providing the relevant changes in the
CPI-U index to the State, municipal employers, and the
unions representing state and municipal employees as well
as (2) the calculation that will establish the maximum
collectively bargained change in total base wages allowed
under 2011 Wisconsin Acts 10 and 32.”

As of November 28, 2011 WERC has not issued Rules for
Defining Total Base Wages.
◦ “Pursuant to 2011 Wisconsin Act 21, the Governor’s
approval needs to be published in Legislative Reference
Bureau’s Register before work on the proposed rules can
begin. Given the timing of publication, it is anticipated that
work will not be able to begin until late September.”

As of November 28, 2011 WERC has not issued Rules for
Defining Total Base Wages.
◦ “While it awaits the ability to begin work on the
administrative rules, pursuant to the request of affected
parties, the Commission has requested that the Wisconsin
Department of Revenue provide the average annual change
in the CPI-U index for collective bargaining agreements
with terms beginning July 1, 2011 and January 1, 2012.
Once that information is received, it will be posted on the
website.”

As of November 28, 2011 WERC has not issued Rules for
Defining Total Base Wages.
◦ “The Commission anticipates that the CPI-U increase provided by
Revenue for July 1, 2011 agreements will be 1.64% and for January 1,
2012 agreements will be 2.0%.”
◦ “By letter dated September 28, 2011, Secretary of Revenue Richard G.
Chandler advised the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
that the CPI-U increase applicable to one year collective bargaining
agreements with a term beginning January 1, 2012 is 2.01%.”
◦ “Commission requests for the CPI-U change for contracts with a term
beginning January 1, 2011 and July 1, 2011 remain pending with the
Department of Revenue.”
◦ The CPI-U increase for July 1, 2012 is presently running at 3.15%.
Final rate will not be solidified until on or after January 15, 2012.



As of November 28, 2011 WERC has not issued Rules for
Defining Total Base Wages.
What does Total Base Wages Mean?
Contemporaneous Definition of Total Base Wage:
◦ Base Wage Example from the Wisconsin Department of Administration –
from Brian Hayes, State Budget Director to Mike Huebsch, Secretary of
Administration, February 15, 2011.

If Base Wages is Calculated off of the starting
salary established 180 days prior:
◦ More funds may be available for distribution toward items
controlled by the Board, e.g. payments for additional service,
performance, etc.

If Base Wages is Calculated off of the
employee’s salary established 180 days prior:
◦ Less funds may be available for distribution toward items
controlled by the Board, e.g. payments for additional service,
performance, etc.
Number of
teachers
Starting Salary
Total
Schedule Salary
Total
1$
28,000 $ 28,000
$
28,000
$ 28,000
1$
28,000 $ 28,000
$
30,000
$ 30,000
1$
28,000 $ 28,000
$
32,000
$ 32,000
1$
28,000 $ 28,000
$
34,000
$ 34,000
1$
28,000 $ 28,000
$
36,000
$ 36,000
1$
28,000 $ 28,000
$
38,000
$ 38,000
1$
28,000 $ 28,000
$
42,000
$ 42,000
1$
28,000 $ 28,000
$
44,000
$ 44,000
1$
28,000 $ 28,000
$
46,000
$ 46,000
1$
28,000 $ 28,000
$
50,000
$ 50,000
10
$ 280,000
$ 380,000
The District is not required to provide a total
base wage adjustment equal to the CPI-U.
 Failure to reach an agreement on total base
wages may result in the employer
implementing its last offer on total base wages.


Teacher compensation will be a combination
of:
◦ Base wages bargained with teacher unions.
◦ Other compensation unilaterally determined by
school boards.

Goals to pursue in setting up compensation
system:
◦ Attract/retain competent staff.
◦ Create incentives for professional development
valued by board/parents/community.
◦ Increase student achievement.
◦ Increase public confidence in and support of
education.

Problems to avoid in setting up compensation
system:
◦ Poorly designed compensation system can work
against achievement of goals.
◦ Unfair system will cause loss of competent staff
and potential for litigation.
◦ Perverse or unexpected outcomes are possible.
 Cheating.
 Parents want only the best teachers.

