1NC
1NC K
just like exploitative civil rights lawyers, the aff’s professionalized
approach disembodies the possibility of an anti-racist legalization
movement—we should keep the center of gravity out of Washington and in
localized spaces
Alexander 10, Associate Professor of Law
[2010, Michelle Alexander, is an associate professor of law at Ohio State University, a civil
rights advocate and a writer. “New Jim Crow : Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness” ProQuest ebrary, pp. 213-215]
civil rights history may be helpful here. Civil rights advocacy has not always looked the
way it does today. Throughout most of our nation’s history— from the days of the abolitionist movement
through the Civil Rights Movement— racial justice advocacy has generally revolved around
grassroots organizing and the strategic mobilization of public opinion . In recent years, however, a
bit of mythology has sprung up regarding the centrality of litigation to racial justice
struggles. The success of the brilliant legal crusade that led to Brown v. Board of Education has
created a widespread perception that civil rights lawyers are the most important players in
racial justice advocacy. This image was enhanced following the passage of the Civil Rights Acts
of 1965, when civil rights lawyers became embroiled in highly visible and controversial efforts to end hiring
discrimination, create affirmative action plans, and enforce school desegregation orders. As public attention
shifted from the streets to the courtroom, the extraordinary grassroots movement that
made civil rights legislation possible faded from public view. The lawyers took over. With all
deliberate speed, civil rights organizations became “professionalized” and increasingly
disconnected from the communities they claimed to represent. Legal scholar and former
NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyer Derrick Bell was among the first to critique this phenomenon ,
arguing in a 1976 Yale Law Journal article that civil rights lawyers were pursuing their own
agendas in school desegregation cases even when they conflicted with their clients’ expressed desires.
A bit of
3 Two decades later, former NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyer and current Harvard Law School professor Lani
Guinier published a memoir in which she acknowledged that, “by
the early 1990s, [civil rights] litigators like
had become like the Washington insiders we were so suspicious of. . . . We reflexively
distanced ourselves from the very people on whose behalf we brought the cases in
the first place.” 4 This shift, she noted, had profound consequences for the future of racial
justice advocacy; in fact, it was debilitating to the movement. Instead of a moral
crusade, the movement became an almost purely legal crusade. Civil rights
advocates pursued their own agendas as unelected representatives of communities defined
by race and displayed considerable skill navigating courtrooms and halls of power across
me
America. The law became what the lawyers and lobbyists said it was, with little or no input from the people whose
we channeled a passion for change into legal
negotiations and lawsuits. We defined the issues in terms of developing legal doctrine and
establishing legal precedent; our clients became important, but secondary, players in a
formal arena that required lawyers to translate lay claims into technical speech . We then
disembodied plaintiffs’ claims in judicially manageable or judicially enforceable terms,
unenforceable without more lawyers. Simultaneously, the movement’s center of gravity shifted to
Washington, D.C. As lawyers and national pundits became more prominent than clients and
citizens, we isolated ourselves from the people who were our anchor and on whose
behalf we had labored. We not only left people behind; we also lost touch with the moral
force at the heart of the movement itself. 5 Not surprisingly, as civil rights advocates
converted a grassroots movement into a legal campaign, and as civil rights leaders became
fate hung in the balance. Guinier continued: In charge,
political insiders, many civil rights organizations became top-heavy with lawyers. This
development enhanced their ability to wage legal battles but impeded their ability to
acknowledge or respond to the emergence of a new caste system. Lawyers have a
tendency to identify and concentrate on problems they know how to solve— i.e., problems that
can be solved through litigation. The mass incarceration of people of color is not that kind
of problem. Widespread preoccupation with litigation, however, is not the only— or even the main— reason
civil rights groups have shied away from challenging the new caste system. Challenging mass incarceration
requires something civil rights advocates have long been reluctant to do : advocacy on
behalf of criminals. Even at the height of Jim Crow segregation— when black men were more
likely to be lynched than to receive a fair trial in the South— NAACP lawyers were reluctant to
advocate on behalf of blacks accused of crimes unless the lawyers were convinced of
the men’s innocence. 6 The major exception was anti– death penalty advocacy. Over the years, civil rights
lawyers have made heroic efforts to save the lives of condemned criminals. But outside of the death penalty arena,
civil rights advocates have long been reluctant to leap to the defense of accused criminals.
Advocates have found they are most successful when they draw attention to certain types of
black people (those who are easily understood by mainstream whites as “good” and “respectable”) and tell
certain types of stories about them. Since the days when abolitionists struggled to eradicate slavery,
racial justice advocates have gone to great lengths to identify black people who defy racial
stereotypes, and they have exercised considerable message discipline, telling only those
stories of racial injustice that will evoke sympathy among whites.
Racism outweighs – the world has already ended for people of color
OMOLADE 84 City College Center for Worker Education in New York City
Barbara-a historian of black women for the past twenty years and an organizer in both the women’s and civil
rights/black power movements; Women of Color and the Nuclear Holocaust; WOMEN’S STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol.
12., No. 2, Teaching about Peace, War, and Women in the Military, Summer, p. 12;
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4004305
In April, 1979, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency released a report on
the effects of nuclear war that concludes that, in a general nuclear war between the
United States and the Soviet Union, 25 to 100 million people would be killed. This is
approximately the same number of African people who died between 1492 and 1890
as a result of the African slave trade to the New World. The same federal report also
comments on the destruction of urban housing that would cause massive shortages
after a nuclear war, as well as on the crops that would be lost, causing massive food
shortages. Of course, for people of color the world over, starvation is already a
common problem, when, for example, a nation’s crops are grown for export rather
than to feed its own people. And the housing of people of color throughout the world’s
urban areas is already blighted and inhumane: families live in shacks, shanty towns,
or on the streets; even in the urban areas of North America, the poor may live without
heat or running water. For people of color, the world as we knew it ended centuries
ago. Our world, with its own languages, customs and ways, ended. And we are only
now beginning to see with increasing clarity that our task is to reclaim that world,
struggle for it, and rebuild it in our own image. The “death culture” we live in has
convinced many to be more concerned with death than with life, more willing to
demonstrate for “survival at any cost” than to struggle for liberty and peace with
dignity. Nuclear disarmament becomes a safe issue when it is not linked to the daily
and historic issues of racism, to the ways in which people of color continue to be
murdered. Acts of war, nuclear holocausts, and genocide have already been declared
on our jobs, our housing, our schools, our families, and our lands. As women of color,
we are warriors, not pacifists. We must fight as a people on all fronts, or we will
continue to die as a people. We have fought in people’s wars in China, in Cuba, in
Guinea-Bissau, and in such struggles as the civil rights movement, the women’s
movement, and in countless daily encounters with landlords, welfare departments,
and schools. These struggles are not abstractions, but the only means by which we
have gained the ability to eat and to provide for the future of our people. We wonder
who will lead the battle for nuclear disarmament with the vigor and clarity that women
of color have learned from participating in other struggles. Who will make the political
links among racism, sexism, imperialism, cultural integrity, and nuclear arsenals and
housing? Who will stand up?
We advocate an abolitionist praxis that works to establish medium term
steps towards ending the carceral state—radical political imagination is
key
Ben-Moshe 11, Liat Ben-Moshe Syracuse University, Genealogies of Resistance to
Incarceration: Abolition Politics within Deinstitutionalization and Anti-Prison Activism in the
U.S., http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=soc_etd
Abolition requires a vision for the future but also taking immediate steps on the way to that
vision, in the form of non-reformist reforms, as discussed in chapter 5. The goal is to improve
present circumstances but without compromising the larger goal of abolition. This is the reason
why Ruthie Gilmore comments46 that prison abolition work means “being a theoretical puritan but a method slut”
and building coalitions towards the goal of creating a social system that wi;; not necessitate prisons and in which
imprisonment would be inconceivable. This is the idea of becoming, instead of being, or of potentiality, as opposed
potentiality differs from possibility, which is something that
might happen in the future; while potentiality represents the imminent, that which is
present but not fully manifested yet at present time. This characterization of abolition
could also been seen in the case of deinstitutionalization activists who insisted on a non-carceral
and inclusive world way before alternatives to institutionalization were in place in all locales (or
in any for that matter). The goal was to close down institutions and refute the institutional and
segregationist mindset in the future while the alternatives were not ready-made and indeed
could not have been, as such a framework did not exist at that time. Queer theorist José Esteban Muñoz
suggests that “we must strive, in the face of the here and now totalizing rendering of reality, to
think and feel a then and there….We must dream and enact new and better pleasures,
other ways of being in the world, and ultimately new worlds” (2009: 1). It is my
contention that this vision, although discussed here in relation to queer futurity, is applicable to radical antiinstitutionalization stances, disability activism in the form of disability justice and prison abolition. According to
Gordon (2004), and following the work of cultural worker Toni Cade Bambara, abolition efforts must take
place while we are still enslaved. She states “abolition time is a type of revolutionary time. But
rather than stop the world, as if in an absolute break between now and then, it is a
daily part of it” (Gordon 2004: 198). Emancipation is ongoing work and cannot wait until the
time is ripe for it. Sociologist and life-long anarchist activist Howard Ehrlich47 believes that radicals, as
to possibility. For Agamben (1999),
opposed to reformers or revolutionaries, are almost by definition not “of the society.” Most are politically engaged
and experiment with alternative ways of being and thinking, in terms of antiauthoritarianism, anti-racism, anti-
The radical life is living today the way you would like the future society to be .
“the essential function of utopia is a critique of what is
present. If we had not already gone beyond the barriers, we could not even perceive them
as barriers” (in Muñoz 2009: 37). This is reminiscent of Thomas Mathiesen‟s work, which theorized
abolition as “the unfinished,” always a work in progress. Mathiesen‟s work has often been
capitalism etc.
Similarly, Ernest Bloch exclaims that
criticized for lacking any concrete suggestions for penology or even activism, thus remaining abstract and detached
reclaiming utopia as a liberatory,
as opposed to derogatory, position would conceive this work as helpful in
from specific activist and policy stances (Saleh-Hanna 2000). But
fashioning new ways of envisioning the world and opening up opportunities that
are not closed off by readymade prescriptions. For Muñoz, “the here and now is a prison
house” (2009: 1). The connection to prison abolition and the more radical factions of the antiinstitutional stance are conjured up by this affirmation from Muñoz , and not simply because he
brings up prison as the ultimate metaphor for stagnation and lack of imagination. Muñoz further discusses Ernst
abstract utopias, explaining that the latter are useful only as
“they pose a critique function that fuels a critical potentially transformative political
imagination” (2009: 3). Concrete utopias, on the other hand, represent collective hopes,
and are the blocks upon which hope can exist. As Bloch writes “hope‟s methodology… dwells in
the region of the not-yet” (quoted in Muñoz 2009: 3). The “not-yet,” as Bloch refers to it, seems akin
to Mathiesen‟s formulation of the “unfinished” in relation to the work of the abolitionist . Hope
is indeed a fundamental requirement for long-time activists. One cannot do any meaningful work for
social change without some amalgamation of hope, pragmatism and a horizon of possibility.
Bloch‟s distinction between concrete and
But, as Muñoz reminds us, “this fear of both hope and utopia, as affective structures and approaches to challenges
within the social, has been prone to disappointment” (2009: 9). Utopia and hope are hard to keep up, and harder
to sustain as critical frameworks and affective economies when alternatives such as pessimism, inertia, resignation,
There are also material and symbolic consequences of
taking up utopia as a guiding force for change. When one is called “utopian” this usually connotes
and even disappointment itself are abounding.
something degrading, a naïveté of sorts, that makes one look foolish or dangerous, depending on the context (as
we have seen in the charges thrown at both deinstitutionalization activists and prison abolitionists, as described in
the previous chapter). In any case,
utopia is not often a feature that makes one be taken seriously.
1NC DA
Cybersecurity’s the lone area of compromise—deal coming now
Swarts, 2-2—Phil, Washington Times, “Obama budget dedicates $14B to cybersecurity,”
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/2/obama-budget-dedicates-14b-tocybersecurity/ --BR
The Obama administration aims to ramp up the federal government’s cybersecurity arsenal,
requesting nearly $14 billion in its 2016 budget proposal — about $1 billion more than in
previous budgets — to combat what many have come to view as an increasingly significant
weakness in American security and infrastructure. The increased funding comes after a
series of high profile attacks, which has drawn national attention to the issue, including a
massive breach at Sony Pictures which the government said was carried out by North
Korea. Likewise in January, the Twitter and YouTube accounts for the U.S. military’s
CENTCOM — which oversees operations in Iraq and Afghanistan — was hacked by
supporters of the Islamic State, a terrorist group often known by the acronyms ISIS or ISIL.
“Cyber threats targeting the private sector, critical infrastructure and the federal
government demonstrate that no sector, network or system is immune to infiltration by
those seeking to steal commercial or government secrets,” the White House said in a
statement. Though the president’s budget proposal was met with widespread criticism by
GOP lawmakers on Capitol Hill Monday, cybersecurity is likely going to be one area where
both parties find common ground. Much of the requested money will be split across
major government agencies that focus on cybersecurity, including the Departments of
Homeland Security, Justice and Defense.
The plan’s a political landmine and a waste of political capital
Sullivan, 12—Andrew, one of the most widely syndicated columnists in the USA, “The
Silent Stoner President, Ctd,” The Dish, http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2012/11/27/thesilent-stoner-president-ctd/ -- BR
That old footage you showed of Obama speaking in favor of decriminalization in 2004 reminded me of one
of the weirdest Obama videos I've ever seen. It's from the summer of 2007 when he was running
for president and in it someone on a rope line in New Hampshire asked what his stance was regarding
medical marijuana. You can tell right away from Obama's body language that he really
doesn't want to answer this question, presumably because he thinks it's a political
landmine. Then the oddest thing happens, and I had to watch it a few times to make sure
that I was seeing what I thought I was seeing. You can see Reggie Love in the background
apparently listening to an earpiece, which I'm assuming must be radioed directly to
somebody like Gibbs or Axelrod or some other adviser. Reggie hears something in the
earpiece and suddenly has to get Obama's attention in the middle of this guy's question and
not-so-smoothly transfers the ear piece to Obama, who then pauses, and after a few beats
apparently parrots back the stock answer coming to him in his ear. Obama's response was that
the Feds cracking down on state medical marijuana operations wouldn't be a worthwhile use of federal resources.
it was one of those rare times where
you see the politically calculated side rather than the casual authenticity that usually comes
across in him, and the sense I got was that whatever Obama's actual position on marijuana
is, he's not about to let that be the issue that he wastes political capital on. That's not going
But never mind the answer, which didn't seem like his own. To me,
to be the issue that prevents him from becoming president and fixing everything else that he cares more about.
As a big Obama supporter back in the summer of '07, I wouldn't have dared point out this video before Obama won
the Democratic primaries, the election in 2008, or the recent reelection, but now that we're on the other side of all
three, I couldn't help but pass along the footage. Above is some footage closer to the real Obama.
Obama has sufficient PC and momentum now—his push is vital to intelsharing
Sorcher, 1-15—Sara, “Sony hack gives Obama political capital to push cybersecurity
agenda (+video),” Christian Science Monitor,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2015/0114/Sony-hack-gives-Obama-politicalcapital-to-push-cybersecurity-agenda-video --BR
“Sony hack gives Obama political capital to push cybersecurity agenda (+video)” Edward
Snowden may have doomed the prospects for cybersecurity legislation last Congress – but
North Korea may revive them in this one. After the leaks from the former National Security
Agency contractor, privacy advocates staunchly opposed cybersecurity bills that share
information with the government, amid fears they would increase the spy agency’s power to
access and share even more private information from citizens. The information-sharing bills
stalled. Yet President Obama’s new push this week has so far been warmly received on
Capitol Hill – and on both sides of the aisle. Obama’s proposals, one week before his State
of the Union address, come after the destructive hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment, for
which the government has publicly blamed and sanctioned North Korea. It’s also on the
heels of a maelstrom of other high-profile data breaches last – including on Home Depot
and JP Morgan Chase & Co. – and this week’s brief takeover of the US military’s Central
Command social media accounts by apparent Islamic State supporters. All told, it may be
enough momentum to break the logjam and give members of Congress political cover to
come together this session to support a controversial part of Obama’s cybersecurity
agenda: To give companies immunity from lawsuits if they share certain information about
cyber threats with the government with the Department of Homeland Security [DHS]. An
information-sharing bill “has to pass this Congress,” Senate Intelligence Committee
Chairman Richard Burr, a North Carolina Republican, told Passcode. “It helps any time the
president supports something.” Moving a cybersecurity information-sharing bill “has
never been easy,” he acknowledged, “but we’re committed to go extremely quickly.” The
Sony hack was a wake-up call on Capitol Hill, several lawmakers said. The attackers not
only stole private information, they destroyed company data and computer hardware, and
they also coerced Sony into altering its plans to release "The Interview," the comedy about
the assassination of the North Korean leaders. All of this may go a long way to persuade
lawmakers that mandating information sharing about cybersecurity threats will ultimately
help defend private companies. “I’m glad [Obama] is pushing to address cyber legislation,”
said Republican Sen. Kelly Ayotte of New Hampshire. “We’ve stalled in the past, and if you
look at what happened with the Sony attack, I think we can’t afford to stall anymore. I
think his timing is right on here… . I haven’t talked to anyone in Congress who has said,
‘This shouldn’t be a priority for us.’” Sen. Angus King, an independent on the Intelligence
Committee, agreed. “I think everybody realizes the urgency.” Maryland Democratic Rep.
