The Use of Force
• Why do we use force?
• What can you do with force?
• Answer: attain political goals
The Functions of Force
1.
2.
3.
4.
Defense
Deterrence
Compellence (coercive diplomacy)
Swaggering
Based in part on:
Sources
• Thomas Schelling. Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960).
• Thomas Schelling. Arms and Influence (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966).
• Alexander George, David Hall, William Simons. The
Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1971).
• Robert Art. To What Ends Military Power?
International Security
Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring, 1980), pp. 3-35.
• Herman Kahn. On Escalation (NY: Penguin, 1965).
1. Defense
Defense at its most complex
Defense at its most basic
2. Deterrence
• Goal: To prevent action
• Method: Threat
• Aimed at influencing an
opponent’s decision making
• Assumption: rationality
Rational Choice
Cost Benefit Analysis
Options
A
Costs
?
Benefits
?
B
?
?
C
?
?
Threat: increases perception of costs
Types of Deterrence
Deterrence by
Punishment
Deterrence by
Denial
Communication
Europe during the Cold
War
China and Taiwan
Credibility and Reputation
• Capability
• Will
• A bluff?
Extended Deterrence
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Europe
Japan
S. Korea
Israel
Taiwan
Australia
New Zealand
What to Threaten?
Irrationality?
Saddam Hussein
Kim Jong-un
• If deterrence fails….
3. Compellence
(coercive diplomacy)
• Goal: To change opponent
behavior
• To stop an opponent from doing
something they are doing
• To get an opponent to do
something they are not doing
Basic Elements
1.
2.
3.
4.
Brute force won’t work
Assumes rationality
War is bargaining
The power to hurt allows you to
enter the bargaining
1. Brute force won’t work
2. Assumes Rationality
Cost Benefit Analysis
Options
A
Costs
?
Benefits
?
B
?
?
C
?
?
3. War is Bargaining
4. Entering the Bargaining?
• The power to hurt
• Capability
• Intentions
Some Lessons
1. Shadow of the Future
2. It doesn’t always work
3. Commitment
4. Credibility
5. Democracies and Compellence
6. Balance of Commitment
7. Non-state Actors
8. Civilians
9. Uncertainty and Risk
10.Domestic Politics
11.Irrationality?
1. Shadow of the Future
• What coerces?
• The promise of future violence
2. It doesn’t always work
Compellence Success
• Cuban Missile Crisis
Compellence Failure
• F-105s over Vietnam
3. Commitment
• Berlin Airlift 1948
4. Credibility
A. Continue the pain
Credibility
B. Interdependence of credibility
and commitment
• Reputation
• Was Vietnam about Europe?
• “Doctrine of Credibility”
5. Democracies
• Poor at compellence?
• Vulnerable?
6. Balance of Commitment
Vietnam War
Balance of Commitment
Ukraine
7. Non-State Actors
• Two Eras
A. Cold War
• Insurgencies and Marxist ethnonationalist terrorists
• Vietcong
• Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
Non-State Actors
B. Post-Cold War:
• Network organizations living off
of globalization
• Not state sponsored
•
•
•
•
AQAM
Boko Haram
ISIL
Al-Shabab
8. Civilians
Dresden, Feb 1945
World Trade Center
9. Uncertainty and Risk
•Competition in risk
taking
•Brinkmanship
•“The Threat That
Leaves Something
to Chance”
• Escalation
• Herman Kahn
10. Domestic Politics and Compellence
The Politics of the Target
Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani
Iranian Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei
Dilemmas
• Irratioality
• Perceiving message
• Can the opponent do what you ask?
4. Swaggering
• The Great White Fleet 12/07-2/09