The Consortium for Policy Research in
Education at the University of WisconsinMadison has posited that there have been three
major phases of compensation systems for
teachers:
◦ Phase I: Boarding Round
◦ Phase II: Position-based salary schedule
◦ Phase III: Single salary schedule
http://cpre.wceruw.org/tcomp/general/teacherpay.php
 Phase I: Boarding Round:
◦ “Teacher compensation consisted primarily of room and
board provided by the local community.
◦ The "Boarding Round" pay system was a strong incentive for
teachers to maintain positive relations with community
members and to maintain a high moral character. It also
reflected the barter economy of the time.” Existed up until
1900. http://cpre.wceruw.org/tcomp/general/teacherpay.php
 Phase II: Position-based Salary Schedule
◦ “In the early 1900s, teacher preparation became more
uniform; requiring higher levels of education, and schools
began to reflect the bureaucratic organizational structures of
the developing industrial cash economy. “
◦ “A position-based salary system was created that reflected a
new form of teacher work, … and increased preservice
education requirements.”
◦ http://cpre.wceruw.org/tcomp/general/teacherpay.php
 Phase II: Position-based Salary Schedule
◦ “ This system paid elementary teachers less than secondary
teachers, in part due to the differences in education required
for these positions, yet also paid women and minority
teachers less than non-minority males, reflecting societal
biases of the time.”
http://cpre.wceruw.org/tcomp/general/teacherpay.php
 Phase III: Single-Salary Schedule
◦ “The single-salary schedule emerged early in the 20th century
in response to further changes in the social and educational
context.
◦ Opposition to overt discrimination and demand for greater
teacher skills led to the system which paid the same salary to
teachers with the same qualifications regardless of grade level
taught, gender or race.
◦ The single-salary schedule did not, however, pay every
teacher the same amount. ”
http://cpre.wceruw.org/tcomp/general/teacherpay.php
 Phase III: Single-Salary Schedule
◦ “The single-salary schedule emerged early in the 20th century
in response to further changes in the social and educational
context.”
http://cpre.wceruw.org/tcomp/general/teacherpay.php
 Phase
IV and beyond?
◦ Student Achievement
◦ Teacher Attributes
◦ Skill based salary schedules
◦ Principals’ Ratings of their Staffs
◦ Merit/performance based salary schedules
 Generally
differentiation solely based
upon:
◦ years of service and
◦ academic attainment.
 Product
of unionization and attempts to
mitigate real and perceived
discrimination issues in pay systems.
 “Steps”
represent years of service (up to,
e.g., 15 years) and/or teaching
experience.
 “Lanes” represent educational
achievement and advanced degrees (up
to, e.g., 10 lanes, with MA-30 being
highest lane).
The traditional single salary schedule
structure dictates the distribution of
available money among those teachers
who are moving through the schedule
and those who are at the highest-paying
step.
Abbreviated Schedule
BA+0
BA+6
MA
MA+30
Step 1 29,560 30,368 33,601
36,835
Step 2 30,633 31,441 34,674
37,908
Step 3 31,760 32,514 35,747
38,981
 Loosely
based on license renewal (6
credits every 5 years)
 Additional pay for years of service
 Incentives for educational
advancement
◦ Level of District ability to establish and
approve incentives varies widely.

Too much structured step movement tends to cause
dissatisfaction among teachers and competitive
problems for the district when it comes to the
attraction and retention of staff.
◦ Teachers perceive that a schedule with too many steps will
require too many years of service to get to the top.