Dutch Ruppersberger, who already reintroduced his version of information-sharing
legislation this session, said in a statement that, “President Obama and I agree we can no
longer afford to play political games while rogue hackers, terrorists, organized criminals and
even state actors sharpen their cyber skills.” However, just because “everybody’s on board
with the idea of it” – as Republican Sen. John McCain puts it – doesn’t mean it will be
easy to make progress on this controversial and complicated issue. “I have been to more
meetings on cyber than any other issue in my time in the Senate, and gotten the least
amount of result,” said Senator McCain, who chairs the Armed Services Committee. There
are already divisions emerging this time around. McCain opposes the White House’s
proposal to route cyberthreat information through the Department of Homeland Secu*rity.
He said the National Security Agency should take that role. “I’m glad to see a proposal of
theirs, for a change, and we’ll be glad to work on it – just not rubber stamp it,” said McCain.
Intel-sharing provisions are critical to halting catastrophic cyberattacks
Lev-Ram, 1-21—citing DeWalt, CEO of FireEye, a leader in cyber security, protecting
organizations from advanced malware, zero-day exploits, APTs, and other cyberattacks.
“Does President Obama's bid to bolster cyber security go far enough?” Forbes,
http://fortune.com/2015/01/21/obama-state-union-cybersecurity/?icid=maing-grid7|ie8unsupported-browser|dl31|sec3_lnk3%26pLid%3D602263 –BR
Sharing real-time threat intelligence and indicators of compromise–both between the private
sector and the government and among the private sector–is a critical component of a
pro-active security strategy. The timely sharing of threat intelligence improves detection
and prevention capabilities and provides organizations with the ability to mitigate and
minimize the adverse consequences of a breach. Sharing also provides enhanced
situational awareness for the community at large. FireEye research demonstrates that
over 70% of malware is highly targeted and used only once. To better manage risk
stemming from this continuously evolving threat environment, FireEye recommends that
organizations conduct robust compromise risk assessments, adopt behavioral based tools
and techniques such as detonation chambers, actively monitor their networks for advanced
cyber threats, stand ready to rapidly respond in the event of a breach and share threat
intelligence and lessons learned through active engagement in information sharing
organizations. As a final preventative measure, organization should obtain a cyber insurance
policy to help with catastrophic repercussions of a breach.
Cyber threats outweigh the aff
Thamboo, 14—Visha, citing Richard Clarke, a former White House staffer in charge of
counter-terrorism and cyber-security, “Cyber Security: The world’s greatest threat,” 11-25,
https://blogs.ubc.ca/vishathamboo/2014/11/25/cyber-security-the-worlds-greatest-threat/
-- BR
After land, sea, air and space, warfare had entered the fifth domain: cyberspace.
Cyberspace is arguably the most dangerous of all warfares because of the amount of
damage that can be done, whilst remaining completely immobile and anonymous. In a new
book Richard Clarke, a former White House staffer in charge of counter-terrorism and cybersecurity, envisages a catastrophic breakdown within 15 minutes. Computer bugs bring
down military e-mail systems; oil refineries and pipelines explode; air-traffic-control
systems collapse; freight and metro trains derail; financial data are scrambled; the electrical
grid goes down in the eastern United States; orbiting satellites spin out of control. Society
soon breaks down as food becomes scarce and money runs out. Worst of all, the identity of
the attacker may remain a mystery. Other dangers are coming: weakly governed swathes
of Africa are being connected up to fibre-optic cables, potentially creating new havens for
cyber-criminals and the spread of mobile internet will bring new means of attack. The
internet was designed for convenience and reliability, not security. Yet in wiring together the
globe, it has merged the garden and the wilderness. No passport is required in cyberspace.
And although police are constrained by national borders, criminals roam freely. Enemy
states are no longer on the other side of the ocean, but just behind the firewall. The illintentioned can mask their identity and location, impersonate others and con their way into
the buildings that hold the digitised wealth of the electronic age: money, personal data and
intellectual property. Deterrence in cyber-warfare is more uncertain than, say, in nuclear
strategy: there is no mutually assured destruction, the dividing line between criminality and
war is blurred and identifying attacking computers, let alone the fingers on the keyboards,
is difficult. Retaliation need not be confined to cyberspace; the one system that is certainly
not linked to the public internet is America’s nuclear firing chain. Although for now, cyber
warfare has not spiralled out of control, it is only a matter of time, before cyber warfare
becomes the most prominent type of attack, and the most deadly because of its scope
and anonymity.
1NC CP
The United States should propose amendments to all necessary
international drug control treaties to allow the legalization of marijuana.
The United States should reverse all laws that legalize marijuana. The
United States should halt all efforts to legalize marijuana while
international drug control treaties prohibit the legalization of marijuana. If
marijuana is ever legalized it should be done through federal policy
waivers. The Drug Enforcement Agency should reschedule marihuana into
Schedule V of the CSA.
The amendment passes and results in eventual legalization—inter se
agreements avoid consensus issues
Don 14
[2014, Allison Don is a University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. candidate 2015, “Lighten
Up: Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” 23 Minn. J. Int'l L. 213, Hein
Online]
In light of the newly passed legislation within the United States concerning recreational
marijuana and proposed legislation in the international community, the best means of
aligning the Single Convention with evolving norms is to amend the treaty. n153
Amendments allow for formal changes to be made to a treaty while maintaining the treaty's
existence. n154 This allows for adjustment as "parties' understanding of the issue" n155
change or circumstances surrounding the issue change without requiring the drafting of a
new treaty or termination of an existing one. By amending the Single Convention to allow
for the recreational use of marijuana, the United States and other countries considering
such legislation would be able to continue the legislative process without any
international obligations impeding the progression towards marijuana legalization.
Article 47 within the Single Convention provides instructions for amending the treaty,
stating that "any party may propose an amendment to this Convention." n156 In order to
make such a proposal, the amendment itself and the reasons behind the amendment must
be transferred to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in writing who will then
disseminate the proposed amendment to the other parties of the treaty and the
Commission. At this point, the Commission has the power to decide if a conference should
be held to discuss the proposal or if the parties should simply be asked if they are willing to
accept. n157 If there is no objection within 18 months, the amendment becomes fully
adopted; if there is an objection, the Commission may then choose to hold a conference to
review the proposal. n158 With 153 current parties to the Single Convention, arriving at a
consensus may prove difficult. This does not preclude the option to amend as "amendments
require agreement between treaty parties, but not necessarily between all parties." Once an
[*237] amendment has been proposed and adopted, parties are free to decide if they will
become a party to the amendment. n159 Those who opt not to join the amendment remain
bound by the treaty's original obligations. n160 By proposing an amendment that would
permit the use of marijuana for recreational purposes, those countries who wish to
pursue such legislation would be permitted to do so and those countries who remain
in opposition would be able to remain parties to the original treaty preventing the use of
recreational marijuana. n161 C. Support for Legalization Within the United States from a Policy Standpoint The need for amendment is evident as
numerous countries move towards marijuana legalization. n162 Within the United States, a movement towards federal legalization is desirable for numerous reasons. Particularly,
legalization would increase tax revenues, lower drug use rates while also lowering the rate of international violence. 1. Marijuana is Costing Taxpayers Money The United States has one
of the busiest criminal justice systems in the world, resulting in and estimated 12.2 million arrests in 2012 alone. n163 Of these arrests, 1,552,432 were for drug abuse violations with
almost half for marijuana related crimes. n164 The money spent, on a national level, for this level of [*238] enforcement of marijuana laws alone is up to $ 7.7 billion a year. n165 The
excessive spending for the enforcement of marijuana prohibition is not only costing taxpayers, but it's also taking away from potential tax revenue. "If it were taxed similarly to alcohol
and tobacco, marijuana would provide $ 6.2 billion in additional revenue each year ... ." n166 The potential for generated revenue, coupled with savings gained by no longer having the
necessity for strict enforcement of marijuana prohibition could potentially amount to an "annual budget increase of nearly $ 14 billion." n167 In order to identify where some of these
saving would be coming from, it's important to take a closer look at spending within the federal prison system. There are well over 200,000 inmates incarcerated at the federal level;
51% of those inmates' most serious charge is a drug offense. n168 Depending on the level of security they're housed in, each inmate costs the federal government between $ 21,000
and $ 33,000 a year. This kind of expenditure led to the Obama administration having ""to request $ 6.9 billion for the Bureau of Prisons in fiscal [year] 2013.'" n169 The expensive
reality doesn't stop there, "federal prison costs are expected to rise to 30 percent of the Department of Justice's budget by 2020." n170 The potential savings to not only taxpayers but
also to the [*239] criminal justice system by essentially eliminating the prohibition on marijuana n171 can be better illustrated through comparisons to the Netherlands, where
marijuana has been decriminalized since the 1970s. For instance, in 2009, the United States incarcerated 743 people for every 100,000. In 2010, the Netherlands incarcerated 94
people for every 100,000. n172 While prison populations fluctuate from year to year and are impacted by numerous factors n173, the stark difference in incarceration rates between the
Netherlands and the United States is hard to ignore. On the expense side of things, the Netherlands spends approximately $ 307 per capita on their criminal justice system while the
United States spends approximately $ 552. n174 By adopting federal legislation similar to that of Washington and Colorado, the federal government would be lightening the current load
on the prison system while simultaneously generating revenue. 2. The Status of Marijuana as an Illegal Substance Has No Deterrent Effect Proponents of maintaining marijuana as an
illegal substance claim that social stigmas associated with breaking the law will prevent individuals from experimenting with and using marijuana. n175 However, there is no empirical
evidence to [*240] support this claim. Recent figures show that in the United States, despite marijuana legislation, high school aged children who view smoking marijuana as risky
behavior has steadily declined since the early 90's. n176 Although marijuana laws have been in effect for over 70 years, there is further evidence of increasing acceptance of the
substance with fifty-eight percent of the population believing marijuana should be legal. n177 Marijuana usage among the population as a whole also shows that marijuana laws have no
deterrent effect within the United States. In 2012, 7.6 million people over the age of 12 reported using marijuana 20 or more days a month, up from 4.8 million in 2002. n178 There
has also been a rise in the number of individuals who use marijuana 300 or more days a year from 3.1 million in 2002 to 5.4 million in 2012. n179 These figures continue to rise despite
an increase in marijuana enforcement. Between 1996 and 2006, there were nine million arrests for marijuana violations. Despite these arrests and their alleged deterrent effect, 25
million people used marijuana in 2007. n180 Growing public acceptance of marijuana in the United States is evident beyond the realm of private use. In 1987, Judge Douglas Ginsburg
was nominated for a seat on the United States Supreme Court by then President Ronald Reagan. Nine days after his nomination, Judge Ginsburg withdrew his name after receiving
backlash for his prior marijuana use. n181 Four years later, then President George H. W. Bush nominated Judge Clarence Thomas. When it became public that Judge Thomas had
previously smoked marijuana, President Bush stated that it was not an issue that warranted [*241] disqualification. n182 Shortly after, Senator Bill Clinton admitted to marijuana
experimentation and was later elected as the successor to George H. W. Bush as President of the United States. n183 Public acceptance of marijuana in the United States has become
so widespread that for the last 16 years the public has chosen as its President an admitted prior marijuana user. n184 3. Legalization May Decrease Overall Drug Use There is a great
deal of speculation as to the effects marijuana legalization would have, but the best indication is to look to the Netherlands where marijuana has been decriminalized since 1976. n185
Following the adoption of decriminalization, marijuana use in the Netherlands actually declined and has since stabilized with no tangible increase or decrease in use. n186 More
importantly, by providing an alternative means of obtaining marijuana, the Netherlands has successfully isolated casual marijuana users to the "coffee shops' found throughout the
country ""where it is as absurd to ask for hard drugs as it is at an average butcher's [shop] to ask for a zebra-steak." n187 By preventing exposure to drug dealers [*242] peddling
"hard drugs,' n188 decriminalization successfully decreased the demand for harder drugs, particularly heroin, because users were no longer being introduced to "hard drugs' by the
dealers they previously had to associate with in order to purchase marijuana. n189 4. U.S. Legalization Would Reduce Violence on an International Level The black market for marijuana
in the United States has led to the formation of drug cartels in Mexico. The cartels smuggle marijuana into the United States and the proceeds from the sale are then smuggled back
into Mexico where they account for over sixty percent of the cartels overall revenue. n190 Without any legal avenues for settling disputes among rival cartels, they are ultimately pitted
against each other in a violent fight for control over territory, smuggling routes and cities along the border between the United States and Mexico. n191 The resulting violence has
caused approximately "60,000 drug-related murders since ... 2006." n192 In 2011, Mexico's former President, Vicente Fox, explained that ""the drug consumer in the U.S. yields billions
of dollars, money that goes back to Mexico to bribe police and money that buys guns ... . So when you question yourselves about what is going on in Mexico, it depends very much on
what happens in this nation.'" n193 By not forcing marijuana producers underground, the United States could substantially alleviate the violence in Mexico. n194 [*243] CONCLUSION
. The United States
signaled a potential shift in its perspective by publicly condoning the new legislation.
The United States is not alone; the international community has shown an increased
approval, and in some instances outright support, of recreational marijuana. This
growing international support warrants an amendment to the Single Convention in order to
allow states to legislate recreational marijuana as they see fit without the constraints of
international obligations. Amending the Single Convention would allow the United
States to pursue federal legislation similar to that of Colorado and Washington. By
legalizing marijuana on the federal level, the United States would see positive gains both
domestically and internationally. The United States would stand to gain significant revenue
while simultaneously decreasing its prison population and international violence. Such
potentially significant ramifications warrant an amendment to the Single Convention in order
to permit states to weigh these benefits in their own territories without being held
hostage by an international treaty that's no longer in line with popular opinion.
Colorado and Washington took a leap of faith in approving the use of marijuana for recreational purposes despite conflicting federal law
The counterplan solves the case but avoids the disads – rescheduling
ensures that legalization happens down the line after treaty amendment
and creates domestic and international momentum
Sullum 14, Senior editor at Reason magazine (Jacob, 2/10, Why Reschedule Marijuana?,
reason.com/archives/2014/02/10/why-reschedule-marijuana)
In light of President Obama's recent observation that marijuana is safer than alcohol, CNN's Jake Tapper wondered
if he was open to reconsidering marijuana's status as a Schedule I drug. When Tapper asked him that in an
interview that aired last week, Obama derailed the conversation by denying that the executive branch has the
the CSA gives the attorney general the
authority to move drugs between schedules. The attorney general has delegated that
authority to the DEA (a division of the Justice Department), which is why that agency has been the recipient
power to reclassify marijuana. That clearly is not true, since
of petitions urging it to put marijuana in a less restrictive category. Because Obama incorrectly insisted that
rescheduling marijuana would require an act of Congress, he never addressed the merits of doing it
administratively. From the perspective of people who believe marijuana should be legalized for medical or general
use, the advantages of such a move are not as substantial as you might think. But neither are they, as UCLA drug
Moving marijuana to a less restrictive legal
category would have some significant practical effects, perhaps the most important of
which would be to advance a more honest discussion of marijuana's hazards and
benefits. As Kleiman points out, removing marijuana from Schedule I would not automatically
make it legal for medical use, since any cannabis product still would have to be approved by the Food and Drug
policy expert Mark Kleiman claims, "identically zero."
Administration (FDA). "For a doctor to prescribe it," notes Aaron Houston, a Marijuana Majority board member and
WeedMaps lobbyist, "there would have to be an FDA-approved formulation of it." Since marijuana itself cannot be
patented, a pharmaceutical company would not have much incentive to go through the arduous, time-consuming,
and expensive process required to gain FDA approval. Furthermore, drug regulators tend to look askance at herbal
medicine, preferring isolated chemicals. "They're never going to approve a whole-plant organic product," says Dan
Riffle, director of federal policies at the Marijuana Policy Project. Rick Doblin, executive director of the
Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, which for years has been trying to jump through the hoops
required to get marijuana approved as a medicine, disagrees. "FDA,
like most regulatory agencies, wants
to expand the areas it regulates," he says. "FDA does want to regulate botanical drugs and
would be willing to approve whole-plant organic products if Phase 3 studies demonstrate safety and
efficacy." In any case, rescheduling marijuana might make it easier to conduct research on the
plant's medical utility, which could lead to cannabis-derived medications that would pass
muster with the FDA. "The biggest obstacle, at least historically, to doing research on
marijuana to prove its medical benefit is that it's in Schedule I," Riffle says. "So you had that
Catch-22, where marijuana is a Schedule I drug because there's no evidence, and there's no
evidence because marijuana is a Schedule I drug." Harvard psychiatrist Lester Grinspoon, co-author of
Marihuana: The Forbidden Medicine and a leading expert on cannabis, agrees that marijuana's Schedule I
status has impeded research. "Since 1970," he says, "it has been the major reason why the
kinds of large double-blind studies which have been the basis for FDA approval of medicines
since the mid-1960s have been impossible to pursue in this country." Dale Gieringer, who runs the
California chapter of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, notes that "there are very
burdensome registration requirements and regulations regarding Schedule I substances."
Although "most of them also apply to Schedule II," he says, they do not apply to substances in
Schedules III through V, which are deemed to have progressively lower potential for abuse.
