Marking to Market: Panacea or Pandora’s Box? Guillaume Plantin Haresh Sapra Hyun Song Shin Case for Marking to Market • Market price reflects current terms of trade between willing parties • Market price gives better indication of current risk profile – Market discipline – Informs investors, better allocation of resources What about volatility? • If the fundamentals are volatile, then so be it. • Market price is volatile… • …but it simply reflects the volatility of the fundamentals Theory of the Second Best • When there is more than one imperfection in an economy, removing one of them need not improve welfare. • In the presence of other imperfections (illiquidity, agency problems, etc.) marking to market need not be welfare improving. “Artificial” Volatility • Dual role of market price – Reflection of fundamentals – Influences actions Actions Prices • Reliance on market prices distorts market prices Three Notions of Value • Fundamental value v • Book value v0 • Market price p v s Fundamental Value v • Not contractible • But firm has good information on v – v is common knowledge (base case) – v is observed with negligible noise (main model) Book Value v0 • Book value determined by past decisions (exogenous to model) • Common knowledge at time of decision • Contractible Market Price • Market price p v s • Lower ability to extract value ( 1) • Limited absorption capacity ( 0) Interpretation of Strategic Effects • Marketable assets and possibility of “liquidity holes” • Hedging credit risk against spike in spreads – Loan sales – Credit derivatives – “reach for yield” Horizon Mismatch • Manager chooses at date 0 – Sell asset (buy default protection) – Hold asset • Aims to maximize date 1 accounting value – depends on accounting regime in place • But asset may be long-lived… Duration of Asset Sell or hold Date 0 probability 1– d cash flow v Date 1 probability d cash flow v Date 2 Date 1 Accounting Values (as seen from decision date) Hold historical cost mark to market 1 d v dv0 1 d v dp Sell v s 2 Historical Cost Regime • Sell when v is high relative to v0 – accounting value is excessively conservative • Sell when others hold – actions are strategic substitutes – self-stabilising Mark to Market Regime • Sell when v is low relative to v0 – market price is excessively volatile • Sell when others sell – actions are strategic complements – multiple equilibria when v is common knowledge Global Game • Firm observes v with small noise • Take limit as noise tends to zero • Unique equilibrium – Fundamental uncertainty dissipates but strategic uncertainty remains Shape of Strategic Uncertainty in Global Game • Conditional on being at switching point, what is the density of s? • Answer: In the limit as noise tends to zero, s is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] – Morris and Shin (2003) • “I am the marginal player. What is the probability that proportion z or less have signal lower than me?” – (i.e.) What is F(z), the value of the cumulative distribution function of s evaluated at z? z x x* v* F(z) v x* v* • Answer: F(z) = z • Cumulative distribution function is the identity function • So, density over s is uniform Historical Cost Regime • Sell when v is high • Hold when v is low • Interior solution for intermediate v Mark to Market Regime • Hold when v is high • Sell when v is low • Unique equilibrium in switching strategies Equilibrium Date 1 Price Equilibrium Loss Effect of Duration Effect of Illiquidity Marking to Market is Superior when Asset is • Liquid – minimise feedback through strategic complementarity • Junior – limited downside potential, large upside (e.g. stocks) • Short-lived – minimise effect of horizon mismatch Damage from Marking to Market is Large when Asset is • Illiquid – Stronger strategic effects • Senior – limited upwide, large downside (e.g. loans, insurance liabilities) • Long-lived – Greater horizon mismatch Winners and Losers • Political Economy of IAS 39 • Banks and insurance companies have been the most vocal critics. • Institutional investors, securities regulators and auditors have been the most vocal supporters.