Too much structured step movement leaves little
money to increase the base and pay for senior teachers.
◦ Most of the money available for pay increases is used up in
step movement when schedules have too many steps.
 If
there are fewer steps, staff reaches
maximum salary quickly.
 Historically, one of WEAC’s bargaining
goals was to achieve salary schedules of
ten or fewer steps.
 Bargaining over salary schedule structure
is now prohibited.
“Percent-per-cell” increases

◦
◦
Focuses more money on the higher paying
steps and lanes
Widens the dollar gap between the “BA
Base” and the “Schedule Maximum.”
 “Dollar-per-cell”
increases focuses:
◦ A greater percentage of available money
on the entry-level steps/lanes
◦ Decreases the percentage gap between
the “BA Base” and the “Schedule
Maximum.”
 Some
districts agreed to incorporate
aspects of PI-34 into the traditional
salary schedule.
 PI-34 is the Wisconsin teacher
licensing system that went into effect
in 2004.
 PI-34
requires teachers to complete a
“professional development plan” in
order to renew their license.
 Some districts permitted teachers to
move one lane on the salary schedule
for each PDP they complete.




ProComp, first piloted in 1999, is one of the oldest
alternative compensation systems still in use.
The ProComp system is a results-based pay program
that uses multiple criteria to assess teachers’
performance.
ProComp contains nine different avenues for increasing
pay - most of which are based on objective criteria.
Participation in ProComp is voluntary. Over 80% of
Denver Public School teachers participate.

Market incentive component:
◦ Hard to Staff Schools: Teachers/specialists who work in
positions that are considered difficult to fill will receive a 3%
Index Bonus (Index = $37,551 in 2011-12). Hard to Staff
assignments are classified as those where the supply of
licensed professionals is low and the rate of turnover is high.
◦ Hard to Serve Schools: Teachers/specialists at schools
considered hard to serve will receive a 3% Index Bonus every
year the school is eligible. Hard to serve schools are those with
a high percentage of students on free and reduced lunch.

Knowledge and skills component:
◦ Teachers who complete one Professional Development Unit in
their current or proposed area of assignment will receive a
salary increase of 2% of the index after:
 Completing approved courses,
 Demonstrating their skills, and
 Reflecting on the values of the knowledge for use with their
students.
◦ Graduate Degrees relevant to current or proposed assignment
or National Board Certificates receive salary increase equal to
9% of the index for life of degree or certificate.
◦ Tuition reimbursement of up to $1000 for courses in current or
proposed area of assignment.

Professional evaluation component:
◦ Salary increase of 3% of index for teachers who receive
satisfactory evaluation. Teachers evaluated once every 3 years.
◦ Unsatisfactory evaluation delays salary increase until teacher
receives satisfactory or better rating.

Student growth component:
◦ Teachers set two annual objectives. Those who meet both receive a
salary increase of 1% of index. Those who meet one objective receive a
1% index bonus.
◦ Teachers whose students exceed an agreed-upon range for one year's
growth as measured by Colorado Student Assessment Program math and
reading will receive a 3% sustainable increase. Teachers who fall below
the lower limit of a standard range will lose their sustainable increase if
they have earned on in the past.
◦ Teachers who work in schools defined as "distinguished" will receive a
bonus of 2% Index. Distinguished schools will be determined annually
based on 30-40 school accreditation indicators. These include
outstanding results based on student growth data and factors such as
school climate, attendance and graduation rates.

ProComp is the subject of evaluations by Dr. Ed Wiley of CUBoulder and by CU-Denver. The following is from the CUDenver evaluation:
◦ Professional Development Unit bonuses were not correlated with higher
teacher effectiveness measured by value-added on student assessments.
◦ Pay for advanced degrees in licenses: there was limited evidence that
they led to changes in instructional practices or improved test scores.
◦ Principals and teachers only moderately understood the evaluation
component and implementation varied in quality. It is not clear if
teachers were motivated by the evaluation incentives or if the incentives
were associated with teacher effectiveness.
◦ Student achievement analysis found that student growth objectives did,
on average, reward effective teachers.

From the CU-Denver evaluation:
◦ Involve teachers from the beginning and collaborate to develop
the system.
◦ Research various compensation systems and develop a system
customized for your district.
◦ Determine the goals for the compensation system and align the
incentives with the desired goals.
◦ Consider the entire compensation package (benefits,
retirement), not just salary.
◦ Allow time to design, plan, pilot and improve the system.
◦ Build into the system a review and change cycle.


