Mankiw 5/e Chapter 9: Intro to Economic Fluctuations

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CASE STUDY

Volcker’s Monetary Tightening

 Late 1970s:  > 10%

 Oct 1979: Fed Chairman Paul Volcker announced that monetary policy would aim to reduce inflation.

 Aug 1979-April 1980:

Fed reduces M/P 8.0%

 Jan 1983:  = 3.7%

How do you think this policy change would affect interest rates? slide 0

Volcker’s Monetary Tightening, cont.

The effects of a monetary tightening on nominal interest rates model prices prediction short run

Liquidity Preference

(Keynesian) sticky

 i > 0 long run

Quantity Theory,

Fisher Effect

(Classical) flexible

 i < 0 actual outcome

8/1979: i = 10.4%

4/1980: i = 15.8%

1/1983: i = 8.2% slide 1

EXERCISE:

Analyze shocks with the IS-LM model

Use the IS-LM model to analyze the effects of

1.

A boom in the stock market makes consumers wealthier.

2.

After a wave of credit card fraud, consumers use cash more frequently in transactions.

For each shock, a.

b.

use the IS-LM diagram to show the effects of the shock on Y and r .

determine what happens to unemployment rate.

C , I , and the slide 2

What is the Fed’s policy instrument?

What the newspaper says:

“the Fed lowered interest rates by one-half point today”

What actually happened:

The Fed conducted expansionary monetary policy to shift the LM curve to the right until the interest rate fell

0.5 points.

The Fed targets the Federal Funds rate: it announces a target value, and uses monetary policy to shift the LM curve as needed to attain its target rate. slide 3

What is the Fed’s policy instrument?

Why does the Fed target interest rates instead of the money supply?

1) They are easier to measure than the money supply

2) The Fed might believe that more prevalent than IS

LM shocks are shocks. If so, then targeting the interest rate stabilizes income better than targeting the money supply. slide 4

Interaction between monetary & fiscal policy

 Model: monetary & fiscal policy variables

( M , G and T ) are exogenous

 Real world:

Monetary policymakers may adjust M in response to changes in fiscal policy, or vice versa.

 Such interaction may alter the impact of the original policy change. slide 5

The Fed’s response to

 G

> 0

 Suppose Congress increases G .

 Possible Fed responses:

1.

2.

3.

hold M constant hold r constant hold Y constant

 In each case, the effects of the  G are different: slide 6

Response 1: hold

M constant r If Congress raises G , the IS curve shifts right

If Fed holds M constant, then LM curve doesn’t shift.

Results:

 Y  Y

2

 Y

1 r r

2

 r

1 r

2 r

1

Y

1

Y

2

LM

1

IS

IS

1

2

Y slide 7

Response 2: hold r constant r If Congress raises G , the IS curve shifts right

To keep r constant,

Fed increases M to shift LM curve right.

Results:

 Y  Y

3

 Y

1

0 r

2 r

1

LM

1

LM

2

Y

1

Y

2

Y

3

IS

IS

1

2

Y slide 8

Response 3: hold

Y constant

If Congress raises G , the IS curve shifts right

To keep Y constant,

Fed reduces M to shift LM curve left.

Results:

 Y  0 r r

3

 r

1 r

3 r

2 r

1 r

Y

1

Y

2

LM

2

LM

1

IS

IS

1

2

Y slide 9

CASE STUDY

The U.S. economic slowdown of 2001

~ What happened ~

1. Real GDP growth rate

1994-2000: 3.9% (average annual)

2001: 1.2%

2. Unemployment rate

Dec 2000: 4.0%

Dec 2001: 5.8% slide 10

CASE STUDY

The U.S. economic slowdown of 2001

~ Shocks that contributed to the slowdown ~

1. Falling stock prices

From Aug 2000 to Aug 2001: -25%

Week after 9/11: -12%

2. The terrorist attacks on 9/11

• increased uncertainty

• fall in consumer & business confidence

Both shocks reduced spending and shifted the IS curve left. slide 11

240

220

200

180

160

140

120

1929

The Great Depression

Unemployment

(right scale)

1931 1933

Real GNP

(left scale)

1935 1937 1939

30

25

20

15

10

5

0 slide 12

The Spending Hypothesis:

Shocks to the IS Curve

 asserts that the Depression was largely due to an exogenous fall in the demand for goods & services -- a leftward shift of the IS curve

 evidence: output and interest rates both fell, which is what a leftward IS shift would cause slide 13

The Spending Hypothesis:

Reasons for the IS shift

1.

Stock market crash  exogenous  C

 Oct-Dec 1929: S&P 500 fell 17%

 Oct 1929-Dec 1933: S&P 500 fell 71%

2.

Drop in investment

 “correction” after overbuilding in the 1920s

 widespread bank failures made it harder to obtain financing for investment

3.

Contractionary fiscal policy

 in the face of falling tax revenues and increasing deficits, politicians raised tax rates and cut spending slide 14

The Money Hypothesis:

A Shock to the LM Curve

 asserts that the Depression was largely due to huge fall in the money supply

 evidence:

M1 fell 25% during 1929-33.

But, two problems with this hypothesis:

1.

P fell even more, so M/P actually rose slightly during 1929-31.

2.

nominal interest rates fell, which is the opposite of what would result from a leftward LM shift.

slide 15

The Money Hypothesis Again:

The Effects of Falling Prices

 asserts that the severity of the Depression was due to a huge deflation:

P fell 25% during 1929-33.

 This deflation was probably caused by the fall in M , so perhaps money played an important role after all.