There are other research obstacles, unique to marijuana. In 1999, responding to the legalization of
medical marijuana in California, the Clinton administration imposed an additional layer of review
on research involving cannabis, requiring approval by the Public Health Service as well as
the FDA, the DEA, and the relevant institutional review board. And even after they get all
the other necessary approvals, researchers have to obtain marijuana from the National
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), which has a monopoly on the legal supply—something that is not
true of other Schedule I drugs. NIDA, an agency whose mission focuses on marijuana's hazards, has not been keen
these requirements is a necessary
would be harder to defend if marijuana were
reclassified, which would mean acknowledging that it has medical value and can be used
safely. Rescheduling marijuana would not affect the legal status of state-licensed cannabusinesses in states such
to assist research aimed at measuring its benefits. Although neither of
consequence of marijuana's Schedule I status, they
as Colorado and Washington, which would still be criminal enterprises in the eyes of the federal government. But
rescheduling could remove one of the major financial challenges
facing state-legal marijuana suppliers: Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code
prohibits the deduction of business expenses related to "trafficking in controlled
substances," but only for drugs on Schedule I or II. If marijuana were moved to, say,
Schedule III, that prohibition would no longer apply. Schedule III, which is supposed to be for
Gieringer notes that
medically useful drugs that can be taken safely and have a lower abuse potential than drugs on Schedules I and II,
arguably is appropriate for marijuana because that is where the DEA put Marinol (a.k.a. dronabinol), a synthetic
version of THC, marijuana's main active ingredient. The DEA also has said naturally occurring THC used in generic
versions of Marinol belongs on Schedule III. But depending on how you define abuse potential, marijuana could go
on a lower schedule. "When you look at the Schedule IV drugs," says SUNY at Albany psychologist Mitch
Earleywine, author of Understanding Marijuana, "you've got the opiate Tramadol, the stimulant Modafinil, lethal
sedatives like phenobarbital and chloral hydrate, and the 'date rape' drug rohypnol. Surely cannabis is safer than
these." Grinspoon believes "none of the schedules is truly appropriate for marijuana." But if it he had to pick, he
says, "based on a realistic appraisal of the drug, I would put it in Schedule V." That category, which includes
codeine and opium preparations, is for prescription drugs with the lowest abuse potential. Rick Doblin notes that
the DEA could move cannabis to a lower schedule only if it changed its definition of "currently accepted medical
use," which demands the sort of large-scale, multi-site, double-blind studies that the FDA requires to approve a
new drug. "Assuming that marijuana has been approved as a prescription medicine by the FDA," Doblin says,
"Schedule II seems too high, since Marinol is in Schedule III. Due to its actual abuse potential, marijuana for
medical use should be in Schedule V." Alex Kreit, a professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego who
the CSA leaves undefined phrases on which scheduling hinges. The
DEA therefore "has enjoyed incredibly broad discretion to interpret and define 'potential for
abuse' and other scheduling criteria," Kreit writes on the Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform blog. Just as it could
studies drug policy, notes that
adopt a less demanding definition of "accepted medical use," the DEA could take a narrower view of "abuse," which
it equates with any nonmedical use. By that standard, marijuana, by far the most popular illegal drug, does indeed
have a high potential for abuse. But that judgment seems peculiar if abuse is defined as problematic use, in which
case potential for abuse might be measured by the percentage of users who become addicted or suffer serious
harm. In truth, as Lester Grinspoon observes, marijuana does not fit any of the schedules very well. It is not the
sort of medicine the FDA is used to approving. But it clearly can be used safely, as Obama conceded when he noted
that it is less dangerous than alcohol. Back in 1988, when he urged the DEA to reschedule marijuana,
Administrative Law Judge Francis Young called it "one of the safest therapeutically active substances known to
man." And while marijuana surely can be abused (what can't?), its potential for abuse seems lower than that of
many pharmaceuticals, not to mention alcohol and tobacco, which the CSA specifically excludes from its schedules.
In light of these inconsistencies, could the DEA take marijuana off of the CSA's schedules altogether? Probably not.
"I think it is very unlikely that the attorney general could remove marijuana from the schedules entirely," Kreit
the CSA gives the attorney general the power to "remove a drug or other substance entirely from
says that "if control is required by United States obligations under
international treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on October 27, 1970, the Attorney General
shall issue an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most appropriate."
says. Although
the schedules," it also
Since the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires its signatories (which include the United States) to
treaty
obligations seems to bar the DEA from descheduling, as opposed to rescheduling,
marijuana. Cannabis "requires a lot of control" under the Single Convention, notes Eric Sterling, president of the
criminalize production, possession, and distribution of cannabis for nonmedical purposes, this reference to
Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, who helped write federal drug legislation in the 1980s as counsel to the House
Judiciary Committee. "Cannabis is supposed to be controlled like opium and opiates." Then again, Kreit notes,
other CSA provisions "seem to contemplate situations where the U.S. does not accept international scheduling
determinations." Riffle, who is also a lawyer, sums it up this way: "I could make some arguments in a court that
[the reference to drug treaties] doesn't bind the executive, but I'd probably lose." The consequences of
administratively descheduling marijuana are difficult to tease out, given that some provisions of federal law refer to
marijuana specifically, while others talk about "controlled substances" or drugs on certain schedules. Aaron
Houston notes one salutary result of descheduling marijuana: Its consumers would no longer be barred from
owning firearms under the Gun Control Act of 1968, which purports to carve out an exception to the Second
Amendment for "unlawful user[s] of…any controlled substance." Even if the CSA permitted the Obama
even moving
marijuana down one level, from Schedule I to Schedule II, could have an important
impact on the drug policy debate. For one thing, it would free the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP), which is required by law to oppose the legalization of any Schedule
I substance, to talk about the hazards of marijuana a little more honestly. Such freedom is
desperately needed, to judge by the effort required to extract the concession that marijuana is safer than
administration to deschedule marijuana, such a step would be politically inconceivable. But
alcohol from ONDCP Deputy Director Michael Botticelli at a congressional hearing this week. "You have Obama
saying that marijuana is less harmful than alcohol, that it's important for Colorado and Washington to move
forward," says Riffle, "but nonetheless you have the ONDCP saying, 'We remain steadfastly opposed to
If it weren't a Schedule I drug, they wouldn't have to say that. The ONDCP would be
free to take a new position on legalization or put out more honest statements about the
harms associated with marijuana." Rescheduling marijuana also might affect the level of
cannabis candor at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which is barred
from using any of its funds to promote the legalization of Schedule I substances. Riffle
legalization.'
thinks lifting that restriction might even make NIDA, which is part of HHS, more willing to
let researchers use its marijuana. Beyond such statutory implications, acknowledging that
marijuana is more beneficial and less hazardous than the government has been saying all
these years is apt to influence the conversation about how to handle this much-maligned
plant. When the president conceded, in an interview with The New Yorker, that alcohol is more
dangerous than marijuana, it set off weeks of high-profile discussion about whether pot
prohibition is sensible or fair. If he followed up on that observation by asking whether
marijuana meets the criteria for Schedule I, it would call further attention to the
arbitrary distinctions drawn by our drug laws. The resulting discussion could help
pave the way for more ambitious moves, such as legislation lifting the federal ban
on marijuana in the 20 states that have legalized it for medical or recreational use. Bill Piper, director of
national affairs at the Drug Policy Alliance, says rescheduling is not his top priority, but it would be "a
significant victory for commonsense drug policy," because it "would acknowledge the weight
of scientific evidence and popular support for medical marijuana, and it could boost state
legislative efforts." Sterling thinks that acknowledgment could help people who get into legal
trouble for growing medical marijuana. "Moving marijuana to any other schedule would be a
recognition by the government that it has medical value," he says, which "makes a difference
in terms of what can be said to a jury." Gieringer agrees. "Rescheduling would send a
powerful message around the U.S. that marijuana does have medical uses," he says, "even in
states like Alabama that don't allow it. This would help put to rest the common argument of cops and DAs
that marijuana isn't medicine." Regardless of the practical consequences, there is something to be said for telling
the truth. "When Obama took office," Riffle notes, "he said that decisions in his administration would be guided by
science, not by politics and ideology. It's very clear that marijuana's continued classification as a Schedule I drug
Since Congress banned marijuana in 1937, says Houston, "we have seen
extremely cynical efforts to overblow the danger of marijuana and to demonize it. A move
to reschedule or unschedule would be the first time since 1937 that our government started to roll back
some of that reefer madness."
violates that mandate."
1NC DA
The plan violates drug treaties creates a precedent for a pick and choose
approach to international law which spills over across all treaty areas
Hasse 13
[10/14/13, Heather Hasse is a New York consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium
and the Harm Reduction Coalition, “The 2016 Drugs UNGASS: What does it mean for drug
reform?”
http://drogasenmovimiento.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/13-10-14-the-2016-drugsungass-e28093what-does-it-mean-for-drug-reform_.pdf]
But why? With all of the progress made in reform around the world lately, many – especially
in the US – are asking if the UN is even relevant to domestic drug reform at this point. With
the recent marijuana laws passed in Colorado and Washington and the proposed legislation
in Uruguay – not to mention decriminalization measures enacted in Portugal and a growing
number of other countries – reform seems inevitable. At some point, the argument goes,
the UN system will simply be overtaken by “real world” reform on the ground. Why
even bother with advocacy at the UN? This is not an easy question to answer; however, I
truly believe that to be effective, reform efforts must be made at every level – locally,
nationally, and globally. It may be true that reform efforts in the US and around the world
have made significant progress in the last 10 years. But there is still a long way to go –
marijuana is still not completely legal anywhere in the world (despite state laws to the
contrary, marijuana still remains illegal under federal law throughout the US), and many
human rights abuses continue to be carried out against drug users throughout the
world in the name of drug control. Meanwhile, the international drug control treaties – the
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its progeny – remain in place and, in fact,
enjoy nearly universal adherence by 184 member states. That so many countries
comply – at least technically, if not in “spirit” – with the international drug treaty system,
shows just how highly the international community regards the system. As well it
should – the UN system is invaluable and even vital in many areas, including climate
change, HIV/AIDS reduction, and, most recently, the Syrian chemical weapons crisis (and
don’t forget that the international drug treaty system also governs the flow of licit
medication). While it is not unheard of for a country to disregard a treaty, a system in which
countries pick and choose which treaty provisions suit them and ignore the rest is, shall we
say, less than ideal. But beyond the idea of simple respect for international law, there are
practical aspects of reform to consider. The drug problem is a global one, involving not only
consuming countries but producing and transit countries as well. Without global
cooperation, any changes will at best be limited (marijuana reform in Washington and
Colorado hardly affects the issue of human rights abuses in Singapore or the limitations on
harm reduction measures in Russia). At worst, reform efforts enacted ad hoc around the
world could be contradictory and incompatible - as might be the result if, for example,
Colombia and the US opted for a regulated market without the cooperation of Costa Rica or
Honduras, both transit countries. Finally, no matter what you think about the treaties
and the UN drug control system, or how significant you believe them to be in the
grand scheme of things, they are here for the time being, and are necessary to any
discussion about drug reform.
Marijuana is a stress test for the broader treaty regime—the plan’s
unilateral legalization ahead of any treaty reforms destroys I-Law which is
key to prevent a host of existential risks—ISIS, Ukraine, warming and
terrorism
Bennett and Walsh 14
[10/15/14, Wells Bennett & John Walsh are scholars at the Brookings Institute, Marijuana
Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15%20marijuana%20le
galization%20modernize%20drug%20treaties%20bennett%20walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.
pdf]
In making the case for the United States to proactively open the door to future change in
the drug treaties, we have emphasized, so far, the negative value of avoiding conflict and
instability. We would be remiss not to end on an equally important positive note. The
political changes and incentives in play in the marijuana-policy debate open a real
opportunity to demonstrate and improve the adaptability of the international legal
system—a system on which the United States relies more and more. No treaty can survive
the collapse of a political consensus supporting it. And no treaty system can endure if it
cannot cope with changing political conditions. Sustainability in international law depends
not only on commitment but also on resilience and adaptability. At this writing, one or
two more U.S. states may be about to adopt a version of marijuana legalization. If states
continue to legalize, and if the federal government continues to allow their reforms to
proceed, the short run for treaty reform may come quite soon. This is why we refer to
the challenge of marijuana legalization as a “stress test” for the adaptability of
international law. Should legalization prove politically popular or socially successful, it will
spread to more states and nations; should it spread, then one way or another both domestic
and international politics will find ways to accommodate it—either by adapting formal legal
commitments or by cutting new, informal channels around those commitments. The
latter would weaken international law; the former would strengthen it. Marijuanarelated reform to the drug treaties offers, in several respects, good odds of achieving
constructive adaptation. Reform need not entail any wholesale reconsideration of
international drug policy, nor need any brand new treaty be negotiated. Modest
incrementalism can do the job. In the United States, moreover, a growing political
constituency, embracing members of both political parties, favors reform, so the issue is
less partisan than many. Persuading the Senate to make more room for U.S.
experimentation by revising an existing treaty is a lighter lift than persuading it to
undertake entirely new treaty obligations. And, if the United States plays its cards right
(with, as we have suggested, suitably narrow and hedged legal changes), we believe a
consensus abroad for modest change could become within reach. In any case, broaching the
subject relatively early on—by ruling treaty change in, now, as a possibility, instead of
ruling it out as a non-starter—may itself open the door to a new international conversation
about modernizing and adapting drug treaties. In other words, marijuana offers as good
a chance as we are likely to see of setting a precedent for creative, consensual,
and gradual adaptation of a well-established international treaty structure. The
international legal system, however suspicious of it many Americans may be, has always
mattered and has never mattered more than now. For example, the campaign against ISIS
and the Ukraine crisis underscore all too dramatically the continuing importance of
multilateral security commitments. If anything, international law’s remit is growing as
environmental, social, economic, and security problems transcend national
borders. From global warming to sanctions on Iran and Russia to the campaign against
terrorism and military intervention in a host of theaters, the United States and its allies
increasingly rely on international agreements and commitments to legitimize and
amplify joint action against common threats. Of course, marijuana and the
international narcotics treaties are only one small piece of that puzzle. But they are a
highly visible piece, and they offer a real opportunity to demonstrate adaptation
through international legal channels, rather than around them. Laying groundwork
for manageably incremental changes—by beginning conversations with treaty partners and
other constituencies about where flexibility might lie—would reaffirm American
commitment to constructive adaptation, and to building consensus. Conversely,
pushing the outer boundaries of the drug treaties’ flexibility could weaken the
international order and damage American interests. To put the point another way:
Marijuana policy reform is a stress test that the United States and the
international order should, and realistically can, pass.
That triggers great power nuclear war
Harald Müller 2K, Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of
International Relations at Goethe University, Summer 2000, “Compliance Politics: A Critical
Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement,” The Nonproliferation Review,
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf
A third very crucial condition is a sufficient commonality of interest and commitment among the
major powers with regard to both the treaty in general and the compliance issue in question in
particular. The great powers act on the basis of a multiplicity of interests, commitments, and orientations. If the
major powers' broader political, economic, and security concerns turn out to be contradictory or even antagonistic,
action outside the
multilateral context will affect the great power relationship and, in turn, the prospects for
continued institutionalized cooperation. In short, power relations do not develop in an ahistorical and
context-free way, following quasi-natural laws. They depend rather on habits, conventions, and
perceptions that are shaped by experience. The constraints and relations in the international system are
thus not immutable, but rather malleable.12 When a treaty regime creates expectations of
multilateral compliance policies, unilateralist behavior can thus cause one of two difficulties: • It
may push other powers (and possibly their followers, proxies, allies, and partners) to rally around the accused
a non-multilateral compliance action by one or more of them becomes more likely. Such
party. This may occur either because the accused party is a close ally, or to deter the power(s) acting unilaterally
from further unilateral actions out of fear that such actions may lead to an adverse change in the balance of power.
diminish the chances for pursuing further the road towards
a world order based on cooperative security,13 rather than balance of power principles.
Moreover, such confrontations include a risk of escalation, which could lead to another
confrontation like the Cuban missile crisis, by far the most dangerous event so far in the
nuclear age. • Alternatively, the aggrieved powers may abstain from a direct confrontation out of concern for
Such a course of events would seriously
these risks, but freeze their cooperation in the arms control field as a sort of reprisal. Such a development, while
less dangerous on the surface, would risk the erosion of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation in the long
run. Would-be rule-breakers could be tempted to play off great powers against each other, making it possible for
them to pursue their rule-breaking activities with less risk and a greater likelihood of getting away unscathed with
the prospects of cooperative
security policy as an ordering principle of world politics decline, and the risk of a major
confrontation among great powers increases. This trajectory is a reflection of the pivotal
role of treaty community cohesion. Because of the particular importance of major
powers within that community—the presumption of legal equality notwithstanding—antagonisms
their deviant course of action. In either mode, arms agreements suffer,
among them are particularly likely to sunder that community and prevent it from
maintaining and strengthening the treaty when it is challenged by deviant behavior.
1NC WOD
Legalizing marijuana doesn’t address the larger systems of oppression that
motivates the police state – it just displaces marijuana dealers into other
forms of criminality
Nakagawa 2014 - Lifelong political activist, community organizer, organization builder,
and trouble-maker (July 31, Scott, “Why I Support Marijuana Legalization, But Not as a
Strategy for Winning Racial Justice” http://www.racefiles.com/2014/07/31/why-i-supportmarijuana-legalization-but-not-as-a-strategy-for-winning-racial-justice/)
But, while I support legalization as an incremental step in the right direction, I think we are
wrong to promote legalization as a means of achieving racial justice. Making that
claim minimizes the very real problem of structural racism that has made the war on drugs
such a hugely devastating law enforcement strategy for Black people. The legalization of
marijuana, in my opinion, would not lead to less over-policing, racial profiling, or overincarceration of Black and brown people. What relief legalization would provide, and I do
believe there would be some immediate relief, would be mostly temporary. Why? The
New York Times report on reader response to their legalization editorials sums it up nicely,
Times readers favor legalization for the same reasons the Times editorial board does: They
think the criminalization of marijuana has ruined lives; that the public health risks have
been overstated; and that law enforcement should focus its resources on graver problems.
Those “graver problems” bother me. They bother me because the illegal drug trade is as
much an economic issue as it is public health issue. My experience growing up in a drug
economy tells me that folk turn to illegal means of making money when legal jobs aren’t
available. And decent paying legal jobs have rarely been harder to find than right now. As a
sociologist friend of mine recently reminded me, prison is a form of disguised
unemployment. That’s part of the reason programs meant to reduce recidivism so often
don’t work. Without a job, people are often forced to commit crimes, like selling marijuana.