Program started in 1993 and ended in 2004 when state
cut funding.
Georgia’s program was a school based program:
◦ Schools would apply to the state. The application would define a set
of performance objectives that the school planned to achieve during
the next year and ways to measure its success.
◦ A state review panel evaluated application and selected schools to
participate in program.
◦ Schools submitted a report at the end of the school year to document
performance on each objective. The state defined the information
needed to be included in the report.
◦ The state review panel used the reports to determine which schools
received an award.

School performance objectives:
◦ Schools have flexibility in defining objectives.
◦ The state expected performance objectives to be
comprehensive in scope, to affect a large portion of students
and to have potential for improving the school.

The state required objectives in four areas:
◦ Academic achievement: schools set 3 goals for improving
student achievement as measured by test scores or other
achievement measures.
◦ Client involvement: schools set 2 objectives addressing needs of
students, parents and community.
◦ Educational programming: schools set 2 objectives focused on
improving the educational offerings provided by the school.
◦ Resource development: schools set objectives focused on raising
additional funding for school programs, offering professional
development for teachers, improving instructional materials or
enhancing school facilities.

Evaluation (from Center for Educator Compensation
Reform, April 2008):
◦ The program may have increased communication and collaboration
within schools.
◦ Awards based on criteria designed by schools may recognize, rather than
enhance, increased effort to achieve school objectives.
◦ School-set objectives account for the school context.
 A high performing school may find goals based on improvement of
test scores more difficult than a low performing school because it has
less room for improvement.
◦ Predicting funding needs difficult.
◦ Extensive application and reporting requirements may limit
participation.

ASPIRE Award (Accelerating Student Progress,
Increasing Results & Expectations):
◦ Program uses value added analysis to measure student progress
on standardized tests and determine teachers’ compensation
bonuses.
◦ Bonuses were combination of individual teacher and school
wide bonuses.

Award Structure:
◦ School wide awards for schools where students demonstrate aboveaverage academic progress (in comparison with other schools in the
district), measured by standardized tests.
◦ Individual teacher awards where the teacher’s students’ progress scores
measured by standardized tests are above average.
◦ School wide awards for schools with above average improvement on
reading and math standardized tests as determined by the Texas
Education Agency (TEA).
◦ School wide awards for schools earning a TEA rating of exemplary or
recognized.
◦ School wide awards for schools where 70% or more of students writing
scores meet the college readiness standard.

Houston Independent School District attributed significant improvement in
student achievement to ASPIRE in its 2009 annual report:
◦ Performance pay totaling more than $40.4 million was awarded in 2009.
◦ “In 2009, 74 percent of HISD’s schools earned the state’s highest
accountability ratings of either Exemplary or Recognized. This all-time
record for HISD was the highest percentage among large urban districts
in Texas.”
◦ “The “Nation’s Report Card” math results released in December 2009
revealed that our minority and economically disadvantaged students
beat the national average in every category. In addition, on average scale
scores, our Hispanic students in eighth grade beat those in every school
district that participated in the National Assessment of Educational
Progress.”
◦ http://www.houstonisd.org/HISDConnectEnglish/Images/PDF/HISD200
9AnnualReport.pdf

“Lessons learned” from the Center for Educator
Compensation Reform:
◦ Communication is essential. It is important to educate teachers
about value added analysis. The EVAAS formulae are
proprietary and teachers may never feel the system is
sufficiently transparent.
◦ Fairness must balance complexity. The system became more
complex to address fairness, which made it more difficult for
teachers to understand.
◦ Explicit Goals should guide performance pay and form part of
a lager effort to improve teacher quality.


The Center is a public conversion charter school in the
Los Angeles Unified School District.
“Peer Assistance and Review:”
◦ This is an evaluation based teacher compensation program
using 3 sets of reviews. All 3 reviews take place 3 times per
year:
 Self-reflection; teaches use state establish standards to review their
own performance.
 Peer review by another teacher or colleague from another building
using the same state established standards.
 Instructional coordinator conducts third review, visits classroom
and meets with teacher on an ongoing basis to discuss strategies
and performance.

