911 Centers in Oregon: Efficiencies through consolidation
By Jeff Rasmussen
EMPA Capstone
Portland State University
June 2012
ABSTRACT
As the expenses to operate 911 centers continue to escalate, local governments
in Oregon are dealing with a failing funding structure for the 911/dispatch centers. The
recent economic recession has reduced the number of devices being taxed and the
current surcharge has not been adjusted to reflect inflationary pressure. One solution to
improve the efficiency of the system is through consolidation of the forty-eight
911/dispatch centers (PSAP – Public Safety Answering Point) across the state.
Technology has advanced to a point that centralized 911/dispatch centers are practical,
due to advanced mapping software and radio switching technology that enables
transmissions to radio towers via secured internet connections.
The current state-wide funding system does not incentivize consolidation, even
though consolidation has the potential to save funds by reducing redundant software
computer systems and personnel located in the same county/region. A reduction in
centers benefits the entire system by having more funding available to maintain the
system’s backbone and advance technology upgrades to handle the next generation of
911 (NG911) communications (for example, text messaging and live streaming video
from cell phones).
The purpose of this capstone research study is to incentivize consolidation
discussions throughout the state by providing financial tools and information that can be
used by PSAP centers to consider consolidation. The research results in the
development of a minimal “right sized” 911/dispatch centers to take advantage of
“economies of scale”. The report does not consider the political and other organizational
issues that are necessarily involved in successful consolidations of PSAP centers.
Page 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section
Page
Section I: Introduction & Purpose of the Project ............................................................ 3
Section II: Statement of the Problem ........................................................................... 11
Section III: Research Steps.......................................................................................... 29
Section IV: Research Findings .................................................................................... 50
Section V: Recommendations ..................................................................................... 66
References .................................................................................................................. 73
Appendices.................................................................................................................. 77
Page 2
Section I: Introduction & Purpose of the Project
…while the consolidation process is complex and difficult, if implemented
correctly, it can yield improvements in service levels, regional interoperability,
responder safety, employee retention, and potential cost savings. L.R.
Kimball’s (Oregon) Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1
Implementation Study (2012).
This project addresses the failing funding structure for the 911/dispatch centers
in Oregon counties and cities. One solution to improve the efficiency of the system is
through consolidation of the forty-eight1 911/dispatch centers (PSAP – Public Safety
Answering Point)2 across the state. Technology has advanced to a point that
centralized 911/dispatch centers are practical, due to advanced mapping software and
radio switching technology that enables transmissions to radio towers via secured
internet connections.
The current state-wide funding system does not incentivize consolidation, even
though consolidations save funds by reducing redundant software and computer
systems located in the same county. A reduction in centers benefits the entire system
by having more funding available to maintain the system’s backbone and advance
technology upgrades to handle the next generation of 911 (NG911) communications (for
example, text messaging and live streaming video from cell phones).
1
Forty-eight is the current number of PSAPs with Santiam Canyon Communication Center recently
contracting with Willamette Valley Communication Center to provide service. The change occurred after
the 2012 Kimball Report was completed (Oregon Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials,
2012).
2
In this paper the term PSAP and 911/dispatch center will be used interchangeable. PSAPs have two
classifications, a Primary PSAP receives 911 calls directly and Secondary PSAPs only receive 911 calls
from a Primary PSAP. The term PSAP in this paper always refers to Primary PSAPs. Oregon Revised
Statutes (ORS) 403.105 (11) “’Public safety answering point’ means a 24-hour communications facility
established as an answering location for 9-1-1 calls originating within a given service area. A ‘primary
public safety answering point’ receives all calls directly from the public. A ‘secondary public safety
answering point’ only receives calls from a primary public safety answering point on a transfer or relay
basis.
Page 3
The Oregon Office of Emergency Management (OEM) is prone to advance a
large technology investment without dealing with the inefficient system of 911 delivery
from 48 different locations that house 279 different “telecommunicater stations.” The
OEM plan is to convert the state-wide system to NG911 technology.
NG911 refers to an upgraded infrastructure that moves beyond the traditional
voice 911 call. These upgrades allow for an IP based system that can support text
messages, photographs, and video from citizens reporting emergencies. In addition,
this infrastructure allows an entire system to communication across regions and
provides support for the existing voice 911 call (National Emergency Number
Association, 2008). Image “1” is a representation of NG911 integrated system that
supports new and legacy communication systems.
Image 1 – NG 911 Technical Architecture Integrated Command Center
SOURCE: Federal Communications Commission - Communications Security, Reliability and
Interoperability Council Working Group, 2010
Page 4
The OEM plan contemplates investing hardware costs of almost $50,000 per
station (10 year lifespan) without addressing a review of the need to have 48 locations
or the need for 279 separate stations (LR Kimball, 2011). OEM had delayed a State
Legislative mandate to produce a report “on the relative merits of public safety
answering point consolidation throughout the state with the intent of reducing
redundancy and creating a more cost-efficient delivery system” (Oregon State
Legislature, 2009). This report was due in 2010. It was in its 10th draft and the state
budget notes stated that funding would have been withheld in the 7th and 8th quarters of
the biennial budget if it was not delivered by the end of the 5 th quarter (April 2012)
(Association of Oregon Counties, 2011, p. 67).
On February 1, 2012, OEM delivered the required report (hereinafter referred to
as the “Kimball Report”) to the Oregon Legislature’s Joint Ways and Means Committee
that included two state-wide consolidation scenarios and cost estimates of NG911
upgrades (Oregon State Legislature - Joint Ways and Means Committee, 2012). The
Kimball Report concludes that “[Oregon’s] emergency communications statewide would
benefit from further consolidation efforts” (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 5, 46, 69).
In response to the Kimball Report, the Oregon Legislature included a budget note that
states:
The Military Department (OEM) is directed to prepare a statewide
information technology plan for upgrading Oregon’s 9-1-1 system(s) to
Next Generation technology. The plan shall include a detailed component
to consolidate the state’s Public Safety Answering Points based upon the
2012 L.R. Kimball Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1
Implementation Report (Oregon Senate Bill 5701 – 2012).
The next chapter reviews the impact of the economic recession on 911 tax
revenue and discusses the benefits of consolidation and moving to NG911 technology.
Page 5
This chapter also evaluates the need to reduce costs and prepare for the conversion to
NG911 that will ultimately provide a vast improvement in service levels.
Section two reviews the history of 911 systems, technology, and funding history
in Oregon. This section also discusses the history of 911/dispatch consolidation in
Oregon. Sections three and four review financial and statistical data from Fiscal Year
2010-11 of 463 PSAPs to determine a minimal “right sized” 911/dispatch center that can
take advantage of “economies of scale” to assist jurisdictions in viewing consolidation
as a regional financial effort to improve service delivery, especially in rural Oregon.
Section five will offer recommendations to assist jurisdiction in evaluating consolidation
options. This project will only outline the steps in the first stage of a multistage process
necessary to evaluate 911 consolidations. The first stage consists of financial modeling
methods to assist jurisdiction to evaluate the potential financial benefits of consolidation.
The driver of this research was initiated after Jefferson County projected a 221% cost
increase in providing 911/dispatch services in the next five years. Although many
factors could be identified that have pushed part of the financial crisis on 911/dispatch
centers, this project purposely avoids discussing public employee union’s collective
bargaining that is a likely factor in jurisdictions reviewing consolidation.
PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT
The balkanized nature of 911 systems across jurisdictions and their Byzantine funding
mechanisms obscure a simple but profound development: our nation’s emergency
system is getting left behind by technological change. … the limits of the legacy
technology used in emergency communications can be best understood by viewing
today’s 911 system as an analog island in a digital sea. …..policymakers must recognize
that the system is stressed to its limits and change is required Health of the U.S. 911
System (911 Industry Alliance, 2008, p. 5).
3
As of March 16, 2012, Coos County and Santiam Canyon Communication Center have yet to report
data to OEM. Warm Springs (Tribe) is not required to report data to OEM.
Page 6
The purpose of this project is to assist jurisdictions in reviewing 911 consolidation
projects as a means to reduce costs and/or improve services levels. Identifying benefits
and barriers is important for jurisdictions early in a review process. Additionally, if a
jurisdiction’s main purpose of reviewing consolidation is financial, the project will
develop financial and budgeting templates that will track cost history and develop
projects for the current operation as well as projects for consolidation scenarios.
Many rural Oregon counties are facing budgetary shortfalls caused by the current
recession. Out of Oregon’s 36 counties, 33 of them have a PSAP within their
jurisdiction. The state of Oregon has total of 48 PSAPs that are operated by a special
district, county, tribe, or city (see Attachment “A” for a map) (Oregon Military
Department, 2011). In the past four years, rural county 911/dispatch centers have seen
costs escalate and state revenue decrease.
These escalating costs and revenue reductions, in some cases have forced
jurisdictions to remove law enforcement positions from the street to be able to maintain
minimum staffing levels in 911/dispatch centers. Other jurisdictions will be facing the
same decision, as financial reserves will be exhausted in two years. The 911 tax
provides enough revenue to fund about thirty-eight percent (38%) of the PSAP’s
operation, with the remaining funds made up locally (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 14).
Vision & Values of NG911 Technology and Consolidation
The vision of a future NG911 system in Oregon is a highly efficient operation that
takes advantage of technology and maximizes the existing $0.75 per month telephone
tax. Transitioning all 911/dispatch centers into NG911 technology would allow for the
following enhanced services:
Page 7

Standardizing the underlying technology of the state's separate 911/dispatch
centers using IP technology and internet-based communication links.

Interconnecting 911/dispatch centers to allow unlimited transfers of calls,
distribution of overflow 911 calls to other 911/dispatch centers.

Allowing the 911 system to accept and handle advanced information from
citizens, including video, photos, text messages, etc.

Interconnecting with private services, such as telematics providers (e.g., OnStar),
to handle automatic crash notification (ACN) and other similar data.

Creating of a state-wide voluntary database that citizens can add medical
information that would be accessed immediately. This same database could also
include medical call history.