Once convicted of that crime, a criminal record can make you unemployable. Those who’ve
been to prison too often end up back in prison, and keeping them there is a way of
managing unemployment, even if this effect is, perhaps, mostly incidental. If we added
incarcerated Black people to the unemployment rolls, Black unemployment statistics would
be noticeably higher (and it’s already twice that of whites). This would more accurately
reflect the status of Black people in the U.S. labor market. Large numbers of poor Black
people have been structurally excluded from the legitimate economy, ironically in part
because Black people as a class won the right to ordinary worker protections nationwide via
the Civil Rights Movement. This made other excluded workers, like undocumented migrants,
cheaper, more compliant, and, following the logic of the market, more desirable. Being
excluded from decent employment opportunities will drive some people to drug dealing.
Unless we deal with this reality, legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end
marijuana dealers to “graver problems” for which there are often more stringent
punishments and less public sympathy. From the perspective of a poor person dependent on
the marijuana trade for their living, legalization is a dead-end. Richer people with the capital
to invest in grow operations, licensing, retail stores, etc., will come in after ordinary drug
dealers have suffered all the risk involved in developing marijuana markets illegally and
squeeze them out. Those of us concerned with racial justice must ask, “squeezed out to
where?”
People in jail for marijuana possession are only .2% of the total population
– the aff does nothing in the most ambitious scenarios
Caulkins and Sevigny 2009 - Carnegie Mellon University’s Heinz School of Public Policy
AND Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh (July 31,
Jonathan P. and Eric L., “How Many People Does the US Imprison for Drug Use, and Who
Are They? ” http://ibhinc.org/pdfs/CaulkinsSevignyHowanydoestheUSimprison2005.pdf)
The vast majority (85%) of the 274,324 people in prison in the U.S. in 1997 for drug-law
violations were clearly involved in drug distribution in one way or another. Many of the
remaining 15% (41,047) had at least some suggestion of possible current or past
involvement in distribution. The precise proportion of drug offenders in prison solely
because they used drugs is thus hard to pin down, but appears to be somewhere in the
range of 2%-15%, representing 5,380 to 41,047 individuals. Furthermore, only about onethird of the 41,047 individuals were in prison as new court commitments; most were
already on parole or probation before the infraction that led to their current incarceration.
Almost half had a current nondrug infraction that may have contributed to their
incarceration. Even taking the upper bound figure of 15%, the number of people in prison
for their drug use is far lower than would be implied by naively assuming that everyone
convicted of drug possession was not involved in distribution. Incarceration for drug
use/possession thus appears to be a very modest contributor (0.5%-3.6%) to the total
sentenced U.S. prison population (1,137,210 in 1997). One reason is that the expected time
served by these individuals is about half that for those who were clearly involved in drug
distribution. It is also worth noting that 50-80% of arrestees test positive for some illicit
drug and -15% of drug arrests are for possession (Maguire and Pastore, 1997), so
presumably if the criminal justice system wanted to incarcerate many more drug
users, that would be possible. Among those in prison for drug use, almost 90% were
involved with cocaine, heroin, and/or (meth)amphetamines. Just 5-7% possessed only
marijuana. Hence, the number of marijuana users in prison for their use is perhaps 8002,300 individuals or on the order of 0.1-0.2% of all prison inmates. This figure is roughly
consistent with ONDCP (2005) and is well below Thomas' (1999) estimate of 9,700 based
on the same survey because Thomas assumes that all inmates convicted of possession were
not involved in trafficking. An implication of the new figure is that marijuana
decriminalization would have almost no impact on prison populations, although it
might well have a bigger effect on other components of the criminal justice system. Another
implication is that the imprisonment risk due to drug use is low, perhaps on the order of
one-and-a-half days per year of use for cocaine, heroin, and (meth)amphetamines, and no
more than about an hour per year of use for marijuana. That is not to say that there are not
many drug users in prison. However, for heavy users of these four major drugs, the vast
majority are in prison because of nondrug offenses (68%- 75%) or drug distribution
offenses (22%-26%). This implies that comparing characteristics of imprisoned drug
offenders with those of drug users is not helpful for determining whether drug-related
imprisonment falls disproportionately on one group or another. Since most imprisoned drug
offenders are involved in distribution, the relevant referent group is drug distributors, not
drug users.
1NC Market
Waiver is a description
Industrial model is sustainable and small farms aren’t net better
Miller 14 [Dr. Henry I. Miller, a physician and molecular biologist, was the founding
director of the FDA's Office of Biotechnology and is a research fellow at Stanford University's
Hoover Institution, “Organic Farming Is Not Sustainable,” May 15,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304431104579550002888434432]
You may have noticed that the organic section of your local supermarket is growing.
Advocates tout organic-food production—in everything from milk and coffee to meat and
vegetables—as a "sustainable" way to feed the planet's expanding population. The
Worldwatch Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental group, goes so far
as to say organic farming "has the potential to contribute to
sustainable food security by improving nutrition intake and sustaining livelihoods in
rural areas, while simultaneously reducing vulnerability to climate change
and enhancing biodiversity." The evidence argues otherwise. A study by the
Institute for Water Research at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, published last year in the
journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, found that "intensive organic agriculture
relying on solid organic matter, such as composted manure that is implemented in the soil
prior to planting as the sole fertilizer,
resulted in significant down-leaching of
nitrate" into groundwater. With many of the world's most fertile farming regions in
the throes of drought, increased nitrate in groundwater is hardly a hallmark of
sustainability. Moreover, as agricultural scientist Steve Savage has documented on the
Sustainablog website, wide-scale composting generates significant amounts of greenhouse
gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. Compost may also deposit pathogenic bacteria on
or in food crops, which has led to more frequent occurrences of food poisoning in the U.S.
and elsewhere. Organic farming might work well for certain local environments on a small
of land and water than conventional
ones. The low yields of organic agriculture—typically 20%-50% less than conventional
agriculture—impose various stresses on farmland and especially on water consumption. A
scale, but its farms produce far less food per unit
British meta-analysis published in the Journal of Environmental Management (2012) found
that "ammonia
emissions, nitrogen leaching and nitrous oxide
emissions per product unit were higher from organic systems" than
conventional farming systems, as were "land use, eutrophication
potential and acidification potential per product unit." Lower crop yields are
inevitable given organic farming's systematic rejection of many advanced methods and
If the scale of organic production were significantly
increased, the lower yields would increase the pressure for the
conversion of more land to farming and more water for irrigation,
both of which are serious environmental issues. Another limitation of organic
production is that it disfavors the best approach to enhancing soil
quality—namely, the minimization of soil disturbances such as tilling,
combined with the use of cover crops. Both approaches help to limit
technologies.
soil erosion and the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides. Organic
growers do frequently plant cover crops, but in the absence of effective
herbicides, often they rely on tillage (or even labor-intensive hand weeding) for
weed control. One prevalent myth is that organic agriculture does not
employ pesticides. Organic farming does use insecticides and
fungicides to prevent predation of its crops. More than 20 chemicals
(mostly containing copper and sulfur) are commonly used in the growing and
processing of organic crops and are acceptable under U.S. organic
rules. They include nicotine sulfate, which is extremely toxic to warmblooded animals, and rotenone, which is moderately toxic to most mammals but so
toxic to fish that it's widely used for the mass poisoning of unwanted fish
populations during restocking projects. Perhaps the most illogical and least
sustainable aspect of organic farming in the long term is the exclusion of
"genetically modified organisms," but only those that were modified with the
most precise and predictable techniques such as gene splicing. Except
for wild berries and wild mushrooms, virtually all the fruits, vegetables and
grains in our diet have been genetically improved by one technique or
another, often through what are called wide crosses, which move genes from one species
or genus to another in ways that do not occur in nature. Therefore, the exclusion
from organic agriculture of organisms simply because they were crafted with
modern, superior techniques makes no sense. It also denies consumers of organic
goods nutritionally improved foods, such as oils with enhanced levels of omega-3 fatty
In recent decades, we have seen advances in agriculture that have
been more environmentally friendly and sustainable than ever before. But
they have resulted from science-based research and technological ingenuity
by farmers, plant breeders and agribusiness companies, not from social elites
opposed to modern insecticides, herbicides, genetic engineering and "industrial
agriculture."
acids.
Small farms fail
McWilliams 09 (James, historian at Texas State University, 10/7,
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/let-the-farmers-market-debatecontinue/?apage=2)
Some academic critics are starting to wonder. Writing in the Journal of Rural Studies,
sociologist C. Clare Hinrichs warns that “[m]aking ‘local’ a proxy for the ‘good’ and ‘global’ a
proxy for the bad may overstate the value in proximity.” Building on this suspicion, she
acknowledges that many small farms are indeed more sustainable than larger ones, but
then reminds us that “Small scale, ‘local’ farmers are not inherently better environmental
stewards.” Personal experience certainly confirms my own inability to make such a
distinction. Most of us must admit that in many cases we really haven’t a clue if the local
farmers we support run sustainable systems. The possibility that, as Hinrichs writes, they
“may lack the awareness or means to follow more sustainable production practices”
suggests that the mythical sense of community (which depends on the expectation of sound
agricultural practices) is being eroded. After all, if the unifying glue of sustainability turns
out to have cracks, so then does the communal cohesiveness that’s supposed to evolve
from it. And this is not a big “If.” “[W]hile affect, trust, and regard can flourish under
conditions of spatial proximity,” concludes Hinrichs, “this is not automatically or necessarily
the case.” At the least, those of us who value our local food systems should probably take
the time to tone down the Quixotic rhetoric and ask questions that make our farmer friends
a little uncomfortable.
Warming is irreversible – consensus of most qualified scientists
Romm 2013 [Joe, PhD in Physics from MIT, Senior Fellow at American Progress, editor of
Climate Progress, former acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and
renewable energy in 1997, “The Dangerous Myth that Climate Change is Reversible,”
http://theenergycollective.com/josephromm/199981/dangerous-myth-climate-changereversible]
The CMO (Chief Misinformation Officer) of the climate ignorati, Joe Nocera, has a new piece, “A Real Carbon
Solution.” The biggest of its many errors comes in this line:¶ A reduction of carbon emissions from Chinese power
plants would do far more to help reverse climate change than — dare I say it? — blocking the Keystone XL oil
a NOAA-led paper explained 4 years ago, climate change is “largely
irreversible for 1000 years,” with permanent Dust Bowls in Southwest and around the globe (if we don’t
slash emissions ASAP).¶ This notion that we can reverse climate change by cutting
emissions is one of the most commonly held myths — and one of the most
dangerous, as explained in this 2007 MIT study, “Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change:
pipeline.¶ Memo to Nocera: As
Adults’ mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter.”¶ The fact is that, as RealClimate has
we would need “an immediate cut of around 60 to 70% globally and continued
further cuts over time” merely to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of CO2 – and that would
still leave us with a radiative imbalance that would lead to “an additional 0.3 to 0.8ºC
warming over the 21st Century.” And that assumes no major carbon cycle feedbacks kick in, which
seems highly unlikely.¶ We’d have to drop total global emissions to zero now and for the rest
of the century just to lower concentrations enough to stop temperatures from rising. Again, even in this
implausible scenario, we still aren’t talking about reversing climate change , just stopping it — or,
explained,
more technically, stopping the temperature rise. The great ice sheets might well continue to disintegrate, albeit
slowly.¶ This doesn’t mean climate change is unstoppable — only that we are stuck with whatever climate change
we cause before we get desperate and go all WWII on emissions. That’s why delay is so dangerous and immoral.
He
leaves people with the impression that coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a practical,
affordable means of reducing emissions from existing power plants that will be available soon. In fact, most
demonstration projects around the world have been shut down , the technology Nocera focuses on
would not work on the vast majority of existing coal plants, and CCS is going to be incredibly expensive
compared to other low-carbon technologies — see Harvard stunner: “Realistic” first-generation CCS
I’ll discuss this further below the jump.¶ First, though, Nocera’s piece has many other pieces of misinformation.
costs a whopping $150 per ton of CO2 (20 cents per kWh)! And that’s in the unlikely event it proves to be
practical, permanent, and verifiable (see “Feasibility, Permanence and Safety Issues Remain Unresolved”).¶ Heck,
guy who debated me on The Economist‘s website conceded things are going so slowly, writing “The idea is that
CCS then becomes a commercial reality and begins to make deep cuts in emissions during the 2030s.” And he’s a
we simply don’t have until the 2030s to wait for deep cuts in
emissions. No wonder people who misunderstand the irreversible nature of climate change, like Nocera, tend to
CCS advocate!!¶ Of course,
be far more complacent about emissions reductions than those who understand climate science. ¶ The point of
Nocera’s piece seems to be to mock Bill McKibben for opposing the idea of using captured carbon for enhanced oil
recovery (EOR): “his answer suggests that his crusade has blinded him to the real problem.” ¶ It is Nocera who has
been blinded. He explains in the piece:¶ Using carbon emissions to recover previously ungettable oil has the
potential to unlock vast untapped American reserves. Last year, ExxonMobil reportedthat enhanced oil recovery
would allow it to extend the life of a single oil field in West Texas by 20 years.¶ McKibben’s effort to stop the
Keystone XL pipeline is based on the fact that we have believe the vast majority of carbon in the ground. Sure, it
wouldn’t matter if you built one coal CCS plant and used that for EOR. But we need a staggering amount of CCS, as
Vaclav Smil explained in “Energy at the Crossroads“:¶ “Sequestering a mere 1/10 of today’s global CO2 emissions
(less than 3 Gt CO2) would thus call for putting in place an industry that would have to force underground every
year the volume of compressed gas larger than or (with higher compression) equal to the volume of crude oil
extracted globally by [the] petroleum industry whose infrastructures and capacities have been put in place over a
century of development. Needless to say, such a technical feat could not be accomplished within a single
generation.”¶ D’oh! What precisely would be the point of “sequestering” all that CO2 to extract previously
“ungettable oil” whose emissions, when burned, would just about equal the CO2 that you supposedly
sequestered?¶ Remember, we have to get total global emissions of CO2 to near zero just to stop temperatures
from continuing their inexorable march toward humanity’s self-destruction. And yes, this ain’t easy. But it is
impossible if we don’t start slashing emissions soon and stop opening up vast new sources of carbon.¶ For those
the entire MIT study, whose lead author is John
Sterman. Here is the abstract:¶ ¶ Public attitudes about climate change reveal a contradiction. Surveys show most
who are confused on this point, I recommend reading
Americans believe climate change poses serious risks but also that reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
sufficient to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations or net radiative forcing can be deferred until there is greater
evidence that climate change is harmful. US policymakers likewise argue it is prudent to wait and see whether
waitand-see policies erroneously presume climate change can be reversed quickly should harm
climate change will cause substantial economic harm before undertaking policies to reduce emissions. Such
become evident, underestimating substantial delays in the climate’s response to anthropogenic forcing. We report
experiments with highly educated adults–graduate students at MIT–showing widespread misunderstanding of the
fundamental stock and flow relationships, including mass balance principles, that lead to long response delays.
GHG emissions are now about twice the rate of GHG removal from the atmosphere. GHG
concentrations will therefore continue to rise even if emissions fall , stabilizing only when emissions
equal removal. In contrast, results show most subjects believe atmospheric GHG concentrations can be stabilized
These beliefsanalogous to arguing a bathtub filled faster than it drains will never overflow-support waitand-see policies but violate conservation of matter. Low public support for mitigation policies may be
while emissions into the atmosphere continuously exceed the removal of GHGs from it.
based more on misconceptions of climate dynamics than high discount rates or uncertainty about the risks of
harmful climate change.
Warming won’t cause extinction
Barrett ‘7 professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, (Scott, Why Cooperate? The
Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)
climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If
unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now
due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and
for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process
displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and
unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take
centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible,
and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a
weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous.
First,
Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its
Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent
of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were
sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be
overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much
consequences.
more about it by now.
1NC Afghanistan
Regional cooperation and institutions solve Afghan stability
PAN 13 (Pajhwok Afghanistan News, April 27, 2013, “Regional states underline Afghan
stability”, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/04/27/regional-states-underline-afghanstability, AB)
It added the international community and the region had a shared responsibility and
common interest in working together for the sake of Afghanistan and the region as a
whole. The support of non-regional countries and organisations involved in the Istanbul Process is
essential to the success of this shared effort. It welcomed efforts to promote a stable, independent,
prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. “Our shared interests are best served by cooperation,
rather than competition, in the Heart of Asia. We will therefore use the Istanbul Process to build a
common platform of shared regional interests, as well as a secure and prosperous ‘Heart of Asia’ region where
Afghanistan has a crucial role as a land-bridge, connecting South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and the Middle East.
“The
first priority and area of common concern is security. Contemporary security challenges
threats have a global character and impact and the only possible way to effectively counter
them is for states to work together according to agreed principles and mechanisms of
cooperation. “In this context, as representatives of a region that is most affected by common security
challenges, we are determined to work together through the Istanbul Process to respond
to our common security challenges and threats,” the document said.
and
Tons of alt causes
Arbour, president – International Crisis Group, 12/27/’11
(Louise, “Next Year’s Wars,” Foreign Policy)
A decade of major security, development, and humanitarian assistance from the international community
has failed to create a stable Afghanistan, a fact highlighted by deteriorating security and a
growing insurgent presence in previously stable provinces over the past year. In 2011, the capital alone saw
a barrage of suicide bombings, including the deadliest attack in the city since 2001; multiple strikes on foreign
missions in Kabul, the British Council, and U.S. Embassy; and the assassination of former president and chief
The prospects for next year are no brighter, with many key
provinces scheduled for transfer to the ill-equipped Afghan security forces by early 2012. The
litany of obstacles to peace, or at least stability, in Afghanistan is by now familiar. President Hamid
Karzai rules by fiat, employing a combination of patronage and executive abuse of power. State
institutions and services are weak or nonexistent in much of the country, or else so riddled with
corruption that Afghans want nothing to do with them. Dari-speaking ethnic minorities remain
skeptical about the prospects for reconciliation with the predominately Pashtun Taliban insurgency, which
enjoys the backing of Pakistan's military and intelligence services. The Taliban leadership in Quetta seem to
reason that victory is within reach and that they have simply to bide their time until the planned
U.S. withdrawal in 2014.
peace negotiator Burhanuddin Rabbani.