Evaluation scores (based on a 4 point scale from
Charlotte Danielson’s Framework for Teaching) are
averaged to determine the level of compensation:
◦ Scoring 2.5 or higher in Level 1 skills (math, literacy, language
arts, special education, classroom management, lesson
planning) get $4,300 bonus.
◦ Scoring 3.0 or higher in Level 2 skills (social studies, science,
art, English Language Learners, physical education) get $5,700
bonus.
◦ Teachers who are fully credentialed and average 3.5 or higher
in all areas receive a $4,500 bonus.

Other bonuses:
◦ Teachers can earn an additional $2000 per year for student
attendance, parent involvement, discipline and teamwork.
◦ Teachers and administrators in a school making the Academic
Performance Index receive an additional $2000 per year.
◦ Teachers in leadership positions (committees, chairs, peer
reviewers, mentors, faculty representatives) can receive
additional pay.
◦ Teachers who sponsor after school activities can receive
additional pay.

Findings from the Consortium for Policy Research
(CPRE) in Education, WCER-UW:
◦ Using value-added analysis, CPRE found a positive correlation
between teacher evaluation scores and student achievement.
◦ Using staff surveys, CPRE tracked teacher attitudes regarding
the compensation system:
 The bonus program was generally accepted by teachers.
 There were strong concerns about the evaluation process.
 A majority of teachers thought the knowledge and skills
assessment portion of the evaluation was unfair, but more than
80% said they made an effort to develop the knowledge and skills
rewarded by the pay plan. Surveys in subsequent years showed an
increase in acceptance.

Lessons learned from the CPRE report:
 Expect changes, but don’t change too much or too often.
 Encourage involvement of representative people in designing the
system, but recognize the need for a “change champion” at times.
 Even in a collegial setting, expect some “fallout” from changes for
which there is no objective way to determine what’s “best” or
“fair.”
 Communication is essential.
 Transition details from one pay system to another are important;
minimizing risk to veterans while meeting the goals of a new
program can be a delicate balance to reach.
 http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/112
ProComp (Denver)
http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=1127
School-based performance pay
(Georgia)
http://cecr.ed.gov/guides/summaries/GeorgiaCaseSummary.pdf
Performance pay (Houston)
http://cecr.ed.gov/guides/summaries/HoustonCaseSumm
ary.pdf
Peer assistance & review (Vaughn
Next Century Learning Center)
http://cecr.ed.gov/initiatives/maps/pdfs/CECR_CA_San
Fernando.pdf
TAP (“Teacher Advancement
Program”) (Chicago, etc.)
http://tapsystem.org/action/action.taf?
page=faq


All systems have a base salary schedule and an
opportunity for teachers to earn more.
Additional pay is sometimes a bonus and sometimes a
permanent addition to salary.

Addition pay plans use some combination of the
following measures of teacher performance:
◦ Teacher evaluation.
◦ Test scores. Sometimes raw test scores were used, more often
value-added analysis was used.
◦ Teacher set objectives designed collaboratively with other
teachers and administrators.
◦ Professional development, degrees, National Board
Certification.
◦ Teacher demonstration of knowledge and skills in subject area
(usually measured through evaluation).

Addition pay plans use some combination of the
following measures of teacher performance
(continued):
◦ Teachers are rewarded for taking a leadership role as an
evaluator, mentor or master teacher.
◦ Other objective indicators such as student attendance and
parent participation.
◦ Market factors:
 Willingness to teacher in difficult schools.
 Possession of certifications in short supply and high demand.

Evaluation based systems are difficult to implement
and are expensive:
◦ Principals and teachers need training in evaluation tools.
◦ Teachers may have difficulty understanding and accepting
validity of new evaluation system.
◦ Evaluations are time consuming and are now not done every
year.
◦ Peer evaluations are difficult because of Wisconsin’s collective
bargaining law and because of union resistance.