Outsource (contract) with an emergency medical dispatching (EMD) call center
services that would provide critical incident medical advice staffed with
emergency room doctors and nurses. This system would allow the doctor or
nurse to provide the pre-arrival instructions directly to the citizens, while allowing
the dispatcher to remain on the line. The in-route medical team would be able
listen to the ongoing incident to allow a highly efficient transition upon arrival (911
Dispatch Magazine, 2011) (911 Dispatch Magazine, 2011).
This vision would require a large investment in technology upgrades. It would
most likely include a cloud-based software that would reduce reoccurring costs (LR
Kimball, Inc, 2012). Reducing the number of 911/dispatch centers would not only save
upfront cost, but has the potential to save local jurisdictions funds by consolidating
administrative, building, and personnel costs (LR Kimball, 2011).
Page 8
The Kimball report estimates an upfront two year investment of $18 million. The
conversion to an interconnected “cloud software” would reduce costs by an estimated
$5.7 million per year. A reduction in the number of PSAPs and telecommunicator
stations can decrease the upfront costs and reduce ongoing costs. Currently if two
jurisdictions combine 911/dispatch centers the entire burden of equipment modification
is their responsibility. The Kimball report, discussed in more detail in section five
estimates, that if consolidation occurred to a point of nine regional PSAPs the savings
increased to $9.3 million per year (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 66-67).
The 2009 (Minnesota) Governor’s Work Group on PSAP Consolidation reported
that cost savings achieved from a consolidation come from two sources. The first
potential source of savings is in personnel. The report cautioned that substantial
reductions of staff are usually not feasible, but some saving can be achieved.
Multi-county consolidated 911/dispatch centers have the potential to save funds.
Potential savings can be achieved by combining the overhead and personnel needed to
operate facilities 24/7. Personnel costs are the largest expenditure category in PSAPs’
budgets. Independent rural county operations have higher staffing levels (per capita)
compared to larger jurisdictions during non-peak hours. This is due to the minimum
staffing levels that cannot take advantage of economies of scale.
The second source of savings is in equipment:
The real cost savings come from the elimination of redundant and
expensive technology such as CAD, 911 answering equipment, radio
consoles, and logging recorders. The single set of technology and
systems found in a consolidated environment reduces costs associated
with procurement, connectivity, and maintenance costs. (Governor’s Work
Group on PSAP Consolidation, 2009, p. 6)
Page 9
In small to medium sized PSAPs, the non-peak hour operations routinely do not
have the workload to independently justify a minimum staffing level of 1.0 FTE. The
need to have at least one person on per shift is a clear operational need, but can be
considered a wasteful use of resources. Combining operations with multiple PSAPs to a
point when non-peak hour workloads can justify a minimum staffing level of 2.0 FTEs is
more economical. A PSAP consolidation is a way that smaller operations can achieve
cost savings by combining resources to take advantage of staffing economies of scale.
In smaller jurisdictions, consolidation can improve service levels. Currently,
thirty-nine percent (39%) of the PSAP receive less than one 9-1-1 call per hour.
However, when multiple incidents occur simultaneously, one dispatcher struggles to
maintain adequate service levels. It is not uncommon when a vehicle accident occurs
that between fifteen and twenty 911 calls are generated. Dispatchers struggle to
repetitive calls, while having to handle a separate incident, all the while dispatching fire
and ambulances to the accident scene. In a consolidation model, the organization
would have at least two dispatchers able to assist during these critical incidents.
Page 10
Section II: Statement of the Problem
This section outlines the history of 911, the 911 funding history in Oregon, history
of consolidation efforts in Oregon, and other funding issues facing the 911 system in
Oregon.
HISTORY OF 911
Believe it or not, the 911 emergency number isn’t available in every single county
of the United States (911 Dispatch Magazine, 2011).
Pre-911. Prior to a single phone number to report emergencies, citizens
reporting crime, fires, or medical emergencies used their telephone in the same manner
as making non-emergency telephone calls. They would need to consult a telephone
book that listed the various local police, fire, and ambulance agencies. The caller would
determine the agency that seemed appropriate and dial a seven-digit number. Valuable
time is lost during these steps, particularly if the caller is a child, is not familiar with the
local area, or does not know the address they are located.
The 911 concept was developed in response to these problems. The central idea
is that a person should be able to dial a single number, from any phone, at any location
at any time, to report any kind of emergency. The citizens would then be assured of the
quickest and most appropriate response.
Basic 911. The phone number 911 in the United States was reserved as the
nation’s emergency telephone number in 1967. Great Britain first developed the
concept for a nationwide number in 1937. It took another year for the system to be put
in place. The first system to implement 911 was by the Alabama Telephone Company
in Haleyville, Alabama. The first (ceremonial) 911 call was on February 16, 1968, when
Page 11
then Alabama Speaker of the House Rankin Fite called and at the receiving end was
Congressman Tom Bevill (Michigan State 9-1-1 Committee, 2011, p. 5).
The Basic 911 system did provide a one number solution for citizens reporting
emergencies; however, the technology only allowed one centralized center to handle all
of the incoming calls. These early Primary PSAPs were usually the largest law
enforcement agency in a community (Oregon Emergency Management, 2000, p. 2).
Since all calls went to one location, if the call was not the jurisdiction of the answering
agency, the PSAP would make another call to the appropriate agency and relay the
nature of the emergency. As technology progressed, PSAPs could transfer the call to
the appropriate agency, but this required the citizen to repeat critical information to a
second person.
Shortcomings of Basic 911 included that citizens needed to know the location of
the emergency and in the case of a dropped call the citizen must redial 911, since the
PSAP did not know the caller’s phone number. In 1981, the Oregon Legislature set the
mandate that by the end of 1991 there would be a state-wide 911 system in the state.
In January 1991, Oregon became the sixth state to have border-to-border 911 services
(Oregon APCO/NENA, 2011, p. 9).
Enhanced 911 (E911). E911 systems started to emerge in the 1980s as
technology improved. The new systems provided technical solutions to three problems
inherent in Basic 911. E911 implements a database system for each telephone number
that allows “selective routing” of the 911 caller to the appropriate PSAP. This solves
many of the call transfer issues that occurred in communities that have overlapping
service boundaries (Oregon Emergency Management, 2000, p. 4). The E911 database
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system’s other advancement includes, the phone number of the caller (Automatic
Number Information [ANI]), as well as the address (location) of the phone number
(Automatic Location Information [ALI]).
This database system continued to improve response times. PSAPs are able to
“populate” database fields on every phone number based upon the address. This
allowed the advent of Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), which identifies the appropriate
law enforcement agency, fire district, and medical response agency of each phone
number as the call comes into the PSAP.
In June 1991, the Oregon State Legislature mandates that enhanced 911
services be provided by all 911/dispatch centers by 2000. This upgrade was completed
in 1999 (Oregon APCO/NENA, 2011, p. 9).
Wireless E911: Phase 1 & 2. In 1996, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) mandated that the same level of notification for landlines shall
become available for the growing number of cell phones. Phase 1 was required to
provide the cell phone number and the location of the cell tower (antenna) the call
originated. In Phase 2, the FCC required an accurate location (latitude/longitude
coordinates) for the calling device (LR Kimball, 2008, p. 12). As of December 31, 2005
all of Oregon’s 911/dispatch centers were capable of phase II delivery of information
(Oregon Office of Emergency Management, 2012).
Next Generation 911 (NG911)4: IP-based communication of emergency-related
voice, text, data, photos, and video. In a report on Vermont’s 911 funding structure, the
4
P.L. 112-96 (Next Generation 9–1–1 Advancement Act of 2012) Section 6503 (e): (4) EMERGENCY
CALL.—The term ‘emergency call’ refers to any real-time communication with a public safety answering
point or other emergency management or response agency, including: (A) through voice, text, or video
Page 13
911 Board stated that technology has progressed to a point that interactions with 911
from citizens is becoming problematic. They pointed out that the current system is
completely based on landline and cellphones as the instrument of communication, when
technology allows many devices to be used to communicate emergencies. Those
include laptops, tablet computers, and stand-a-lone texting devices. They concluded
from an operational and taxing standpoint that “it may become problematic to
determine what a phone call actually is or even what a phone is” (State of Vermont
Enhanced 9-1-1 Board, 2012, p. 15). “Callers to 911…generally assume that the newer
technologies they are using to place a call are matched by the same level of technology
at the 911 call centers” (Congressional Research Services, 2011, p. 29).
HISTORY OF 911 TAX RATES IN OREGON
In 1981, when the Oregon Legislature instituted the plan to have (basic) 911
services statewide they imposed a three percent (3.0%) tax on all telephones monthly
bill. This tax was increased to five percent (5.0%) in 1991. The additional two percent
(2.0%) tax was dedicated to the funding of equipment changing to enhanced 911
services statewide. In 1995, the Oregon Legislature removed the five percent (5%) tax
and imposed a flat seventy-five cent ($0.75) per month surcharge on “any retail
subscriber who has a telecommunications service capable of accessing 911 services”
and related data; and (B) nonhuman-initiated automatic event alerts, such as alarms, telematics, or
sensor data, which may also include real-time voice, text, or video communications.
(5) NEXT GENERATION 9–1–1 SERVICES.—The term ‘Next Generation 9–1–1 services’ means an IPbased system comprised of hardware, software, data, and operational policies and procedures that: (A)
provides standardized interfaces from emergency call and message services to support emergency
communications; (B) processes all types of emergency calls, including voice, data, and multimedia
information; (C) acquires and integrates additional emergency call data useful to call routing and
handling; (D) delivers the emergency calls, messages, and data to the appropriate public safety
answering point and other appropriate emergency entities; (E) supports data or video communications
needs for coordinated incident response and management; and (F) provides broadband service to public
safety answering points or other first responder entities.
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(Oregon APCO/NENA, 2011, p. 9). This change also included language that made it
clear that cellular phones would now pay a tax to support 911 services (Oregon
APCO/NENA, 2011) (Oregon Emergency Management State 9-1-1 Program, 2009).
The change to the flat tax included a six year sunset clause. Including this
sunset clause has remained with renewal of the tax in 2001 and 2007. This tax is up for
renewal in 2013.
Table “A” – History of 911 Tax Rates in Oregon
Year
1981
Rate
Notes
3.0%
1991
5.0%
Additional 2% for E911
1995
$0.75
Six Year Sunset (2001)
2001
$0.75
Six Year Sunset (2007)
2007
$0.75
Six Year Sunset (2013)
Source: Oregon Department of Revenue (http://www.oregon.gov/DOR/BUS/IC-603-625.shtml)
The current taxing structure has not kept up with technology. Currently prepaid
cellphone plans are not taxed in Oregon. In Vermont, they estimate that up to twentyfive percent of the cellphone plans are now prepaid wireless plans (State of Vermont
Enhanced 9-1-1 Board, 2012, p. 12). In July 2011, the New Millennium Research
Council (NMRC) released a report that three out of five new wireless subscriptions in
2010 were prepaid wireless plan (New Millennium Research Council, 2011). This tax
inequity is likely one of the causes of the reduced revenue in Oregon. It is estimated
that if this loophole is fixed it would add $6 million per year into the 911 revenue stream
(Oregon APCO/NENA, 2011, p. 6).
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HISTORY OF 911 TAX REVENUE
The Oregon 911 tax revenue in down substantially. Since 2008, the revenue
from this tax has declined almost nine percent (8.8%)5 (Oregon Emergency
Management, 2011). Using the FY 2011 third quarter revenue distribution, the 911
revenue will be at the same level of collection as it was in 2006 (Oregon Emergency
Management State 9-1-1 Program, 2009, p. 18). The Oregon 911 funding system
receives its funding from a $0.75 per month tax on all telephones in the state (except
pre-paid cell phones) (Smith, 2011). Currently the revenue is shared with counties and
cities. Just over sixty percent (60.5%) of the funds are distributed to counties and cities
based upon population. All counties are guaranteed one percent (1%) of the amount
distributed (Oregon Revised Statute - 403.240(9)). Twenty-Seven of the 36 counties
are “one percent counties” (Caldwell, 2011, p. 19). The funds are restricted to activities
directly related to 911 (Oregon Military Department, 2010, p. 22).
The State of Oregon’s Department of Military, through the Office of Emergency
Management (OEM) receives just over thirty-nine percent (39.5%) of the tax. OEM
must use the funds to pay for PSAP common network services, Federal
Communications Commission regulations, and costs associated with the Enhanced 911
program costs related to providing state-wide wire line and wireless 911 services
including equipment. The remaining one half percent (0.5%) is kept by the Department
of Revenue for administrative processing cost recovery (Oregon Military Department, p.
22).
The State of Oregon is one of seven states identified by the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) that used 911 tax revenue “to fund programs other
5
Comparing 4th Quarter 2008 ($10,294,562) to 3rd Quarter 2011 ($9,384,854).
Page 16
than 911/E911 services” for calendar year 2010 (Federal Communications Commission,
2011, pp. 10-11). Currently, the Oregon Legislature is transferring the investment
interest on the balance of the 911 equipment account to the state’s general fund. The
OEM estimates that this diversion of investment income totaled $817,000 for fiscal year
2009-10 (Oregon Emergency Management, 2010, p. 22). The 2010 FCC report states
that Oregon transferred $3.6 million of 911 funds in the general fund in 2009 (Federal
Communications Commission, 2010, p. 11). In 2002, the Oregon Legislature
transferred $9 million of 911 surcharges into the state’s general fund. At the time, this
represented 14% of the total revenue stream for fiscal year 2001-02 (Oregon
Emergency Management, 2010, p. 22).
With the passage of the Next Generation 9-1-1 Advancement Act of 2012, (P.L.
112-966) that President Obama signed on February 22, 2012, Oregon is at risk to miss
out on the $115 million that will come available in federal 911 grants. A summary of this
legislation by LR Kimball, indicates that any entity that diverts 911 funds for other
purposes will be ineligible for grant funding (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012).
Alternative 911 Revenue Resources for Local Jurisdictions
Oregon is one of 21 states that does not allow local jurisdictions to adopt local
911 tax surcharges (Federal Communications Commission, 2011, p. 5). Five counties
have used alternative methods to support 911/dispatch centers in Oregon. Deschutes
and Hood River Counties have created (with voter approval) “County Service Districts”
P.L. 112-96 – Section 6503(c)(3): CONDITION OF GRANT.—Each applicant for a grant under this
section shall agree, as a condition of receipt of the grant, that if the State or other taxing jurisdiction within
which the applicant is located, during any period of time during which the funds from the grant are
available to the applicant, obligates or expends designated 9–1–1 charges for any purpose other than the
purposes for which such charges are designated or presented, eliminates such charges, or redesignates
such charges for purposes other than the implementation or operation of 9–1–1 services, E9–1–1
services, or Next Generation 9–1–1 services, all of the funds from such grant shall be returned to the
Office.
6
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authorized by Oregon Revised Statue (ORS), Chapters 198 and 403. These districts
retain the Board of County Commissioners as the governing body and are adopted with
a permanent property tax levy.
Columbia, Klamath, and Tillamook Counties have created (with voter approval)
“911 Communications (special) District”. These districts are authorized by ORS
403.300 to 403.380. These districts’ governing bodies are an elected board (five to
seven members), that oversee all operations of the district. These districts are also
established with a permanent property tax levy.
Another option for jurisdiction is ORS 280.040 to 280.090, which allows a
governing body to seek voter approval for an option property tax levy. These types of
property tax increase are usually referred to as “local option levy”. This type of levy may
not be greater than five years in length. Deschutes County currently has an active local
option levy for 911 operations. This levy expires in 2013 and the county has submitted
a ballot proposal to increase the permanent property tax rate of the County Service
District to relieve the necessity to seek voters’ approval of this additional amount every
five years (Deschutes County, 2012).
HISTORY OF 911 CONSOLIDATION IN OREGON
In 1981, when the Oregon Legislature put in motion the 10-year plan for a
statewide (basic) 911 system, there were 280 different 911/dispatch centers. Over the
years these numbers have decline (see Table “B” for history). The current number of
911/dispatch centers is 48.
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Table B – History of the Number of Oregon PSAPs (911/dispatch centers)
Year
Number
of
PSAPs
Pre1981
3007
1981
280
1991
91
1995
64
2000
57
2003
52
2009
50
2010
49
2012
48
Source: OEM, Oregon APCO/NENA, OEM 911 Efficiency Study (1994)
While the number of 911/dispatch centers continues to drop, 11 counties in
Oregon have more than one 911/dispatch center within their jurisdiction (see Table “C”).
These range from two in Jefferson County with a population of 21,750 to four in Lane
County with a population of 352,010. These 11 counties have a total of 26 of the 48
911/dispatch centers in the state.
Oregon has gone through several studies on 911 consolidations. The first study
was ordered by the Oregon Legislature during the 1991 session for OEM to “conduct an
efficiency study of Oregon's 9-1-1 system” (Oregon Emergency Management, 1994, p.
11). This study was not completed until 1994 and it took and additional piece of
legislation (Enrolled House Bill 3517 – 1993 Session) to clarify the nature of the study.
One of the eight specific areas the legislature wanted studied was an “assessment of
the optimal number of PSAPs” (p. 11) (Enrolled House Bill 3517, Section 5(e)).
“The number of dispatch centers and/or 9-1-1 centers … is estimated at something in the vicinity of 300”
(Oregon Emergency Management, 1994, pp. 44-45).
7
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Table C - Counties with Multiple PSAPs (2012)
County
Number
of PSAPs
Population
CLACKAMAS
2
376,780
CLATSOP
2
37,070
COOS
2
63,035
CURRY
2
22,355
JEFFERSON
2
21,750
LANE
4
352,010
LINCOLN
3
46,135
MALHEUR
2
31,345
MARION
2
315,900
UMATILLA
3
76,000
YAMHILL
2
99,405
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center
The final recommendation regarding the optimal number of PSAPs was as
follows:

“The optimal number of PSAPs in a given geographical area should be
determined at the local level after consideration of the most effective and efficient
use of total resources to provide this and other associated services required by
the local constituency.