No spread of instability – data proves
Silverman 9 [Jerry, Ph.D. in international relations, Ford Foundation Project Specialist,
"Sturdy Dominos," 11-19, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22512]
The resurrection of "falling dominos" as a metaphor for predicted consequences of an American military
withdrawal reflects a profound inability to re-envision the nature of today's global political
environment and America's place in it. The current worry is that Pakistan will revive support for the
Taliban [6] and return to its historically rooted policy of noninterference in local governance or security
arrangements along the frontier. This fear is compounded by a vision of radical Islamists gaining access to
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Those concerns are fueled by the judgment that Pakistan's new democratically elected
civilian government is too weak to withstand pressures by its most senior military officers to keep its pro-Afghan
Taliban option open. From that perspective, any sign of American "dithering" would reinforce that historically-
rooted preference, even as the imperative would remain to separate the Pakistani-Taliban from the Afghan
insurgents. Further, any significant increase in terrorist violence, especially within major Pakistani urban centers,
would likely lead to the imposition of martial law and return to an authoritarian military regime, weakening
American influence even further. At its most extreme, that scenario ends with the most frightening outcome of allthe overthrow of relatively secular senior Pakistani generals by a pro-Islamist and anti-Western group of secondtier officers with access to that country's nuclear weapons. Beyond Pakistan, advocates of today's domino theory
point to the Taliban's links to both the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union, and conclude
that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would encourage similar radical Islamist movements in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In the face of a scenario of increasing radicalization along Russia's relatively new,
southern borders, domino theorists argue that a NATO retreat from Afghanistan would spur the projection of its
The primary problem with the worstcase scenarios predicted by the domino theorists is that no analyst is really prescient
enough to accurately predict how decisions made by the United States today will affect future
outcomes in the South and central Asian region. Their forecasts might occur whether or not
the United States withdraws or, alternatively, increases its forces in Afghanistan . Worse, it is
entirely possible that the most dreaded consequences will occur only as the result of a
decision to stay. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the earlier domino theory falsely represented
own military and political power into the resulting "vacuum" there.
interstate and domestic political realities throughout most of Southeast Asia in 1975. Although it is true that
American influence throughout much of Southeast Asia suffered for a few years following Communist victories in
Vietnam War as part of a larger conflict,
our opponent's focus was limited to the unification of their own country. Although border disputes
erupted between Vietnam and Cambodia, China and the Philippines, actual military conflicts occurred only
between the supposedly fraternal Communist governments of Vietnam, China and
Cambodia. Neither of the two competing Communist regimes in Cambodia survived . Further,
no serious threats to install Communist regimes were initiated outside of Indochina, and,
most importantly, the current political situation in Southeast Asia now conforms closely to what
Washington had hoped to achieve in the first place [7]. It is, of course, unfortunate that the transition
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, we now know that while we viewed the
from military conflict in Vietnam to the welcome situation in Southeast Asia today was initially violent, messy,
bloody, and fraught with revenge and violations of human rights. But as the perpetrators, magnitude, and victims
the level of violence eventually declined. This time around, there are at least two
the Taliban is no longer
the unified group that emerged during 1994. Instead, the term "Taliban" is applied to several groups
engaged in the current insurgency against the Karzai government and NATO forces. Those
groups collaborate through a complex set of shifting alliances that extend across the
disputed Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Second, given that local Taliban have demonstrated their capacity
of violence changed,
questionable assumptions underlying the resurrection of the domino theory. First,
to effectively engage NATO forces without the equivalent of NATO military and civilian trainers or logistical support,
other indigenous groups opposed to the Taliban and/or al-Qaeda are also likely to be
stronger than domino theorists assume and are likely to proactively defend themselves
against radical Islamists once we are no longer there to do it for them. A retrospective view of
America's involvement in Vietnam and its ultimate consequences for U.S. interests reinforces the aphorism that all
politics are local. That truism seems lost on American foreign-policy decision makers who tend to see international
threats in global rather than local terms. Further, the danger remains that the metaphor of falling dominos might
resonate with governments in the region that face their own increasingly radical domestic opposition. Our fears of
regional collapse might also speak to Russian and Chinese policy makers fearful of potentially greater instability
regional threats, even if they do arise, do not threaten the core
national interests of the United States-the substantially exaggerated fears of terrorist "safehavens" notwithstanding. Those worries simply do not justify the overwhelmingly
disproportionate and financially ruinous military response that has characterized our
involvement there. The "fall of dominos" is no more inevitable in South and central Asia now than it was in
along their borders. But such
Southeast Asia more than a half century ago. True, the earlier circumstances in Vietnam and Southeast Asia are
not, in most respects, similar to the current situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the remainder of South and
central Asia. Nonetheless, the emphasis in both cases on external interstate threats-rather than on autonomous
non-state actors-has been a mistake because it does not reflect the actual source of most violent conflicts since the
1960s.
In an exponentially complex world characterized by multiple actors, the domino
theory does not help predict the future course of political relations in the region-nor would
any other simplistic metaphor. Despite the view that the alliance between various Taliban and al-Qaeda
factions is both strategic and long-term, a consensus is forming that most Taliban groups are either nationalists
who want to seize formal authority within recognized sovereign-states, or more localized groups that merely want
to be left alone by any pretenders to centralized state-authority. Perversely, the desire of nationalist Taliban to
seize sovereign-state power represents an acceptance of a largely secular European system of interstate relations.
local community-based groups
continue to oppose any attempts, whether sponsored by Americans or Islamic radicals, to establish
centralized state authority there.
In that conversion will likely be found the seeds of their eventual undoing-as
2NC
2NC Condo
Conditionality Good 2NC
First our offense1- Critical thinking- Reacting to multiple attacks increases aff ability to
evaluate their best arguments and collapsing down teaches the neg to
make strategic, reactive decisions- that’s key to decisionmaking skills
2- Negative flexibility- The aff gets to parametricize the rez by picking one
example- its an inherent advantage because they know way more about
their one aff than the neg who has to be prepared for every aff- the only
check is to advance multiple cps
Now our defense1- Not “infinitely” regressive- time limits and quality of argument create a
limit. Our interp is: _______________________________________
2- Ground- Aff can always make “aff key” args and addons- it’s offense
against any and all CPs
3- Strat and time skew are inev- The alternative to multiple advocacies is
more T and Das- those require just as many answers and create strategic
double binds too
4- CPs aren’t uniquely complex and perms check the advantages of neg
fiat- a SKFTA CP is way less threatening than a SKFTA DA because you can
perm it
5- To vote aff you have to believe the debate is irreparably damaged by
conditionality- it might make debate hard but not impossible
6- Don’t be fooled by “reciprocity”- the aff’s job is to pick the question of
debate and the neg’s is to find a way to disprove it- that’s why stability is
important for the aff and flexibility is key for the neg
Afghan
No impact to Pakistan instability—their ev is hype
Hundley ’12 (Before joining the Pulitzer Center, Tom Hundley was a newspaper journalist
for 36 years, including nearly two decades as a foreign correspondent for the Chicago
Tribune. During that time he served as the Tribune’s bureau chief in Jerusalem, Warsaw,
Rome and London, reporting from more than 60 countries. He has covered three wars in the
Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rise of Iran’s post-revolutionary theocracy. His
work has won numerous journalism awards. He has taught at the American University in
Dubai and at Dominican University in River Forest, Illinois. He has also been a Middle East
correspondent for GlobalPost and a contributing writer for the Chicago News Cooperative.
Tom graduated from Georgetown University and holds a master’s degree in international
relations from the University of Pennsylvania. He was also National Endowment for the
Humanities journalism fellow at the University of Michigan. Published September 5, 2012
With both sides armed to the teeth, it is easy to exaggerate the fears and much harder to pinpoint
where the real dangers lie. For the United States, the nightmare scenario is that some of Pakistan's warheads or its
fissile material falls into the hands of the Taliban or al Qaeda -- or, worse, that the whole country falls into the
hands of the Taliban. For example, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer now at Harvard University's Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, has warned of the "lethal proximity between terrorists, extremists, and
nuclear weapons insiders" in Pakistan. This is a reality, but on the whole, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal appears to be
To outsiders,
Pakistan appears to be permanently teetering on the brink of collapse. The fact that large
swaths of the country are literally beyond the control of the central government is not reassuring. But a weak
state does not mean a weak society, and powerful internal dynamics based largely on
kinship and tribe make it highly unlikely that Pakistan would ever fall under the control of
an outfit like the Taliban. During the country's intermittent bouts of democracy, its civilian leaders have been
consistently incompetent and corrupt, but even in the worst of times, the military has maintained
a high standard of professionalism. And there is nothing that matters more to the Pakistani
military than keeping the nuclear arsenal -- its crown jewels -- out of the hands of India,
the United States, and homegrown extremists. "Pakistan struggled to acquire these weapons against the wishes
reasonably secure against internal threats, according to those who know the country best.
of the world. Our nuclear capability comes as a result of great sacrifice. It is our most precious and powerful
weapon -- for our defense, our security, and our political prestige," Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani lieutenant
nuclear security is in the responsibility of the
Strategic Plans Division, which appears to function pretty much as a separate branch of the military. It
has its own training facility and an elaborate set of controls and screening procedures to
keep track of all warheads and fissile material and to monitor any blips in the behavior
patterns of its personnel. The 15 or so sites where weapons are stored are the mostly
heavily guarded in the country. Even if some group managed to steal or commandeer a weapon,
it is highly unlikely the group would be able to use it. The greater danger is the theft of fissile
general, told me. "We keep them safe." Pakistan's
material, which could be used to make a crude bomb. "With 70 to 80 kilos of highly enriched uranium, it would be
fairly easy to make one in the basement of a building in the city of your choice," said Pervez Hoodbhoy, a
distinguished nuclear physicist at Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University. At the moment, Pakistan has a stockpile of
about 2.75 tons -- or some 30 bombs' worth -- of highly enriched uranium. It does not tell Americans where it is
stored. "All nuclear countries are conscious of the risks, nuclear weapons states especially so," said Gen. Ehsan ulHaq, who speaks with the been-there-done-that authority of a man who has served as both chairman of Pakistan's
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and head of the ISI, its controversial spy agency. "Of course there are concerns.
much of what you read in the U.S. media is irrational and reflective of
paranoia. Rising radicalism in Pakistan? Yes, this is true, and the military is very conscious of this." Perhaps
the most credible endorsement of Pakistan's nuclear security regime comes from its most
steadfast enemy. The consensus among India's top generals and defense experts is
Some are genuine, but
Pakistan's nukes are pretty secure. "No one can be 100 percent secure, but I think they are more
than 99 percent secure," said Shashindra Tyagi, a former chief of staff of the Indian Air Force. "They
keep a very close watch on personnel. All of the steps that could be taken have been taken. This business of the
Taliban taking over -- it can't be ruled out, but I think it's unlikely. The Pakistani military
understands the threats they face better than anyone, and they are smart enough to take
care it." Yogesh Joshi, an analyst at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, agrees:
that
"Different states have different perceptions of risk. The U.S. has contingency plans [to secure Pakistan's nukes]
because its nightmare scenario is that Pakistan's weapons fall into terrorist hands. The view from India over the
Pakistan, probably more than any other nuclear weapons state, has taken
measures to secure its weapons. At the political level here, there's a lot of confidence that Pakistan's
years is that
nuclear weapons are secure."
Afghanistan doesn’t spill over to Pakistan\
Haas 10 – president of the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard N., “Let's Un-Surge in
Afghanistan,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/23669/lets_unsurge_in_afghanistan.html,
WRW)
The second interest at stake is Pakistan. Some argue that we must stabilize Afghanistan lest it
become a staging ground for undermining its more important neighbor, one that hosts the world's
most dangerous terrorists and possesses more than 100 nuclear weapons. This defies logic. Pakistan is
providing sanctuary and support to the Afghan Taliban who have not demonstrated an
agenda to destabilize Pakistan. Why should we be more worried than the Pakistanis themselves? Viewing
Afghanistan as holding the key to Pakistan shows a misunderstanding of Pakistan. It is, to be
sure, a weak state. But the threats to it are mostly internal and the result of deep divisions
within the society and decades of poor governance. If Pakistan ever fails, it will not be
because of terrorists coming across its western border.
Ridiculous to say that they wouldn’t find other forms of profit – there is no
intrinsic connection between drugs and terrorism – human trafficking, oil
theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other drugs are all massive alt causes
WOD
The plan frees up resources for more policing of harder drugs – turns the
advantage
Hesson 14 -- immigration editor, covers immigration and drug policy from Washington
D.C. [Ted, "Will Mexican Cartels Survive Marijuana Legalization?" Fusion,
fusion.net/justice/story/mexican-cartels-survive-marijuana-legalization-450519, accessed
6-2-14]
1. Mexico is the top marijuana exporter to the U.S. A 2008 study by the RAND
Corporation estimated that Mexican marijuana accounted for somewhere between 40 and
67 percent of the drug in the U.S. The cartel grip on the U.S. market may not last for long.
Pot can now be grown for recreational use in Colorado and Washington, and for medical use
in 20 states. For the first time, American consumers can choose a legal product over the
black market counterpart. Beau Kilmer, the co-director of the RAND Drug Policy
Research Center, says that a few states legalizing marijuana won’t eliminate the
flow of the drug from down south, but a change in policy from the federal
government would be a game changer. “Our research also suggests that legalizing
commercial marijuana production at the national level could drive out most of the
marijuana imported from Mexico,” he wrote in a 2013 op-ed. 2. Marijuana makes up
more than $1 billion of cartel income Pot isn’t the main source of income for cartels.
They make most of their cash from drugs like cocaine and heroin. But marijuana accounts
for 15 to 26 percent of the cartel haul, according to RAND’s 2008 data. That
translates to an estimated $1.1 billion to $2 billion of gross income. The drop in sales
certainly wouldn’t end the existence of drug traffickers — they bring in an estimated $6
billion to $8 billion annually — but losing a fifth of one’s income would hurt any
business. On top of that, Kilmer says that marijuana likely makes up a higher
percentage of the cartel take today than it did back in 2008. So taking away pot
would sting even more . 3. Authorities could focus on other drugs Marijuana made
up 94 percent of the drugs seized by Border Patrol in the 2012 fiscal year, judging by
weight. If pot becomes legal in the U.S. and cartels are pushed out of the market, that
would allow law-enforcement agencies to dedicate more resources to combat the trafficking
of drugs like heroin and cocaine.
Pesticides
Pesticide levels are decreasing
Jessica Marshall, Discovery News, Oct. 27, 2008, Pesticides Dropping in
Groundwater?, http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2008/10/27/pesticidesgroundwater.html
Pesticide concentrations in groundwater held constant or decreased over a recent 10-year
period, according to a nationwide survey conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey. The
study sampled 362 wells across the country from 1993 to 1995 and again from 2001 to
2003. "Looking at trends, it doesn't look like we're seeing any increases in concentration or
detection frequency," said study author Laura Bexfield of the USGS in Albuquerque, N.M. "If
anything, a couple of the compounds seemed to decrease. Overall, I think it's a good story."
Although more than half of shallow wells in urban or agricultural areas and one-third of
deep aquifers contain measurable amounts of at least one pesticide, only six pesticide
compounds were detected in 10 or more wells during each of the two sampling cycles.
Bexfield found a significant decline in atrazine -- one of the most-used pesticides -- and its
breakdown product, and in prometon, which is used in non-agricultural settings to control
weeds, near buildings and along transportation routes.
Pesticides are net good for the environment and humanity by a factor of
1,000- the lit is biased
Jerry Cooper and Hans Dobson- Natural Resources Institute, University of
Greenwich- 2006 (last cite), PESTICIDES AND HUMANITY: THE BENEFITS
OF USING PESTICIDES,
http://www.croplifefoundation.org/Documents/Research%20Briefs/Pesti
cidesandhumanitybenefits.pdf
The overwhelming majority of publicly available publications on pesticides take a negative
position. This is no surprise since the benefits seem self-evident – they kill pests - whereas
the hazards are unintended and therefore of greater academic and journalistic interest. In
order to inform a more balanced view, this study was carried out to identify and
characterise the various types of benefit and where possible find publications to support
them. There is no attempt in this report to weigh the benefits of pesticides against potential
risks – that would represent a much bigger task. The source information assembled during
the preparation of this report can be consulted through the dedicated CropLife Benefits
Database, which can be found at
(http://www.croplifefoundation.org/international_benefits_db.asp). This database allows the
user to search on a range of criteria for published evidence of various types of benefit
arising from pesticide use. A short abstract and the bibliographic reference for each
publication can be accessed from the web pages and for inhouse users, the full text
document can be downloaded.In addition to identifying the immediate consequences – here
referred to as pesticide effects (essentially examples of pesticides killing pests) - the report
tracks through to primary benefits such as increased yield and then to less intuitively
obvious secondary benefits, for example reducing the emission of greenhouse gases
because using herbicides is less energy intensive than the mechanical cultivations required
to achieve an equivalent effect, or slowing down rural-urban migration in the developing
world by making agriculture a better livelihood option. In some cases these secondary
benefits are what ultimately justify the pesticides’ use. The primary and secondary benefits
can be further categorized as economic, social or environmental (see Appendix 1), but this
is not the way this analysis is structured. Rather, it is structured on the basis of the three
main pesticide effects, since we consider this more user-centred. Where there are benefits,
it follows that there are individuals or groups of people who gain, i.e., the beneficiaries. The
report considers who stands to gain from different types of pesticide use, such as farmers,
consumers, local communities, commerce, the global environment or mankind generally.