Teacher designed objectives will tend to reward
teachers for what they are already doing well.
Most plans can identify effective teachers, but it is not
clear that any motivate teachers to become more
effective.
Pay for professional development, advanced degrees
and National Board Certification not show to improve
student achievement.

Transitions are difficult.
◦ Veteran teachers are typically the most resistant to the new pay
systems.
◦ Many systems are voluntary, with teachers opting into the
system.
◦ The Vaughn Next Century Learning Center used its evaluation
model on all teachers, but the performance pay plan is
voluntary. This built teacher trust in the system as teachers
could determine what they would have received had they
agreed to be paid under the performance pay plan.
◦ Communication with staff is critical.

Unintended consequences:
◦ Public Records:
 Teacher compensation is a public record.
 Parents will likely demand that their children be placed with the
high performing teachers.
 How does the District make classroom assignment decisions in
this environment?

Unintended consequences:
◦ Cheating:
 University of Chicago Study: Estimated that serious cases of
teacher or administrator cheating on standardized tests occur in a
minimum of 4-5 percent of elementary school classrooms
annually. Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and
Predictors of Teacher Cheating, Jacob, Brian and Levitt, Steven,
2003.
http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/JacobLevitt2003.pdf

Unintended consequences:
◦ Cheating:
 “An investigation into Atlanta’s public school system has
uncovered evidence that teachers and principals have been secretly
erasing and correcting answers on students’ tests for as long as a
decade. A state investigation found that 178 educators at 44 of the
district’s 56 schools engaged in cheating. The report is a huge
blow to an urban school district that for years was hailed as one of
the country’s most successful due to increased student
performance.”
 http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/07/06/massive-teachercheating-scandal-uncovered-in-atlanta/
 http://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta/investigation-into-aps-cheating1001375.html

Unintended consequences:
◦ Cheating:
 California teachers from 23 schools in 21 districts have been
accused by the state of cheating to improve standardized test
scores, lesser misconduct or mistakes on standardized achievement
tests.
 http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/07/local/la-me-teachercheating-20111107

Unintended consequences:
◦ Cheating:
 A USA Today investigative story in March 2011 identified 1610
instances of gains is a classroom grades’ test score that were 3 or
more standard deviations above the average statewide gain on
those tests – in other words, ahead of 99.9% of other classrooms.
 Gains of 5, 6 or 7 standard deviations were found in dozens of
instances.
 A gain of 3 or more standard deviations suggests the possibility of
cheating, particularly if that class has a significant drop off in
performance in the next year.
 http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2011-03-06-schooltesting_N.htm
 The
Public
◦ 43rd annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of
the Public’s attitudes toward the Public
Schools – September 2011
http://www.pdkintl.org/poll/docs/pdkpoll43_2
011.pdf
 The
Public – Gallup Poll Continued
◦ How important do you think each of the
following factors should be in determining a
public school teacher’s salary:
 Level of academic degree earned,
 Years of teaching experience,
 Teacher’s students receive on standardized
tests,
 Evaluations conducted by the principal

Does the Public’s viewpoint change on these
criteria if they are applied toward staff
reductions rather than compensation?
◦ The Gallup poll on the following page demonstrates
a change in public perception based upon the context
in which student test scores are used.
 District’s
goals in implementing system
◦ Fiscal Responsibility
◦ Improve student achievement
◦ Retain quality staff
◦ Recruit quality staff

Will the alternative compensation system
achieve the District’s desired results? Recent
Research Findings:
◦ RAND Corp. Study Released: July 2011
◦ School District Focus: New York City
◦ Findings: Bonuses had no positive effect on student, teacher,
or school performance.
◦ Suggestions: Improve teacher buy-in and perceived value of
bonuses.
◦ Source:
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/09/16/04pay_ep.h31.html?tkn=OVZFse
Kwi3G8Is9og%2Folw6qHQHel8%2BeZe63x&intc=es