Local governments are strongly encouraged to evaluate their 911 systems to
determine if they are providing the service in the most effective and efficient
manner based on cost and service delivered.

OEM working with the Oregon 9-1-1 Advisory Committee and Oregon's public
safety community, will work to complete a criteria based matrix to be used by
local governments in evaluating their 911 systems.
Page 20

The 9-1-1 Efficiency Study Committee supports the local consolidation of 911
PSAPs if it is supported by the local public and private safety agencies and
results in improved service to the public served” (Oregon Emergency
Management, 1994, p. 51).
In 1995, the Oregon Legislature passed a requirement8 that all 911/dispatcher
centers located in a county that includes more than one center provide a report to the
state. This report was to be submitted to OEM prior to December 31, 2000. The
required report was expected to demonstrate the benefits of having multiple 911/centers
within a county jurisdiction. The benefits were defined as “providing better service or
cost savings that has been verified” (Oregon Military Department, 2010, p. 18).
In response to this report requirement, OEM conducted is its own report and
study on multiple PSAPs located inside one on county. The Multi-PSAP County Report
Evaluation Study was completed in October 2000. The Report among other things
concluded:

PSAPs in multi-PSAP counties tended to have higher call transfer rates between
PSAPs, that increase response times, and

Some of the PSAPs in multi-PSAP counties are very small, often with only one
person during low-activity hours. This creates a potential for lower service to the
public when two or more calls are received simultaneously (Oregon Emergency
Management, 2000, p. 12).
One of the conclusions of the 2000 report was that most “high-value”
consolidations have taken place and the remaining consolidation opportunities would
8
Section 14, Chapter 276, Oregon Laws 1995
Page 21
have “marginal benefits, incur high capital costs, and/or encounter entrenched and
vigorous political opposition” (Oregon Emergency Management, 2000, p. ES4 & 25).
The report recommended that the state should focus on other improvements to the 911
system, instead of forcing consolidation efforts. The report concluded that
“consolidation has decreased in importance in comparison to other current critical public
safety communications issues” (p. 25).
The Oregon Legislature ignored the recommendation to stay away from forced
911 consolidations. In June 2001, Governor Kitzhaber signed into law HB 3977, which
required PSAPs in multi-PSAP counties to submit a plan for consolidation,9 restricted to
no more than one PSAP in each county (effective September 1, 2002),10 and
emphasized the intent not to fund more than one PSAP per county after July 1, 2003
(Oregon Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials, 2012, p. 3).11 In
addition to these requirements, the legislation created a Primary Public Safety
Answering Points Consolidation Incentive Fund,12 but stated that OEM is not allowed to
spend any funds without legislative approval during the next legislative session that
would not begin until January 2003.13
The plans to force 911/dispatch centers into no more than one center per county
hit a double whammy. The first was a recession in 2002, that created a $1.7 billion
shortfall in income tax projections requiring five special session (Seattle Times, 2002).
During the third special session, the legislature transferred $9 million from the 911 funds
into the state’s general fund to help close the shortfall (Oregon Emergency
Oregon HB 3977 – 2001 Session, Section 1 (2)(a).
Ibid.
11 Ibid., Section 7
12 Ibid., Section 5
13 Ibid., Section 9
9
10
Page 22
Management, 2010, p. 22). The second was local backlash, which cause legislators to
submit not less than five different bills14 to remove the forced consolidation in multiPSAP counties (Oregon Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials, 2012,
p. 3). Ultimately, HB 3154 was passed and signed by Governor Ted Kolongoski in July
2003. This legislation removed the forced consolidation and eliminated the Primary
Public Safety Answering Points Consolidation Incentive Fund15.
The effect of the 2001-03 effort to force consolidation did have residual effects.
A total of five 911/dispatch centers in multi-PSAP did consolidate between 2001 and
2005 (see Table C on page 19). These included one in Clackamas County (City of
Milwaukee), one in Douglas County (Myrtle Creek), one in Jackson County (Ashland),
one in Umatilla County (Pendleton), and one in Washington County (Forest Grove).
Persuasion Through Budget Notes
Since the 2001 mandate and reversal in 2003, the legislature has stayed out of
openly calling for 911/dispatch center consolidation. They have turned to including
“budget notes” attached to the legislation that enacts state spending, otherwise known
as the budget bill(s). These budget notes focusing on 911/dispatch center have
appeared in the 2009, 2011, and 2012 budget bills.
In a Budget Information Brief – Budget Note (2007), Legislative Fiscal Officer,
Ken Rocco explains the history and authority of budget notes. In this brief, he states
that “...a budget note is a formal directive to a state agency expressing legislative intent
for a particular budget issue” (p. 1). The history of budget notes goes back 36 years,
but was only recently formalized with the adoption Joint Committee on Ways and Means
14
15
HB 2833, HB 3124, HB 3154, HB 2707, and HB 3257
Oregon HB 3154 – 2003 Session, Sections 1 & 2
Page 23
Committee Rule #13 in the 74th Legislative Assembly (2007). Budget notes do not have
the “force of law.” However a note “carries greater authority than an instruction but
lacks the legal basis of administrative rule for revised state” (p. 3). In his report, Rocco
includes a continuum (see Image “2”) of the authority regarding a budget note in
comparison to administrative rules and statutes.
Image 2 – Continuum of Authority of Legislative Action
Source: Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Information Brief – Budget Note (2007, p. 3)
Rocco concluded that state agencies are not legally required to comply with
budget notes, but states that historically the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative Branch
agencies comply for three reasons. The first is that agencies have a mutual interest in
the outcome. The second reason is that the agency has an interest in maintaining good
relations with the Legislative Assembly. The third reason is that agencies recognize
that compliance may avoid “unnecessary statutory language to satisfy legislative
concern over a technical or non-policy issue” (p. 3).
In the Oregon Military Department’s 2009 budget bill (SB 5536), the legislature
attached a budget note that the department “will conduct a study of the relative merits of
Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) consolidation throughout the state with the intent
of reducing redundancy and creating a more cost-efficient delivery system” and deliver
this study during the 2010 legislative session (Oregon State Legislature, 2009, p. 7). In
response, OEM put together a Consolidation Task Force that included public safety,
local government, and private sector partners. This task force met numerous times and
Page 24
developed a draft report that was never submitted to the legislature. The OEM website
includes the “10th draft” version of this study.
In the Oregon Military Department’s 2011 budget bill (HB 5037), the legislature
attached a more strongly worded budget note. The budget note states that OEM has
failed to provide the consolidation study requested in 2009 and that if a study was not
submitted to the legislature in 2012, the Legislative Fiscal Office would complete a study
using 911 funds (Oregon State Legislature, 2011, p. 10). The Association of Oregon
Counties (AOC) reports in their 2011 Legislative Summary, that the state budget has
withheld expenditure authorization from the OEM budget for the last two remaining
quarters of the biennial budget. The report states that this $20 million dollar holdback is
to “ensure that the report will be done” (Association of Oregon Counties, 2011, p. 67).
The OEM did complete the task of the consolidation study by contracting with LR
Kimball company. The report was submitted to the 2012 legislature. In the report, LR
Kimball reviewed the merits of consolidating PSAPs and the cost analysis of upgrading
the entire state 911 system to software and equipment that would be able to handle
NG911 requirements. The report analyzed three scenarios. The first was the status
quo of 49 PSAPs. The second was a centralized single statewide PSAP. The third was
system of nine regional PSAPs. This report will be analyzed in Section Five.
In the 2012 budget bill (SB 5701), the legislature included a budget note that
instructs OEM to prepare a plan for upgrading the state 911 system to NG911
technology. In addition, the budget note states that this plan “shall include a detailed
component to consolidate the state’s Public Safety Answering Points” based upon the
2012 Kimball report (Oregon State Legislature, 2012, pp. 28-29). The budget note did
Page 25
not specify which consolidation scenario that OEM should pursue, but in the report
Kimball does state that a single statewide system is not recommended and the “perfect
world” solution is a long-term goal of nine regional PSAPs that offer the best level of
service and cost efficiencies (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 69).
Summary
The Oregon 911 system needs to prepare for the conversion of expensive
technologic upgrades to NG911. The expense can be daunting, but the return on the
investment has less than a four year payback and will have ongoing savings of close to
$5.7 million per year. These savings would not be a windfall to 911/dispatch centers,
but would be retained by OEM in the 911 subaccount. Additionally, this savings can be
increased to $9.3 million per year if the 48 PSAPs are able to find a way to voluntarily
consolidate (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 66-67). Failure to pursue voluntary
consolidations may have the state legislature repeat the 2001-styled forced mandates.
Locally funded 911/dispatch centers are feeling economic pressure. Rising
personnel costs and aging equipment16 coupled with a reduction in 911 tax revenue
have put some 911/dispatch centers on an unsustainable path. If the Oregon
legislature does not modify the 911 tax to include pre-paid cellphones, the 911 system
should plan on continued reduced revenue even if a rebounding economy restores
consumer confidence.
Many of the 911/dispatch centers in Oregon are considered small (less than 4
workstations17) or receive less than one 911 call per hour18 (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp.
16
Over forty-five percent (45%) of the Computer Aided Dispatch hardware in Oregon 911/dispatch
centers is over eight years old (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 23).
17 Thirty-Four of forty-nine PSAPs have less than four workstations. Twelve PSAPs have two
workstations.
Page 26
13-18). The infrastructure costs of computers, software, and emergency power systems
for these centers are expensive to maintain. When factoring in the volume of 911 calls
received for these smaller PSAPs the economics of maintaining these centers
operationally is difficult to justify. In addition, many of the smallest PSAPs have only
one telecommunicator on duty at any one time. While call volume is less than one per
hour, the potential risk to service levels are great, since it is difficult to handle more than
one 911 call and dispatch the first responders.
These small 911/dispatch centers are justifiably overstaffed, due to call volume,
but are simultaneously understaffed when you consider the operational need to be able
to hand a flurry of multiple 911 calls that cannot be anticipated. Seconds count in
responding to 911 calls, the citizens of these smaller PSAPs are at risk when multiple
911 calls are received. At the same time, these same citizens are potentially
overpaying for a 911/dispatch center that receives less than one call per hour. Six
911/dispatch centers receive less than six 911 calls per day.
The concept of consolidation of 911/dispatch centers is fairly straight forward.
With today’s technology of selective routing a telephone number that dials 911 across
the state is immediately routed to two hubs (Portland and Eugene). At each of these
hubs the location of the call is identified either by the ALI (automated location
information) if it is a landline or by cell tower location. Once the location of the call is
determined, it is selectively routed back to the appropriate 911/dispatch center. In other
words, the old technology (Basic 911) of “centralized switches” in each community
effectively restricted 911 calls from leaving a community and rerouted those calls back
18
Nineteen of forty-nine PSAPs receive less than 911 call per hour. Thirty-eight of forty-nine receive less
than 4 calls per hour.
Page 27
to a local 911/dispatch center requiring a locally based 911/dispatch center. The new
technology makes remote 911/dispatch centers even more feasible with breakthroughs
in internet based radio command systems. If a radio tower can be connected to an IP
(Internet protocol) system, either by fiber optic or microwave, a telecommunicator can
communicate by radio with police, fire, and EMS personnel without a need to be located
within the local community.
The governing bodies of 911/dispatch centers need additional tools to evaluate
potential 911 consolidations. The employees of these 911 centers are not likely to raise
the issue without inquiry. When this inquiry is requested many times 911 staff quickly
raises many reasons a consolidation cannot happen, without taking into consideration
that service levels will usually improve and the potential to save financial resources is
an important factor. The problem is that without hiring a consultant that may cost up to
$100,000, a governing body of a small jurisdiction is left wondering what consolidation
efforts may produce in service level benefits and potential cost savings. The purpose of
this research is to develop financial templates that can be used to project operation
costs and find the “right sized” 911/dispatch center that is based upon consolidated
911/dispatch centers’ call volumes and population.
Page 28
Section III: Research Steps
…comparing the cost of current, non-consolidated PSAP operations with that of a
consolidated environment is not an apples-to-apples comparison. An analogy may be a
1985 model ambulance and a brand new ambulance, which can get from the scene of an
accident to an emergency room in a similar manner. However, the older model is less
reliable, less safe, less efficient, and not equipped with the most current medical devices.
These devices can be the difference between life and death. Consolidation Guide:
Office of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications (Office of Statewide Emergency
Telecommunications: State of Connecticut, 2012, p. 5)
This section outlines the research undertaken to collect information that can
assist 911/dispatch centers in evaluating possible consolidations. This research
consists of four sets of data. The first includes a summary of financial and call data
from 4619 of the 49 Oregon PSAPs that were operational in FY 2010-11. The second
includes a review of the different types of 911 consolidations. The third is a review of
the recent NG911 and PSAP consolidation report completed by the LR Kimball
Company on behalf of OEM. The fourth is a summary of data used to compare the
number of PSAPs with other states.
OREGON PSAP FINANCIAL & CALL VOLUME DATA
The source of data for this project is the annual report that is required by state
law20 for all 911/dispatch centers. These reports include information on how state 911
tax revenues were spent in different categories, including amounts of local funds spent
on 911 activities. The report (see Appendix “2” for report template) requires thirty-four