 In what ways does a deflation affect the economy?

slide 16

The Money Hypothesis Again:

The Effects of Falling Prices

The stabilizing effects of deflation:

  P   ( M/P )  LM shifts right   Y

 Pigou effect :

 P   ( M/P )

 consumers’ wealth 

  C

 IS shifts right

  Y slide 17

The Money Hypothesis Again:

The Effects of Falling Prices

The destabilizing effects of unexpected deflation: debt-deflation theory

 P (if unexpected)

 transfers purchasing power from borrowers to lenders

 borrowers spend less, lenders spend more

 if borrowers’ propensity to spend is larger than lenders, then aggregate spending falls, the IS curve shifts left, and Y falls slide 18

The Money Hypothesis Again:

The Effects of Falling Prices

The destabilizing effects of expected deflation:

 e

 r  for each value of i

I  because I = I ( r )

 planned expenditure & agg. demand 

 income & output  slide 19

Why another Depression is unlikely

 Policymakers (or their advisors) now know much more about macroeconomics:

 The Fed knows better than to let M fall so much, especially during a contraction.

 Fiscal policymakers know better than to raise taxes or cut spending during a contraction.

 Federal deposit insurance makes widespread bank failures very unlikely.

 Automatic stabilizers make fiscal policy expansionary during an economic downturn.

slide 20

Imports and Exports as a percentage of output: 2000

Percentage 40 of GDP

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Canada France Germany Italy

Imports Exports

Japan U.K.

U.S.

slide 21

Three experiments

1.

Fiscal policy at home

2.

Fiscal policy abroad

3. An increase in investment demand slide 22

1.

Fiscal policy at home

r

An increase in or decrease in reduces saving.

G

T r

1

*

NX

2

S

2

S

1

NX

1

Results:

0

 NX S 0

I

1

I ( r )

S, I slide 23

NX and the Government Budget Deficit

Percent of GDP

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

1950

Budget deficit

(right scale)

1960

Net exports

(left scale)

1970 1980 1990 2000

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

4

2

8 Percent of GDP

6 slide 24

2.

Fiscal policy abroad

r

Expansionary fiscal policy abroad raises the world interest rate.

r

2

* r

1

*

NX

2

NX

1

S

1

Results:

0

 NX I 0

I r I r

I ( r )

S, I slide 25

3.

An increase in investment demand

r

S

EXERCISE:

Use the model to determine the impact of an increase in investment demand on NX , S , I , and net capital outflow.

r *

I

1

NX

1

I ( r )

1

S, I slide 26

3.

An increase in investment demand

r

NX

2

S

ANSWERS:

 I > 0,

 S = 0, net capital outflows and net exports fall by the amount  I r *

NX

1

I

1

I

2

I ( r )

2

I ( r )

1

S, I slide 27

2

-1

-2

-3

-4

1

0

-5

1975

U.S. Net Exports and the

Real Exchange Rate, 1975-2002

1980 1985 1990 1995

Net exports (left scale)

Real exchange rate (right scale)

2000

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0 slide 28

Four experiments

1.

Fiscal policy at home

2.

Fiscal policy abroad

3. An increase in investment demand

4. Trade policy to restrict imports slide 29

1.

Fiscal policy at home

A fiscal expansion reduces national saving, net capital outflows, and the supply of dollars in the foreign exchange market…

…causing the real exchange rate to rise and NX to fall.

ε

ε

2

ε

1

S

2

 I r

S

1

 I r

NX

2

NX

1

NX ( ε )

NX slide 30

2.

Fiscal policy abroad

An increase in r* reduces investment, increasing net capital outflows and the supply of dollars in the

ε

ε

1

ε

2

S

1

 I r

S

1

 I ( r

2

* ) rate to fall and

NX to rise.

NX

1

NX

2

NX ( ε )

NX slide 31

3.

An increase in investment demand

An increase in investment reduces net capital outflows and the supply of dollars in the foreign exchange real exchange rate to rise and NX to fall.

ε

ε

2

ε

1

S

1

 I

2

S

1

 I

1

NX

2

NX

1

NX ( ε )

NX slide 32

4.

Trade policy to restrict imports

At any given value of ε , an import quota

  IM   NX

 demand for dollars shifts

ε

ε

2

ε

1 doesn’t affect S or

I , so capital flows and the supply of dollars remains fixed.

NX

1

NX ( ε )

2

NX ( ε )

1

NX slide 33

4.

Trade policy to restrict imports

Results:

 ε > 0

(demand increase)

 NX = 0

(supply fixed)

 IM < 0

(policy)

 EX < 0

(rise in ε )

ε

ε

2

ε

1

NX

1

NX ( ε )

2

NX ( ε )

1

NX slide 34

Inflation and nominal exchange rates

Percentage 10 change in nominal

9 exchange 8 rate

7

6

5

Italy

South Africa

4

3

2

1

Belgium

New Zealand

Sweden

Australia

Ireland

Canada

Spain

France

UK

0

-1

-2

Germany

-3

Netherlands

Switzerland

Japan

-4

-3 -2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Inflation differential

Depreciation relative to

U.S. dollar

Appreciation relative to

U.S. dollar slide 35

CASE STUDY

The Reagan Deficits revisited

1970s 1980s actual change closed economy small open economy

G – T 2.2

3.9

  

S 19.6

17.4

   r 1.1

6.3

  no change

I

NX

ε

19.9

-0.3

115.1

19.4

-2.0

129.4

Data: decade averages; all except

 no change no change no change r and ε are expressed

 as a percent of GDP; ε is a trade-weighted index.

slide 36

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