The finding from the study is that the list of beneficial outcomes from sensible use of
pesticides is long and provides compelling evidence that pesticides will continue to be a vital
tool in the diverse range of technologies that can maintain and improve living standards for
the people of the world. The hazards of pesticides are well documented. A recent brief
survey of pesticiderelated articles produced a ratio of over 40 negative for each one with a
more positive viewpoint. Some take the line that organic agriculture has survived
successfully for centuries and should therefore be the basis of modern productive
agriculture. A host of others point to health problems from accidental or deliberate exposure
to pesticides. Such occurrences are recognised, but this report focuses on the other, rather
neglected side of the coin, that is the ways in which pest management chemicals make a
positive and often essential contribution to society. Most people eat food grown in a system
that uses pesticides and many individuals use pesticides in the house or garden. In places
where there are insects whose bites can be a nuisance or a hazard, insecticides are used to
make life safer or more comfortable. Yet there is little acknowledgement of the important
beneficial role that pesticides play in US and European agriculture, or in parts of the world
where flies and other arthropod vectors spread dreadful diseases (WHO, 2004). Why then
the paucity of independent published material underlining their useful role? One reason is
that scientific literature is partially blind to the benefits since peer-reviewed scientific
reports have to be innovative, and when a product does exactly what the manufacturer says
it does, it is not newsworthy. No one publishes scientific papers on the wonders of gloss
paint, but it remains a good way to protect exterior woodwork. Some authors do value the
beneficial role of pesticides. Lomborg (2001) said "If pesticides were abolished, the lives
saved would be outnumbered by a factor of around 1000 by the lives lost due to poorer
diets. Secondary penalties would be massive environmental damage due to the land
needs of less productive farming, and a financial cost of around 20 billion US
Dollars". Denis Avery (1999), Director of the Centre for Global Food Issues at the Hudson
Institute in the US wrote in the Wall Street Journal “Humanity in the 21st century can
banish hunger, end nutritional deficits in its children, and save virtually all of the remaining
wild lands in the process. But there are only two ways to do it: either murder four billion
people, or use chemicals and biotechnology to maintain and increase yields on land
already under farming”.
Home appliances are more dangerous than pesticides- prefer studies to
overblown risk perceptions
Jerry Cooper and Hans Dobson- Natural Resources Institute, University of
Greenwich- March 19, 2007, The benefits of pesticides to mankind and the
environment, Science Direct,
http://www.croplifefoundation.org/Documents/Research%20Briefs/Pesti
cideBenefitsResearchPaper.pdf
Weighing the risks against the benefits of pesticide use is not only hampered by the paucity
of information on benefits, but also by the fact that most people are poor judges of the
relative hazard that pesticides represent. Based on earlier US data by Upton (1982), Hibbitt
(1990) ranked 30 hazards on the criterion of number of deaths per year, with number 1
being the largest number of deaths and number 30 being the smallest. Pesticides were
ranked very low at number 28 behind food preservatives (ranked 27), home appliances
(ranked 15), swimming (ranked 7) and smoking and alcohol (ranked 1 and 2, respectively).
But public perceptions were very different. Women voters thought that pesticides ranked
number 9 in the list, and college students put them at number 4. Both groups performed
poorly at estimating the relative risks posed by a list of hazards, perhaps due to the
predominantly negative publicity that pesticides receive. Moreover, food safety and health
concerns in the general public have increased in Europe following serious incidents such as
Salmonella poisoning, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), Foot and Mouth and
Escherichia coli infections. Pesticide residues in food, detected at ever-lower levels due to
increasingly sensitive laboratory equipment, are perceived to be associated with these
issues and are lumped together with them as another of the evils of agricultural
intensification. However, the evidence does not support the popular view that
pesticide residues represent a significant health risk in Europe and the US.
Warming D
extend
Small Farms
Big ag is key to food production and GMO’s---collapse of agri-consolidation
is worse for every impact
Michael Grunwald 9, a senior correspondent at Time magazine, is the author of The
Swamp: The Everglades, Florida, and the Politics of Paradise. “The Case for Big Ag:
Industrial farming pollutes rivers, distorts politics, and hurts rural communities. But it might
just save the rainforest,”
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2009/0907.grunwald.html, DOA: 9-23-14,
y2k
Hmm. We’re going to need more food. And we’re going to need our food growers to use less land. It
sounds like we’re going to need—industrial agriculture. In the future, for the same reason we won’t want to sacrifice
valuable cropland for biofuels, we won’t want to sacrifice it for low-yield organic kale either. As much as we love Michael Pollan’s delicious
prose, as much as we feel we ought to love locally grown, pesticide-free, genetically unmodified, naturally fertilized, antibiotic-free,
multigrain whatever, we’re going to need the world’s farmland to produce as much
sustenance as possible on as little ground as possible, so that we can leave the Amazon
alone. Just as we’ll have to increase people-per-acre urban densities to rein in exurban sprawl, we’ll have to increase calorie-per-acre farm
production to rein in agricultural sprawl. Michelle Obama’s little garden is a lovely gesture, but it’s not going to feed a
world where food demand is rising much faster than food supply, where overpumping is lowering water tables
and imperiling agriculture in China and India, and where grain reserves dwindled to an all-time low last year. To feed that world, we’ll
need Big Ag to do what it does best. This will require a jolting paradigm shift. Industrial farmers have a well-earned reputation in
policy circles as obesity-promoting, pesticide-spewing, water-wasting, energy-hogging, illegal-alien-hiring, politician-buying corporate welfare queens who
wax hypocritical about family farmers and the "heartland" while driving small farms out of business and hollowing out rural towns. Their subsidies help
deplete aquifers, destroy rivers, intensify Third World poverty, and scuttle free trade deals that would boost the nonagricultural sectors of the U.S.
high yields look like the best way to limit agriculture to a sustainable
footprint that would leave enough trees and marshes to avoid a planetary emergency, it
economy. But now that their
might be time for good-government types, environmentalists, anti-hunger activists, free trade supporters, health advocates, and other perennial Big Ag
bashers to start thinking about how to work with them. Those taxpayer-supported amber waves of grain have environmental benefits as well as costs.
That doesn’t mean we have to support agro-fuels—although we should support efforts to convert crop waste into energy as long as it doesn’t remove land
from production. We don’t have to support egregious subsidies for multimillionaire farmers, either—although given the hopeless politics of the issue it
we ought to recognize
and encourage the potential of genetically modified crops to produce high-yield, drought-resistant
crops that require fewer petroleum-based fertilizers and pesticides. And we ought to
acknowledge that agricultural consolidation, while painful for family farmers and rural communities, is not only
inevitable but in many ways desirable. Big Ag can use the advantages of bigness not only to
boost production (by buying the best seeds and inputs and tractors) but to reduce waste
(with precision GPS gadgets that adjust spraying and watering according to the topography of the field ).
might make sense to agree to support them if they’re tied to soil, water, and energy conservation requirements. But
We might even rethink our opposition to those icky confined-feeding operations, especially when they’re clumping together (more greenhouse-friendly)
chickens rather than cows. In exchange, maybe those feedlots could stop destroying the Chesapeake Bay. That would be Big Ag’s end of the bargain:
Eliminate its most egregious and least sustainable practices. Stop farming to the edge of the river, and stop draining wetlands. Keep the cows out of the
stream, and more runoff on the farm. Stop spreading petroleum-based fertilizer when and where it isn’t needed. Stop creating a massive dead zone in
The industry made strides dealing with its erosion problems in response to
federal incentives; perhaps it could clean up the rest of its act with proper inducements. Big Ag has been so politically
successful for so long that it might resist any compromise, but the farm lobby knows its cuethe-violins baloney about humble tillers of the heartland soil might not justify redistribution from
taxpayers to agro-industrialists forever. And one positive by-product of the trend toward corporate farming is that
corporations tend to worry about their images. If agriculture keeps producing more than 30
percent of the world’s emissions, including the deforestation effect, it’s going to get stuck with the mother of all
image problems. Brazil is an interesting example. Its larger producers make our Big Ag look like Jeffersonian yeomen, and they’ve become
the Gulf of Mexico.
international pariahs to the save-the-rainforest crowd. But they’re much lighter on the land than the slash-and-burn subsistence farmers on the Amazon
frontier. It’s probably too late for another green revolution; we’re bumping up against the limits of photosynthesis, and global yield increases have
dwindled to about 1 percent per year. And there would be social costs to a large-scale expansion of industrial agriculture in Africa and the rest of the lowyield Third World, as well as political costs; it’s no coincidence that the world’s biggest soybean farmer is also the governor of a large Brazilian province
on the Amazon frontier. But agricultural consolidation is going to continue no matter what; economies of scale create huge efficiencies, and they give
large producers at least some counterweight against the vastly consolidated processing, shipping, and retailing industries. Searchinger’s epiphanies
World hunger and
warming are two of the great challenges of this century, and they are inextricably
linked through agriculture and the land. About five million children already die of nutrition-related
causes every year, and about fifteen million acres of carbon-rich forests already get converted into farms every year. As the world
population rises, both of those figures are likely to explode unless agricultural productivity can
explode as well. So by all means, we should ask industrial farmers to clean up their act. But first, we
might want to beg them to save the planet and feed the world.
remind us that if it’s going to happen eventually, it might as well happen now, while there’s still a rainforest to save.
global
Genetic modification is key
Anthony Trewavas 2K, Professor at the Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology at the
University of Edinburgh, “GM IS the Best Option We Have”,
http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html, DOA: 9-2414, y2k
In 535A.D. a volcano near the present Krakatoa exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A
bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here
and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The
after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in
There are apparently 100 such
volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. And even smaller
volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply.
Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would destroy much of our
civilisation. Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a
chance at survival. Colliding asteroids are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that
technological advance may be the only buffer between us and annihilation. When people say to me they do not need GM, I am
full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment.
astonished at their prescience, their ability to read a benign future in a crystal ball that I cannot. Now is the time to experiment; not when a holocaust is
GM is a technology whose time has come and just in the nick of time
upon us and it is too late.
. With each
billion that mankind has added to the planet have come technological advances to increase food supply. In the 18th century, the start of agricultural
mechanisation; in the 19th century knowledge of crop mineral requirements, the eventual Haber Bosch process for nitrogen reduction. In the 20th
Each time population growth has been sustained
without enormous loss of life through starvation even though crisis often beckoned. For the
21st century, genetic manipulation is our primary hope to maintain developing and complex
technological civilisations. When the climate is changing in unpredictable ways, diversity in agricultural technology is a strength and a
century plant genetics and breeding, and later the green revolution.
necessity not a luxury. Diversity helps secure our food supply. We have heard much of the precautionary principle in recent years; my versi on of it is "be
prepared".
Small farming causes deforestation---synthetic fertilizer is key
Robert Paarlberg 10, a professor at Wellesley College and Associate at the Weatherhead
Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, “Attention Whole Foods Shoppers:
Stop obsessing about arugula. Your "sustainable" mantra -- organic, local, and slow -- is no
recipe for saving the world's hungry millions,” 4-26-10,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/26/attention_whole_foods_shoppers, DOA:
9-22-14, y2k
When it comes to protecting the environment, assessments of organic farming become more complex. Excess nitrogen fertilizer use on conventional
halting synthetic nitrogen fertilizer use
would cause
environmental problems far worse. Here's why: Less than 1 percent of American cropland is under
certified organic production. If the other 99 percent were to switch to organic and had to
fertilize crops without any synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, that would require a lot more composted
animal manure. To supply enough organic fertilizer, the U.S. cattle population would have to
increase roughly fivefold. And because those animals would have to be raised organically on forage
crops, much of the land in the lower 48 states would need to be converted to pasture. Organic field crops also have lower yields
farms in the United States has polluted rivers and created a "dead zone" in the Gulf of Mexico, but
entirely (as farmers must do in the United States to get organic certification from the Agriculture Department)
per hectare. If Europe tried to feed itself organically, it would need an additional 28 million hectares of
cropland, equal to all of the remaining forest cover in France, Germany, Britain, and Denmark combined. Mass
deforestation probably isn't what organic advocates intend. The smart way to protect against nitrogen runoff is to reduce
synthetic fertilizer applications with taxes, regulations, and cuts in farm subsidies, but not try to go all the way to zero as required by the official organic
standard. Scaling up registered organic farming would be on balance harmful, not helpful, to the natural environment.
Small farms don’t solve sustainability
Hurst 09 (Blake, farmer in Missouri. The American, Journal of the American Enterprise
Institute, 7/30, http://www.american.com/archive/2009/july/the-omnivore2019s-delusionagainst-the-agri-intellectuals)
The most delicious irony is this: the parts of farming that are the most “industrial” are the
most likely to be owned by the kind of family farmers that elicit such a positive response
from the consumer. Corn farms are almost all owned and managed by small family
farmers. But corn farmers salivate at the thought of one more biotech breakthrough, use
vast amounts of energy to increase production, and raise large quantities of an
indistinguishable commodity to sell to huge corporations that turn that corn into thousands
of industrial products. Most livestock is produced by family farms, and even the poultry
industry, with its contracts and vertical integration, relies on family farms to contract for the
production of the birds. Despite the obvious change in scale over time, family farms, like
ours, still meet around the kitchen table, send their kids to the same small schools, sit in
the same church pew, and belong to the same civic organizations our parents and
grandparents did. We may be industrial by some definition, but not our own. Reality is
messier than it appears in the book my tormentor was reading, and farming more
complicated than a simple morality play.
1NR
2NC Impact—AT UN Bad
Even if overall compliance is low—this issue is key to give US credibility in
enforcing treaties and preventing excessive flexibility—the aff dooms the
system
Bennett 14
[10/16/14, Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings
Institution; interviewed by Jonathan Rauch, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at
Brookings, “Marijuana Legalization Poses a Dilemma for International Drug Treaties,”
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/10/16-marijuana-enforcementmodernize-international-drug-treaties-rauch]
Why should we care about avoiding a collision between international
commitments and domestic policies? Countries technically violate treaties all the
time, don’t they? The United States has a unique role in the world. It can summon
powers that no other nation can summon, but it confronts risks that no other nation
confronts. If you accept that premise, then the United States has a unique interest in
securing reciprocal compliance from its treaty partners. It gets harder and harder to
call out our partners for excessive flexibility within the drug treaty structures—or for
that matter within other multilateral commitments—after we have claimed a lot of
flexibility for ourselves.
Legalization wrecks the global rule of law by signaling that domestic
interests come before treaty obligations
Counts 14 [2014, Nathan Counts is a J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, “INITIATIVE
502 AND CONFLICTING STATE AND FEDERAL LAW” 49 Gonz. L. Rev. 187,
http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/law-review/files/2014/04/1-Counts-Pgs-187-212.pdf]
In dealing with the conflicting state and federal law, enforcement decisions will affect the
United States’ role as an actor in international law and the direction of international
cooperation in combatting illegal drug trade. First, if the United States breaches its treaty
obligations under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, it would undermine the
international rule of law. A strong international rule of law is desirable “to establish and
maintain order and enhance reliable expectations” in international affairs.142 As there are
no enforcement mechanisms for international legal obligations equivalent to that which
exists with domestic law, the weight of obligations relies to some extent on comity among
the states involved.143 As long as states agree to limit their sovereignty and comply with
international law, states will be more likely to respect one another’s reasonable expectations
and fulfill their obligations.144 Both conventions have provisions that read, “If there should
arise between two or more Parties a dispute relating to the interpretation or application of
this Convention, the Parties shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the
dispute by . . . peaceful means of their own choice,” and should this fail, they agree to
jurisdiction before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).145 Despite this possibility of
justiciability of breach, it is highly unlikely that any state party would bring a case before
the ICJ over domestic non-enforcement of the treaty obligations, as diplomatic channels are
more predictable and possible noncompliance with ICJ judgments weakens the international
rule of law.146 If the United States fails to enforce the CSA and allows the Washington
legalization system to succeed, it may signal to other states that the United States is
willing to allow its domestic law overcome its international law obligations and
may not be reliable in international transnational enforcement efforts in the future.
It also signals to other states that they may allow their domestic law to inhibit
effective enforcement of international treaty obligations, which may undermine the
United States’ goals in the future.
All of the issues with the UN link to alternatives—a response to book they
cite
Wadlow 9
[Rene Wadlow, “ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the Search for
Alternatives”, http://globalsolutions.org/books/ConUNdrum-Limits-United-Nations-andSearch-Alternatives#.VNY-XP54oUs]
What the authors do not mention is the difficulties of governments with smaller delegations
than those of the US to find their way through the labyrinth of the U.N. system. Also
unmentioned is any comparison between the U.N. and national governments also
filled with ministries, agencies and funds with overlapping and duplicate missions.