categories for revenue and expenditures, two categories for the number of employees,
and two categories for call-taking data. This can be used to determine the ideal “rightsized” PSAP in terms of cost efficiency.
19
20
Missing PSAP data is from Coos County, Santiam Canyon, and Warm Springs.
ORS 403.120(1)(c)(A) and 403.240 (11).
Page 29
Since 911 tax revenue is shared with cities and counties, additional analysis was
conducted to further refine cost factors into “gross” (does not include 911 taxes) and
“net” (includes 911 taxes). The purpose of including gross and net calculations is
because the 911 tax revenue is not shared proportionally by population. As stated
earlier, state law21 guarantees each county one percent (1.0%) of all revenue collected
based upon the county’s unincorporated population. A list of the counties and there
“1% minimum” status is included in Table “D”.
In reviewing the efficiency of a 911/dispatch center solely relying on the “net” cost
of providing services does not give an accurate accounting, since smaller counties
receive a disproportionate amount of 911 tax revenue. For example, the smallest
county in the state is Wheeler County with a total population of 1,435. Using the 2011
3rd quarter distribution of 911 tax revenue, Wheeler County is projected to receive a
total of $228,830. That is equal to $159 per resident (See Table “E”). The largest
county that does not receive a minimum one-percent is Washington County,22 with a
population of 536,370 is projected to receive $1,018,810 for a total of $1.90 per
resident.
This disproportionate funding tax distribution should not be ignored when
reviewing financial analysis in attempting to find more efficient 911/dispatch centers.
21
ORS 403.240(9)
Although Multnomah County has a total population of 741,925, its unincorporated population is 17,637
which makes it eligible for a “1.0% minimum” allocation.
22
Page 30
Table D – Oregon Counties – “1% Minimum” 911 Tax Status
Population July
1, 2011 (PSU)
Unincorporated
Population (OEM)
BAKER
16,215
4,811
1% Minimum
911 Tax
Revenue
(Yes/No)
Yes
BENTON
85,995
18,641
Yes
378,480
170,682
No
CLATSOP
37,145
12,975
Yes
COLUMBIA
49,625
22,104
Yes
COOS
62,960
25,530
Yes
CROOK
20,855
11,758
Yes
CURRY
22,335
12,615
Yes
DESCHUTES
158,875
51,240
No
DOUGLAS
107,795
57,935
No
GILLIAM
1,880
580
Yes
GRANT
7,450
2,889
Yes
HARNEY
7,375
3,075
Yes
22,625
14,055
Yes
203,950
62,530
No
County
CLACKAMAS
HOOD RIVER
JACKSON
JEFFERSON
21,845
13,464
Yes
JOSEPHINE
82,820
46,335
Yes
KLAMATH
66,580
42,722
Yes
LAKE
7,885
5,350
Yes
LANE
353,155
96,245
No
46,155
19,365
Yes
117,340
35,805
Yes
31,445
14,485
Yes
318,150
83,620
No
11,270
4,270
Yes
741,925
17,637
Yes
75,965
16,658
Yes
1,765
615
Yes
TILLAMOOK
25,255
15,670
Yes
UMATILLA
76,580
21,865
Yes
UNION
25,980
6,445
Yes
6,995
2,955
Yes
25,300
9,254
Yes
536,370
213,763
No
1,435
675
Yes
LINCOLN
LINN
MALHEUR
MARION
MORROW
MULTNOMAH
POLK
SHERMAN
WALLOWA
WASCO
WASHINGTON
WHEELER
Yes
YAMHILL
99,850
23,655
Source: PSU Population Research Center and OEM 2011 3rd Quarter Report
Page 31
Table E – 911 Tax Revenue per County per Resident
County
Population
1% Minimum 911 Tax
Revenue (Yes/No)
Projected 911 Tax Revenue
Distribution per Resident* +
741,925
Yes
$0.31
318,150
No
$1.25
LANE
353,155
No
$1.30
JACKSON
203,950
No
$1.46
DESCHUTES
158,875
No
$1.54
WASHINGTON
536,370
No
$1.90
LINN
117,340
Yes
$1.95
378,480
No
$2.15
99,850
Yes
$2.29
107,795
No
$2.56
BENTON
85,995
Yes
$2.66
JOSEPHINE
82,820
Yes
$2.76
UMATILLA
76,580
Yes
$2.99
POLK
75,965
Yes
$3.01
KLAMATH
66,580
Yes
$3.44
62,960
Yes
$3.63
49,625
Yes
$4.61
46,155
Yes
$4.96
CLATSOP
37,145
Yes
$6.16
MALHEUR
31,445
Yes
$7.28
UNION
25,980
Yes
$8.81
WASCO
25,300
Yes
$9.04
TILLAMOOK
25,255
Yes
$9.06
22,625
Yes
$10.11
22,335
Yes
$10.25
21,845
Yes
$10.48
CROOK
20,855
Yes
$10.97
BAKER
16,215
Yes
$14.11
MORROW
11,270
Yes
$20.30
LAKE
7,885
Yes
$29.02
GRANT
7,450
Yes
$30.72
7,375
Yes
$31.03
6,995
Yes
$32.71
1,880
Yes
$121.72
SHERMAN
1,765
Yes
$129.65
WHEELER
1,435
Yes
$159.46
MULTNOMAH
MARION
CLACKAMAS
YAMHILL
DOUGLAS
COOS
COLUMBIA
LINCOLN
HOOD RIVER
CURRY
JEFFERSON
HARNEY
WALLOWA
GILLIAM
*Based on CY 2011 3rd Quarter Distribution
+County Distribution only - Does not include revenue distributed to cities located within each county)
Source: PSU Population Research Center and OEM 2011 3rd Quarter Report
Page 32
The reports submitted by the individual PSAPs were reviewed to evaluate
consistency in the reporting of population. Many PSAPs did not use recognized
population data from the PSU Population Research Center. In reviewing the data,
some PSAPs operating in counties that have multiple PSAPs did not reduce the
population of the PSAPs that larger PSAPs surround. Prior to data analysis, the
population data was adjusted to match the July 2011 certified population figures
provided by PSU’s Population Research Center (See Appendices “3”, “4”, and “5” for
PSU population data).
In counties that have multiple PSAPs, population was adjusted to conform to
known PSAP boundaries. In some jurisdictions, PSAPs’ boundaries do not follow city
boundaries. For example, the city of Brookings’ PSAP receives calls and dispatches for
an adjacent fire district that does not have an identified population from PSU. In these
cases, the submitted PSAPs’ populations are not adjusted from their reported
population. However, the larger PSAPs population was adjusted downward from the
PSU data for populations of PSAPs of cities. For the above example, the Brookings
PSAP’s (located in Curry County) reported population is 16,000. The PSU data for
Brookings is only 6,360. The Brookings PSAP population is not adjusted. The
remaining PSAP in Curry County is operated by the county. The PSAP population for
Curry County PSAP is reduced by 6,360 from the PSU population estimate for Curry
County.
The FY 2010-11 PSAP reports were analyzed to determine the following
information:
1.
911 calls per resident (911 calls divided by population).
Page 33
2.
911 tax revenue per resident (tax revenue divided by population).
3.
Percentage of expenditures paid by 911 tax revenue (tax revenue divided by
total expenditures).
4.
“Gross” cost per resident (total expenditures divided by population).
5.
“Net” cost per resident (total expenditures minus 911 tax revenue divided by
population).
6.
“Gross” cost per 911 call received (total expenditures divided by 911 calls).
7.
“Net” cost per 911 call received (total expenditures minus 911 tax revenue
divided by 911 calls).
8.
Residents per 911/dispatch center total employees (FTE) (residents divided
by total FTE in 911/dispatch center).
9.
911 calls per total employee (FTE) (residents divided by total FTE).
10. 911 calls per hour (911 calls divided by 365/24).
Assumptions and Methodology
Using the data from the FY 2010-11 OEM reports it is possible to determine that
certain characteristics of PSAP lead to lower costs. In order to complete this task some
assumptions were made.
 Average Cost per FTE. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics the
average wage of a dispatcher is $37,500. The Kaiser Family Foundation
reports the average employer cost for health care in 2011 was $10,944.
Oregon Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) reports that the
average employer contribution in FY 11-13 is almost 11 percent (10.8%) and
that 70 percent (70%) of employers contribute the six percent (6%) into
Page 34
employees Individual Account Program (IAP) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2012) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011) (Oregon Public Employees
Retirement System (PERS), 2011). Together, the combination of the above
pieces of information resulted in the following assumption: Average PSAP
total FTE employee cost is $54,744 [(37,500*1.168) +10,944].
 Exclude PSAPs for inconsistent data. To be able to confidently compare
PSAP data, an examination was completed to check that the reported number
of total employees (FTEs) was consistent with the reported total expenditures.
The 46 PSAPs total FTE was multiplied by $54,744, then divided by the total
expenditures reported to determine the percentage of expenditures assumed
to have been spent on personnel.
If the above calculation of personnel
costs is greater than 100 percent (100%) of the reported expenditures it
resulted in the following assumption:
the reported financial data is flawed
and should be excluded. Table “F” includes the three PSAPs that have an
assumed error by having personnel costs greater than the reported total
expenditures.
Table F – Excluded PSAPs for Inconsistent Employee Data
PSAP
South Clatsop (Seaside)
Josephine County
Lake County
Reported
Total
FTEs
Reported
Total
Expenditures
8.00
15.00
6.25
$97,117
$623,069
$336,533
Assumed
FTE Cost
($54,744)
$437,952
$821,160
$342,150
Assumed
Percent of
Budget
Spent on
Personnel
451.0%
131.8%
101.7%
 Excluded PSAPs if multiple secondary PSAPs exist within the same county
boundary. To be able to confidently compare PSAPs an examination was
Page 35
conducted to determine if primary PSAPs data would be biased. Primary
PSAPs that have more than one secondary PSAP within the same jurisdiction
would likely have a lower staffing ratio, since the telecommunicators would be
transferring calls to other dispatch centers and would not be required to staff
personnel for those tasks. The potential of comparing different PSAPs that
have different staffing requirements resulted in the following assumption:
Primary PSAPs that transfer 911 calls to multiple secondary PSAPs have a
lower staffing level, since they do not dispatch field personnel and should be
excluded from the study. Table “G” includes the three PSAPs that have been
excluded.
Table G – Primary PSAPs Excluded – Multiple Secondary PSAPs
Number of
Secondary
PSAPs*
Secondary PSAPs
Coos
3
Bay Cities Ambulance, Myrtle Point
PD, and North Bend PD
Coos Bay PD and Coos County
Sheriff
Lane
3
Junction City PD, Lane County
Sheriff, and Springfield PD
Central Lane Communications,
East Lane 911, South Lane 911,
and West Lane 911
Linn
3
Sweet Home PD, Lebanon PD, and
Albany PD
Linn County Sheriff
County
Excluded Primary PSAPs
* Not including Oregon State Patrol (OSP) or Department of Public Safety & Standards secondary PSAPs.
Source: OEM (http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/OR911/docs/psap_directory.pdf?ga=t)
 PSAPs Staffing. In the PSAP Staffing Guidelines Report (2003) adopted by
the National Emergency Number Association (NENA), the staffing of PSAPs
recommended two methods for determining staffing levels. The first method
relies on available call data (volume, duration, and queuing theory). The
second method relies on using the following three categories of PSAPs based
upon population size: small (0 to 19,000), medium (19,000 to 100,000), and
Page 36
large (100,000 to 140,000). The report stated that using population size was
based upon the comparison of using call data and actual staffing of existing
PSAPs. Using a population matrix the Report staffing requirements will be
similar for jurisdictions that have similar characteristics (pp. 2-3,19-21). Table
“H” outlines the total FTEs recommended based on PSAP size.
Table H – Recommended Staffing – PSAP Size
Population
Small PSAP
Medium PSAP
Large PSAP
Up to 19,000
19,000 to 100,000
100,000 to 140,000
Recommended
Staffing*
9.0
16.0
25.6
* Total FTE including training, data base administration, and administrative support positions
Source: National Emergency Number Association (NENA), PSAP Staffing Guidelines Report (2003), Pgs
20-21
The report provides a method for calculating the number of FTEs
required to staff a position 24 hours per day for 365 days per year. The report
suggests an “available working man-hours” calculation to determine a
“manning ratio”. The first step in the process is to deduct the total number of
hours an employee is expected to be absent from work. These deductions
include, vacation, sick leave, and training. Those hours are deducted from
2,080 hours (52 weeks times 40 hours). This number is then divided by
8.760, which is the total hours in a year (24 hours times 365 days). The result
is the number of FTEs needed to cover one position every hour of a year.
Table “I” does this calculation based upon an employee receiving nine
holidays, 15 vacation days, 12 sick days, and four days of training. The
resulting “manning ratio” is that for each telecommunicator position needed
for each hour of the day a PSAP needs at least 4.98 FTEs to cover all
Page 37
available hours if each employee used all vacation and sick leave during the
year. Using the above pieces of information resulted in the following
assumption: the minimum manning ratio is 4.98 employees to provide 24/7
coverage of a PSAPs center position.
Table I – “Manning Ratio” Calculation to Determine Staffing Needs for 24/7 Positions
Days
9.0
12.0
15.0
4.0
Hours
72.0
96.0
120.0
32.0
320.0
A
B
C
D
E
Paid Holiday
Sick Days
Vacation
Training
Total Hours "off" (A+B+C+D)
F
40 hours at 52 weeks (40 x 52)
2,080.0
G
Total Employee Hours Available per
Year (F-E)
1,760.0
Notes
Available working manhours per year
Posts
H
I
24 hours @ 365 Days (24 x 365)
1.00
8,760.0
FTEs
4.98
FTEs @ 24/7 coverage (H ÷ G)
Manning ratio
Source: PSAP Staffing Guidelines Report (2003), Pgs 30-31 and Appendix D
Data Set. With the exclusions mentioned above the analysis undertaken to
determine a “right-sized” PSAP includes call volume and financial data from 37 of the 49
PSAPs that were operational in FY 2010-11. Three PSAPs failed to provide reports to
OEM, three PSAPs were excluded due to inconsistent data, and six PSAPs were
excluded due to the presence of multiple secondary PSAPs within their jurisdiction. The
remaining PSAPs had a collective total of 1,298,146 911 calls during the reporting
period and spent a total of $83.6 million. Attached is Appendix “6” provides a summary
of the data set and the analysis used for this study.
Page 38
COMPARISON OF PSAP CONSOLIDATION MODELS
Research was undertaken to evaluate the four different models of PSAP
consolidations. The state of Connecticut’s Consolidation Guide (2012) outlines four
consolidation models and eight “key issues” to consider when determining
consolidation.
The four consolidation models are:
 Full Consolidation Model: This is the consolidation of 911/dispatch
functions for all public safety agencies within a defined geographical area
into one agency. This new organization can be their own entity or a
separate department within another agency (Michigan State 9-1-1
Committee, 2012, p. 33).
 Co-Location Model: This model combines one or more PSAPs into a
single physical space. In addition to sharing space, this may also include
shared technology such as CAD, telephone systems, radios, and
recorders while remaining separate entities (Michigan State 9-1-1
Committee, 2012, p. 32).
 Partial Consolidation Model: This model combines different public safety
agencies, but not all into one location. The model is more likely to occur in
jurisdictions that have multiple PSAPs, which may consolidate disciplines
(Law Enforcement, Fire, and EMS) in different buildings and different
locations (Office of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications: State of
Connecticut, 2012, p. 6).
Page 39
 Virtual (Hybrid) Consolidation Model: This model can include variations of
what is listed above wherein a PSAP maintains separate physical
locations, but shares common phone equipment, radio equipment, CAD,
and other public safety dispatching equipment over a secure IP network.
This model may include creation of a new organization or agreements
between entities to consolidate policy and procedures (Michigan State 91-1 Committee, 2012, p. 34) (Office of Statewide Emergency
Telecommunications: State of Connecticut, 2012).
The recommended eight key issues to be considered when determining the
preferred consolidation model include the following:
 Potential for Service Improvements. Reducing or eliminating the number
of 911 calls between PSAPs. Desire to increase effectiveness during
large-scale incidents. Greater utilization of existing telecommunicator
employees (Office of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications: State of
Connecticut, 2012, pp. 7-8).