Will the alternative compensation system
achieve the District’s desired results? Recent
Research Findings:
◦
◦
◦
◦
National Center on Performance Incentives Report
Released: September 2010
School District Focus: Nashville, Tenn.
Findings: No impact on student achievement for 6th to 8th
graders, minimal impact on 5th graders.
◦ Source:
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/09/16/04pay_ep.h31.html?tkn=OVZFse
Kwi3G8Is9og%2Folw6qHQHel8%2BeZe63x&intc=es

Will the alternative compensation system
achieve the District’s desired results? Recent
Research Findings:
◦ Mathematical Policy Research Released: May
2010
◦ School District Focus: Chicago
◦ Findings: No improvement on student math and
reading scores; no effect on teacher retention.
◦ Source:
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/09/16/04pay_ep.h31.html?tkn=OVZFse
Kwi3G8Is9og%2Folw6qHQHel8%2BeZe63x&intc=es
 How
do you assess present and future
costs?
◦ Costing
◦ Actuarial Assessment
 How do you split a potentially fixed pie?
 Costs of Additional Duties?
◦ Peer Coach
◦ Peer Review team
 Financial
Impact in other States
◦ Race to the Top Funds
◦ Some of the largest programs were dismantled
this summer due to cost in Texas and New
York City
 Source:
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/09/16/04pay_ep.h3
1.html?tkn=OVZFseKwi3G8Is9og%2Folw6qHQHel8%2Be
Ze63x&intc=es
 Relationship
to Wisconsin Act 10
◦ Requirement to negotiate over total base
wages.
◦ Prohibition on negotiating over other items –
steps, lanes, performance, merit, additional
duties, etc.
◦ Resources allocated to Act 10 bargaining
requirements are not available for alternative
compensation.
 Relationship
to Wis. Stats. 118.21 and
118.22, i.e. teacher contract statute and
teacher renewal of contracts statute.
◦ Wis. Stats. 118.21 requires that the teacher’s
salary be listed on the individual contract.
◦ Can salary be reduced without going through
the nonrenewal process under Wis. Stats.
118.22?

How will the compensation system be
structured in order to minimize exposure to the
following:
◦ Age discrimination in employment claims;
◦ Gender/sex discrimination in employment
claims; and
◦ Other prohibited bases of discrimination
under state and federal law








Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act
Equal Pay Act
Section 1981
Section 1983
Americans with Disabilities Act
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Retaliation

Equal Pay Act
◦ The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from discriminating
against both male and female employees on the basis of sex
by paying different rates ". . . for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions . . . ." (29 U.S.C. 206(d))
◦ Exceptions exist where the difference is due to a bona fide
seniority system, merit system, a system which measures
compensation by quantity or quality of production or a
differential based on a factor other than sex. The law is
enforced by the EEOC.

Property Interest in Merit Pay
◦ Swartz v. Scruton et al 964 F.2d 607(7th Cir. 1992)
 Ball State University Professor sues the University
over the Department of Anthropology challenging
the department’s failed to adhere to a previously
outlined method of calculating merit pay and
allegedly awarded him a lesser merit pay increase
instead.

Property Interest in Merit Pay
◦ Swartz v. Scruton et al 964 F.2d 607(7th Cir. 1992)
 Court held that Swartz did not enjoy, by virtue of a
contract, rule or understanding, a legitimate claim
of entitlement to a merit pay increase per se.

Property Interest in Merit Pay
◦ Swartz v. Scruton et al 964 F.2d 607(7th Cir. 1992)
 While Swartz may have an expectation of a merit
pay increase, he has no property right, contractual
or otherwise, to a specific amount of a merit pay
increase because his merit pay is based on multiple
layers of contingency.4 Reed v. Village of
Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir.1983)
("property is what is securely and durably yours
under state ... law, as distinct from what you hold
subject to so many conditions as to make your
interest meager, transitory or uncertain.”)