The half-theme that runs through several of the chapters but is developed fully in none is
the role and power of the representatives of non-governmental organizations. The President of
the Heritage Foundation, Edwin Feulner, notes “Nonstate actors operating through advocacy groups and
nongovernmental organizations, virtually unknown at the U.N. in the early 1980s, now exert influence over U.N.
deliberations and activities on a level that is sometimes nearly on par with sovereign states.” Susan Yoshihara adds
“Aided and abetted by activist NGOs, the U.N. retains sweeping plans to remake the world, but at steep cost to its
traditional role of providing vaccinations, medicine, clean water, and a helping hand.” One can question if providing
vaccinations and clean water were traditional U.N. roles. Having been a NGO representative to the U.N. in Geneva
since 1973, after having been a professor of social development at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies
I have followed closely the growth of U.N. development activities — much of it in
response to the membership of new states, especially from Africa starting in the early
1960s. A few governments, strong leadership from some U.N. agencies, concern and some
initiatives from NGOs have marked the growth of U.N. development efforts . However, the
growth has been largely in response to events, the Nigeria-Biafra War of the late 1960s and the Sahel
drought of the 1970s have been key moments that required multi-level responses. The U.N. has grown not
by having “sweeping plans to remake the world” but in response to immediate needs of
people and the difficulties of a single national government to meet these needs . This book is a
realistic look at the limits of the U.N. However, the search for alternatives should be within the
U.N. system and not in alternative structures.
in Geneva,
The UN is our best hope for transnational problem solving and legitimacy
Hirsh, 9/24/13 [“Why the United Nations Is Suddenly Relevant”, Michael Hirsh is chief
correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to 2012 Decoded. Hirsh previously
served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in
its Washington bureau. He was also Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a
weekly column, http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2013/09/why-united-nationssuddenly-relevant/70738/?oref=d-skybox]
That's especially the view in Washington, which more often than not sees the big green building on the East River as a giant, musty
suddenly the United Nations has become freshly relevant, more so than it has
been in years, certainly for all of Obama's first term. And new U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power, who is
encumbrance. But
largely untested as a diplomat, finds herself in a very hot spotlight, one that might even make her predecessor, new National
the actions of
the U.N. Security Council could determine Obama's major foreign-policy legacy, even
more so than his takedown of Osama bin Laden, on the long-festering issues of Iran's nuclear
Security Advisor Susan Rice, a touch regretful that she departed New York so soon. Indeed, in coming months
program and Syria's civil war. In both cases a legal dependency on the U.N. Charter and previous Security Council
resolutions will be crucial to success. It already seems clear that it was, more than anything, the sharp
bite of U.N.-approved sanctions on Iran that led to the surprise election of moderate President
Hassan Rouhani, who has practically tripped over himself offering to negotiate and whose muchanticipated speech Tuesday is expected to give clues as to his flexibility. It is also clear that previous U.N. Security Council
resolutions dating back to 2006 and demanding that Tehran suspend uranium enrichment will, more than anything else, put
On Syria -- an issue on which Obama has looked
consistently weak for two years -- it is also a U.N. Security Council resolution that will enforce
the deus-ex-machina deal that Moscow and Washington suddenly already agreed upon to dismantle Bashar al–Assad's chemical
Rouhani's sincerity and internationalism to the test.
weapons. [Read more: Will Obama and Rouhani Meet Face-to-Face at the United Nations?] The Russians are resisting any mention
of force in the new resolution, and Obama has pledged to keep open his earlier threat to attack Syria unilaterally if it does not
comply. But even here, says John Bellinger, the former legal counsel to the State Department, the president's best argument rests
on the U.N. charter's "Chapter 7" guarantee of the right to "collective self-defense." Bellinger, who served under George W. Bush,
says the previous president might have won more support in Iraq had he done something similar. "My advice to Obama would be
Rather than rely on new and untested theories such as preemption or humanitarian
intervention, emphasize more a reliance on the U.N. charter itself." American policy-makers
have rarely paid much respect to the U.N. General Assembly, an obstreperous talking shop
built on the pretense that the vote of Zimbabwe or Liechtenstein is as important as that of
the United States. U.S. presidents have also grown impatient with the Security Council, which Franklin Roosevelt set up
toward the end of World War II as a global policing body. Presidents, including Obama, tend to see the
Security Council as a stagnant pool of lost great-power ambitions, a pretend-place where a Russia can
puff itself up into an image of its former self. Under Vladimir Putin, Moscow has often done just that, vetoing
every resolution that might have authorized an intervention in Syria over the last two years. But
now Russia has publicly committed itself to a U.N.-authorized dismantling of Syria's
chemical weapons—and if Moscow follows through, that will achieve the double victory of curtailing Assad's activities and coopting an increasingly roguish Russia back, to some degree, into the international system. The fact is that, as Obama is
same:
discovering anew, the Security Council remains the
main repository for
international legitimacy—which is another way of saying it's the most effective
way of getting other nations to ally with the United States. As we are finding out anew, the growing body of
U.N. Security Council resolutions is what gives American foreign-policy goals the heft of international law, rather than the stigma of
a diktat from Washington.
The UN is key
UNNC, 9/28/ 13 [United Nations News Center, “UN must reflect the world as it is, not as it
used to be, say Ministers from Germany, Liechtenstein”,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46123&Cr=general+debate&Cr1=#.UkiQ
_FM6z3M]
Germany's Foreign Minister underscored the need for United Nations reform
saying the Organization must be strengthened so it can
play the vital role intended for it and reflect the realities of today's world. “The authority of the
United Nations depends on its being representative,” Guido Westerwelle told the high-level
debate at UN Headquarters. “A Security Council without permanent seats for Africa and Latin America does not
28 September 2013 –
in his address to the General Assembly,
reflect the realities of today's world. A Security Council in which Asia, that emerging and highly populated region, is
represented with only one single permanent seat does not reflect the realities of today's world.” Mr. Westerwelle
said Germany, with its partners Japan, India and Brazil, is prepared to assume greater responsibility. “ We
are
seeking reform of the United Nations so that its power to build consensus, establish global
rules and act effectively in response to crises and conflicts is demonstrably
strengthened,” he stated.
The impact is extinction—even if the UN has flaws, the alternative is worse
Tharooor, 03 [Shashi Tharoor, is the Indian Minister of State for Human Resource
Development, Member of Parliament (MP) from the Thiruvananthapuram of Kerala, an
author and a columnist, Tharoor subsequently obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree in history
from St. Stephen's College in Delhi.[5] and went on to pursue graduate studies at The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, from where he obtained an M.A in
1976, an M.A.L.D in 1977 and a Ph.D. in 1979 at age 23.[6],
http://www.cfr.org/world/why-america-still-needs-united-nations/p7567]
Summary: Multilateralism is a means, not an end, and
there is no more multilateral body than the UN. That
the UN's inclusiveness is the key to the legitimacy only it can
confer. The organization thus remains an essential force in international politics, and one the United
may make it unwieldy at times, but
States benefits from greatly. THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY In September 2002, a radical new document declared that "no nation can
build a safer, better world alone." These words came not from some utopian internationalist or ivory-tower academic, but from the
new National Security Strategy of the United States. For all its underpinnings in realpolitik, the strategy committed the United
States to multilateralism. This statement should not have been surprising, for multilateralism, of course, is not only a means but an
end. And for good reason: in international affairs, the choice of method can serve to advertise a country's good faith or
disinterestedness. Most states act both unilaterally and multilaterally at times: the former in defense of their national security or in
The larger a country's backyard, however, the
greater the temptation to act unilaterally across it -- a problem most acute in the case of the
United States. But the more far-reaching the issue and the greater the number of countries
affected, the less sufficient unilateralism proves, and the less viable it becomes. Hence the
ongoing need for multilateralism -- which the U.S. National Security Strategy seemed to recognize. The United
Nations is the preeminent institution of multilateralism. It provides a forum where sovereign
states can come together to share burdens, address common problems, and seize common
opportunities. The UN helps establish the norms that many countries -- including the United States -- would like
their immediate backyard, the latter in pursuit of global causes.
everyone to live by. Throughout its history, the United States has seen the advantages of living in a world organized according to
laws, values, and principles; in fact, the republic was not yet 30 years old when it first went to war in defense of international law
(attacking the Barbary pirates in 1804), and it has done so multiple times since, including in the first Gulf War. The UN, for all its
imperfections -- real and perceived -- reflects this American preference for an ordered world. That Washington has often used
force on behalf of such principles makes good political sense. After all, acting in the name of international law is always preferable
couching U.S. action in terms of
international law universalizes American interests and comforts potential allies. When American
actions seem driven by U.S. national security imperatives alone, partners can prove hard to find -as became clear when, in marked contrast to the first Gulf War, only a small "coalition of the willing" joined
Washington the second time around in Iraq. Working within the UN allows the United States to maximize
what Joseph Nye calls its "soft power" -- the ability to attract and persuade others to adopt the American agenda -rather than relying purely on the dissuasive or coercive "hard power" of military force. Global challenges also
require global solutions, and few indeed are the situations in which the United States or any other
country can act completely alone. This truism is currently being confirmed in Iraq, where Washington is discovering that
to acting in the name of national security. Everyone has a stake in the former, and so
it is better at winning wars than constructing peace. The limitations of military strength in nation building are readily apparent; as
Talleyrand pointed out, the one thing you cannot do with a bayonet is to sit on it.
Equally important, however, is the
need for legitimacy, and here again the UN has proven invaluable. The organization's role in legitimizing state action has
been both its most cherished function and, in the United States, its most controversial. As the world's preeminent international
When the UN
Security Council passes a resolution, it is seen as speaking for (and in the interests of) humanity as a whole, and in
so doing it confers a legitimacy that is respected by the world's governments, and usually by their
organization, the UN embodies world opinion, or at least the opinion of the world's legally constituted states.
publics. When the resolution in question is passed under Chapter VII of the charter -- that document's enforcement provisions -- it
becomes legally binding on all member states. The composition of the council that passes a particular resolution is no more
relevant to its legitimacy than that of a national parliament that passes a law; congressional legislation, by the same logic, is not
less binding on Americans if the majority that votes for it comes overwhelmingly from small states. The legitimacy of the UN
inheres in its universality and not in its structural details, which have long been subject to the clamor for reform. Some Americans
have scorned the status and conduct of many of the Security Council members that failed to support the United States on Iraq. But
this unseemly sneering over the right of Angola, Cameroon, or Guinea to pass judgment in the council overlooks the valuable
contribution their presence makes. The election of small countries to the council bolsters its legitimacy by enhancing its role as a
repository of world opinion. Universality of membership also allows the world to view the UN as something more than the sum of
its parts, as an entity that transcends the interests of any one member state. The UN guards the vital principles entrenched in its
charter, notably the sovereign equality of states and the inadmissibility of interference in their internal affairs. It is precisely
because the UN is the chief guardian of both these sacrosanct principles that it alone is allowed to approve derogations from them.
Thus when the UN, in particular the Security Council, legislates an intervention in a sovereign state, it is still seen as upholding the
basic principles even while approving a departure from them. When an individual state acts in defiance of the UN, on the other
hand, it merely violates these principles. This is why so many countries, including the most powerful ones, take care to embed
their actions within the framework of the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. For examples of this, one need only peruse a
random selection of speeches by countries explaining their votes on the Security Council, especially those concerning military
action. The value of internationally recognized principles resonates across the globe and has been reified through 58 years of
To suggest -- as did some
critics of the UN during the Iraq crisis -- that the organization has become irrelevant overlooks the
message President George W. Bush himself sent when he appeared before the General Assembly in
repetition -- including last March, when the council debated Iraq. SHOWDOWN IN NEW YORK
September 2002. In calling on the Security Council to take action, Bush framed the problem of Iraq as a question not of what the
United States (unilaterally) wanted, but of how to implement Security Council resolutions. Indeed, these resolutions were at the
heart of the U.S. case. Had the Security Council been able to agree that force was warranted, it would have provided unique (and
incontestable) legitimacy for U.S. military action. The fact that the council did not ultimately agree, however, strengthens, rather
The council's refusal to serve as a rubber stamp
for Washington will give any future support it lends to the United States greater credibility.
than dilutes, the rationale for approaching it in such situations.
Council resolutions do not serve only to codify the acceptable in the eyes of the world; they also, quite directly, lay down the law.
In fact, several countries, from Norway to India, do not or cannot (as a matter of politics, policy, or constitutional law) commit
forces overseas without the council's explicit authorization. Such a practice ensures that these countries will not be drawn into
military adventures at the behest of one or a handful of powerful states. They send troops only when the Security Council, speaking
in the name of the world as a whole, blesses an enterprise. Nonetheless, since the Iraq crisis, some critics have suggested that
"coalitions of the willing" will eventually eliminate the need for formal structures such as the UN. "Multilateralism á la carte," the
thinking goes, will replace "multilateralism á la charte." But even ad hoc coalitions require structure: many states, when asked by
Washington to contribute troops for Iraq, have hesitated to do so without the sanction of a UN resolution or a UN-authorized
International institutions give the United States' potential partners a framework
within which they can feel empowered on (at least notionally) equal terms -- and without which they are not
command structure.
willing to participate. Put another way, the difference between a UN operation, in which everyone wears a blue helmet, and a
"coalition of the willing" led by one big power is similar to that between a police squad and a posse. Posses are more difficult to find
and to fund than are police. Similarly, developing countries in any coalition need financing in order to play their part, and such
Unilateralism is always more
expensive than its alternative, and in today's tight world economy, the costs of international
unilateralism may no longer be sustainable. Even when a Security Council resolution is not legally required for an
financing is more easily provided through the UN's agreed cost-sharing formula.
action, the UN's imprimatur can still prove extremely useful for the United States. A council decision does not just spread expense
and political risk, by diluting Washington's responsibility for a course of action that might provoke resentment or hostility. It is also
easier for many governments to sell a policy to their publics if they can describe it as a response to a UN resolution, instead of to an
American request. The United States has already learned this lesson: for example, when it has tried to prompt countries to revise
and update their domestic security procedures or laws on terrorism, it has discovered that governments are often happier to
receive the same American expert as a UN adviser than as a U.S. one. In fact, part of the value of the UN (including for
Washington) is the respect in which its members hold the body. Such respect has permitted the United States, on numerous
occasions, to advance its specific interests under the cover of international law. For example, UN sanctions on Libya helped the
United States achieve a settlement over the Lockerbie bombing. And after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Security
Council's two subsequent resolutions provided an international framework for the global battle against terrorism. Resolution 1373
required nations to interdict arms flows and financial transfers to suspected terrorist groups, report on terrorists' movements, and
update national legislation to fight them. Without the legal authority of a binding Security Council resolution, Washington would
have been hard-pressed to obtain such cooperation "retail" from 191 individual states, and it would have taken decades to
negotiate and ratify separate treaties and conventions imposing the same standards on all countries. As such examples
demonstrate, it is clearly not in the U.S. interest to discredit the UN or the Security Council. For every rare
occasion when the council thwarts Washington, there are a dozen more when it acts in accordance with U.S. wishes and compels
To marginalize the council, then, would be to blunt a vital arrow in the
U.S. diplomatic quiver. BEYOND LIMITS What about the Security Council's structural
deficiencies? For all the carping about its outdated composition -- which, by common consensus, reflects the geopolitical
realities of 1945 rather than 2003 -- no other body has acquired the kind of legitimacy it brings to bear
on world affairs. The council may need reform, therefore, but until member states agree on how to go about
making changes, it remains the only global body with responsibility for maintaining
international peace and security. Suggestions that the UN should be replaced -- by a coalition of
democracies, for example -- overlook the fact that during the Iraq debate, the most vigorous
resistance to the United States in the council came from other democracies. Nor is
other countries to do the same.
NATO a feasible alternative to the council, because its legitimacy is geographically limited, as
is that of other regional organizations. NATO authorization might have been deemed sufficient for the Kosovo
campaign. But in that war, the target was another European state, Yugoslavia. NATO's imprimatur would not have been enough to
justify military action in Iraq, which is why the United States and the United Kingdom tried so hard to get the Security Council's
benediction for that action. In any case, the council's final vote (or lack thereof) on Iraq was not the only gauge of its relevance to
that situation. Just four years ago, when NATO bombed Yugoslavia without even referring to the council (let alone securing its
approval), many critics similarly argued that the UN had become irrelevant. But the Kosovo question soon came up again at the
Security Council, first when an unsuccessful attempt was made to condemn the bombing, and then when arrangements had to be
Only the Security Council could have approved the
arrangements so as to confer on them international legitimacy and encourage all
nations to extend their support and resources. And only one body was trusted enough to
run the civilian administration of Kosovo: the United Nations. The same pattern was not followed precisely in
made to administer the province after the war.
the case of Iraq, but the events were similar. Resolution 1483, adopted unanimously on May 22, granted the UN a significant r ole in
postwar Iraq. That the United States chose to give the UN such a prominent position reflects not just British pressure but also
Washington's own recognition that it needs the world body. Indeed, the very fact that the United States submitted the resolut ion to
the Security Council was an acknowledgment by Washington that there is, in Secretary-General Kofi Annan's words, no substitute
for the unique legitimacy provided by the UN. The body might have been written off during the war. But
as with Kosovo, it
was quickly found to be essential to the ensuing peace.
Of course, peace can be kept in many ways, and
Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and now Iraq offer four different models for how the UN can engage in postconflict situations. But
peacekeeping (which includes mediation, monitoring, and disarmament) remains exactly the
kind of mission where using the UN has advantages for Washington that greatly outweigh
the negatives. First, there is the obvious attraction of burden-sharing: UN peacekeeping
allows other countries to help shoulder the United States' responsibility for maintaining peace
around the world. Second, despite some well-publicized failures, UN peacekeeping works. The UN's
"blue helmets" won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988; since then, they have brought peace and democracy to
Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and East Timor; helped ease the U.S. burden after regime
changes in Haiti and Afghanistan; and policed largely bloodless stalemates from Cyprus to the Golan Heights to Western Sahara.