Potential for Cost Savings. Reduction in employee costs. Reduction in
duplicate equipment. Increased ability to afford advance technology (pp.
8-9).
 Potential for Improved Communication. Increased communication
between disciplines (Fire, Law Enforcement, and EMS). Improved
coordination during incidents require activation of mutual aid responses.
Improved tracking of resources and field personnel (p. 10).
Page 40
 Potential Benefits from Shared Technology. Improved ability to purchase
new technology that small jurisdictions cannot afford. Ability to upgrade
aging equipment (p. 11).
 Potential for Consistent Training. Improved training opportunities.
Standardized training and improved on the job training (p. 12).
 Potential for Organizational Expansion/Career Path. Ability to
create/increased supervision, training, and quality assurance positions
that do not exist in small organization. Additional career opportunities may
increase retention and decrease costs associated with hiring and training
(p. 13).
 Degree of Control Loss (Loss of Control). The degree a model would
require changes in operations through standardization. Some
organizations may be less accepting of losing control of employees or
operation standards. The blending of fire and law enforcement cultures
can be difficult (pp. 13-14).
 Degree of Change in Managing Non-Dispatch (ancillary) Tasks. The
degree a model would require organizations to reassign (or hire
replacement employees to perform) non-911 duties. This change usually
impacts smaller organizations that have low call volumes or have used
PSAP personnel in police stations to have a 24/7 presence (p. 15).
The Consolidation Guide encourages organizations considering consolidation to
review their goals and determine to what degree they desire to affect a new
Page 41
organization. A matrix of the four models and the eight key issues are included in Table
“J”.
Table J – Model Comparison Summary Chart
Key Issue
Potential for Service Improvement
Full
Consolidation
Partial
Consolidation
CoLocation*
Virtual
(Hybrid)
Consolidation
High
Medium
Low-High
High
Low-High
Low-Medium
Medium
Low-High
Potential for Improved Communication
Potential for Benefits from Shared
Technology
High
Low-Medium
Medium
High
High
Medium
High
High
Potential for Training Consistency
High
Medium
Low
High
Potential for Organization Expansion
(Career Ladder)
High
Medium
Low
High
Degree of Control Loss
High
Medium
Low
High
Degree of Change for Management of
Non-Dispatch (Ancillary) Tasks
High
Low-High
Low
High
Potential for Cost Savings
* "Level of impact is dependent upon the level of sharing space and technology, as well as the political environment.
Achievement of maximum benefits requires a high level of sharing technology and physical space, as well as a
cooperative political environment to achieve maximum benefits."
Source: Consolidation Guide, Office of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications: State of Connecticut.
(2012). Page 16.
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 2012 LR KIMBALL REPORT
During the 2012 legislative session, OEM finally delivered a report on PSAP
consolidation that the legislature had been requesting since 2009. It had taken three
budget notes and the ultimate threat of removing authorization to spend state resources
to finally achieve the requested report. The original request in 2009 was that OEM “will
conduct a study of the relative merits of Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP)
consolidation throughout the state with the intent of reducing redundancy and creating a
more cost-efficient delivery system” (Oregon State Legislature, 2009, p. 7).
Page 42
OEM combined the PSAP consolidation with an additional study to determine the
costs to transition into a statewide NG911 system. The consolidation section of the
report gives an overview of the consolidation process, the current PSAPs system in
Oregon, and consolidation options.
The report states that PSAP consolidations “can yield substantial improvements
in service levels, regional interoperability, responder safety, employee retention, and
potential cost savings” (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 1). Kimball indicates additional
benefits from a state-side perspective are that consolidation encourages interagency
cooperation, more effective use of resources, and improved large-scale incident
management (p. 6).
The Kimball study reviews two consolidation scenarios. The first scenario is to
consolidate all 911 call taking duties into one statewide primary PSAP.23 This would
leave the current 48 PSAPs to act as secondary PSAPs.24 The system would have all
911 calls received at a centralized location. Once the call taker determines the location
and nature of the incident they would transfer the call to the local secondary PSAP.
Transitioning the 48 PSAPs into secondary PSAPs would have a major impact on local
government, since secondary PSAPs are ineligible to receive any 911 tax revenue for
equipment and personnel (Rees, 2012, p. 2).
Kimball argues that the advantages of a single statewide PSAP includes call
taking standardization, centralized quality assurance, and lower infrastructure costs of
Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 403.105 (11) “’Public safety answering point’ means a 24-hour
communications facility established as an answering location for 9-1-1 calls originating within a given
service area. A ‘primary public safety answering point’ receives all calls directly from the public. A
‘secondary public safety answering point’ only receives calls from a primary public safety answering point
on a transfer or relay basis.
24 Ibid.
23
Page 43
converting to a NG911 environment. The lower infrastructure costs are based upon the
current number of 911 consoles (279) and the single statewide PSAP would only
require 31 consoles. The disadvantages are that all 911 calls would be required to have
at least one call transfer and a greater reliance on technology as opposed to local
knowledge. Ultimately, Kimball discourages this type of scenario stating that the
financial benefit does not outweigh the substantial and overwhelmingly negative25
aspect that every 911 call would have at least one inherent delay in transferring calls to
a secondary PSAP (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 37).
The second scenario that was studied by Kimball was a regional PSAP system of
nine centers. The study recommends dividing the state into regions based upon 911
call volume, existing partners, and state geography. The nine region concept is an
attempt to balance 911 call volumes into the state geography. The nine regions are:
“When 911 call takers are located in a separate facility, such as a single statewide 911 center, the 911
call taker must conduct a preliminary interview to determine the nature and location of the emergency for
each incoming 911 call. This preliminary interview serves two key purposes. First, it allows the call taker
to identify the secondary PSAP to which the call must be transferred. Second, and more importantly, the
preliminary interview ensures that the caller’s location, at minimum, is received should the call be lost
unexpectedly. This allows help to still be sent. The call must then be transferred to the appropriate
secondary PSAP for dispatch. The dispatcher then must re-interview the caller to ensure the call has
been delivered to the correct dispatch point, that the address and call nature are correct, and to gather
further details regarding the incident. At times, a second transfer is needed, which would include a third
similar interview, to ensure all needed services such as police, fire and EMS are dispatched. In addition
to the frustration experienced by the 911 caller, this system creates unnecessary delays in the dispatch of
emergency personnel. The average length of time added to a call during this process is 30 seconds for
each transfer. While 30 seconds seems like a short period of time, consider that 30 seconds may be the
difference between:
 A person being rescued from a house fire or becoming a fatality
 A violent criminal being apprehended or escaping
 A heart attack victim being resuscitated or dying
 A drowning victim suffering brain damage or recovering fully
 A hunting accident victim bleeding to death or recovering
While these are dramatic examples, they are examples of real situations that occur daily in public safety.
In emergencies, seconds count. Should a call need to be transferred a second time, another 30 seconds
is added to the call processing time. The transferring of calls creates additional problems by creating a
delay in getting vital information to field personnel. For example, multiple calls are often received for the
same incident. Each caller often has different information to share. If each 911 caller is routed to the
statewide center first and then transferred to the secondary PSAP, the dissemination of information
critical to field personnel is delayed” (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 37-38).
25
Page 44
Central, Eastern, Eugene Metro, Gorge, Multnomah, North Coast, Portland Metro,
Salem Metro, and South Coast. A map of the proposed regions is attached as
Appendix “7”. Table “K” summarizes how the 911 call volume was used to develop the
regions (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 40-42).
Kimball argues that the nine regional model would result in the following
advantages: service level improvements, reduction or elimination of transfer of 911
calls, quicker call processing, standardized training, and lower infrastructure costs in the
transition to the NG911 environment. The lower infrastructure costs result from the fact
that the current number of 911 consoles is 279 and the regional plan would only require
70 consoles. Kimball identified the following disadvantages of the regional model: a
perceived loss of local control, accommodating ancillary duties26 performed by
dispatchers in small organizations, and a long delay in cost savings if a new buildings
had to be found to house the newly consolidated center (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 42).
“In small PSAPs, it is not cost effective or logical to have call takers/dispatchers sitting idle for the
majority of their shifts, especially when taking into account that many of the PSAPs statewide receive less
than a single 9-1-1 call per hour on average. Therefore, a wide range of additional duties are commonly
assigned (front desk, administrative calls, monitor prisoners, monitor alarms, and clerical duties). Often,
these additional duties fall outside the realm of emergency communications. Ninety-four percent of the
State’s PSAPs assign their 9-1-1 telecommunicators duties outside of true emergency communications
(call taking and dispatching) functions. The number and significance of the additional assigned tasks is
dependent on the PSAP, call volume, and the time of day. In many instances, after normal business
hours, PSAP personnel are the only ones remaining in the building and interface with citizens looking for
a safe haven or in need of assistance. As a 24/7 operation, the PSAP is also often assigned the
responsibility for taking after-hours calls for other municipal departments whether or not the calls are
related to public safety. Often, when actual emergency communications responsibilities comprise the
smallest portion of job responsibilities, then the employees’ focus is primarily on non-emergency
communications-related tasks rather than the other way around. Given the stakes associated with
emergency communications, creating an environment that allows the employees’ focus to be on receiving
and processing 9-1-1 calls first is strongly recommended. Re-assignment of these ancillary duties is a
key issue in many consolidation efforts. In order to consolidate, municipalities must either re-assign these
duties to existing employees, hire additional staff to handle them, or alter the type and level of service
offered to citizens after hours” (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 20-21).
26
Page 45
Table K – Kimball Nine Region 911 Call Volume
Kimball
Recommended
PSAP Regions
Number of
Current
PSAPs
CY 2010
911 Calls
Percentage
of Total
Central
3
144,963
8.6%
Eastern
10
68,911
4.1%
Eugene Metro
6
237,699
14.0%
Gorge
7
48,466
2.9%
Multnomah
1
387,923
22.9%
North Coast
7
78,505
4.6%
Portland Metro
3
272,025
16.1%
Salem Metro
4
242,556
14.3%
South Coast
7
212,198
12.5%
TOTAL
48
1,693,246
100.0%
Source: Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1 Implementation Study (Oregon), LR Kimball,
2012
The second part of the Kimball study estimated the costs of converting the entire
statewide 911 system into a NG911 environment. Since the Kimball report does not
recommend a single statewide system, but a nine regional center plan it is best to
compare the costs estimates between the 49 PSAPs and the recommended
consolidation plan.
The cost of the current 911 system’s infrastructure totals approximately $12.1
million per year. OEM receives about $13.5 million per year in 911 tax revenue to pay
for these costs. In both scenarios, the NG911 equipment will replace most of the
current equipment, referred to as “legacy equipment”. Both legacy and NG911
equipment have contracts that require maintenance of the equipment or ongoing costs