Property Interest in Merit Pay
◦ Kanter v. Community Consolidated School 65 and the Board
of Education of School District 65 [Northern District of
Illinois 558 F. Supp. 890 (1982)]
 Kanter alleges a denial of her procedural due process rights in her
claims regarding the establishment of written standards defining
"meritorious achievement" and defendants' failure to give written
reasons for denial of track movement.
 Plaintiff, however, has failed to allege a denial of a liberty2 or property
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and without alleging
such an interest, she is not entitled [ 558 F.Supp. 892 ]to procedural due
process. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,408 U.S. 564, 569,
92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

Property Interest in Merit Pay
◦ Kanter v. Community Consolidated School 65 and the Board
of Education of School District 65 [Northern District of
Illinois 558 F. Supp. 890 (1982)]
 Kanter alleges a denial of her procedural due process rights in her
claims regarding the establishment of written standards defining
"meritorious achievement" and defendants' failure to give written
reasons for denial of track movement.
 Plaintiff, however, has failed to allege a denial of a liberty2 or property
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and without alleging
such an interest, she is not entitled [ 558 F.Supp. 892 ]to procedural due
process. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,408 U.S. 564, 569,
92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

Property Interest in Merit Pay
◦ Kanter v. Community Consolidated School 65 and the Board
of Education of School District 65 [Northern District of
Illinois 558 F. Supp. 890 (1982)]).
◦ In the case at bar, plaintiff Kanter has failed to establish a
property or liberty interest in a track movement merit pay
increase. The denial of this increase has not affected her
property right in continued employment with the school
system. Therefore, the complaint does not adequately state a
violation of substantive due process, [ 558 F.Supp. 893 ] and
so cannot survive the defendants' motion to dismiss.

If the Compensation System uses Student Data
◦ Student Progress
 Value added models
 Individual student tracking [measurements within
a specified period of time]
 Implications
 118.30 (2) (c) The results of examinations
administered under this section or under 20 USC
6311 (b) (3) to pupils enrolled in public schools,
including charter schools, may not be used as the
sole reason to discharge, suspend, or formally
discipline a teacher or as the sole reason for the
nonrenewal of a teacher's contract.
How do you measure academic achievement if
no standardized exam exists in an area?
 Whether all staff—or only teachers—should
have access to bonuses or additional
compensation?
 Whether some teachers should have access to
more additional compensation than others?

 How
will compensation system and goals
be created?
◦ By board and administration alone,
◦ Collaboratively with staff and other interested
parties)
 Will
goal attainment be based on
individual, group, or a multitude of
performance factors?
 Which
staff members will serve as
evaluators (administrators, peers, mentors,
outside evaluators, etc.)
 How much is the District willing to invest
in training evaluators and in effectuating
other parts of alternative compensation
system?
 How
will the transition be made (e.g.,
what to do with divergent base salaries
that probably exist)?
 How does the system emphasize student
assessment and simultaneously safeguard
against potential misapplication of the
assessment process?
 Does
the District have sufficient
administrative staff to effectuate a change
in compensation systems?
 Do you act now or wait until research
gives more definitive direction on what
works?
 How
soon after implementation will the
board and administration review the
system for possible revisions?
 How will the success or failure of the
system be measured?
Academic Attainment
 Annual Performance Reviews
 Supply and Demand Differentiation
 Recruitment Incentives
 Retention Incentives
 Position Differentiation
 Skill Acquisition
 School Based Student Achievement Awards

 Academic Attainment
◦ Education in specific content areas
◦ Advanced degrees
◦ National Board
◦ Master Teacher
Performance Reviews –
Principal’s evaluation of teacher
 Annual
◦ Funding: District retains discretion as to
whether to provide or not based upon
availability of funds.
◦ May include student achievement data
 Locally Assessed
 Statewide assessed
Performance Reviews –
Principal’s evaluation of teacher
 Annual
◦ May include other objective criteria
 Parental contacts
 Attendance at required school functions
 Curriculum updates
Performance Reviews –
Principal’s evaluation of teacher
 Annual
◦ May include subjective criteria linked to the
District’s
 Team dynamics interaction with peers
◦ Denial of annual payment (see earlier
discussion on court cases on denial of
increment)