UN peacekeeping is highly cost-effective. The UN is used to running operations on a shoestring, and it
spends less per year on peacekeeping worldwide than is spent on the budgets of the New
York City Fire and Police Departments. UN peacekeeping is also far cheaper than the
alternative, which is war. Two days of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 cost more than the entire UN peacekeeping
Third,
budget that year, and one week of Operation Iraqi Freedom would amply pay for all UN peacekeeping for 2003. The UN operation
that ended the Iran-Iraq War cost less annually than the crude oil carried in two supertankers. Considering how many supertankers
None of this is to
deny that the Security Council's record has been mixed. The body has acted unwisely at
times and failed to act altogether at others: one need only think of the fate of the "safe areas" in Bosnia and the
were placed at risk during that ruinous conflict, this makes peacekeeping an extraordinary bargain.
genocide in Rwanda for instances of each. The council has also sometimes been too divided to succeed, as was the case in early
2003 over Iraq. And all too often, member states have passed resolutions they had no intention of implementing. But the UN, at its
Sometimes it
only muddles through. As Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN's second secretary-general, put it, the UN was not created
to take humanity to heaven but to save it from hell. And this it has done innumerable times,
especially during the Cold War, when it prevented regional or local conflicts from igniting a
superpower conflagration. To suggest, on the basis of the disagreement over Iraq, that the Security Council has
become dysfunctional or irrelevant is to greatly distort the record by viewing it through the prism of just one issue. Even while
disagreeing on Iraq, the members of the Security Council unanimously agreed on a host of other
vital issues, from Congo to Côte d'Ivoire, from Cyprus to Afghanistan. Indeed, the Security Council remains on the whole a
best, is only a mirror of the world: it reflects divisions and disagreements as well as hopes and convictions.
remarkably harmonious body. Authorizing wars has never been among its principal responsibilities -- only twice in its 58 years of
existence has the council explicitly done so -- and it seems unduly harsh to condemn it solely over its handling of so rare a
challenge. In any case, it would be folly to discredit an entire institution for a disagreement among its members. One would not
close down the Senate (or even the Texas legislature) because its members failed to agree on one bill. The UN's record of success
and failure is no worse than that of most representative national institutions, yet its detractors seem to expect the UN to succeed
(or at least to agree with the United States) all the time. Too often, the UN's critics seem to miss another fundamental
characteristic of the world body: the way it functions both as a stage and as an actor. On the one hand, the UN is a stage on which
its member states declaim their differences and their convergences. Yet the UN is also an actor (particularly in the person of the
secretary-general, his staff, agencies, and operations) that executes the policies made on its stage. The general public usually fails
to see this distinction and views the UN as a shapeless aggregation. Sins (of omission or commission) committed by individual
governments on the UN stage are thus routinely blamed on the organization itself. Sometimes member states deliberately
officials blamed the UN for not preventing genocide in
Rwanda -- despite the fact that Washington itself had blocked the Security Council from
taking action in that crisis. Indeed, one of the more unpleasant, if convenient, uses to which the UN has regularly been
contribute to this confusion, as when American
put has been to serve as a pliant scapegoat for the failures of its member states. Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
ruefully noted this point when alleged UN deficiencies were blamed for the purely American-made disaster in Mogadishu in October
1993. And Annan has often joked that the abbreviation by which he is known inside the organization -- "SG" -- stands for
"scapegoat," not "secretary-general." There is, sadly, considerable utility in having an institution that, by embodying the collective
will (or lack thereof) of 191 member states, can safely be blamed for the errors that no individual state could politically afford to
admit. But those who need a whipping boy must be careful not to flog him to death. IN IT TOGETHER The UN's relevance does not
stand or fall on its conduct on any one issue. When the crisis has passed, the world will still be left with, to use Annan's phrase,
threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
the degradation of our common environment, contagious disease and chronic starvation,
human rights and human wrongs, mass illiteracy and massive displacement. These are problems that no
one country, however powerful, can solve alone. The problems are the shared responsibility of
humankind and cry out for solutions that, like the problems themselves, also cross frontiers.
The UN exists to find these solutions through the common endeavor of all states. It is the
indispensable global organization for a globalizing world. Large portions of the world's
population require the UN's assistance to surmount problems they cannot overcome on their
own. As these words are written, civil war rages in Congo and Liberia and sputters in Côte d'Ivoire, while long-running conflicts
innumerable "problems without passports" -(WMD),
may be close to permanent solution in Cyprus and Sierra Leone. The arduous task of nation building proceeds fitfully in
Afghanistan, the Balkans, East Timor, and Iraq. Twenty million refugees and displaced persons, from Palestine to Liberia and
beyond, depend on the UN for shelter and succor. Decades of development in Africa are being wiped out by the scourge of hiv/aids
(and its deadly interaction with famine and drought), and the Millennium Development Goals -- agreed on with much fanfare in
September 2000, at the UN's Millennium Summit, the largest gathering of heads of government in human history -- remain
Too many countries still lack the wherewithal to eliminate poverty, educate girls,
safeguard health, and provide their people with clean drinking water. If the UN did not exist to help
tackle these problems, they would undoubtedly end up on the doorstep of the world's only superpower. The UN is also
essential to Americans' pursuit of their own prosperity. Today, whether one is from Tashkent or Tallahassee,
it is simply not realistic to think only in terms of one's own country. Global forces press in from every
conceivable direction; people, goods, and ideas cross borders and cover vast distances with ever greater frequency, speed,
unfulfilled.
and ease. The Internet is emblematic of an era in which what happens in Southeast Asia or southern Africa -- from democratic
advances to deforestation to the fight against aids -- can affect Americans. As has been observed about water pollution, we all live
downstream now. Thus U.S. foreign policy today has become as much a matter of managing global issues as managing bilateral
ones. At the same time, the concept of the nation-state as self-sufficient has also weakened; although the state remains the
primary political unit, most citizens now instinctively understand that it cannot do everything on its own. To function in the world,
jobs depend not
on local firms and factories, but also on faraway markets, grants of licenses and access from foreign governments,
international trade rules that ensure the free movement of goods and persons, and international
financial institutions that ensure stability. There are thus few unilateralists in the American business
community. Americans' safety, meanwhile, depends not only on local police forces, but also on guarding
against the global spread of pollution, disease, terror, illegal drugs, and WMD. As the World Health
Organization's successful battle against the dreaded sars epidemic has demonstrated, "problems without passports"
are those that only international action can solve. Fortunately, the UN and its broad family of
agencies have, in nearly six decades of life, built a remarkable record of expertise and achievement on
these issues. The UN has brought humanitarian relief to millions in need and helped people rebuild their
countries from the ruins of war. It has challenged poverty, fought apartheid, protected the rights of
children, promoted decolonization and democracy, and placed environmental and gender
issues at the top of the world's agenda. These are no small achievements, and represent issues the United States
cannot afford to neglect. The United Nations is a valuable antidote to the tendency to disregard the
problems of the periphery -- the kinds of problems Americans may prefer not to deal with but that are impossible to
ignore. Handling them multilaterally is the obvious way to ensure they are tackled; it is also the
people increasingly have to deal with institutions and individuals beyond their country's borders. American
only
only way. Americans will be safer in a world improved by the UN's efforts, which will be needed long after Iraq has passed from the
The exercise of American power may well be the central issue
in world politics today, but that power is only enhanced if its use is perceived as legitimate.
headlines. KEEPING GULLIVER ON BOARD
Ironically, although many in Washington distrust the world body, many abroad think the Security Council is too much in thrall to its
most powerful member. The debates over Iraq proved that that is not always the case; but even if it were, it is far better to have a
world organization that is anchored in geopolitical reality than one that is too detached from the verities of global power to be
A UN that provides a vital political and diplomatic framework for the actions of its
most powerful member, while casting them in the context of international law and
legitimacy (and bringing to bear on them the perspectives and concerns of its universal membership) is a UN that
remains essential to the world in which we live. The goals of the charter, however, cannot be met without
effective.
embracing the fundamental premise that President Harry Truman enunciated in 1945: We all have to recognize that no matter how
great our strength, we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please. No one nation ... can or should expect any
special privilege which harms any other nation. ... Unless we are all willing to pay that price, no organization for world peace can
The UN, from the start, assumed the willingness of its
members to accept restraints on their own short-term goals and policies by subordinating their actions
to internationally agreed rules and procedures, in the broader long-term interests of world order. This was an explicit
alternative to the model of past centuries, when strong states developed their military power to enforce their
politics, and weak states took refuge in alliances with stronger ones. This formula guaranteed large-scale
warfare; as Franklin Roosevelt put it to both houses of Congress after the Allied conference at Yalta, the UN would replace the
accomplish its purpose. And what a reasonable price that is!
arms races, military alliances, balance-of-power politics, and "all the arrangements that had led to war" so often in the past. The
UN was meant to help create a world in which its member states would overcome their vulnerabilities by embedding themselves in
international institutions, where the use of force would be subjected to the constraints of international law. Power politics would not
disappear from the face of the earth but would be practiced with due regard for universally upheld rules and norms. Such a system
also offered the United States -- then, as now, the world's unchallenged superpower -- the assurance that other countries would not
feel the need to develop coalitions to balance its power. Instead, the UN provided a framework for them to work in partnership with
the United States.
Even if it fails, maintaining it as a viable last resort is key to planetary
survival
Schlesinger, 03 (Steven, Dir. world Policy Institute @ New School U., The Record
(Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario), “UN is the world's emergency room; Its survival requires
U.S. commitment”, 10-4, L/N)
The ultimate outcome of the San Francisco Conference is still not known. However, what happened there that
produced the last of these grand compacts, the United Nations, has already had an enormous impact over the last
the United Nations in the age of nuclear weaponry -- far more
sinister circumstances than any faced by those earlier meetings -- is affecting the survival or demise
of humanity. The United Nations and its labours have become the background noise of our global age. It is
truly ubiquitous. It has overseen 40 years of decolonization around the planet; sent peacekeepers to
places such as Cambodia, Cyprus and Sinai; helped end apartheid in South Africa via sanctions. The
United Nations' World Health Organization was critical in eradicating smallpox and is on the verge of
six decades. Indeed, the founding of
stamping out polio; its World Food Program feeds hungry people in Africa; its UN Development Program sends
more multilateral aid dollars abroad than any nation. People forget that before the United Nations' founding, there
was no truly functioning international organization (except for the creaky, faltering League of Nations). This meant
for many decades, there was no place for nations to go in global crises. Today, after half a
this aging experiment in global society exists
and has given some modicum of hope to the world -- despite a dearth of financial resources and the
brickbats tossed at it by American politicians. It has become the world's geopolitical emergency
room. The question is whether it can survive.
that
century of the United Nations, few of us are unaware that
Strengthened UN key to multilateralism
UNNC, 9/28/13 [United Nations News Center,‘Multilateral efforts must guide our quest for
peace and security,’ India tells
UNhttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46116&Cr=multilateral&Cr1=#.UkiRy1
M6z3M]
the Prime Minister of India today urged a
renewed focus on the role of the United Nations as a forum for multilateral action to
28 September 2013 – At a time when the world faces multiple challenges,
ensure inclusive growth and development, and to combat terrorism and other “grave” security threats.
Warning that the world today appears equally sceptical both of the capacity of the UN to achieve its
goals and of the state of international relations in general, Manmohan Singh told the General Assembly that for
multilateralism to remain relevant and effective, multilateral institutions need to be
reformed. “Multilateral efforts must guide our quest for peace and security, wherever they
are threatened. And the centrality and contribution of the UN system to development must
be restored,” he said. “The place to begin is right here,” Mr. Singh declared, telling delegations at the
Assembly’s annual General Debate that the UN Security Council must be reformed and restructured to reflect current political
realities, particularly to include more developing countries as both permanent and non-permanent members.
Indpeendently – THEY HAVE CONCEDED THERE WILL BE NO TREATIES
WHICH MEANS THAT EVEN IF THE UN IS BAD HAVING TREATIES IS GOOD
International law is inevitable but US engagement is key to its
effectiveness
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research ‘02
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear
Policy, 2002 (Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions
Regarding Security-Related Treaties, May,
http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf
The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands
of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world
economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors,
and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas
accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres
of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still
continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument
employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons.
They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including
prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms,
such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons
of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given
issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the
structured system established by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are
resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear
infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and
enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical implications for
international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into
treaties expecting that they are only political commitments that can be overridden based on
U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat
its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states
will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. When the
United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find
that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance.
2NC AT NPT
No risk of opaque prolif – forces slow development which avoids
destabilization
Dunn – Senior VP, Science Applications International Corp, served as assistant director of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency – ‘9 Lewis, THE NPT Assessing the Past,
Building the Future, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009
Since the United States first acquired nuclear weapons in 1945, the time a country needs to
produce a nuclear weapon has steadily increased-even taking into account the uncertainties in determining exactly when
some programs started and when they came to fruition. (See Table 1, ‘‘Estimated Time Needed to Acquire the Bomb.’’) The first five nuclear
powers took between three and eight years to test a nuclear weapon, with China the outlier at eight years. By contrast ,
the next nuclear powers took on the order of between nine and fifteen years to acquire a
nuclear weapon, if not longer, depending on whether North Korea had weaponized plutonium as of 1994. Aspiring proliferator
Libya had been seeking nuclear weapons for nearly thirty years when Qaddafi decided to
end the program; Iraq under Saddam Hussein had been pursuing nuclear weapons for almost
twenty years when its program was ended by outside intervention; Iran, today’s most threatening case,
may well be nearly twenty years into its pursuit of nuclear weapons-or even longer, given speculation about interest in
nuclear weapons on the part of the shah of Iran. Many factors probably explain the relative lengthening
of the time it takes to get the bomb, including limited technological and industrial
capabilities, financial limitations, poor management, and uncertain political and bureaucratic
commitment. Suffice it to propose, however, that by forcing countries to pursue nuclear weapons
clandestinely, NPT Article II and III obligations (for its parties) and the NPT-based norm of
nonproliferation (for nonparties) contributed as well. In both cases, the need to pursue a program
clandestinely turned out to be an important impediment that caused problems
with mobilizing resources, paying extra expenditures for middlemen, acquiring
needed inputs, and carrying out the daily activities of clandestinely pursuing
nuclear weapons. Perhaps equally important, by making it harder, more expensive, and timeconsuming to assemble the necessary wherewithal for the bomb, international
export controls linked directly to NPT Article III also played a part in slowing
these proliferation programs. Over time, moreover, the impact of Article III in slowing
proliferation probably grew thanks to the steady strengthening of nuclear suppliers’ controls
in the 1980s and 1990s.34 In addition, this Article III_related contribution in slowing proliferation had
three major benefits. First, as already suggested, it allowed time for ‘‘other things to happen.’’
Second, even in the cases in which it proved impossible to block eventual acquisition of nuclear
weapons, slowing the pace of proliferation may have significantly contributed to
avoiding a growing perception of runaway proliferation as unavoidable. (The fact that even
those proliferators that openly tested a nuclear weapon did so only after a considerable further delay may also have helped lessen the
resulting proliferation momentum.) Third, in many cases, having to covertly seek nuclear weapons
constrained the scope of the country’s nuclear weapons program, thereby posing a
lesser threat.
Opaque prolif doesn’t risk miscalc
Debs and Monteiro ‘12 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale and Stanton
Nuclear Security Fellow at Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford
University; Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Alexandre and Nuno,
“The Flawed Logic of Striking Iran”, 1/17/12; <
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137036/alexandre-debs-and-nuno-p-monteiro/theflawed-logic-of-striking-iran>)
Kroenig misreads history again when he considers a nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. In his view, they "lack nearly all the safeguards that
United States and the Soviet
Union avoided a nuclear exchange even during the hottest crisis of the Cold War , the Cuban Missile
helped the United States and the Soviet Union avoid a nuclear exchange during the Cold War." Yet the
Crisis, at a moment in which Soviet retaliatory capability was still uncertain, there were no clear direct communication channels between the two
Moreover, the historical
record shows that even young and unstable nuclear powers have avoided nuclear
escalation despite acute crises. Pakistan and India avoided nuclear war in Kargil in 1999,
as well as after the terrorist attacks targeting the Indian parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008. When national survival is at stake, even
opaque and supposedly "irrational" regimes with nuclear weapons have historically behaved
in prudent ways.
leaderships, and Soviet experience managing their nuclear arsenal was no longer than five years.
Opaque prolif allows intervening actions that solve the impact
Dunn 2009 (Senior VP, Science Applications International Corp, served as assistant
director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Lewis, THE NPT Assessing the
Past, Building the Future, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July)
The obligation to accept IAEA safeguards (as well as the more fundamental Article II obligation) has reinforced other
motivations in leading NPT proliferators to pursue nuclear weapons clandestinely . Iraq, Libya, and
North Korea (before testing a nuclear device in 2006) all have pursued nuclear weapons covertly. Iran is widely believed to be doing so now, despite its
One result of
having to pursue nuclear weapons clandestinely may be to constrain the size, pace, and
effectiveness of these programs. Here, too, buying time sometimes allowed other
things to happen, whether Saddam Hussein’s self-defeating decision to invade Kuwait in 1991
or Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s fundamental reassessment of Libya’s national goals in 2003.
protestations to the contrary. Syria appears to have been doing so as well, though Syrian officials reject all such charges.29
Doesn’t cause conflict
Lyon 2005 (Program Director, Strategy and International, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, Rod, Nuclear weapons, international security and the NPT, Australian Journal of
International Affairs,59:4,425 — 430)
But at a second level, Wesley overstates the problems that might properly be attributable to the NPT. His
claim that the current NPT regime is dangerous – much more worrying, if true, than its being merely unfair and only partially effective – is unconvincing.
the evidence is thin that the covertness of nuclear weapons programs is directly
attributable to the NPT. Covertness arises from reasons of national security. Do we really
think that open and honest proliferation would be less destabilising? Stability has
more to do with the consequences of having a nuclear arsenal than with the
means by which the arsenal is acquired. Similarly, it might be optimistic to believe that
transnational proliferation rings, like A. Q. Khan’s, would go out of business quickly under a
different non-proliferation regime. Transnational networks move stuff now because they are increasingly
capable of doing so in a globalised world of imperfect monitoring. They are not going to stop doing that just because
we delete the NPT from the arms control list. The empowerment of transnational
networks is the direct byproduct of the enabling force of globalisation .
I think