to maintain. During the transition to NG911 equipment the legacy equipment must
remain operational, so the three year transition has added costs that mostly disappear
Page 46
in the fourth year. In both scenarios, the remaining legacy equipment will have a $1.0
million maintenance cost.
The difference between the two scenarios is that the current system has 49
PSAPs that utilize 279 telecommunicator workstations, as opposed to 70 workstations
in the regional plan. In addition, the reduction of 40 PSAPs would eliminate the costs
associated with emergency power generation systems, computer aided dispatch (CAD)
systems, 9-1-1 answering equipment, radio consoles, and logging recorders. With less
equipment to purchase and maintain, Kimball estimates that the 10 year cost difference
between the two scenarios is $94.0 million for the 49 PSAP system and $62.5 million for
the regional plan, a difference of $31.5 million (see Table “L”).
Table L – Kimball Estimate on NG911 Transition – 49 PSAPs & 9 Regional PSAPs
49 PSAPs
Year
Maintenance
"legacy"
Equipment
1
$12,120,444
2
$6,782,660
3
Purchase &
Maintenance
NG 911
Equipment
9 Regional PSAPs
TOTAL
Maintenance
"legacy"
Equipment
$12,120,444
$12,120,444
$6,237,096
$13,019,756
$5,951,327
$1,277,323
$9,982,208
$11,259,531
4
$1,000,000
$7,657,208
5
$1,000,000
6
Purchase &
Maintenance
NG 911
Equipment
Annual
Difference
TOTAL
$12,120,444
$0
$3,353,696
$9,305,023
($3,714,733)
$3,896,690
$4,937,548
$8,834,238
($2,425,293)
$8,657,208
$1,000,000
$4,037,548
$5,037,548
($3,619,660)
$7,157,208
$8,157,208
$1,000,000
$3,537,548
$4,537,548
($3,619,660)
$1,000,000
$7,157,208
$8,157,208
$1,000,000
$3,537,548
$4,537,548
($3,619,660)
7
$1,000,000
$7,157,208
$8,157,208
$1,000,000
$3,537,548
$4,537,548
($3,619,660)
8
$1,000,000
$7,157,208
$8,157,208
$1,000,000
$3,537,548
$4,537,548
($3,619,660)
9
$1,000,000
$7,157,208
$8,157,208
$1,000,000
$3,537,548
$4,537,548
($3,619,660)
10
$1,000,000
$7,157,208
$8,157,208
$1,000,000
$3,537,548
$4,537,548
($3,619,660)
TOTAL
$27,180,427
$66,819,760
$94,000,187
$28,968,461
$33,554,080
$62,522,541
($31,477,646)
Source: Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1 Implementation Study (Oregon), LR Kimball,
2012, Pages 66-67.
Page 47
COMPARISON OF OTHER STATES – PSAP AREA AND POPULATION
Research was undertaken to compare Oregon with the other states. A recent
report by the Michigan 9-1-1 State Committee surveyed Oregon and 26 other states in
the number of PSAPs per state, average square miles per PSAP, and average
population per PSAP (Michigan State 9-1-1 Committee, 2012, pp. 107-110). During
subsequent research other state data was obtained. This data is summarized in Table
“M”.
Page 48
Table M– States PSAP Average Population and Average Size
State
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Hawaii
Iowa
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
North Carolina
North Dakota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Nevada
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Vermont
Wisconsin
Wyoming
AVERAGE
MEDIAN
PSAPs
92
75
465
97
106
9
163
6
117
275
134
117
112
110
26
24
259
161
115
117
171
53
82
128
22
74
4
187
47
205
23
357
187
49
69
160
572
124
8
154
34
129
112
Population
Average
31,695
85,227
80,116
51,847
33,718
99,770
115,982
201,923
26,037
46,657
65,611
24,386
38,744
41,212
51,091
240,565
25,280
61,389
19,174
25,362
17,353
18,668
22,272
73,288
30,572
24,680
329,118
47,015
43,812
94,527
117,415
32,315
20,061
78,185
184,092
39,663
43,961
64,524
78,218
36,928
16,577
67,781
43,961
Average
Size
566
1,515
335
1,069
46
217
331
1,071
478
202
268
703
355
396
1,187
407
30
353
692
401
403
2,746
937
381
3,136
1,039
2,242
40
2,582
230
4,775
115
367
1,959
650
258
458
319
1,156
353
2,856
918
407
Source: FCC, Kansas 911, Massachusetts 911, Missouri 911 (2007), US Census
Page 49
Section IV: Researching Findings
(W)e had to deal with personnel, we had to deal with budgets, and the old notion
of merger, centralization, combining services – and there is still out in the rural
area some element of suspicion about whether or not this is going to work. The
proof is in the pudding, the citizens of Owensboro and Daviess County are
served more swiftly and completely than they were in the past – it will save
taxpayer dollars and it will save taxpayer lives. Judge Executive Reid Haire,
Daviess County (KY) on consolidating 911 services with the City of Owensboro
(KY) (9-1-1 Magazine, 2010).
This section summarizes the research findings and recommends a minimally
sized PSAP that takes advantage of economies of scale that are present in larger
jurisdictions.
Reasons to Consider Consolidation
Local governments have seen a decrease in 911 tax revenues since the
beginning of the current economic recession. In addition, more citizens are switching to
emerging pre-paid cellphone plans that evade the 911 tax in Oregon. These
circumstances have led to a decrease in 911 tax revenue by 8.8% to local jurisdictions
since 2008. One of the main reasons for jurisdictions to consider consolidation is
financial, but a more important reason is an improved level of service to citizens. The
911 system is the lifeline for citizens in some type of crisis and local government needs
to reevaluate the most effective and efficient manner to provide assistance to these
hyper-critical calls for help.
Today’s emerging technologies have left the current 911 systems behind.
Citizens have an expectation that the same technologies they have on their mobile
devices are available to 911 centers. Texting, sending pictures, and videos occurs with
little problem with today’s smartphones, laptops, and tablet devices. The technology
enhancement (NG911) for 911 centers to interact in this same manner requires a large
Page 50
investment in new equipment. Small 911 centers are not likely to be able to afford
these large investments with a relatively low volume of critical incidents. However, if
three or four small 911 centers join forces, they have the ability to afford these new
technologies and offer improved service.
Enhanced service levels from consolidation include higher utilization of existing
telecommunicators. Small 911 centers are likely to only have one person on duty 24
hours per day. Many of the 911 centers receive less than one 911 call per hour.
However, when multiple calls occur, telecommunicators can become quickly
overwhelmed while at the same time, surrounding communities have
telecommunicators available sitting idle. By consolidating, these peak incidents can be
handled by the combined strength of regional 911 centers. In addition, these
communities no longer need to each pay for expensive computer systems, emergency
power generation systems, and training.
The possibility of cost savings is achievable by taking advantage of the
economies of scale that become available in larger organizations. Larger 911 centers
make staffing allocations based upon call volume, as opposed to maintaining a minimal
staffing level of one person in small 911 centers. Larger organizations only need one
building, one director, and one set of computer infrastructure.
OEM just received a consolidation report with cost estimates to upgrade the
entire statewide system to NG911 technology. The two scenarios estimated costs for
the 49 current 911 centers compared to a “perfect world” consolidation of 911 centers
into nine regional centers. The cost difference between these plans is $31 million over
a ten-year period. Local jurisdictions would likely save costs in these regional 911
Page 51
centers by being able to have fewer employees sitting idle in their individual 911centers
waiting for the next 911 call, while their counterpart in the next community is dealing
with multiple critical incidents.
Finding the Right-Sized 911 Center
To find the “right-sized” 911 center call and financial data was used from 37
centers in Oregon. Determining efficient 911 centers’ characteristics and analyzing the
applicability of consolidating small and medium 911 centers is feasible with the correct
analysis and incentives from the state.
Analyzed 911 Centers. The thirty-seven 911 centers analyzed received
1,298,146 calls in FY 2010-11, this represents approximately 76.6% of the calls
received in the state. The remaining 23.4% of the calls went to twelve 911 centers that
were not included in this analysis because they either did not complete the OEM report,
had inconsistent data, or had multiple secondary PSAP within their jurisdiction that
would skew staffing comparisons.
When the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) produced a report
entitled, PSAP Staffing Guidelines, in 2003 it classified PSAPs into three categories
based upon population size. A small PSAP is under 19,000. A medium PSAP is
between 19,000 and 100,000. A large PSAP is between 100,000 and 140,000. Table
“N” includes a list of the 37 PSAPs used in this analysis. This table also includes the
population served, NENA PSAP size category,27 and average hourly 911 call volume.
27
The category of large PSAP will include the six PSAPs that over 140,000 population.
Page 52
Table N – PSAPs Analysed, Population Served, NENA Size Classfication, and Average Hourly
911 Call Volume
Population
Served #
COUNTY
PSAP
Lincoln
Gilliam
Wallowa
Umatilla
Harney
Grant
Lincoln
Morrow
Malheur
Curry
Curry
Baker
Jefferson
Malheur
Crook
Hood River
Tillamook
Wasco
Union
Clatsop
Umatilla
Lincoln
Yamhill
Columbia
Umatilla
Klamath
Marion
Yamhill
Benton
Clackamas
Douglas
Deschutes
Jackson
Marion
Clackamas
Washington
Multnomah
Toledo Police Department#
TRI County Comm#
*Wallowa County Sheriff#
Milton-Freewater Comm#
Harney County Sheriff#
*John Day Comm Center#
Lincoln City PD#
*Morrow County Sheriff#
Ontario 9-1-1
*Curry County Sheriff
Brookings PD
Baker County#
Jefferson County Sheriff#
Malheur County Sheriff
Prineville 9-1-1#
Hood River County District#
*Tillamook County District#
Wasco County 9-1-1
Union County Comm#
Astoria 9-1-1
*Hermiston PD
Lincoln County Comm Agency#
Newberg-Dundee Comm
Columbia 9-1-1 Comm District#
Umatilla County Sheriff#
Klamath Comm District#
N. Marion County Comm (NORCOM)
Yamhill County Comm#
Corvallis Regional Comm#
Lake Oswego Communications
Douglas County
Deschutes County District#
Emerg. Comm S. Ore (Jackson)#
Willamette Valley Comm (Salem)
Clackamas County#
Washington County Comm#
Bureau of Emerg. Comm (Portland)#
4,695
5,080
6,995
7,045
7,375
7,450
7,960
11,270
15,300
15,975
16,000
16,215
18,712
20,070
20,855
22,625
25,255
25,300
25,980
27,000
30,000
33,500
40,000
49,625
50,605
66,580
74,000
74,445
79,297
82,375
107,795
158,875
203,950
330,000
343,568
534,809
739,626
911
Calls
per
Hour
0.18
0.27
0.21
0.30
0.17
0.21
0.95
0.63
0.51
0.63
0.75
0.76
1.12
0.69
1.11
1.17
1.89
1.25
1.07
1.40
1.16
3.05
1.57
2.42
2.73
5.43
2.75
3.43
2.67
1.96
5.06
5.93
10.39
16.50
12.44
13.95
41.48
NENA PSAP
Size
Classification
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
* Missing data from OEM was added using data from the 2012 LR Kimball Report.
# Population was adjusted using PSU Population Research Center data (Additional adjustments were made. See
section four for details).
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center
Page 53
Disproportional Share of 911 Tax Revenue and Higher Costs. Analysis shows
that smaller PSAPs tend to receive a disproportional share of the 911 tax revenue and
have higher costs per residents (See Chart “1”). The formula for revenue sharing favors
small counties by guaranteeing at least one percent (1%) of the revenue.
Chart 1 – Gross Cost per Resident and 911 Tax Revenue Per Resident
Gross Cost Per Resident & 911 Tax Revenue Per
Gross Cost Per Resident
Resident
911 tax per resident
$140.00
Small Size PSAPs
$120.00
Medium Size PSAPs
Large Size
PSAPs
$100.00
$80.00
$60.00
$40.00
* Missing data from OEM was added using data from the 2012 LR Kimball Report
+ Population was adjusted using PSU Population Research Center data (additional adjustments were made. See
section four for details).
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center
Economies of Scale. The 37 agencies were analyzed by grouping them into their
NENA size classification to review differences in size between: annual 911 calls per
resident, average hourly 911 call volume, resident per PSAP FTE, annual 911 calls per
PSAP FTE, cost (gross) per resident, and cost (gross) per 911 call. The purpose of this
Page 54
Clackamas County+
Douglas County
Willamette Valley Comm (Salem)
Washington County Comm+
Emerg. Comm S. Ore (Jackson)+
Deschutes County District+
Bureau of Emerg. Comm (Portland)+
*Hermiston PD
Newberg-Dundee Comm
Lake Oswego Communications
N. Marion County Comm (NORCOM)
Yamhill County Comm+
Klamath Comm District+
Corvallis Regional Comm+
Umatilla County Sheriff+
Columbia 9-1-1 Comm District+
Astoria 9-1-1
Lincoln County Comm Agency+
*Tillamook County District+
Malheur County Sheriff
Wasco County 9-1-1
Hood River County District+
Union County Comm+
Ontario 9-1-1
Prineville 9-1-1+
Milton-Freewater Comm+
Toledo Police Department+
Brookings PD
Lincoln City PD+
Jefferson County Sheriff+
Baker County+
*Curry County Sheriff
*Morrow County Sheriff+
Harney County Sheriff+
*John Day Comm Center+
TRI County Comm+
$-
*Wallowa County Sheriff+
$20.00
analysis is to quantify the extent to which medium and large PSAPs take advantage of
economies of scale.

Annual 911 calls per resident. The average of the 37 PSAPs was 0.39
annual 911 calls per resident. The three groups are comparable (see
Table “O”). The agency with the highest rate of 911 calls per resident was
Lincoln City with 1.04 annual calls. This is likely attributed to the high
volume of tourism that inundates the city during the summer months.
Harney County had the lowest rate at 0.21 annual calls per resident.
Harney County’s low rate is likely attributed to its low population density28
and very few visitors.
Table O – Annual 911 Calls per Resident by NENA PSAP Size
NENA
PSAP Size
Number
of PSAPs
Annual 911
Calls per
Resident
Small
13
0.42
Medium
17
0.44
Large
7
0.38
COMBINED
37
0.39
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center

Average hourly 911 call volume. The average hourly call volume for the
37 agencies is 148 call per hour. There is a significant difference in the
volume of calls (see Table “P”), that not surprisingly increases as the
population served increases. The agency with the highest volume was
Portland with an average of over 41 calls per hour. This represents
almost 28 percent (27.9%) of the entire volume of calls for the 37
28
Harney County has the lowest population density in Oregon at 0.75 residents per square mile
(Association of Oregon Counties, 2011).
Page 55
agencies. The least busy agency was Harney County with an average of
0.17 calls per hour. At this rate Harney County receives less than 29 call
per week.
Table P – Average Hourly 911 Call Volume by NENA PSAP Size
NENA PSAP
Size
Small
Medium
Large
COMBINED
Number
of PSAPs
13
17
7
37
Average Hourly
911 Call
Volume
0.51
2.10
15.11
148.19
Source: OEM

Resident per PSAP FTE. The average for the 37 agencies is that each
FTE serves 4,423 residents. The difference between the groups is
significant. The small PSAPs’ FTEs only are only serving 1,446 residents,
the medium group increases its efficiency over the small group by 132%
serving 3,356 residents. The large PSAP group, at 5,597 residents per
FTE is serving 287% more residents per FTE than the small PSAP group
(See Table “Q”). The agency that has the least amount of residents
served per FTE is Tri-County Communication (Gilliam, Sherman, and
Wheeler Counties) at only 535 residents. The agency with the highest
resident per FTE ratio is Clackamas County with 8,279.
Page 56
Table Q – Ratio of Residents serve per PSAP FTE by NENA PSAP Size
NENA
PSAP Size
Number of
PSAPs
Residents
per PSAP
FTE
Small
13
1,446
Medium
17
3,356
Large
7
5,597
COMBINED
37
4,423
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center

Annual 911 calls per PSAP FTE. The average for the 37 agencies is that
each PSAP FTE receives 1,737 calls per year. The difference between
the groups is significant. The small size PSAP FTEs only receive 575
calls per year, which is 142% less calls per FTE than the medium group,
who handle 1,395 calls per year. The large PSAP group, at 2,094 calls
per FTE is handling 264% more calls per FTE than the small PSAP group
(See Table “R”). The agency that received the least amount of calls per
FTE is Tri-County Communication (Gilliam, Sherman, and Wheeler
Counties) at only 248 calls per FTE. The agency that receive the highest
amount of calls per FTE was Klamath County at 3,068.
Table R – Annual 911 Calls per PSAP FTE by NENA PSAP Size
NENA
PSAP Size
Number
of PSAPs
Annual 911
Calls per
PSAP FTE
Small
13
575
Medium
17
1,395
Large
7
2,094
COMBINED
37
1,737
Source: OEM
Page 57

Cost (gross) per resident. The average for the 37 agencies is a cost per
resident of $25.29. The difference between the three groups is significant.
The small size PSAP average cost (gross) is $60.74 per resident, which is
85% higher than the medium group that has an average cost of $32.84
per resident. The larger group’s average was $23.72, which is 156% less
expensive per resident than the small PSAP group (See Table “S”). The
agency with the highest cost (gross) per resident is Tri-County
Communication (Gilliam, Sherman, and Wheeler Counties) at $121.61.
The agency with the lowest cost per resident is Douglas County at $14.41.
Table S – Average Cost (Gross) per PSAP resident by NENA PSAP Size
NENA
PSAP Size
Number
of PSAPs
Cost
(Gross) per
Resident
Small
13
$60.74
Medium
17
$32.84
Large
7
$23.72
COMBINED
37
$25.29
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center

Cost (gross) per 911 call. The average for the 37 agencies is a cost per
911 of $64.41. The difference between the three groups is significant.
The small size PSAP average cost per 911 call is $161.92, which is 105%
higher than the medium group that has an average cost of $78.97. The
larger group’s average was $67.28, which is 140% less expensive per 911
call than the small PSAP group (See Table “T”). The agency with the
highest cost per 911 call is Tri-County Communication (Gilliam, Sherman,
Page 58
and Wheeler Counties) at $262.56. The agency with the lowest cost per
resident is Klamath County at $30.18.
Table T – Average Cost (Gross) per 911 Call by NENA PSAP Size
NENA
PSAP Size
Number
of PSAPs
Cost (Gross)
per 911 Call
Small
13
$161.92
Medium
17
$78.97
Large
7
$67.28
COMBINED
37
$64.41
Source: OEM
Factors influencing costs. Analysis was undertaken to determine characteristics
of PSAPs that influence the cost (gross) per resident. The factors identified are
compared to two cost efficiency calculations. The first calculation is the cost (gross) per
resident. The second calculation is the cost (gross) per 911 call received. While both
calculations are a good indicator of efficiency, jurisdictions that have higher rate of 911
calls per resident can use call volume data to analyze PSAP staffing, as recommended
by the NENA PSAP Staffing Guidelines Report (2003) using Erlang’s queing theory (pp.
13-16).

Annual calls per resident. The fluctuation between PSAPs size groups is
not significant. The fluctuation between individual PSAPs indicates that
12 of the PSAPs have a +/- variation of greater than 25% of the combined
average. The data indicates that a PSAP having a higher or lower amount
of 911 calls per resident does not influence cost per resident (See Chart
“2”).
Page 59
$250.00
1.00
$200.00
0.80
$150.00
0.60
$100.00
0.40
$50.00
0.20
$0.00
0.00
Harney County Sheriff+
Lake Oswego Communications
Washington County Comm+
*John Day Comm Center+
*Wallowa County Sheriff+
Ontario 9-1-1
Corvallis Regional Comm+
Malheur County Sheriff
Clackamas County+
N. Marion County Comm (NORCOM)
Deschutes County District+
*Hermiston PD
Newberg-Dundee Comm
Toledo Police Department+
*Curry County Sheriff
Union County Comm+
Milton-Freewater Comm+
Yamhill County Comm+
Brookings PD
Douglas County
Baker County+
Columbia 9-1-1 Comm District+
Wasco County 9-1-1
Willamette Valley Comm (Salem)
Emerg. Comm S. Ore (Jackson)+
Hood River County District+
Astoria 9-1-1
TRI County Comm+
Prineville 9-1-1+
Umatilla County Sheriff+
*Morrow County Sheriff+
Bureau of Emerg. Comm (Portland)+
Jefferson County Sheriff+
*Tillamook County District+
Klamath Comm District+
Lincoln County Comm Agency+
Lincoln City PD+
Chart 2 – Annual Calls per Resident
Annual Calls per Resident
$300.00
1.20
Gross Cost per resident

Gross Cost per 911 Call
“3”).
Page 60
911 calls per resident
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center
Average hourly 911 call volume. The fluctuation between PSAPs size
groups and individual PSAPs is significant. The data indicates that
PSAPs that receive more 911 calls per hour are more efficient (See Chart
$0.00
Harney County Sheriff+
Toledo Police Department+
*Wallowa County Sheriff+
*John Day Comm Center+
TRI County Comm+
Milton-Freewater Comm+
Ontario 9-1-1
*Morrow County Sheriff+
*Curry County Sheriff
Malheur County Sheriff
Brookings PD
Baker County+
Lincoln City PD+
Union County Comm+
Prineville 9-1-1+
Jefferson County Sheriff+
*Hermiston PD
Hood River County District+
Wasco County 9-1-1
Astoria 9-1-1
Newberg-Dundee Comm
*Tillamook County District+
Lake Oswego Communications
Columbia 9-1-1 Comm District+
Corvallis Regional Comm+
Umatilla County Sheriff+
N. Marion County Comm (NORCOM)
Lincoln County Comm Agency+
Yamhill County Comm+
Douglas County
Klamath Comm District+
Deschutes County District+
Emerg. Comm S. Ore (Jackson)+
Clackamas County+
Washington County Comm+
Willamette Valley Comm (Salem)
Bureau of Emerg. Comm (Portland)+
Chart 3 – Average Hourly 911 Call Volume
Average Hourly 911 Call Volume
$300.00
Gross Cost per resident

Gross Cost per 911 Call
(See Chart “4”).
Page 61
911 Calls per Hour
$200.00
$100.00
45.00
40.00
$250.00
35.00
30.00
$150.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
$50.00
5.00
-
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center
Residents per PSAP FTE. The fluctuation between PSAPs size groups
and individual PSAPs is significant. The data indicates that a PSAP with a
higher ratio of residents being served per PSAP FTE is more cost efficient
$0.00
TRI County Comm+
Toledo Police Department+
Lincoln City PD+
*Morrow County Sheriff+
*Wallowa County Sheriff+
Milton-Freewater Comm+
Harney County Sheriff+
*John Day Comm Center+
Hood River County District+
*Curry County Sheriff
Brookings PD
Baker County+
*Tillamook County District+
Prineville 9-1-1+
Ontario 9-1-1
Wasco County 9-1-1
Jefferson County Sheriff+
Columbia 9-1-1 Comm District+
Lincoln County Comm Agency+
Union County Comm+
Umatilla County Sheriff+
Malheur County Sheriff
*Hermiston PD
Astoria 9-1-1
Deschutes County District+
Emerg. Comm S. Ore (Jackson)+
Corvallis Regional Comm+
Newberg-Dundee Comm
Klamath Comm District+
N. Marion County Comm (NORCOM)
Yamhill County Comm+
Willamette Valley Comm (Salem)
Douglas County
Bureau of Emerg. Comm (Portland)+
Washington County Comm+
Lake Oswego Communications
Clackamas County+
Chart 4 – Residents per PSAP FTE
Residents per PSAP FTE
$300.00
Gross Cost per resident

Gross Cost per 911 Call
$200.00
$100.00
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center
Annual 911 calls per PSAP FTE. The fluctuation between PSAPs size
groups and individual PSAPs is significant. The data indicates that a
PSAP with a higher ratio of annual calls per PSAP FTE is more cost
efficient (See Chart “5”).
Page 62
9,000
$250.00
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
$150.00
4,000
3,000
$50.00
2,000
1,000
-
$300.00
$0.00
TRI County Comm+
Toledo Police Department+
Harney County Sheriff+
*Wallowa County Sheriff+
*John Day Comm Center+
Milton-Freewater Comm+
*Morrow County Sheriff+
Ontario 9-1-1
*Curry County Sheriff
Hood River County District+
Lincoln City PD+
Brookings PD
Baker County+
Union County Comm+
Malheur County Sheriff
Prineville 9-1-1+
Wasco County 9-1-1
Columbia 9-1-1 Comm District+
*Hermiston PD
Corvallis Regional Comm+
Deschutes County District+
Jefferson County Sheriff+
Lake Oswego Communications
Umatilla County Sheriff+
Washington County Comm+
*Tillamook County District+
N. Marion County Comm (NORCOM)
Newberg-Dundee Comm
Astoria 9-1-1
Yamhill County Comm+
Emerg. Comm S. Ore (Jackson)+
Lincoln County Comm Agency+
Douglas County
Willamette Valley Comm (Salem)
Clackamas County+
Bureau of Emerg. Comm (Portland)+
Klamath Comm District+
Chart 5 – Annual 911 Calls per PSAP FTE
Annual 911 Calls per PSAP FTE
Gross Cost per resident
Gross Cost per 911 Call
Page 63
Annual 911 Calls per PSAP FTE
$250.00
$50.00
911 calls per hour is an indicator of cost efficiency, these PSAPs also have a
3,500
3,000
$200.00
2,500
2,000
$150.00
1,500
$100.00
1,000
500
-
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center
The analysis of the data does show that the medium and large PSAPs have
significantly less cost than the small PSAP group. Further analysis indicates that
PSAPs that have a higher hourly volume of 911 calls per hour, a higher ratio of
residents per PSAP FTE, and have more 911 calls received per PSAP FTE have the
lowest cost per PSAP resident. Although data suggests that having a higher volume of
significantly higher ratio of residents per PSAP FTE (See Chart “6”) and this factor is a
more likely predictor of cost efficiency.
Chart 6 – Residents per PSAP FTE and 911 Hourly Call Volume
911 Call Hourly Call Volume & Residents Per PSAP FTE
9,000
Residents per PSAP FTE
911 Calls per Hour
45.00
40.00
7,000
35.00
6,000
30.00
5,000
25.00
4,000
20.00
3,000
15.00
2,000
10.00
1,000
5.00
-
Harney County Sheriff+
Toledo Police Department+
*Wallowa County Sheriff+
*John Day Comm Center+
TRI County Comm+
Milton-Freewater Comm+
Ontario 9-1-1
*Morrow County Sheriff+
*Curry County Sheriff
Malheur County Sheriff
Brookings PD
Baker County+
Lincoln City PD+
Union County Comm+
Prineville 9-1-1+
Jefferson County Sheriff+
*Hermiston PD
Hood River County District+
Wasco County 9-1-1
Astoria 9-1-1
Newberg-Dundee Comm
*Tillamook County District+
Lake Oswego Communications
Columbia 9-1-1 Comm District+
Corvallis Regional Comm+
Umatilla County Sheriff+
N. Marion County Comm (NORCOM)
Lincoln County Comm Agency+
Yamhill County Comm+
Douglas County
Klamath Comm District+
Deschutes County District+
Emerg. Comm S. Ore (Jackson)+
Clackamas County+
Washington County Comm+
Willamette Valley Comm (Salem)
Bureau of Emerg. Comm (Portland)+
8,000
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center
Medium and large PSAPs are able to take advantage of economies of scale by
having a higher number of residents being served per PSAP FTE. This higher ratio of
residents served per FTE is a compelling factor that appears to translate into lower
costs per resident and lower costs per 911 call received. Jurisdictions with higher rates
of 911 calls per resident will likely need to have higher staffing ratios, but queuing theory
calculations are available to fine tune staffing desirability.
Page 64
-
These savings can be achieved by increasing the population each PSAPs serves
by consolidating small and medium PSAPs into regional 911 centers. Increasing the
population size of PSAPs through consolidation should allow these new agencies to
decrease cost to residents.
Improvement of service levels can also be achieved by consolidating to a
population size group that would necessitate a consolidated PSAP having at least two
telecommunicators working during non-peak call hours. Having minimal staffing of two
telecommunicators 24/7 would be an improvement in service levels to small and
medium sized PSAPs. In reviewing the data and using a “manning ratio” (see section 4)
of 4.98, an organization needs 4.98 FTEs to staff one position 24/7. Therefore, a PSAP
would need a total FTE greater than 10.0 to have the ability to staff two positions 24/7.
Of the 37 PSAPs, 43% have a total less than 10.0 FTEs. Therefore are not likely
to have two telecommuncators on duty 24/7. As mentioned earlier, the low call volume
of small PSAP does not justify more than one telecommunicator, but this puts the
residents of a PSAP at risk when multiple critical incidents occur. A better service
model is a PSAP that is “right-sized”, which can take advantage of economies of scale
and provide a higher level of service during multiple incidents.
Page 65
Section V: Recommendation
The primary responsibility of government is Public Safety, and one of the most
significant components of that responsibility is communication. This 911 center
is the public’s lifeline for assistance. – Mayor Ron Payne, Owensboro, Kentucky
(9-1-1 Magazine, 2010).
The public test is very simple. Ask your friends, coworkers, neighbors or
strangers at the coffee shop if they care what 911 center answers their call for
help, which police department shows up when they dial 911, which court handles
the parking tickets online, or who is managing the emergency medical response
team that comes to your kids’ soccer game to attend to a broken leg or
unexpected seizure. - M. Scott Sotebeer (Sotebeer, 2012).
The thing people have to get out of their minds is county and jurisdictional lines.
It’s not the technical hurdles; it’s the hurdles we’ve created for ourselves, those
invisible county lines. - Sheriff John Haukos, Big Stone County (MN) (Freedom
Foundation of Minnesota, 2010).
This section sets forth a data-driven decision making process that can assist
jurisdictions in assessing whether consolidations are a viable budgetary strategy. The
section seeks to answer three questions: What is the “right-sized” PASP? What is the
minimally-sized PSPA? And, What are the key financial elements that need to be
included in making a consolidation decision?
“Right-Sized” PSAP Characteristics
Research indicates that small sized PSAPs are more costly to operate than
medium and large sized PSAPs. Small PSAP are unable to take advantage of
economies of scale. Research indicates that the ten PSAPs that have the lowest cost
per resident, have an average a resident to PSAP FTE ratio of 5,273 (see Table “U”).
To be able to achieve the efficiency of these PSAPs, higher resident to FTE ratio
necessitates combining PSAPs into regional 911 centers.
Page 66
Table U – PSAP with the Lowest Cost per Resident and Resident to PSAP FTE Ratio
County
PSAP Name
Douglas
Clackamas
Umatilla
Marion
Marion
Clackamas
Washington
Klamath
Multnomah
Malheur
Douglas County
Clackamas County
Hermiston PD
Willamette Valley Comm (Salem)
N. Marion County Comm (NORCOM)
Lake Oswego Communications
Washington County Comm
Klamath Comm District
Bureau of Emerg. Comm (Portland)
Malheur County Sheriff
AVERAGE
Gross
Cost per
Resident
Resident
per PSAP
FTE
$14.41
$14.57
$19.66
$19.88
$20.39
$21.10
$21.25
$21.56
$21.89
$22.76
$19.75
5,673
8,279
3,333
5,500
4,353
6,337
5,992
4,295
5,734
3,237
5,273
Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center
PSAPs using the recommended resident to PSAP FTE ratio (5,273) in
considering consolidation scenarios, should also consider sizing the potential merger to
a population size that achieves a service level enhancement. If consolidated PSAPs
can achieve a population base that can justify a minimum staffing level of two
telecommunicators, service levels will be improved. This level of staffing enables a
PSAP center to handle multiple incidents during non-peak hours.
Using a “manning ratio” of 4.98 (total FTEs needed to cover a position 24/7/365)
a PSAP would need a minimum staffing level of 10.0 FTEs. Taking into account that
staffing needs fluctuate between different hours of the day, it is important for efficiency
to increase the population that can justify 10.0 FTEs even during the slowest shift. The
NENA PSAP Staffing Guidelines (2003) indicates that a “normal call volume” can be
assumed for two of three (eight hour) shifts (p. 27). This report calculated staffing
requirements on 54 different PSAPs using a queuing theory calculation (Erlang B
formula). Of the 54 PSAPs, 32 required a staffing level of two during normal call
Page 67
volume. The guidelines indicate that the third shift should be staffed to handle the “peak
call volumes.” None of the 32 PSAPs that required a staffing level of two during normal
call volume required a peak call volume staffing greater than three (National Emergency
Number Association (NENA), 2003, pp. 27-29).
Using the “manning ratio” of 4.98 and an “average servers” of 2.33 (two shifts of
2.0 and one shift of 3.0) the PSAP Staffing Guidelines indicate that a total
telecommunicator staff size should be 11.6 FTE. Rounding this up to 12, plus adding
one additional FTE to serve as a Director brings the total FTE to 13.
Recommended Minimally Sized “Right-Sized” PSAP
Based on the recommended resident to PSAP ratio and the recommended
minimum sized PSAP staff, the smallest PSAP that can take advantage of some
economies of scale and improve service levels during non-peak hours is 68,549 (5,273
times 13). Using the data from the PSAP call volume, financial reports, and NENA
PSAP Staffing Guidelines, it is possible to calculate the volume, workload, and
equipment needs of a PSAP with a population of 68,549 and staff size of 13.0 FTEs.
The proposed PSAP of nearly 70,000 would be considered by NENA guidelines
as a medium sized PSAP. Using the average 911 calls per residents for medium sized
PSAPs, the PSAP would receive 30,161 calls per year (.44 times 68,549). The annual
number of 911 calls received per FTE would be 2,320. The average hourly 911 call
volume would be 3.44.
The proposed PSAP would be most similar to Klamath County Communications
that serves 66,000 residents, has 15.5 FTES, and receives 47,557 calls per year. The
Page 68
annual number of 911 calls received per FTE is 3,068. The average hourly 911 call
volume is 5.43.
In the NENA guidelines, the report completed queuing calculations on 54 PSAPs
to recommend staffing requirements. Of the PSAPs that also provided population data,
eight were of similar size to the proposed PSAP. The average staffing requirements
was 12.44 FTEs (See Table “V”), which is very similar to the proposed PSAP staffing of
12.0 FTEs.
Table V – Similar Sized PSAP – Queuing Calculation Staffing Requirements
Source Data
PSAP Code
Agency B27
Agency B29
Agency B30
Agency B31
Agency B32
Agency B34
Agency B35
Agency B36
Average
State
PA
IL
TX
IN
PA
MI
LA
NC
Population
62,000
68,277
73,334
75,000
75,259
80,000
89,974
94,536
77,298
Queuing Calculations
Telecomm.
Average Manning
Required
Servers
Ratio
(FTE)
2.33
4.89
11.42
2.33
4.89
11.42
2.33
4.89
11.42
2.00
4.89
9.79
2.33
4.89
11.42
3.33
4.89
16.31
2.33
4.89
11.42
3.33
4.89
16.31
2.54
4.89
12.44
Source: NENA PSAP Staffing Guidelines (2003), Pgs. 33-35 and 41-42
Recommended Financial Template
To assist jurisdictions contemplating consolidation, a template has been
developed (Appendix “8”). This template can assist jurisdictions in estimating costs of a
consolidation scenario. The template also calculates staffing solely based on
population.
The template allows jurisdictions to begin the discussions of the value of
consolidating with only three data entries (911 tax revenue, population, and call volume)
for each jurisdiction. The user will need to decide how to split the FTEs between
Page 69
telecommunicators, supervisors, director(s), clerical, and IT/network positions. The
template has predetermined costs of these five positions; however, the user can
customize these settings. The user will need to estimate the costs of materials and
services. The template instructions suggest this figure should be in the range of
$60,000 and $100,000 per consolidated PSAP. The template has predetermined
projected increases of one percent growth in 911 tax revenue, six percent (6%) growth
in personnel costs, and two and one half percent (2.5%) growth in materials and
services; however, the user can customize these settings.
Although research indicates a minimally “right-sized” PSAP should be above the
population of 68,549, instructions will list an alternative smaller sized PSAP, based upon
20-hours of two telecommunicators on duty with a 4-hour gap with one
telecommunicator on duty. The likely time this would occur would be from 2:30 A.M. to
6:30 A.M. This could be accomplished with combining eight-hour and ten-hour shifts.
In this scenario, the staffing need for telecommunicators would be 9.12 FTE (manning
ratio of 4.98 times agency servers of 1.83). In this smaller organization, the director’s
position could fill in shifts for the equivalent of 0.12 FTE (equal to 4.8 hours per week);
thereby the organization would only need to be 10.0 FTE. This smaller consolidated
PSAP could handle a population size of 52,730 (10 FTEs times 5,273), but would lack
of double coverage 24/7.
Conclusion
Historically 911 centers were built and operated by single agencies for their own
users. These organizations were designed to meet technology constraints of the 1980s
and have led to inefficient use of scarce resources and higher costs with little
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opportunity to benefit from economies of scale. Consolidation allows for the elimination
of duplicate equipment, supports coordinated regional responses, and leads to more
effective and efficient service.
The legislature has expressed concern over lack of action from OEM and PSAPs
to consolidate operations voluntarily. The most recent budget note requests OEM to
develop a plan implementing the NG911upgrades and include a “detailed component to
consolidate the state’s Public Safety Answering Points” based upon the 2012 Kimball
report (Oregon State Legislature, 2012, pp. 28-29). Research indicates that regional
centers having a population size of at least 69,000 can increase cost efficiency and
provide a higher level of service than standalone centers, which put the citizens at risk
when multiple incidents occur.
In conducting this research it is clear from the history of 911 in Oregon and the
emerging technology that is now available, that the 2013 legislative session is likely to
become a watershed year for 911. The 911 tax is set to sunset and it is estimated that
sixty percent of new cellphone plans will evade this tax unless the legislature closes this
loophole. The legislature has received a 911 consolidation and NG911 upgrade report
that would bring new technology to 911 centers, which would allow citizens to text, send
pictures, and even stream video in reporting emergency situations. This study
estimates the state would save $31 million over a ten-year period if 911 centers
consolidated into nine regions.
Consolidation is a complex, multi-dimensional issue that represents a cultural
change for employees and organizational leaders that have complete control of 911
services in their communities. This project only addresses the first step in the
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consolidation process. It is intended to allow jurisdictions to compare the status quo of
stand-alone 911 centers to a consolidated regional system. Organizations will need to
be convinced that loss of control is offset by the benefits realized in joining a
consolidated regional system. The potential political and organization resistance will
need to be addressed in consolidation steps beyond the financial evaluation
recommended.
The data-driven approach to this project offers the opportunity for jurisdictions to
review consolidation scenarios and the advantages that it offers. A likely outcome of
the 2013 legislative session is the instigation of the first steps in forced consolidations.
These steps could range from specific mandates to reduced funding for small standalone centers. This project allows jurisdictions to review multiple scenarios that could
be advantageous in promoting an alternative regional approach suggested by Kimball.
The estimated savings of $31 million of a regional system is not likely to be
ignored by the legislature. Jurisdictions that voluntarily initiate consolidation efforts
might be able to convince the state legislature to fund some consolidation costs or
initiate some type of pilot project funding that would not be available for jurisdictions that
wait for state mandates.
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Public Safety Consolidation.
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COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF 911 AND ENHANCED 911 FEES AND
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Federal Communications Commission. (2010). REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STATE
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Attachment “A” – Oregon Map of PSAPs
Source: OEM
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Appendix 2 – OEM FY 2010-11 Budget Report
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Appendix 3 – County Population – July 1, 2011
County
July 1, 2011
Population Estimate
BAKER
16,215
BENTON
85,995
CLACKAMAS
378,480
CLATSOP
37,145
COLUMBIA
49,625
COOS
62,960
CROOK
20,855
CURRY
22,335
DESCHUTES
158,875
DOUGLAS
107,795
GILLIAM
1,880
GRANT
7,450
HARNEY
7,375
HOOD RIVER
22,625
JACKSON
203,950
JEFFERSON
21,845
JOSEPHINE
82,820
KLAMATH
66,580
LAKE
7,885
LANE
353,155
LINCOLN
46,155
LINN
117,340
MALHEUR
31,445
MARION
318,150
MORROW
11,270
MULTNOMAH
741,925
POLK
75,965
SHERMAN
1,765
TILLAMOOK
25,255
UMATILLA
76,580
UNION
25,980
WALLOWA
6,995
WASCO
25,300
WASHINGTON
536,370
WHEELER
1,435
YAMHILL
99,850
SOURCE: PSU – Population Research Center
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Appendix 4 – City Population – July 1, 2011
Source: PSU – Population Research Center
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Appendix 5 - Populations for Incorporated Cities Located in More than One County - July 1,
2011
City and Counties
Albany
Population
50,520
in Benton
in Linn
Lake Oswego
6,698
43,822
36,725
in Clackamas
in Multnomah
in Washington
Portland
34,165
2,551
9
585,845
in Clackamas
in Multnomah
in Washington
747
583,546
1,552
Source: PSU – Population Research Center
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Appendix 6 – OEM FY 2010-12 DATA SET (37 PSAPs)
(PDF version is included)
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Appendix 7 – 2012 Kimball Report Recommended Regions
Source: Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1 Implementation Study (Oregon), LR Kimball,
2012, Page 41
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Appendix 8 – Financial Template for PSAP Consolidation Scenarios
(MS Excel file attached)
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